Earnings Quality and Stock Returns

Konan Chan, Louis K. C. Chan, Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Josef Lakonishok

February 2004

Department of Finance, National Taiwan University, Taipei 106, Taiwan(K. Chan); Department of Finance, Col-
lege of Business, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, IL 61820 (L. Chan and Lakonishok);
Department of Finance, Goizueta Business School, Emory University, Atlanta GA 30322 (Jegadeesh), and NBER
(Lakonishok). We thank Theodore Sougiannis, Siew Hong Teoh, as well as participants at the American Finance
Association 2001 Meetings and the Berkeley Program in Finance Spring 2002 seminar for helpful comments and
suggestions.
Abstract
An exclusive focus on bottom-line income misses important information about the quality of earnings. Ac-
cruals (the difference between accounting earnings and cash ow) are reliably, negatively associated with
future stock returns. Earnings increases that are accompanied by high accruals, suggesting low-quality
earnings, are associated with poor future returns. We explore various hypotheses earnings manipulation,
extrapolative biases about future growth, and under-reaction to changes in business conditions to explain
accruals predictive power. Distinctions between the hypotheses are based on evidence from operating per-
formance, the behavior of individual accrual items, discretionary versus nondiscretionary components of
accruals, and special items. We check for robustness using within-industry comparisons, and data on U.K.
stocks.
Security analysts, rm managers, and investors all devote a great deal of attention to rms reported
earnings. Forecasts of earnings are widely disseminated in the nancial press, and revisions in analysts
forecasts are closely followed. Managers are keenly interested in maintaining growth in earnings because
their compensations are often tied to their rms prots. News that a rm has fallen short of earnings
expectations can immediately send its stock price plummeting; rms that beat expectations, on the other
hand, are handsomely rewarded by investors.
The focus on earnings is so intense that it has been suggested that the market xates on rms bottom
line income, to the exclusion of other indicators of operating performance. Such single-minded attention
fails to recognize that reported net income is the result of an extended accounting process with considerable
room for managerial discretion at every step. The perils of focusing exclusively on bottom-line earnings are
vividly highlighted by the recent spate of corporate accounting scandals. Given the heightened attention to
accounting income, managers have an incentive to be aggressive in applying accounting rules so as not to
disappoint investors and analysts. The Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) cites hundreds of cases
where managers have used accounting maneuvers to puff up their rms prots. Examples of high-prole
rms that have inated earnings for extended periods include Enron, Tyco International and Xerox.
As a result, there have been growing concerns about rms quality of earnings, or the extent to which
reported earnings reect operating fundamentals. In the context of stock prices, to the extent that the market
xates on reported income and does not take into account the quality of rms earnings, there may be
temporary deviations of prices away from their correct values. Put another way, measures of earnings
quality may have predictive power for future movements in stock prices.
This paper examines whether, and why, there is information in earnings quality for future stock returns.
We focus on one measure, accounting accruals, which has recently gained attention as a potentially important
indicator related to earnings quality, and which may be useful for equity valuation. Accruals represent
the difference between a rms accounting earnings and its underlying cash ow. Large positive accruals
indicate that earnings are much higher than cash ows. Earnings and cash owcan differ because accounting
conventions with respect to the timing and magnitude of revenues and expenses (the so-called revenue
recognition and matching principles) are not necessarily based on cash inows and outows. Some
1
revenues can be counted toward earnings in the current period, for example, even though they have not yet
been received in cash. Similarly, certain expenses (such as depreciation) are deducted from revenues even
though they entail no cash outlays.
Sloan (1996) nds that stocks with high accruals, signifying earnings are high relative to cash ows,
subsequently have lower returns and under-perform stocks with low accruals. One popular interpretation of
this evidence, which serves as the explanation by default, equates accruals with managerial book-keeping
mischief (see, for example, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000)). Academic evidence supporting the existence
of managerial manipulation of earnings is provided in Friedland (1994), Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser
(1999), and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b). As managers inate earnings above cash ows, accruals
rise. High accruals may reect, for example, increases in accounts receivable as managers record sales
prematurely, or decreases in current liabilities as managers understate liabilities such as warranty expenses.
Since investors xate on reported bottom-line income, they are temporarily fooled. This viewpoint has far-
reaching consequences. It suggests, for instance, that it may be necessary to limit managers discretion with
respect to accounting, since investors apparently cannot unravel the valuation effect of reported earnings in
a timely manner under current reporting standards.
Such an interpretation may be premature. There is some evidence that accounting accruals are above
average for rms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC (see Dechow et al. (1996)). However, there
is no documented evidence that managers deliberately manipulate earnings through accruals for rms with
high accruals in general. The level of accruals thus serves as a coarse measure of earnings manipulation. If
manipulation is not the culprit, reforms to limit managerial exibility may be counter-productive. Accord-
ingly, we also explore several other hypotheses about why accruals are associated with subsequent returns.
These hypotheses draw on the idea that the effect of accruals may stem from the same patterns of investor
behavior as other widely-documented regularities in stock returns, such as the book-to-market effect as well
as price and earnings momentum. Explanations for these phenomena have been developed in recent research
on behavioral nance (see Barberis and Thaler (2002), Hirshleifer (2001) for surveys of this literature).
In particular, accruals are driven by changes in working capital, which in turn tend to rise with sales. A
high level of accruals may thus be a reection of strong past growth in sales. Some evidence from studies
2
in psychology suggest that individuals extrapolate past trends from short histories too far into the future
(see the discussion in Shleifer (2000)). For example, managers of growing rms with high accruals may
be lulled into thinking that there is much stronger persistence in sales growth than is the case. They build
up inventories and other working capital items on the basis of inated expectations. Similarly, analysts and
investors tend to anchor too heavily on past growth in their forecasts and valuations (De Bondt and Thaler
(1990), La Porta (1996), La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok
(2003a)). As a result, the market pricing of rms with high accruals is built on an overoptimistic estimate of
future growth rates, so future returns are likely to turn out to be disappointing.
Another explanation is that the components of accruals contain information about operating performance
but the market reacts to this information slowly. The components of accruals, such as changes in inventories,
receivables, and payables are commonly used by security analysts as indicators of business conditions. A
rm that faces difculties in generating sales or is over-producing, will experience a build-up of inventories.
Similarly, poor sales or credit difculties may lead to a rise in payables. While rms with high accruals
are not necessarily falling into nancial distress, the components of accruals pick up early signs that sales
growth is slowing, even though the bottom-line earnings number remains healthy for the time being. There
is extensive evidence that the market responds with a delay, or underreacts, to the information in various ac-
counting numbers (see, for example, Bernard and Thomas (1989), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996),
Abarbanell and Bushee (1998), and Piotroski (2000)). Such a pattern of under-reaction may reect another
behavioral trait documented in the psychology literature, namely that individuals are too slow in updating
their beliefs when new evidence arrives (see Edwards (1968)). Accordingly an alternative hypothesis is that
there is a slow response to the information contained in accruals. In particular, accruals rise as a result of a
relative slowdown in business conditions, but initially the market does not fully respond to this signal. As a
result accruals lead the subsequent negative stock price reaction.
