Daoang v.

Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)


Facts:

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos
who are minors at that time. Minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and
guardian just for the purpose of legal action, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said
adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore
said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that
those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by legal
fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether or not the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Agonoy are disqualified to adopt
under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:

The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons
who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it
changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to children. The children
mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. The rule of
statutory construction is when a statute is clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is required.
The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of
statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the
judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, without pronouncement as to
costs.



AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. NO. L-32717
November 26, 1970

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito Mutuc, a candidate
for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, from using jingles in his mobile
units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. Petitioner questioned the act of
respondent as a violation of his right to free speech. Respondent however contended that the
prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it
unlawful for candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin. It was the COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed to be
used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the phrase and the like.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like.

RULING:
NO. The COMELECs contention that a candidates jingle forms a part of the prohibition that is
categorized in the last three words and the like are not included. The court declines the action
of the COMELEC. What was done cannot merit the Supreme Courts approval under the well-
known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumeration being
applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. What was
contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for distribution and that "the
use of a 'jingle,' a verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of a
'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed form of election propaganda, and both forms of election
advertisement. The COMELEC also failed to observe the basic rule in statutory construction in
which the construction of the law will not be as such as to work injury or injustice because it
would impair the candidates constitutional rights. (Legis construction non facit injuriam).



Paras v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996
Ponente: Justice Francisco
Facts: Petitioner, Danilo E. Paras, is the incumbent barangay captain of Pula, Cabanatuan
City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. The registered voters of the
barangay filed a petition for his recall. A recall election was set and in which petitioner filed a
petition. Petitioner cites Section 74 (b) of Local Government Code, which states that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1)
year immediately preceding a regular local election., petitioner insists that the scheduled January
13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan election was set by Republic
Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. Petitioner
maintains that as the Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular local election, no recall election
can be held for four months separate the Sangguniang Kabataan election from the recall election.

Issue: Whether or not a Sangguniang Kabataan election is a regular election.

Held: No. A statutes provisions must be considered with the other parts and must be kept
in line to the general intent of the whole enactment. Section 74 (b) of Local Government Code
merely designates such period. Considering the Sangguniang Kabataan election as regular will
improperly confine the Local Government Code provision on recall. No recall election can be
conducted if that is the case. It is assumed that legislature intended to enact an effective law, and
interpretation should give effect to the intent, with the whole statute. It is the basic principle in
statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus,
the interpretation of Section 74 (b) of Local Government Code should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum x x x. An interpretation too literal that the spirit is denied will fall in former of
the latter.


People v. Mapa
GR L-22301, 30 August 1967 (20 SCRA 1164)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur
Facts: Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code in connection with Section 2692 of
the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA 56 and as further amended by RA 4. The
accused admits to possess a firearm on the grounds of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano
Leviste of Batangas. The lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime and
sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to two years. As the appeal involves a
question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to
illegal possession of firearms.

Held:NO. The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated
that the law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are
not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list
therefore the accused is not exempted. In the rules of statutory construction, when the language
of the law is clear, no explanation is required.


Abellana v. Marave
G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974)
Fernando ,J.

FACTS:
Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. It was
filed in the city court of Ozamis City, which found Petitioner guilty. Petitioner appealed such
decision to the Court of First Instance (CFI). When that was happening, the Private Respondents
as the offended parties filed with another branch of the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for damages.
Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground of Sec.1 Rule 111 of
the Rules of the Court in which the respondent cannot issue a separate suit when the case s on
appeal. Respondent Judge issued the order to deny Petitioners motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

HELD:
Petition is dismissed because the petitioners literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court ("the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charge is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party ...reserves his right to
institute it separately.") will give rise to constitutional question in violation of rights of the
respondent with regards to Article 33 of the Civil Code in which it is stated that In case of
physical injury, a civil action for damages entirely separate from criminal action may be brought
by the injured party. As stated in Article 10, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitution, the grant of
power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive
rights. In the rules of statutory construction, a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm
in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. In the case at bar, literal
construction of the law is not favored because if construed literally, litigants would not be able to
exercise their alleged right.

Doctrine: Legis construction non facit injuriam. The construction of the law will not be as such
as to work injury or injustice

Aisporna v. CA
GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)
First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its
authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as
Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna
participated actively with the aforementioned policy.
An information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of
Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act or acting as an agent in the
soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance
Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, she naturally helped him in
his work and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called to
renew. At that time Rodolfo was absent and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to
renew. The trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced her to pay a fine with subsidiary
imprisonment. On appeal, the trial courts decision was affirmed by the appellate court. The
Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may
not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the
Insurance Act
Held: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged.
In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent,
subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second
paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section. The appellate
courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but
under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2
applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any person who for compensation
shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation,
directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not
be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act. In the rules of statutory consturstion,
the legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied or construed independently, but the
whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in
order to produce a harmonious whole.
PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations
GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring
Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429
votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Under the Rules and Regulations implementing the
present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast is sufficient for certification of the
victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by
employees who did not want any union therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified
in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner would seize upon the doctrine
announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial
Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering
there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Director.
Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion
Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition,. Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of
discretion. The conclusion reached by the Court was supported by the construction placed by the
executive officials applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present
Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on
February 3, 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as
May 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1, 1974. It shows that
there was enough time fo the framers of the law to study it and to avoid inconsistency. The
Supreme Court cannot ignore the interpretation that is embodied in the Rules. AWith regards to
statury construction, the interpretation of the law will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is
adopted when there is amiguity and the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should be given controlling weigh.



CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES
L-28771 (38 SCRA 284) March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, the petitioners brother, Felix Matabuena, donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the
deed of donation was executed. On September 13, 1962, Felix died. The plaintiff filed an
affidavit and claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon The lower court of
Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid because it was made at the time when Felix and
Petronila were not yet spouses, which makes Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
HELD: Yes. It is a principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between
spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper
pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall
not apply also to common-law relationships. The court, however, said that the lack of the
donation made by the deceased to Respondent does not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will
have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix and
Petronila were legally married before Felix died which makes Petronila his widow. She is then
entitled to 1/2 of the property of the deceased and the other half would be given to Felix
Matabuenas sister, Cornelia Matabuena.

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
Taada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2
unless otherwise provided.

HELD:
Yes. the Court orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect. Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and
not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for
the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on
April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizpens. Without this, there would be no basis for
Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.


People v. Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable
cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. the trial started upon defendants
plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of
the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace
is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in
support in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code the lower court dismissed the information
against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the
appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code
Held: NO. Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus
omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. Substitution of terms is not omission. the term judge includes all officers
appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the
peace, and even jurors, The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace
from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the
enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the
legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case
for trial on the merits.
Demafiles v. Comelec
Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-28396 (December 29, 1967)
Chapter 4.18, Footnote 126, page 159
FACTS:
Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to
reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering
that they were re-electionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner.
Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question
were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as
municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision.
ISSUES:
2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified
from sitting in municipal board of canvassers.
3. W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return.
HELD:
RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality
of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall
have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of
meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January
following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created
municipality.
No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause.
However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation
should be annulled. The law states any member of a provincial board or of
municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be incompetent
to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul and
illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order
canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.


Arabay Inc. v. CFI of Zamboanga
Case No. 16
G.R. No. L-37684 (September 10, 1975)
Chapter VI Page 259, Footnote No. 43
FACTS:
The Municipality of Dipolog enacted Ordinance No. 19 that charged tax for
the selling and distribution of gasoline, lubricating oils, diesel fuel oils, and petroleumbased
products. Arabay Inc., distributor of gas, oil and other petroleum products,
contested the validity of such on the ground that the tax is beyond the power of a
municipality to impose under Sec. 2 of RA No. 2264, which provides that municipalities
may not impose tax on articles subject to specific tax except gasoline.
ISSUE:
W/N Arabay Inc. is entitled to a refund.
HELD:
The ordinance imposed a sales tax not only because of the character of the
ordinance as a sales tax ordinance, but also because the phraseology of the
provision reveals in clear terms the intention to impose a tax on sale. It is evident from
the terms that the amount of the tax that may be collected is directly dependent
upon to the volume of sales. Since Sec. 2 of the Local Autonomy Act prohibits the
municipality from imposing sales and specific tax, with the exception of gasoline,
there subsists the right of Arabay Inc. to a refund. The reasonable and practical
interpretation of the terms of the proviso in question resulted in the conclusion that
Congress, in excluding gasoline, deliberately and intentionally meant to put it within
the power of such local governments to impose whatever type or form of taxes.


City of Manila vs. Teotico
City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA
G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
Concepcion, J.:

Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped
down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an
uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall,
Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which
dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.

Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and
have been constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P.
Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that
the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue
were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from
the City's "control or supervision."
Almeda v. Florentino
Case No. 10
G.R. No.L-23800 (December 21, 1965)
Chapter VI, Page 265, Footnote No. 67
FACTS:
RA183, the charter of Pasay City (enacted June 21, 1947), provides in its Sec. 14
that the Board shall have a secretary who shall be appointed by it to serve during the
term of office of the members thereof RA 2709 amended Sec. 12
of RA 183. Par. 2 of Sec. 12 of the Pasay City Charter, as amended,
the Vice-Mayor of Pasay City appointed Petitioner Almeda as secretary of the
Municipal Board of said City. The very next day, the Board refused to recognize
Petitioner as its secretary and, in turn, appointed Respondent Florentino to the position,
under Sec. 14 of the City Charter.
ISSUE:
Which law applies on the matter of the appointment of the Secretary of the
Municipal Board of Pasay City?
HELD:
The petition was dismissed. There is nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any
intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the
provisions of Sec. 14 of R.A 183. Repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is
manifested that the legislature so intended.

National Housing Authority v. Reyes
Case No. 85
G.R. No. 49439 (June 29, 1983)
FACTS:
Private Respondents owned a parcel of land, subject of an
expropriation proceedings granted by the court in favor of the NHA. Respondents claimed
they should be paid the assessed value of P6,600.00 pursuant to PD 42. Petitioner
opposed the payment claiming that it was too excessive. He cited PD 464 which
provides just compensation not to exceed the market value declared by the owner
in the amount of P1,400.00. Respondent Judge granted the payment of P6,600.00,
but Petitioner had opposed it pursuant to PD 1224 which states that the government
shall choose between the value of real property as declared by the owner x x x or
the market value determined by the City or Provincial Assessor, whichever is lower.
ISSUE:
W/N PD 464 as amended by PD 1224 determines the valuation on just
compensation.
HELD:
Courts accord the presumption of validity to executive acts and legislative
enactments, x x x because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution x
x x. The Respondent Judge should have followed just compensation in expropriation
cases, that the lower value made by the landowner should be the basis for fixing the
price. The petition for Certiorari is granted.


Paat v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 95
G.R. No. 111107 (January 10, 1997)
FACTS:
Petitioner questioned the legality of the forfeiture of the truck used in illegal
logging operations. He insists that only the Court can do so, citing Section 68 of PD
705 as amended by EO 277 which reads The court shall further the order of
confiscation in favor of the Governmentas well as the machinery, equipment
which are illegally used
ISSUE:
W/N the petition should be granted in light of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705.
HELD:
No. The above-quoted provision should be read together with Sec. 68a.
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil to
be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.