SELECTED TOPICS

ON
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE
OF 1991
(R.A. NO. 7160)




GROUP NO. 05
HASHIM, ZAIDA AMORILLE B.
PATALINGHUG, VRAMIE L.
TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.
TORRES, ROMEL G.
LLB- 4

HASHIM, ZAIDA AMORILLE B.
__________________________________________
H. Qualifications and Disqualifications of Elective Officials
A. QUALIFICATIONS
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-
one (21) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the
sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15)
years of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day
[Section 39 (a), R.A. No. 7160).
1. Citizenship
This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it
should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
"Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of candidates (Frivaldo vs.
COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727).

2. Residence
a. Absence
Caasis application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the
Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his
application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities
before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our
conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his
election thereto was null and voidn (Caasi vs. Court of appeals, 191 SCRA 229).


The principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI, we ruled in the case of absence
from ones residence or origindomicileto pursue studies, engage in business, or
practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence. The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely
depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and
utterances. In the instant case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner
temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling,
profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in
Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The
intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte
therefore, is not present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte
through the years does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein
(Abella vs. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253).

The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence,
that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired
by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of
choice). Registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case
questioning a candidates lack of residency. Petitioner nonetheless says that his
registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January 2001 is
conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v. Guray, however,
registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
candidates lack of residency (Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607).

To effect change of domicile, there must be animus manendi coupled with
animus non revertendithe intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be
for an indefinite period of time, the change of residence must be voluntary, and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual (Michelena vs.
Boado, 475 SCRA 290).

Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law
requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of
voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community. This
purpose is best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the
area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice. In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of
herein private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City is substantial enough to show
his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his
qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners very legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and
common-sense rationale for the residence requirement (Torayno vs. COMELEC,
337 SCRA 574)
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the
solicitor general or (2) a public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to
the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. A
reading of the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under any of the
above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this suit (supra).

The term residence, as used in the election law, imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like

reasons, one intends to return. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new
domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place
chosen for the new domicile must be actual (Papandayan vs. COMELEC, 381
SCRA 133)

Applying case law to the present case, it can be said that the respondent
effectively abandoned her residency in the Philippines by her acquisition of the
status of a permanent U.S. resident. Nonetheless, we find that the respondent
reacquired her residency in the Philippines even before the holding of the May
2001 elections. The records show that she surrendered her green card to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy way back in
1998. By such act, her intention to abandon her U.S. residency could not have
been made clearer. Moreover, when she decided to relocate to the Philippines for
good in 1993, she continued living here and only went to the U.S.A. on periodic
visits to her children who were residing there. Moreover, she was elected Mayor in
the 1998 elections and served as such for the duration of her term. We find such
acts sufficient to establish that the respondent intended to stay in the Philippines
indefinitely and, ultimately, that she has once again made the Philippines her
permanent residence (Gayo vs. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504)

B. DISQUALIFIACTION
The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to
the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded (Section 40, R.A. No. 7160)
1. Conviction of offenses involving moral turpitude
a. Ground
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine. In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the
general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in Zari v. Flo-res, to wit: It
(moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it

is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself
must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by
statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such
acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited (De la Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483)

At any rate, the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should
have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means
that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
(Moreno vs. COMELEC, 498 SCRA 547).

b. Duration
The Republic act 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to
local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for
disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them
only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of
candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all public officers.
Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of
candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to
prevail.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act
or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a
malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes
his fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the
public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude (Magno vs. COMELEC, 390 SCRA 495).

2. Fugitive from justice
A fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only
be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the
fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction (Rodriguez vs. Commission on elections, 259 SCRA 296)

PATALINGHUG, VRAMIE L.
__________________________________________
10. Prohibitions
Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest
(a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly
or indirectly, to:
(1) Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit
in which he is an official or employee or over which he has the power

of supervision, or with any of its authorized boards, officials, agents,
or attorneys, whereby money is to be paid, or property or any other
thing of value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the
resources of the local government unit to such person or firm;
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a
local government unit;
(3) Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited in favor of
such local government unit for unpaid taxes or assessment, or by
virtue of a legal process at the instance of the said local government
unit;
(4) Be a surety for any person contracting or doing business with the
local government unit for which a surety is required; and
(5) Possess or use any public property of the local government unit for
private purposes.
(b) All other prohibitions governing the conduct of national public officers
relating to prohibited business and pecuniary interest so provided for under
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven thirteen (R.A. No. 6713) otherwise
known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees" and other laws shall also be applicable to local government
officials and employees (Section 89, R.A. No. 7160).
Practice of Profession
(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of
their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That
sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office.
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings
involving the local government unit of which he is an official; and
(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the
sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, that the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom (Section 90,
R.A. No. 7160)
Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not discriminate against
lawyers and doctors. It applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the
professions or engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that
sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or

teach in schools except during session hours. If there are some prohibitions that
apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of law
is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
[Javellana vs. Department of Interior and Local Government, 212 SCRA
475(1992)]
Petitioner violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 prohibiting a
government official from engaging in the private practice of his profession if such
practice would represent interests adverse to the government. The complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia
is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real
employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against
City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting
them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of RA 6713)
prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private practice of his
profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government
(supra)
The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing
the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center is not well-founded. This it based, and rightly so, on the
additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to
operate the Valencia Cockpit in the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of
the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the Sangguniang
Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation,
and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or
taken part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the
material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. A fortiori, there is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a
co-conspirator in the absence of a finding that Mayor Teves himself is guilty of the
offense charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan correctly absolved the petitioners of
the charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to belabor this point.
[Teves vs. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309(2004)]

I. Succession of Elective Officials
Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent
vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian
members according to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the
highest ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the
punong barangay.