Our analysis of the predictive power of accruals for stock returns confronts these hypotheses earnings
manipulation, extrapolative biases concerning future growth, or under-reaction to business conditions. We
distinguish between these explanations along the following dimensions. First, we examine the operating
performance of rms with high and low accruals. Specically we check whether the timing of changes in
3
accruals coincides with the timing of changes in underlying protability, as proxied by indicators such as
sales turnover, or operating prot margin. Second, we examine the individual components of accruals (in-
cluding accounts receivable, inventories and accounts payable). Some items give managers more discretion
(for example, with regard to the timing of revenue recognition) so focusing on such items may highlight the
effects of manipulation. Hribar(2000) and Thomas and Zhang (2002), for instance, focus on the relation be-
tween inventory changes and future stock returns. Importantly, the predictions of the earnings management
and under-reaction hypotheses differ for some components of accruals. Under the conventional interpreta-
tion that accruals solely reect earnings manipulation, an increase in accounts payable is a favorable event
because it reduces accruals. However increases in payables, to the extent that they signal difculties in
meeting payments, should be unfavorable from the standpoint of the underreaction hypothesis. Third, we
decompose accruals into nondiscretionary and discretionary components and examine the information in
each component for returns. Our analysis differs from the earlier work in Jones (1991) and Xie (2001)
because our decomposition is based on sales growth. An increase in sales may, for instance, give rise to an
increase in inventories and accounts receivable, thereby raising the nondiscretionary component of accru-
als. If extrapolative biases are boosting investor valuations of rms with high accruals the nondiscretionary,
sales-related, accrual component should do well in predicting future returns. On the other hand, the manip-
ulation hypothesis and underreaction hypothesis suggest that only the discretionary component of accruals
that is unrelated to sales growth should predict future returns. Fourth, we focus on the behavior of special
items for rms with relatively high levels of accruals. Special items are intended to capture the impact of
unusual or nonrecurring events on a rms income statement (such as inventory writedowns). If managers
manipulate earnings, the effects of the manipulation will ultimately unwind, and it is likely that the correc-
tions are reported as special items in subsequent years (although nancial statements generally do not spell
out the nature of the transactions reported under special items). We thus track special items to pick up the
footprints of earnings manipulation in prior years.
Our robustness checks extend the available evidence in two new directions. First, we verify that accruals
predict returns within industries. Since working capital requirements differ across lines of business, the level
of accruals and hence their potential inuence vary across industries. The association between accruals and
4
returns is likely to be stronger in industries where non-cash working capital makes up a larger component
of rms assets. Second, all the extant literature examines the effect of accruals with U.S. data. This raises
the possibility that the association between accruals and returns is spurious, and arises from collective data-
snooping. To address this issue, we also use data from the United Kingdom. The U.K. stock market is the
second largest after the U.S. in terms of capitalization with accounting conventions that closely match those
in the U.S., but it has not been previously studied in this context.
These are our main ndings. Accruals are reliably, negatively related to future stock returns, as rst
documented by Sloan (1996). Firms with high current accruals experience a sudden, large increase in
accruals over the prior year, accompanied by a substantial deterioration in cash ows. The high accrual
years mark a turning point in the fortunes of these rms. Firms with large accruals exhibit high levels of
past earnings and sales growth. They continue to report growing earnings even as accruals are high and only
in the subsequent year do earnings show signs of deterioration. Accordingly, the time series behavior of
accruals and operating performance for rms with the largest accruals gives strong evidence that managers
are manipulating earnings, and the market is initially misled. Furthermore, in subsequent years, the amount
of income-decreasing special items relative to total assets is larger for the rms with high accruals.
We also nd that the non-discretionary component of accruals, constructed by extrapolating past trends
in sales growth and accruals, does not predict future returns. Xie (2001), using different methods, nds a
similar result. This evidence is not consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis.
The evidence on accruals predictive power is robust. Comparing homogeneous sets of rms within an
industry, higher accruals are associated with lower returns. Similar results also emerge from U.K. stocks. In
particular, we nd that in the U.K. accruals help predict returns, and that changes in inventory are by far the
most important component of accruals for predicting returns.
In a larger context beyond why accruals predict returns, our results reinforce the growing evidence that
the quality of earnings matters. When an increase in earnings is accompanied by high accruals, suggest-
ing low-quality earnings, subsequent stock returns are sub-par. Notably, in a two-way classication, the
marginal contribution of accruals in predicting returns exceeds the contribution of earnings surprises. The
joint importance of accruals and earnings surprises is also emphasized by Collins and Hribar (2000).
5
Two points deserve mention at the outset. First, even under the conventional notion that accruals repre-
sent opportunistic manipulation by managers, the effects of high and low accruals may not be symmetric.
Given the attention devoted by investors and the media to companies short-term earnings performance,
there are intense pressures to paint a rosy picture of a rms earnings prospects (see, for example, Chan,
Karceski and Lakonishok (2003b)). In comparison, the motives to lower current earnings and defer them
to the future are less compelling. Accordingly, traces of manipulation are more likely to be present when
accruals are high than when accruals are low. Secondly, the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. When
sales growth starts to slow, for example, managers may face mounting pressures to inate earnings in order
to meet analyst forecasts, thereby leading to an increase in accruals. These pressures may be stronger in-
sofar as investors and analysts maintain exaggerated expectations about future protability growth. At the
same time, inventory may start to accumulate as sales growth declines, and accounts receivable may rise
as competitive pressures force rms to extend better credit terms, so accruals increase. In short, any stark
distinctions between the hypotheses may be articial, so an eclectic interpretation may be more appropriate.
In their examination of the evidence, Thomas and Zhang (2002) arrive at a similar conclusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 outlines the connections, as well as differences,
between our work and related studies in the accounting research literature. This section also describes the
sample and helps to motivate the importance of earnings quality through a simple two-way classication.
Section 2 documents the accrual effect. Various hypotheses as to why accruals predict returns are explored
in section 3. The results from cross-sectional regressions are reported in section 4. Tests for robustness are
provided in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 Preliminaries
1.1 Related research
Financial researchers interest in accruals can be traced back to the extensive literature documenting the
predictability of the cross-section of returns based on rm protability measures. In particular, a large
number of papers uses earnings-price ratios (the ratio of net income to stock price) to explain the cross-
6
section of future returns (Basu (1977), Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991), Fama and French (1992)).
Net income is a noisy measure of operating performance, however. Managers have much leeway with
respect to the timing and measurement of revenues and expenses, so earnings can be manipulated. Further,
special items such as restructuring charges and write-offs can have large temporary effects on earnings.
Several papers use cash ow (earnings plus depreciation) relative to price as an improved measure of
protability. Compared to earnings, cash ow measures are in general less volatile and more difcult to
manipulate by managers. Moreover, there is no consensus in the investment industry as to the best measure
of cash ow, so even if managers had the capability, it is not clear what they would manipulate. Perhaps
for these reasons cash ow yield generally has stronger explanatory power for returns. For example, in
one-way sorts by earnings-price ratios, the extreme deciles of stocks have differences in annual returns of
about 3.9 percent over the subsequent year (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)). When sorted by cash
ow to price ratios, the return spreads are about 9.9 percent.
1
The upshot is that at least one component
of accruals, depreciation, adds information beyond net income. More generally, Rayburn (1986), Wilson
(1987), Bowen et al. (1987), Bernard and Stober (1989), Houge and Loughran (2000) nd that stock prices
respond to innovations in accruals (which include not only depreciation but also changes in other working
capital accounts) as well as innovations in operating cash ows.
Sloan (1996) documents an intriguing return anomaly associated with accruals. He nds that stocks
with large positive (income-increasing) accruals in a given year tend to have low returns in subsequent
years. These stocks have an average size-adjusted return of -5.5 percent in the following year. Collins and
Hribar (2000) conrm this nding with quarterly accruals. One interpretation of these results is that large
positive accruals are a symptom of earnings management, but investors do not realize this and are misled into
believing that future protability will stay high. Numerous researchers examine whether the mispricing can
be traced to the portion of accruals that reects opportunistic managerial behavior (discretionary accruals).
Jones (1991) develops a model to parse out the discretionary and nondiscretionary components of accruals.
