TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO

FACTS:
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without
the knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was
celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church
wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that
Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years
later, Escao went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently
became an American citizen and also married an American. In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for
legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and
causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for damages in the amount of
P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same
time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos.

ISSUE:
Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar.
Whether or not the divorce and the second marriage of Escao were valid.
Whether or not sexual infidelity of Escao may be invoked by Tenchavez as a ground for
legal separation.

HELD: Yes.

On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public
humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier
(because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to
her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter
to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason
of the fact that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce
decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral
damages and attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded
and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way
have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the
decision of the court below, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

The Supreme Court held that the divorce is not valid, making the second marriage void since
marriage ties of Escao and Tenchaves is existing.

Tenchavez can file a petition for legal separation because Escao committed sexual infidelity
because ofthe fact that she had children with the American.Sexual infidelity of a spouse is one of
thegrounds for legal separation.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.
139 SCRA 139

Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They
established residence in the Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in
Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in
1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered to render an
accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be
declared with a right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no community property.

Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and
American husband held binding upon the latter.

Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question
as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as
an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United
States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national
law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his own
representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.


PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653

Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three
and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart
since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said
respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another
man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the
annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper.

Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant
of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must
have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact
that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he
filed suit.


REP of the Phil vs Cipriano Orbecido III
GR No 154380 Oct 5, 2005

Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva were married in Lam-
an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing
along their son and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000,
respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his wife in the States that his wife had
remarried after obtaining her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the
trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The
Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).

Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to
the instant case. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized
alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry. However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes
naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to
submit competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried.

BELLIS v BELLIS
FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife
whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of
his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate
children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they
have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be
applied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of
the illegitimate children.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law,
being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent,
Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the
Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Intestate
and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.