(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall
be resolved by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of
their predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective
local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the
sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters
in each district in the immediately preceding local election (Section 44, R.A.
No. 7160).

1. Ranking
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on
the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the
total number of registered voters of each district.The sam shall apply in the
ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay
for purposes of succession.If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation
[Victoria vs. Commission on Elections, 229 SCRA 269(1994)]

2. Ineligibility of winner
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, an elective local official,
including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a qualified elector or a qualified
voter he must also be a registered voter of the barangay where he intends to run
for office. Indeed, the electorate cannot amend or waive the qualifications
prescribed by law for elective office. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility. The fact that Bautista, a non-registered
voter, was elected to the office of Punong Barangay does not erase the fact that he
lacks one of the qualifications for Punong Barangay. Thus, when the electorate
voted for Bautista as Punong Barangay on 15 July 2002, it was under the belief
that he was qualified. There is no presumption that the electorate agreed to the
invalidation of their votes as stray votes in case of Bautistas disqualification. The
Court cannot adhere to the theory of respondent Alcoreza that the votes cast in
favor of Bautista are stray votes. A subsequent finding by the COMELEC en banc
that Bautista is ineligible cannot retroact to the date of elections so as to invalidate
the votes cast for him [Bautista vs. Commission on Elections, 414 SCRA 299
(2003)].

3. Appointment
Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession
provided above do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following
manner:

(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the sangguniang panlungsod of
component cities and the sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay,
upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the
political party under which the sanggunian member concerned had
been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank
created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed in the
manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the
same political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused
the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant office. In
the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination and a certificate of
membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political
party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment
without such nomination and certification shall be null and void ab
initio and shall be a ground for administrative action against the
official responsible therefore.
(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who
does not belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon
recommendation of the sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to
fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in
the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next
in rank of the organization concerned (Section 45, R.A. No. 7160).
The phrase sanggunian concerned in Section 45(c) should more properly
be understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This
is in keeping with the policy implicit in Section 45(a) (3). In other words, with the
exception of the Sangguniang Barangay pars. (a) and (b) must be read as providing
for the filling of vacancies in the various Sanggunians when these vacancies are
created as a result of the cessation from office (other than expiration of term) of
members who belong to political parties. On the other hand, Section 45(c) must be
understood as providing for the filling of vacancies created by members who do not
belong to any political party [Farias vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396(1996)]

The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended to
him by the Sanggunian concerned since the power of appointment is a
discretionary power, yet neither is he vested with so large a discretion that he can
disregard the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned (supra).

In the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward
Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding discussion, neither
is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which
was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was
appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox
was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the
provincial governor who appointed him (supra).




4. Party of occupant of last vacancy
The last vacancy in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation
of the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had
become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated, and the term last
vacancy is thus used in Section 45 (b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy
previously created. The term by no means refers to the vacancy in the No. 8
position which occurred with the election of Rolando Lalas to the seventh position
in the Sanggunian. Such construction will result in absurdity [Navarro vs. Court
of Appeals, 355 SCRA 672(2001)].

5. Temporary vacancy
Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive
(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is
temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons
such as, but not limited to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension
from office, the vice-governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest
ranking sangguniang barangay member shall automatically exercise the
powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief executive
concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees
which can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds
thirty (30) working days.
(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the
appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive
concerned that he has reported back to office. In cases where the temporary
incapacity is due to legal causes, the local chief executive concerned shall
also submit necessary documents showing that said legal causes no longer
exist.
(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country
but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3)
consecutive days, he may designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the
said office. Such authorization shall specify the powers and functions that
the local official concerned shall exercise in the absence of the local chief
executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees.
(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or
refuses to issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal
vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the
case may be, shall have the right to assume the powers, duties, and
functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of absence of the said
local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection (c)
hereof.
(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case
authorize any local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of
the office, other than the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be
(Section 46, R.A. No. 7160).


The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the intent
behind the Local Government Code. There is no question that Section 49 in
connection with Section 52 of the Local Government Code shows clearly the intent
to provide for continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor. x x
x By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of succession
provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary
vacancy occurring in the same office. In this case, there was a need to fill the
vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who obtained the highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted
correctly in extending the temporary appointment. [Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA
251(1991)]

J. Discipline of Local Officials
a) Elective officials
(i) Grounds Disciplinary Actions
An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the following grounds:
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or
dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in
the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the
status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court (Section 60, R.A. No. 7160).
(ii) Jurisdiction
A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be
prepared as follows:
(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized
city, an independent component city or component city shall be filed before
the Office of the President;

(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed
before the sangguniang panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the
Office of the President; and
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision
shall be final and executory (Section 61, R.A. No. 7160).
(iii) Preventive suspension
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a
province, a highly urbanized or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a
component city or municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the
barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the
offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty
(60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative
cases are filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively
suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same
ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective
official shall be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated
within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was formally notified
of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case
is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the
duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of
termination of the case.
(d) Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive suspension shall be
penalized as abuse of authority (Section 63, R.A. No. 7160).
(iv) Removal
The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative
investigation shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent for any
elective position [Section 66 (c), R.A. No. 7160].

(v) Administrative appeal
Decisions in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt
thereof, be appealed to the following:

(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the
sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan;
and
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities
and independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory (Section 67,
R.A. No. 7160).
(vi) Doctrine of Condonation
The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation is not only founded on the
theory that an officials reelection expresses the sovereign will of the electorate to
forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for administrative
discipline which was committed during his previous term but is also dictated by
public policy; The doctrine cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the
reelected official may have committed during his previous term [Salalima vs.
Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55(1996)].