Using this model, Subramanyam (1996) and Xie (2001) show that discretionary accruals predict returns,
but the nondiscretionary component does not. Thomas and Zhang (2002) examine the importance of the
1
In either case, only rms with positive earnings or cash ow are considered.
7
different components of working capital changes.
Some, but not all, of our results echo the ndings of these other studies. What is generally missing from
this earlier literature, however, is an evaluation of the economic reasons for the relation between accruals
and returns. In the absence of such an explanation, one cannot dismiss the charge that the effect of accruals
is a statistical uke which does not extend to other samples or other periods. In this respect, our tests to
discriminate between the underlying hypotheses are novel contributions. Other aspects of our analysis are
also new. We see what happens to the operating performance and special items of rms that have high
or low accruals, so as to get a sharper picture of whether managers are manipulating earnings to disguise
their sagging prospects. Similarly we generate new ways of measuring discretionary and non-discretionary
accruals. Some industries have larger working capital requirements than others, so the importance of ac-
cruals need not be uniform across industries. Our analysis at the level of industries hence yields potentially
more powerful tests of the relation between accruals and returns. We also provide original evidence from
the U.K., which is second in market size to the U.S. and affords high-quality accounting data. The various
working capital accounts can provide different information about returns that is masked when working with
total accruals. Accordingly, we estimate predictive regressions that allow the components of accruals to
have differential effects on returns. These let us develop trading strategies that improve on results reported
in the previous literature.
1.2 Sample and methodology
The sample comprises all rms listed on the New York (NYSE), American (AMEX) and Nasdaq markets
which are covered on both the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) le as well as the Compustat
les (current and research). We consider only domestic, primary stocks and exclude closed-end funds,
investment trusts, units and foreign companies. Following related accounting studies in this area, nancial
rms (with SIC codes 60006999) are dropped from the sample.
2
2
To mitigate return measurement problems with small, low-priced stocks we exclude any stock trading as of the portfolio
formation date at a price below $5 that falls in the bottom three deciles of market capitalization, based on NYSE breakpoints.
8
We follow Sloan (1996) and measure accruals as:
Accruals = CACL DEP
= (AR + INV + OCA) (AP + OCL) DEP. (1)
CA is the change in non-cash current assets, given by the change in current assets (Compustat annual
data item 4) less the change in cash (item 1). CL is the change in current liabilities excluding short-
term debt and taxes payable, given by the change in current liabilities (item 5) minus the change in debt
included in current liabilities (item 34) and minus the change in income taxes payable (item 71). DEP is
depreciation and amortization (data item 14). The components are further dened as AR the change in
accounts receivable (item 2); INV the change in inventories (item 3); OCA the change in other current
assets (item 68); AP the change in accounts payable (item 70); and OCL the change in other current
liabilities (item 72). As the magnitudes of all these items vary with the overall size of the rms balance
sheet, we follow the accounting literature and scale each item by average total assets (the average of total
assets, Compustat data item 6, at the beginning and end of the scal year).
3
Since we are interested in rms
operating performance we focus on protability before nancing costs and taxes. Our measure of earnings
is thus operating income after depreciation (before interest expense, taxes and special items), corresponding
to Compustat annual data item 178.
We measure all variables at the end of April each year from 1971 to 1995.
4
We assume that there is
a four-month delay between the end of a rms scal year and when the accounting information becomes
3
Accruals are measured under Sloans (1996) approach as changes in the working capital accounts from the balance sheet.
Firms that have undergone a merger/acquisition (or a divestiture) are thus more likely to be categorized as rms with high (or
low) accruals. Since the subsequent stock returns of rms involved in mergers and acquisitions tend to be below average, high
accruals may be associated with poor future returns on this account. To circumvent this problem, Collins and Hribar (2002) use an
alternative measure of accruals that is based on the statement of cash ows. Their alternative measure continues to predict returns,
and moreover yields a spread in returns that is larger than the spread based on the conventional approach. Since the measurement
issue is not likely to be the explanation for the accrual effect, we do not consider it in our analysis. Moreover, rms were generally
not required to disclose their cash ow statements before 1988. To obtain as long a sample period as possible, we therefore follow
the conventional approach based on the balance sheet to measure accruals.
4
Our analysis begins in 1971 because prior to that year there are fewer than 400 rms with available data on the required
accounting items.
9
publicly known. All rms with available data are included in the sample, regardless of their scal year-ends.
Table 1 summarizes the accounting variables. Panel A provides descriptive statistics on the components
of working capital; panel B presents statistics on earnings, cash ow, accruals and the individual accrual
items.
5
Accruals comprise the changes in various working capital accounts, so to give some perspective we
begin by examining the underlying working capital items in panel A. Current assets is the dominant item,
representing 47.1 percent of total assets for the median rm. Accounts receivable and inventory make up the
bulk of current assets, with each item accounting for more than 20 percent of total assets for a typical rm.
Panel B provides information on the individual accrual items. The largest accrual item is depreciation,
but it displays little variability across rms, as evidenced by the low standard deviation. The items that
contribute most to differentiating accruals across rms are changes in accounts receivable and changes in
inventory. The standard deviation of each of these items exceeds 7 percent. Total accruals displays large
cross-sectional variability, with a standard deviation of 10.2 percent. This variability is close in magnitude to
the average level of earnings (as a percent of total assets). The implication, then, is that changes in accruals
that may not appear unusual can lead to substantial changes in reported earnings.
1.3 The importance of earnings quality
To help motivate the remainder of the paper, we rst examine the potential importance of looking beyond
the bottom-line earnings number and considering accruals as well. The cross-sectional predictive power
of earnings surprises for future returns is widely documented (see, for example, Latane and Jones (1979),
Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984), Bernard and Thomas (1989), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996)).
However, it may not be meaningful to compare rms with large and small earnings surprises without some
adjustment to separate cases where rms are improving their underlying cash ow performance from cases
where they may be cooking the books. In this respect, adjusting net income to reect the quality of
earnings may be important. Table 2 checks whether we can rene the predictive power of earnings surprises
5
Each year we calculate the percentiles of the distribution across all rms in the sample that year. The quartiles reported in Table
1 are the simple means of these statistics over all years in the sample period.
10
for returns by taking into consideration accruals as a (crude) measure of the quality of earnings.
Table 2 assigns stocks to portfolios on the basis of a two-way classication. We group stocks at the end
of each April over the sample period into one of ve categories based on earnings surprise. Our indicator
of earnings surprise is the change in earnings from a year ago, relative to average total assets.
6
At the
same time stocks are independently classied into quintile groups based on accruals relative to average total
assets. The intersection of these two classications gives twenty ve categories; stocks are equally-weighted
within each group.
We report annual buy-and-hold returns and abnormal returns for each portfolio in the rst year after
portfolio formation. Size and book-to-market adjusted abnormal returns are computed as follows. Each
April we calculate quintile breakpoints for size (market value of equity) based on NYSE stocks. Since
the bottom quintile of rms contains a disproportionately large number of rms (mostly Nasdaq stocks)
we break this group out into two categories (the rst and second decile of the distribution of rm size).
Accordingly there are six categories by rm size. Independently we calculate quintile breakpoints for the
ratio of book-to-market value of equity. The intersection of these two classications gives thirty groups. We
calculate buy-and-hold returns for equally-weighted portfolios of the stocks within each group. Based on
where a stock falls given the size and book-to-market breakpoints, it is assigned one of these portfolios as a
control. The abnormal return for a stock is the difference between its raw return and the return of the control
portfolio.
In line with results from previous studies, a measure of earnings surprise predicts stock returns. To
assess the marginal contribution of earnings surprise, we calculate the spread in returns between the top and
bottom quintiles by earnings surprise for each of the ve categories of accruals. The spreads are reported
in the last row of each panel in Table 2. The average spread in abnormal returns is 4.2 percent per year.
