THE CRIMINOLOGY OF TERRORISM: HISTORY, LAW, DEFINITIONS,

TYPOLOGIES
"One man willing to throw his life away is enough to terrorize thousands." (Wu Ch'i)

Terrorism has been around as a major nuisance to governments as long as recorded

history. The Bible advocates terror, assassination, and annihilation in several places
(see the book of Numbers and book of Joshua). Regicide, or the killing of kings by
rivals, and the brutal suppression of loyalists afterwards, has been an established
pattern of political ascent since Julius Caesar (44 B.C.). The Zealots in Israel (100 A.D.)
fought Roman occupation with hit-and-run tactics in public places. The Assassins in
Iraq (1100 A.D.) fought the Christian Crusaders with suicide tactics. The Thuggees in
India (1300 A.D.) kidnapped travelers for sacrifice to their Goddess of Terror, Kali.
The Spanish Inquisition (1469-1600) dealt with Heretics by systematized torture, and the
whole medieval era was based on terrorizing a countryside. The Luddites (1811-1816)
destroyed machinery and any symbol of modern technology. A Serb terrorist (1914)
started World War I. Hitler's rise to power (1932) involved plans for genocide. Nations
like Ireland, Cyprus, Algeria, Tunisia, and Israel probably would have never become
republics if not for revolutionary terrorism, and more than a few people would say the
United States was founded on terrorism. However defined, it is clear that terrorism has
helped shape world history in a variety of ways, and it has long meant different things to
different people.

The academic field of what Ross (2006) calls terrorism studies has grown substantially
in recent years. Two scholarly journals focus almost exclusively on the subject --
Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. More and better
empirical studies have been conducted, and in some ways, despite setbacks such as the
U.N. failure to define terrorism (no internationally accepted definition of terrorism
exists), better definitions of terrorism have been established. Certain areas of interest
are of growing importance, such as the role of the media in terrorism (need for more
research on this), and whether 9/11 produced a paradigm shift or whether terrorism is
nothing new, among other issues. There is a need to be cautious in tossing the terrorist
label around, as most experts (e.g., Hoffman & Claridge 1998) suggest it is better to
define terrorism by the nature of the act rather than by the identity or socio-
demographics of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, reproduced below (noting there is no
"one, best" definition) is the field's so-called "consensus" definition, devised in the early
1980s and probably adhered to by (it can be estimated) about 75% of experts in the
field, despite reservations about its failure to distinguish supporters of terrorism as well
as terrorism-like criminal behaviors such as drug trafficking:

The Consensus Definition of Terrorism

Terrorism is a method of combat in which random or symbolic victims become
targets of violence. Through the previous use of violence or the credible threat of
violence, other members of a group are put in a state of chronic fear (terror). The
victimization of the target is considered extranormal by most observers...which in
turn creates an audience beyond the target of terror.... The purpose of terrorism is
either to immobilize the target of terror in order to produce disorientation and/or
compliance, or to mobilize secondary targets of demand or targets of attention
(Schmid 1983: 111)
 THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM

One cannot avoid long-standing debates, going back as far as Aristotle, over when it is
politically and morally acceptable to use unconventional tactics such as violence and fear
to bring about political and social change. History is replete with the ideas of great
thinkers who believed that, under the right circumstances, unconventional tactics were
not only smart, but a moral or civic duty. Religious leaders over the centuries have
contributed thoughts about when unjust warfare is just, when "holy terror" is justified,
and military thinkers have advocated less-than-honorable tactics. Most terrorism
throughout history has been directed against governments (what is called political or
revolutionary terrorism), but terrorism can also be global or take the forms of state
terrorism or state-sponsored terrorism. These latter types occur when governments
turn on their own citizens, or try to stir up trouble among the citizenry of another
nation. In fact, it was state terrorism that put modern use of the term "terrorism" in
the English vocabulary.

The French Revolution Origins of Terrorism

The word "terrorism" traces its roots in the English language to the French Revolution
(1789-1795) when British statesman Edmund Burke used the term to describe the actions
of the Jacobin-dominated French government. During a period of the French Revolution
known as the Reign of Terror (1793-1794) under the leadership of Maximilien
Robespierre (Head of the Committee on Public Safety and Revolutionary Tribunal),
thousands of "enemies of the state" were put on trial and guillotined. Scholars disagree on
the numbers, but the larger estimates are that 500,000 citizens were arrested, 40,000 were
executed, 200,000 were deported, and another 200,000 died in prison from starvation and
torture. Arrests and convictions were made on the flimsiest of evidence, as France
plummeted into a surveillance society with the moves of every citizen being watched.
Robespierre himself was assassinated by a coup d'etat in 1794, and what followed was a
period known as the White Terror, with the new regime hunting down the old regime as
terrorists. Napoleon Bonaparte put an end to in-fighting when he took power in 1799 to
recreate an empire-state.

The word "terrorism" took on a slightly different meaning after German philosopher,
Immanuel Kant wrote about it in 1798 to describe a pessimistic view of the destiny of
mankind. This idea of terror as the abandonment of all hope for a collective solution to
life's problems, and the scary, yet liberating experience of only being able to count on
yourself became the genesis of two mid-1800 ideas known as anarchism and
communism. Anarchism was invented in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and
expanded upon by Mikhail Bakunin in 1848 and Karl Heinzen in 1849. Anarchism
supported terrorism with statements such as "if you have to blow up half a continent to
destroy the enemy, do so with no scruples or conscience." Communism was invented in
1844 by Karl Marx contemplating the theses of Feuerbach, which were essentially
Kantian ideas about the liberating potential of self-reliance and mass movements. Lenin
expanded on communist theory by condemning individual acts of terrorism, yet
supporting mass acts of terrorism. It was Lenin in 1908 who invented modern state-
sponsored terrorism (or stirring up trouble among the citizenry of other nations) when he
said "We cannot reject terror, as it is the one form of military action which may be
perfectly suitable or even essential at a definite juncture in battle." The battle that
Lenin and Stalin fought for many years was the Cold War (1922-1993), which sought to
defeat capitalism and establish a world-wide communist regime. This Cold War
contained many proxy "Dirty Wars" between the United States and Russia (proxy
meaning fought on soil other than American or Russian), and helped establish the
international meaning and nature of terrorism. Meanwhile, Lenin and Trotsky started
up a Red Terror inside Russia from 1918-1923 with a vast gulag of concentration camps,
which was carried on by Stalin's purges in the mid-1930s with the Great Terror. The
United States, for its part, engaged in a "Red Scare" roundup of suspected anarchists
and communists. Terrorism sponsored abroad and at home went hand in hand during
the Cold War.

The next phase in the history of terrorism involved nationalism and the desire to rid a
country of colonial rule. The Macedonian insurgency (1893-1903) against the Turkish
Ottoman Empire became the first anti-colonial group in modern history to
systematically wage guerilla warfare, avoid conventional battle, occupy towns and
villages, engage in propaganda, and use terrorism to gain control. Nationalist terrorism
provided the notion that "there are no innocent non-combatants" since it was typical
with this type of terrorism for many more non-combatants to be killed than
combatants. Perhaps the most well-known figure in the history of nationalist terrorism
is Colonel T.E. Lawrence ("of Arabia"), who organized the 1916-1918 insurgency by
Arab irregulars against Ottoman Turks. Undoubtedly, another major figure was Mao
Zedong, whose peasant army brought down what was left of imperial Manchu China in
1949 at the start of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's victory and guerrilla warfare tactics
inspired revolutionaries and terrorists throughout the Third World, as did Fidel Castro
and Che Guevara during the Cuban Revolution of 1959. In fact, it was in Latin America
where terrorism became most closely tied to anti-colonialism. Carlos Marighella (1930-
1971) wrote the Latin American handbook on terrorism (The Minimanual of Urban
Guerrilla Warfare), claiming it required adherence to a "higher morality", that one
man's terrorist is another man's liberator. (The phrase "one person's terrorist is
another person's freedom fighter" has unknown origins.) In other parts of the world,
different anti-colonial patterns emerged, such as those associated with the non-terrorist
and non-violent tactics of Mahatma Gandhi. However, in Africa, terrorist tactics were
successfully used to achieve the independence of states such as Kenya and Algeria. It
was nationalist terrorism which popularized the phrase "freedom fighter."

Another period of time that brought a different meaning to terrorism was the World
War II period with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Here, the word "terrorism"
became to be associated with totalitarian regimes and police states. For example, when
Hitler's minister of the Interior, Hermann Goering said in 1933 that "I will not be
crippled by judicial thinking. I don't have to worry about justice. I shall use the power
of the police to the utmost," this is pretty much an announcement of a police state that
engages in terrorism against its own citizens. Words used to describe this kind of
terrorism include state terrorism, state-imposed terrorism, or state-directed terrorism.
It became typical of dictatorships in many places without Fascist or Nazi influence,
places like Argentina, Chile, Greece, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru,
because "death squads" or "terror squads" (usually off-duty policemen) roamed about
the countryside intimidating and killing political opponents, human rights workers,
student and labor leaders, journalists, and others.

The year 1968 marked a radical shift in Middle East politics when Palestinian groups
accomplished a streak of notable skyjackings. It could easily be argued that terrorism
in the Middle East had earlier benchmarks, and indeed certain religious aspects of it do,
but 1968 was a turning point. In the words of the PLO representative to the United
Nations that year, "The first several hijackings accomplished more for our cause than
twenty years of pleading" which illustrates this turning point that made all the world a
stage for international terrorism. Dershowitz (2002) documents other twists and turns in
Palestinian tactics, but another important date is 1974 when PLO Chairman Yassir
Araft eloquently argued before the U.N. that his people were "freedom fighters" not
terrorists (although see Ahmad 2001 for an account of the year 1944 being significant
when sympathy for the Holocaust caused people to start referring to Jewish terrorist
groups like Irgun, the Stern Gang, and Hagannah as "freedom fighters"). The 1960s
and 1970s also saw the emergence of a new type of nationalism called separatism. This
describes indigenous ethnic groups who have long lived in a province, but want to
separate from their host nation and start their own country. Examples include Quebec,
the Basque Homeland, and portions of Indonesia. Like their anti-colonial predecessors,
separatists sought to use terrorism to attract international sympathy and a perception of
them as freedom fighters.

In the 1980s, the War on Drugs was launched by the United States, and the word
"narco-terrorism" came into the vocabulary (Ehrenfeld 1990). The word meant that
drug trafficking was being used to propagate the objectives of certain governments and
terrorist organizations. Narco-terrorism was seen as a Communist plot at first.
Eventually, it became seen as an economic threat. However, the War on Drugs forced
the United States into building a military-police apparatus for intervening in the
domestic affairs of foreign countries. The U.S. also started paying attention to how
elections were held in foreign countries. As we entered the 1990s, America and the
Western powers also became aware of exactly how many "hot spots" (also called
"trouble spots", low intensity conflicts, or the gray area phenomenon) there were in the
world. Places like the Balkans, Kashmir, Somalia, and the Congo had been sitting as
powder kegs for years. Places like Syria, Iran, and Iraq were secretly sponsoring global
terrorism. Places like China, North Korea, and Pakistan were developing weapons of
mass destruction. And, then there was the problem of all the broken-up former Soviet
states.

With overwhelming challenges abroad and a tendency to be easily distracted by

domestic affairs, the United States suffered a major attack by terrorism on September
11, 2001 (Dudley 2002). Two planes were hijacked and flown into New York's World
Trade Center, a second plane flew into the Pentagon, and a third plane crashed into a
field in Pennsylvania. It was the worst terrorist attack on American soil, and like Pearl
Harbor, snapped America out of a false sense of security. Those responsible were
identified as belonging to al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, headquartered in
Afghanistan, and supported by a regime known as the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is only one of
numerous Islamic militant groups, and some experts have argued we need to classify al-
Qaeda as Islamo-fascist for its extreme fundamentalist beliefs, but al-Qaeda prefers to
think of itself as mujihadeen (holy warriors). In response to 9/11, the President
announced a War on Terrorism in front of Congress on September 20th. The speech
was very similar to Winston Churchill's famous 1940 "total war" speech before the
House of Commons as Prime Minister regarding victory at all costs.

Presidential Declaration of War on Terrorism

We will direct every resource at our disposal, every means of diplomacy, every tool of
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every
 necessary weapon of war to the disruption and eventual defeat of terrorism. Every nation
now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From
this day forward, any nation that harbors or supports terrorism will be regarded as a
hostile regime. We will do far more than retaliate. Americans should expect a battle
unlike any other they have ever seen, not one battle, but a lengthy campaign, some visible,
others secret. We will drive terrorists from place to place until there is no refuge or rest.

A declared War on Terrorism, sometimes abbreviated WOT (or GWOT, for Global)
is probably not the best way to put it, although it doesn't matter if the armed forces
engaged in such a struggle like the acronym GWOT, and it wins the war and/or gets it
over with. From an intellectual standpoint, however, and to be conceptually rigorous,
one would NOT normally declare war on a tactic (i.e., terrorism), but would instead
declare war on the root causes (e.g., extremism, fanaticism) of a problem. Definitional
problems remain, since goals are still nebulous (e.g., like a war on injustice). Wars are
usually fought against nationalities (e.g., war with the Germans), and to be brutally
honest, against religions, or at least radical elements of it (e.g., war with radical Islam).
War is the top gun in the specrum of conflict any power can launch against another
power, and GWOT calls for full-spectrum conflict. Spectrum of conflict is the term used
to describe a graduation of conflicts on continuums of intensity and scope. Full
spectrum wars can be fought absolutely or pragmatically. War itself is a word with
forensic dimensions and legal implications.

THE LAW OF TERRORISM

In contrast to other countries, the United States has no legal definition of terrorism.
There is no organized body of legislation one might call the law of terrorism, and there
is no inherent crime of terrorism (terrorists are charged with other offenses). There is a
long-standing legal code called Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2331 which is
entitled "Terrorism" and attempts to define it, but it is essentially all about
international terrorism and represents America's version of outlawing internecine
conflict on its soil. Internecine conflict is when someone else's battle spills over on your
land, which might not seem important, but terrorists often disregard any respected
areas of combat or demarcated battlefields. Constitutionally (at least for now), it is not
illegal to claim you are a terrorist, belong to a terrorist group, or be suspected of being a
terrorist. Ninety percent of the time, suspected terrorists do nothing wrong until they
commit an indictable act. Indicted terrorists are charged with other crimes -- planning
for violence, raising funds illegally, and carrying out a violent act. The most common
criminal charges against terrorists include bombing, arson, hijacking, assault, kidnapping,
murder, theft, and sabotage. For terrorists who are captured before completing an act, the
most common charges are illegal possession of explosives and weapons, illegal raising of
funds, and conspiracy. International law only recognizes the criminal corollaries of
terrorism, such as conspiracy, kidnapping, murder, and arson. State criminal laws do
recognize certain specific intent crimes, such as telephone harassment for terrorist
purposes, along with other stalking and domestic violence offenses, but these are not
really referring to terrorism but forms of personal intimidation. In short, there are an
assortment of terrorism-related laws, none of which alone or in combination, make any
sense in terms of understanding terrorism or getting a legal perspective on it. With few
exceptions (Henderson 2001; Combs 2003), authors don't even attempt a chapter on law
in their terrorism books.
 Let's try to cover terrorism law, relying upon resources such as a website the U.S.
State Department calls current anti-terrorism laws, and one at the University of
Pittsburgh that does a good job of tracking recent and pending anti-terrorism laws.
Basically, the following alphabetical list of items make up what might be called the
codified law of terrorism:

• AIRCRAFT & MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 2 -

outlaws destructive uses of vehicles
• BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 10 - bans the possession of
any biological weapons
• CHEMICAL WEAPONS, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 11B - bans the possession of
any chemical weapons
• CIVIL DISORDERS, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 12 - outlaws violent civil disorders
or riots
• DISASTER RELIEF, Title 42, Chapter 68 - sets up interstate assistance compacts
in case of emergency
• EMERGENCY POWERS, Title 50, Chapter 34 - allows declaration of national
emergency
• FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE, Title 50, Chapter 36 - allows
wiretaps on suspected terrorists
• IMMIGRATION, Title 8, Chapter 12, Section 1182 - allows deportation of
conspirators to terrorism
• INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 133B, Section 2331 --
outlaws political violence
• QUARANTINE & INSPECTION, Title 42, Chapter 6A, Subchapter II, Part G -
allows border shutdowns
• REWARDS FOR ESPIONAGE, Title 18, Part II, Chapter 204 - rewards citizens
who snitch on enemies of state
• SABOTAGE, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 105 - makes anything impeding a war
effort illegal
• SEDITION, Title 18, Chapter 115 - outlaws conspiring to overthrow the
government
• WAR POWERS, Title 50, Chapter 33 - allows President & Congress to jointly
declare war
• WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, Title 50, Chapter 40 - bans possession of
any such weapons

Codified laws, like the above, have stood the test of time, and in addition have
received the approval of various jurist associations. There is little chance of
misunderstanding a codified law. Next in order of importance, are the court cases which
have established precedent as binding and guiding forces of law. The following selected
cases make up what might be called the case law of terrorism:

• Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) - The constitutional right to free
speech only applies to discussion or explanation of doctrines or ideologies that
urge the overthrow of the government. Speech that advocates such overthrow or
interferes with vital matters of national security is not protected.
 • Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) - To qualify as an indictable enemy of
the U.S., a person must take some concrete steps toward harmful action, and not
simply be expressing their opinions.
• Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) - Persons who belong to enemy groups
with only a supportive, passive, or inactive role are just as indictable as those who
play more active roles.
• Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) - Puts the burden of proof on
prosecutors to show political speech is inherently violent, and removes the
burden on defendants to show it was vague.
• U.S. v. Wang Kun Lue & Chen De Yian, U.S. 2D Circ., 96-1314 (1996) - Allows
states to pass anti-terrorism laws which are extensions of international treaties.
• Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 97-1252 (1999) -
Immigrants can be deported for engaging in terrorist or political activities where
evidence supporting such claims is presented in secret.
• Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2D 402, 419 (D.N.J. 1999) - Immigrants on
student visas can be deported on the basis of secret evidence that supports claims
they are terrorists or dangerous.

In addition to codes and cases, there is what is called "public law" which consist of
legislation signed into law. Often, these have not yet passed constitutional muster, but
they represent what the legislative branch of government thinks ought to be done
quickly. The following acts are a select list of what makes up the public law of
terrorism:

• Title 22, Chapter 38, Sec. 2656f Annual Country Reports on Terrorism
-- Since 1988, the Dept. of State has been required to submit to Congress a
detailed report on major, "significant" terrorist events.
• Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 -- Bans terrorist
fundraising in the United States, sets up an expedited alien terrorist removal
system, modifies the procedures for requesting political asylum, curtails the
appeal process, increases the penalties for conspiracies involving explosives and
other terrorist crimes, applies the money laundering statute to terrorism, and
clarifies federal and state police jurisdiction over investigating terrorism.
• Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation
Act of 2001 -- Enhances penalties for knowingly concealing or disguising the
nature, location, source, ownership, or control of material support or resources
to terrorists.
• Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT)
Act of 2001 -- Enhances roving surveillance authority and streamlines wiretap
authorizations, sets up anti-terrorism asset forfeiture procedures, approves
detention of suspected terrorists, removes obstacles to investigating terrorism,
increases the penalties for terrorist crimes, removes any statute of limitations,
encourages federal involvement in domestic preparedness exercises, and
supporting creation of a new agency called the office of Homeland Security.
• Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 -- creates a new federal
agency called the Transportation Security Administration as well as a federal Air
Marshals program.
 • Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 -- Sets up
joint military, police, and intelligence community tracking systems for facial
recognition, voice intercept, and other technologies useful in improving border
security.

Then, following codes, cases, and legislation, there are pronouncements made by the
executive branch of government, called Executive Orders, Decisions, Declarations, or
Directives. The most well-known of these is probably the Presidential Decision
Directive, or PDD, which has a long history of use going back to creation of the NSA and
the launching of various secret missions during the Vietnam War. Many documents in
this category are classified, but others are easily found on the White House web site.
They are considered binding "administratively" upon government employees who work
for an executive branch agency. The most common type of administrative law is made
up of regulations passed by the heads of various agencies, but with terrorism, many
executive decisions are made, so the following documents would make up the
administrative law of terrorism:

• Executive Order on Terrorist Financing (September 18, 2001) - Blocks and

prohibits financial transactions designed to support terrorist groups not yet
designated by the U.S. Department of State as foreign entities that support
terrorism.
• Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security (October 8,
2001) - establishes a new federal agency called the Department of Homeland
Security.
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1 (October 30, 2001) - Establishes
a Council of Deputies and Principles for the review of intelligence analysis
reports.
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-2 (October 30, 2001) - Sets up
aggressive, new immigration policies to locate, detain, prosecute, and deport
suspected terrorists.
• Military Order for the Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (November 13, 2001) - Reserves law
enforcement, judicial, and correctional authority to the Secretary of Defense.

Finally, there are Agreements, Treaties, Declarations, Resolutions, Conventions and

Protocols entered into by the United States and other nations, or by all nations as a
whole via the United Nations (which is not the world's legislative authority). There is
considerable difference of opinion about whether such documents are legally binding on
non-cooperating entities or groups at the sub-national level, but they do, to some extent,
represent the international community's consensus on terrorism, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. The following categories make up the international law of
terrorism:

• Laws of War - The Hague Conventions produced at least 21 international

agreements on the rules of war, including notions on the rules of engagement,
and the Geneva Conventions, among other things, produced special protections
for innocent persons and civilians, as well as banning guilt by association at
international law. Specifically banned are acts or threats designed to spread
terror by the use of indiscriminate violence.
 • Piracy Law - A collection of Conventions, Declarations and case law which
describe crimes against humanity and common enemies of humankind, most
notably hijackers and hostage takers, and sets up a system of international
extradition. Recent examples include the Paris Declaration, Tokyo Convention,
and Montreal Convention.
• Diplomatic Law - A set of Treaties and Conventions, such as the Franco-
Belgium Treaty of 1834 and Venice Statement of 1980, which remove any
possibility of claiming harm against heads of state and diplomats is a political
crime. Instead, such act are to be regarded as common crimes subject to
criminal penalties.
• U.N. Resolutions - Statements of condemnation and calls to action convened in
Conventions to vote on behavior regarded as threatening to world peace and
security. To date, at least twelve major conventions have been signed and
ratified by the member-states of the United Nations.

DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

There is no one, good definition of terrorism. In fact, it might be impossible to define

because it is intangible and fluctuates according to historical and geographical contexts.
Some forms of it are indistinguishable from crime, revolution, and war. Other forms of
it are easily distinguishable. Each and every person knows that they would in some way,
some day, under some back-against-the-wall condition, support some form of terrorism
(as a tactic of last resort) in the name of some deeply cherished cause or value. You may
already be a supporter of terrorism, or you may live under a government that practices
terrorism, and not know it. There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism
(Long 1990).

The Christian Science Monitor's special report, Exactly What is Terrorism? draws
the user into a quiz over what they think qualifies as terrorism, and what does not. Here
are some excerpts (think about how strongly you feel that each case is terrorism or not,
and the answers will be hidden in the following paragraph).

Difficult Scenarios or Borderline Definitions of Terrorism

Case #1: A group, aiming to overthrow a political leader who has been raising
taxes quite a lot lately, carries out a bombing at the luxury hotel the leader is
staying at. They call ahead first, warning of the attack, but still some innocent
civilians are killed.
Case #2: A group of soldiers go AWOL after a hard battle in which they lost
some of their comrades, and because they don't know who's harboring the
enemy or even who the enemy is, they go on a rampage, ravaging any fields,
buildings, crops, shelter, and territory that might be giving solace to the enemy.
They take some care, however, to spare civilians and their homes.
Case #3: A group of revolutionaries break into an embassy building, demanding
the release of some political prisoners, and the government steadfastly refuses to
negotiate, sending in an elite team of commandos, who are repelled, but in the
gun battle, some hostages are killed. The government says they were used as
human shields, but the revolutionaries say different.
 The nature of terrorism is always changing. What is called terrorism one year may be
called something else next year. Terrorism is an emotionally charged word that is
frequently used to politically and socially denigrate one's opponents. It seems, if you
sympathize or side with the perpetrator, then it is not terrorism, but if you sympathize
or side with the victim, then it is terrorism. A lot of people think they know terrorism
when they see it. Now, for the answers from the earlier quiz - Case #1 is an example of
inadvertent terrorism, at best, and if you think it's clearly terrorism, then all that's
important to you is the harming of innocents, and motives don't matter. You're also
confusing assassination, accident, and manslaughter with terrorism. Case #2 is an
example of reckless terrorism, at best, and you'll probably recognize it as Sherman's
march to the sea. If you thought it was a clear-cut case of terrorism, then you're
confusing war with terrorism. War is hell, but terrorism is less than war. However, if
you thought it was clearly not a case of terrorism, then you're too focused too much on
body counts, and have neglected to consider that property sabotage may be the most
common form terrorism, especially with insurgency and counter-insurgency operations.
Case #3 probably comes closest to a clear-cut example of terrorism because the hostages
were originally put in harm's way by the revolutionaries; that is, unless the embassy
employees did something to cause the revolutionary reprisal against them. If the
employees are totally innocent (say an embassy from Sweden), then it is the case that
noncombatants were deliberately targeted. If the employees were involved in espionage
or something that had to do with the political prisoners, then it's a different matter.
With terrorism as a criminal justice topic, you've really got to stretch the legal concepts
of causation and intent (see this Lecture on the Advanced Topic of Intent if interested in
this topic).

Don't worry if you're confused on the whole good/bad, motive/act thing. Philosophers
have debated it for years, and there are experts in criminal justice who say the act, not
the motivation, should define terrorism (Jenkins 1985), and then there are experts who
say the motivation, not the act, should define terrorism (Hoffman 1999). Those who
write encyclopedias of terrorism state that an adequate working definition ought to have
three parts: method, target, and purpose (Kushner 2003). You'll also note that three
different branches of the U.S. government use three different definitions, as follows:

Official Definitions of Terrorism

State Department definition, Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 38, Section 2656f(d):
premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
FBI definition: the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.
Defense Department definition: the calculated use, or threatened use, of force or
violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies,
often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.
United Nations definition: any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a
civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain
from doing any act. Article 2(b) of International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, May 5, 2004)
 The State and Defense Departments conceive of terrorism as war -- "the
premeditated" or “the calculated use of violence" (see Department of Defense Directive
2000.12, “DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program,” April 1999). On the
other hand, the Justice Department conceives of terrorism as crime -- “the unlawful use
of force or violence" (see "Organization of the Department of Justice,” Code of Federal
Regulations, Title 28—Judicial Administration, 2001). The State Dept. definition is the
one used to officially count terrorism, and it is important to note that a "significant"
terrorist event is one which meets the requirements of being "politically motivated" and
"intended to influence an audience." This means that an "official" act of terrorism
must be directed toward a symbolic target that is important to the political interests of a
government somewhere. By contrast, the FBI definition (which is most often used in law
enforcement training because it treats terrorism as crime) would classify random acts of
violence and acts for personal gain as terrorism. The State Dept. definition comes
closest to the FBI definition by the inclusion of an economic cost estimate, the threshold
for economic harm being $10,000. Let's look at an example of how the State and FBI
definitions differ:

Differences between State and FBI Definitions

A group that used a vehicle to smash an ATM machine and collect
more than $10,000 from it would NOT be classified as a terrorist
State Dept.
event, regardless of what the money was used for, unless they
definition
issued a communique indicating that they did it for the purpose of
getting back at this economic symbol of the government.
A group that used a vehicle to smash an ATM machine and collect
more than $10,000 from it would be classified as terrorism
regardless of whether they pocketed the money for personal gain,
FBI definition
as long as the FBI and law enforcement networks regarded this
group as associated or linked with a pattern of known terrorist
activity.

Simonsen and Spinlove (2000) do a good job of comparing and contrasting the
different constructs, and note that the State approach emphasizes motives, the DOD
approach emphasizes goals, and the FBI approach emphasizes methods. Combining the
three would produce some overly complex definition like "Terrorism is the clandestine,
criminal resort to violence or threat of violence on the part of a group toward innocent
bystanders which seeks to accomplish some purpose against some recognized authority.
The purpose is usually political and the target is usually civilian." Alex Schmid (1988)
has attempted to analyze the frequency of different emphases in at least 109 definitions
of terrorism, and finds that, in rank order, most definitions emphasize goals (political),
purposes (fear), targets (victim reactions), and methods (combat strategy or tactic).
Only a small number of definitions emphasize the publicity aspect, covert nature, or
criminal character of terrorism. It is undoubtedly that case that political motivation
ranks as the leading element in most definitions of terrorism. In fact, some years ago,
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1976)
recommended calling any crime that is politically motivated an act of terrorism.
However, the problem with making something political into criminal goes beyond
motivation (endless debates can be had over the presence or absence of instrumental or
expressive motives in terrorism) as well as methods (Historical note: assassination was
common in the 19th Century; bombing in the 20th; and techno-exotic forms such as
cyber-, narco-, and eco- in the 21st). The idea of terrorism as crime rests upon having
an adequate legal framework (which doesn't exist) as well as an understanding of the
costs or impact of terrorism. Yet, that doesn't stop agencies from trying.

The FBI has primary responsibility for the criminal investigation of terrorism. The
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 authorizes them to (1) oversee
detention and deportation of aliens suspected of terrorist activities; and (2) search and
seize any fund-raising activities by foreign groups suspected of engaging in terrorist
activity. Other countries have stronger criminal laws. In France and Great Britain, for
example, suspected terrorists can be held for indefinite amounts of time. U.S. police are
severely restricted in how they can interrogate and use electronic surveillance, and in
addition, the U.S. Bill of Rights, to a certain degree, protects extremism (strongly held
political beliefs) and fanaticism (strongly held religious beliefs) -- two underlying
causes of terrorism.

The U.S.A. Patriot Act (October 26, 2001) allows for longer detention of suspects,
expanded surveillance and intelligence gathering powers by federal authorities.
Congress passed additional anti-terrorism laws in the wake of September 11, and at
least three states (Michigan, New Jersey, and New York) have passed their own anti-
terrorism statutes.

The CIA has primary responsibility to preempt, disrupt, and defeat terrorism.
Presidential Directives signed in 1995 and 1998 authorize them to treat terrorism as a
crime, use all-source information, apprehend offenders, and bring them to justice
wherever they can worldwide. The head of the CIA (DCI) coordinates the Intelligence
Community (IC), and the National Security Council coordinates the nation's
counterterrorism efforts. The CIA maintains a War on Terrorism website.

The Department of State has primary responsibility to use its diplomatic efforts with
foreign governments to thwart terrorism. It also helps to develop, coordinate, and
implement counterterrorism policy. On the State Department's website, one can find
the Top Ten List of Most Wanted Terrorists as well as other lists, data, and resources,
such as the List of Entities which constitute terrorist groups.

The newly-formed Department Homeland Security is charged with coordinating

protection strategies against terrorism. A Nationwide Threat Level Warning (five level
color coded) System is maintained at the Office of Homeland Security, and state
variations exist (e.g. Virginia) which tell citizens what to do. DHS is made up of units
from 22 pre-existing agencies comprising four divisions: (1) Border, transportation and
security -- the Customs Service, Transportation Security Administration, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Border Patrol, the Agriculture Department's Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service and the U.S. Coast Guard; (2) Emergency preparedness
-- the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Justice Department and the
Department of Health and Human Services; (3) Weapons of mass destruction -- research
laboratories, such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, would coordinate
research, develop vaccines, and plan for other countermeasures; (4) Information
analysis -- the CIA, the National Security Agency, the FBI, INS and other organizations
with responsibility for evaluating the country's critical infrastructure and its
vulnerabilities, including food and water systems, energy, transportation and national
monuments.
 The Department of Defense has unmatched resources for dealing with dangerous,
unstructured situations, and they also have their own extensive intelligence apparatus.
Yet the military is severely limited by what they can do legally. For one thing, the Posse
Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) prohibits the use of soldiers to enforce criminal laws
against American citizens. Other Executive Orders and Presidential Directives (some
secret; some not) similarly limit the use of military intelligence, such as Executive Order
12333 and PDD 39 (Presidential Decision Directive 39 - "US Policy on
Counterterrorism"). One of the basic tenets of the law of war is established in the
doctrine of jus ad bellum which defines whether the conflict has a legal basis to happen
in the first place, and jus in bello which outlines what actions in war are legal in and of
themselves. The thing that most clearly distinguishes military from law enforcement
action is that the military has mostly a free hand at preemption (preemptive first strike)
while the best that the criminal justice system can do is harass and thwart (given
exclusionary rule and entrapment constraints). One cannot overemphasize the
importance of the rules of war since they have been around beginning in the early 17th
Century when they were first proposed by Hugo Grotius and subsequently codified in
the Geneva and Hague Conventions of 1860, 1899, 1907, and 1949. They consist of five
(5) basic rules: civilians cannot be taken as hostages; POWs cannot be treated
inhumanely; reprisals cannot be launched against innocents; and diplomats and
ambassadors are off-limits. When the rules of war are broken, the term "war crime" is
used to describe the act, and steps are taken to hold the perpetrators accountable by an
international tribunal. If there is to be some kind of enforcement mechanism, it will
most likely be an outgrowth of military tribunals.

Distinctions are easier to make than definitions. Jonathan White's (2002) approach
in placing terrorism on a continuum of conflict is keenly illustrative. It sees terrorism as
between rioting and guerilla warfare, and his model is adapted/modified below:

Jonathan White's Continuum of Conflict

Civil Low
Folkway Organized Guerrilla Total Mass
Law Crime Riot Terrorism Level
Violation Crime War War Destruction
Tort War

Gus Martin (2003) also approaches the definition of terrorism by making

distinctions. He accepts the inevitability of political motivation as a common element of
most definitions, and then distinguishes between the elements of method (force) and
target, as follows:

Gus Martin's Typology of Conflict

Indiscriminate force, combatant target Discriminate force, combatant target
(Total War) (Limited War)
Indiscriminate force, noncombatant
Discriminate force, noncombatant target
target
(Restricted Terrorism)
(Unrestricted Terrorism)

Another approach might be to distinguish terrorists from others of their kind or how
they perceive themselves. No group has openly admitted they were terrorists since the
1940s, and the most commonly preferred self-terminology includes guerrilla, fighter, or
warrior. What follows is an alphabetical listing of the many terms terrorists use to call
themselves (with the proviso that any errors or mistakes in definition are my own):

• Avengers -- those who evoke the image of righteous vengeance (on behalf of
others)
• Crusaders -- those who engage in extremes to set the pace for others
• Defenders -- those who think of themselves as vigilantes (defenders of self and
others)
• Dissidents -- those who want to defeat or overthrow an existing government
• Extremists -- those with strongly held political beliefs out of the ordinary
• Fanatics -- those with strongly held religious beliefs out of the ordinary
• Fighters -- those who usually claim the other side are terrorists
• Guerrillas -- those who fight a stronger opponent with hit-and-run tactics
• Insurgents -- those who use propaganda, guerrilla tactics, and irregular fighting
forces
• Insurrectionists -- those who are in armed opposition to the laws of a government
• Liberators -- those who consider themselves on the vanguard of freedom fighting
• Lunatics -- those on the extreme fringes of left or right ideologies
• Nationalists -- those fighting for the whole of their homeland
• Radicals -- those with left-wing opinions (right-wingers are called reactionaries)
• Rebels -- those who champion a cause not always their own, but the people's
cause
• Revolutionaries -- those who are committed to a certain ideology to bring about
change
• Separatists -- those fighting for a separate division of their homeland
• Soldiers -- those who say they belong to an army or other military organization

There are, of course, many other terms that one would encounter in studying
terrorism. What is left out from the list would be terms such as: Liberationists; Pirates;
Resisters; Propagandists; and Mercenaries. These may be terms that have some special
meaning, but the process quickly gets redundant after awhile. Redundancy is evident in
the phrase Freedom Fighter, because no side to every clash fights for anything but
freedom. As an aside, it's often argued that parts of the American Revolution, like the
Boston Tea Party, involved terrorist acts, and that this illustrates "one person's terrorist
is another person's freedom fighter." However, this argument misses the fact that the
groundwork for the American Revolution was already underway in a variety of
directions, and "legitimate" freedom fighting always contains advance warning, follows a
warrior code, obeys the rules of war, prohibits certain kinds of weapons, does not use
outlaw tactics, and takes steps to select targets that harm the least number of innocents.