1. Grounds
Public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term. The doctrine of forgiveness or
condonation is not only founded on the theory that an officials reelection expresses
the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission
constituting a ground for administrative discipline which was committed during his
previous term but is also dictated by public policy [Salalima vs. Guingona, Jr.,
257 SCRA 55(1996)].
Any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in
the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 and the incidents
related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract for additional
repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450
are deemed extinguished by his reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronized
elections. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner
Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in
the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of
appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant
circumstances (supra).

2. Effect of appeal of finding of Commission on Audit
Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55
3. Procedure
a. Preventive suspension
i. Valid suspension

The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the Constitution
itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A.O. No. 23,
however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating
Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Josons claim. The President remains the

Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power
to discipline [Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279(1998)].
In sum, preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining
Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt
is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence (supra).

The provision of Section 63 of the Local Government Code was only meant
as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor, and mayor to
impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman is not mentioned
in the said provision and was not meant to be governed thereby. Verily, the said
provision does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman,
which is a constitutionally created office and independent from the Executive
branch of government [Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 165(2005)].

ii. Void suspension
In its Order dated 22 April 2003, the Office of the President stated that the
facts of the case do not warrant a conclusion that issues are deemed joined.
Furthermore, the Office of the President found no basis for the issuance of the
preventive suspension. Where the grounds cited by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for recommending the preventive suspension of a respondent mayor were just
general statements unsupported by any evidence, the same would be contrary to
the requisites for a preventive suspension; Suspension from office of an elective
official would deprive the electorate of the service of the person they have voted into
officethe Supreme Court has been ill at ease with suspensions because it is out
of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government [Joson III vs. Court of
Appeals, 482 SCRA 360(2006)].

TORRES, ROMEL G.
_________________________________________
b. Decisions
Form and Notice of Decision
(a) The investigation of the case shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from the start thereof. Within thirty (30) days after the end of the
investigation, the Office of the President or the sanggunian concerned shall
render a decision in writing stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the
reasons for such decision. Copies of said decision shall immediately be
furnished the respondent and all interested parties.
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor
shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended
as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
(c) The penalty of removal from office as a result of an administrative
investigation shall be considered a bar to the candidacy of the respondent
for any elective position (Section 66, R.A. No. 7160).


i. Validity
To render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local officials,
the decision of the Sanggunian must thus be in writing stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decision. Neither may the so-called
Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5,
1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of
the requisite majority. Like the procedure in the Supreme Court, the voting
following the deliberation of the members of the Sanggunian did not necessarily
constitute their decision unless this was embodied in an opinion prepared by one
of them and concurred in by the others, in the same way that the voting following
the deliberation on a case in the Supreme Court becomes its decision only after the
opinion prepared by a Justice is concurred in by others composing the majority.
Until they have signed the opinion and the decision is promulgated, the Justices
are free to change their votes.
Reelection of respondent abates any administrative disciplinary proceedings
against him.-
Pursuant to 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense. On the other hand, any administrative disciplinary
proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is reelected,
because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct he might
have committed during his previous term (Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616).


ii. Penalty
There is no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension,
although the aggregate thereof exceeds six months and the unexpired portion of
the elective officials term of office where the suspension imposed for each
administrative offense does not exceed six months and there is an express
provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the
unexpired portion of their term of office (Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55).

Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the
President in each of the subject four administrative cases are correct, it committed
no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the
aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners
term of office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each
administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express
provision that the successive service of the suspension should not exceed the
unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners. Their term of office expired
at noon of 30 June 1995. And this Court is not prepared to rule that the
suspension amounted to the petitioners removal from office.
The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since
such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in
the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section 60. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 grants to the disciplining authority the power to
remove an elective local official. Paragraph (b) of the said Article provides as
follows: (b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60,

The Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the
disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other. (Emphasis supplied) This grant to the disciplining authority of the power to
remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. It is settled that no rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, like the Local
Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law

that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of
harmony with the statute is a nullity (supra).

Power to remove erring elective local officials from service lodged exclusively
with the courts. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the power to remove erring elective
local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b),
Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,
insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring
elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of
the Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective
public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such
power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for
what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people
through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put
to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where the
disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove,
it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove
(Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601, July 31, 2002).


c. Appeal
i. Availability of appeal
Petitioner brought this case by way of petition for certiorari and mandamus.
A prime specification of the writ of certiorari, however, is that there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available
to petitioner. But, in the case at bar, petitioner could have appealed the decision of
the Sanggunian to the Office of the President as provided in 67(b) of the Local
Government Code. The so-called Decision prepared by Sanggunian Member
Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 cannot be regarded as the decision of the
Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority [Malinao vs. Reyes,
255 SCRA 616(1996)].


ii. Execution pending appeal
The decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code
are immediately executory even pending appeal. Under the same case of Lapid v. Court
of Appeals, we enunciated that the decisions of the Office of the President under the
Local Government Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the
pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandated them to be so. In
sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for
reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court
of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision. Thus, the
DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution (Calingin vs. Court of
Appeals, 439 SCRA 173).

