Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No.

L-25554, October 4, 1966

Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress ofthe Philippines seeking to
permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of
the House of Representativesbefore December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the
preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being
that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term
of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December30,1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who
approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional
provision refers to all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation
between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for
the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the
members of the Senate and the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of
office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensationprovided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.
Jocelyn H. Baylon 1
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974 BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, Petitioner, vs. ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the
Philippines, Respondents.
, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year
terms covering a twelve- titutional officials
and certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members of Congress from P7, 200 to P32,000. The Act expressly
provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provis -year term, he
was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Courts unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay:
"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate
and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article
Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which
e sum of P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his
ess Auditor did not sign the
warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman
warrant and its supporting
papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-
eview appealing the decision of the Auditor-General
alleging that at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess as provided by law was already P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his
retirement gratuity based on that salary increase.
ISSUE/S:

HELD:
The petition was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi:
There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act 186, secrtion 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is whether
or not he can claim in based on the P32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant reti rement gratuity to members of
Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by
the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed. Section 14, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution provides that: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Party-list Representatives:
AMORES v HRET
GR 189600, 6/29/2010

SUMMARY:
Petition to declare Villanueva as ineligible to hold office as representative of CIBAC for being overage to represent youth. Change of affiliation must be made
six months before elections. Youth sector is represented by 25 30.

FACTS:

5/14/2009: Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of office of one Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as representative of CIBAC in the HoR.
Petitioner argues:
o Villanueva was 31 at the time of filing of nomination, beyond the age limit of 30 which was the limit imposed by RA 7941 for "youth sector".
o Villanueva's change of affiliation from Youth Sector to OFW and families not affected six months prior to elections.
Respondent argues:
o RA 7941 requirement for "age" for youth sector representative only applicable to first three elections after the party list act.
o There was no resultant change in affiliation.

ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva

RULING:
Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC

HELD:
Villanueva's arguments are invalid. The law is clear. If representative of youth sector, should be between 25 to 30.
Villanueva is ineligible to also represent OFW. Sectoral representation should be changed SIX MONTHS prior to elections.

Martinez vs. Morfe
FACTS:
Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista were Constitutional Convention delegates. Both Martinez and Bautista are facing criminal prosecutions. In
view thereof, they would like to invoke their alleged right to immunity of arrest. Their alleged right was based on the Constitutional Convention Act, wherein,
delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative.
The Solicitor-General, on behalf of the judges, disputed that the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity does not cover criminal cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal cases are included in immunity from arrest.
HELD:
Petition DISMISSED.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is granted by the Constitution was understood in the same sense it has in
American law, there being a similar provision in the American Constitution. Its authoritative interpretation in the United States was supplied by the
Williamson case, a 1908 decision.
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the peace," as used in the
constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, ... " He traced its historical background thus: "A brief
consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege in England will, we think, show the source whence the expression "treason felony, and breach of the
peace" was drawn, and leave no doubt that the words were used in England for the very purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation of the
parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a civil nature." Story's treatise on the Constitution was likewise
cited, his view on the matter being quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the peace, the phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend
to all indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact attended with force and violence, as those which are only constructive breaches of the peace of the
government, inasmuch as they violate its good order."
As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick and Willoughby could use practically identical appraising such immunity, the former stating
that it "is not now of great importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the person is now almost never authorized except for
crimes which fall within the classes exempt from the priviledge." The state of the American law on this point is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By common
parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before
and after, to enable them to go to and return from the same." A prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should
be Philippine law, if deference were to be paid to what was explicitly agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them.
When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is
likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need for any transgression
of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in
seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after
legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the
rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would main
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS (2000)
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the
first instance of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. With his
function, they expect him to make their voices heard. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
HELD:
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, free person expects to achieve the continuity of government
and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did
so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic
illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve
his full term in office.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class
We are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the
police power of the State.
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966
Facts: Defendant Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. He wrote an
open letter to the President dated November 14, 1958 which caused said to letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in Philippines.
This exposed the allegedly operational plans of AFP officers of a massive political build-up of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, to prepare him
in becoming a Presidential candidate in 1961.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication
Held: The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the publication falls within the purview of the phrase speech or debate in Congress as used
in Art. VI, Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11). Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in
session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. It was an open letter to the President, when Congress presumably was not in session,
and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. In causing the communication to be so published, he was not
performing his official duty, either as a member of the Congress or as officer of any committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.