Term Paper in Legal Research

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 7

Term Paper in

Legal
Research

Jael-Claudine B. Soriano

59
Sheryl, Eric's counsel, once asked for postponement and the court granted it since the
opposing counsel, Bernadine, did not object. Eric then asked Sheryl not to allow any
further postponements because his case has been pending for 8 years. When trial
resumed, Bernadine moved to reset the trial because of her infant's ailment. What must
Sheryl do?

Introduction
Supreme Court reiterated the old legal maxim, that justice delayed is justice
denied and oftentimes, this maxim has proven to be true in the Philippine justice
system. However, lawyers are not the only ones who are guilty of these delaying
tactics, court dockets are often clogged and different legal issues often crop up that
need extra time to be decided upon. As secured by constitutional guaranties, a speedy
trial means a trial conducted according to fixed rules, regulations, and proceedings of
law, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays manufactured by the
ministers of justice. This often repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of
disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is constitutionally
guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. Our laws do have safeguards to ensure the
prompt and speedy action on all types of legal actions and cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution declares that:


All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

True, indeed, the 1987 Constitution provides the right not only to a speedy trial
but also to a speedy judgment after trial. Hence, the Constitution mandates dispatch
not only in the trial stage but also in the disposition thereof, warranting dismissals in
case of violations thereof without the fault of the party concerned, not just the accused.
The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and

administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial


hearings.
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case
against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the
administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in
the trial of criminal cases. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant
has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed,
and such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendants assertion
or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are
considered.
The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative
term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. Hence, base from my research,
Jurisprudence has set forth the following guidelines:
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, Four (4) factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right;
and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or
justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different
reasons or justifications invoked by the State. (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312-313).

Relative thereto, the Supreme Court has clarified that in determining the
right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A
mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA
55) the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy trial and speedy
disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations
in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat,
resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers
of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert
such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.
In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 408 Phil. 767 (2001), the
complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy
disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional
guarantee.
According to Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman, inordinate delay in resolving a
criminal complaint, being violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process
and to the speedy disposition of cases, warrants the dismissal of the criminal case.
In Cadalin

v.

Philippine

Overseas

Employment

Administrations

Administrator,(G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721), the Court,
considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties lawyers,
held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.
Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied
consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the
case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter was
discussed during the initial hearing. Petitioners conformity thereto can be deduced from
his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the

evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His
failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the cases be tried separately is
fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except
only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice.In fact, petitioners
acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial
presentation of the Peoples evidence in the five BW cases.
In the case of Tan vs. People, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and
the petitioners failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled
the death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, in failing
to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the preliminary
hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, and petitioner was
deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto. For the reasons abovestated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of
violating petitioners right to speedy trial (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21,
2009, 3rd Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
The right of an accused to speedy trial is not violated by the mere postponement
of scheduled hearings of the case. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for
an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
The right to speedy trial allows reasonable continuance so as not to deprive the
prosecution its day in court.
In the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been
violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. These are
length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be considered in answering
judicial inquiry whether or not a person officially charged with the administration of
justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases guarantee.

Considering the jurisprudence laid down by the previous cases mentioned,


Sheryl, as Erics counsel should explain to Eric that a motion for postponement is a
privilege and not a right. Bernadines move for postponement should not assume beforehand

that her motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is a
matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and that she shall
respect whatever the decisions of the court may be. However, Sheryl shall take note of
the period set forth in R. A. 8493 for the Speedy Trial and/or Resolution of cases, and
shall see to it that only the allowable periods of delay as provided in Section 10 thereof
be excluded from computing the time within which trial must commence. Toward this
end, Sheryl shall insist on the strict adherence to the period set forth in the law and shall
be ready to move for the dismissal of the case, where there is delay or violation of the
afforested periods.
1

1. 1 Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution


2. (Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162214, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 294, 312313).
3. In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan, (G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55)
4. Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 408 Phil. 767 (2001)
5. Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations Administrator,(G.R. No.
104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721)
6. (TAN vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009, 3rd Division, Chico-Nazario, J.).
7. Nelson Imperial, et al. vs. Maricel M. Joson, et al G.R. No. 160067
8. Santos O. Francisco vs. Spouses Gerard and Maricel Joson Nelson G.R. Mo. 170410
9. Imperial, et al. vs. Hilarion C. Felix, et al.,G.R. No. 171622, November 17, 2010.
10. MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 003 Series of 2008
11. Section 1 (h), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Procedure
12. Angchonco, Jr. v. Ombudsman

You might also like