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a
substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws (Berces vs. Guingona, 241 SCRA 539).



d. Effect of Re-election
Petitioners re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the
administrative case pending before us moot and academic.
Except for criminal acts committed, public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term.-
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefore. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup
(Aquinaldo vs. Santos, 212 SCRA 768).

b) Appointive officials
J. Recall
By Whom Exercised
The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered
voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such
recall belongs (Section 69, R.A. No. 7160).
A. Initiation
Initiation of the Recall Process
(a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the
registered voters of the local government unit to which the local elective
official subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city,
district, and municipality which shall be composed of the following:
(1) Provincial level. - All mayors, vice-mayors, and sanggunian
members of the municipalities and component cities;
(2) City level. - All punong barangay and sanggunian barangay
members in the city;
(3) Legislative District level. - In case where sangguniang
panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal
officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod
members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the
district; and
(4) Municipal level. - All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay
members in the municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene
in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceedings against any
elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial,
city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution
adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly
concerned during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may
also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of
the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned
during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was
elected.
(1) A written petition for recall duly signed before the election registrar
or his representative, and in the presence of a representative of the
petitioner and a representative of the official sought to be recalled
and, and in a public place in the province, city, municipality, or
barangay, as the case may be, shall be filed with the COMELEC
through its office in the local government unit concerned. The
COMELEC or its duly authorized representative shall cause the
publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a
period of not less than ten (10) days nor more than twenty (20) days,
for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the
petition and the required percentage of voters.
(2) Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the COMELEC or its duly
authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of
candidates to the position and thereafter prepare the list of
candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be
recalled (Section 70, R.A. No. 7160).

The petition to initiate recall proceedings must be of or by, at least 25% of the
total number of registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only,
but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters. Recall must be pursued by
the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of
disenchanted electors, otherwise its purpose as a direct remedy of the people shall be
defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would
destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government
(Angobung vs. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 245).

B. Limitations
(a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once
during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election (Section 74, R.A. No. 7160).

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated
in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law, and
who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of
age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the
rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 113-118).
Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424,
Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not qualified
to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no manner then
may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or local) (Paras
vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49).


A recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory recall
assembly (PRA) or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters
of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or
petition with the COMELEC; As used in par. (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code,
recall refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they
should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Since the power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings
but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74 of the Local Gov-
ernment Code cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedingsthe
limitations in Section 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is
vested in the registered voters (Claudio vs. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388).

C. Mootness
The specific purpose of the preparatory recall assembly was to revive the vice-
mayor. However, the resolution does not apply to the vice-mayor anymore, since she
gave up the office of vice-mayor when she assumed the position of mayor (Afiado vs.
COMELEC, 340 SCRA 600).

K. Term limits
C. Term
The principal aim of the liga ng mga barangay is to promote the development of
barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.
The rule is settled that unless holding over be expressly or impliedly prohibited, the
incumbent may continue to hold-over until someone else is elected and qualified to
assume office (Galarosa vs. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728).

Special elections could be held anytime, provided the date of the special
elections is within thirty days from the time the cause of postponement has ceased.-
Unlike Section 6, Section 45 does not state that special elections should be held on a
date reasonably close to the date of the election not held. Instead, Section 45 states that
special elections should be held within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for
postponement. Logically, special elections could be held anytime, provided the date of
the special elections is within thirty days from the time the cause of postponement has
ceased (Sambarani vs. Commission on elections, 438 SCRA 319).

Since there was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13
August 2002 special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay
chairmen of their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity (supra).
As the law now stands, the language of Section 5 of RA 9164 is clear. It is the
duty of this Court to apply the plain meaning of the language of Section 5. Since there
was a failure of elections in the 15 July 2002 regular elections and in the 13 August
2002 special elections, petitioners can legally remain in office as barangay chairmen of
their respective barangays in a hold-over capacity. They shall continue to discharge
their powers and duties as punong barangay, and enjoy the rights and privileges
pertaining to the office. True, Section 43(c) of the Local Government Code limits the
term of elective barangay officials to three years. However, Section 5 of RA 9164
explicitly provides that incumbent barangay officials may continue in office in a hold
over capacity until their successors are elected and qualified (supra).






TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.
____________________________________________
L. Local Government Units
1) Barangay
2) Municipality
3) City
4) Province
A. Barangays
As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and
implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities
in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may
be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably
settled (Section 384, R.A. No. 7160).
The Code explicitly vests on the punong barangay, upon approval by a
majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay, the power to appoint or
replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive
barangay officials [Section 389 (b) (5) R.A No. 7160]. This provision is reinforced, in
the case of the secretary and the treasurer, by the provisions of Section 394 and
Section 395 of the Local Government Code. Applying the rule that the power to
appoint includes the power to remove, one that the Court finds no cogent reason to
now depart from, the questioned dismissal from office of the barangay officials by
the punong barangay without the concurrence of the majority of all the members of
the Sangguniang Barangay cannot be legally justified. To rule otherwise could also
create an absurd situation of the Sangguniang Barangay members refusing, like
here, to give their approval to the replacements selected by the punong barangay
who has unilaterally terminated the services of the incumbents. It is likely that the
legislature did not intend this absurdity to flow from its enactment of the law
[Alquizola vs. Ocol, 313 SCRA 273, August 27, 1999].