Critiques of definitions are also easier than making them. An illustrative example
here is William Dyson's (2001) approach to dissecting terrorism. He starts by criticizing
dictionary definitions of "terror," and most certainly, some of the worst definitions of
terrorism confuse it with fear, fright, alarm, being shocked, or scared. It is also easily
distinguishable from acts of civil disobedience, marches, demonstrations, leafleting,
picketing, protesting, and rioting. It is less distinguishable from guerilla warfare or
revolutionary wars (which can be restricted or unrestricted, as Martin calls it). In fact,
terrorism often escalates into war, a phenomenon that experts call the Sarajevo Effect
(Lacquer 1999) in which the 1914 assassination led to World War I. Dyson (2001) adds
that terrorism can evolve into insurrection (which is the same as civil war), and he
speculates that a terrorist situation becomes revolutionary whenever 25% of the
population is engaged in the violence.

The most widely used definitions in criminal justice are simple ones created by Brian
Jenkins (1985), Bruce Hoffman (1999), and Walter Laqueur (1999), all resting upon the
idea of illegitimate force to achieve political ends by targeting innocent people. These
simple definitions suffice for understanding complex social factors, but it should also be
realized that we may never be able to define terrorism. It is important to note that the
means used by terrorists are always illegitimate, even though their ends may be
sometimes legitimate. Most of the terms similar to terrorism like freedom fighter and
revolutionary often make use of the argument that the End Justifies the Means. To a
terrorist, there's no such thing as innocent bystanders.

One of the main objectives of terrorism is usually to gain publicity for some cause,
and public fear, roused thru the media, may contain a key to understanding the
psychology of terrorism. It may also be important in producing a criminological
definition of terrorism. The threat of harm to innocent bystanders is what makes
terrorism powerful. In this sense, it is the same as what makes military operations
powerful - striking terror in the hearts of the enemy. Terrorists are particularly
concerned with invoking fear in those who identify with the victims of their action. In
this fashion, terrorism is always symbolic, and "media-motivated", so targets likely to
be reported on by prominent media organizations are especially vulnerable.

Terrorism should be distinguished from guerilla warfare since the latter is an

acceptable form of combat. A terrorist should be distinguished from a guerilla (a term
meaning "little war") because terrorists tend to have an urban focus and operate in
small bands. An active terrorist organization is usually made up of "cadres" or
"teams" of 3-5 members (the 9/11 attackers were organized in five-man teams) which
themselves consist of "cells" of 1-2 members (who live and travel together). Guerillas
are organized differently, and generally have quite larger cadres and cells. Terrorism is
generally a short-lived affair, while guerilla warfare is a long, drawn-out process. In
addition (although this is debatable), terrorists tend to come from upper- rather than
lower class backgrounds, as in the vigilante groups that make up right-wing, pro-
government "death squads" in Latin America and Asia. Terrorists also tend (arguably)
to be the products of over-permissive, wealthy families with whom they were in conflict,
had inconsistent mothering, or were isolated from their parents in some way (Martin
and Romano 1992). Terrorists also tend to use religion as a context or cover for their
activities, a characteristics they share with extremists. Fanatics believe they must purify
the world, destroy others in the name of righteousness, or advance a religious cause of
some sort. Even environmental terrorists have some kind of pseudo-religious belief
system.

Terrorism should also be distinguished from crime, at least in the sense that a war on
terrorism is different from a war on crime or war on drugs. There are at least five good
reasons for this, but the obvious one is that no law enforcement or criminal justice
system needs to be nudged in the direction of becoming more like the military. There is
also a long-standing tradition in the field of legal studies which only considers certain
criminological aspects of terrorism (e.g., those aspects of terrorism which hold that the
phenomenon is a sociological manifestation of societal structures and processes and not
some "essentialist" phenomenon of "real" terrorism beyond the definitional powers of
authorities). On the crime-terrorism distinction, Geraghty (2002) is a good guide, as
is Deflem (2005). Fuller (2006) outlines the primary differences between a war on
terrorism versus a war on crime or other social problems:

• a war on terrorism has (or should have) a clear and identifiable enemy (social
problems are more diffuse)
• a war on terrorism is political (rather than social, or solved by tinkering with
social service delivery systems)
• a war on terrorism uses military weapons (police have little need for military
weapons and equipment)
• a terrorist enemy does not enjoy U.S. legal protections (at least fewer
constitutional protections)
• a terrorist firmly believes their cause is just (most criminals admit they're
deviant)

Deflem (2005) makes some good points about the current status of criminology on
terrorism. He says that criminologists should not be embarrassed to learn from other
research disciplines, but they must also seek to provide a distinctive contribution to the
scholarship. Some issues, such as terrorism and the media and terrorism and foreign
policy have already been well-explored by social scientists other than criminologists. But
the relations between terrorism and counterterrorism in connection with criminal
activity as well as with crime control remain at present underexplored and form a field
rich with potential for criminological research and theory. It is the specific province of
criminology to study the patterns and dynamics of crime and social control from a
social-scientific viewpoint in relation to their conditions and implications at a societal
level. Terrorism is often connected with political, legal and military issues, often with
deep-seated moral resonance. Counterterrorism is likewise a complex constellation
much broader than police activities alone. However, issues of crime and social control
are always and inevitably present in the reality and discourse on terrorism. The fact that
the connection between terrorism and crime, on the one hand, and counterterrorism and
social control, on the other, is not always neatly drawn nor evident does not mean that
criminologists have no legitimate stake in their study. On the contrary, by bridging
criminological scholarship with the existing literature on terrorism and counter-
terrorism, a criminology of terrorism-related phenomena can be meaningfully
connected to what is known from other social sciences and, at the same time, reveal the
merits of its unique scientific focus and orientation.

TYPOLOGIES OF TERRORISM

Just as there is no one good definition of terrorism, typologies do not account for all
forms of terrorism. Prof. Eskridge's Terrorism Page, from his course on terrorism out
in Nebraska has some graphic examples of typologies, but it should be noted that
typologies of terrorism are usually NEITHER motive-based NOR behavior-based, like
they are in other areas of criminological study, such as the areas of profiling and street
crime (the exception being Hacker's typology of terrorists by traits, included below).
This is evident from the following examples commonly found in textbooks and/or in the
strangely confused way the media reports what is going on in times of terrorist-related
crisis or war (Hess & Kalb 2003). In the following typologies, notice in the headings how
the types are classified in different ways.
 Terrorism Classified by Place
1. Domestic -- by residents of a country within that country
2. International -- by representatives of a country against
another country
3. Non-state -- extremism and revolution for its own sake
4. State-sponsored -- by a government against its own people or
in support of international terrorism against another
government
5. Internecine -- conflict that spills over into another country or
fought on foreign soil
Terrorism Classified by Personality Trait
1. Crazies -- strong survival attitude, but not based in reality; self-
centered; goals clear only to perpetrator; irrational and
unpredictable; strikes at random
2. Crusaders -- sacrificial, death attitude; blends politics and
religion; seldom willing to negotiate; task-oriented and indifferent
to risk; seeks publicity and largest group possible
3. Criminals -- strong self-preservation attitude; selfish; seeks gain
and is task-oriented; avoids high risk; predictably targets small
groups (Hacker 1976)
Terrorism Classified by Purpose
1. Political -- for ideological and political purposes
2. Nonpolitical -- for private purposes or gain
3. Quasi-terrorism -- skyjacking and hostage taking
4. Limited political -- ideological but not revolutionary
5. Official or state -- used by nation against nation or people
Terrorism Classified by Target
1. Mass terror -- targets general population
2. Dynastic terror -- selective targeting of individuals or groups
3. Random terror -- targets anybody in wrong place at wrong time
4. Focused random terror -- targets specific public places frequented by
opposition
5. Tactical terror -- attacks government or politically attractive targets (Combs
2003)
Terrorism Classified by Issue
1. Revolutionary -- aims to replace the existing government by drawing out repressive
responses which can be exposed as inhumane (Red Army Faction, PLO, Hizballah)
2. Political -- heavily armed groups tending to be focused around supremacy,
government intrusion, or religious revisionism (Aryan Nation, Posse Comitatus,
Freemen)
3. Nationalist -- promotes the interests of a minority or religious group that has been
persecuted under majority rule (Sikh radicals, Muslim fundamentalism)
4. Cause-Based -- groups devoted to a social or religious cause using violence to address
their grievances (Islamic Holy War, Abortion clinic bombings)
5. Environmental -- groups dedicated to slowing down development they believe is
harming animals (Animal Liberation Front, Earth 1st)
6. State-sponsored -- when a repressive regime forces its citizens into total obedience
(Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, Iraq, Sudan, Haiti)
7. Nuclear -- outlaw states possessing nuclear threats (Libya, North Korea)
8. Genocide -- when a government seeks to wipe out a minority group in its territory
(Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Iraq, Turkey)

What most typologies are attempting to get at are tactics unique to the modes of
attack. There are five (5) tactics that terrorist use and four (4) modes of attack, or
types of weapons used. The tactics can be either basic or advanced, depending upon
how well-trained the terrorists are at guerilla warfare. The basic tactics are: (1) rolling,
in which the terrorists drive a vehicle by in what amounts to a hit-and-run maneuver;
(2) ambush, which is a standard platoon-level military maneuver drawing the enemy
into a line of fire; (3) standoff, which is a back-against-the-wall maneuver, usually with
an escape plan; and the advanced tactics are (4) boutique, which usually involve a
combination of modes of attack, but are intended primarily to have a large impact; and
(5) revenge, which also usually has a large impact, at least symbolically.

The modes of attack, or weapon systems, are (1) traditional -- when makeshift or
ordinary weapons are used; (2) technological -- when weapons of mass destruction, such
as nuclear, chemical, or biological, are used; (3) cyber -- when viruses, computer attacks,
or destruction of information infrastructure occur; and (4) narco -- when flooding a
market with drugs is used.

In addition, certain other factors are known as "force multipliers" which allow
small groups to operate on a higher level. The four (4) force multipliers are: (1)
technology; (2) transnational support; (3) media; and (4) religion. Furthermore, terrorists
often rely upon crime instead of military force, as the six most common terrorism-related
crimes are: (1) bombing; (2) hijacking; (3) arson; (4) assault; (5) kidnapping; and (6)
hostage taking. While there may be certain connections between the force multipliers
and types of crimes chosen (for example, bombing might be related to media coverage),
typology development, in itself, seems to represent the cutting edge of criminology and
criminal justice scholarship, perhaps for the ease of teaching.

As a final note, it is always important to remember that there is a long, historical

legacy of sponsored terrorism, and there are many "rogue states" out there, for
example: Libya, South Yemen, Syria, Iran, Cuba, and North Korea. There are also
well-established nineteenth- and twentieth-century patterns and traditions of using
terror to accomplish political and business ends. Some of these traditions have been
totally foreign to Western nations, and others we have spawned ourselves. Domestic and
international terrorism spawned by a democratic regime is always more episodic than
the systematic and enduring terrorism spawned by rogue regimes.

Postscript: Guest Lecturer Definition of Terrorism

From time to time, guest lecturers are invited into the course to make a contribution.
The following is one of those: Coming up with a definition of terrorism that can
become a standard to judge actions against is a challenge. I recommend looking at an
article written by Boaz Garnor, Executive Direct of the International Policy Institute
for Counter-Terrorism (www.ict.org.il). It is called "Defining Terrorism: Is one
man's Terrorist another man's Freedom Fighter?" (published 25 Jun 01) He
 proposes the following as a common definition and explanation:

"Terrorism is the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or
against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims. This definition is based on
three important elements:

1. The essence of the activity—the use of, or threat to use, violence. According to
this definition, an activity that does not involve violence or a threat of violence will
not be defined as terrorism (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful
demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
2. The aim of the activity is always political—namely, the goal is to attain political
objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or
economic policies, etc. In the absence of a political aim, the activity in question will
not be defined as terrorism. A violent activity against civilians that has no political
aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of insanity
unrelated to terrorism. Some scholars tend to add ideological or religious aims to the
list of political aims. The advantage of this definition, however, is that it is as short
and exhaustive as possible. The concept of “political aim” is sufficiently broad to
include these goals as well. The motivation—whether ideological, religious, or
something else—behind the political objective is irrelevant for the purpose of
defining terrorism. In this context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl
deserves mention:

Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most analysts fail
to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as logical or necessary
aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are empirical regularities
associated with terrorism. More often they simply confuse analysis.

3. The targets of terrorism are civilians. Terrorism is thus distinguished from other
types of political violence (guerrilla warfare, civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism
exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous
anxiety, and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks against civilian targets. The
proposed definition emphasizes that terrorism is not the result of an accidental injury
inflicted on a civilian or a group of civilians who stumbled into an area of violent
political activity, but stresses that this is an act purposely directed against civilians.
Hence, the term “terrorism” should not be ascribed to collateral damage to civilians
used as human shields or to cover military activity or installations, if such damage is
incurred in an attack originally aimed against a military target. In this case, the
responsibility for civilian casualties is incumbent upon whoever used them as
shields." If you wear a uniform, you can expect to come under attack, but if you are
a civilian, you should not expect to come under attack. The problem with terrorism
is that it usually attacks the civilian, not the soldier. However, regardless of who the
terrorist attacks, it is a criminal act.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Air War College's Terrorism Page
Communist Party Line on What Lenin Actually said about Terrorism
ERRI Terrorism Archive
Exactly What is Terrorism?
FBI's CounterTerrorism Authority and FBI's online terrorism Library
IACSP Association
International Policy Center on Terrorism
Is There a Definition of Terrorism?
Legal Aspects of The Posse Comitatus Act
LII's Backgrounder on National Security and Terrorism Laws
Presidential Directive 39 Secret/Unclassified (Redacted) Document
RAND Corp. 2000 Report of Domestic Preparedness to Terrorism
Section by Section Analysis of the USA Patriot Act
Terrorism Research Center
The Historical Development of Terrorism and Insurgency
U.S. State Dept. Office of Counterterrorism
Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why (pdf)
Yale Law School's Avalon Project on the Laws of War
Yahoo Full Coverage on Terrorism

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Nyatepe-Coo, A. & Zeisler-Vralsted, D. (Eds.) (2004). Understanding Terrorism: Threats
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Last Updated: 05/06/06

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 THE CRIMINOLOGY OF TERRORISM: THEORIES AND MODELS
"The point of theory isn't to think safe thoughts, but dangerous thoughts." (Ronald Beiner)

Most of the major theories of terrorism are derived from theories of collective
violence in the field of political science, and indeed, prior to the emergence of criminal
justice as a separate discipline in the early 1970s, it can be safely said that political
science pretty much had a monopoly over theories of terrorism, followed perhaps by the
disciplines of religion and economics. Sociological, psychological, and criminological
theories have also certainly had a role to play with some relevance. We will begin, first,
with the theories of political violence, and it is customary to say at this point that none of
the following ideologies, or any ideology for that matter, are being advocated. The
purpose is to provide an objective overview of theories, concepts, causal factors, and
models. The underlying concern should be to answer the questions "Why Does
Terrorism Occur?" or "What Causes It?" rather than pass judgment or assess any of
the theories at this point. With the political theories, we shall see that it is often the form
of governance which is the main cause of terrorism, and with the other theories, we will
find a number of subcultural and personality factors at work. With other theories, such
as sociology, we will see how things like the interplay between social movements and
societal response can explain terrorism.

It should be noted that theory is more than the study of motive. In criminology,
theories tend to take on more than the explanation of offender mindsets and behavior.
They often tackle issues such as victimology and criminal justice system response.
Motive itself is frequently ignored in the prosecution of terrorists (Smith 1994; Smith,
Damphousse, Jackson & Karlson 2002). Sentencing variation exists in bringing
terrorists to justice mostly due to "structural-contextual" effects (when components of
criminal justice work more interdependently and not at odds with one another), and also
to "liberation" effects (when judges and juries do not feel free to follow their own
sentiments because the terrorist event was of high severity). Research is another area
where theory tries to be useful. Terrorism databases, such as the one at the MIPT
Knowledge Base, are often analyzed in various ways which afford an opportunity to test
theories, tease out the relevant variables or factors, and do comparative theory testing,
etc., all of which point to the larger purposes of theory, such as to guide research and
policy.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF ANARCHISM AS A THEORY OF TERRORISM

Terrorism is most definitely not a form of governance, but anarchism is. Most
anarchists reject terrorism in its vanguard varieties (for nationalist or religious
purposes), but in a theoretical sense, anarchism justifies terrorism as a form of criminal
action that attacks the values of an organized, complacent society. Anarchism is a
theory of governance that rejects any form of central or external authority, preferring
instead to replace it with alternative forms of organization such as shaming rituals for
deviants, mutual assistance pacts between citizens, syndicalism (any non-authoritarian
organizational structure that gives the greatest freedom to workers), iconoclasm (the
destruction of cherished beliefs), libertarianism (a belief in absolute liberty), and plain
old rugged individualism. Anarchism is often referred to as the nineteenth century roots
of terrorism, the term first being introduced in 1840 by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.
Anarchism defined is the rejection of the state, of any form of coercive government, of
any form of domination and exploitation. It is the notion of free and equal access to all
the world's resources to enable positive freedom (freedom to) in place of negative
freedom (freedom from, or the basis of most constitutional rights).

As a theory, anarchism holds a unique place in history because it was the first
revolutionary movement to come up with systematic ideas about the purpose of
agitation. You'll recognize some of these ideas as terrorist tactics, but it's important
first to understand them in the context of anarchism. Proudhon contributed the idea of
finding the "moment" as in when the moment is ripe for revolutionary action. Another
anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, popularized the idea of "propaganda by deed" or letting
your actions speak for themselves, which was a theory originally developed by Carlo
Pisacane, an Italian revolutionary who argued that ideas spring from deeds and not the
other way around. Over the years, this notion has evolved into a fairly competent
philosophy of the bomb as part of a propaganda campaign to stimulate awareness and
sympathy with the cause, and in this respect has been noted as a defining feature of
terrorism (Georges-Abeyie & Hass 1982). Bakunin's ideas strongly influenced
anarchism because his concept of propaganda by deed also included a prohibition
against large scale group action (it being better, he thought, for anarchist action to be
individualized or done in small groups). Most anarchists operate on the principle of
leaderless resistance, or acting on your own, with little knowledge or support of the
groups they may belong to. Major anarchist figures, like Karl Heinzen and Johann
Most, contributed the idea that murder, especially murder-suicide, constituted the
highest form of revolutionary struggle. Both advocated the use of weapons of mass
destruction. Other anarchists contributed different ideas, such as Peter Kropotkin's
notion of "propaganda by word" or radicalizing the public by use of subversive
publications. Anarchism (like fascism) has also had some influential female figures, and
Emma Goldman (1869-1940) comes to mind as a early founder of free speech (the
ACLU) and sexual freedom movements. Minor figures in the history of anarchism, like
Charles Gallo, Auguste Vaillante, Emile Henry, and Claudius Konigstein advocated the
idea that to have the most effect, the targets must be innocents (in places such as
crowded dance halls or shopping centers) or symbols of economic success (like banks
and stock exchanges). It may be worth noting, in passing, that the famous Italian
criminologist, Cesare Lombroso, developed his notion of the "born criminal" in part by
being called in to examine the physical features of some minor anarchists who were
really nothing more than criminals justifying their behavior with anarchist talk.

Between 1875 and 1912, anarchists alone or in small groups managed to assassinate or
attempt to assassinate the leaders of nine (9) different countries, including the U.S. (with
President William McKinley in 1901). These crimes were just the most well-known acts
of anarchism, as anarchists were involved in numerous ordinary crimes such as theft,
robbery, murder, kidnapping, assault, and bombing. The most famous incident was the
Haymarket riot in Chicago during 1886. During these peak years for classic anarchism,
May Day celebrations became famous as all-out crime-rampant days. Police
departments around the world became convinced there was an international conspiracy,
and suspicious foreigners were locked up by the hundreds in many countries.
Perfunctory trials were held, and many defendants were hanged or deported. The most
famous of these trials was the 1920 case of Sacco and Vanzetti who were more antiwar
and labor activists than anarchists. Anarchism in the classical sense was largely erased
from the face of the earth by 1917 via a number of factors: the rise of communism and
fascism (both of which are opposed to anarchism), strong xenophobic deportation (Red
Scare) laws in democratic countries, and the fact that classic anarchism never became
an organized movement. Twentieth-century terrorist groups which came later and
claimed an ancestry with anarchism include: the Japanese Red Army, the British Angry
Brigade, the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Weatherman in the United States, and
the Mexican Zapatista movement (Kushner 2003). During the Spanish revolution of
1936, something called anarcho-syndicalism developed, which is a loose confederation
of various protest groups (see the Workers Solidarity Alliance website). Those who call
themselves anarchists today (see Purkis & Bowen 1997) are more likely to be
environmentalists or part of the anti-globalization movement who target for attack such
institutions as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or World Trade
Organization.

For purpose of balance, it is important to point out that anarchism today does not
support terrorism. It has historically supported terrorism and even today might
support assassination, but there are only weak theoretical links between the two, most
strongly with the propaganda by deed concept. Anarchists hold to a doctrine that
anarchy must be created in the act of self-liberation from oppressive and coercive
relationships. You don't blow up the relationship as terrorists do; instead, you convince
others that grounds for the existing relationship must be blown up. Anarchism is not
about mad bombing or chaos. Terrorists target people; anarchists target things such as
institutions and structures. Bakunin did not want the death of people but the
destruction of things and positions of authority. Only a small minority of terrorists have
ever been anarchists, and only a small minority of anarchists have ever been terrorists.

In fact, there is an area of study called anarchist criminology, a controversial subfield

of critical criminology which celebrates the fact anarchism really has no workable
definition (Tifft 1979; Ferrell 1997). Anarchist criminology advocates the abolishment
of criminal justice systems. It argues that much harm has been committed in the name
of reasonableness, and anarchist criminology is committed to promoting the unthinkable
and unreasonable. Like other subfields of critical criminology, anarchist criminology
views the state as an inherently oppressive entity, and anarchist justice not only
promotes social justice (equal access to all resources), but protects diversity and
difference among people (Ferrell 1999).

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF FASCISM AS A THEORY OF TERRORISM

Fascism is the one form of government with the most disagreement about a definition
for it, which Passmore (2002) attempts to consolidate as an ultranationalist ideology that
is unabashedly racist. The word comes from the Latin "fasces" which means to use
power to scare or impress people. It generally refers to the consolidation of all economic
and political power into some form of super-patriotism that is devoted to genocide or
endless war with one's enemies. Benito Mussolini, who practically invented the term in
1922, said it is the merger of state and corporate power. Adolf Hitler said that it is the
clever and constant application of propaganda so that people can be made to see
paradise as hell, and the other way around. So-called Islamo-Fascism can also be
traced to the same time period as the birth of the Nazi ("national socialist") fascism in
1928 when the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan Al Muslimun), parent organization of
numerous terrorist groups, was formed in reaction to the 1924 abolition of the caliphate
by the Turks.
 Fascism supports terrorism at home and abroad. Charismatic leaders are usually
given supreme powers to crack down on dissidents, peacemakers, and anyone who
doesn't abide by the "cult of the individual" which worships a He-man mentality and
the party line. With the frequent wars and militaristic ventures that come with fascism,
an effort is made to demonize the enemy as sub-humans who deserve extinction. These
enemies are also made into scapegoats for all the past problems a country has had.
Fascism appeals to the frustrations and resentments of a race of people who think they
ought to have a bigger place at the global table. When combined with an anti-western
slant (the United States as Great Satan), fascism becomes a means of social identity
(Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, Islamo-Fascism) as well as a facilitator of terrorism
against all western interests.

Frustrated fascists who fail to gain control in their own countries have historically
turned to terrorism. They are most likely to turn to domestic terrorism since fascists do
not believe that citizen rights are bestowed merely because someone inhabits a country.
Nor do they believe that all human beings are possessed of equal rights. "Foreign"
families and businesses (as they define them) are usually targeted for extermination by
fascists. The enemies who are seen as the greatest threat are those who fascists see as
corrupting or poisoning family and property relations.

Fascism is full of ironies and contradictions. On the one hand, it is anti-modern in its
glorification of the land, a return to country life, and its fascination with peasant dress
or costume. On the other hand, it is pro-modern in its worship of military technology,
favoritism of big business, mass mobilization of people, promotion of commercialized
sport, and its surprisingly liberal attitude toward the involvement of women in the
movement. Science and scholarship also take on interesting twists under fascism.
"Hard" sciences like biology and chemistry usually advance significantly, especially in
areas such as genetic research. "Soft" sciences like sociology and psychology usually
become usurped into mumbo-jumbo pseudoscientific ideas about a glorified folk culture
and reasons for hating the enemy.

Just as anarchists have their May Day (May 1st) celebrations, fascists also tend to
celebrate anniversaries. Many terrorists, of course, have been known to time their
attacks to coincide with the date for an historical event or the birthday of someone
special to them. For example, with ecoterrorism, that day is October 16, which coincides
the the United Nation's World Food Day, and is usually when McDonald's restaurants
are targeted for vandalism. However, the most important date in the study of terrorism is
April 19. A number of significant events have happened on that date. Right-wing
domestic terrorist groups call it "Militia Day" because it was when the siege at Waco
ended, it was when surveillance began at the Ruby Ridge compound in Idaho, and it
marks the anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing of the federal building. Neo-Nazi
fascist groups celebrate April 19 because it was the day German Nazis started wiping
out Jewish ghettos across Europe, as well as the following day being Adolf Hitler's
birthday. Internationally, terrorist groups who regard themselves as "freedom
fighters" and trace at least part of this justification to the American Revolution, take
heart in the fact that the American Revolution started on April 19, 1775 at the Battle of
Lexington. It remains to be seen if September 11 will replace April 19 as the most
popular date for terrorism.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF RELIGION AS A THEORY OF TERRORISM

 More than one criminologist has pointed out that the disciplines of theology, religion,
and philosophy have had important things to say about terrorism (Stitt 2003; Kraemer
2004). It is also a fact that about a quarter of all terrorist groups and about half of the
most dangerous ones on earth are primarily motivated by religious concerns (Hoffman
1993). They believe that God not only approves of their action, but that God demands
their action. Their cause is sacred, and consists of a combined sense of hope for the
future and vengeance for the past. Of these two components, the backward-looking
desire for vengeance may be the more important trigger for terrorism because the
forward-looking component (called apocalyptic thinking, or eschatology) produces
wild-eyed fanatics who are more a danger to themselves and their own people. The trick
to successful use of terrorism in the name of religion rests upon convincing believers or
convertees that a "neglected duty" exists in the fundamental, mainstream part of the
religion. Religious terrorism is therefore, NOT about extremism, fanaticism, sects, or
cults, but is instead all about a fundamentalist or militant interpretation of the basic
tenets. Most religious traditions are filled with plenty of violent images at their core,
and destruction or self-destruction is a central part of the logic behind religion-based
terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2001). Evil is often defined as malignant narcissism from a
theological point of view, and religion easily serves as moral cover for self-centered
terrorists and psychopaths (Stitt 2003). Religion has always absorbed or absolved evil
and guilt in what is called theodicy, or the study of how the existence of evil can be
reconciled with a good and benevolent God. Most religions theodicize evil away as
either: (1) a test of faith; (2) a product of free will; (3) part of God's plan; or (4)
functional to let people learn right from wrong; and terrorists easily make use of these
established theodicies or critiques of them (Kraemer 2004).

To be sure, the usual pattern in religious-based terrorism is for a psychopathic,

spiritual leader to arise that is regarded as somewhat eccentric at first (a tendency
toward messianism). But then, as this leader develops their charisma, they tend to
appear more and more mainstream and scholarly. They begin to mingle political with
religious issues (a tendency toward theocracy), and little-known religious symbols or
pieces of sacred text take on new significance. Quite often, these symbols are claimed to
be an important part of that religion's history that has somehow been neglected. The
stage is then set for blaming somebody for the betrayal of this sacred heritage. First, the
politicians in one's own country are blamed, but soon a foreign influence, like
secularization or modernization is blamed. Militant religions quickly move to
blaming a foreign influence for at least three reasons: (1) it doesn't serve the religion's
survival interests to blame a homeland; (2) it makes use of a long history of competition,
animosity, and war between the world's different religions; and (3) any blaming to be
done must occur on the symbolic or cosmic level, which is to say that the enemy cannot
have a face, but must be some impersonal, evil-like force or influence. Hence, the most
specific enemy a militant religion can have is some global trend like secularization,
modernization, or Westernization. The strength of fundamentalism is its ability to
guarantee a radical change is coming without specifying exactly what it will look like.
However, once a semi-vague enemy has been identified, the religious movement borrows
the idea of "sovereignty" from the political realm and begins to see itself as the
legitimate defender of the faith and legitimate restorer of dignity to the homeland. Most
importantly, such "defenders" justify terrorist action in their accountability only to
God, for it is God who has chosen them for this sacred mission in history.
 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of religion as a theory of terrorism is how a
devout believer could come to mix politics and religion in such a way. The answer is in
the conception of worship. Most of us associate worship with dressing up, the ringing of
church bells, and one-way communication with God (human to God). But worship is
not just about the liturgy of church ritual. Worship is part of service to God and all of
humanity on behalf of God (striving to receive instructions from God). Politics is also
about service, especially public service. So-called "liberation theology" that
permeates Latin America has always had a handle on this aspect of worship as service
which is intended to bring about the emancipation of the poor. Antonio Gramsci (1891-
1937), a founder of the Italian communist party who is best remembered for the concept
of hegemony (Bocock 1986), or the idea of an all-encompassing world-view, also
postulated a model of worship as opposition. To engage in any sort of enterprise
involving service to God, humanity, or social justice, each group of devout worshippers
must see through their religious culture toward political goals. It is not so much as using
religion to achieve secular ends, but the transformation of theology to create "free
spaces" that permit creative action consistent with that religion's view on the needed
transformation of society. A key theological transformation that supports terrorism
would be the notion that communal violence, even though violence is despised, is still a
form of worship that may help discover the true nature of God and open up two-way
communication with God (God to human).

Religious terrorism can be quite extreme in its tactics. Not only does it strive to
avenge a long history of persecution and injustice, but it frequently carries out
preemptive attacks. This is because a high level of paranoia is usually maintained about
the actual degree of threat that the enemy trend poses. Rarely are religious terrorists
swayed by secular sources of information about the degree of actual threat, but instead
are driven by doctrinal differences of opinion over interpretation of holy scriptures.
This results in two things: (1) a rather non-selective targeting pattern, lashing out
blindly, often harming innocents; and (2) the creation of numerous offshoot, spin-off, or
fringe groups who believe they are commanded to follow a different mission imperative.
Add to this the fact that most adherents have already long felt like alienated and
marginal members of society, and you've got a recipe for perhaps the most dangerous or
prolific kind of terrorism in the world today.

Most religious terrorist groups can trace their origin to key historical events.
Institutional memory is long, as the example of Irish terrorism points out, and it is not
uncommon for the group to conduct rituals designed to "never forget" some long-ago
grievance. In one sense, this is why religious terrorism is popular, because political
terrorism, like politics, has a much shorter memory. Another variety of religious
terrorism has its roots in millenarianism, where the key event is some doomsday or
apocalyptic date where something was supposed to happen. We know from studies of
UFO cults that such groups are often more dangerous after an event fails to happen
because of cognitive dissonance, which forces a rearrangement of attitudes and beliefs
that are frequently more rigid and fantastic. However, political events also serve as the
catalyst for religious terrorism, and these are usually tied into whatever messianic
traditions the religion has. For example, the rise of al-Ikhwan Muslim militancy can be
traced to a date in 1979 (during the Islamic year 1400) when the return of the prophet
Madhi was anticipated at the Grand Mosque in Mecca. Adherents of the belief stormed
the mosque by force, which happened to coincide with a time for pilgrimage and the
height of the tourist season. The government reacted by forcing the militants out,
cementing forever a date of infamy in which the group became certain that the
homeland needed rescuing from secularization. Religious terrorists also typically have
"mourning periods" or dates such as "anniversary of the martyrs" because these
activities are important ways the group recruits true believers from those who have been
standing on the sidelines. Recruitment generally is followed by a reeducation program
that changes the way a person thinks about good and evil. Anything foreign, secular, or
modern without question becomes evil; and anything supporting an all-out,
uncompromising struggle with the enemy, including the killing of innocents, becomes
good. The only exceptions are when the group has freed up some nonviolent avenues of
experimentation.

It is important to understand the practice of martyrdom in the terrorist context.

Not only does a martyr serve recruitment and other purposes after their death, but a
whole mythology develops around them, which might be called a process of martyrology
(Ranstorp 1996). Targets are chosen not for strategic purposes, but for symbolic purposes,
and the repercussions of an attack are managed as well. The ideal target is one in which
the martyr can inflict more damage than is expected for their size. The idea is to
produce an impression that the group is larger and more powerful than it actually is.
This feeling of power is enhanced by the use of anonymity, whereby the martyr goes
through an indoctrination process where they are stripped of their real identity and
provided with a false background history. The process goes much further than
establishing a cover story in case of capture. The process involves changing the family
name and home town the martyr came from, so that any repercussions or reactions to
the terrorist event can be channeled toward another family or town. In some cases, the
cover story is used to direct government counterterrorism toward the wrong target
(especially if the martyr's family is well known and the town is small). In other cases, it
is used to give the impression that dozens of martyrs are coming from the same town,
when in fact they are not.

In all fairness, it should be said that most militant religious groups only adopt
terrorism as a tactic of last resort. We have not discussed Just War Doctrine here, but
ethics and/or fair play are integral parts of most religions, and there are usually
unwritten rules for when the cosmic struggle (as Juergensmeyer 2001 calls it) spills over
into political struggle. Religious terrorists demonstrate marvelous ingenuity in means,
methods, and timing, but their targeting is flawed, and one can only wonder how
strategically effective is their "symbolic" success from "striking at the heart of the
infidels." Perhaps the whole reason for it is to bolster their reputation among other
religious communities. This would be supported by the fact that some terrorist acts are
scheduled on dates specifically designed to desecrate a competitor's religious holidays
and sacred moments.

THE ECONOMICS THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE AS A THEORY OF

TERRORISM

The discipline of economics has many concepts that are relevant to an understanding
of terrorism -- supply and demand -- costs and benefits, etc. Fully-developed economic
or econometric models of terrorism are quite rare, however, and often involve such
things as "psychic" costs and benefits (Nyatepe-Coo 2004). More down-to-earth
economic theories can be found in the literature on deterrence. Rational choice theory,
in particular, has found a place in criminology, and holds that people will engage in
crime after weighing the costs and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice
about motivation after perceiving that the chances of gain outweigh any possible
punishment or loss. Criminals must come to believe their actions will be beneficial -- to
themselves, their community, or society -- AND they must come to see that crime pays,
or is at least a risk-free way to better their situation. Perhaps the most well-known
version of this idea in criminology is routine activities theory (Cohen and Felson 1979),
which postulates that three conditions must be present in order for a crime to occur: (1)
suitable targets or victims who put themselves at risk; (2) the absence of capable
guardians or police presence; and (3) motivated offenders or a pool of the unemployed
and alienated. Other rational choice theories exist which delve further into models of
decision making. In the few models of collective violence that have found their way into
criminology, the Olson hypothesis (source unknown) suggests that participants in
revolutionary violence predicate their behavior on a rational cost-benefit calculus to
pursue the best course of action given the social circumstances.