Importantly, the marginal contribution of accruals is larger. From the last column in panel B, the spread in
abnormal returns between the top and bottom quintiles by accruals averages 6.2 percent. Even when the
earnings surprise is most favorable and one expects positive abnormal returns on the basis of prior research,
6
At each portfolio formation date current earnings is the earnings number as of the most recently ended scal year, assuming a
four-month publication delay.
11
abnormal returns turn out to be negative if accruals are high. When accruals are high, abnormal returns are
negative across all categories of earnings surprise. Holding xed earnings surprise, returns become more
disappointing as accruals rise. To summarize, the evidence in Table 2 suggests that the market may be
temporarily misled by focusing on the bottom line and ignoring information about the quality of earnings,
as proxied by accruals. This result echoes Collins and Hribar (2000), who nd that the magnitude of the drift
in returns following extreme earnings surprises depends on whether the change in earnings is accompanied
by high or low accruals.
2 The accrual effect
2.1 Accruals and stock returns
Table 3 examines the characteristics and returns of stocks classied by accruals. At the end of April each
year, we rank stocks by accruals relative to average total assets and assign them to one of ten equal-sized
portfolios. Annual buy-and-hold returns and abnormal returns for these equally-weighted decile portfolios
are calculated for each of the three years following portfolio formation.
7
Panel A of Table 3 describes the average levels of accruals, cash ows, earnings and accrual components
for the decile portfolios (all measured as of the portfolio formation date). In the portfolio of the highest-
ranked stocks, accruals average 18.9 percent of total assets while in the portfolio of lowest-ranked stocks
accruals are -16.2 percent of total assets. Accruals are positively correlated with earnings, but negatively
correlated with cash ow. Earnings relative to total assets are 17.6 percent for the top decile portfolio, but
only 7.1 percent for the bottom decile portfolio. Despite their very high earnings, rms in the top decile
portfolio generate negative cash ows because of high accruals. The rms in the bottom decile portfolio, on
the other hand, produce substantial cash ows in spite of their low earnings due to their negative accruals.
Panel B shows that rms with high accruals tend to be growth stocks with low book-to-market ratios.
7
If a stock is delisted in a year subsequent to portfolio formation, we use the return on the CRSP value-weighted return from
that point on until the end of the holding period. At the beginning of the next holding period we rebalance all remaining stocks in
the portfolio to equal weights and compute returns for the following year.
12
Further, they have performed well in the past: growth in sales averages 22.8 percent per year in the three
years leading up to portfolio formation. Panels C and D provide additional evidence on the superior past
performance of the rms ranked highest by accruals. The average stock return on this group is 35.9 percent
per year over the three prior years, and past abnormal returns are large.
8
However, the extraordinary past
stock price performance is mainly driven by the large returns three and two years before portfolio formation.
One year prior to portfolio formation, their returns, while above average, are less stellar. The rise in accruals
for this portfolio, at the same time that its performance undergoes a relative slowdown, is not inconsistent
with the idea that managers manipulate earnings to maintain favorable investor sentiment. Further, the lofty
valuations of the rms with large positive accruals probably provides managers with an added incentive to
manipulate earnings in order to maintain earnings growth and avoid negative earnings surprises.
Past studies (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996))
document continuations in price trends over intermediate horizons. On this basis the above-average past
returns of the portfolio with high accruals suggests that returns should continue to be relatively high in the
year following portfolio formation. To the contrary, in the rst post-formation year the top decile portfolio
has an average return of only 9 percent (the overall return in the rst year averaged across all the decile
portfolios is 15.6 percent). The lowest-ranked decile portfolio has an average return of 17.8 percent, so that
the return differential between the low- and high-accruals portfolios is 8.8 percent (the t-statistic for the
difference is 3.79).
9
However much of the difference in returns stems from the relatively poor performance
of the high-accruals portfolio. The spread in return between the second and ninth decile portfolios, for
example, is only 3.8 percent. Average returns continue to be disappointing for the high-accruals portfolio in
the second and third years after portfolio formation.
8
Recall that, in order to mitigate problems with extreme returns in the years following portfolio formation, we exclude from our
sample any stock which in the portfolio formation year is priced below $5 and which falls in the bottom three deciles of market
capitalization based on NYSE stocks. This exclusion rule tends to drop rms that have had poor past returns, so the overall average
return across the ten portfolios in the pre-formation period tends to be higher than the overall mean return in the post-formation
years. Nonetheless, when all stocks are included it is still the case that the high-accruals portfolio tends to have superior past
performance.
9
The predictive power of accruals for returns is originally documented in Sloan (1996).
13
The portfolio returns after adjusting for size and book-to-market effects (Panel Dof Table 3) tell the same
story as the raw returns. Mean abnormal returns differ by 7.4 percent between the low- and high-accruals
portfolios in the rst post-formation year. The bulk of the difference is due to the low abnormal return on the
high-accruals portfolio (-4.7 percent), whereas the abnormal return for the low accrual portfolio is relatively
small (2.6 percent).
10
The differences in abnormal returns across the extreme decile portfolios may stem
from differences in the incentives to manipulate earnings upward or downward. In particular, if managers
are manipulating earnings, they are more likely to inate earnings than to decrease or smooth earnings. As
a result, the potential impact of manipulation on returns may be more apparent in the portfolio with high
positive accruals. In summary, accruals predict future returns, although the effect is largely driven by the
poor performance of the portfolio with the highest accruals, where the incentive to manipulate earnings may
be the strongest.
2.2 Operating Performance
To get some insight into the reasons behind the large divergence between earnings and cash ows, we
examine the portfolios operating performance before and after portfolio formation. Figure 1 plots selected
balance sheet items and operating performance measures for the extreme deciles over the ve years before
and after portfolio formation. The underlying statistics are provided for all decile portfolios in Appendix
Table A1.
At the portfolio formation year-end, average accruals for the highest-ranked portfolio are 18.9 percent
of assets. In comparison, this portfolios average accruals are less than 6 percent of assets in the other
pre-formation years. Accruals in the case of the lowest-ranked decile portfolio behave similarly, only in
the opposite direction. Two items are chiey responsible for the sudden change in accruals: inventories
and accounts receivable. By their nature, accruals should be mean-reverting. Inventories and accounts
receivable may rise temporarily as business conditions slow down, for example. However, it is unlikely
10
The results are robust to assumptions about the delay in the release of accounting data. When we replicate Table 3 using only
rms that announce earnings no later than the end of April in the formation year, the average spread in abnormal returns over the
rst subsequent year is 9.8 percent with a t-statistic of 6.43. We also obtain results that are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3
if we move the portfolio formation date to the end of June each year.
14
they will continue climbing at the same rate for several successive years, once production and marketing
decisions are adjusted. Similarly, if managers manipulate earnings by recognizing revenues prematurely,
current accruals rise but there will be some accompanying decline in future accruals. Figure 1 conrms
that the extreme accruals are quickly reversed in the year after portfolio formation, and the pattern in the
post-formation period is similar to the pre-formation period.
There are several possible explanations for the changes in accruals. Accruals may grow if managers
expect sales to grow in the near future. For instance, managers may build up inventory in anticipation of
large increases in future sales. However, the performance of sales in the post-formation period for the top
decile portfolio does not seem to warrant such expectations. In fact, sales relative to assets (sales turnover)
drops in the rst post-formation year, and continues to decline over the subsequent years. In short, it is
unlikely that these rms were building up inventory to meet growing demand.