B. Municipality and Cities
The municipality, consisting of a group of barangays, serves primarily as a
general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and
direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial
jurisdiction (Section 440, R.A. No. 7160).
The city, consisting of more urbanized and developed barangays, serves as a
general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular, and
direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial
jurisdiction (Section 448, R.A. No. 7160).
1. Employees

Paragraph 12 along with paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 13 and 14 of EO 503 deals with
safeguards against termination, reduction of pay and diminution in rank of
existing personnel; it is not about the power of the mayor to discipline personnel of
the Division of City Schools. In effect, the said provision serves more to limit the
appointing authority of the city mayor, whose acts must be circumscribed by the
aforecited conditions. It is not incompatible and can exist with aforecited provisions
of the Administrative Code. Indeed, it cannot be deemed to have divested the
regional director of his disciplining power. The court agreed with the CA that the
LGC did not automatically repeal the provisions in the 1987 Administrative Code,
contrary to petitioners argument. There is no provision in the LGC expressly
rescinding the authority of the DECS regional director to appoint and exercise
disciplinary authority over first-level employees. On the other hand, implied
repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing of such intention. Absent any contrary statutory provision, the power to
appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. Since respondent was
appointed by the regional director of DECS, she may be disciplined or removed by
the latter pursuant to law (Aguirre vs. De Castro, 321 SCRA 95, December 17,
1999).


2. Powers of mayors
a. Imposition of conditions for issuance of mayors permit
The distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do
business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular
profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is
issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A
business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business
or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is
the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of
his or her profession. (Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
329 SCRA 314, March 31, 2000).
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioners business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in
petitioners employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from
the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to
regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance
of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a
function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically
empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional
Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry. In the case at
bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage
in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to
engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does
have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the
Board of Examiners in Optometry (supra.)

b. Issuance of mayors permit
The exercise of the power of a mayor to issue licenses and permits cannot be
deemed ministerial, and as to whether the power was validly exercised is a matter
within the province of a writ of certiorari, not of mandamus. While the Supreme
Court agreed with petitioner that there is no ordinance conferring upon the
respondent mayor the power to refuse the issuance of the permit for the operation
of an arrastre service, we are, as yet, unprepared to declare that the power of the
municipal mayor as enunciated under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) is ministerial. What can
be deduced from the aforesaid section is that the limits in the exercise of the power
of a municipal mayor to issue licenses, and permits and suspend or revoke the

same can be contained in a law or an ordinance. Otherwise stated, a law or an
ordinance can provide the conditions upon which the power of the municipal
mayor under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) can be exercised. Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 takes its cue from Section 16 thereof, which is largely an
exercise of delegated police power. The general welfare clause is the delegation in
statutory form of the police power of the State to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may
prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents
and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Accordingly, the court have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the
regulation of gambling, the occupation of rig drivers, the installation and operation
of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of cockpits, the exhumation
and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, and the operation of hotels,
motels, and lodging houses as valid exercises by local legislatures of the police
power under the general welfare clause (Roble Arraste, Inc. vs. Villaflor, 499
SCRA 434, August 22, 2006).

c. Revocation of mayors permit
The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not expressly
granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to revoke is limited by the
authority to grant the license, from which it is derived in the first place. Thus, if
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) grants a license upon its finding that the
applicant drug store has complied with the requirements of the general laws and
the implementing administrative rules and regulations, it is only for their violation
that the FDA may revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the
permit upon his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied particularly
to Olongapo City have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such
conditions that the mayor may revoke the said permit. In the case at bar, the
petitioner acted invalidly in revoking Mayor's Permit No. 1954 after the FDA had
authorized the resumption of operations of the San Sebastian Drug Store following
the enforcement of the penalties imposed upon it. However, it was competent for
the petitioner to suspend Mayor's Permit No. 1955 for the transfer of the Olongapo
City Drug Store in violation of the said permit. Such suspension should
nevertheless be effective only pending the return of the drug store to its authorized
original site or the eventual approval by the mayor of the requested transfer if
found to be warranted (Gordon vs. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 51, November 8, 1988).

While the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue
the same, he must observe, however, due process in exercising these powers,
which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard. True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate
private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police raid
on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these
commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he directed
policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such
act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716 which expressly prohibits police raids and
inspections, to wit: Section 1. No member of the Western Police District shall
conduct inspection of food and other business establishments for the purpose of
enforcing sanitary rules and regulations, inspecting licenses and permits, and/or
enforcing internal revenue and customs laws and regulations. This responsibility
should be properly exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned
agencies. (Emphasis supplied) These local government officials include the City
Health Officer or his representative, pursuant to the Revised City Ordinances of the
City of Manila, and the City Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the Local
Government Code (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 387 SCRA 149, August 12, 2002)

d. Appointment of employees

The provisions of Republic Act 5185 giving mayors the power to appoint all
officials entirely paid out by City funds and those of BP 337 empowering local
executives to appoint all officers and employees of the city, were not meant to
deprive the City Council of Manila, its appointing power granted by existing statute
and after all, that arrangement is sufficient to accomplish the objectives of both the
Decentralization Act and the Local Government Code, that is, to provide teeth to
local autonomy (Lopez vs. Civil Service Commission, 195 SCRA 777, April 16,
1991)

e. Removal of employees
Generally the power to appoint includes the power to remove employees
appointed by a municipal mayor without having to secure the concurrence of the
Sangguniang Bayan may be similarly terminated by him without the need to
secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan. As for petitioners argument
that the former mayor acted without the authority of the Sangguniang Bayan, the
same does not lie. Under R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code), a head of
department or office in the municipal government shall be appointed by the mayor
with the concurrence of the majority of all sangguniang bayan members. Generally
the power to appoint includes the power to remove except in instances where it
does not include the power to remove, e.g. 1. The Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman who are
appointed by the President may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 2. The Judges of lower
court are subject to discipline by the Supreme Court en banc which can order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Since it is not claimed
that respondent was a head of department or office in the office of petitioner, then
following Sec. 444(5) of the Local Government Code, under which a mayor is
empowered to appoint all officials whose salaries and wages are wholly or mainly
paid out of municipal funds and whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for in this Code, as well as those he may be authorized by law to appoint, former
Mayor Camero did not have to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan
to terminate respondents services (Municipal of La Libertad vs. Penaflor, 453
SCRA 833, March 18, 2005).