Rational choice theory, in political science, follows a similar line, and holds that
people can be collectively rational, even when making what appears to be irrational
decisions for them as individuals, after perceiving that their participation is important
and their personal contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns they may
have for the "free rider" problem (Muller and Opp 1986). For those unfamiliar with it,
the "free rider" problem is a classic paradox in social science and economics which
asks why anybody should do something for the public good when most likely someone
else will get credit for it and most everybody else will benefit merely by sitting idly and
doing nothing. Perhaps the most eloquent spokesperson for rational choice ideas in the
field of terrorism is Wesleyan professor Martha Crenshaw (1998), whose writings
inform my remarks below.

Let's take, for example, a typical terrorist event that involves hostage-taking and all-
too-frequent hostage-killing. From an individualist rational point of view, the best
choice would be to keep at least some of the hostages alive in order to bargain with the
government for leniency. Yet, often a collectivist rational mentality sets in, and the
group choice (or groupthink) is to kill all the hostages. Is this killing senseless, the
product of deranged minds, or an example of mob behavior? The answer is NO on all
points from a rational choice point of view. It may be a reasonable and calculated
response to circumstances. It may involve a collective judgment about the most efficient
course of action that has the most lasting impact on observers (for social learning
purposes). And most importantly, the senselessness of it all may be just what the group
needs to make their ideological point that they are terrorists, not just ordinary
criminals.

Terrorism is not a pathological phenomenon. The resort to terrorism is not an

aberration. The central focus of study ought to be on why some groups find terrorism
useful, and in standard control theory fashion, why other groups do not find terrorism
useful. Some groups may continue to work with established patterns of dissident action.
Other groups may resort to terrorism because they have tried other alternatives. Still
other groups may choose terrorism as an early choice because they have learned from
the experiences of others, usually through the news media, and Crenshaw (1998) calls
this the contagion effect, and claims it has distinctive patterns similar to the copycat
effect as in other theories of collective violence (Gurr 1970). There may be
circumstances in which the terrorist group wants to publicize its cause to the world, a
process Crenshaw (1995) calls the globalization of civil war.

Factors that influence the rational choice of terrorism include place, size, time, and
the climate of international opinion. A terrorist plot in a democratic society is less likely
to involve senseless violence than a scheme hatched under an authoritarian regime
because under the latter, terrorists realize they have nothing to lose with the expected
repercussions. Size is important because a small elite group is more likely to resort to
terrorism when the population is passive. This means that more senseless acts of
violence may occur in a stable society rather than one on the verge of collapse. Time
constraints are important because the terrorist group may be competing with other
groups or attempting to manage a tit-for-tat strategy with counterterrorism. The
climate of international opinion, if low for the problems of the host country, may force
the terrorists to take action that risks a repressive counterterrorist reaction, in hopes
that their suffering will capture public attention. In short, terrorism is an excellent tool
for managing the political agenda on a world stage.

THE GLOBALIZATION THEORY OF TERRORISM

Nassar (2004) has probably written the most interesting piece on globalization theory
as it relates to terrorism, and the ideas are fairly robust precisely because globalization
can be a complex subject at times. Globalization contributes to dreams, fantasies, and
rising expectations, but at the same time, it leads to dashed hopes, broken dreams, and
unfulfilled achievements. Terrorism breeds in the gap between expectations and
achievements. The thinking is very similar to strain theory in criminology or the rising
expectations theory of prison riots, and about the only thing unique about globalization
theory is that it adds a rich-poor dichotomy. Rich people (or nations) are seen as
wanting power and wealth, and poor people (or nations) are seen as wanting justice.
From this perspective, then, rich people are part of the causal factor or root cause of
terrorism, since they contribute to the conditions which give rise to it. Perpetrators of
"terrorism" (always treated as an ill-defined concept in globalization theory) are never
seen as born or raised with any specific predispositions toward it. In brief, globalization
theory holds that if the oppressed and disgruntled poor people of the world were simply
given the chance to find peaceful means for achieving justice, terrorism would not
thrive.

Globalization theory is further tied into ideas about colonialism, imperialism, and
neocolonialism. The first two words are often used interchangeably to describe a set of
conditions (technically, extensions of sovereignty) where the mores, values, and beliefs of
the colonizers are considered superior to those of the colonized. However, when the
assumption is made that (imperial) power is a necessary thing to maintain cultural
superiority, this is the usual meaning of imperialism. Neocolonialism is a concept
developed by Marxists and holders of certain conspiracy theories to refer to allegations
about First World nations, international organizations, and/or multinational
corporations employing economic, financial and trade policies to dominate less powerful
countries. Onwudiwe (2001) is typical of the criminological approach taken when
globalization ideas are incorporated into theories about terrorism, and it is probably
safe to say that the approach remains relatively underdeveloped.

SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM

 Modern sociological perspectives are primarily concerned with the social construction
of fear or panic, and how institutions and processes, especially the media, primary and
secondary groups, maintain that expression of fear. It is important for students to be
able to critically assess the social construction of terrorism and grasp sociological
viewpoints, and as a good starting point, I would recommend Gibbs (1989) or any of
several new books that critique the war on terrorism or look at it as mythology or
dialogue. However, it is equally important for students to recognize that the social
constructionist viewpoint is all about consequences, not causes. Labeling theory in
criminology, for example, is a social constructionist viewpoint that, in my opinion, goes
about reconnecting consequences with causes in a way that is less systematic than the
way functionalists did it a long time ago. My own theory of terrorism (O'Connor 1994)
makes use of a neo-functionalist framework to chart the way terrorism impacts the
whole of society by affecting core values of achievement, competition, and
individualism. Some societies become "softer" targets after terrorism (especially after
short-term target hardening), and other societies become stronger in the long term. It
depends upon interaction patterns, and stabilities and interpenetrations among the
structural subsystems (economy, polity, religion, law) of a particular society. However,
there are probably only three people left in the world who understand the kind of
Parsonian functionalism I'm describing, so it will most likely be the case that labeling
and learning theories will dominate sociological thought on terrorism, followed by
conflict or radical theories which all-too-often overdo the implication of state crime,
fiscal crisis, capitalism, or imperialism with terrorism. For a promising approach that
more carefully attempts to tread these sociological waters, see Ross (1999).

Let's get down to the causal models of sociology rather than worry about
perspectives. Regardless of the name for the theoretical viewpoint, one is likely to
encounter the following, or some variation of them, as causal factors in almost all
etiological, sociology-related thinking (FIVE SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
TERRORISM):

• the frustration-aggression hypothesis

• the relative deprivation hypothesis
• the negative identity hypothesis
• the narcissistic rage hypothesis
• the moral disengagement hypothesis

The frustration-aggression hypothesis is the idea that every frustration leads to

some form of aggression, and that every aggressive act relieves that frustration to some
extent. A professor I had once referred to it as the "flush-toilet" model of motivation
because the basic notion is that stress and hassles build up until they reach a point that
"breaks the camel's back" and the displacement of released energy provides some
benefit in terms of catharsis or ventilation. Students should be advised that very
sophisticated models of this hypothesis exist in criminology, and that my description is
only a crude simplification.

The relative deprivation hypothesis is the idea that as a person goes about
choosing their values and interests, they compare what they have and don't have, as well
as what they want or don't want, with real or imaginary others. The person then usually
perceives a discrepancy between what is possible for them and what is possible for
others, and reacts to it with anger or an inflamed sense of injustice. Students should be
advised that debates exist within criminology regarding relative deprivation and
terrorism, on the one hand, with the anomie or strain tradition which finds causal
influence in such objectivist factors as Gross Domestic Product, and on the other hand,
with the left realist tradition which finds causal influence in subjective experiences of
deprivation or discomfort.

The negative identity hypothesis is the idea that, for whatever reason, a person
develops a vindictive and covert rejection of the roles and statuses laid out for them by
their family, community, or society. For example, a child raised in a well-to-do family
may secretly sabotage every effort made to hand them the good life on a "silver platter,"
deliberately screwing up in school, at work, and everyplace else until the day comes,
with some apparent life-altering experience (like engaging in terrorism), that the long-
nurtured negative identity comes out, and the subject can then make it feel more like a
total identity transformation. Students should be advised that there are many varieties
of this idea that exist in a number of theories across many fields of study.

The narcissistic rage hypothesis is an umbrella idea for all the numerous things
that can go wrong in child-rearing, such as too much smothering, too little smothering,
ineffective discipline, overly stringent discipline, psychological trauma, coming from a
broken home, etc., that all leads to the same effect of a "What about Me?" reaction in
the child. It is actually a two-way process with the child contributing as much as the
parents and other role models which results in a damaged self-concept, a tendency to
blame others for one's inadequacies, and the well-known "splitting" of self into a "good
me" and "bad me" which often forms the basis for personality disorders involving a
lack of empathy for the suffering of others. Students should be advised that there is not
all that much consensus on the primal importance of narcissism, and that the literature
on child-rearing is full of mixed empirical results.

The moral disengagement hypothesis is the idea that encompasses all the ways a
person neutralizes or removes any inhibitions they have about committing acts of
horrific violence. Some common patterns include imagining one's self as a hero,
portraying one's self as a functionary, minimizing the harm done, dehumanizing the
victim, or insulating one's self in routine activities. Organized crime figures, for
example, usually hide behind family activities with their wives and children. Students
should be advised that in the study of terrorism, there are numerous other ways that
violence is rationalized which go far beyond denigrating one's enemies and beefing one's
self up as a crusader (see Hacker 1996). Terrorist rationalizations usually involve a
complete shift in the way government and civil society is perceived.

Psychological perspectives, with few exceptions (Ross 1996; 1999), are decidedly
clinical in what is often a futile attempt to find something pathological in the terrorist
personality. Merari (1990) provides a good overview of psychological approaches,
but one of the major names in this area is David Long, former assistant director of the
State Department's Office of Counter Terrorism, who has gone on record saying there's
no such thing as a terrorist personality, but then has said they typically suffer from low
self-esteem, are attracted to groups with charismatic leaders, and enjoy risk-taking
(Long 1990). A sampling of psychological factors that have been investigated include:
ineffective parenting or rebellion against one's parents, a pathological need for
absolutism, and a variety of other "syndromes" and hypotheses (see Margolin 1977), but
study after study for the past thirty years has yielded very little valid and reliable
information about the psychology of terrorists other than the following generalizations:

A Summary of Psychological Knowledge about Terrorism

As far as we know, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing wrong
when they kill and injure people. They seem to share a feature of the
psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or
psychopathic personality disorder, which is reflected by an absence of empathy
for the suffering of others. However, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill
for this. A common feature is a type of thinking such as “I am good and right.
You are bad and wrong.” It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to
distance themselves from opponents and makes it easier for them to kill people.
It is not the same kind of simplistic thinking one would expect from someone
with low intelligence or moral development. Most terrorists are of above average
intelligence and have sophisticated ethical and moral development. A closed-
minded certainty is a common feature of terrorist thinking. (Merari 1990)

Although what we don't know about the psychology of terrorism is more than what
we do know, there have been several promising attempts to merge or combine
psychology with sociology (and criminal justice) into what might be called terrorist
profiling (Russell and Miller 1977; Bell 1982; Galvin 1983; Strentz 1988; Hudson
1999). This line of inquiry actually has a long history, and includes what rare studies
exist of female terrorists. The earliest study (Russell and Miller 1977) found that the
following people tend to join terrorist organizations:

• 22-25 years of age

• 80% male, with women in support roles
• 75-80% single
• 66% middle or upper class background
• 66% some college or graduate work
• 42% previous participation in working class advocacy groups
• 17% unemployed
• 18% strong religious beliefs

These data, as well as other known characteristics and attributes about terrorists,
have found their way into databases, some public, some private. One of the most well-
known databases used by researchers is the RAND-St. Andrews University Chronology
of International Terrorism. When suicide bombing became popular, Merari (1990)
conducted rare interviews with terrorists, and found that most suicide terrorists are
between the ages of 16 and 28. Most are male, but 15% are female and that proportion
is rising. Many come from poor backgrounds and have limited education, but some
have university degrees and come from wealthy families.

We'll return again from time to time to this group of theories, and new developments,
because criminology is quite heavily informed by sociology and psychology. What
sociological and psychological approaches basically tell us now is that individuals join
terrorist organizations in order to commit acts of terrorism, and that this process is the
same as when individuals join criminal subcultures in order to commit acts of crime.
There appears to be no unique terrorist personality. Instead, there appear to be unique
subcultural phenomena which develop, support, and enhance a penchant for cold-
blooded, calculated violence which, if not satisfied within a terrorist organization might
be fulfilled elsewhere. Terrorism is a social activity. Individuals join a terrorist group
usually after they have tried other forms of political involvement. The emotional links
between individuals and the strength of commitment to their ideology appear to become
stronger by the group living in the underground and facing adversity in the form of
counterterrorism. Socialization in the underground is quite intense, and Ferracuti
(1982), a criminologist, has documented the "fantasy wars" that go on in the terrorist
underground. An individual's identity may become tied to the group's identity, but it is
just as likely that emotional relationships become as important (if not more) than the
group's purpose. This means that the distribution of beliefs among members in a
terrorist group may be uneven. There may be major differences between individual and
group ideology. Ideology may not necessarily be the main component of motivation.
From profiling terrorists for many years, we know that most of them are action-hungry
practitioners, not theoreticians. This knowledge may provide new counterterrorism
strategies which attempt to change individual beliefs and weaken group cohesion.

PSYCHIATRIC THEORIES OF MENTAL ILLNESS AS A THEORY OF

TERRORISM

The leading exponent of the terrorist-as-mentally-ill approach is Jerrold Post (1984;

1990), who has gone on record saying that the most dangerous terrorist is likely to be a
religious terrorist, and that all terrorists suffer from negative childhood experiences and
a damaged sense of self. His analysis of the terrorist "mindset" (a word that substitutes
for terrorist personality, and technically means a fixed mental attitude or inclination)
draws upon a view of mental illness that compels, or forces, people to commit horrible
acts. It should be noted that we know from criminal justice that this is not the only
possible view on mental illness. More "crazy" people come into contact with the law
through sheer folly and foolishness than a compulsion their mental illness made them
have. Post (1990) makes a somewhat neo-Freudian distinction between terrorists who
desire to "destroy the nation, or world, of their fathers" and those who desire to "carry
on the mission, or world, of their fathers." In short, it boils down to the Oedipus
Complex, which is hating or loving your father, or at least the "world" they represent.
There is actually some empirical support for this viewpoint. For example, when solitary
terrorist offenders are studied, such as skyjackers and mail bombers, a severely
dysfunctional relationship with their father is often found. The "anarchic-ideologue"
terrorist, according to Post (1984) is rebelling against their father, and according to
Kaplan (1981), has a pathological need to pursue absolute ends because of their
damaged sense of self-worth. For a review of these and related theories, see Ruby
(2002).

Another analysis is provided by Jessica Stern (1999) who attempts to gain

psychological insight into the distinction between "doomsday" terrorists, who would use
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that might end all life on earth, and "dangerous"
terrorists, who would limit themselves to the conventional arsenal of terrorism. Stern's
concern is primarily with the counterproliferation of WMD, but cases studies of groups
such as Aum Shinrikyo, the Tamil Tigers, Al-Qaida, and Hizballah show that terrorists
most likely to order the use of WMD tend to be afflicted with paranoia and
megalomania. Of these two illnesses, the megalomania is more severe, and the
paranoia is at such a moderate level that it enhances their intelligence and keeps them
from becoming schizophrenics or sociopaths. Stern (1999) takes exception with
arguments that terrorists suffer from any antisocial, psychopathic, or sociopathic
disorder.

Walter Laqueur (1999) offers yet another distinction, between terrorists who are
"fanatics" and those who are "extremists." The standard meaning of these terms is that
fanatics are religious zealots and extremists are political zealots, but Laqueur (1999)
strips away any religious connotation, and says that most terrorists are fanatics. The
concept of fanaticism carries some implications of mental illness, but is not in itself a
diagnostic category. Laqueur (1999) claims that fanaticism is characterized by excessive
cruelty and sadism, but others (Taylor 1994) have pointed out that fanaticism is
characterized by the following:

• prejudice toward out-groups

• authoritarianism
• an unwillingness to compromise
• a disdain for other alternative views
• a tendency to see things in black and white
• a rigidity of belief
• a perception of the world that reflects a closed mind

To this, we might add the concept of Machiavellianism (Oots & Wiegele 1985),
which refers to an extreme form of the psychological trait of manipulativeness.
Terrorists are disposed to not only manipulate their victims, but the audience as well.
Both the timing of a future event and the aftermath of a completed event are
manipulated by terrorists. For example, the counterterrorism reaction by authorities is
manipulated. The press and public are manipulated, with terrorists doing everything
they can to work the media and obtain liberal press coverage. The fact that terrorism is
aimed more at the audience than victim has provided numerous points of conjecture for
researchers. It has been the source of most theoretical models of terrorist contagion,
whereby different terrorist groups compete with one another for media attention, most
theoretical models of copycat behavior, whereby different terrorist groups try to outdo a
previous group with the harm inflicted, and more importantly, the contributions of
biological and physiological researchers.

BIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF TERRORISM

David Hubbard (1983) was one of the first biological researchers of terrorism, and his
line of work is similar to the familiar cycle of violence hypothesis in criminal justice. In
this view, people who commit repetitive and cyclical acts of violence (which would
include wife beaters, rapists, and serial killers) are driven by hormonal or
neurochemical fluctuations in their body or brain chemistry. Three compounds, in
particular, have been singled out as having abnormal levels among terrorists:
norepinephrine, acetylcholine, and endorphins. Of these, norepinephrine is suspected
as being the most influential, as it is associated with the so-called flight or fight
mechanism in human biology. The theory of "fight or flight" was developed by W. B.
Cannon back in 1929, and refers to a state of arousal under stress in which the heart,
lungs, and muscle operate more efficiently. As it applies to terrorism (and crime), the
behavioral requirements of such activities (fighting exhilaration before an event, and
fleeing manipulation of audience after an event) produce a syndrome of physiological
need for arousal at fairly regular intervals. Motives for terrorism appear to be quite
stable when the biological viewpoint is taken, and it is possible to link a variety of
aspects in the typical terrorist profile with biological factors. For example, xenophobia
may be biological induced since the fear of strangers tends to be discernible even at
infantile stages of development. Other explanations might involve insights from
sociobiology (Wilson 1975) or kin selection theory in evolutionary psychology (Daly &
Wilson 1994). For more information on biological factors as the cause of criminal
behavior, see my lecture on Psychobiology and Crime. For an example of research using
a biological framework to analyze suicidal terrorism, see A Sociobiological View of
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (pdf).

INTERNET RESOURCES
Anarchy Archives Research Center on History and Theory of Anarchism
Anarchy-movement.org
Anarchosyndicalism by Rudolf Rocker
Are Terrorists Psychotic or Psychopathic?
Islamism, Fascism, and Terrorism
Peter Kropotkin's 1910 Encyclopedia Article
Psychological Qualities of Machiavellianism
Religion as Opposition: A Gramscian Model
Review of Latest Books on Terrorism
Talking to Your Kids about Fascism
Terrorism as Fascism's Most Loyal Helpmate in Ending Democracy
Terrorism and Political Violence: A Bibliography
The Anarchist FAQ Webpage
The Emma Goldman Papers
The New Evil of Islamo-Fascism
The Psychology of Terrorism: Mind of a Terrorist
The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism [HTML Exec. Summary]
Understanding Evil: The Psychology of Terrorism
Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why (pdf)

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Last updated: 05/06/06

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 COUNTERTERRORISM: DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONS
"We should not be constrained by Boy Scout ethics in an immoral world." (Kenneth Adelman)

Counterterrorism may be defined as the use of personnel and resources to preempt,

disrupt, or destroy terrorists and their support networks (Kushner 2003). The prefix
"counter" in words such as counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and counterespionage
is intended to mean that any effort taken will be proactive, aggressive and offensive, as
opposed to any reactive or simply defensive strategy which might be implied by other
terms such as anti-terrorism or responding to terrorism. There are a variety of policy
options in counterterrorism, but outside of prevention in the form of secondary target
hardening, few experts recommend conciliation, restraint, isolationism, or ignoring the
problem. This lecture discusses the so-called "soft" approaches, such as diplomacy,
social reform, negotiation, and intelligence analysis. If space permits, there will also be a
discussion of law enforcement responses. We shall discover that these are not really
"soft" activities at all, and that labeling the categories of policy options is foolish. So-
called "soft" approaches are complex and complicated, to be sure, but they have a
potential to be highly effective, and in the end, that is perhaps all that matters - what
works.

Some essential background is needed before an understanding of diplomatic options

can be achieved. Actually, quite a bit of background is needed, but see this short
History of Diplomacy for starters. There, diplomacy is defined as "the ordered conduct
of relations between one group of human beings and another group alien to
themselves." The primary purpose of diplomacy is communications, and the ultimate
goal of diplomacy is peace. Diplomacy, as it is practiced today, can be considered a
method of conflict transformation, and there are two kinds of conflicts for which it is
best suited -- (1) material conflicts, which revolve around dividable assets and can
usually be handled by traditional conflict resolution techniques; and (2) identity
conflicts, which involve deep-seeded feelings of hate but a sense of legitimate grievance
and are usually handled by so-called "track two" diplomacy techniques which
frequently, but not necessarily, focus on reconciliation and/or restorative justice.

DIPLOMACY AS COUNTERTERRORISM

Diplomacy is the most frequently used and most successfully used form of
counterterrorism. Numerous misconceptions exist about it. What diplomacy is NOT
may be easier to describe, and things such as foreign policy and international law are
definitely things involving other continuums. These areas might be called the
"legislative" branch of diplomacy (Nicolson 1964), but policy and law are things best left
to a President, his or her Cabinet, a Legislature, and a Judicial Branch. Instead,
diplomacy is mostly "executive" in the sense that a seasoned team of professionals
(called the Foreign Service or Diplomatic Service) are used who are dedicated to the
practice of diplomacy and nothing else. Diplomacy is also NOT about negotiation, guile,
or trickery, which might be expressed in such commonplace definitions as "the art of
persuading others to do things that serve mutual interests." This is a bad definition of
diplomacy, and in fact, the practice of diplomacy is often all about fixing the problems
that nations get into by trying to deceive one another. A true and correct definition of
diplomacy requires an understanding of its history, a topic to which we now turn.
 Historically, diplomacy began in prehistoric times. When the first tribe of cavemen
realized that it might be better to listen to what the messenger from another tribe had to
say before killing and eating them, diplomacy was born. The concepts of messenger,
emissary, ambassador, envoy, herald, and to some extent, angel, are all concepts similar
in meaning to diplomat. The idea that there is a time and place for persons who are
"off-limits" or under a "white flag" from harm is the idea of diplomacy. You might
begin to see the potential of diplomacy for counterterrorism at this point. The social
taboo against killing well-meaning foreigners on state business is one of the world's
oldest taboos. The ancient Greeks called such visitors "heralds" and throughout the
centuries, the profession of herald (like one's heraldry or coat of arms) ran in families.
The Romans are generally credited with creating "archivists" (specialists in diplomatic
precedents and procedures) and so-called "secret" diplomacy, but the Italian states
during the fifteenth century created public positions known as "ambassadors". The
word diplomat comes from the Greek word "diploun" meaning "to fold" which refers
to the stamped metal plates early diplomats used to carry. These metal plates consisted
of passes to come and go across international borders, and were called "diplomas"
which eventually became associated with documents of academic achievement. As the
years went on, the Vatican and England helped spread the practice of housing
permanent missions (embassies or consulates) overseas. By 1815 at the Congress of
Vienna, every nation officially approved and sanctioned a global diplomacy system, with
diplomats recognized as a true profession, distinct from the job of statesman or
politician. Diplomacy is today thought of as a regularized system of establishing channels
of communication and avenues of cooperation between inter-state actors. The standard
definition is "the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations
between governments and independent actors" (Satow 1905).

To become a diplomat requires earning a title, inheriting a title, or having one

bestowed upon you by the sovereigns of your country. In the United States, the
standard procedure is to work for awhile as a career foreign service officer in an agency
like USAID (Agency for International Development), and your supervisors will process
you for such a title as your career rises. Since the Congress of Vienna, the following
standard titles are what one is likely to encounter among diplomatic teams and
consulate missions, while it should be noted that representatives to the United Nations
are usually required to be at the level of plenipotentiary, and that in most missions,
almost all envoys regard themselves as extraordinary. Diplomatic theory and practice
are derived from notions of social justice and a relatively little known field of social
science called peace studies (Barash 1991). You'd be surprised at how many colleges
and schools that offer a degree in peace studies. Programs solely devoted to diplomacy
are fewer in number, and usually affiliated with history departments (as Norwich is),
political science departments (as George Washington is), or in the case of the Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, has been around since 1933 and has emerged
into a separate college division unto itself.

• Ambassador - the highest ranking officer of a diplomatic mission who is

sometimes addressed as Excellency
• Envoy extraordinary or Minister plenipotentiary -- someone in charge of a
special project or has special responsibilities
• Envoy ordinary or Minister resident -- someone working on a regular project, or
a regular employee at a mission
 • Charge d'affaires -- an acting head of a mission when others leave, and who is
left behind to express displeasure
• Attaché -- military officers, lower-level foreign service personnel, or commercial
businessmen performing special services
• Counselor -- secretaries or assistants who are regular employees that work at the
mission
• Honorary attaché -- a volunteer or person of private means who is not a
permanent member of a mission

Diplomatic language contains certain phrases, which over the course of centuries,
have become part of a common international vocabulary. For example, if a diplomat
says his or her country "cannot remain indifferent," that almost certainly means that
his or her country will be intervening soon in the affairs of another country. When a
diplomat says that matters are of "grave concern," that almost always means a hard line
is being taken. When a diplomat says that something will be interpreted as an
"unfriendly act," that almost certainly implies a threat of war. When diplomats are
dispatched to settle a conflict or controversy, it is not the same as sending negotiators.
The role of a negotiator is to distract the enemy while you are doing other things, like
preparing to attack them. With negotiation, there is usually compromise; someone wins,
someone loses, or at least both parties never get all they want. The role of a diplomat is
to resolve a situation to the ultimate triumph for all; everyone usually wins, and the
region is ideally transformed by peace. Diplomats carry letters of credentials and full
powers signed by a President or Secretary of State to act on behalf of a sovereignty.
Let's take a look at some of the tools of diplomacy:

• Accession -- this is a clause in existing treaties by which parties who did not sign
off on it can do so later
• Accord -- this is a document signed by both parties which is not of sufficient
importance to justify calling it a treaty.
• Ad referendum -- this is when a diplomat agrees to something but requires his or
her government to approve it later
• Agreement -- this is a document signed by both parties to formalize what they
have sounded out with one another prior to a meeting
• Compact -- this is a short-term agreement to continue talking and outlines the
course of procedure to follow
• Conference -- this is the name for a meeting of diplomats between all interested
parties and is called a congress or convention when heads of state are present
• Declaration -- this is doctrinal statement of rights or policies to be shared
between nations before the diplomats arrive
• Memoire -- a memorandum or note passed by diplomats to one another which
are expected to get back to their sovereigns secretly
• Note -- the ordinary means of communication by diplomats expressing their
thoughts on matters
• Protocol -- a record of the less formal means of procedure by which agreement
may be reached
• Treaty -- a bilateral or multilateral document that concludes diplomatic action
between parties
• Voeux -- these are wishes or recommendations for future good conduct that have
no binding force on signatories
 The most common uses of diplomacy in counterterrorism include: developing
bilateral or multilateral anti-terrorist policies; arranging for the sharing of intelligence;
arranging permission for law enforcement authorities from one country to come in and
arrest (or interrogate) a suspected terrorist in another country; and establishment of
appropriate sanctions on sponsors of terrorism. In some cases, diplomatic overtures are
made to the terrorists and their groups themselves, even though they are sub-national
actors. Some famous cases where diplomacy worked in the terrorist context include:
ending the OPEC hostage crisis at Vienna in 1975; arranging a prisoner exchange with
Lebanese hijackers in 1985; catching Carlos the Jackal in 1994; getting the IRA to agree
to a laying down of arms in 1998; and numerous cease-fire agreements between Israelis
and Palestinians from 2001-2003. Diplomacy also played a part in social reform
movements when Spain changed how it was dealing with the Basque rebellion during
the 1980s, and when Peru changed how it was dealing with the Shining Path in the
1990s. Diplomacy has positive results, indeed, when it can do things like get terrorists
to apologize and change their ways, and also get governments which have fought
terrorism repressively become better democracies that respect civil liberties.

NEGOTIATION AS COUNTERTERRORISM

Diplomacy can also have horribly negative results. Conventional wisdom holds that
it is never good to negotiate with terrorists or to concede to their demands, at least while
they are still engaging in violence. In fact, the U.S. and many of its allies are formally
committed to a policy of "no negotiation" with terrorists. However, it is often the case
that this policy is not followed. It exists as hard-line rhetoric more than reality. The
truth is that history shows democracies are more willing to negotiate and compromise
with terrorism than not. When such efforts go wrong, they encourage the terrorists to
repeat their acts and become more violent later on. They also embarrass a nation and
result in lost credibility for many years. When such efforts go partially right, and that is
all they can be - partially effective, the best that can happen is the incident goes away,
and there is some closure, for awhile, on the world stage regarding the attention given.

Efforts to negotiate and compromise with terrorists are called concessionary

options, and they have been used quite often by a number of parties over the years.
Negotiators rather than diplomats are usually involved in these options. A countless
number of ransom payments have been made by governments, corporations, and
families to terrorists. Numerous prisoner exchanges, prisoner releases, and even mass
releases of prisoners have been made throughout history, and the U.S. has been party to
it. For all its tough talk, Israel has engaged in almost as many concessions as
crackdowns. Perhaps the most famous act of concession involving the U.S. was the Iran-
Contra scandal. During 1985-1986, high-ranking officials of the U.S. government sold
$30 million worth of guns to Iran in hopes of getting Iranian help for releasing
American hostages held by Shi'ite terrorists in Lebanon. The money from the gun sale
was used to support anti-Sandinista forces in Latin America. Iran, for its part, came
through and successfully pressured the terrorists to release the hostages in Lebanon.
Shortly after, however, more American hostages were seized by the same terrorist
group, among others, and the U.S. suffered a major credibility problem in Latin
America from which it has not since recovered. Iran-Contra is just one example of
things gone horribly wrong, but in all fairness, it is up to history to decide if short-term
expediency options are worth the long-term costs. The best that can be said is that the
following concessions are only marginally effective (and for the most part, bad ideas),
but they might be conceivably useful under some very specific historical circumstances
where they don't reward terrorism or create credibility problems:

• Payment of ransom money to terrorists

• Payment of bribe or protection money to terrorists
• Giving weapons, food, material, technology, or information to terrorists
• Release of imprisoned terrorists upon demand by other terrorists
• Release of imprisoned supporters or sympathizers of terrorism
• Release of political prisoners, dissidents, extremists, and spiritual fanatics
• Provision of transport to another location intra- or internationally
• Provision of political asylum or amnesty within a host country
• Provision of top-notch legal services and a public court forum to air their cause
• Provision of access to the news media to broadcast their propaganda

INTELLIGENCE AS COUNTERTERRORISM

Good intelligence is the best weapon against terrorism, but it should be all-source
intelligence, and the kind, which is good for almost all kinds of intelligence -- the value-
added kind which separates out the signals from the noise, such as what is sometimes
called Indications & Warnings (I&W) in the intelligence community. Indicators will be
discussed in a moment, but "all source" requires some clarification at this point. This
means that all the different platforms (technical and human) of intelligence collection
should be used, along with open source platforms like the Internet. It is best when all
the collection assets converge or cover at least one of the indicators an analyst is trying
to assess (another meaning of "all source"). From the human asset (espionage) aspect,
this involves sometimes dealing with "bad apples," and from the open-source
perspective, this involves mining the Internet for what it's worth. For analysis, while
reactive (after the fact) investigation may prove useful for some purposes, it's generally
considered that with crimes like terrorism, a proactive (before the fact) strategy is best,
and a proactive one which accounts for all sorts of strange and unusual contingencies.
For example, sometimes sensitivity training may be needed along with proactive efforts,
especially when the intelligence resource being used is a community within the U.S.
where a significant number of immigrants live. Such communities can be an invaluable
resource, but there should be friendly and open relationships between law enforcement
and such areas. For example, an organization called PfP (the Partnering for Prevention
and Community Safety Initiative) has piloted some techniques for getting the Arab,
Muslim, and Sikh communities in Southeastern Michigan, Southern California, and
Greater Boston to work cooperatively with local law enforcement. Such "networking"
as it would be called in the language of community policing should be fine-tuned to an
effective level.

A proactive mode of inquiry will also take advantage of the fact that many terrorists
have quite predictable social and psychological motivations. Their "profiling" is
somewhat easy to do. In many ways, terrorists behave like common criminals, but they
just take politics or religion very seriously. Also, because nonstate or modern terrorists
usually have no legitimate sovereignty structure, like a nation-state or official
organization, the role of group support and reference groups in the system become
extremely important. Strategic thinking toward elimination of terrorism as a "tactic"
not an enemy is still evolving (Pena 2006), but traditional techniques have some value
too. Indicator collection and efforts toward "profiling" should strive toward including
all the following in intelligence gathering and interpretation:

"Indicators" refer to those collectable things which would have to happen and those
that would likely happen as a scenario unfolds (Khalsa 2004). Indicators are usually
thought of as factors of risk. The three (3) primary factors of risk regarding terrorism
are: adversary capability, adversary intentions, and target vulnerability. There is some
debate within intelligence circles as to whether the third one is necessary, and some
people define "terrorism threat assessment" (as opposed to terrorism risk assessment)
as only involving the first two. The third is controversial precisely because it sometimes
involves collecting vulnerability information on an ally or friendly force. The following
table lists some of these indicators, but it must be borne in mind that the analyst must
strive toward including others that are also important in intelligence interpretation:

Terrorism Indicators
Capability Indicators:
Lethal Agents: Delivery Methods:
1. Biological 1. Ground based
2. Nuclear or radiological 2. Water vessel/scuba
3. Chemical 3. Aircraft
4. Conventional bombing/explosion 4. Missile
5. Hijacking 5. Suicide/Human host
6. Hostage taking/kidnapping 6. Mail/Postal service
7. Assassination 7. Food/Beverage/Water supply
8. Firearms 8. Gaseous
10. Knives/blades
11. Computers
Intention Indicators:
1. Weapons/material movement Vulnerability Indicators:
2. Terrorist travel 1. Current security posture
3. Terrorist training 2. Number of people in target area
4. Anti-indicators 3. Significance of target
5. Significant events and dates 4. Specific facility vulnerabilities
6. Propaganda levels 5. Ability to deter or disrupt
7. Surveillance of targets 6. Level of cooperation with U.S.
8. Tests of security 7. Significant events and dates
9. Other

Additional "profiling" indicators:

1. Group Information -- Name(s), ideology (political or social philosophy), history of the
group, dates significant to the group, and dates on which former leaders have been
killed or imprisoned. (Terrorist groups often strike on important anniversary dates) Some
groups also have a Bible or manifesto which is important to obtain (doomsday dates).

2. Financial Information -- Source of funds, proceeds from criminal activities, bank

account information. (Sudden influxes of funding or bank withdrawals indicate
preparation for activity) It's also important to determine the group's legal and financial
supporters. Generally, anyone who would write an official letter of protest or gather
names on a petition for a terrorist is a legal-financial supporter. Sometimes, an analysis
of support will reveal linkages and/or mergers with other terrorist groups.