It is likely that changes in current business conditions, or managerial manipulation of earnings, account
for the sudden jump in accruals for the top decile portfolio. A slowdown in sales growth relative to expecta-
tions, for example, may initially result in an increase in inventory. In the event of a slowdown, competitive
pressures may compel rms to offer more attractive credit terms to support sales, thereby raising accounts
receivable. While sales growth and earnings stay positive in the years after portfolio formation for rms
with high accruals, Figure 1 and Table A1 conrm that the dazzling growth of their pre-formation years
has cooled. However, the timing of the slowdown in sales and earnings (relative to total assets) seems to
occur one year after the jump in accruals, rather than contemporaneously. The delay raises the suspicion that
managerial manipulation may be contributing to the jump in accruals during the portfolio formation year.
Managers may have seen signs of weakness in sales over the year leading up to the portfolio formation date,
and they attempt to delay its impact on the bottom line. In particular, managers have considerable latitude
as to when expenses or revenues are recognized. To avoid a disappointing earnings report, for example,
managers may delay writing off obsolete inventory or allocate more overhead to inventory. This results in
an inated valuation of inventory and at the same time a reduction of expenses, and hence higher reported
earnings. Similarly, some of the growth in sales in the portfolio formation year may be due to managers
booking revenues before the sales are completed.
15
In any event, the upshot from Figure 1 is that an improvement in earnings when accompanied by an
increase in accruals (and hence a reduction in cash ow) is an early warning sign of a relative deterioration
in future operating performance. The decline in operating performance is accompanied by sub-par stock
returns (Table 3).
The operating performance of rms with low accruals also reveals an interesting pattern, although any
evidence of manipulation here is somewhat less apparent. The popular belief is that rms store some earn-
ings in the form of accruals in good years so that they can tap into such earnings in bad times. For example,
rms may be more aggressive in writing off bad debt and obsolete inventory at times when the bottom line
earnings number offers sufcient cushion to absorb such write-offs. However, the rms with the lowest
accruals have declining sales and earnings over the period prior to portfolio formation. Earnings relative to
assets and the gross margin hit their lowpoints in the portfolio formation year, so this is not a particularly
opportune moment to store earnings through accruals. Rather, it may be the case that these rms reduce
their earnings in the formation year when they see light at the end of the tunnel and signs that their fortunes
will rebound in the near future. Cutting earnings even more enables them to show subsequent improvements
in the bottom line numbers that the market does not seem to anticipate fully at the portfolio formation year.
3 Understanding the predictive power of accruals
3.1 The components of accruals
Relating total accruals to future stock returns provides limited opportunities to distinguish between the com-
peting explanations for accruals predictive power. One way to focus our tests is to look at the components
of accruals (see also Thomas and Zhang (2002)). For example, some accounts may be more susceptible
to managerial manipulation than others, so the relation between accruals and subsequent returns should be
more pronounced for these items. If, on the other hand, underreaction to a decline in sales growth is driving
the subsequent stock price changes, then the effects of the slowdown should be relatively uniform across
the components of accruals. Importantly, in the case of an increase in accounts payable the manipulation
hypothesis and the underreaction hypothesis yield very different predictions. On the one hand, an increase
16
in accounts payable may be an early warning sign of deterioration in cash ow and hence signals poor stock
price performance in the future. Under the conventional belief that changes in accruals connote manipu-
lation, however, a rise in accounts payable lowers current accruals and is perceived as transferring current
earnings to the future. Insofar as investors interpret this as a negative shock to current earnings and do not
recognize the impact on future earnings, the future stock price performance should be favorable as future
earnings recover.
Table 4 reports returns on portfolios sorted by each component of accruals. With the exception of
changes in other current liabilities, each component reliably predicts raw and abnormal returns at least over
the rst year following portfolio formation. The accrual component that is associated with the largest spread
in returns over the post-formation period is changes in inventory (panel B). The mean raw return over the
rst post-formation year for the portfolio ranked lowest by INV is 19 percent, compared to 9.5 percent
for the highest-ranked portfolio, for a spread of 9.53 percent. The spread in average abnormal returns is 7.2
percent. These are comparable to the spreads associated with total accruals: in Table 3, the corresponding
spreads are 8.8 percent and 7.4 percent for raw and abnormal returns, respectively. Thomas and Zhang
(2002) also nd a strong association between inventory changes and future returns.
INV may signal unanticipated changes in a rms future prospects. For example, in many macroe-
conomic models, changes in aggregate inventory are a negative leading indicator of future economic condi-
tions. On the other hand, it is possible to manipulate earnings through INV . For example, managers may
not be fully writing off obsolete items in their inventories, or they may be allocating more overhead expenses
to inventory than to cost of goods sold. Furthermore, such manipulation of inventory has a dollar-for-dollar
impact on the cost of goods sold, and thus ows directly through to bottom line income.
In the rst year after portfolio formation, changes in accounts receivable (panel A) are associated with a
mean spread in raw returns of 5.4 percent, or 3.1 percent for abnormal returns. Accountants and regulators
suggest that overstating revenues, or recognizing revenues prematurely, are common ways to manipulate
earnings. SEC (2003) nds that in the cases where there was enforcement action, improper revenue recog-
nition, which in turn leads to elevated accounts receivable, is the most commonly-used method for inating
earnings. It is also possible that the increase in accounts receivable arises because as sales growth undergoes
17
a relative attening, rms are compelled to offer more generous credit terms in an effort to maintain revenue
growth. If changes in business conditions are driving accruals, however, the effect should generally be uni-
form across the different components. In this respect, the differences between the return spreads associated
with INV and AR, even though their cross-sectional dispersions are roughly the same (Table 1), is not
consistent with the under-reaction hypothesis.
Changes in accounts payable (panel D) provide a sharp means to discriminate between these two hy-
potheses. In panel D, the sort by AP indicates that the extreme decile portfolios future performance does
not mesh with the conventional notion that identies accruals with managerial manipulation. Specically,
over the post-formation period it is the highest ranked decile portfolio that has relatively poor returns while
the lowest ranked portfolio does not underperform. The top decile portfolios abnormal return is -3.1 percent
in the rst post-formation year while the bottom decile portfolios abnormal return is 2.6 percent. Averaging
over the three post-formation years, the average abnormal returns for the top and bottom decile portfolios are
-2 percent and 0.7 percent per year, respectively. The positive spread in returns between the bottom and top
decile portfolios ranked by changes in accounts payable is consistent with investors being slow to impound
changing business conditions into stock prices. For instance, when a companys business prospects cool,
accounts payable may rise because the rm may not be so cash-rich as before.
In summary, inventory changes are the dominant component of accruals for predicting returns. Changes
in accounts receivable and accounts payable also have some predictive power. Based on the evidence from
the accrual components, the verdict on which hypothesis best explains the effect of accruals is, however,
split. On the one hand, the non-uniform impact of changes in inventory and accounts receivable suggests
that managers are manipulating earnings. On the other hand, the negative association between accounts
payable changes and future returns is hard to square with the conventional presumption that accruals reect
only managerial manipulation of earnings.
3.2 The role of nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals
As business conditions such as sales vary across rms, so do working capital requirements and thereby the
level of accruals. Controlling for the effects of business conditions may help tease out more clearly the
18
role of managerial discretion in using accruals to manipulate earnings. In this section we implement this
idea by decomposing the level of accruals into nondiscretionary and discretionary components. The nondis-
cretionary component captures the impact of business conditions while the discretionary portion reects
managerial choices. Our strategy parallels other approaches in the accounting literature for distinguishing
between non-discretionary and discretionary accruals (see Jones (1991)).