f. Prevention of pollution
It is beyond a municipal mayors ken and competence to review, revise,
reverse, or set aside a permit to operate the petitioners charcoal briquette plant
issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), which is the primary
authority to determine whether petitioners manufacturing process violates anti-
pollution laws, rules and regulations. The complaint against the petitioner for
violation of anti-pollution laws should have been addressed to the EMB which
alone is empowered to investigate and, after a public hearing, to determine whether
the charcoal briquette plant was causing air pollution in excess of permissible
limits, whether the discharge of smoke from petitioners 16-meter smoke stack
should be reduced or discontinued, whether additional devices for that purpose
should be installed, and whether its business should be temporarily suspended or
totally banned. That investigation and determination can only be made by the EMB,
assisted by its staff of sanitary engineers, environmental experts, chemists,
physicians, and technical men working with scientific equipment and laboratory
facilities to measure the degree and extent of air pollution in the plant site and
around it, and determine the danger, if any, that it poses to the health of the
people in the barangay where the plant is located (Technology Development Inc,
vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA xi).

C. Provinces

The province, composed of cluster of municipalities, or municipalities and
component cities, and as a political and corporate unit of government, serves as
dynamic mechanism for developmental processes and effective governance of local
government units within its territorial jurisdiction (Section 459, R.A. No. 7160)



1. Appointment of officials
The power to appoint or designate one temporarily in cases of
temporary absence or disability or a vacancy in a provincial office resides in
the President of the Philippines, not the Provincial Governor.
The law applicable is Section 471(a) of RA 7160 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code which mandates that:
Sec. 471. Assistant Treasurers.(a) An assistant treasurer may be appointed by
the Secretary of Finance from a list of at least three (3) ranking eligible
recommendees of the governor or mayor, subject to civil service law, rules and
regulations.
x x x x x x x x x
In fact, the appointing officer is authorized by law to order the payment of
compensation to any government officer or employee designated or appointed to fill
such vacant position, as provided under Section 2077 of the Revised
Administrative Code which states that:
Section 2077. Compensation for person appointed to temporary service.
In case of the temporary absence or disability of a provincial officer or in case of a
vacancy in a provincial office, the President of the Philippines or officer having the
power to fill such position may, in his discretion, order the payment of
compensation, or additional compensation, to any Government officer or employee
designated or appointed temporarily to fill the place, but the total compensation
paid shall not exceed the salary authorized by law for the position filled.
Undoubtedly, the aforecited laws do not authorize the Provincial Governor to
appoint nor even designate one temporarily in cases of temporary absence or
disability or a vacancy in a provincial office. That power resides in the President of
the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance. Necessarily, petitioners designation as
Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by Governor Mayo being
defective, confers no right on the part of petitioner to claim the difference in the
salaries and allowances attached to the position occupied by him.
Moreover, what was extended to petitioner by Governor Mayo was merely a
designation not an appointment (Dimaandal vs. Commission on Audit, 291
SCRA 322, June 26, 1998)

2. Vice Governor
It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and duties
of the Office of the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only acts as
the Governor but does not become the Governor. His assumption of the powers,
duties and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent
vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily, he does not
relinquish nor abandon his position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming
an Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the powers and duties
of the higher office. But the problem is, while in such capacity, does he temporarily
relinquish the powers, functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor,
including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP? Sad to say the new
Local Government Code is silent on this matter, yet this query should be answered
in the positive. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually
a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative
prerogatives and powers, he is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time
being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are

essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board
perform functions partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority
vested by law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some
legislative powers of Congress (Gamboa vs. Aguirre, 310 SCRA 867, July 20,
1999).

To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor
creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor
whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This
event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice
Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of
the remedy set in Article 49(b) of the Local Government Codeconcerning the
election of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting Governors
(Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is
in such capacity. Under Section 49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the regular
presiding officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members present and
constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding
officer.(supra.)

The Vice-Governor, as the presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, has administrative control of the funds of the said body and it is
he who has the authority to approve disbursement vouchers for expenditures
appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. However, in this
case, it does not appear whether the contractual/job order employees, whose
appointments were terminated or cancelled by the Memorandum dated July 1,
2002 issued by the respondent Governor, were paid out of the provincial funds
or the funds of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nonetheless, the validity of the said
memorandum cannot be upheld because it absolutely prohibited the respondent
Vice-Governor from exercising his authority to appoint the employees, whether
regular or contractual/job order, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and restricted
such authority to one of recommendatory nature only. This clearly constituted an
encroachment on the appointment power of the respondent Vice- Governor
under Section 466(a)(2) of Rep. Act No. 7160 (Atienza vs. Villarosa, 458 SCRA
385, May 10, 2005).