3. Personnel Data -- List of leaders (and changes in leadership), list of members (and
former members), any personnel connections between its members and other groups of
similar ideology, and the skills of all group members (weapons expertise, electronics
expertise, etc.) (Knowing the skills of the group is an important part of threat assessment)
If the philosophy revolves around one leader, it's important to know what will occur if
something happens to that leader. Often, the analysis of family background is useful to
determine how radically a leader or member was raised. Group structure, particularly
if the organization pattern is cellular, determines who knows whom.

4. Locational Data -- Location of group's headquarters, location of group's "safe"

houses (where hide from authorities), and location of group's "stash" houses (where
hide weapons and supplies). (Regular attacks on "stash" houses is the most frequently
used counterterrorism technique) It's important to specify the underground that exists
where terrorists can flee. This is harder than determining safe havens. Terrorists like
to live in communal homes instead of living alone.

While ordinary street crime is often deterred by crackdowns, target hardening,

denying opportunity, and aggressive security (with known displacement patterns),
terrorism frequently defies deterrence and predictable displacement patterns because
they don't seek targets of opportunity, but symbolic targets. As a group, terrorists are
very team-oriented, and always prepared for suicide missions. On the other hand,
ordinary criminals are undisciplined, untrained, and oriented toward escape. Terrorists
are just the opposite. They have prepared for their mission, are willing to take risks, and
are attack-oriented. If captured, they will usually not confess or snitch on others as
ordinary criminals do. Traditional law enforcement methods are not all that effective
when it comes to the investigation or intelligence of terrorism.

LEFT WING AND RIGHT WING PROFILES

Characteristic: Right Wing Left Wing

Social change perspective Reactionary Revolutionary
Social class membership Lower/middle Lower/middle/upper
Leadership Male dominated Egalitarian
Marital status Married Single/divorced/separated
Age 16-76 25-45
Educational level High school College
Religious belief Fundamental Agnostic/atheist
Criminal planning Impulsive Meticulous

MORAL SUPERIORITY AS COUNTERTERRORISM

Some would say that moral superiority is how to win the war on terrorism
(Netanyahu 1986), and indeed, Prof. Chris Harmon (in How al-Qaeda May End)
suggests this also. Most terrorist groups do come to an end, and even a doctrine can be
defeated. Winning a war on terrorism requires that there be a moral conviction in the
justice of the fight. A terror war must give expression to the morality involved, and
fight as if it were a war of ideas. Terrorism, in may ways, is an attack on national will.
Terrorists often count on the fact that their targets are "soft and weak" and will not be
able to sustain a coordinated grand strategy. Terrorists know that their targets will
critique themselves, and debate among themselves. They know their targets will argue
among themselves about the morality of counterterrorism, and in fact, they are often
counting on this kind of moral skepticism to develop before they attack again.

The moral arguments against terrorism (that it is unjustifiable) should be forcefully

restated time and time again, and by as many voices as possible, globally. The language
of morality can be powerful. Not only does it appeal to foreign audiences, but it can help
with domestic morale also. Democratic-minded and moderate leaders of organizations
in the host nations for terrorists should be assisted in having their "voices" amplified by
the democratic nations.

STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM

So-called "sponsors" of terrorism distance themselves from the operations they have
supported, but are usually recognizable by a patterned similarity in how they engage in
acts of violence both within their own countries as well as internationally. Usually the
sponsor or patron is a duly elected government official or a Cabinet appointee, and in
other cases, it is a military or business leader. Sometimes, the terrorist group is a
"puppet" organization for those officials, promoting that nation's interests or ideology
overseas. At other times, the sponsor has little to no control over the terrorists, having
become a supporter through double-cross or blackmail. Sponsorship generally involves
political support, financial support, weapons, training, sanctuary, and safe havens. In
many cases, the terrorists have access to diplomatic facilities and the intelligence
services of their host country. State sponsors often launch "proxy" wars using terrorism
or insurgency.

There are seven countries involved in state-sponsored terrorism, what U.S.

intelligence calls the "Big Seven." They have been active supporters of a wide range of
terrorism, most notably in a number of embassy bombings, in at least 12 countries.
Let's examine the BIG SEVEN in detail:

IRAN -- The Iranian government regularly carries out assassination against its main
opposition party, the Kurdish Democrats, and exiles abroad. They regularly set off
bombs around the Middle East and Asia (Turkey is a prime target). The groups that
they sponsor, and who take the credit for the attacks, are numerous, but mostly involve
Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, or the PIJ. Iran does not try to conceal its ties with
Palestinian organizations, and pretty much provides safe haven to any group that
refuses to recognize Israel's right to existence.

CUBA -- Castro's regime in the past has provided funding, military training, arms, and
guidance to revolutionary groups around the world. Today, with the exception of
support to such Latin American groups like the FARC and ELN, Cuba mostly provides
safe haven and retirement packages to ex-terrorists.
IRAQ -- The Iraqi government (prior to U.S. invasion) plotted assassination attempts
against U.S. leaders, but their more successful operations involved bombing or rocket
attacks on U.N. installations or offices. In the past, Iraq has provided bases, weapons,
and protection to various Arab terrorist groups, especially those, like al-Qaeda, who
support dreams of Islamo-fascism.

LIBYA -- The government in Libya refuses to abide by U.N. resolutions and has been
implicated in numerous bombings around the world, involving aircraft, restaurants, and
discotheques. Several Arab terrorist groups, like the Abu Nidal Organization,
maintained their headquarters in Libya and proudly hanged their signs above the
doorway.

NORTH KOREA -- The North Korea government regularly sponsors raids on offices
and installations in South Korea. Assassination attempts against South Korean
government officials are common. The groups they sponsor are from all over the world,
Lebanon, Uganda, and Myanmar. Although VIP assassination training appears to be
their main method of support, North Korea has also been involved in aircraft and office
bombing. Their economy is in the gutter, and the only "cash crop" they have is nuclear
missile technology.

SUDAN -- The government in Sudan refuses to abide by U.N. resolutions and harbors
some of the world's most violent terrorist groups, mostly radical Islamic groups. The
country serves as a prime base camp for Egyptian terrorists, and has some geostrategic
value to Islamic fundamentalists who see Sudan as a bridgehead for the penetration of
religious ideology into Africa.

SYRIA -- Syrian intelligence is available to anyone, terrorist or non-terrorist, who is

willing to pay the price demanded by this mercenary state. Several terrorist groups are
headquartered in Syria, mostly left-wing Palestinian organizations like the PLF and
PFLP. Other groups that have been provided training or support include the PKK and
Japanese Red Army. With Syrian approval, the Beka'a Valley continues to serve as an
organizational and training center for international terrorism. These bases are also
involved in drug and counterfeit money manufacture.

CONTROVERSIES IN COUNTERTERRORISM

There's no shortage of recommendations for what to do about terrorism. One of the

most consistent themes in the literature is the principle that there should be no
bargaining with terrorists. For most nations, the standard policy is no concessions. This
position has always been strongly advocated by the law enforcement community,
primarily because of reasoning that bargaining invites repeated attacks (Elliott and
Gibson 1978). Another common recommendation, often made by criminologists, is that
terrorism should be processed by the criminal justice system the same way as other crimes
(Crelinsten et al. 1978). The argument here is really that special squads, units, and strike
forces cause more problems than they solve. Others in criminal justice argue for
counterterrorism to build social consensus and reform (O'Connor 1994). Current
controversies involve to what extent anti-terrorism efforts by political democracies
corrupt those democracies because such efforts are always politically motivated and
impact civil liberties (Turk 1982; Ross 2000). The following points are lessons from those
controversies.
 POINT #1: Some of the things that best shape a response to terrorism are derived
from simply knowing the functions of terrorism. This is one of the approaches first
suggested by Brian Jenkins of the RAND think tank. Since one of the functions of
terrorism (at least the revolutionary type) is to provoke government overreaction,
anything the government can do to keep itself from overreacting will thwart the
terrorists' objectives. Since another function is to gain control of the media, anything
voluntary or involuntary on the part of the media which stifles exposure also stifles
terrorism. Bombings make the best pictures, so the more media-driven the terrorists,
the more likely bombings will be the mode of attack. Another common function or
demand is the release of political prisoners, and this is almost never a true objective.
The real objective is politicization of all prisoners, the winning over of new recruits
among the prison population. And finally, the best strategy may be one of going after the
financial supporters of terrorism, not the terrorists themselves. Ideology may be able to
sustain them, but not for long once the money runs dry. It's only with narcoterrorism
that this "dry well" strategy fails, since the drug market doesn't respond to simple
supply-demand forces.

POINT #2: The other thing about terrorism (or at least quasi-terrorism and the more
lunatic fanatics) is that they are imitators, not innovators. That is, their crimes are
copycat or cyclical. The skyjacking phenomenon of the 70s was an excellent example of
this, where terrorists always waited until some other group made the first move, and
then they "jumped on the bandwagon." Most of the them do this because they are
sorely trying to imitate military strategy; others do it because of standardized
paramilitary training or textbook lessons in guerilla tactics; and still others do it to
throw off suspicion from themselves. Anyway, the cyclic pattern is quite predictable,
and in general, conforms to a Wave-Crest-Plateau pattern.

POINT #3: Although it's inevitable that the first few hostages may die, a thing called
the Stockholm Syndrome works in the favor of anti-terrorist forces. The longer the
hostages stay alive, the less likelihood harm will come to the hostages. With this
syndrome, the hostages come to think of their captors as protecting them from the police
and soon start to identify with their captors. The captors themselves start to develop a
parent/child relationship with their hostages. Other syndromes include the Penelope
Syndrome, where women find violent criminals sexually attractive. Hostage negotiation
and rescue are perhaps the most complicated type of anti-terrorist operation.
 POINT #4: In assessing the threat of terrorism (in lieu of information on group skills
and capabilities), it's important to concentrate on counting the number of incidents. Do
not count the number of victims, nor the value of harm. It's hard to do this especially after
some extraordinary incident in which many people have died, but the only true
comparison is the number of attacks since terrorists often have no idea themselves about
how many victims will be killed by their actions. Nationalist groups tend to seek a high
number of fatalities while revolutionary groups tend to seek fewer deaths and more
wounds or injuries. Splinter or spin-off groups seem more interested in death counts
and fatalities. The point is that no matter how many victims are targeted, the group is
only a threat via its number of attacks as a percent of total activity.

POINT #5: Do count the number of victims saved by any preventive action. If you
manage through some leverage to get the terrorist leader to stop things with a cease-fire
agreement, regardless of whether further negotiation follows or not, it will significantly
help your agency and your career if you have calculated how many lives you've saved,
and can report this information to policymakers. Everyone in a leadership position wins
by a cease-fire. The terrorist leader looks good; your leaders look good; and if the
experts that say terrorist leaders have low self-esteem are right, it should be an easy job
to feed their egos and get leverage on them through negotiation. After the cease-fire, it's
important to also measure the resumed level of violence and compare it to pre-cease-fire
levels. Does the violence resume at a higher or lower level? It may be that your short-
term (e.g., 30-day) truce resulted in a 16% short-term reduction in violence (e.g., 6
months), but in the long-run, you've instigated a more heinous pattern of violence.

POINT #6: Giving into terrorist demands for political change only changes the pattern
of violence, not the violence itself. Economic and political reforms aimed at helping the
group's ethnic or religious group and resolving its grievances will win over some
supporters among the general population, but in the long-run, will create new problems
and a new set of grievances over the precise implementation of policy and the degree of
power sharing. A much better strategy is to initiate economic and political reforms for
all the people of a nation. Economic development solutions have worked in Ireland,
Uruguay, and Italy.

POINT #7: The thing that works best is reduction of recruits, supplies, and support.
You've got to reduce the number of active trainee members of the terrorist
organization. Capture and imprisonment works (it's helped to keep Spain fairly
terrorism-free), as well as preemptive strikes against training camps. The number of
terrorists captured or killed should be counted, and this can be put as the denominator
in a fraction with the number of government security forces killed in the numerator.
You've also got to keep weapons, ammo, and supplies out of the hands of terrorists.
Destruction of their "stash" houses is the best preemptive strategy. Unfortunately, many
religious terrorist groups operate under the cover of religion and it doesn't look good to
blow up religious buildings. Whenever a dragnet or raid takes place, the number of
weapons found should be counted. Finally, cutting off support should be done with
precision and not indiscriminately. Too often, governments are willing to engage in
"collective punishments" against all (suspected) aliens, all unfriendly foreign powers,
and even its own citizens, in what are all only symbolic efforts with no discernable short-
term or long-term effect. A more precise focus would go beyond identifying support
countries by name, and identify support by type, amount, seasonality, and
displacement. The latter two mean that cutting off support at certain times of the year
will have more effect than a random cutoff, and that cutting off two or more sources of
support will be effective since groups may simple displace or find new sources of support
once old ones dry up.

POINT #8: Things that don't work, or have questionable value, include the notion that
swift and harsh retaliation is the best policy. This is a popular notion, but the degree of
moral certainty and justification empowering terrorism does not respond to displays of
overwhelming force or "lines drawn in the sand." The standard doctrines of deterrence
as punishment (that punishment be swift, certain, and severe) don't apply to terrorism.
Justice has a longer timeline in this context. If you're going to play the retaliation game
right, wait until things have cooled off and hit them when they least expect it.

POINT #9: Terrorism doesn't respond to coalition-based sanctions which are intended
to express the international community's disregard for them. Terrorists are people who
have long ago felt rejected by mainstream society. In fact, their desire is often to be
further rejected. If they are broken up from receiving any psychological rewards or
sympathy from their social support groups, this strategy might work. Terrorists long
ago crossed the line of ethical and moral restraint. Rebuilding this in all the diverse
places of the world is going to take some time.

POINT #10: Sharing of information and intelligence by counterterrorism agents is

essential. Unfortunately, turf battles, credit claiming, stovepipes, and unnecessary
secrecy permeates the counterterrorist community. Agency cooperation, however, also
fragments the jurisdictional grounds and/or changes the perceived level of threat, so
there tends to be more intelligence/policy disconnects. Law enforcement agencies
typically separate terrorists into criminal, political, or mentally unstable categories, and
this may be too simplistic a classification. Terrorist behavior differs from that of
ordinary criminals. Criminal investigation techniques must be modified to reflect these
differences when examining terrorist cases.

COUNTERTERRORISM ANALYSIS

Let's look at five (5) terrorist groups and how we would analyze them:

RED
EOKA TUPAMAROS IRA ETA
BRIGAGE
(Cyprus) (Uruguay) (Ireland) (Basque)
(Italy)
Type Nationalist Revolutionary Nationalist Revolutionary
Nationalist
& Greek/Turkey Urban student 2nd class Economic
Unique language
History separation radicalism treatment change
Union with Socialist United Societal
Aim Own Nation
Greece economy Ireland betterment
Courier Students 1st tried Shadow
Pyramidal
Organ- system, organized sugar military government,
paired cells
ization led by Greek workers into battalions, central
called brigades
Army colonel cells then cells committee
Strength 5 per group, 2 per cell, 5 per cell, 700 members 800 actives,
275 members 3000 members 2000 8000
 members underground
Bombing, Protests, Kidnapping,
Sabotage, Demonstrations,
Attacks Riots, Clashes, Robbery,
Demonstrations Assassinations
Executions Executions Extortion
Avg. age 27,
Avg. age
Avg. age 23, Students and Avg. age 25, Radicalized
Social 21, married
working class sympathizers middle class students,
with kids
criminals
1/3 Mass Many
Mass support, Relatives
Ideological neo- support, some sympathizers,
Support Church and and friends
Marxist support ideological Ideological
Greek support abroad
Marxist support Maoist support
France,
Russia, Cuba, Czech
External U.S., Russia, Republic,
Greece Cuba
Aid PLO, Libya, links to Sicilian
others links to IRA, Mafia
PLO

BRIEF ANALYSIS: First of all, the groups with a cell structure are most likely to
thwart human intelligence since the purpose of the cell structure is prevent any one
member from knowing who his or her immediate leaders are. Such groups would be
difficult to infiltrate or penetrate. This may or may not be true with the IRA which
mixes family with business (married with children), depending upon the levels of
fidelity. ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) may therefore be the best approach for such
groups.

The groups with military, paramilitary, and shadow government organization might
be easier to infiltrate or penetrate with HUMINT (Human Intelligence). Size is a major
consideration. Undercover law enforcement operations tend to work well with smaller
terrorist groups. Larger groups that are capable of launching a sustained terrorist
campaign will require more than a law enforcement operation.

ECONOMIC-BASED COUNTERTERRORISM

Under Executive Order 13224, the U.S. Treasury Dept. periodically identifies certain
entities as terrorism financing organizations (financiers), and under U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1390, all member states must block the assets of such organizations.
Terrorist financiers often look like humanitarian aid organizations, an example being
Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), an al-Qa'ida front operating out of Illinois
since 1992. Attacking terrorism on economic fronts, whether via blocking or freezing of
assets, requires extensive knowledge of organizational structure. Certain organizational
principles are endemic to all terrorist groups. Organizations employ varieties of
command and control structures, but they are frequently organized along the same
pattern no matter what causes they endorse.

The typical organization is arranged in a pyramid. It takes many more people to

support terrorist operations than to carry them out; therefore, the majority of people
who work in terrorist organizations serve to keep terrorists in the field. The most
common job in terrorist groups is support, not combat.

According to Fraser & Fulton (1984), the hierarchical structure of terrorist groups is
divided into four levels. The smallest group is at the top and is responsible for command.
As in military circles, leadership makes policy and plans while providing general
direction. Other researchers have often pointed out that the command structure is not as
effective as in legitimate organizations because of the demand for secrecy. The command
structure in a terrorist organization is not free to communicate openly with its
membership; therefore, it cannot exercise day-to-day operational control.

The second level in Fraser’s hierarchy contains the active cadre. The active cadre is
responsible for carrying out the mission of the terrorist organization. Depending on the
organization’s size, each terrorist in the cadre may have one or more specialties. Other
terrorists support each specialty, but the active cadre is the striking arm of the terrorist
group. After the command structure, the cadre of active terrorists is the smallest
organization in most terrorist structures.

Under the active cadre is the second largest and the most important level of a terrorist
organization. Active supporters are critical to terrorist campaigns. Any group can carry
out a bombing or kidnapping, but to maintain a campaign of bombings and kidnappings
takes support. Active supporters keep the terrorists in the field. They maintain
communication channels, provide safe houses, gather intelligence, and ensure all other
logistical needs are met. This is the largest internal group in the organization.

The last and largest category is the organization’s passive supporters. This group is
extremely difficult to identify and characterize because supporters do not readily join
terrorist groups. Many times they are used without their knowledge; they simply
represent a favorable element of the political climate. When a terrorist group can
muster political support, it will have a relatively large number of passive supporters.
When its cause alienates the mainstream, passive support dwindles. Passive support
complements active support.

Most terrorist groups number fewer than 50 people and are incapable of mounting a
long-term campaign. Under the command of only a few people, the group is divided
according to specific tasks. Intelligence sections are responsible for assessing targets and
planning operations. Support sections provide the means necessary to carry out the
assault, and the tactical units are responsible for the actual terrorist action.

Terrorist organizations have two primary types of subunits: the cell and the column.
The cell is the most basic type. Composed of four to six people, the cell usually has a
specialty; it may be a tactical unit or an intelligence section. In some organizations, the
duties of tactical cells vary with the assignment. Other cells are designed to support the
operations.

Groups of cells form to create columns. Columns are semiautonomous

conglomerations of cells with a variety of specialties and a single command structure. As
combat units, columns have questionable effectiveness. They are too cumbersome to be
used in major operations, and the secrecy demanded by terrorism prevents effective
intercolumn cooperation. Their primary function is combat support because elements in
a column can be arranged to support the tactical operations of cells.

MILITARY-BASED COUNTERTERRORISM

Military special operations are generally used when little is known about the precise
details of a terrorist organization. It must be remembered that intelligence gathering
and counterterrorism is normally a police responsibility. The reason for this is that even
though police agencies share information with spy agencies, it is the police who must
testify at trial, not spies. Collaboration between police and spy agencies is essential in
military-based counterterrorism.

While the most effective counterterrorist activities involve preemptive strikes at their
bases of support, the most commonly used methods involve retaliation and/or hostage
rescue. Many nations maintain specialized counterterrorism units, and these units have
a long history, going back as far as the Roman Empire with Jewish extremists. Israel
has, in fact, been at the forefront of counterterrorism policy. Israel's Golda Meier
formed the first modern counterterrorist agency (the Sayeret Mat'Kal) to hunt down
and kill terrorists, abiding by what became the world's rules on retaliation:

• No bystanders must be killed, only terrorists

• Terrorists should be killed in the same way as their victims died
• Terrorists should know who is killing them before they die
• Someone must stay behind to clean up the evidence and mislead police
investigation

Probably the most effective counterterrorist agency in the world is the British SAS
(Special Air Service). They developed the stun grenade and various other noise-flash
devices commonly found today. They also developed night vision goggles and special
ladders for assaults. Members of this elite unit are anonymous. They have been used
against the IRA and throughout Europe. Many countries around the world receive SAS
support or training in forming their own counterterrorist agencies. Spain also operates
a little-known anti-terrorist group, the GEO (Grupo Especial de Operaciones), which
specializes in "shoot to kill" and hostage rescue operations like the SAS. The Sultan of
Oman maintains a special force (SSF - Sultan of Oman Special Forces) that is constantly
on fifteen-minute standby in case of terrorist activity against Omani interests in the
Persian Gulf. France operates a special police unit (GIGN - Groupment d'intervention
de la Gendarmerie Nationale) trained in counterpropaganda and psychological
warfare. The Netherlands and Norway have special marine corps units which protect
those nations' economic interests at home and overseas. Germany's GSG9
(Grenzschutzgruppe 9) is an elite force of well-equipped volunteers capable of infinite
stealth and overwhelming firepower.

The United States has a system of FBI special units who work with local police SWAT
teams and the CIA providing intelligence. Delta Force is perhaps the most well known
U.S. counterterrorist unit. However, Seal Team Six is the Navy's equivalent. ATF also
maintains a special unit. First responder units throughout the U.S. are trained in
terrorist scenarios. Local police departments are trained in close quarter combat
situations. America's newest agency is the FAST (First Fleet Antiterrorist Special
Team).
 GLOBAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Since terrorism is not restricted to any one jurisdiction, it mandates a global response.
Repercussions are felt everywhere, and at some point, counterterrorism must require
more than the ability of one state to combat terrorism. Extradition and deportation
schemes have been the traditional global counterterrorism tools. Extradition is the
surrender by one state to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense
outside its own territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being
competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender. Political offenses, however,
are normally exempt from extradition, and death penalty concerns are an additional
complication. Deportation procedures, likewise, rely upon cooperation, and usually
create problems for whatever country the terrorist is deported to. Deportation is often
used in the United States whenever a defendant is not allowed to view classified material
against them. Aliens convicted of serious crimes are regularly deported.

The G-8 countries (which include Canada, the United States, Britain, Germany,
France, Italy, Japan, and Russia) have long made counterterrorism an agenda item at
their summits (see G-8 Centre). Most of their proposals rest on using Interpol as a
formal association of police agencies everywhere, or more recently Europol, the
embryonic Europe-wide police agency. Other recommendations involve military
installations, municipal operations, defense contractors, and the private sector. Most
well-known, however, is the call for a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC),
an idea spawned in 1993 by a U.N. committee and ratified by the Rome Statute in 1998
and taking effect in 2002 (see ICC website). As an entity created by the U.N. treaty
process, the ICC's jurisdiction would be any international crime like war crime,
genocide, unprovoked aggression, crimes against humanity, and (theoretically)
terrorism. States consent to participate on a case-by-case basis. The forum is supposed
to be neutral and 18 judges are elected for nine-year terms. The court may sentence
convicted offenders to incarceration for terms of up to 30 years or, in cases of extreme
gravity, life imprisonment The following is an in-depth look at the ICC and terrorism:

The International Criminal Court and Terrorism

The ICC is designed to hold individuals accountable for their actions, and
defendants must be present at trial where they are defended by counsel of choice and
presumed innocent. Defenses can be based on diminished capacity to understand the
unlawfulness of the acts, duress, and self-defense. Three crimes fall under its
jurisdiction:
(1) genocide -- intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily
or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in
part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.
(2) crimes against humanity -- any widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: (a) murder; (b)
extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation or forcible transfer of population; (e)
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law; (f) torture; (g) rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity; (h) persecution against any identifiable group or
 collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender …, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in
connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court; (i) enforced disappearance of persons; (j) apartheid; (k)
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
(3) war crimes -- (a) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions; (b) other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within
the established framework of international law; (c) in the case of an armed conflict
not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions; (e) other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable
in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework
of international law.
Terrorism is not specifically included in the court's jurisdiction largely due to
concerns that a consensus cannot be reached on a legal definition. The U.S. and the
Arab states (among others) believe that use of most definitions would politicize the
court, and the U.S. further fears that the court might interfere with America's right to
act as the world's police force. If agreements can be reached over the definition of
terrorism and the "national sovereignty" right of unilateral action, there is hope that
terrorism might be added as a new crime under the court's jurisdiction when the
opportunity to add new crimes comes up for a 7/8 majority vote in 2009. At present,
the U.S. has stated it prefers to bring terrorism suspects to trial through domestic
courts and its own military tribunals.

Another basic problem of course is the questionable status of detainees in a war on

terrorism. Captured terrorists may be held by one nation as "unlawful combatants"
and deprived of POW (prisoner of war) status and Geneva convention protections. Such
protections require viewing the terrorists as legitimate armies. Rule 117 of the ICC's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides for detention in a "custodial state" and allows
for a hearing on pretrial conditional release. By definition, terrorists do not meet the
four requirements necessary for combatant status (wear uniforms or other distinctive
insignia, carry arms openly, be under command of a person responsible for group
actions, and conduct their operations in accordance with laws of war). For this reason,
captured terrorists are not usually afforded prisoner of war status” (Joint Chiefs of Staff
Publication 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Antiterrorism,
Washington, DC: 17 March 1998).

INTERNET RESOURCES
American Diplomacy
Counter-Terrorism Resources for Law Enforcement
DiploFoundation (www.diplomacy.edu)
ERRI Terrorism Archive
How al-Qaeda May End
IACSP Association
International Policy Center on Terrorism
A Global Phenomena Mandating a Unified International Response
Legal Considerations on Terrorists as Combatants and POWs
Terrorism Research Center
U.S. State Dept. Office of Counterterrorism
Yahoo Full Coverage on Terrorism
PRINTED RESOURCES:
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Last updated: 05/06/06

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 COUNTERTERRORISM: MILITARY AND ECONOMIC OPTIONS
"They've got to stop their aggression, or we're going to bomb them back into the stone age"
(Curtis LeMay)

This lecture focuses upon so-called "hard" approaches in counterterrorism, namely

those involving the use of military force and economic sanctions. If space permits, law
enforcement implications will also be discussed as they relate to hard-line approaches.
We shall discover that, because of a variety of factors, military and economic
counterterrorism is successful largely for symbolic reasons. It makes us feel good to
drop bombs on an enemy and to think we are siphoning off their money. This is known
as the catharsis effect of counterterrorism, and there are some experts (Lesser et. al.
1999) who argue that sometimes that is the best policy. The truth, however, is that more
innocent people than intended targets usually suffer under these options. Bombs often
go awry, causing "collateral damage," and it is well-known that economic sanctions
rarely cause the sanctioned regime to suffer -- it is their people who suffer. At best,
these options produce destabilization in regions where terrorism thrives, but we will
re-examine an old justice principle - deterrence - and see if it applies as a more stable
form of hard-line action. Also, since both military and economic options are so closely
tied to foreign policy, we shall begin there, with an overview of national security strategy
in the context of international relations.

STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the beginning, there were city-states which began to see themselves as some sort of
union or federation, which became nation-states, and then the wars of survival in the
name of liberty began. The first, the Peloponnesian war, brought an end to any hope for
a free Greek nation-state, and then there was the Roman Empire, that great experiment
in centralized government. Provinces in the Roman Empire were allowed to practice
self-government within the limitations established by Rome. The famous "Pax
Romana" of this empire meant subjugation without assimilation, and more importantly,
stood as a symbol of law and order for over thousand years. When Rome fell, Pope Leo
III appointed Charlemagne as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and the Roman
system of colonial administration was replaced by the feudal system. Under feudalism,
the notion of "sovereignty" developed, with a vassal owing unquestioning allegiance to
their overlord in "fiefdoms" (as far as the lord thought his power extended; his
dominion as master of all that he surveys). However, the Pope started removing feudal
bonds in cases of misconduct by the lord, and the notions of "jurisdiction" and
"legitimacy" replaced sovereignty. The territorial jurisdiction system replaced
sovereignty, and in the quest for territorial expansion of jurisdiction, the Crusades were
launched into the middle east. Part of that quest was the urge to create a new world
order. It failed, and Europe drifted into a state of anarchy with rule by dukes and
duchesses with limited legitimate authority.

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 ended rule by dukes, re-created the nation-state
system, and brought with it the notion of "balance of power," the world's first strategy of
international relations. From 1648 to 1919, the theory of balance of power shaped the
world into much of how it looks today.
 BALANCE OF POWER: The idea of an interlocking, equilibrium-based system of
international order in which each nation kept an eye on each other nation, and when
one nation showed signs of starting a war or expanding its colonies, the other nations
would shift their alliances, the weak against the strong, to restore the status quo
distribution of power.

It had always been the case throughout history that alliances and treaties were formed
on the basis that one's ally is who they fear less against the power they fear more (raison
d'etat, or the law of survival), but it had never been the case, until the balance of power,
that the enemy of today would become the ally of tomorrow. This led to strange
bedfellows, as the 5 or 6 European nations in this game of power politics carved up the
world to their liking, comfortable in the thought that they were maintaining the best
that could be accomplished for international peace. The principalities of Italy, for
example, Venice, Florence, Naples, and Milan, constantly checked and balanced one
another with international trade. The English and Dutch, for example, constantly
shifted sides in the long conflict over colonial expansion between France and the
Habsburg dynasties. Most importantly, the balance could be maintained by options
other than war. All the world had to do in response to an aggressor among them was to
form new alliances, often by arranged marriages between princesses, often by
diplomacy, and often by forcing the aggressor to partition their newly conquered lands
fairly among members of the new, more powerful alliance. During the colonial era of
expansion, war as we know it changed. To be sure, there were preemptive wars, if new
alliances could be adjusted in time to check an aggressor. Also, there were limited wars,
to force aggressors afterwards to the bargaining table. The acquisition of new territory
by one power did not mean that others had to make a similar expansion. The balance
could be maintained by redistributing economic wealth, commercial channels,
monopolies on technology, or other resources. Balance of power was a wonderfully
peaceful system for preventing global domination by any one power, but it all fell apart
with World War I, but then was resurrected after World War II in that version of it
known as detente, with only two superpowers, Russia and the U.S., left to maintain the
equilibrium.

Moving now to 1945, with the end of World War II and the birth of the United
Nations, we see another type of strategy developing - the doctrine of detente or
deterrence - which was a game with many names played by the world's superpowers,
Russia and the U.S., with all the world as their stage. 1945 was also the birth of the
atomic warfare age, and the type of deterrence involved was nuclear deterrence. For
four years after bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. enjoyed the privilege of
being the world's sole atomic superpower, but that all changed in 1949 when Russia
detonated its first atomic bomb in a trial experiment.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: The idea that collective world security could be

maintained by having a very small number of nations, ideally two, in possession of
enough nuclear weapons so that conventional war would become obsolete and the
threat of global thermonuclear war would become unthinkable and suicidal.

The doctrine of detente or deterrence which took the form of an Arms Race and Cold
War between Russia and the U.S. was not codified by the U.N., but that international
body quickly became a forum for conflict between the world's two superpowers. The
U.N. was helpless, and other nations were helpless. The U.N. could take no action
because both Russia and the U.S. exercised veto power whenever it looked like the U.N.
needed to step in. Nations organized into "West" and "East" blocs as the two
superpowers played out "proxy" wars in Third World countries. The idea of
sovereignty as in "sovereign nation" lost meaning, since all the U.N. offered was
equality. International peace was achieved via nuclear deterrence as a result of
containment and the threat of massive retaliation. Early in the Cold War, official U.S.
policy called for massive retaliation, but then, after the Korean War, the official policy
became flexible response. Behind both policies was the idea that any nuclear war would
involve Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) for the principals, and possibly for the
world as well.

Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was a deterrent philosophy. It meant that

because each side had the ability to wipe each other out, they didn't dare do it. The idea
of flexible response that augmented MAD was the notion of using conventional forces
first, and then developing and using smaller nuclear warheads (20-megaton city
destroyers to devices so small they could be carried by one soldier). The wonder of Cold
War stability was that it was all based on managing perceptions. If your enemy thought
you had all kinds of weapons, and were willing to "use it or lose it," then detente was
maintained. Nuclear weapons need to be deployed in a triad - on land, sea, and air, so
the enemy doesn't know where your weapons are, and an entire specialty developed in
intelligence work to try and come up with indications and warnings of where and when
weapons would be used. Most nuclear weapons, however, were tasked for a
"decapitation" attack upon command and control sites.

By the 1960s, the Arms Race produced more nuclear weapons than were militarily
useful, that is to say, there were more warheads than targets to drop them on. This
became known as overkill, and it is what led to limitation and disarmament talks. The
first SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement got started in 1969, followed
by the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty in 1974. Recent events include SALT II in
1989 and SORT (Strategic Offense Reduction Treaty) in 2002. The U.S. withdrew from
the ABM treaty in 2001 in order to create a space-based (star wars) missile defense
system.

MODERN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Today, the situation has changed dramatically. Nuclear deterrence doctrines no

longer preoccupy policymakers. Instead, the primary threats facing the United States,
its allies and its friends are terrorism, ethnic violence and a few small states that seek to
use force to intimidate their neighbors or to enslave their own populations. Some
strategists have urged a reconsideration of deterrence as defense policy, but terrorists
and their sponsors are quite difficult to deter because they seek destruction (the so-
called "crazy states" phenomenon), and threatening them with war and destruction
in retaliation for some violent act produces no deterrent effect. This led to consideration
of prevention as the best policy, along with preemption - the latter being a way to make
use of warning intelligence capability. Preventive preemption, or preemptive
prevention (it doesn't matter which word comes first) requires policymakers to assess
threats, decide if conflict is inevitable, and then make one of the most difficult and
horrific decisions in international relations. Policymakers have to make judgments
about the level of risk the nation is prepared to accept and decide whether it is better to
fight now while the costs are relatively low, or wait and possibly confront a more
dangerous adversary later. Preemptive prevention was announced by the President as
the official U.S. policy during a speech at West Point on June 1, 2002, and has been
analyzed or written about quite extensively since then (see JSCOPE 2005 Conference
Papers on Pre-emptive War or this NDU award-winning paper, in Word, on How the
Bush Doctrine meets the Test of the Powell Doctrine). It is somewhat similar to a notion
of deterrence, however, the correct terminology is dissuasion. Dissuasion refers to a
situation where there is only one superpower in the world, called a hyperpower, and
dissuasion suggests that military strikes by this hyperpower will be so technologically
and operationally advanced, that potential competitors and enemies will abandon all
threats. Dissuasion is a hyperpower's way of playing asymmetric warfare, since
terrorists do just enough to taunt retaliation with their guerilla hit-and-run tactics, the
appropriate response is overwhelming "shock and awe."

PREEMPTIVE PREVENTION: The idea that the best defense is a good offense,
or under international law, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or a preemptive
war that arises when one side decides there is a very great risk its adversary will
attack within days or hours, and that the attack will cripple its ability to defend itself
or retaliate.