Few rms have sufciently long time series to permit reliable estimation of a regression model to extract
the discretionary portion of accruals. Instead we rely on a parsimonious model. First we relate the level of
each component of working capital for a rm to its current sales. For example in the case of inventory, I
it
,
and sales, Sales
it
, for rm i in year t, we dene
E
t
(I
it
) =

5
k=1
I
itk

5
k=1
Sales
itk
Sales
it
. (2)
The nondiscretionary change in inventory, NDI
it
, is then given by
NDI
it
= E
t
(I
it
) I
it1
, (3)
while the discretionary change in inventory, DI
it
is
DI
it
= I
it
E
t
(I
it
). (4)
Equation (2) models the level of each underlying working capital account, such as inventory, as a relatively
stable proportion of rm sales. The model reects the idea that working capital requirements are closely
related to sales. To smooth out transitory uctuations in this relation we estimate the proportion as the ratio
of a moving average of the past ve years of the item to a moving average of the past ve years of sales. The
discretionary component of the change in a working capital item is the difference between the actual level
and its tted level from equation (2).
Stocks are sorted into decile portfolios by discretionary accruals in panel A, and by nondiscretionary
accruals in panel B of Table 5. In terms of the return spreads between the lowest- and highest-ranked decile
portfolios, the sort by discretionary accruals comes close to matching the performance of the sort by total
accruals. In panel A, the return spread between the extreme deciles is 7.8 percent in raw returns (7.4 percent
in abnormal returns) over the rst post-formation year. The spreads corresponding to the classication by
19
total accruals are 8.8 and 7.4 percent for raw and abnormal returns, respectively. Very large changes in
working capital in any year are likely to reect instances of managerial discretion, so the extreme portfolios
in the sort by accruals should also do well in detecting the impact of manipulation. What is more telling is
how well discretionary accruals spread out the returns for the other, intermediate, portfolios. For example,
the second and ninth decile portfolios have a spread in abnormal returns over the rst subsequent year of 5.6
percent based on discretionary accruals, compared to 2.5 percent based on total accruals.
11
Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) argue that the accrual decomposition methods popularly used in the
accounting literature do poorly in separating the discretionary and nondiscretionary elements. Any mis-
specication in the decomposition introduces measurement errors in each estimated component. As a result,
the ability of estimated discretionary accruals to predict returns is understated. Further, to the extent that
a part of measured nondiscretionary accruals is contaminated by the discretionary component, our results
likely overstate the ability of nondiscretionary accruals to predict returns.
The extrapolation hypothesis posits that rms with high accruals represent instances of overvaluation
because of investors cognitive biases. In particular these rms have enjoyed high sales growth in the past,
and investors extrapolate past growth to form exaggerated expectations about future growth. Our decom-
position procedure assumes that nondiscretionary accruals grow proportionally with sales. However, panel
B indicates that there is essentially no association between nondiscretionary accruals and future returns.
Accordingly, this evidence is not consistent with the extrapolation hypothesis.
12
Table 6 examines the predictive power of individual components of accruals, in terms of their discre-
tionary and nondiscretionary values. For the sake of brevity we report differences in the returns (raw and
abnormal) between the extreme decile portfolios. Since Table 4 indicates that changes in three accounts
11
The appropriate decomposition of accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components is a controversial issue. De-
chow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) evaluate different procedures for decomposing accruals and report results in favor of the ability of
the Jones (1991) model to detect earnings management. Xie (2001) uses the Jones (1991) model to decompose accruals and nds
results similar to ours. In additional, unreported, tests we nd that, compared to the Jones decomposition, our approach based on
past sales generally yields larger spreads in future returns and a more monotonic pattern across the decile portfolios returns.
12
In a related context, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2002) examine analysts earnings forecasts and argue that the extrapolation
hypothesis does not explain the relatively low returns on growth stocks.
20
inventory, accounts receivable and accounts payable account for the bulk of the predictive power of
accruals, we limit attention to these items.
The results from Table 6 echo those in the earlier tables. For instance, the discretionary component
of inventory changes is associated with the largest spreads in future abnormal returns. The difference in
the rst post-formation year between the extreme decile portfolios is 9.1 percent in terms of abnormal
returns. Discretionary increases in accounts payable are associated with lower future returns, counter to
the managerial manipulation hypothesis, but in line with the market underreaction hypothesis. For both
inventory and accounts payable, the nondiscretionary portion induces almost no difference in returns.
Information on that part of accruals which is predictable from past sales, or nondiscretionary accruals,
would appear to be easily available to sophisticated investors and analysts. Accordingly it would stretch
credulity if returns are systematically related to nondiscretionary accruals. In this respect our nding that
future returns are related only to discretionary accruals provides some reassurance that the accrual effect is
not entirely spurious.
3.3 The behavior of special items
High accruals may be a reection of managers deliberate attempts to manipulate accounting numbers in
order to avoid disappointing analysts and investors. For example, managers can inate earnings by over-
stating the ending level of inventory and thus underestimating the cost of goods sold. While this results in
higher earnings, the cash ow situation does not improve because the increased inventory raises accruals.
Of course, inating earnings in one period has consequences for reported earnings in the future. In the case
of overstating inventory, one potential impact is an increase in writedowns of inventory in subsequent years.
Such writedowns will show up at least in part as a reversal of future accruals: after the original overstatement
of inventory which increases accruals, future years accruals become lower. Part of the high previous accru-
als may also be unwound as a special item on the income statement. Special items reect unusual charges to
a rms income, and include writedowns of inventory or receivables, as well as restructuring or reorganiza-
tion costs. In this section we track the behavior of accruals and special items in the years following portfolio
formation, in order to pick up the traces of any manipulation of earnings in previous years.
21
Panel A of Table 7 reports the level of special items as a percent of average total assets, for rms sorted
by accruals at the end of April each year. Not all rms report special items, so we form ve portfolios to
ensure that each group contains a sufciently large number of rms. We track special items over each of the
three years up to the portfolio formation date, and the three following years.
The level of special items is on average negative. The reason for this nding may be that analysts and
investors generally focus on earnings from continuing operations. When earnings are lackluster, managers
may try to put the best face on the situation. They may interpret the earnings disappointment as a one-time
event, and count it as a special item in order to shield net income from continuing operations. What is
especially striking from our standpoint is the difference in how special items behave over the years before
and after portfolio formation. For the top quintile of rms ranked by accruals, special items experience
the largest change over the three years following portfolio formation, compared to the three prior years.
Their special items are on average -0.14 percent of total assets before portfolio formation, and jump to -0.56
percent on average in the post-formation period. The corresponding averages for the quintile portfolio that
is ranked lowest by accruals are -0.43 percent (pre-formation) and -0.40 percent (post-formation). The large
jump in income-decreasing special items following a year when accruals are especially high, may reect the
effects of managerial manipulation of earnings in prior years being reversed over time.
13
Although income-reducing special items quickly rise after the portfolio formation year for the stocks
with high accruals, the post-formation reversal in accruals occurs over a relatively longer period. In panel
B of Table 7, total accruals remain positive for the top decile portfolio in the rst two post-formation years
before turning negative in the third year. Discretionary accruals display a similar pattern, dropping to -1.83
percent of assets three years after portfolio formation (panel C). In short, special items pick up more imme-
diately the unwinding in past accruals. This may reect the tendency of investors and analysts to discount
special items as transitory charges and focus instead on income from continuing operations. In this case
managers may be more willing to let the effects of high past accruals ow through special items, and shield
13
As sales growth and business conditions slacken, the special item charges may reect adjustments in rm policy in subsequent
years. For instance, if demand falls below expectation, managers may choose to write down inventories to more appropriate levels.
It is not obvious, however, why the adjustment to slower business conditions should continue to be stretched out several years after
the year when accruals signal a turning point.