HASHIM, ZAIDA AMORILLE B.
__________________________________________
1. Basic Principle
A. Policy and Application
1. Declaration Policy
a. Local autonomy for territorial and political subdivisions
The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy (Art. 10 Sec. 2
of the Philippine Constitution).

b. Accountability of Local Government units through recall, initiative and
referendum

It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local
government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative and referendum (Sec 2 (b) of RA 7160).

c. Consultation by national offices with local government units and non-
government organizations before implementing any program (Sec.2)
It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units,
non-governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the
community before any project or program is implemented in their respective
jurisdictions (Sec 2 (c) of RA 7160)

2. Rules interpretation
a. Liberal Interpretation of power of local government units
Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit.
Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted
in favor of the local government unit concerned [Section 5 (a), R.A. No. 7160]

b. Strict construction of tax ordinances
Section 5. (b) In case of doubt, any tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be
construed strictly against the local government unit enacting it, and liberally in
favor of the taxpayer. Any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any local
government unit pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall be construed strictly
against the person claiming it [Section 5. (b)]

c. Liberal interpretation of general welfare provisions
The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to
give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community [Section 5. (c)]

d. Application of Original terms of construct or law upon vested rights
Rights and obligations existing on the date of effectivity of this Code and arising
out of contracts or any other source of presentation involving a local government
unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the
law in force at the time such rights were vested [Section 5. (d)]

e. Resort to customs in the absence of law or jurisprudence (Sec.5)
In the resolution of controversies arising under this Code where no legal provision
or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to the customs and traditions in the
place where the controversies take place [Section 5. (e)]

B. General Powers and Attributes of Local Government Units

1. A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered by law in the case of a province, city,
municipality, or other political subdivision, or by city or provincial ordinance in the
case of a barangay
2. The creation or conversation of a local government unit to another level shall be
based on:
a. sufficient income
Income - It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate
with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

Province- 20 million Annual Income
City- 20 million Annual Income
Municipality- 2.5 million Annual Income
b. Population
Population - It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned

Province- 200,000
City- 150,000
Municipality- 25,000
Baranggay- 2,000/ Highly Urbanized 5,000
c. Land area (Sec.7)
Land Area - It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified
by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such
basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. Compliance
with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance
(DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau
(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

Province- 200 sq. km.
City- 100 sq. km.
Municipality- 50 sq. km
3. Division and merger of local government units shall comply with the same
requirements for their creation. The income, population or land area shall not be
reduced to less than the minimum requirements.(Sec.8)

4. a local government unit may be abolished when its income, population or land
area has been reduced to less than the minimum requirements (Sec.9)
5. The creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of the
boundaries of local government units must be approved by plebiscites in the
political units affected. (Sec.10)
6. The corporate existence of a new local government unit shall commence upon
election and qualification of its chief executive and majority f the members of the
sangunian. (Sec.14)
7. Every local government unit is a body politic and corporate. (Sec.15)
8. Powers
a. Powers expressly granted
Among the authorities and powers granted to LGUs under RA 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, is the power to
generate resources to supplement national governments ssistance through
Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA) and grants. Under Section 18 thereof, LGUs are
authorized to levy taxes, fees and charges and create other sources of revenues for
its exclusive use and disposition. The power to impose fee/charge/ or generate
revenue under the Code is exercised by the Sanggunian through an appropriate
ordinance.

b. implied powers
c. powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for efficient and effective
governance
d. Powers essential for promotion of general welfare. (Sec.16)
9. A local government unit may exercise the power of eminent domain.
a. an offer must have been made to the owner and rejected.
b. The local government unit may immediately take the possession upon filling
of expropriation proceedings and deposit in court of 15% of the fair market value.
(Sec.19)
10. a local government unit may close or open any local road, alley, park or square
by two thirds vote of all members of the sangunian. Property permanently
withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any proposes. (Sec.20 )
11. Corporate Powers
a. powers
i. To have continues succession in the name

ii. To sue and the sued
iii. To have and use a seal
iv. To acquire and convey property
v. To exercise other powers granted to corporations. (Sec.22)
b. The local chief executive may not enter into any contract without prior
authorization by sangunian. (Sec.22)
12. Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability
for death or injury to a person or damage to property. (Sec.24)

PATALINGHUG, VRAMIE L.
_____________________________________
C. Intergovernmental relations
1. National government and local government units
a. The President shall exercise general supervision over government units.
i. The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities.
ii. The President shall exercise supervision over component cities and
municipalities though the province and over barangays through the city and
municipality. (Sec.25)
b. No project shall be implemented by government authorities without consultation
with the local government units and prior approval of the sangunian (Sec.27).
2. Inter-Local Government Relations
a. The province, through the governor, shall ensure that any component city and
municipality acts within powers. (Sec.27)
b. The city or municipality, through the major, shall ensure that barangays act
within the scope of their powers. (Sec.29)
c. The governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the mayor. The
mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by punong barangays. (Se.30)
II. Elective Officials
A. Qualifications and Election
1. Qualifications

a. Common qualifications
i. Filipino Citizen
ii. Registered over the local government unit, or the district where he intends to
elected in the case of members of the sangunian.
iii. Residence therein for the least one year immediately before the election.
iv. Ability to read and write Filipino or any other local dialect.
b. Age
i. candidates and the provinces and highly urbanized cities--- 23 years.
ii. Candidates for mayor or vice mayor of component cities or municipalities--- 21
years
iii. Candidates for sangunian member in component cities and municipalities18
years
iv. Barangay officials18 years
v. Sanguniang kabataan--- 15 to less than 18 years (Sec. 7, Rep. Act. No. 1964)


2. Disqualifications
a. Those sentenced for an offense involving moral turpitude or an offense
punishable by imprisonment for one year or more, within two years after serving
sentence
b. Those removed from office because of an administrative case
c. Those convicted for violating oath of allegiance t the Philippines
d. Those with dual citizenship
e. Fugitive from justice
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of it.
g. The insane feeble minded