There have been 20 preventive wars launched by the great powers over the last three
centuries. Pearl Harbor, for example, was a preemptive strike by the Japanese against
the U.S. Preemptive strikes sometimes backfire. Democracies tend to avoid them.
Democratic societies are usually restrained by fear of cost and doubts over the serious of
a threat warranting preemptive action. Politicians also are concerned that voters will
toss them out of office if they over-reach. Democracies typically prefer to create an
alliance or coalition, relying on strategies of destabilization and containment, or
preemptive covert operations in hopes of starting a coup. However, there is some
precedent for preemption. Military advisors suggested preemption during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, and Israel definitely used it when they perceived they were under
imminent threat of Arab attack in 1967. Preemptive wars are rare because of the
immense costs at home and internationally, and there are almost always doubts about
the threat's gravity and immediacy.

First strikes can occasionally be justified before the moment of imminent attack, if the
point of "sufficient threat" has been reached. This concept has three dimensions: "a
manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a positive
danger, and a general situation in which waiting greatly magnifies the risk." The notion
of "threat" is also closely related to the term "vital interests," which refers to any threat
against the life of the nation, such as destruction of major cities or any step that could
ruin the economy. The following are the standard vital interests of any country,
particularly the United States:

• Protecting the territory and population of the homeland

• Preventing the emergence of a hostile coalition
• Ensuring freedom of the seas, lines of communication, airways, and space
• Ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic
resources
• Deterring and defeating aggression against allies and friends
 There is also precedent for preemptive prevention in the U.N. Charter by what is
called "anticipatory self-defense." The U.N. Charter, Article 51, declares that nothing
shall impair the inherent right of a member nation to engage in individual or collective
self-defense if attacked." It should be noted that there are controversies over
interpretation of Article 51, just as there are over whether just war doctrine justifies
preemption. The interests of justice requires a clear explanation of the grounds for
preemption (need for "regime change"), and there is probably some moral obligation
for reconstruction ("nation building") after preemptive action has been taken.

MILITARY COUNTERMEASURES

The military option is what most people think of when they think of counterterrorism,
however, special counterterrorist operations, like special counterdrug operations,
usually are only carried out under special, highly restrictive, circumstances. The basic
problems are that the military doesn't work well with criminal justice procedures
(which are often part of the mix when capture, rather than assassination, is the goal).
The military's purpose is also to blow things up, and terrorists rarely provide a "target-
rich" environment. The military is also trained to carry out defensive as well as
offensive action, but in many cases, usually involving occupation of a country
afterwards, the need for defensive maneuvers interfere with successful completion of
tracking down terrorists. Offensive action may be necessary to destroy regimes that
align themselves with terrorism, and these often have to be U.S.-led efforts, in order to
create an incentive for allies to send police forces afterwards. Offensive action is
synonymous with higher morale at home.

All branches of the U.S. military contain special operations forces that are well
suited for counterterrorist missions. It is well known that these special forces are more
effective and produce less collateral damage than conventional forces. They are also the
kinds of forces that commit to the most risk of death, and this is the reason why
policymakers are reluctant to use them. Some special forces contain police units, but
most of them are trained for reconnaissance, surveillance, "surgical" raids, hostage
rescue, abductions, and liaisons with allied counterterrorist forces. U.S. special
operations forces are organized under the U.S. Special Operations Command, and
mostly consist of Green Berets organized into units called A Teams. The traditional
purpose of an A Team is force multiplication, or getting on the ground and multiplying
their operational strength. Delta Force (also known as 1st Special Forces Operational
Detachment) is a more secretive group that also operates in small teams. When large
elite units are needed, America relies upon such units as the Army's 75th Ranger
Regiment or the U.S. Marine Corps. The U.S. Navy also has special assault units called
the Sea Air Land Forces (SEALs). The most common objective of a special forces unit
in counterterrorism is to punish and destroy the terrorists, and secondarily, to destroy
their military and paramilitary assets.

There are times, however, when you need to go further, and destroy the terrorist's
non-military sources of support. This is when covert operations are called for. They
are usually arranged by an agency of the intelligence community, but frequently involve
U.S. military forces. Some intelligence agencies have their own paramilitary force,
however. There is a long history of covert ops, or "shadow wars," and probably the
most controversial aspect of it is assassination. This is generally reserved for the
elimination of key supporters of terrorism. There is little research on the effectiveness
of assassination when it comes to terrorism, and martyrdom effects are likely. Needless
to say, such missions are secret, and government "deniability" is incorporated into such
operations. Some history: after the Vietnam War, the U.S. officially declared that it
would no longer use assassination. A presidential executive order signed in 1981
(Executive Order 12333) expressly forbids employees of the U.S. from assassinating
adversaries. This was reinforced later by Executive Order 11905 which prohibited
hiring anyone to commit assassination. These prohibitions were reconsidered in the
wake of terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland during September 11, 2001.

Also covert and somewhat secretive in nature is psychological warfare, which

involves the creation of internal mistrust, fear, infighting, and other types of discord.
Typically, this is a destabilization operation, and ranges from activities as dangerous as
infiltrating a terrorist group to dropping propaganda or disinformation leaflets over the
enemy. A number of newer techniques have incorporated principles of cyberwar or
information warfare.

ECONOMIC COUNTERMEASURES

Terrorists use a variety of means for financing. Besides money laundering, they may
use drug trafficking, smuggling of bulk cash, trade-based money laundering, charities
for fundraising, and informal money remittance systems such as hawala. Hawala (also
known as hundi) is an informal money transfer system used primarily in the Middle
East, Africa and Asia. It originated in South Asia. In the hawala system, money is
transferred via a network of hawala brokers, or hawaladars. The transparency of
hawala networks (no records are kept) may very well represent the greatest challenge in
fighting terrorism on the economic front. Besides hawala, the world also has a rather
large black market peso system (usually involved with drug money) and a Fei chien
(Asian variety of hawala meaning "flying money") system. A challenge is that terror
funds may be raised legitimately or be perfectly "clean" at the beginning, but then, the
transfer method may be illegitimate (involving money laundering, smuggling, invoice
manipulations, or trade diversions). Some transfer systems are legitimate, however.
For example, commodities trading may take place with gold, precious gems, tobacco, or
oil. The regular security transfer and brokerage process may be used, and additionally,
funds may be transmitted via gift cards, debit and credit cards, Internet digital currency
systems, and stored value cards, like prepaid phone cards and "chits."

The Invisible Bankers used by Terrorists, Drug Dealers, and Smugglers

For hundreds of years, the world has had an informal money-remittance system in
which people living overseas could send money home for relative's living expenses,
and this "fringe" banking system has always been cheaper and faster than anything
like Western Union. In a given year, an estimated $150 billion flows through such
channels, which is about 35% of all global transfers. The al-Qaeda terrorists who
attacked on 9/11, authorities discovered, operated with a $800,000 budget, and used
such a system -- the well-established Middle Eastern "Hawala" network. Within the
US alone, there are about 23,000 convenience stores, restaurants, and small shops
where the Hawala banking system is practiced, and record-keeping is sloppy. It is
difficult to investigate because, in contrast to the usual procedure of money
laundering, funds used by Hawala to underwrite terror frequently start off "clean"
and become "dirty" later (and amounts are somewhat small, say around $200).
 Operators are known as hawaladars, who pool remittance cash with funds from
business, and then work with a hawaladar colleague (or cousin) in the destination
country, who delivers the remittance amount (for a very small fee of maybe 1%), and
the two hawaladars settle up later (perhaps by one hawaladar shipping $1000 worth
of goods to his cousin, but only invoicing for $800, and then the other hawaladar
selling the goods for a full $1000, wire-transferring back the $800, with the
remaining $200 going to party originally targeted for remittance). Source: Freedman,
M. (2005).

Fighting terrorism economically is a priority established by Executive Order 13224,

which expanded U.S. power to target the support structure of terrorist organizations.
Law enforcement (primarily the U.S. Treasury Department with some of its new offices
- see graphic below) now has the ability to freeze assets and to block the financial
transactions of terrorists and those that support them. It also enables the United States
to deny foreign banks access to U.S. markets if they refuse to cooperate with American
authorities by identifying and freezing terrorist resources abroad. As of early 2003, the
United States has succeeded in freezing terrorist assets in over 165 countries. Since 11
September 2001, more than $112 million in terrorist assets has been frozen worldwide in
over 500 accounts. More than $34 million of these assets was frozen in the United States,
and over $78 million was frozen overseas.

Besides Treasury Dept. initiatives, also established under the USA Patriot Act was
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) intelligence unit which is tasked
with being the primary U.S. intelligence source for domestic financial information. It is
responsible for maintaining and analyzing Suspicious Action Reports and Currency
Transaction Reports filed by financial institutions in accordance with the Bank Secrecy
Act. It also works with law enforcement, the CIA, and regulatory agencies to assist with
intelligence of financial crimes committed within the United States. In addition, there is
the Egmont Group—an international organization of 69 Financial Intelligence Units
formed six years before 11 September 2001 to share intelligence of suspicious financial
activities. Other multilateral groups, such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund assist with legal harmonization, which is a term meaning that
technical assistance treaties and extradition treaties all have to be modified to support
more sophisticated tracking of terrorist financing at the same time being sensitive to the
different definitions of terrorism and legal systems of foreign countries.

Although terrorists engage in illegal activity to obtain funds and then launder the
currency as conventional money launderers do, some terrorist organizations are much
more likely to raise their funds legitimately and then use those funds to kill and attack.
For example, terrorist groups in Europe, East Asia, and Latin America rely on common
criminal activities including extortion, kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, counterfeiting,
and fraud. Other groups, such as those in the Middle East, rely on commercial
enterprises, donations, and funds skimmed from charitable organizations to not only
fund their activities but also to move materiel and personnel. Still other groups rely on
state sponsors for funding.

Charitable organizations and nongovernmental organizations are popular ways for

terrorists to raise and transmit funds. Terrorists have abused some legitimate charities
with schemes to siphon money from humanitarian purposes and funnel it to terrorism.
For example, the Palestinian militant organization Hamas used a U.S. charity, the Holy
Land Foundation for Relief and Development. Hawala networks operate outside the
formal financial system and are used legitimately by those who distrust formal financial
institutions. Due to the lack of a paper trail, tracing funds through hawali is practically
impossible. For example, Al-Barakaat was a Somali-based hawala with connections in
over 40 countries. It was the money-remitting company used by Usama bin Laden to
finance al-Qaeda operations. Hawala networks are required to register with the
governments they work in. However, failure to register is not as powerful a law
enforcement tool as one would wish. The names of originators and receivers in financial
transactions are still anonymous.

Commodities- or trade-based money laundering is another type of terrorist financing,

and involves the smuggling of bulk cash and the evasion of federal reporting
requirements used to track money laundering with commodities such as diamonds,
precious metals, gold, and tobacco. There is evidence that bin Laden's al-Qaeda
operation shifted to trading in gold after investigators started pursuing his financing. In
other cases, outright fraud is involved. International trade can be used by terrorist
organizations to disguise funding sources being imported and exported. Front
companies might overvalue or undervalue merchandise or might fabricate shipments
altogether. Customs officials are usually able to identify anomalies in the packing
weight, shipping weight, and reported value of trade shipments. A Customs
supercomputer called the Numerically Integrated Profiling System (NIPS) has improved
the Treasury Department’s counterterrorism efforts. This intelligence software, which
was originally designed to track airline passenger information, was modified to track
terrorist financing activities. NIPS is housed in the Trade Crimes Intelligence Unit
within the Intelligence Division at Customs headquarters, and the service spends about
 $150,000 per year on it, which runs under Windows NT and can search as much as 100G
of data very quickly.

TARGET HARDENING AND HOMELAND SECURITY

It's only appropriate to "harden" your targets when you suspect they will come under
terrorist attack. There are many ways to classify these targets, for example, as vital,
critical, political, economic, or symbolic, etc. Some targets are most likely already
hardened, like military targets, and the list of vulnerable military targets is quite small,
and would only include places like NASA facilities, U.S. Dept. of Energy facilities, the
Pentagon, and certain bases, camps, or forts. However, other targets are most likely
"soft" targets - either because they are vital, but have no security or bodyguards in
place - or as is often the case, they are symbolic targets that are only "symbolic" to the
terrorists, and you would never think they needed protection. What follows is a
typology or classification of the many targets of terrorist attack.

Political Targets Economic Targets Ecological Targets

1. The President 1. Oil Pipelines 1. America's Farm Belt
2. The Vice President 2. Banks 2. National Forests
3. The First Lady 3. Financial Institutions 3. U.S. Cattle Herds
4. Mrs. Vice President 4. Oil Tankers 4. National Parks
5. The President's Family 5. Oil Companies 5. Hoover Dam
6. The Vice President's Family 6. Auto Manufacturers 6. Dams
7. Ex-Presidents 7. Fort Knox 7. Garbage Dumps
8. An Ex-President's Family 8. The Wheat Belt
9. U.S. Embassies 9. Important Bridges Educational Targets
10. U.S. Consulates 10. New York Harbor 1. Universities
11. Foreign Embassies in U.S. 11. The Lincoln Tunnel 2. Private Schools
12. Governors of Key States 12. The Holland Tunnel 3. Summer Camps
13. The Statue of Liberty 13. Postal Services 4. School Buses
14. Political Conventions 14. Empire State Building 5. Ivy League Schools
15. The White House 15. Wall Street 6. Schools that Politicians attended
16. The U.S. Congress 16. NY Stock Exchange
17. Air Force One 17. Electrical Power Grids
18. The Lincoln Memorial 18. Coal Power Plants
19. Camp David 19. Nuclear Power Plants
20. The Smithsonian Institute 20. Chemical Companies
21. The Washington 21. FED Chairman
Monument

When selecting a target, terrorists usually seek out the one that is: (a) most high up in
vital importance; (b) softest in terms of being unprotected; and (c) most significant or
symbolic to their cause. A series of attacks on the nation's landmarks, for example,
would NOT be the typical pattern of a relatively small, emerging terrorist group. That
kind of totally symbolic strategy would most likely be followed by a terrorist group that
has already attacked other targets, and is using the landmarks as a way to "finish up"
their work. A group with an ecological target would also be typically one that has
already attacked in another way, the purpose here being to demoralize or weaken their
enemy, but like groups with an educational target (like an all-white school that rich kids
attend), there might be some unusual race-based or nation-based hatred involved.
Therefore, the main targets are going to be POLITICAL and ECONOMIC, especially as
the two of these (and others) might overlap. For example, the terrorists can be expected
to do their homework, and they will find out which companies, corporations, causes, and
schools that the political leaders worked for, are involved in, or attended. These kind of
calculations will ultimately determine targeting.

Many homeland security precautions, however, are directed toward hardening

what might be called transportation, transit, or tourist targets. These are almost always
insecure, if not "soft" targets, and usage of them by terrorists may be more a matter of
convenience than calculation. Their only value is the shock or fear effect produced, but
governments must and will go to great lengths to show they are protecting their innocent
citizens. The following is a list of such targets.

Tourist Targets
1. Museums 10. Expensive Restaurants
2. Theme Parks 11. Expensive Hotels
3. Shopping Centers 12. New Years Eve Events
4. Railway Stations 13. Cruise Ships
5. Subway Stations 14. Ski Resorts
6. Airports 15. Golf Resorts
7. Ferries 16. Casinos
8. Opera Theatres 17. Athletic Events
9. Musical Events 18. Hollywood Events

With this last group of targets, there is the distinct possibility that a terrorist attack
will not be recognized as an attack when it comes, and by that, is meant that some kind
of "silent" weapon of mass destruction might be used, for example, a germ warfare
agent or a slow radiological leak of some kind. While there is no substitute for the value
of news coverage that will be obtained by bombing a tourist target, such "flashy" tactics
by the terrorists will make for little difference whether the target is big or small. In
other words, a small shopping center in the heartland makes for as good a tourist
bombing target as a large shopping center in a major city. What the major tourist
targets need are monitoring devices for a WMD attack, not the usual extra bomb-
sniffing patrols.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Center for Defense Information
Contributions by the Department of the Treasury to the Financial War on Terrorism
(pdf)
Dealing With a Potential Nuclear Hitler
Gyre.org's Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence Topics
Hiroshima: Was it Necessary?
Historical Roots of the U.S. War on Terrorism
International Law Homepage of the U.N.
Map of Imperialism and the Balance of Power by 1919
National Money Laundering Strategy (pdf)
Nuclear Deterrence Strategy and Doctrine
RAND's Terrorism Resources
Stratwise Strategic Intelligence
The Terrorism Research Center
The Transformation of Strategy from Deterrence to Preemptive Retaliation
U.S. Military Counterterrorism Operations
Weapons of Mass Destruction Intelligence Threat Assessments

PRINTED RESOURCES
Alexander, Y. (Ed.) (2006). Counterterrorism Strategies. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
Boyle, Francis. (2003). The Criminality of Nuclear Deterrence: Could the U.S. War on
Terrorism Go Nuclear? Gardenia, CA: Clarity Press.
Bolz, F., Dudonis, K. & Schulz, D. (2005). The Counterterrorism Handbook, 3e. Boca
Raton: CRC Press.
Brown, S. (2003). The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century.
Washington DC: Brookings.
Cassara, J. (2006). Hide and Seek: Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and the Stalled War on
Terrorist Finance. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books.
Cateau, Jeff & Michael Levin. (2003). The Complete Idiot's Guide to The Pentagon.
Indianapolis: Alpha Books.
Ehrenfeld, B. (2005). Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It. NY:
Bonus Books.
Fenwick, Charles. (1965). International Law, 4e. NY: Appleton Crofts.
Freedman, M. (2005). "The Invisible Bankers: How Terrorists, Drug Dealers, and
Smugglers are Using a Global System as Old as the Silk Road to Finance their
Operations, and There's Not Much We can do About It." Forbes (Oct 17): 95-104.
Frey, B. (2004). Dealing with Terrorism: Stick or Carrot? Northhampton, MA: Edward
Elgar.
Gaddis, John. (1982). Strategies of Containment: Postwar Nuclear Security. NY: Oxford
University Press.
Haass, R. (1999). Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War
Period. Washington DC: Brookings.
Hammes, T. (2004). The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St. Paul:
Zenith Press.
Jervis, R., Lebow, R. & Stein, J. (1989). Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: John
Hopkins Univ. Press.
Kauppi, Mark. (2002). "Counterterrorism Analysis 101." Defense Intelligence Journal
11(1): 39-53.
Kissinger, Henry. (1957). Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. NY: Simon & Schuster.
Kissinger, Henry. (2001). Does America Need a Foreign Policy? NY: Simon & Schuster.
Korb, L. (2003). A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington DC: Brookings.
Lesser, Ian, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt & Michele Zanini. (1999).
Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica: RAND.
Martin, Gus (2003). Understanding Terrorism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Moran, Daniel. (2002). "Strategic Theory and the History of War," in John Baylis,
James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin S. Gray (eds.) Strategy in the Contemporary World.
NY: Oxford University Press.
Napoleoni, L. (2005). Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror
Networks. NY: Seven Stories Press.
Passas, N. (2004). "Terrorist Finance and the Nexus with Transnational Organized
Crime," Northeastern University College of Criminal Justice Newsletter (Summer): 8-9.
Posen, Barry. (2003). "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and
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Counterterrorism. Guilford, CT: McGraw Hill.
Primakov, Y. (2004). A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the 21st Century.
Washington DC: Brookings.
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pp. 317-335 in Russell Howard & Reid Sawyer (eds.) Terrorism and Counterterrorism.
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Last updated: 05/06/06

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 SUICIDAL TERRORISM
"There is no refuge from confession but suicide, and suicide is confession." (Daniel Webster)

Suicidal terrorism, sometimes called suicide terrorism, is a form of organized urban

terrorism that goes by a variety of other names, such as "new" or "next generation"
terrorism. It is NOT that form of urban terrorism which refers to inner-city, door-to-
door combat like Marighella's idea of urban guerrillas winning by losing via authorities
exposed as counterreactive and repressive, NOR is it usually enough to meet the
definition of insurgency (see Lecture on Insurgency). Instead, it's referring to what
some experts call "postmodern" terrorism (Laqueur 1996) or "new school" terrorism
(James Woolsey once said old school terrorists use violence to get a seat at the table
while new school terrorists want to blow up the table). This type of terrorism is not
designed to be pragmatic or realistic, but symbolic and an effective media ploy. A not
uncommon part of the pattern of this behavior is for one segment of the terrorist group
(the "political wing") to engage in fake diplomacy, token social services and education,
business fronts, and the contesting of elections, while another segment of the terrorist
group (the "military wing") engages in ambushes, assassinations, kidnappings, and
suicide bombings. There is usually a lot of propaganda and window-dressing
surrounding this form of terrorism, but all of it is false. Suicidal terrorism can occur in
a number of settings, both indoor and outdoor. It is also not confined to the Middle
East, serves numerous terrorist purposes, and may very well be the kind of terrorism
we'll see more of in the future (Bloom 2005).

Traditional approaches to countering urban terrorism, to be sure, have always

involved indoor "structure clearing." Small units go building-by-building in what is
called a MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) operation. A significant
difference between this kind of operation and others is the attention that must be paid to
avoiding casualties. Counterterrorism in an urban environment requires knowing the
terrain and knowing the enemy. The terrain will mostly determine positions and
movements (such as whether a top down or bottom up assault is called for), as well as
where safe footholds (consolidation points) can be gained. The terrain, also to some
degree, determines the method of entry or breach, and sometimes this is subdued
(rather than the more typical explosive, dynamic, "flooding" entry). The
counterterrorist response to urban terrorism requires avoiding predictable patterns at all
costs. Far more important, however, is knowing the enemy, and being able to
distinguish between those who wish to die (the martyrs or suicidal terrorists) and those
who do not wish to die (the guerrillas or ordinary terrorists). While some level of
advance intelligence may be helpful in making these distinctions (perhaps a sociology of
place, or ecology), distinctions are often made in split seconds at the tactical level.
Guerrillas normally evade attack, while martyrs typically do not, preferring instead to
die in place. Martyrs also generally have better, fortified positions, but both types will
likely use booby traps. The time and place of the firefight may very well be the best
indicator of whether suicidal terrorism is involved.

Suicidal terrorism is mostly terrorism without a cause or conscience, or if there is a

cause, it's overly blinded by hate and rage, and the behavior logically runs contrary to
the idea of terrorism itself (it's more akin to mass murder or certain hostage-taking
incidents). It used to be that terrorists played by some rules, practiced guerrilla hit-and-
run tactics, conducted surgical strikes, and at least had some moral scruples over the
killing of innocent noncombatants, or a plan to defeat the enemy. Not any more. The
traditional higher callings among terrorists, like ideology, religion, and homeland seem
to be less and less relevant, and are used only today as a subterfuge for popular support
and media exposure. In many ways, we are entering the Rebellious Era of terrorism,
where any target is fair game, collateral damage is not in its lexicon, every terrorist
wants to cultivate a Robin Hood image, and every motive or cause becomes politicized
by the media reaction to it. The "new" terrorists seem to be engaging in terrorism for
the fun, or "hell" of it. This lecture attempts to spell out the vision of destruction that
these kind of terrorists have.

THE SYMBOLISM OF THE ACT

The geographic location, or place, of the suicidal terrorist event is of some

importance. There are many reasons why urban areas, capitol cities, and places where
innocent people congregate are the new playgrounds for terrorists. One is the fact there
are more human shields for the handlers of the suicidal terrorist to hide behind,
although nothing prohibits handlers from manipulating their proxies at a distance. It's
easier, however, for the related parties to escape and hide in overcrowded, urban areas.
There is also an abundance of targets in urban areas. Cities are a target-rich
environment. The anonymity of city life lends itself to false or fake identification.
Authorities will have a hard time maneuvering in urban areas. Terrorists know that the
real reason why the military stays out of cities is not because of some agreement to
respect police turf, but because you can't maneuver tanks and military equipment easily
there. They also know that most city services are woefully under-prepared for terrorist
attack. They also know that most democratic governments have something like a Posse
Comitatus Act which prohibits the military from being used as a domestic police force.
When selecting a target, terrorists usually seek out the one that is: (a) most high up in
vital importance; (b) softest in terms of being unprotected; and (c) most significant or
symbolic to their cause. What's new about suicidal terrorism is the symbolism behind
the desperation of the act.

Some of the new RULES that terrorists play by include the following. (1)
Indiscriminate, arbitrary, and unpredictable killing of noncombatants. The idea that
there are no innocent bystanders is not new to the theory of terrorism. What's new is
the desire to kill or maim as many of the general public as possible. (2) Lone wolves or
beserkers. These are individuals who constitute a terrorist cell unto themselves.
Terrorists have moved beyond the principle of leaderless resistance (not knowing who's
in charge) to an organizational model that makes room for "covert" or "sleeper" cells.
These individuals go off unpredictably and at times and places of their own choosing.
(3) Faith in victory. Suicidal terrorism never gives up, it never surrenders or quits,
and it never compromises anything in vain. This is what makes it different from
religious terrorism which wants to lose, achieve martyrdom and go to heaven, and this is
what distinguishes it from nationalistic terrorism, which seeks government concessions
regarding a homeland. (4) Cherished symbols as targets. What gives a target
symbolic value is if large numbers of a population group regard it affectionately.
Suicidal terrorists never attack anything citizens regarded as a monstrosity. (5)
Internecine conflict. Not only do the new terrorists seek mutually assured destruction,
they often want the conflict to spill over onto as many foreign shores as possible. (6)
Technology. Classic terrorism had strong ties to anarchism and the shunning of
technology. The new terrorism embraces technology, and manifests a desire to be as
advanced and exotic as possible. They are not technocrats, but they have a proclivity
toward modern consumerism. (7) Weapons of mass destruction. Suicidal terrorists
admire chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and want to get their hands on them.
Laqueur (1999) makes an interesting point that as the intelligence level of a terrorist
goes down, the desire to obtain weapons of mass destruction goes up.

THE END OF IDEOLOGY

Most of what Daniel Bell (1960) predicted in his book, The End of Ideology, came true.
We are living in un-heroic times of free-floating aggression, angst, and self-delusion.
Less than one half of one percent of the population would commit to an ideology, yet all
of us want some sort of adventure or passion out of life. IDEOLOGY is defined as a
form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements are as prominent as
theoretical ones. It is a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change
it (Encyclopedia Brittanica 2002). With the fall of the Berlin Wall, more than the Cold
War ended. So did our desire to do any hard thinking about the global economy, culture
clashes, mass immigration, ethnic hatred, how to end human suffering, and how to
guard against government bureaucratization. Today, everyone is a populist (populism is
the cause that champions the plight of the average, ordinary person). Further, it's an
anti-intellectual climate, both for the terrorists and counter-terrorists. Most of the
current War on Terrorism can be seen as a cleansing or mopping-up operation for the
remaining few "pockets" of intellectual revolutionary terrorism. Let's analyze this
connection more fully.

Leftist (radical, Marxist, revolutionary) terrorism has always been the domain of
intellectuals who consider themselves a vanguard elite. The notion of a vanguard
strategy has been around since Lenin and the Bolsheviks (a word meaning
majoritarianism) who believed that hard-core Communist Party followers should
consider themselves the "vanguard of the proletariat" (the working class). The
Trotskyites (followers of Leon Trotsky) rejected the idea of a worker's state in one
country (Russia), and believed in a worldwide vanguard which would enable a
permanent, global Socialist revolution. Castroism is a variety of Trotskyism, and
Maoism is closer to Leninism (although the peasant class is championed under
Maoism). Che Guevara toyed with the idea of "consciousness raising" in the Americas,
but rejected it in favor of the Maoist idea that happiness is a warm gun.

True-cause revolutionary and liberationist ideologies faded away precisely because

the struggle was taken inward - psychologically. The workers of the world never united,
and it was an American, Abbie Hoffman, who declared in 1968 that the movement was
all about "Revolution for the Hell of It." More intellectually significant were the
existential philosophers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Herbert Marcuse, especially Marcuse's
(1964) book One-Dimensional Man.

HERBERT MARCUSE: German-American existential/phenomenological

philosopher, Father of the New Left, Leader of the radical intelligensia, and
Celebrator of the Hippies who argued that well-off, middle-class college students
should throw off their "manacles" of unearned privilege and fight in common cause
with the poor and downtrodden to destroy the welfare/warfare state. Liberation from
 affluence is the only thing worth liberating. Mass media, oppressive culture,
advertising, management, and most contemporary modes of thought are the enemies
and appropriate targets for liberators.

Now, within Frazier's hierarchy, you'll recall, is an organizational level called the
active cadre. This is the vanguard of a terrorist group. They have been indoctrinated
or led to believe that terrorist violence is absolutely necessary on their part as righteous
champions of whatever poor and downtrodden group they are fighting for. Cooper's
(1977) doctrine of necessity is applicable. It says that a person becomes a terrorist not
because they enjoy violence, but because they are forced toward it. They come to believe
that continuance of the status quo is worse than the violence caused by terrorism. They
may come from backgrounds where they were raised to detest violence, but their utter
hatred of the status quo helps them overcome any feelings of guilt about killing innocent
people. Notice it's not the cause or ideology that drives the terrorist. Instead, it's an
internalization of other people's problems and the desire to be heroic. If anything, it's an
ideology of violence. It would be immoral not to be violent.

The idea that there should be no scruples of conscience when it comes to blowing
things up can be traced to the 1848/1849 German activist Karl Heinzen. The
Communists, especially Engels, tried to shut him up, but Heinzen proclaimed the first
terrorist philosophy of mass destruction. Heinzen's beliefs are known as the doctrine of
unjustified means.

KARL HEINZEN: Nineteenth-century German radical freethinker who resurrected

Gracchus Babeuf's (1792) philosophy that "All means are legitimate in the fight
against tyrants." In his essay Der Mord (Murder) he proclaimed that all means were
valid to hasten the advent of democracy. As a radical democrat, Heinzen wrote: "If
you have to blow up half a continent and cause a bloodbath to destroy the party of
barbarism, you should have no scruples of conscience. Anyone who would not
joyously sacrifice his life for the satisfaction of exterminating a million barbarians is
not a true republican."

Suicidal terrorists frequently want little by way of practical or political gain. In the
words of a Hizbollah leader, "We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and
offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy." New terrorism appears to
be motivated by little more than a desire to bomb the hell out of one's evil enemies, or as
one contemporary philosopher of terrorism, Ken Wilber calls it, "first-tier, blue
thinking."

The notion that terrorism is a kind of spiritual quest, sojourn, or state of

consciousness can be attributed to Ken Wilber, who is probably best known for his
2001 book, A Brief History of Everything, his extensive website, and his opposition to the
war in Iraq. Wilber's theory of terrorism is called AQAL (All-Quadrants, All-Levels)
theory, and although it's a little complicated (and explained in numerous places
elsewhere), I'll try to summarize AQAL theory. The Four Quadrants are similar to
my own (O'Connor 1994) neo-functionalist approach to explaining how the four parts of
society are affected by terrorism, but Wilber uses them as representative of segments of
society that must all be attended to equally in order to prevent pathological personalities
or societies from developing. The Quadrants consist of:

• The upper right quadrant - atoms, molecules, cells, organs, neural systems and
brains
• The upper left quadrant - intent, consciousness, maturity, the mind, sensations,
perception, impulse, concepts, and aesthetic taste
• The lower right quadrant - groups, families, tribes, villages, and nations
• The lower left quadrant - the cultural, world views, cultural perspectives, values,
and morals

The Levels are more extensive, color-coded, and reference a worldview or state of
consciousness, and their essential characteristic is that each one thinks of itself as the
only way to see things:

• Beige: Archaic-Instinctual. The level of basic survival

• Purple: Magical-Animistic. The level of gangs, corporate tribes, athletic teams,
etc.
• Red: Power Gods. The level of self; powerful, impulsive, egocentric, heroic, e.g.
the “terrible twos,” rebellious youth, frontier mentalities, soldiers of fortune, wild
rock stars
• Blue: Conformist Rule. The level of life as having meaning, direction, and
purpose, with outcomes determined by an all-powerful Other. Rigid social
hierarchies; paternalistic; one right way and only one right way to think about
everything. Law and order, impulsivity controlled through guilt; fundamentalist
belief; obedience to rule of Order; e.g. Puritan America, Confucian China,
Islamic fundamentalism
• Orange: Scientific Achievement. The level that escapes from ‘herd mentality’ and
seeks truth and meaning in achievement, materialistic gains, and the laws of
science rule
• Green: Sensitive Self. The level of community, human bonding, ecological
sensitivity, networking, and a human spirit freed from greed, dogma, and
divisiveness
• Yellow: Integrative. The level of life as a kaleidoscope of natural hierarchies,
systems, and forms, subject to flexibility and spontaneity, with differences and
pluralities integrated into interdependent, natural flows
• Turquoise: Holistic. The level of Universal holistic system, uniting feeling with
knowledge; multiple levels interwoven into one conscious system
• Coral: An indefinable level that may well be the realm of saints and mystics

Wilber's AQAL theory of terrorism is that far too little social resources have been
directed toward the Left Quadrants, and that far too many societies have looked for
natural hierarchies in the Right Quadrants, when the only natural hierarchies are
atomic and in the Upper Right. Also, far too much Blue, first-tier, thinking is
encouraged. Fear, loathing, and disrespect must give way to Orange thinking (which
may imply the need for a World Police Corps). In short, terrorism should be conceived
of as a form of self-doubt, breed from fear, and caused by the absence of genuine
opportunities for respect, dignity, and self-development in the world today.

CRIMINAL TERRORISM
 Postmodern terrorists have given up on revolution and liberation, and instead pursue
what can only be described as organized criminal activity where it's "just business as
usual." Narco-terrorism is one such variety, but many terrorist groups raise money
through criminal activity, and to be sure, a few terrorists started out as street thugs or
had a proclivity for such things as vehicle theft. The so-called "true criminal" terrorist
is rare, however. For one thing, the mentality is different between a criminal and a
terrorist. Mental disorders abound among the criminal population -- antisocial
personality disorder, psychopathy, sociopathy, etc. The worst that can be said about
terrorists is that they suffer from delusions of grandeur and a strong paranoid streak
(Laqueur 1999). This is just the opposite of what most people think. They think that
terrorists have to be crazy to kill so many innocent people, but they're "crazy like a
fox." Criminals, on the other hand, are the crazies, suffering from anxieties,
depressions, psychoses, neuroses, and personality disorders. Terrorists sleep very well at
night, thank you.

On the other hand, there are similarities between some terrorism/insurgency

situations and certain criminal patterns of group behavior, most notably gang war. The
U.S. Army War College has a recently published (2005) document entitled "Street
Gangs: The New Urban Insurgency" which compares mutated forms of terrorist-
insurgents to criminal street gangs. We normally think of insurgents as military actors
or as some form of nonstate terrorists, but in a complex situation, it's hard to separate
those with political motivations from those with criminal motivations. It may very well
be that the political insurgents pay criminals to do "political" work, but it's just as likely
that in such situations, the criminals are more than happy to engage in terrorist-like
action for the hell of it. If the latter is the case, then you got what Hobsbawm (1965)
once called "primitive rebels" or banditry.

The question then becomes to what extent terrorism, or terrorist ideology, is a cover-
up for criminality, or psychopathology? The literature on the forensic psychology of
terrorism is enormous (Taylor 1991; Reich 1998; Robins, R. & J. Post 1997; Taylor &
Horgan 2000), and there is no one, neat answer to the question. Some experts argue that
the psychological mechanism that allows terrorists to do what they do is a process of
moral disengagement. Others say it's a coping strategy for stress. Some would argue
that terrorist motives are driven by such things as boredom and the need for a sense of
adventure. A few claim it's the case of a massive inferiority complex, brought on by a
strong sense of humiliation (Lindner 2001). Nobody argues that terrorism is
psychopathy. It's apparent that most suicidal terrorists are well-read, educated,
intelligent, thoughtful, reflective, rational people with common sense. They also just
happen to be people you can't reason with, because they fervently hold fanatical or
extremist beliefs deep in their heart and soul. They have what Voltaire called an
incurable disease of the spirit, a fixation, if you will, with seeing no harm, no foul play,
no bad intent, and no negative impact in what they do. They possess a dehumanized,
emotionless attitude toward others, regarding most people as "the walking dead" (see
The Revolutionary Catechism for a terrorist guide to interpersonal relations).