22
income for as long as possible.
Echoing our results from the previous tables, the behavior of the bottom decile portfolio is not symmetric
with the behavior of the top decile portfolio. In the case of stocks with the lowest accruals as of the portfolio
formation year, total and discretionary accruals remain relatively low in the following years. The prolonged
subsequent adjustment in accruals of these rms may be a hint that these cases are less likely to represent
instances of earnings manipulation, compared to rms where accruals are high.
4 Cross-sectional regressions
4.1 Accrual regressions
As another way to determine the impact of the individual accrual items we carry out monthly cross-sectional
regressions. Table 8 reports the time-series averages of the regression slopes together with their t-statistics.
The dependent variable in each regression is the annual abnormal return for individual stocks. Panel A
presents results based on raw accruals, and panel B gives results for discretionary accruals.
Regression (1) in panel A conrms a negative and signicant relation between raw accruals and future
abnormal returns. The slope coefcient for accruals averages -0.2627 (with a t-statistic of -4.14). In the
univariate regressions for the individual accrual items the slope coefcients are also negative and signicant.
When all three accrual components changes in accounts receivable, inventories and accounts payable
are included (regression (5) in Table 8) the item with the largest predictive power is inventory changes.
The average slope for INV is -0.2661, and it is almost as large as the slope for accruals by itself in the
rst regression. Notably, the average slope for changes in accounts payable is always negative in panel A,
although it is not statistically signicant in regression (5).
The results for discretionary accruals in panel B generally tell a similar story. For example the average
slope for discretionary accruals is -0.2419 (with a t-statistic of -5.20) in regression (6), and the average
slope for discretionary changes in inventory is -0.3259 (with a t-statistic of -4.55) in regression (10).
23
4.2 Portfolio results based on return prediction models
Regardless of why items like changes in inventory or accounts payable predict returns, there is no reason
to think that a catchall measure like total accruals best summarizes the information in these predictors.
Parsimony compels us to look at a short list of variables, but the specic linear combination of these variables
dened as accruals may not necessarily be the most informative indicator of manipulation or future business
conditions. Indeed, the negative association between accounts payable and future returns strengthens the
suspicion that it may be possible to improve on the accrual measure. In particular slopes from regression
models such as those in Table 8 can be interpreted as weights for constructing alternative indicators. In
this section we see if measures constructed in this fashion turn out to be more informative than considering
accruals only. We do this by implementing a trading strategy based on predicted returns from the models,
and examining whether the predictions from the models spread out returns more than do accruals.
We consider four return prediction models. In model 1, the predictor is accruals, so all the individual
accrual components (depreciation and changes in: inventories, accounts receivable, accounts payable, other
current assets, and other current liabilities) enter the regression. Model 2 uses the discretionary components
of these same items, as given by equations (2) and (4). Model 3 uses as predictors changes in: inventories,
accounts receivable and accounts payable. The discretionary components of these three variables serve as
the predictors in model 4. At each year-end we take a rolling average of the estimated coefcients from all
the prior years cross-sectional regressions and use these as the parameters in the prediction model. Based
on the predicted return from the model, stocks are ranked and grouped into one of ten portfolios. Buy-and-
hold raw returns and abnormal returns for the ten equally-weighted portfolios are then calculated over the
subsequent year.
14
Table 9 reports the mean returns for the portfolios. Recall that the sort by accruals generates a return
differential of 8.8 percent in raw returns and 7.4 percent in abnormal returns between the extreme deciles
over the rst subsequent year. This performance is roughly matched by all the models in Table 9. For
14
To start the trading rule at the beginning of the sample period, we use the average coefcients from the rst ve years cross-
sectional regressions to generate predicted returns. Returns earned from the trading strategies are calculated from the sixth year
onward. This ensures that there is no look-ahead bias.
24
example, the predictive model (1), which is based on all the individual accrual items, yields a spread of 8.3
percent for raw returns, and 7 percent for abnormal returns between the extreme deciles. Economic intuition
suggests that the nondiscretionary portion of accruals should not help to predict returns, so a strategy that
excludes this component should do better. Model (2), which is based on the discretionary portion of the
individual accrual items, conrms this logic. The spread in raw returns (abnormal returns) is 8.9 percent
(8.8 percent).
Compared to a trading rule based on total accruals, rules based on models (3) and (4), which use only
three accrual items changes in inventory, accounts receivable and accounts payable hold up well.
The difference, however, is that models (3) and (4) allow for a negative predictive relation between accounts
payable changes and returns. In particular, the investment strategy based on model 4 yields the largest return
spread (9.7 percent in raw and abnormal returns). This model predicts returns based on discretionary values
of INV , AR, and AP.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 The accrual effect within industries
Working capital requirements vary across lines of business, so in a line of activity where inventories and
receivables represent a small fraction of total assets, accruals (excluding depreciation) are likely to be rela-
tively low. The information contained in accruals about future returns is likely to be meager in such cases.
To bring out more clearly the predictive power of accruals, we examine return spreads associated with ac-
cruals across rms within the same industry, so they are relatively homogeneous. In particular, we apply
the same sort procedure as in Table 3 to form four portfolios within each of the industry groupings dened
by Fama and French (1997). The spread in abnormal returns between the bottom and top quartile portfolios
for each of the three years after portfolio formation is reported in Table 10, along with the simple mean and
25
t-statistic over all industries.
15
The abnormal return spread in the rst post-formation year averages 5 percent across all industries (with
a t-statistic of 6.86) and is positive in 29 out of 32 cases, so the accrual effect is robust. Notably, the spread
tends to be larger in industries where working capital is high such as Toys (Recreational Products), and
Construction, and is smaller in lines of business with low working capital levels such as Meals (Restaurants,
Hotel and Motel), Utilities and Transportation.
The results in Table 10 also provide another means of discriminating between the competing explana-
tions for the accrual effect. In the case of cash-based businesses where earnings roughly match cash ows,
there is less scope for managers to distort reported income. Under the manipulation hypothesis, therefore,
the predictive power of accruals should vary across industries depending on the levels of working capital.
On the other hand, if unanticipated changes in business conditions are the force driving both accruals and
subsequent returns under the underreaction hypothesis, the effect of accruals should be relatively uniform
across industries. The dominant components of working capital are inventory and accounts receivable (see
Table 1). In Table 10, the rank correlation between inventory plus accounts receivable (relative to average
total assets) and the abnormal return spread AR1 is 0.27. The rough correspondence between the size of the
return spread and the level of working capital thus provides support for the manipulation hypothesis.
5.2 Evidence from U.K. stocks
All the existing studies which document the association between accruals and future stock returns are based
on evidence from the U.S. This raises the question whether the accrual effect is specic to U.S. stocks. If
the evidence does not generalize to other markets with similar accounting conventions, the suspicion arises
that the association is spurious and may have no economic rationale. Accordingly, as another robustness
check we explore whether accruals predict returns in a foreign market. In particular, accounting standards
in the U.K. are similar to those in the U.S., and (as of the time of writing) the U.K. equity market is the
15
We require the average number of rms in an industry over the sample period to be at least 20. Also, the number of years where
an industry contains fewer than 20 rms cannot be over 5. Firm-year observations that do not meet these criteria are assigned to the
Other category in the table.
26
second-largest in the world. From the standpoint of the potential motivation to manipulate earnings, it is
also noteworthy that generally speaking in the U.K. management compensation schemes (as well as the
behavior of research analysts and investors) more closely resemble those in the U.S. than do other countries.
In Table 11 we replicate our analysis using data on U.K. stocks. The sample comprises all domestic,
primary, non-nancial U.K. stocks which are available in the Xpressfeed database, with data on accruals
and returns. Portfolios are formed at the end of April each year from 1991 to 2000, assuming a four-month
reporting delay.