TORRES, ROMEL G.
______________________________________
3. Election

a. The Governor, vice governor, mayor, vice mayor, and punong barangay shall
be elected large. (Sec.41)
b. For Provinces and cities with two or more legislative districts, the elective
member of sangunian shall be elected by legislative districts. Provinces and cities
and municipalities in Metropolitan in Manila with only one legislative district shall
be divided into two districts by the Commission on Elections. (Sec. 3 (a) and (b)
Rep. Act. No. 7166; Sec. 1, Rep. Act. No. 7887)
c. Regular elective members of the sangunian of cities and municipalities shall be
elected at large. (Sec.1, Rep. Act. NO. 7887)
d. Sanguniang barangay members shall be elected in large.
e. The president of the league of the sangunian members of component cities and
municipalities shall be ex officio member of the sanguniang panlalawigan.
f. The president of the liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga
sanguniang kabataan shall be ex officio member of the sangunian.
g. There shall be a sectoral representative from the women, workers, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector determined
by the sangunian. (Sec.41)
4. Terms of office 3 years (Sec.43, as amended by Sec. 2, Rep. At. No. 9164)
B. Vacancies and Sucession
1. Governor and mayor
a. Vice governor and vice mayor
b. sanguniang members according to ranking
2. Punong barangay
a. Highest ranking sanguniang barangay member
b. Second highest ranking sanguniang barangay member
3. Ranking in the sangunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
the votes obtained to number of registered voters in each district.
4. Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots. (Sec.44)
5. Sangunian
a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent component cities----
appointment by President

b. Component city and municipality ---- appointment by governor
c. Sanguniang barangay appointment by mayor
d. Except for the sanguniang barangay, the appointment shall come from the
political party of the member who caused the vacancy.
e. If the member does not belong to any party, the appointee shall be
recommended by the sangunian.
f. The appointee for the sanguniang barngay shall be recommende by the
sanguniang barangay.
g. Vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sangunian
shall be filed by the official next in rank in the organization. (Sec.45)
6. Temporary Vacancy
a. When the governor, the mayor or punong barangay is temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties, the vice governor, vice mayor, or ranking
sanguniang barangay member shall exercise his powers except the power to
appoint, suspend or dismiss employees, which can only be exercised after 30
working days.
b. When the local chief executive is traveling within the Philippines for not more
than 3 consecutive days, he may designate an officer-in-charge. The authorization
shall specify the powers of the officers-in-charge except the power to appoint,
suspend or dismiss employees.
c. If the local executive does not issue the authorization, the vice governor, vice
mayor, or highest ranking sanguniang member shall assume his powers on the
fourth day of his absence. (Sec.46)

TANJUSAY, MARIA KATRINA S.
_________________________________________
C. Local Legislation
Local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
for the Province; the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the City; the Sangguniang Bayan
for the Municipality; and the Sangguniang Barangay for the Barangay (Section 48,
R.A. No. 7160).

1. The vice governor, the vice mayor, and the punong barangay shall be presiding
officer of the sangunians but shall vote only in case of a tie [Section 49 (a), R.A.
No. 7160].
2. In case of inability of the presiding officer, the members shall elect a temporary
presiding officer from among themselves [Section 49 (b), R.A. No. 7160].
3 For disorderly behavior and absence without justifiable cause for four (4)
consecutive sessions a, member may be censured, reprimanded, excluded from the
session, suspended for not more than 60 days, or expelled. Suspension or
expulsion shall require concurrence of at least two thirds (2/30 vote of all the
sanggunian members. A member sentenced by final judgment to imprisonment for
at least one year for a crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically
expelled. [Section 50 (b) (5), R.A. No. 7160].
4 Every sanggunian member, upon assumption of officer , shall make a full
disclosure of his business and financial, or professional relationship or any
relation within the fourth degree which he may have with any one effected by any
ordinance or resolution of the sanggunian which involves a conflict interest
[Section 51 (a), R.A. No. 7160]. Such relationship shall include:
(1) Investment in the entity to which the ordinance may apply
(2) Contracts with any person to which the ordinance or resolution may apply
"Conflict of Interest" refers in general to one where it may be reasonably deduced
that a member of a sanggunian may not act in the public interest due to some
private, pecuniary, or other personal considerations that may tend to affect his
judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public Section 51 (a) (2), R.A. No.
7160].

5 A special session may be called by the local chief executive or a majority of the
sanggunian members. Unless concurred in by two-thirds vote of the members
present, no matter may be considered at a special session except those stated in
the notice. Section 52, R.A. No. 7160].
6 A majority of all the members of the sanggunian shall constitute quorum.
Section 53, R.A. No. 7160].

7 The veto shall be communicated to the sanggunian within 15 days in the case
of a province and 10 days in the case of a city or municipality. Section 51 (b),
R.A. No. 7160]. The sanggunian may override the veto by two-thirds of all its
members. Section 55 (c), R.A. No. 7160].
8 The governor or mayor may veto any item in the following cases:
a. Appropriation ordinance
b. Ordinance adopting a local development plan and public investment program.
c. Ordinance directing the payment of money or creating a liability. Section 55,
R.A. No. 7160].
9. Review
a. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall review ordinances and resolutions of cities
and municipalities to determine if they are within their power. Section 56, R.A.
No. 7160].
b The sangguniang panlungsod or bayan shall review sangguniang barangay
ordinance to determine if they are lawful. Section 57, R.A. No. 7160].

10. Effectivity
a. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance, it shall take effect after 10 days from
posting at the provincial capitol or city, municipality or barangay hall and two
other conspicuous places [Section 59 (a), R.A. No. 7160].
b. The gist of all ordinance with penal sanction shall be published in in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. In the absence of such
newspaper, the ordinance shall be posted in all municipalities and cities of the
province where the sanggunian of origin is situated [Section 59 (c), R.A. No.
7160].
c. In highly urbanize and independent component cities, in addition to posting , the
main features of the ordinance shall be published in a local newspaper of general
circulation. In the absence of such newspaper, it shall be circulation. [Section 59
(d), R.A. No. 7160].