The motivations for becoming a terrorism are diverse, and they depend not just upon
applied political psychology (Robins & Post 1997) but the socio-historical context of the
time and place (Crenshaw 2001). There are regions of the world where long-standing
grievances are part of the local culture. There are times when the apocalyptic visions of
fundamentalist religions take hold. There are places of higher learning which steer
intellectual thought in the direction of justifying terrorism. One thing is clear -- to
become a terrorist, you need to be exposed to like-minded others. It's easy to
sympathize with terrorists, but another thing to excuse their actions.

The profiling of terrorists is no easy task, and profiling the new, modern terrorists
tends to baffle experts. CIA profiling tends to be more clinical and psychodynamic than
FBI profiling. Criminal profiling uses a combination of psychology, observation,
deduction and forensics. Terrorist profiling uses a combination of political psychology,
sociology, psychoanalysis, and psychiatry. The closest thing to a composite of a
"perfect" terrorist is a person with extreme hatred in their soul and an extreme sense of
self-righteousness. They feel they have been left with no choice in a world which moves
in the diametrically opposite direction of their convictions. They see their enemies in the
world as evil -- and evil must be destroyed, root and branch. In drawing up profiles, it's
important not to make too much of national origin. That would be pretty much the same
as racial profiling. It is helpful to consider social class background. Most suicidal
terrorists tend to come from the elite, educated, upper social classes. Revolutionary
terrorists are drawn from two extremes: the most upper and most lower classes.
Nationalist and separatist movements produce terrorists from the lower classes.
Religious terrorists come from all social classes. In the Muslim world, terrorists come
from the ranks of the unemployed, and in the United States, from the middle class.
Social psychological models are also helpful, as in Jeffrey Ian Ross' (1999) attempt to tie
together structural factors about socio-cultural conditions with psychological facilitating
traits. Here's a paraphrasing of those facilitating factors:

• a strong ego, need for excitement, and a feeling of being lost

• disorders along the paranoid-narcissistic spectrum (see this lecture on Paranoia-
Narcissism)
• drive to belong, join, or be part of a group
• an intellectually enriching learning environment or opportunities to learn new
things
• a tendency to make cost-benefit calculations that exaggerate benefits and
minimize costs

THE READINESS TO KILL AND DIE

It's true that some terrorist behavior is less than rational. Suicide, for example, is not
normally the act of a rational person. Many experts (Ganor 2000; Schweitzer 2000)
have commented on the tendency for modern terrorists to use suicide attacks. In fact,
the Islamic Jihad (there are several Islamic Jihads started in the 1980s, all stemming
from inside the Muslim Brotherhood movement started in the 1920s) have specialized in
the use of suicide bombers, which involve a person wearing explosives or detonating a
driven vehicle packed with explosives. Other groups have also embraced suicide
terrorism. The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka proudly wear cyanide necklaces as a sign of
commitment to their cause, saying "We are married to our cyanide; it makes us clear-
headed and purposeful." IRA terrorists have starved themselves to death; Russian
revolutionaries have blown themselves up; and fascist movements have a distinct
tendency toward a mystique of death. The Japanese kamikaze tradition best exemplifies
this warrior mentality or mystique, which is characterized as a honor to be permitted to
die. The Islamic tradition adds an element of "deluxe martyrdom" (Laqueur 1999), in
which surviving family members are well taken care of.

CASE STUDY: Islamic Jihad, a shadowy, non-hierarchical collection of

leaderless groups that evolved from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt about
1925. They seek to purify and unite the Arab world, and operated as an
evangelical group within the mosques and universities for many years. They
formed connections with Hizbollah and Hamas in the 1980s, and later with
al-Qaeda, having been fighting an undeclared "holy" war against Israel, the
United States, and anything Western for the last several years. Hostage
taking (and eventual murder of hostages) and suicide bombing are their
trademarks. They believe it is the religious duty of every Muslim to fight in
the jihad, and in (bin Laden's fatwa) 1998, called for the killing of
Americans anywhere in the world.
ADDENDUM: Jihad is a word with two meanings. It means holy war by
means of the sword, but it also means struggle for one's soul against baser
instincts. Muslim clerics, militants, and fundamentalists all reject the second
definition as dangerous heresy. "Strict" interpretation of the Koran is used to
support the holy war definition, which also brands as cowards those who
turn away from their sacred duty to fight in the name of Allah. The holy war
needs to be fought until all infidels, or nonbelievers, are driven from the
Arab world and/or there are no competing religions in the world [see
istishad, or martyrdom self-sacrifice].

While some suicidal terrorism is probably done out of fatalism, the terrorist thinking
they are going to die living under present conditions, or die if captured (the death
penalty not being a deterrent here), deluxe martyrdom is a radically new
phenomenon. For Muslims, suicide is not a mortal sin, as it is in Catholicism. The
Koran does not permit suicide in principle, but religious leaders say it is allowed under
special circumstances. The Koran does preach that it is a religious duty to fight and die
for Allah and Islam. Martyrdom in the name of Allah carries the following benefits:

• eternal life in paradise

• permission to see the face of Allah
• the loving kindness of 72 virgins
• the promise of heaven for 70 relatives
• family financial rewards of thousands of dollars
• family increase in social status

The perpetrator of a suicide attack is not considered to have committed suicide.

Rather, they are perceived as a "shahid" or martyr fulfilling a religious command.
They are not permitted to volunteer for suicide missions, but are instead selected by
religious teachers, and undergo a series of training or indoctrination sessions. Part of
this indoctrination may involve attempts at being buried alive to overcome the fear of
death. Candidates come from a cross-section of society, and occasional use seems to be
made of young females between the ages of 16 and 28. The role of women in suicidal
terrorism is a matter of speculation, as is the degree to which suicidal attacks trigger
more "copycat" suicidal attacks. Perpetrators are trained to use a "belt bomb"
containing 15-30 pounds of explosives. Besides being a cheap and easy method of
terrorism, it's the most accurate guidance system available in the world today. They can
pretend to be a pregnant woman, and pause at precise moments when a crowd
congregates around a target. The method attracts media coverage, and no escape plan is
usually needed except for any handlers, supervisors, or back-up personnel in the area.

Istishad: The Islamist Word for "Suicide Bomber"

Islamists and Jihadists become quite angry when the media and the West
refer to those who blow themselves up as engaging in suicide bombing. A
typical angry reaction would go as follows: "This is not suicide. Suicide is
weak, selfish, and mentally disturbed. This is 'istishad' which consists of
martyrdom or self-sacrifice in the service of Allah. A martyrdom operation
is the highest level of jihad. Nor is the action murder. A murderer is
someone with a psychological problem. It's not murder because we're not
bloodthirsty people. We don't like to kill. We don't do it because we like to
kill civilians, but that is a fact of life because the jihad must go on."

THE INFORMAL PROCESS OF RECUITMENT

Postmodern terrorism relies upon informal means of recruitment. Certainly, some

groups (Hezbollah is one) have formal indoctrination and allegiance ceremonies, but the
vast majority of terrorist organizations rely upon schools, religious institutions, families,
and word-of-mouth to get new members to join. Once the terrorist group has succeeded
in getting one family member to join (and die), it is a simple matter to get the remaining
members of that family to believe it is a "given" for the surviving members of that
family to join. Another tactic is for the terrorist recruiter to set up someone as
responsible for a criminal offense because the terrorists know that a prison experience
will radicalize that person. Different recruiters from different terrorist groups may
even threaten to report the person as a "collaborator with the enemy" to another group
if they don't join the group the recruiter represents.

In the recruitment process, it's important to remove any sense of the recruit's self-
identity. There is no room for individuality in a terrorist organization. Success or failure
(pride or shame) regarding the terrorist organization becomes an individual matter, and
terrorist groups often compete with other terrorist groups over who has the most
dramatic and violent operations. It's also important for recruits to renounce any sense
of hesitation, guilt, or remorse they may have. There's no room for moral considerations
within a terrorist organization. This objective is normally accomplished by demonizing
the enemy; e.g. "anything which helps defeat the enemy" or "the more dead, the
better." Nothing is illegitimate (although the Koran speaks of not poisoning the well) in
the cause of defeating an enemy. No distinctions are made between the enemy's soldiers,
civilians, women, or children.

After recruitment, there is a need to provide a mechanism for granting social status to
the new recruit. They must receive respect from their acquaintances and be a source of
awe and inspiration to the young. By intent, the whole process of recruitment is
designed to make it look like it is a natural step to join a terrorist organization, much
like the armed forces of a country would like it to look like it's a natural step to serve
your nation.

THE AMATEURIZATION OF TERRORISM

 When teenagers get involved in terrorism, they can hardly be considered
professionals. It's not that all teenagers are immature; it's just that they rarely have the
resources - financial or otherwise - to carry out much more than suicide, homemade,
script-kiddie attacks. More than a lowering of the average age is the cause of
amateurization, which is also synonymous with splinter groups that break off with a
better-equipped main group. The growing trend toward more secretive and shadowy
forms of organization contributes toward amateurization. In such organizations, there
is less training, command, control, and leadership. Combined with no ideology or cause
to believe in, amateur terrorism may turn out to be the real threat in the future.

Amateur terrorists can be defined as part-timers who work with homemade

equipment, are only indirectly or remotely controlled by a leadership entity, operate in
idiosyncratic fashion, and are just as likely to hurt themselves in the process of
attempting to harm or shock others. Arquilla & Ronfeldt (2001) conceptualize this new
era of terrorism as "netwar", a non-hierarchical organizational form that is designed
for all sorts of doctrine - terror, crime, militancy, or vandalism. Under this
conceptualization, jihad will take the form of cyber-jihad, and the "swarm" tactic this
entails means allowing amateurs to do what they will. Rebel groups without a cause
(clue) will simply take the path of least resistance - and may use technology as a force
multiplier - to have an impact. Let's examine one such group, often looked at as the
world's first post-communist, postmodern insurgency - the Zapatistas.

CASE STUDY: the Zapatistas, or Zapatista National Liberation Front (Ejercito

Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional - EZLN), were Leftist rebels who championed the
cause of Indians native to Mexico's Chiapas province. In 1994, the Zapatistas began
killing Mexican soldiers and policemen. By 2001, the Zapatistas emerged as an
above-ground "Robin Hood" group for the civil rights of oppressed people
everywhere.

The Zapatistas started out without any computer technology, but they soon realized
that transnational organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) had
computers and websites, so they started a propaganda campaign on the Internet by
tailoring their terrorist attacks to what was newsworthy for the NGOs. Their Internet
proficiencies progressed to the point of web hacks and cyber-crime. In the late 1990s,
they were the world's first information guerrilla movement. When the Zapatistas
launch a web attack, their "network" of supporters, sympathizers, and loosely-affiliated
movements all launch web attacks too. The effect of this, as it is for suicidal and
amateurish terrorism, is often more overwhelming than traditional terrorism.

HUMILIATION AS A CAUSE OF MODERN TERRORISM

The humiliation paradigm is most associated with the work of Straub (1990) on
bystander intervention and Lindner (2001) on gendercide. Evelin Lindner is a
psychological counselor with extensive private practice experience in the Middle East.
She has developed a paradigm that draws heavily upon the psychological notion of
empathy, and the viewpoint that all human beings yearn for recognition and respect,
and that the withdrawal or denial of recognition and respect, experienced as
humiliation, is the strongest force that creates rifts between people and breaks down
relationships. Humiliation is defined as a personal feeling where respect and
recognition are lacking, and it is not due to ethnic, religious, or cultural differences
(which create rifts by themselves or are used as fronts for the deeper humiliation rift).
Nor is humiliation the same as feeling like a victim (which generally results in either
depression or lashing out in rage). Instead, humiliation is the feeling of being helpless,
pinned down, held down, or kept passive (and unable to control world events).
Criminologically, humiliation is quite different from deprivation, the standard concept
in criminology to explain these kinds of things.

Lindner's (2001) research involved years of trying to understand things like why some
Palestinian mothers would want to have more babies so their children could grow up to
become suicide bombers, or why successful businessmen (like Osami bin Laden) would
abandon wealth and promising careers to become terrorists. The answer, it seems, is a
sense of felt humiliation and helplessness about being unable to contribute effectively to
the "global village" or one's notion of global responsibilities. Two points can be made
about this explanation -- one, that suicidal terrorists are deeply sincere and selfless
about their motives for terrorism-- and two, that the world's movement toward
globalization or a "global village" has negative side effects that create terrorism (even
humanitarian aid can be humiliating).

Apparently, the postmodern terrorist cannot sit passively by and watch world events
run their course without some personal commitment. Terrorism is then, like an eating
disorder or alcoholism, where the person tries to "drown" their sorrow or humiliation,
and further, will "manufacture" a series of humiliations (when there is none in their
lives) by over-empathizing (sincerely and deeply) with the problem of others'
suffering. Likewise, there will be those who are perceived (or misperceived) as the
"humiliators" in all this, and above all, those most likely to be perceived as the
humiliators are those who point out the inequalities and deprivations in the world
(human rights violations) that were once taken for granted or just accepted. Perhaps
this paradigm has some validity. It may very well be that some people turn to terrorism
precisely because they feel deeply humiliated by the arrogant, self-congratulating style
in which the leading nations of the world are constantly pressuring for greater human
rights. It remains to be seen, however, if empirical research validates the hypothesis
that empathy for suffering is a cause of terrorism. It may very well be that this line of
explanation simply involves some twisted sense of heroism or bystander intervention
gone horribly wrong.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Criminal versus Terrorist Profiling
Excerpts from Martha Crenshaw's Terrorism in Context
Herbert Marcuse Internet Archive
Infantry Tactics in Military Operations in Urban Terrain
Profiling a Terrorist
Profiling Islamic Suicide Terrorists (pdf)
Profiling Osama bin Laden
The 1848 German Revolutionaries
The ICT Institute at Herzliya
The "New" Terrorism: Does It Exist?
The Revolutionary Catechism
PRINTED RESOURCES
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Last updated: 10/10/05

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 ETHNO-NATIONALISTIC TERRORISM
"A nation's honor is dearer than a nation's comfort." (Woodrow Wilson)

Nationalist terrorism is mostly "traditional" terrorism (also called revolutionary or

ideological terrorism), but it is also a large category of terrorism with many subtypes.
For the most part, it is practiced by individuals belonging to an identifiable organization
with a well-defined command-and-control structure, clear political, social or economic
objectives, and a comprehensible ideology or self-interest (Hoffman 1999). On the other
hand, nationalist terrorism can be (and often is) the driving force behind "state"
terrorism, whenever nationalist movements overpower and/or coincide with "religious"
movements; and in this sense, Ahmad (2002) is right: the world probably has more to
fear from a "Hindu bomb" than the "Muslim" bomb one so frequently hears about.
The usual targets of nationalist terrorism are usually selective and usually discriminate
-- ambassadors, bankers, dignitaries -- symbols often blamed for an economic, political,
or social injustice. They usually issue communiqués taking credit for, and explaining in
great detail, their actions. Only rarely do such groups operate outside their home
territory unless it is in their interest to do so or they claim to be representing the
oppressed of some Third World (an outdated and archaic concept), or additionally, they
belong to some diaspora. Disapora (Greek for "scattering or sowing of seeds") is a term
from the field of migration studies referring to the study of dispersed ethnic populations
and carrying connotations of forced resettlement, expulsion, slavery, racism, war and
conflict. To provide some further definitions, an ethnic group is a human population
whose members identify with each other, usually on the basis of a presumed common
genealogy or ancestry (Smith 1986). Ethnic groups are typically united by common
cultural, behavioural, linguistic, or religious practices, and an important political science
distinction is that an ethnic group is distinguished from a nation-state by the former's
lack of sovereignty. Nationality (which is part of the root conception behind
nationalism) refers to a person's legal relationship to a legal system, or set of laws which
they perceive as applicable to them, although under international law, it is each nation's
right to declare whom they believe their nationals are. A person who is not a national of
any state is referred to as a stateless person, many of whom are also refugees, asylum
seekers, and/or sometimes present themselves as having dual citizenship (a term not
allowed in some nations). Legally, nationality can only be acquired by jus soli
(birthright), jus sanguinis (blood), or naturalization (a process that is part of
immigration law). Nationalism is an ideology which holds that some notion of
nationality or some variant of what is often talked about in the field of "identity
politics" should serve as the only legitimate basis for a nation-state. It must be
remembered that in the field of terrorism studies, it is quite dangerous to talk about
terrorism on the basis of nationality alone, but there are interesting things to discuss
nonetheless.

Nationalism is the driving force behind a love of country so strong that one is willing
to die trying to change or overthrow a government seen as corrupt and/or oppressive.
It's an Enlightenment notion associated with the thought of Locke, Voltaire, Rousseau,
and Montesquieu that the best form of democratic government is based on the natural
desire of people to govern themselves as a distinct nation-state. It has been the
underlying justification for the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the
Mexican Revolution, and the Cuban Revolution. The patriotic feeling of loyalty to one's
national ties can take different forms depending upon the economic and cultural
context. Most people are familiar with jingoistic nationalism where a common
external enemy unites people in a war mentality. Others, especially Westerners, might
be familiar with self-interest nationalism in which a presumed economic superiority
permits the export of a civilization in the name of prosperity. Militaristic nationalism
tends to involve fascist or socialist movements that glorify the institutions, icons, and
achievements of a state. And finally, there is ethnic nationalism which is rooted in
ethnic identity as the basis for a cause. This last form has become a dominant model of
terrorism in the 21st Century, and is called ethno-nationalist terrorism, or more
simply, ethnoterrorism.

Ethnic identity has some unique sociological characteristics. First of all, it is

egalitarian - the identity of the masses. Joan of Arc, for example, explained why she
continually used familiar names for the French nobility by saying "After all, we're all
French." Secondly, it allows a certain amount of freedom while at the same time
reinforcing group solidarity. A person who says they are French-American-Canadian,
for example, has a couple of second-order identities, but they are still French. Thirdly,
there are no entry or exit points for ethnic identity. Nobody needs certificates or
credentials to prove their ethnicity, and most people can come and go (exit the group
and reenter) with relative ease. The most negative aspects of ethnicity involve
stereotyping and de-individualization. It's easier to gas the Jew, lynch the Black, or
shoot the White Man than it is to understand such groups as individuals. Ethnicity also
tends to find its way into public policy, no matter how fair the politicians try to be.

Nationalism, or more precisely, the concept of nation-state, was used by the great
European powers to create and administer their colonies. It's easier to govern when the
"people" think they're all part of a nation-state with borders. Unfortunately, it turns out
in this post-colonial era that there were a diverse number of different ethnic groups
within those borders. That's why scholars such as Horowitz (1985) say ethnic conflict is
nationalist conflict. Control of the state, a state, any state becomes the goal of ethnic
conflict. That's why nationalist terrorist groups are referred to as subnational
organizations, para-states, states within a state, liberationists, separatists, or unifiers.
One should never underestimate the power of such groups. They are not political parties
fighting for their slice of a pie, nor are they simply elites with a grudge going back to
some historical accident (they fantasize about some imagined loss instead, or in the case
of the IRA, an exaggerated actual loss). As Connor (1994) points out, such terrorists are
emotional personalities with an "us-them syndrome" who are capable of the worst
atrocities, up to and including genocide, because ethno-nationalism is a passion or drive
that goes straight to the core of an identity need to "find one's self." Ethnonationalist
terrorism is less rational and comprehensible than plain, old nationalist terrorism.

THE MOST DANGEROUS KIND OF TERRORISM

One of the experts on ethno-nationalist terrorism is Daniel Byman (1998), a RAND

analyst, who argues that it has some built-in advantages that make it the most dangerous
kind of terrorism (although he is hesitant to use those words). These advantages are
paraphrased below with some of my own additions*.

• It polarizes ethnic conflict and accentuates a primal fear of race war

• Well-timed and well-placed symbolic attacks reinforce the ethno-nationalist issue
 • It easily provokes government over-reaction who see it as an insurgency or
domestic problem
• It frequently produces government concessions which are seen as a sign of
success
• It often raises money (donations) and public support quickly
• Long-standing logistical support and hiding places are easy to come by
• There is a ready-made audience or constituency (you're either in or out)
• There are no innocent bystanders (anyone not identifying with the right ethnic
group is the enemy)
• Terrorized victims often cope by joining the terrorist movement*
• Passivity (doing nothing) ensures escalation of the violence to genocide*
• You can't trust their cease-fires, peace treaties, or statements of curtailing
operations*

Countering ethnoterrorism is quite difficult. Ethno-nationalists almost always hold

the high ground on morality, being seen as "good patriots", so any moral outrage by a
reactionary government is futile as it only reinforces group cohesion. Byman (1998)
suggests that what might work is empowering the ethnic community, winning over
moderates to the political system, and encouraging self-policing. This is all wishful
thinking, as such measures can result in insurgency problems, fractionalization, and
escalation.

THE INTERNATIONAL REACH OF NATIONALIST TERRORISM

Despite the fact that most ethnoterrorism is confined to one country or theatres of
operation, there have been many groups who developed an international presence.
More often than not, these are Left-Wing groups, or splintered factions of Left-Wing
groups, that take up the calling of oppressed people everywhere. In such cases, support
is usually obtained from a sponsoring nation, but it would be a mistake to call it state-
sponsored terrorism since they mostly rely upon popular support and the strength of a
solid message. It's also interesting to note that the leaders of many international
terrorism groups were women. This is different from say, religious terrorism where
women are more commonly used as cannon fodder, or terrorism in general, which is a
male-dominated profession. How and why women achieve terrorist leadership roles are
matters of speculation. Laqueur (1999:38) argues that they are more fanatical and have
a greater capacity for suffering, but the field of criminology largely rejects this notion.

THE RED ARMY FACTION (RAF): A third-generation terrorist group descended

from the Baader Meinhof Gang (BMG) and German Red Army, all active from 1968
to 1998, when they indicated they were ceasing operations. Founded out of a student
protest movement, Red Army ideology consisted of terrorism on behalf of the
oppressed Third World. The BMG picked victims with ethnic-sounding names (e.g.
Brinkmann) out of a phone book. The RAF fought to free the BMG founders from
prison and later turned their attention to the anti-NATO movement. The BMG had an
unique composition of half men, half women. The leaders, Andreas Baader and
Ulricke Meinhof - a female - mixed pornography and group sex with their ideological
indoctrination. Their story is told at the website This is Baader-Meinhof. Like most
European left-wing groups, RAF merged into Direct Action (a shadowy French
umbrella group) to create the appearance of a superterrorist united front. In the late
 1970s, it was reported that RAF members were training other terrorists in
bacteriological warfare at Palestinian camps.
ITALIAN RED BRIGADES (BR or Brigate Rosse): An ultra left-wing group
active from 1967-1985 who engaged in over 14,000 terrorist attacks and brought the
Italian government to a standstill. Known for decentralized cluster attacks
(simultaneous or in sequence), they believed that the only thing politicians of any
stripe could understand was violence. They accomplished the murder of former Prime
Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, the kidnapping of US Army BGen. James Dozier in
1981, and claimed responsibility for murdering Leamon Hunt, US chief of the Sinai
Multinational Observer Group in 1984. Their solid anti-Establishment ideology won
the hearts and minds of many followers. They came closest to perfecting the
Tupamaros model than any other terrorist group, and have formed alliances with
others, such as the PLO.
JAPANESE RED ARMY (JRA): A far-East left-wing group formed in 1969 by the
Young Communists who hijacked an airliner to North Korea and solidified their ties
with the intelligence service there. In 1971, the group split into an International
branch (led by a female-Shigenobu Fusako) and Domestic branch (led by Mori
Tsuneo). Shigenobu moved to Beirut to join the Palestinians in fighting capitalism by
attacking Israel. Mori's branch became a cult-like murderous group, with Mori
murdering most of his followers. Shigenobu's branch had the backing of Syria, North
Korea and other sponsors, and became an international terrorist ring. From 1985-
1999, she masterminded successful attacks against Western interests in Europe, Asia,
and even on U.S. soil in New Jersey. In November, 2000, she was finally nabbed by
Japanese police [read the story].

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

State-sponsored terrorism, also called warfare by proxy, "puppet" or nuisance

terrorism, occurs when a patron state provides political, economic, or military support
to a group of people or organization in a host nation to achieve strategic or hegemonic
ends (hegemony defined below) by perpetrating aggressive terrorism on the patron's
behalf. It is a low-cost alternative to conventional warfare, and convenient for sponsors
who do not wish to be known, are afraid of defeat, or do not wish to appear as the
aggressor. Experts worry that this type of terrorism is most likely to involve weapons of
mass destruction.

ANTONIO GRAMSCI: Early 20th Century Italian diehard communist who resisted
Mussolini and wrote on hegemony (heg e' mon ee) as the true cause of an open,
humanist Marxism, being a struggle for the hearts, minds, and common sense of
followers. Hegemony is the way nations try to project their way of seeing things and
social arrangements as common sense, and is involved in perceptions of global
superpower status. Hegemony is also Phase One of a terrorist movement, according to
Gramsci, which involves the destruction of beloved symbols and ideals. Gramsci's
writings are complex and the stuff of dissertation research.

State sponsorship can make, break, and modify a terrorist group. During the World
War I era, for example, the Armenians terrorized the Turkish Ottoman Empire, but
received no outside support, and were quickly wiped out. The Macedonians, by contrast,
received the help and protection of Bulgaria, and were able to launch a more sustained
campaign. Unfortunately, Bulgarian assistance came at a price, as the Macedonian
terrorists were used against Bulgaria's enemies, domestic and foreign. The Russian
Communists also became involved in sponsoring terrorism during this time period,
using Romanian groups as their main proxy, and later, the PLO and Cuba.

Shortly after World War II, Third World terrorism emerged practically everywhere
in bids for independence from the colonial powers. It was most violent in Northern
Africa and the Middle East, with anti-Israeli terrorism becoming state-sponsored by
early 1960. Of all the colonial powers, the French faced the most organized resistance, in
Algeria and Indochina (Vietnam), sponsored by neighboring countries. The 1960s
brought all the "big players" (China, Russia, the United States) into sponsorship of
terrorism, as well as a number of "little players" (Cuba, North Korea, East Germany).
Left-Wing and Ultra Left-Wing terrorism spread rapidly throughout the world,
including North America (with the Weathermen and Black Panthers), the Left operating
out of the universities. Right-Wing terrorism also spread globally, in places like Turkey,
Israel, and Latin America, the Right operating mainly out of religious institutions. It's
not too much of an exaggeration to say that most of the world's nation-states
experienced some kind of martial law between 1968 and 1974.

After the end of the Cold War, the amount of money traditional supporters gave to
their proxy groups decreased, but other supporters moved in to pick up the slack (such
as Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Syria). Today, support can come from nation-states, diasporas
(immigrant communities in other countries, or nations without states), refugee camps,
wealthy individuals, or charitable organizations (Byman et. al. 2001). It is almost
certain that state-sponsored terrorism will continue, if only as a "nuisance." The
purpose of nuisance terrorism is to intimidate, compel the enemy to waste resources,
and thereby weaken him. Below are profiles of two state-sponsored groups, selected to
illustrate the longevity of such terrorism.

KURDISH WORKER'S PARTY (PKK): Also called Kurdistan Worker's Party,

one of the world's largest nationalist terrorist groups, somewhat Maoist and
chameleon-like in character, they have fought for decades to establish a Kurdish
statehood. They operate in Turkey and Europe, train in Lebanon, and are supported by
Syria and Iran (using Syria as their main base). There are some 20 million Kurds
living in diasporas throughout the world (areas in red on map), many in Iraq where
they have been the victims of chemical weapons by the Iraqi government, others in
places like Germany where they are
extorted for protection money. Started as an
intellectual movement in Turkish
universities during 1973, the PKK has
evolved into an anti-Turkish, drug-
smuggling operation, having renounced
Marxism in 1990, and staunchly refusing to
have anything to do with religion, although
they have used Islamic rhetoric since 1995. They are very ruthless and well-
organized, having wiped out more than 10,000 people in village massacres, and don't
seem to mind killing non-sympathetic Kurds as well as innocent Turks. They are
particularly good at stealing arms from Turkish and NATO military bases. Frustrated
 by the absence of U.S. and U.N. involvement, they have embraced anti-Western
sentiment in recent years, kidnapping and killing Western tourists, with teachers,
policemen, and travel agents being their favorite targets. Since 2002, the PKK has
claimed to cease its activities, but the Turkish government is skeptical and has its
hands full with other terrorist groups such as Turkish Hezbollah, who buries its
kidnap victims in cement.
BASQUE SEPARATISTS (ETA): One of the world's oldest separatist groups who
have fought for decades to establish an independent Basque region, an area about
100 square miles between Spain and France. The Basques are one of Europe's oldest
Christian ethnic groups, and the
region is the world's number three
tourist destination spot. Started as an
anti-Franco student resistance
movement during 1959, the ETA
started murdering Spanish officials in
1968 and have "accidentally" killed
about 800 civilians hence, most since
1995 being bombed or kidnapped
foreign tourists, mainly British
citizens. Robbery, kidnapping,
murder, and extortion are their main tactics along with breaking their own ceasefires.
They have effectively sabotaged Spanish and French tourism, electoral processes,
and seem to favor attacks on nuclear power plants. About 400 of their members are
currently imprisoned, and government concessions never seem to be enough for
them. They have established a culture of violence similar to the situation in Northern
Ireland. No one knows how large they are or who is sponsoring them (Spanish
authorities suspect Latin American support). Young people join by paying dues and
being trained to kill in small cells of four each. ETA operatives have reportedly
trained in Algeria, Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Cuba and several South
American states harbor ETA operatives.

STATE TERRORISM

State terrorism, or terrorism "from above", is more than repression, suppression, and
human rights violations. It involves sponsored or unsponsored Black Operations
combined with Psychological Warfare where reactionary governments, their
militaries, militias, intelligence services, or police forces engage in acts ranging from
political and mass murder to torture and crimes against humanity. The most horrific
acts of terrorism have always been committed in the name of counterterrorism. The United
States has been the worst offender in this regard, supporting at least 30 intolerable
regimes since WWII engaged in state terrorism against populist movements (Blum
2000). Operation Phoenix, for example, officially lasted from 1968-1971 where CIA
teams went into Vietnamese villages and murdered civilian chiefs because of their
politics. The French did much the same thing earlier, and the Vietnam conflict
produced what many Third World leaders (in Latin America and elsewhere) took as the
French-American model of counterterror (torture, murder, and disappearance).

State terrorism is often carried out under the guise of economic self-interest when in
reality, it's usually the product of a "sick mind" (dictator or strong man) gone made
with power, and sponsors of such powers often underestimate this. Control of the mass
media and suppression of dissent are common trademarks, and it would be a mistake to
neglect corruption, or the desire to line one's pockets. State terrorists usually subscribe
to an ideology of plutocracy - a system of rule by and for the rich. When state
terrorism is uncovered, the spin or media story is often that of a lone gunman or some
conspiracy theory, which feeds additional conspiracy theories trying to uncover the real
story. The most common method of media manipulation, however, is suppression by
omission (which involves downplaying the incident or providing the media with a
distracter story).

MICHAEL PARENTI: Late 20th Century political scientist (with his own website),
author of over 10 books, and premiere American radical thinker on American
involvement with state terrorism (Noam Chomsky being American's second leading
radical). He distinguishes "wholesale" terrorism from "retail" terrorism that gets
reported in the news. He estimates that U.S.-backed surrogate forces have killed at
least 8 million innocent people since Vietnam, and claims U.S. national security
agencies and corporate America are the world's leading sponsors of terrorism today.

State terrorism is almost always Ultra Right-Wing terrorism, a relentless devotion or

crusade to the cause of anti-Communism. General Augusto Pinochet (who ruled Chile
from 1973-1990) was quoted as saying "I would like to be remembered as a man who
served his country, who served Chile throughout his entire life on this earth. And what
he did was always done thinking about the welfare of Chile." Pinochet was a U.S.-
supported dictator who tortured and executed 2279 dissidents in unusually cruel and
perverse ways. Atrocities were also committed after 1981 U.S. involvement in Sandinista
Nicaragua with funding of the counterrevolutionaries (Contras) in Honduras, but the
media only focused on allegations that Lt. Col. Oliver North was trading drugs for arms.
The original handlers of the Contras were Argentine Army intelligence officers.

ARGENTINA's DIRTY WAR: Beginning in 1976 with the rise of two terrorist
groups, the Montoneros (Liberal Peronists) and the ERP (student radicals), both
perfecting the Tupamaros model, and Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla's (the Pink Panther's)
wiping them out after a military coup, the "Dirty War" was a counterinsurgency
campaign to eradicate anyone and anything regarded as politically subversive. Some
of the atrocities included rape, baby harvesting, mass murder, cross-border
assassinations (Operation Condor, involving Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia), and
refined torture techniques involving electric shock, asphyxiation and sexual
perversion. It lasted until 1982 when the Argentine military went too far and annexed
the Falkland Islands, bringing down the wrath of the British and loss of U.S. support.
Since 1998, Argentina has been trying to come to grips with this horrible past, and
documentation of U.S. involvement has been recently declassified.
EAST TIMOR'S INDEPENDENCE: An island country with a number of issues
that fought its way to U.N. protection in 1999 after 24 years of Indonesian state
terrorism, despite 85% of its territory being burned to the ground and 33% of the
population being killed by Indonesian-trained militias and armed forces. The U.S.
now has severed all military and training assistance to Indonesia, but for many years,
was the principal supporter. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim country, and has
long received U.S. military and economic aid, propping up the 32-year dictatorship of
 General Suharto, and protecting economic (oil & mining) interests in the Aceh
province. The East Timorese are trying to seek justice for war crimes, genocide, and
human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial killings, torture, as well
as restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association.

CORRUPT NATION-STATES

There are a number of places around the world where bribery, or the misuse of public
office for private gain, rules the day, and when an entire nation is run like this, it is more
than a breeding ground for terrorism -- it's a safe haven for all kinds of terrorists.
Almost every year, the U.S. AID, through a coalition called Transparency International,
releases a report called the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index) which lists the worst
offenders -- nations where public officials and their cronies don't miss any chance to
take bribes or kickbacks at every opportunity. The leaders of such nations plunder
their environment in unsustainable ways, engage in blood diamond commerce (blood or
"conflict" diamonds have been financing civil war in Africa for years), put a lot of ghost
workers on the bureaucratic payroll, and line their pockets at the expense of their
people. The CPI is a poll of polls, drawing upon the collective expertise of several
economic intelligence agencies, and here are the worst offenders:

MOST CORRUPT NATIONS IN THE WORLD

1. Bangladesh 9. Uganda
2. Nigeria 10. Moldova
3. Paraguay 11. Haiti
4. Madagascar 12. Ecuador
5. Angola 13. Cameroon
6. Kenya 14. Bolivia
7. Indonesia 15. Kazakhstan
8. Azerbaijan 16. Vietnam

In these kinds of places, the bribe to get a telephone installed is usually more than the
cost of using the telephone for a whole year, and things like that are just the normal way
of doing business. Examples of corruption range from fraud, embezzlement, nepotism,
bribery, and extortion to influence-peddling. Systematic corruption is prevalent. A
customs official usually gets their job through a political favor or bribe, and is expected
to share whatever bribes they get with superiors. A judge in a corrupt nation usually
has their judicial decision influenced by bribes. Tax, health, fire, and police officials
regularly demand bribes. A corrupt government that is neither representative nor
effective is not legitimate. There is no rule of law and low accountability for public
officials. A patronage system, or one based on personal loyalties, such as to one's family,
ethnic, or religious group, has replaced the rule of law. One-party dominance of the
political system also creates an underground, black market economy.