The results for the U.K. data conrm an association between accruals and future returns. Further, the
sort by accruals (panel A) generates larger spreads in returns than the U.S. results. The difference in raw
returns between the lowest- and highest-ranked decile groups is 13.5 percent in the year following portfolio
formation, and the corresponding difference in excess returns is 10.8 percent. When we look at the com-
ponents of accruals, the evidence generally echoes that in the U.S. The major contribution to the predictive
power of accruals comes from the inventory component. The sort by inventory changes (panel C) produces
spreads in raw and excess returns (about 8 percent) that are close to the results for total accruals. In short, our
evidence from the second-largest equity market, which is relatively free from data-snooping biases, conrms
the predictive power of accruals for returns, and also highlights the importance of the inventory component.
6 Summary and conclusions
A rms bottom-line earnings number has traditionally been the focus of analysts, investors and re-
searchers, while other nancial statement items have generally been overlooked. These other items may
provide information about the quality of a rms earnings and possibly have rich predictive power for stock
returns. As a starting point to call attention to the potential relevance of earnings quality, this paper borrows
from the empirical accounting literature. In particular, there is a reliable, negative association between ac-
cruals (the difference between accounting earnings and cash ows) and future stock returns. Importantly, the
behavior of accruals throws a different light on the connection between earnings surprises and stock returns.
This association between surprises and returns has been extensively documented in the empirical nance
27
literature, and serves as the basis for many widely-used investment strategies. What is less well documented
in this literature, however, is that the relation must be qualied by the behavior of accruals. Increases in
earnings that are accompanied by high accruals are associated with sub-par returns. In this regard, accruals
may provide information about the quality of earnings.
Our nding that accruals have predictive power for returns is not new (see Sloan (1996), Collins and
Hribar (2000,2002), Xie (2001)). However, the bulk of the previous research on the informativeness of
accruals is generally silent as to the economic basis for its association with future returns (Thomas and
Zhang (2002) is a notable exception). This paper explores three explanations for why accruals predict stock
returns. Under the conventional interpretation, high accruals smell of earnings manipulation by managers.
On the other hand accruals may serve as leading indicators of changes in a rms prospects, without any
manipulation by managers. The market tends to underreact to these indicators, however, so returns lag
accruals. Accruals may also predict returns if the market views accruals as reecting past growth, and
extrapolates such growth to form over-optimistic expectations about future performance.
We contribute new evidence that helps to discriminate between these hypotheses. We examine operating
performance and special items around years when accruals rise, develop an original and relatively robust
procedure for disentangling the discretionary and non-discretionary components of accruals, formulate mul-
tivariate return prediction regressions based on accrual components, and provide tests based on industries
and U.K. data.
The bulk of the evidence ts the hypothesis that accruals reect managers manipulation of earnings. In
particular, we nd that a large increase in accruals marks a sharp turning point in the fortunes of a company.
A rm that looked dazzling (with high stock returns and high earnings growth) in the years preceding the
rise in accruals suddenly appears to lose steam and its growth reverts to a more normal rate. Earnings in
subsequent years, while staying positive, tumble along with stock prices. Intriguingly, in the year when
accruals are high and possibly signal that the companys past growth has faded, earnings show no weakness
but continue to grow rapidly. These patterns suggest that rms with high accruals already face symptoms
of a cooling in their growth, but they use creative accounting to delay reporting the bad news. In subseqent
years, special items also become more negative, suggesting that the effects of the prior years manipulation is
28
being corrected. The fact that the effects are most pronounced for rms whose accruals are high, rather than
rms with low accruals, ia also consistent with the manipulation hypothesis. There are stronger pressures
on managers to inate earnings to maintain favorable investor sentiment, compared to the incentives to defer
current earnings to the future.
On the whole, several other pieces of evidence suggest that the effect of accruals is not solely driven
either by under-reaction to changes in business conditions, or by extrapolative expectations. For example,
if changes in business conditions were the sole force driving accruals and investors under-react to these
changes, the effects of accruals should be roughly uniform across accrual components and across indus-
tries. Instead, the two main components of accruals, changes in inventory and accounts receivable, have
different degrees of predictive power, even though they share the same amount of cross-sectional variability.
Furthermore, the accrual effect varies across industries and tends to be positively associated with industry
levels of non-cash working capital. The manipulation hypothesis, however, can account for these results.
When we decompose accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components, we nd that the discre-
tionary component is the main contributor to the predictability in returns. The accounting literature generally
tends to regard discretionary accruals as being an indicator of managers attempts to manipulate earnings.
Nondiscretionary accruals, on the other hand, do not help to predict returns, contrary to the hypothesis that
high-accrual rms tend to be overvalued because of exaggerated expectations about future growth.
Regardless of the sources of accruals predictive power, a simple catchall measure such as accruals may
not be the most informative indicator. Accordingly we develop a model based on the components of accruals
to predict future returns. This model does better in spreading out returns than the simple accrual measure.
The bulk of the predictive power of accruals stems from changes in inventory and changes in accounts
receivable.
Accruals continue to predict returns even within homogeneous groups of rms which belong to the same
industry. We also use a dataset on U.K. rms that is not subject to data-snooping biases in order to provide
new evidence on the effect of accruals. The results from both the U.S. and U.K. data suggest that a small
number of accrual items including changes in inventory, which seem to contain information about the quality
of earnings, help to predict the cross-section of future returns.
29
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33
Table I
Summary statistics
The sample comprises all domestic common stocks (except nancial rms) on NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq
with coverage on CRSP and Compustat, and with available data. Variables for each rm are measured as of
the end of April each year from 1971 to 1995, assuming a reporting delay of four months from the end of the
scal year. Panel A provides summary statistics for the components of working capital (each item is divided
by average total rm assets). Panel B provides statistics for: CA the change in non-cash current assets;
CL the change in current liabilities excluding short-term debt and taxes payable; DEP depreciation and
amortization; AR, change in accounts receivable; INV , change in inventories; OCA, change in other
current assets; AP, change in accounts payable; OCL, change in other current liabilities. Accruals is
dened as (CACLDEP); earnings is measured as operating income after depreciation; cash ow
is earnings minus accruals. All items are divided by average total rm assets.
Panel A: Components of working capital (relative to average total assets)
Standard 25-th 75-th
Variable Mean deviation percentile Median percentile
Current assets 0.459 0.238 0.269 0.471 0.631
Current liabilities 0.191 0.110 0.117 0.171 0.240
Accounts receivable 0.217 0.140 0.115 0.204 0.290
Inventory 0.218 0.170 0.064 0.203 0.331
Other current assets 0.024 0.028 0.008 0.016 0.030
Accounts payable 0.103 0.082 0.050 0.081 0.128
Other current liabilities 0.089 0.069 0.044 0.073 0.112
Panel B: Earnings, cash ow and accruals (relative to average total assets)
Standard 25-th 75-th
Variable Mean deviation percentile Median percentile
CA 0.060 0.121 0.001 0.038 0.100
CL 0.027 0.064 -0.001 0.018 0.047
DEP 0.045 0.028 0.027 0.039 0.055
AR 0.030 0.073 -0.001 0.017 0.050
INV 0.026 0.071 -0.002 0.010 0.046
OCA 0.004 0.023 -0.001 0.002 0.007
AP 0.014 0.045 -0.004 0.008 0.026
OCL 0.013 0.038 -0.001 0.008 0.022
Accruals -0.012 0.102 -0.064 -0.024 0.028
Earnings 0.121 0.126 0.070 0.117 0.176
Cash ow 0.133 0.141 0.075 0.137 0.202
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