Propensity probability

The propensity theory of probability is one interpre-

tation of the concept of probability. Theorists who
adopt this interpretation think of probability as a phys-
ical propensity, or disposition, or tendency of a given
type of physical situation to yield an outcome of a cer-
tain kind, or to yield a long run relative frequency of such
an outcome.
[1]
Propensities are not relative frequencies, but purported
causes of the observed stable relative frequencies.
Propensities are invoked to explain why repeating a cer-
tain kind of experiment will generate a given outcome
type at a persistent rate. A central aspect of this expla-
nation is the law of large numbers. This law, which is a
consequence of the axioms of probability, says that if (for
example) a coin is tossed repeatedly many times, in such
a way that its probability of landing heads is the same on
each toss, and the outcomes are probabilistically indepen-
dent, then the relative frequency of heads will (with high
probability) be close to the probability of heads on each
single toss. This law suggests that stable long-run fre-
quencies are a manifestation of invariant single-case prob-
abilities. Frequentists are unable to take this approach,
since relative frequencies do not exist for single tosses of
a coin, but only for large ensembles or collectives. Hence,
these single-case probabilities are known as propensities
or chances.
In addition to explaining the emergence of stable relative
frequencies, the idea of propensity is motivated by the de-
sire to make sense of single-case probability attributions
in quantum mechanics, such as the probability of decay
of a particular atom at a particular time.
The main challenge facing propensity theories is to say
exactly what propensity means. And then, of course,
to show that propensity thus dened has the required
properties. At present, unfortunately, none of the well-
recognised accounts of propensity comes close to meet-
ing this challenge.
1 History
A propensity theory of probability was given by Charles
Sanders Peirce.
[2][3][4][5]
1.1 Karl Popper
A later propensity theory was proposed by philosopher
Karl Popper, who had only slight acquaintance with the
writings of Charles S. Peirce, however.
[2][3]
Popper noted
that the outcome of a physical experiment is produced
by a certain set of generating conditions. When we
repeat an experiment, as the saying goes, we really per-
form another experiment with a (more or less) similar set
of generating conditions. To say that a set of generat-
ing conditions has propensity p of producing the outcome
E means that those exact conditions, if repeated inde-
nitely, would produce an outcome sequence in which E
occurred with limiting relative frequency p. For Popper
then, a deterministic experiment would have propensity 0
or 1 for each outcome, since those generating conditions
would have same outcome on each trial. In other words,
non-trivial propensities (those that dier from 0 and 1)
only exist for genuinely indeterministic experiments.
Poppers propensities, while they are not relative frequen-
cies, are yet dened in terms of relative frequency. As a
result, they face many of the serious problems that plague
frequency theories. First, propensities cannot be empir-
ically ascertained, on this account, since the limit of a
sequence is a tail event, and is thus independent of its -
nite initial segments. Seeing a coin land heads every time
for the rst million tosses, for example, tells one nothing
about the limiting proportion of heads on Poppers view.
Moreover, the use of relative frequency to dene propen-
sity assumes the existence of stable relative frequencies,
so one cannot then use propensity to explain the existence
of stable relative frequencies, via the Law of large num-
bers.
1.2 Recent work
A number of other philosophers, including David Miller
and Donald A. Gillies, have proposed propensity theo-
ries somewhat similar to Poppers, in that propensities are
dened in terms of either long-run or innitely long-run
relative frequencies.
Other propensity theorists (e.g. Ronald Giere
[6]
) do not
explicitly dene propensities at all, but rather see propen-
sity as dened by the theoretical role it plays in science.
They argue, for example, that physical magnitudes such
as electrical charge cannot be explicitly dened either, in
terms of more basic things, but only in terms of what
they do (such as attracting and repelling other electrical
charges). In a similar way, propensity is whatever lls the
various roles that physical probability plays in science.
Other theories have been oered by D. H. Mellor,
[7]
and
Ian Hacking
[8]
1
2 5 EXTERNAL LINKS
1.2.1 Principal Principle of David Lewis
What roles does physical probability play in science?
What are its properties? One central property of chance
is that, when known, it constrains rational belief to take
the same numerical value. David Lewis called this
the Principal Principle,
[9]
a term that philosophers have
mostly adopted. For example, suppose you are certain
that a particular biased coin has propensity 0.32 to land
heads every time it is tossed. What is then the correct
price for a gamble that pays $1 if the coin lands heads,
and nothing otherwise? According to the Principal Prin-
ciple, the fair price is 32 cents.
2 See also
Bayesian probability
Frequentism
3 References
[1] 'Interpretations of Probability', Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy . Retrieved 23 December 2006.
[2] Miller, Richard W. (1975). Propensity: Popper or
Peirce?". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26
(2): 123132. doi:10.1093/bjps/26.2.123.
[3] Haack, Susan; Kolenda, Konstantin, Konstantin; Kolenda
(1977). Two Fallibilists in Search of the Truth. Pro-
ceedings of the Aristotelian Society 51 (Supplementary
Volumes): 63104. JSTOR 4106816.
[4] Burks, Arthur W. (1978). Chance, Cause and Reason: An
Inquiry into the Nature of Scientic Evidence. University
of Chicago Press. pp. 694 pages. ISBN 0-226-08087-0.
[5] Peirce, Charles Sanders and Burks, Arthur W., ed.
(1958), the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce
Volumes 7 and 8, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
MA, also Belknap Press (of Harvard University Press)
edition, vols. 7-8 bound together, 798 pages, online via
InteLex, reprinted in 1998 Thoemmes Continuum.
[6] Giere, R. (1973). Objective single case probabilities and
the foundations of statistics
[7] Mellor, D.: The Matter of Chance
[8] Hacking, I. 1965. Logic of Statistical Inference. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
[9] A Subjectivists Guide to Objective Chance, Philosophical
Papers of David Lewis, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1986, pp. 83132.
4 Bibliography
Peirce, Charles Sanders. the Collected Papers
of Charles Sanders Peirce, Arthur W. Burks ed.,
(1958), Volumes 7 and 8, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, also Belknap Press (of Harvard
University Press) edition, vols. 7-8 bound together,
798 pages, online via InteLex, reprinted in 1998
Thoemmes Continuum.
Burks, Arthur W. (1978), Chance, Cause and Rea-
son: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientic Evi-
dence, University of Chicago Press, 694 pages.
The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interaction-
ism. Popper, Karl and Eccles, Sir John. 1977, ISBN
0-415-05898-8
The Propensity Interpretation of the Calculus of
Probability and of the Quantum Theory. Popper,
Karl. In Observation and Interpretation. But-
tersworth Scientic Publications, Korner & Price
(eds.) 1957. pp 6570.
The Logic of Scientic Discovery. Popper, Karl.
Hutchinson, London. 1959
Quantum Mechanics without The Observer.
Popper, Karl. In Quantum Theory and Reality.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York.
Bunge, M. (ed.). 1967
Philosophical Theories of Probability. Gillies, Don-
ald. Routledge. 2000.
Objective Single-Case Probabilities and the Founda-
tions of Statistics. Giere, R. N, in Logic, Methodol-
ogy and Philosophy of Science IV, P. Suppes, et al.,
(eds.), New York: North-Holland. 1973
A Subjectivists Guide to Objective Chance. Lewis,
David. In Richard C. Jerey (ed.), Studies in Induc-
tive Logic and Probability, Vol. II. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of Berkeley Press, 263-293. Reprinted with
Postscripts in David Lewis (1986), Philosophical
Papers. Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
83-132
5 External links
Propensity probability at PhilPapers
3
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