There are critical links between corruption, crime, and terrorism. First comes the
corruption, which establishes a multiplicity of crimes, including the criminal trafficking
networks and black markets that enable gun and drug smuggling, for example. Many of
the citizens in such drug transit zones become addicts, but many of them also come to
hate what they regard as exacerbating factors -- such as foreign investors allowed to
profit through bribes -- and they come to blame not only their own government, but the
governments of these foreign investors for the vast poverty and injustice in their land.
The irony is that these foreign investors are not even sending the money they make back
home, as many of them are engaged in money laundering, or safe off-shore investment
banking. Money laundering is also the most common way terrorist groups are
financed. Here's a 2003 list that the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) put out that
they call Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, or places where banking
regulations are not very strict and tougher regulations have been resisted:

NATIONS WITH BANKS INVOLVED IN MONEY

LAUNDERING
1. Cook Islands 9. Ukraine
2. Egypt 10. Bahamas
3. Guatemala 11. Cayman Islands
4. Indonesia 12. Dominica
5. Myanmar 13. Lebanon
6. Nauru 14. Liechtenstein
7. Nigeria 15. Marshall Islands
8. Philippines 16. Grenada

CAPITALIST TERRORISM

The financial incentive to make money from terrorism is not new. Worldwide violence
has always been driven by the arms market. The international trade in weapons doesn't
leave the clearest paper trail, but it's commonly known that you can buy anything from
anybody in this business. Bolivia is a major conduit and transshipment center in arms
trading. The remains of the Soviet Union's arsenal is for sale to anyone with hard
currency. The French have historically demonstrated a willingness to sell to anybody,
and so have the Belgians, at least in small arms, a specialty of theirs. Two economic
forces in the arms market are hybridization and customization. Both involve combining
parts of weapons systems from one manufacturer or national entity with parts from
another manufacturer or entity. French computers combined with Russian radar are a
hot hybrid item, and MiG fighters, of course, are customizable. Increasingly
sophisticated weaponry is finding its way into the hands of terrorists and subnational
organizations. Here's a table of the biggest exporters and importers on the arms market:

Exporters: Importers:

Russia (18 billion a year) Iraq & Iran (6 billion a year)

U.S. (8 billion a year) Saudi Arabia (3 billion a year)
France (4 billion a year) India (3 billion a year)
Cuba (2 billion a year) Vietnam (2 billion a year)
China (2 billion a year) Angola (2 billion a year)
Czech Republic (1 billion a year) Libya (2 billion a year)
Poland (1 billion a year) Egypt & Syria (2 billion a year)
Germany (1 billion a year) Australia & Japan (1 billion a year)

Other terrorists have been mercenaries, or soldiers of fortune. They are guns for hire,
as long as they think the cause is just and the money is right. They may or may not have
ideological convictions, and a desire to see "action" may be the primary motivating
force. The classic cases of this are Carlos the Jackal and Abu Nidal, although many
experts warn about blowback from surviving members of the Afghani majhadeen.

CARLOS THE JACKAL: aka Carlos Ramirez Santos,

aka Salim, Andres Martinez, Taurus, Glen Gebhard,
Hector Hevodidbon, and Michael Assat, was a 44-year
old Venezuelan raised by Marxist-Leninists who is
regarded as a master terrorist (along with Abu Nidal).
From the early 1970s until his extradition in 1994 where
he showed no remorse and was suspected of being a
psychopath (read Carlos Captured), he is responsible for
approximately 83 deaths worldwide. Unusual among
terrorists, he was a gun for hire, having no dedication to
any single ideological cause, and worked for Libya, Syria,
and Iraq, among others. He lived a playboy lifestyle, and
left dead corpses in his wake. His most famous exploits
were the 1975 capture (and billion dollar ransom) of
OPEC oil ministers at a meeting in Vienna and the 1980
attempted assassination of INTERPOL and UN Crime
Prevention officials in Caracas. There were numerous
other exploits, mostly against France (his favorite target),
and many of his victims were innocent bystanders. He
worked with and trained other terrorist groups: the
German Bader-Meinhoff gang (he married one of the
gang members), the Italian Red Brigade, the Japanese
Red Army, and Middle Eastern groups.
ABU NIDAL: aka Sabri al-Banna, a Palestinian, born in
Jaffa, whose family was run out of Palestine by Israeli
forces in 1948, and spent his teenage years becoming a
bitter extremist in the refugee camps of Nablus where he
also joined Fatah, but split with that PLO group in the
1970s over their being too peace-oriented. He set up his
own killer teams to strike at Israelis, westerners, Arab
moderates, and Yassar Arafat. His well-disciplined teams
became known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, and
carried out over 900 hits (some as contract killings)
across 20 countries over 25 years. His methods included
hijacking, bombing, and assassination, which seemed to
halt in the 1990s. A shadowy, psychotic, and vicious
killer, he lived in the shadows most his life, and possessed
an extraordinarily warped sense of justice, redress, and
revenge. He was discovered dead from gunshot wounds
while dying from leukemia in 2002 while living in Iraq.

NARCOTERRORISM

Narcoterrorism is a term that has instigated debate among experts, ever since Rachel
Ehrenfeld (1990) first coined the term in 1990, or so they say on the back of her book
Funding Evil (2003). Actually, the term goes back at least 7 years earlier, in 1983, when
it was used by the President of Peru. It could also be found much earlier in the
literature of the 1950s about China's influence on the drug trade, if one would look for
it. Some believe it's a useless term that confuses the drug war with the war on
terrorism. Drohan (2005) says that we should start by defining "narco-mercantilism"
before calling some country "narcocracies." Others believe using the word
narcoterrorism is a way of degrading true revolutionaries. Technically, it refers to the
financing of terrorist activities by participation in the drug trade, and some (Napoleoni
2003) have even gone so far as to say narcoterrorism is a component of all terrorism
today as a direct outgrowth of the modern global economy's complicity in arms
smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and a number of other shadowy criminal activities that
take place by proxy on the world stage. Theoretically, narcoterrorism is both a mode of
attack (saturating the enemy population with dangerous narcotics) and a tactic (raising
so much money you don't have to fight, just buy friend and foe alike). It's closely
associated with the practice of money laundering, in which drug dealers convert illegally
gained profits to "clean" cash using foreign businesses and banks. The DEA defines it
as any terrorist act carried out by groups that are directly or indirectly involved in
cultivating, manufacturing, transporting, or distributing illicit drugs. The term is
generally applied to groups that use the drug trade to fund terrorism (the most drug-
funded terrorist groups being Colombian groups, the Shining Path, the Tamil Tigers,
Hezbollah, PKK, ETA, the Real IRA, and Al-Qaeda). Osama bin Laden has reportedly
advocated using narcotics trafficking to weaken Western societies by supplying them
with addictive drugs. (In 2000, Americans spent almost $63 billion on illegal narcotics.)

In 1998, the U.S. spent almost $3 billion dollars on interdiction efforts. Most of these
funds go to foreign aid at what are called "source-zone" countries, to help them improve
their law enforcement capabilities and develop alternative sources of revenue for their
economy. The U.S. also uses a certification system to pressure foreign governments to
strengthen their legal systems. Decertification results in U.S. opposition to loans from
the World Bank and other multinational organizations. The U.S. also works feverishly
at increasing its extradition treaties with nations, meaning that they will surrender
targeted drug offenders for trial on American soil. Terrorist groups thrive in "source-
zone" countries by charging unofficial taxes on the growers. Here's the source countries:

Marijuana: Cocaine: Heroin:

Myanmar
Laos
Thailand
Colombia Vietnam
Mexico
Brazil Afghanistan
Colombia
Peru Pakistan
Jamaica
Ecuador India
Iran
Colombia
Mexico

Besides "source-zone" countries, there are a number of "transit-zone" countries, too

many in fact to list, but these are places where drugs are refined, cut, designed,
imported and exported. A few nations have made drug importing and exporting a main
part of their economy - Syria and Lebanon coming to mind as two good examples of
economies heavily dependent upon being transit zones for drug trafficking. In such
places, the government collects the custom taxes and distributes it to whatever terrorist
groups are receiving "safe haven." Drugs are a handy way to get lots of cash. Just
from taxes on poppy growers in Afghanistan, the Taliban was reportedly able to raise
$50 million a year.

The violence associated with narcoterrorism is generally targeted at the corruption

and/or removal of criminal justice officials, specifically judges and attorney generals. At
least this is the Colombian exemplar, which is a $300 million a year business, and
produces 80% of the world's cocaine supply and 70% of America's heroin supply.

• Colombia -- 167 police officers, 13 Supreme Court judges, and 1 Minister of

Justice have been assassinated for their refusal to take money from drug cartels.
• Italy -- 4 judges along with their wives and bodyguards have been pipe bombed
• Russia -- numerous judges are being attacked and killed by gangsters, by police,
or by both in combination
• Mexico -- 2 judges have been assassinated
• Senegal (Africa) -- 1 judge has been assassinated
• Guatemala -- 1 judge has been assassinated
• Algeria -- 1 judge has been killed in a drive-by shooting
COLOMBIA's DRUG WARS: Colombia is the most politically violent country in
the world. At least one assassination occurs per week. The government, with U.S.
backing, turns a blind eye toward right-wing death squads as well as military action
against whole villages, terrorizing, torturing, and murdering those seen as too liberal
or sympathetic to the rebels. The rich in Colombia are very rich, and the poor are very
poor. The rebels consist of two Left-Wing terrorist groups, the FARC and ELN,
which are large and well-equipped. In addition, the country is de facto ruled by Right-
Wing drug lord cartels (narcotraficantes) who have cultivated the most popular
support. When violence erupts between government, rebel, and cartel forces, the
country devolves into anarchy. FARC forces peasants to grow coca and ELN tends to
tax existing growers. Another group, the AUC (United Self Defense Forces) also
dabbles in the cocaine business. Colombia is the third largest recipient of U.S.
foreign aid, and America's "Plan Colombia" hopes to help the government become
strong and fight narcotraficantes. In addition, the U.S. government operates a school
for military leaders out of Ft. Benning called WHISC (Western Hemisphere Institute
for Security Cooperation) which teaches counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics
methods. Both Plan Colombia and WHISC are the targets of a well-organized protest
group (SOAW) in the United States.

PETROTERRORISM

Not only has petro-security become highly important in the post-9/11 world, but there
has long been a feeling (at least in some quarters of American public opinion since the
Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74) that certain petro-states are, in effect, holding the U.S.
"hostage" over its oil dependency...

INTERNET RESOURCES
A Case Study of the PKK in Turkey
American State Terrorism
Amnesty International's Pinochet Page
Anti-Corruption Gateway for Europe and Eurasia
Argentina's Dapper-State Terrorism
BBC Special on ETA's Bloody Record
Brigate Rosse: Politics of Protracted War in the Imperialist Metropolis
CNN Special on Basque Conflict in Spain
CNN Special on the Ocalan Trial (PKK)
East Timor Action Network
ICT Profile of the Red Brigades
NarcoTerror.org
Spanish Government Intelligence Report on ETA
The Nationalism Project
Turkish Government Intelligence Report on PKK
U.S. Weapons Sales & Military Training in Indonesia
Wikipedia Entry on Nationalism

PRINTED RESOURCES
Ahmad, A. (2002). Lineages of the Present: Ideology and Politics in Contempory South
Asia. NY: Verso Press.
Armony, A. (1997). Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-Communist Crusade in
Central America, 1977-1984. Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies.
Blum, W. (2000). Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower. Monroe, ME:
Common Courage Press. [sample chapters]
Byman, D. (1998). "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
21: 149-69.
Byman, D., P. Chalk, B. Hoffman, W. Rosenau & D. Brannan. (2001). Trends in Outside
Support for Insurgent Movements. Santa Monica: RAND.
Chirot, D. & M. Seligman (eds.) (2001). Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences,
and Possible Solutions. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association. [sample
pages]
Chomsky, N. (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants. Berkeley: Odonian Press.
Connor, W. (1994). Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton,
Princeton University Press.
Dartnell, M. (2001). Action Directe: Ultra Left Wing Terrorism in France 1979-1987.
London: Frank Cass & Co.
Drohan, W. (2005). "Narco-mercantilism and the War on Drugs: Is Victory an Option."
Pp. 319-328 in D. Clift, Learning with Professionals: Selected Works from the JMIC.
Washington DC: JMIC.
Ehrenfeld, R. (1990). Narco Terrorism. NY: Basic Books.
Ehrenfeld, R. (2003). Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It.
Chicago: Bonus Books.
Giraldo, J. (1996). Colombia: The Genocidal Democracy. Monroe, ME: Common Cause
Press.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections From the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence &
Wishart.
Hoffman, B. (1999). Inside Terrorism. NY: Columbia Univ. Press. [sample chapter]
Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Irvin, C. (1999). Militant Nationalism: Between Movement & Party in Ireland & the
Basque Country. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.
Kegley, C. (ed.) (1990). International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls. NY:
St. Martin's.
Laqueur, Walter. (1999). The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass
Destruction. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
McGarry, J. & B. O'Leary. (1993). The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Case
Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts. London: Routledge.
Napoleoni, L. (2003). Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks.
London: Pluto Press.
Parenti, M. (2001). (7e) Democracy for the Few. NY: St. Martin's Press. [sample chapter
of Against Empire]
Parenti, M. (2002). The Terrorism Trap. San Francisco: City Lights Books.
Smith, A. (1987). The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell.
Webb, G. (1999). The CIA, the Contras, and the Crack Cocaine Explosion. NY: Seven
Stories Press.

Last updated: 03/02/06

Syllabus for JUS 415
Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 RELIGIOUS TERRORISM
"One religion is as true as another." (Robert Burton)

Tragically, all major religions can justify violence, and religion has long been
associated with terrorism. Ever since there was good and evil, religious people have
pondered whether using evil to fight evil is good in the name of justice or self-defense.
There may be some kind of connection between attachment to the idea of God and a
proclivity toward violence. The most common resort to violence occurs when a religious
group feels threatened and thinks of itself as a chosen people. Less common is the
compulsion to slaughter others in the name of a deity, and even less common (although
not insignificant) is the role of sexuality in the mindset of religious fundamentalists who
kill. Religions also spawn sects, cults, and alternative religions, and religious terrorism
(terrorism in the name of religion) likewise tends to spawn offshoots and factions. A
sect is an offshoot of an established religion (Mormons, for example), and most either
die off or expand into a major denomination like the Mormons did. A sect-based
religious group is more likely to play the role of the victim, not the aggressor. A cult, on
the other hand, is a more dangerous, spiritually innovative group (the Branch
Davidians, for example) headed by a charismatic leader who usually has other aims than
to become a major denomination. Many cults are harmless, but others are into mind
control and some are into mass suicide. Still other cults have a doomsday orientation,
and these tend to be ones which engage in religious terrorism (such as Aum Shinri
Kyo). Any sect or cult can become involved in religious terrorism or it can just worship
terrorism (a terrorism cult). The motives can be wide-ranging, from engaging in
psychic warfare to expressive behaviors that are homicidal, suicidal, or both. Cults are
usually more dangerous than sects (see the Watchman Fellowship's List of Cults for a
near-complete list or Perlmutter's summary of occult religions).

There are four warning signs of a dangerous religious group: (1) apocalyptic thinking,
or eschatology, that the world is coming to an end, and true believers will enjoy unique
rewards at endtime; (2) charismatic leadership where the leader dominates the followers
spiritually, emotionally, and sexually; (3) paranoia and demonization of outsiders,
accompanied by intentional isolation within a cloistered community; and (4)
preparations of a defensive nature, usually indicated by a buildup of guns, poisons,
and/or weapons of mass destruction. Many terrorist experts (Lewy 1974; White 2002)
regard apocalyptic thinking as the first and most important danger sign. Let's briefly
examine some of the major world religions:

CHRISTIANITY: The most popular religion in the world (33%) and the one with the
most historical record of violence, much of it in-fighting. A person becomes Christian
by being born again (Conservatives), baptized (Protestants and Catholics), reciting the
Apostles' creed (Catholics), or having a personal relationship with Jesus (Liberals).
Eastern Orthodoxy rejects the Apostles' creed. The strongest bond involves
interpretation of the New Testament, although Fundamentalists (Extreme
Conservatives) believe the Bible is inerrant and not subject to modern interpretation.
ISLAM: The world's second largest (20%) and fastest growing religion. The word
Islam is derived from the word "salam", meaning peace or submission. Allah is a
word meaning one true God. Muslim is a word meaning a person who submits to the
will of God. A person becomes Muslim by becoming a follower of Islam, attending a
 mosque (all are non-denominational), reading the Qur'an, holding six beliefs
(involving God, angels, messengers, Satan, Day of Judgment, and Jesus was no son of
God), and practicing five pillars (reciting a creed, praying 5 times a day, charity,
fasting, and pilgrimage). Sikhism is a cross between Islam and Hinduism that rejects
elitism and cherishes ceremonial weapons.
HINDUISM: The world's third largest (13%) religion and the oldest organized one.
The word Hindu comes from the Persian, from the Indian name for the river Indus -
Sindhu. The Persians commonly replaced the S sounds with H sounds, and Hindus to
them were people who inhabited the areas bounded by the Sindhu river. It is a religion
without a founder, and a person becomes Hindu by reading the sacred texts,
recognizing the holy trinity (Brahma the Creator, Vishnu the Preserver, and Shiva the
Destroyer), and practicing various hymns, incantations, and Yoga to commune your
soul with the unity of all reality. Most Hindus (80%) regard Vishnu as the ultimate
deity, although there are many sects. Hindus believe in transmigration of the soul, or
reincarnation, in judgment for good and bad acts.
BUDDHISM: The world's fourth largest (6%) religion, founded by Buddha in 535
BC. Buddha is a term meaning one who is enlightened or has awakened. In
Buddhism, there is no God, savior, heaven or hell, only a state of Nirvana achieved by
meditation and avoiding extremes of mortification and hedonism. Southeast Asia
practices Southern Buddhism which emphasizes karma. China, Japan and Korea
practice Eastern Buddhism, which celebrates festivals and is mostly a ruling class
religion. Tibet, Mongolia, and Russia practice Northern Buddhism (the Dalai Lama
being the ruler) which emphasizes pilgrimages to sites in Sri Lanka and India. There
are a variety of traditions mixed with local culture. Most Japanese (85%), for
example, also follow Shinto, an ancient nature worship religion, and Shintoists almost
always follow Confucianism (love of family) or Taoism (the force that flows thru
life).
JUDAISM: Not one of the world's largest (0.2%) religions, but one of the most
influential. The history of the Jews is chronicled in the Old Testament, which
corresponds to their sacred texts, the Torah being only five chapters of it. Jews
believe in an incorporeal God who is all-powerful (i.e., monitoring everything on
earth, but also merciful and just. There is no savior in Judaism, and the Jews are the
chosen people not because they think of themselves are superior but because they
believe, theologically, they have received more difficult responsibilities and will
receive more punishments if they fail. Synagogues are governed by the congregation,
the Rabbi being someone well educated. The main forms are Orthodox, Reform, and
Conservative (an intermediate position between Orthodox and Reform).

Professor Huntington (1996) in his book Clash of Civilizations makes the argument
that religion determines culture and that at least eight separate culture clashes are
occurring in the world today. The Middle East, of course, goes without saying, and he
points to the Balkan (Yugoslavian) region as a place where clashes between Christianity,
Orthodox Christianity and Islam often erupt into violence. Japan is another area ripe
for conflict, as is the Indian subcontinent and Hindu region. Latin America and Africa
will have emerging clashes, mostly Christian in-fighting, or in the case of Africa (which
is 40% Christian and 40% Muslim), an ultimate battle clash.
 Religion often provides a mantle or cloak of respectability for terrorism. The JUST
WAR DOCTRINE is a religious precept, and as old as war itself (see Lecture on Laws of
War and Just War Theory for a detailed exposition on this). Parts of the Bible hint at it,
and St. Thomas Aquinas synthesized it in Summa Theologicae. While some argue that
nuclear weapons have made the doctrine outmoded, it might be illustrative to review the
basic principles here:

• A just war is only a last resort; all non-violent options must have been exhausted
• A just war is carried out by an authority with legitimacy; some society must
sanction it
• The only permissible reason for a just war is to redress an injury or wrong
suffered
• A just war should only be fought if there is a reasonable chance of success
• The ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace
• Violence in a just war must be proportional to the violence of the injury suffered
• The weapons of a just war must discriminate between combatants and non-
combatants

Equally as important as just war theory is in understanding religious terrorism, there

is a need to understand the morality of religious warfare, which in many ways is like the
morality of asymmetric warfare. Take, for example, the following quotation from Martin
Luther, founder of the Protestant Reformation in Christianity -- "It is both Christian
and an act of love to kill the enemy without hesitation, to plunder and burn and injure
him by any method until he is conquered, except that one must beware of sin and not to
violate wives and virgins." The point of the discussion here is that there are always
moral constraints to religious warfare. They may not be the same kind of constraints
reflected in just war principles, but they are constraints nonetheless, and represent a
particular kind of restraint (e.g., not violate wives and virgins) which reflects a moral
superiority against overpowering odds (asymmetric power situation). Religious
terrorists may cross the boundaries of fair play, but they are almost always convinced in
their own minds of the moral superiority of their actions.

THE WAR NOBODY KNOWS HOW TO WIN

Half of the world's thirty most dangerous terrorist groups claim religion as their
motivation. This motivation involves believing that their religion mandates acts of terror
as sacred duty in an endless, cosmic struggle for the best way to please God. Religious
terrorism has no military objective. A holy war, or jihad, is endless because it has a
spiritual objective. No one ever knows when God is pleased enough, and when the
situation in heaven matches the situation on earth. Nobody cares who or how many get
killed in spiritual warfare. It for this reason that experts say religious terrorism might
not be the world's most dangerous type, but it certainly is the most dedicated and
unpredictable (Juergensmeyer 2001). While some are, most religious terrorists are
NOT part of a sect or cult. Instead, most religious terrorists are are devout,
fundamentalist, "true" believers in their mainstream religion. The divine mandate for
destruction is regarded as the "neglected duty" within the mainstream religion, and
implied, directly or indirectly, in the sacred texts, or at least their interpretation of those
sacred texts. Religious terrorists also do NOT consider themselves terrorists, since they
say they do not enjoy violence for the sake of violence. They regard themselves as
religious activists or militants. Religious terrorists always seem to be spiritually
"prepared" for violence, and they have long past the point of having second thoughts or
doubts about it.

Religious terrorism is not countered by the same factors that counter other forms of
terrorism. Neither military nor diplomatic solutions seem to work. Cease fires and
negotiations also don't work, for example, with organizations containing no "secular"
wing. Only a few religious organizations (like the IRA) maintain a secular, or political
front. Hoffman (1999) argues that even groups with secular wings will act
unconstrained because they are playing to God and no one else. It's also plausible to
argue that religious terrorists don't want to win, since religion is at base an underdog
philosophy which needs an overpowering demonized enemy, or Great Satan. In many
ways, religious terrorism wants to fail because it adheres to some martyrdom notion of
being the world's "loser." This kind of losing ideology is called fatalistic suicide, and is
more common that egoistic and altruistic suicide. The greatest fear that most analysts
have is if weapons of mass destruction get in the hands of religious terrorists -- they have
no fear of destroying themselves and everybody else in the process.

IRISH TERRORISM

The model known as Irish terrorism is also a model for nationalistic terrorism, but
here, we will only consider the religious elements of it, and patterns that have emerged
between the Catholics (GREENS) and Protestants (ORANGE). Historically, most
Catholics were republicans living in the South, and Protestants were unionists (also
landlords and industrialists) living in the North. Each side had been arguing and
arming themselves since the 19th century. The first major conflict erupted on Easter in
1916 when the unionists called in British help, and the town of Dublin was demolished
by British artillery. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was formed that day, and led
by Michael Collins, a student of Russian anarchism and terrorism. Murder and
mayhem followed until a brief peace came after creation of independent Southern
Ireland (the Republic of Ireland) in 1921. The struggle then shifted to Northern Ireland,
where the British tightened their hold by creating the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC),
a sort of semi-military police force, which became the favorite target of the Provisional
IRA (a Northern Ireland spin-off group affiliated with the Sinn Fein party -- another
spin-off group being the Irish Continuity Army, dedicated to international terrorism,
not just within Ireland). The Provisional IRA committed sporadic acts of terrorism
until 1994 when peace talks began, and a cease-fire was agreed to. During the cease-fire
(which some see as surrender), another spin-off group emerged - the Real IRA, which
is the group officially recognized as the present foreign terrorist organization although
there are still active elements of the Continuity IRA.

There are many theories of the Irish conflict, but any understanding must admit that
religion, politics, and economics are inseparably mixed. The three main denominations
in Ireland are Catholic, Church of England, and Presbyterian - all religions of
providence that emphasize the need for God's approval of secular affairs. Competition
for political influence runs high, and people vote along religious lines. Economic
discrimination (for jobs) also tends to revolve around religion. Everyone wants to
control the state for reasons of deeply felt religious and economic deprivations, and this
desire permeates all aspects of everyday life. Religion may not be the root cause of Irish
conflict, but it is definitely the fuel that flames the passions. Most Irish terrorism is in
the name of retaliation or retribution, and this kind of retaliation is driven by spiritual
conceptions of vengeance. The GREENS believe they are protecting their homeland
from human rights abuses at the hands of an illegitimate British government which is
unaccountable under any rule of law (Bloody Sunday being a reminder of this). The
ORANGE believe they are being betrayed by a peace-seeking British government and
must retaliate for more lethal, indiscriminate, and evil terrorism (the Omagh bombing
being a reminder of this).

MICHAEL COLLINS (1890-1922): Irish revolutionary, soldier,

politician, and founder of the IRA. He was disgusted at the
defamation and oppression Irish suffered at the hands of the
British, and studied the hit-and-run tactics of the Boers in South
Africa while in prison during 1916. Elected to the Sinn Fein
executive committee in 1917, he formed intelligence networks,
loan programs, and assassination squads (the Twelve Apostles). He
excelled at fund raising, arms smuggling, and helping comrades
escape from jail. The Twelve Apostles effectively wiped out the British secret service
presence in Ireland. He helped create the first Anglo-Irish treaty in 1921, but was shot
by a ricocheting bullet during an ambush by anti-treaty forces.
THE REAL IRA (OMAGH BOMBING): In August
of 1998, just weeks after peace talks looked like they
were going to finally settle the Irish conflict once and
for all, a car bomb went off in a crowded shopping
center of Omagh, a town that is roughly 60-40
Catholic-Protestant. The high-tech device killed 29
innocent civilians, including Protestants, Catholics, a
Mormon and two Spanish visitors. The victims ranged
in age from unborn children to grannies. Both
republicans and unionists were killed, including a prominent member of the Ulster
Unionist Party, a team from the Gaelic Athletic Association, and students from the
Irish Republic who were up north on a day trip. The bombing sparked a trip to
Northern Ireland by President Clinton to jump-start the peace talks once again, but in
2001, the U.S. declared them a terrorist group and froze their assets.

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN THE SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT

Very often, religious terrorism is mixed with ethnic conflict. That is the situation on
the Indian subcontinent and throughout much of South Asia where one identifies as
______-speaking, ______-believing. Sri Lanka, a poor island south of India formerly
known as Ceylon, is a good example. There, about 75% of the people are Sinhalese-
speaking, Buddhist-believing, 12% of the people are Tamil-speaking, Hindu-believing,
and 8% of the people are Arab-speaking, Muslim-believing. The Tamils have long
hated the Sinhalese practice of infusing Buddhist philosophy into politics, but there are
moderate factions within the Tamils who believe that the Sinhalese can be bargained
with.
 TAMIL TIGERS, or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE), are a uniformed terrorist group with its own web
page who fight the Sri Lankan and Indian governments, as
well as any moderate Tamils who oppose their cause, which is
ostensibly a Tamil homeland, but in reality involves ethnic
and Hindu fanaticism (spiritualism, sexual asceticism, and cult
of suicide). Since 1975, they have killed thousands of people
and assassinated an Indian Prime Minister. Their fighting force is estimated at 10,000
(including women and children), and they are notorious for their suicide attacks. Their
international headquarters are in London and Paris, some have received training in
Lebanon, and they are known for their on-again, off-again truces of peace. Recognized as
one of the most effective guerrilla units in the world (on the Chinese-Cuban pattern), they
have for years virtually ruled the Jaffna peninsula. They have modern high-tech weapons,
including computers, SAM missiles, and their own small navy. They operate numerous
corporate business fronts which smuggle arms, drugs, and other commodities.

South Asia (which includes India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Nepal) has
the highest population densities in the world (Bombay = 127,000 people per sq mi. -
NYC only 24,000/sq mi), there are dozens of languages, low life expectancies, and not
enough food to go around (people believing more children means better chance of
growing food). After Mohandas Gandhi led a non-violent war of independence in 1947,
North India (which was primarily Islamic) became partitioned off from South India
(which was primarily Hindu), and Pakistan was born out of a mass migration. In 1971,
a ethnic conflict centered in Pakistan led to another mass migration, this time forming
Bangladesh. Since 1975, the Sikhs have controlled the "emergency zone" Punjab
region. India has experienced domestic terrorism at the hands of groups like Assam
(United Liberation Front of Assam) in the Bengali region. The result is a region with
scattered ethno-religious groups, all trying to exercise political clout or self-
determination in one way or another. The Kashmir conflict is a good example of this
kind of struggle or conflict.

KASHMIR, an area on the northern borders of India

and Pakistan, and officially known as Jammu &
Kashmir, is about 70% Muslim (convertees at one
point in their history) and the rest include Hindus,
Sikhs and Buddhists. Both India and Pakistan have
claimed and fought over Kashmir since 1948. Since
1989, Kashmiri militants, suspected of Pakistani
backing, have taken up arms against the Indian
military presence. Three main groups - Hizbul
Mujahideen; Lashkar-e-Toyeba; and Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen - are reluctant to stipulate in detail what
they are fighting for, beyond the removal of India from Kashmir. Recently a Pan-
Islamic group - Jaish-e-Mohammad [Army of Mohammad] - has emerged to join the
cause, and religious jihad is regularly practiced by other Islamist groups there. More
than 30,000 men, women and children have died in the past decade, with some
estimates as high as 60,000 people. It is one of the world's most dangerous places.
India deploys more than 500,000 security personnel in the area to combat the
insurgency. India and Pakistan have repeatedly come close to war there with both
 sides nuclear armed.

Adherents of different religions often claim they cannot live with one other in the
same area. Buddhism tends to be practiced by people living in highland areas, Hindu by
lowland people, and Islam by city folk. In Buddhism, everything and everyone is equal.
In Hinduism (as well as Confucianism), everything is born unequal - some people are
born noble, others are not. Islam and Christianity tend to fuel the mix by adding
elements of fundamentalism, most notably in the notion of martydom, which is highly
attractive to the Asian region because it has the highest suicides rates of anywhere in the
world. Ethno-religious terrorism in the region baffles most experts. It is difficult to
distinguish religious and nonreligious motivation, and South Asian terrorism tends to be
heavily mixed with a criminal element, both organized and unorganized. Ahmad (2002)
is most likely right: the world probably has more to fear from a "Hindu bomb" than the
"Muslim" bomb one so frequently hears about.

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN THE BALKAN CONTEXT

The Yugoslavia region and the neighboring Balkans (Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, and Romania) [see larger map of region] have long been
a region of ethnic and religious conflict. There are over 10 million Balkan Muslims
(Kosovo, Bosnia, and Bulgaria have over 2 million each), and anti-Muslim hatred runs
high as does anti-Christian hatred (the Serbs are Christian). Balkan Muslims are not
your average Muslims. They drink, smoke, celebrate Easter and Christmas, and are the
descendants of Christians who converted to Islam in the 15-16th century to avoid
persecution by the Ottoman Empire. Their sworn enemies are those of Serbian and
Slavic descent who happen to be decended from Orthodox Christianity who see their job
as protecting Europe from Muslim invasion. In the words of the Serb leader, Slobodan
Milosevic, they're "dirty rotten Turks who breed like rabbits, run drugs, flood Slav
lands with their alien offspring, and deserve to be sent back to Mecca where they
belong."
 The Balkans
War was fought
from 1991 to
1999, with
America and
NATO involved
in the middle of
it, first with
Croatia (1991-
1995) where we
backed the
Muslims, then
with Bosnia
(1992-1995)
which is still
under U.N.
occupation, and
then with
Kosovo (1999)
where we
bombed
Belgrade and
other Yugoslav
cities,
accidentally
hitting a Chinese
embassy in the
process. The
Balkan war is
regarded by
most U.S. experts as a tragic mistake. There are an abundance of books on the subject, along
the lines of "NATO's Blunder" (Carpenter 2000). It was the first time American bombers
struck European cities since World War II, and it was the first first netwar of propaganda, as
charges of "real" terrorism and genocide bounced across the Internet. In retrospect, all sides to
the conflict committed atrocities. Croatia had a large Serbian population in the middle of the
country, and they fought hand-to-hand until NATO helped march the Serbs out at gunpoint. In
Bosnia, the town of Sarajevo was devastated, and U.N. peacekeepers observed such things as
"ethnic cleansing" where Serbian soldiers tried to impregnate non-Serbian women. In the late
1990s, over 5000 Kosovar people (a term coined by NATO - Kosovars consider themselves
Albanians or Kosovo Albanians), were killed by Serbian police and military, and another 1.5
million became refugees in nearby Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. The Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) were regarded as terrorists by Serbians, and the world is judging
Milosevic and the Serb leadership as terrorists. The Arab world tends to see U.S. and NATO
involvement in the conflict as an example of Christianity trying to wipe out Islam in one last,
great crusade. Today (2004), Kosovo is still officially a province of Serbia and Montenegro,
although it is governed by a UN regime (UNMIK) and patrolled by NATO forces (K-FOR
troups, consisting mostly of German soldiers). Violence is an almost everyday event, most of
the time involving Muslim Albanians killing Christian Serbs or burning down Christian
churches.
 RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN THE EURASIAN CONTEXT

The former Russia (Russian Federation) and its Caucasus region have long
experienced terrorism which escalated in 1999 with the start of Russia's war on
terrorism in Chechnya. The Chechens are a Muslim people (again not your average
Muslims) who hate the Russians, declared their independence in 1991, and beat the
Russians in a ground war from 1994-1996. Their cause has become the cause of Muslims
everywhere. In fact, the idea of an international mujahidin can be traced to the
Chechnya conflict. There is evidence of a Chechen connection to an al-Qaeda terrorist
network, and Chechen militants fought alongside al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Chechen terrorism has spread throughout the region into Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Moscow itself. One of the groups involved in spillover
violence is the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), but Chechnya produces plenty
of its own militant groups. The region is used as a base for financial and logistic
assistance to terrorist groups worldwide. The Islamic charity organization known as the
Global Relief Foundation had a headquarters in Chechnya, and is a known front for
financing terrorist groups. Russian organized crime is also heavily active in the region
and involved in arms smuggling. The Arab news network al-Jazeera frequently
broadcasts pictures of Chechen civilians killed in the Russian war on terrorism.
Numerous pro-Chechnya websites can be found on the Internet.

The Chechen terrorists are financed by the Chechen mafia as well as with Saudi
money (for building mosques) and Arab relief fronts. There are some 150 Chechen
mafia groups operating in or near Moscow, and they seem to prefer London, rather than
Switzerland, as their money laundering center. They are constantly engaged in gang
warfare with other Russian gangs, most notably the Solntsevskaya, and of course, in
making whatever profit they can from criminal activity. Chechen terrorism is largely
successful because the Chechen mafia obtain and pass on intelligence obtained from
bribing Russian military personnel. Both Chechen and Russian mafia groups have been
involved in the nuclear black market, smuggling depleted plutonium, cesium, and other
radioactive material that makes "dirty" bombs. An in-depth analysis of Chechen
terrorism is called for.

In-depth Analysis of Chechen Terrorism

The main terrorist group is called Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion
of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM). The Chechens are a traditionalist Muslim ethnic group that
has lived for centuries in the mountainous Caucasus region near the city of Grozny and has
consistently resisted Russian subjugation. In terms of religion, they have been most influenced
by significant divisions among the Sufi sects and brotherhoods of Islam, particularly the more
militant strands of Sufism, and in recent years, by extremist varieties of Wahhabism. Chechen
Muslims are determined to build a "pure" Muslim society which would be organized and
regulated according to the Shariat law, and consist of a larger Islamic state in the Northern
Caucasus which would include Daghestan, Ingushetia and possibly other Russian regions. [For
religious background, see JMU's Islam in the North Caucasus at
http://www.jmu.edu/orgs/wrni/islam1.htm.] The Chechens have a long hatred of the
Russians. During World War II, the Soviet dictator Stalin accused the Chechens of
cooperating with the Nazis and forcibly deported, starved, or killed tens of thousands of them.
After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Chechnya, along with 14 other breakaway republics
(Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tadjikistan, Turmenistan, and Uzbekistan) declared independence.
The Soviets let these other 14 go peacefully, but not Chechnya. Russia fought two (2) wars
against Chechnya:
(1) The first Chechen war (1994-96) followed the Soviet collapse and a simultaneous
Islamic revival in Chechnya where Islamic Chechens started to kill ethnically mixed Russian-
Chechens, one family at a time, and the Russians felt they had no choice but to intervene.
100,000 civilians were killed in this war [Wikipedia article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Chechen_War]
(2) the second Chechen war
(1999-present) was precipitated
by the Chechen incursion into
Dagestan (a Russian Federation
country to the East strategically
located next to oil in the
Caspian Sea), but Dagestan was
also a country Chechnya wanted
to Islamicize, and did,
somewhat successfully, since
about half the population in
Dagestan has joined Chechnya
in its "holy war" against Russia
and the other half of the
population are refugees
attempting to flee somewhere.
International aid organizations
attempting to help the refugees
are handicapped by the prevalence of kidnapping in the region, and Chechen-Dagestani rebels
have not hesitated to kidnap or execute any relief workers, journalists, or foreign nationals who
enter the area. Dagestani government forces fight alongside Russian soldiers, but mainly do
border patrol work. So far, 60,000 civilians have been killed in this war, and it shows no signs
of ending, although the Russians have declared it officially over and want several hundred
refugees in Ingushetia to return to Chechnya. [Wikipedia article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Chechen_War]
Strategy, Tactics, and Support Structure
Hit-and-run attacks are primarily used against the Russian military and Russian civilians.
Chechen terrorism demonstrates an amazing ability to defeat the toughest of Russian security
measures, presumably through deception, bribes, advanced technology, or inside intelligence.
Roadside bombs, for example, are often placed along where a target is sure to travel, and
Chechen terrorist training camps [video available at
http://www.intellnet.org/resources/chechen_terrorists/6.html] are not only well-equipped, but
technologically sophisticated, as e-mail and cell phone communication is quite common.
Suicide attacks seem only to be used as a last resort, or at times when public sympathy is
needed. Extortion, gun-running, counterfeiting, and kidnapping-for-ransom are internal
sources of revenue, and external funding is received by al-Qaeda, Islamic charities, and
reportedly Saudi Arabia. Popular support for the Chechen cause among the Muslim world is
widespread. The Arabic satellite news network al-Jazeera frequently broadcasts reports of
Russian abuses, often accompanied by graphic footage of dead or wounded Chechen civilians.
The United States stands by Russia's right to subdue the Chechen rebellion, and the U.S.
frequently downplays Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya. At any given time, Chechen
terrorists hold about 700 international hostages, and at least 4 American citizens have been
taken hostage and killed. Some Chechen terrorist ideology is strongly anti-American.
The photo to the left is of a 1999 Russian Apartment
Building blast that killed 64 residents. Two other similar
bombing attacks occured that year. From 2000-2002,
numerous bombing attacks on Russian parades and shopping
markets were made, culminating in a October 2002 57-hour
seizure of a Moscow theater where some 700 people were
attending a performance. Russian special forces launched a
commando raid, and the opium-derived gas (fentanyl) they
used to disable the hostage-takers killed more than 120 hostages, as well as many of the
terrorists. The Chechens turned to suicide bomber tactics shortly after this. [Navy report:
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/may03/russia.asp]
The al-Qaeda Connection and Leadership
The late Chechen warlord Khattab (killed in 2002) fought alongshide Osami bin Laden
during the 1979-89 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Other Chechen militants joined Taliban
forces against the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance during the Afghan War, and the Taliban was
the only government to recognize Chechen independence. The 9/11 ringleader, Muhammad
Atta, initially planned to join the fight in Chechnya. Zacarias Moussaoui, the “20th hijacker”
in the 9/11 attacks was a recruiter for al-Qaeda-backed rebels in Chechnya. Most experts put
the number of al-Qaeda fighters or foreign mercenaries in Chechnya at approximately 200.
The current leader, or field commander, of RSRSBCM is Shamil Basayev, known as "The Che
Guevera of Russia," the "Most Wanted Man in Russia," or the "Top of Interpol's Most Wanted
List." [See dossier at http://www.diacritica.com/sobaka/dossier/basayev.html and Army Intel
Report at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fmsopubs/issues/shamil/shamil.htm]. Basayev has
also been declared an "international terrorist" by the U.S. State Dept. He has a reputation for
being resistant to being killed (despite numerous attempts), and ideologically, he regards
Palestinian terrorist groups as being too "peaceful" and easy on their enemy, and has vowed to
come down to the middle east after he "liberates" Chechnya and free Palestine. Some Basayev
quotes appear below:

• "Today, war proceeds in a haphazard manner. Mujahideen (holy warriors) know what
to do, and nether I nor other leaders are required to tell them much. Everyone has
grown as a soldier, knows how to make a mine from practically any substance, learnt to
war, and the tactics we have employed -are the tactics of bees, when incessant little
stings overwhelm the enemy by number."
• "The world is slipping - exactly slipping - into World War III. It seems to have already
started, waiting for the moment to burst out, for the current injustice and current chaos
created by the top tyrants - the USA and Russia - will inevitably ignite a major conflict,
and by the mercy of Allah, we prepare for it."
• "With regard to peaceful enemies, you'd better refrain from illusions; the war will come
to every house of yours, for the entire of Russia and the world is engaged in war. Do
not assume that we consider you as peaceful population. We consider you as unarmed
military men, because those who by majority approve the genocide of the Chechen
people cannot be peaceful population. According to the law of Shariate, mere verbal
approval of war ranks peaceful citizens among the enemy."

• "Believe me, multiple new military groups arise in Chechnya today, of which neither I
nor Maskhadov nor anyone else is in control. The groups act autonomously today,
doing whatever they think appropriate."
 RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN THE NORTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

Sudan is the largest country in Africa (roughly the size of Europe), and located south
of Egypt. It has been a war zone since it's independence from Britain in 1954. Years of
dictatorships and military coups have been the norm, with the situation escalating in the
1990s to genocide. Northern Sudan (the safer region) consists of 8 million Arabic-
speaking Muslims, and an indigenous black Nuba population which the current
government has been trying to exterminate. Southern Sudan consists of 6 million black
Africans who are Christians or animists (animism is a primitive religion that every
object, even a rock, has a soul). The current government's goal is to become Africa's
first all-Islamic nation, so Islamic Law and Jihad are used to persecute and execute any
non-believers. Christians, in particular are regularly murdered, raped, maimed, or
forced into slavery. The National Islamic Front regime which holds the capital city of
Khartoum regards Christian missionary activity as Western invasion. Osama bin Laden
hid for many years in Sudan. Next to Iran, Sudan is one of the world's largest sponsors of
terrorism, but it is trying to change that, and began cooperating with America's war on
terror in 2002, but American intelligence and diplomatic officials are quite suspicious of
Sudan's sincerity in this regard.

SUDANESE TERRORISM: Government officials wear

NIF (National Islamic Front) emblems. Soldiers wear GoS
(Government of Sudan) emblems. The main extremist
group sometimes wears PDF (Popular Defense Force)
emblems. All three are government-sponsored, and the
larger PDF is filled with Muslim fanatics. Militia groups
use names like Mujahadeen (holy warriors) or Murahaleen,
and fight alongside government forces. These groups wipe
out an average of 10 villages a year. Sudan harbors a
number of terrorist groups, including remnants of old ones
like Abu Nidal, and Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Egypt's Al-
Gama'at al-Islamiyya all have headquarters in Sudan. Other groups have safe haven.
Training camps have supported terrorist movements throughout Africa. The Sudanese
government is supported by Iran which sees Sudan as a bridgehead for the penetration
of Iranian Fundamentalism into Africa.

The United States has spent about $30 million in covert aid to the rebel forces in
Sudan while at the same time sending $100 million in humanitarian aid. U.S. officials
deny that the covert aid was military, describing it as 'non-lethal' - radios, uniforms,
boots, tents, etc. The rebel groups are split and factionalized, the strongest one being the
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Other include the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM), and its armed wing, the SPLM/A (A for Army), the Sudanese Allied
Forces (SAF), and the United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSF). In the opinion of
most military experts, none of these rebel groups ever has a chance of winning against
the stronger, government NIF/GoS forces.

Many religious cults tend to form in Africa, and much of it involves distorted forms of
Christian fundamentalism which mix witchcraft with what might be called
Pentecostalism. This is prevalent in Ghana, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria,
but we'll focus on Uganda, a country located directly below Sudan. Like many
Africans, Ugandans believe in witch-doctors, who not only attempt to heal the sick
(usually by cutting off a body part), but provide financial and marital advice. Christian
missionaries in the region usually report having a hard time explaining things like
witches and devils. Africans, however, are intensely interested in anything to do with
salvation and putting troubles behind you to start a new life. At least one terrorist cult
group, the LRA, has exploited these desires. The LRA, in existance since 1989, has an
agreement with the National Islamic Front/Government of Sudan (NIF/GoS) that they
would support the NIF/GoS in their jihad against the Southern Sudanese, if the
NIF/GoS would support the LRA.

THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY, or LRA, represents a mix of Christian cult,

Islam, and native African religions. It is also an armed terrorist group fighting the
Ugandan government, with backing from Sudan and Christian charity foundations.
They seek to establish a state based on a somewhat twisted version of the Ten
Commandments. Their leaders have called themselves Charismatic Pentecostals, but
they pray like Muslims, and the group is under tremendous pressure from their main
sponsor, the Sudan, to Islamicize. Their possibly-insane leader, Joseph Kony, has
promised followers immunity from bullets if Holy water, certain ointments, and
religious insignia are applied to their bodies. They kidnap about 12,000 boys and girls
every year, raising the boys to become warriors and the girls to become domestic sex
slaves. Millions of other people have been displaced from their homes by LRA action.
Mass suicides sometimes occur during church services. One of their fatalistic beliefs
involves hastening doomsday by spreading AIDS through the rape of girls and
women. Another involves training boys to attack their home villages, kill their
childhood family and friends, and cannibalize boiled body parts. The Uganda
government has been trying to wipe out the LRA (and occasionally declares success),
but it is hard to fight a war against forces where 80-90% of the troops consist of
abducted, indoctrinated children
Joseph Kony - profile - Nephew of a Voodoo Priestess, former Catholic
altar boy, and educated as a social worker, Kony rose to the ranks of
"Major-General" in the LRA and is a self-proclaimed spirit medium who
says he talks directly to the Holy Ghost and has issued standing orders to
"Kill all clergy" and turn nuns into sex slaves. Child captives are taught
his vision of an apocalyptic "The Silent World" where all guns will fall
silent and only those knowing how to use crude weapons, like stones, spears, and
machetes, will survive. The LRA is obsessed with the idea of supernatural
intervention and battlefield fighting with primitive weapons (2 Corinthians 10:3,4).
LRA indoctrination and punishments consist of beatings, rapes, the severing of limbs,
lips, and ears, and unspeakable other atrocities. [see Joseph Kony's Spirit War]

RELIGIOUS TERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EASTERN CONTEXT

At last count, there were 57 separate nations with Islam as the official religion or a
substantial part of the population consisting of Muslims. These nations belong to a
group called the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which has gone on
record saying there's no such thing as separation of church and state. There is even no
such thing as a secular religion, like the official Church of England religion in Great
Britain. There appears to be three schools of Muslim thought on the subject. The
majority group believes that it is the sacred mission of Islam to rule the world by use of
the sword if necessary. Another group accepts cohabitation with other religions as long
as Islam is the world's pre-eminent religion. A third group, the moderates, advocates
co-existence primarily because of the economic benefits it brings. Bearing the scars of
life and an inability to develop constitutional democracies, Middle Eastern countries
take particular umbrage at the existence of Israel, the history of which follows.

The area known as Palestine is an ancient land which has always been populated by
Arab Muslims, Arab Christians, and Arab Jews. In 1917, the British promised to help
create a Jewish "national home" in Palestine. Arab protests began in 1920. In 1919
there were 568,000 Muslims, 74,000 Christians, and 58,000 Jews in Palestine. Fifteen
thousand Jews a year immigrated during Hitler's rise to power, and some 100,000 death
camp survivors came later. Today, there are 1,091,000 Muslims, 614,000 Jews, and
146,000 Christians in Palestine. Wars have been fought in 1948–49, 1956, 1967 (The Six
Day War), 1973–74 (The Yom Kippur War), and 1982 between Israel and the Arab
states.

The current conflict centers on two Israeli-controlled territories. The West Bank [see
map] has the largest percentage of Arab Muslims, and the conflict there revolves around
the status of Jerusalem (the center of three great religions). The Gaza Strip [see map] is
another Muslim area where the intifadah (grassroots uprising) began, and refugee camp
conditions are worse than in the West Bank. The religious backdrop to the situation is
heavily mixed with anti-U.S. sentiment, where the U.S. is seen as supporting Israel
only because of American oil interests. Further, the U.S. is seen as being responsible for
militarizing the region (the Middle East is the most militarized region in the world) and
propping up corrupt Arab governments. In addition, American culture is seen as
hopelessly racist, or at least stereotypical, in the way it portrays Arabs - as the bad guys
in movies, cartoons, war films, and popular conception, up to and including the latest
way Americans easily roll the words "Islamic terrorism" off their tongues.

It's hard to walk the line between cultural sensitivity and stereotype. Suffice it to say
that opinions vary, but some believe Islam doesn't mean peace, but submission - to the
will of Allah to "fight and slay the unbelievers wherever you find them, and seize them,
beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem of war" (The Koran, Surah
IX:5). If these viewpoints are true, then there really is such a thing as Islamic
terrorism [see Lecture on Islamist Extremism]. There are, indeed, organizations
dedicated to Islamic domination of the world, just as the great "breakout" of Islam
during the 7th Century that resulted in the Arab "golden age." At the forefront of this
idea are Muslim clerics most likely kept quiet by their governments, and in some ways is
an adequate description of Osami bin Laden's goals for al-Qaeda. In the Philippines and
Malaysia, there's the Abu Sayyaf group. In Algeria there's the Armed Islamic group. In
Egypt there's Al-Gam'a al-Islamiyya and Al-Jihad. Other Islamic groups simply hate
Israel and want to destroy it. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, and the Palestinian Liberation Front are such groups. We'll deal first with
the terrorist origins of the PLO.
 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is
the coordinating council for all Palestinian
organizations, founded in 1964 at the first Arab
summit meeting. The dominant group is Al Fatah,
headed by Yasir Arafat [see psychological profile]
who formed a group of warriors known as fedayeen,
and became chairman of the PLO in 1968. Other
groups include Syrian-backed As Saiqa and the
Marxist-oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP). Since its founding, the PLO has
been committed to the destruction of Israel, and over the years involved in acts of
terrorism. It toned down its rhetoric and acts of terrorism in 1974 when it received
UN recognition as a government in exile. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and
dispersed many PLO terrorists, and in 2002 again launched a campaign in the West
Bank. At one time, Abu Nidal was part of the PLO, but a rift with Arafat developed,
and the two became mortal enemies. Arafat has also been unable to control HAMAS,
founded in the Gaza Strip during 1987 as the main Palestinian rival to the PLO.
Hizbollah [see their website] is primarily an Iranian-sponsored Lebanese movement
that behaves more like a militia than a terrorist group.

Other Middle Eastern groups are more closely linked to Muslim fundamentalism than
the Palestine issue, and fundamentalism in this context bridges both Sunnis and Shiites,
and can be seen as anti-Americanism - an outright hatred of American values and
culture couched in the language of religion. A few leaders of these groups have openly
called for the deaths of Americans on a global scale. The foremost character in this
regard is Osama bin Laden and his group, al-Qaeda, which are perhaps marginal
players compared to the global Islamist threat or perhaps the strongest, most dangerous
of such a threat. Expert opinion varies over this; see the 2005 CRS Report entitled Al
Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment (pdf).

OSAMA BIN LADEN: A multi-millionaire who runs a private

terror network from a hideaway in Afghanistan or parts
unknown. Born into a wealthy Saudi family in 1957 as the 7th of
50 children, he joined the Afghan Mujahedin in 1979. During the
Gulf War, he became incensed that Saudi Arabia allowed
American troops on its soil, and later came to blame the U.S. for
the problems of Palestine. In 1996, he issued a fatweh, or
religious decree, to kill American soldiers, and in 1998, that all dutiful Muslims
should consider killing American civilians and their allies, including women and
children, as their legitimate, sacred duty [read fatweh]. In 1998, he masterminded
embassy bombings in Tanzania and Nairobi, and in 2001, the plane crashes of 9/11.
He is also suspected of supplying the troops and rocket launchers that shot down U.S.
helicopters in Somalia during 1993, and being behind the November 1995 bombing of
a Saudi base in Riyadh that killed six Americans. He has been linked to Ramzi
Yousef, the convicted mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

Al Qaeda ideology, to which Osama Bin Laden and others like him represent, is an
admixture of various Koranic misinterpretations and a hatred of the U.S. and/or all
westernized things. The following is an excerpt of the entire Introduction to the Al-
Qaeda Training Manual (UK/BM Translation, captured by the Manchester England
Metropolitan Police during a search of a home, found in a computer file described as the
"military series" related to the "Declaration of Jihad; the manual was translated into
English and was introduced at the embassy bombing trial in New York).

Martyrs were killed, women were widowed, children were orphaned, men were
handcuffed, chast women’s heads were shaved, harlots’ heads were crowned, atrocities
were inflicted on the innocent, gifts were given to the wicked, virgins were raped on the
prostitution alter.
After the fall of our orthodox caliphates on Marcy 3, 1924 and after expelling the
colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the
Moslem nation. These rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the
colonialists themselves. Moslems have endured all kinds of harm, oppression, and torture
at their hands.
Those apostate rulers threw thousands of the haraka Al-Islamyia (Islamic
Movement) youth in gloomy jails and detention centers that were equipped with the most
modern torture devices and (manned with) experts in the oppression and torture. Those
youth had refused to move in the rulers’ orbit, obscure matters to the youth, and oppose
the idea of rebelling against the rulers. But they (the rulers) did not stop there; they started
to fragment the essence of the Islamic nation by trying to eradicate its Moslem identity.
Thus, they started spreading godless and atheistic views among the youth. We found some
that claimed that socialism was from Islam, democracy was the (religious) council, and
the prophet – God bless and keep him – propagandized communism.
Colonialism and its followers, the apostate rulers, then started to openly erect
crusader centers, societies, and organizations like Masonic Lodges, Lions and Rotary
clubs, and foreign schools. They aimed at producing a wasted generation that pursued
everything that is western and produced rulers, ministers, leaders, physicians, engineers,
businessmen, politicians, journalists, and information specialists. [Koranic verse: as
Allah’s enemies plotted and planned, and Allah too planned, and the best of planners is
Allah]
They (the rulers) tried, using every means and (kind of) seduction, to produce a
generation of young men that did not know (anything) except what they (the rulers) want,
did not say except what they (the rulers) think about, did not live except according to their
(the rulers) way, and did not dress except in their deception back on them, as a large
group of those young men who were raised by them (the rulers) woke up from their sleep
and returned to Allah, regretting and repenting.
The young men returning to Allah realized that Islam is not just performing rituals
but a complete system: Religion and government, worship and Jihad (holy war), ethics
and dealing with people, and the Koran and sword. The bitter situation that the nation has
reached is a result of its divergence from Allah’s course and his righteous law for all
places and times. That (bitter situation) came about as a result of its children’s love for
the world, their loathing of death, and their abandonment of Jihad (holy war).
Unbelief is still the same. It pushed Abou Jahl – may Allah curse him – and
Kureish’s valiant infidels to battle the prophet – God bless and keep him – and to torture
his companions – may Allah’s grace be on them. It is the same unbelief that drove Sadat,
Hosni Muberak, Gadhafi, Hafez Assad, Saleh, Fahed – Allah’s curse be upon the non-
believing leaders – and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison, and torment
Moslems.
These young men realized that an Islamic government would never be established
except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide nor make a truce with unbelief, but
 rather confronts it.
The confrontation that Islam calls for with these godless and apostate regimes,
does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor Aristotelian diplomacy.
But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, bombing, and destruction,
and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.
The young came to prepare themselves for Jihad (holy war), commanded by the
majestic Allah’s order in the holy Koran. [Koranic verse: Against them make ready your
strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the
hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides whom ye may not
know, but whom Allah doth know.]
I present this humble effort to these young Moslem men who are pure, believing,
and fighting for the cause of Allah. It is my contribution toward paving the road that leads
to majestic Allah and establishes a caliphate according to the prophecy.

When speaking of al-Qaeda, one should strive to be clear if they are speaking of: (a)
traditional al-Qaeda, the group which attacked the US on 9/11; (b) ideological or
doctrinal al-Qaeda, the leaderless followers who simply believe in the same ends; or (c)
the new al-Qaeda, which is part of the insurgency in Iraq targeting other Muslims. The
second type is likely to be rather unpredictable, and the third type is likely to be far
more dangerous, as newer, younger members may see the old, core members as
something of an anachronism, and may try to carry the torch further. One of the
lessons regarding religious terrorism is that it almost always involves change in the form
of "transmutation" or what White (2002) awkwardly calls "transmogrification." It is
therefore difficult to characterize such a threat in absolute terms.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Is The Conflict in Northern Ireland Really Religious?
Christian Fundamentalism in Africa
CNN Special Report on the Status of Jerusalem
Council of Foreign Relations Q&A on Chechnya
Council of Foreign Relations Q&A on Sudan
Field Manual of the Christian Militia
History Guy's Links on Conflict in Northern Ireland
LTTE Terrorist Attacks and Related News
Overview of the Kashmir Conflict
PsyBC Psychology of Religious Fundamentalism
Religious Populations of the World
ReligiousTolerance.org
Ritualistic and Occult Crime
TamilNet.com
Terrorism on the Indian Subcontinent
The Arab-Israeli Wars
The Jewish Post of New York
The Northern Ireland Conflict (1968-present)
The Spiritual Meaning of Jihad in the Muslim Religion
WebQuest of Balkan Conflicts
Wikipedia Talk: List of Organizations in Religious Terrorism
Yahoo Coverage of Hague War Crimes Tribunal
Yahoo's List of Buddhism Links
Yahoo's List of Hindu Links
Zipple: The Jewish SuperSite

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Last updated: 03/07/06

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: JIHADISM, QUTBISM, AND WAHHABISM
"We must fight and slay the Pagans wherever we find them, and lie in wait for them in every
stratagem of war." (Mohammed)

Islamic extremism is interesting to study from a criminological or criminal justice

perspective, but far too often scholars and experts have put it off out of charitable
deference to the sensitivities of Muslims or a simple desire to leave well enough alone. It
is difficult, but not impossible, to conduct such analysis and be charitable too. An
objective, balanced approach is probably most needed, as are more nuanced distinctions
among types of adherents to the Muslim faith. This lecture intends to talk about some
basic distinctions between Muslim extremists and Muslim moderates, setting the
groundwork for more in-depth analysis. It must be quickly noted that once we do this
(distinguish extremists and moderates), we are immediately setting up straw man
arguments for the extremists to use -- enabling moderates to be perceived as
compromisers with the West, and saying there are distinctions to be made when Islamic
doctrine holds there are no distinctions. There is danger in choosing the words to use
since careless terminology unintentionally winds up promoting the ideology of
extremists (Streusand & Tunnell 2006).

For example, the term "jihad" simply does NOT have negative connotations for most
Muslims, even when used in the context of describing terrorist purpose or action.
Although it is true Muslims have debated the meaning of the term for centuries, any
Westerner who uses the term to describe a jihadist (or mujahidin) in a negative way
makes himself the enemy of all Muslims. Similarly, anyone who says that Muslims
worship the same God (emphasizing the God of Abraham as the common heritage of
Judaism, Christianity and Islam) simply does NOT understand that Muslims regard
their God as different, with Abraham as the first Muslim, with Moses and Jesus having
it wrong, and with Mohammad bringing it down perfectly (see Is Allah God?).

However, some basic distinctions can be made. First of all, anyone labeled an
"extremist" generally resorts to (or thinks in terms of) a militant solution first and finds
justification for it in faith or the literal meaning of text (e.g., "when texts have spoken,
reason must be silent"). It is this silencing of reason which characterizes an extremist.
A moderate is inclined to supplement their faith with reason, the power of mind, and
freedom of thought, before considering a militant solution. The whole "faith then
reason" versus "reason then faith" juxtaposition is, of course, quite familiar as a
Western dichotomy derived from the Augustine/Aquinas debates (see Lecture on
Scholastic Medievalism), but it should be noted many intellectual forms of Islam go far
back before then, to philosophical differences with the ancient greeks and/or the
reception of Aristotle (Bertolacci 2006). Militancy is also a word we should define. A
militant solution usually means an irregular fighting force is put together of some kind,
which is a common denominator with insurgency, insurrection, armed resistance, and
(quite often) terrorism. An inclination to use force or at least to count on it during
protest and demonstration characterizes a militant. It is probably the case that
extremists and militants outnumber moderates in the Muslim world, but differences of
opinion (among world leaders) lead to consideration of at least "some" militancy and
extremism as not always breeding terrorism. Many Muslim countries (Pakistan, for
example) tolerate some forms of militancy and extremism because they don't see it as
always breeding terrorism. The analysis contained herein only examines a limited
number of extremist and moderate types (a Part II of Islamist Extremism is in the
works). Calling upon academic free inquiry, one can also urgently demand that an
examination of what seems to be recurrent problems with Islam be conducted, and
toward that end, two hypotheses about the religion are usually considered good starting
points -- (1) that Islam is inherently violent - and (2) that Islam is susceptible to
hijacking or distortion which promotes violence. These hypothesis seem to organize the
literature fairly well, and their examination is followed by some in-depth analysis of
many specific issues. Westerners, especially Americans, are curious. What is it about
those militant strands of Islam that seem to spawn so much bloodshed in the world?

Much of what is to be discussed here will seem foreign and incomprehensible from a
Western viewpoint. Therefore, some practical conceptual framework might be useful at
the outset, especially when discussing terrorism which is apparently driven by deep
religious conviction. The Lecture on Religious Terrorism only touched on this -- and it
is the rare secular mind that can comprehend the depth of religious passion within
Islamist extremism (perhaps fanaticism is a better term). Readers might find useful the
framework provided by Cooper (2004) which draws upon the concepts of "political
religion" (from the philosopher Eric Voegelin) and "pneumopathology" (from the
philosopher Friedrich Schelling). In the fields of political science and sociology, the
term "political religion" usually refers to an ideology where the goal is to create a form
of politics with the same power as religion. Totalitarianism and theocracy are terms
often associated with this, but are not absolutely necessary conditions, as even
democracies can develop things like "civil religions" around events like SuperBowl
Sunday (the favorite example of sociologists who study such things). There is some
debate among scholars about the exact role of the cult of personality in political
religions, and Cooper (2004) is illustrative of modern debates over whether such
phenomena are really forward-looking (modernist) or backward-looking
(fundamentalist). The term "pneumopathology" refers to a disease of the spirit, an
imaginative second reality (being deranged by one's own beliefs) which explains the
world in different terms than what common sense would provide. In short, it refers to a
religious conviction so strong and intoxicating that it blinds a person to common sense
and makes it impossible for anyone to reason with them. As Cooper (2004:40) puts it:
"there is an inherent friction between commonsense reality and the occult reality within
which the terrorist lives imaginatively, an imaginary reality where killing the innocent
to impress others is understood to be heroic, altruistic, and self-sacrificing." As a leader
of Hezbollah put it: "we are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us
something. We are fighting to wipe out and annihilate the enemy."

Armed with frameworks and terminologies, it can be seen that the war on terrorism
(as war on Islamist extremism) is, in some sense, a contest of souls (a spiritual war and
more than an ideological or conceptual war, if you will) where the order of battle
involves who has the strongest belief system regarding the best system of
interrelationships between worlds (i.e., the spiritual, secular, religious, commercial
worlds, etc). Within the predominantly spiritual universe that is Islamist extremism,
terrorists guided by it genuinely believe they are heroic, more heroic and successful than
any soldier or businessman could ever be. The hero fantasy consumes their
imagination. Extremists are, after all, defending their god, and coming closer to their
god. The acts of destruction that they engage in (any destruction being a victory) bring
value to the cause and are a vivid proof of faith. The act of terrorism might be publicly
condemned but secretly admired by most Muslims, even moderates. Any terrorist
acting in the name of Allah (particularly within the Wahhabi view that the world ought
to be Muslim) is to be revered and admired. Such terrorists are the Middle East's
longed-for superhero, and seek to be the next best thing to the Mahdi or the Twelfth
Imam. They are not deterred by weapons, for they know that weapons will not destroy
their cause. The terrorist longing for union with god thru carnage is inseparable from
the impulse toward annihilation. Their goals and ambitions soar above logic, and they
have created a fantasy world (a second reality) in their minds about an angry god who
wants to pat them on the back for slaughtering apostates or nonbelievers (shunning the
usual religious response to apostasy as not being good enough). America is hated
precisely because its power and the Western viewpoint threatens much that is central in
the promises of their faith.

THE HYPOTHESIS THAT ISLAM IS INHERENTLY VIOLENT

At the outset, it must be noted, as Khan (2006) does, that this particular hypothesis --
that puritan Islam is inherently violent and Muslim militants are addicted to carnage --
has had a counterproductive effect in promulgating an ontology where significant
negative changes are taking place in international law, such as expansion of preemptive
war doctrine and other reactionary practices are ascendant (e.g., declining civil liberties,
prescribed extra-judicial killings, torture, renditions, indefinite detentions, and
numerous other human rights violations). There are as many evil necessities in
counterterrorism as there are in terrorism. There are also many ways Islam easily
serves as a mantle or cover for terrorism, although I wouldn't go so far as to say Islam
always and inevitably leads to terrorism, as some have said who advocate this hypothesis
(Wright 2001; Lewis 2003), and do so on the basis that the only sense in which Islam is a
religion of peace is when all nonbelievers are converted and there is no occasion for war;
i.e., the final command of Mohammed in the Quran is carried out -- to conquer the
world in the name of Islam (9:29). Islam is not a pacifist religion which values passive
witnessing, but in all fairness, other religions have promoted violence or been quite
pushy about how they go about witnessing their faith (see Gabriel 2002 for a comparison
with Christianity). Islam, however, seems to have particularly assembled all the right
ingredients for being violent-prone or at least non-democratic in its method of conflict
resolution. From most interpretations, warfare of some kind is always mandated
against nonbelievers. Twenty-six (26) chapters of the Quran deal with jihad, a fight
able-bodied believers are obligated to join (Surah 2:216), and the text orders Muslims to
"instill terror into the hearts of the unbeliever" and to "smite above their necks" (8:12).
Further, the "test" of loyalty to Allah is not good acts or faith (as is common in
Christian religion), but martyrdom which results from fighting unbelievers to the death
(47:4), fighting the good fight being the only assurance of salvation in Islam (4:74;
9:111). Much of this is, of course, subject to scholarly debate (the most frequent
grounds for such debate being that passages are takenout of context, but that is
something all religious doctrines are subject to). Yet, just by looking at certain passages,
one can easily find support for the "violent Islam" hypothesis -- passages such as the
following: the sins of any Muslim who becomes a martyr are forgiven by the very act of
being slain while slaying unbelievers (4:96), and those who are unable to do jihad, such
as women or the elderly, are required to give "asylum and aid" to those who do fight
unbelievers in the cause of Allah (8:74). Then, of course, there is the so-called X-rated
vision of Paradise, to wit: martyrs are rewarded with virgins, among other carnal
delights, in Paradise (38:51, 55:56; 55:76; 56:22). Regarding asylum privileges, it is
unknown why the Muslim practice of asylum never developed along the forty-day rule
of medieval Western common law, yet seems to have evolved into some sort of lenient,
international law approach to political asylum.

Fifty-seven (57) nations in the world support Islam as part of their dictatorship or
theocracy, and it is the world's second-largest (20%) and fastest-growing religion among
the oppressed and disenfranchised. There are no formal denominations to speak of
(other than Shiite and Sunni, but all mosques are ostensibly non-denominational), and it
is perhaps more accurate to talk about schools of thought, sects, or cults. Even then,
those terms don't fully capture the richness and depth of Islamic variation since there
are "religious" schools of thought (Sunni and Shiite), "political" schools of thought
(chronological and geographical Renaissance periods), "legal" schools of thought
(Islamic jurisprudence about Qur'anic interpretation), and the traditional distinctions
between sect (offshoots such as Salifism) and cult (breakaways such as Qutbism) don't
apply all that well. There are strange offshoots of Islam, some of which seem to
"insulate" societies from terrorism, or at least produce a different variety. Such is the
case, for example, with the peculiar religion of the Omanis, who are followers of
Abdallah ibn Ibadah al-Maqdisi's branch of Islam, a breakaway from the Khariji
("quietist") movement in Basra in 650 AD. Some experts suggest that the movement is
an offshoot of a dissident Shiite sect hailing originally from Ibadh in Saudi Arabia,
which was introduced to Oman in the eighth century. Experts also believe Oman (a
25% Sunni society that is fairly open to Israel) has been relatively free from terrorism
precisely because of its religion, with Janardhan (2006) explaining this as follows:
Oman is the only Ibadhi country in the world, with its tenets closely linked to the Maliki
Sunni school, and Ibadhism rejects primogeniture succession and asserts that the
leadership of Islam should be designated by an imam who is capable and elected by the
people, where both political and religious leadership are vested in an imam. What little
terrorism exists in Oman is usually seeded from the ideology of imama ("rule of the
imam") and its values, and most dissidents typically argue that their intention is not to
overthrow the regime, but to spread the Madhab ("Islamic jurisprudence") of Ibadhi.
Jails and pardons are the typical punishments. Many Muslims consider the Ibadhi
orientation unorthodox, but it has conditioned the society in such a fashion that it is
extremely conscious of sectarian affiliations and avoids things along divisive lines.

In one respect, it seems that the ascetic monotheism in Islam insists that the religion
be defined more by opposition than affirmation. As such, Islam and Islamic extremism
are undeniable social movements to be reckoned with, as believers think their prophet
being the last to appear in the Holy Days makes Him the real messenger of God, and
that anyone believing otherwise is an "infidel" or apostate deserving of less-than-human
dignity and worth. There is a strong anti-secular thrust in Islam along with a belligerent
superiority that make it dangerous, but perhaps no more than certain puritanical or
reconstructionist strains in other religions. What Islam needs is a Reformation period
like the Protestant Reformation that occurred in Christianity (An-Na'-Im 1996), but it
has only had a Renaissance period with Ba'athism -- that fascist, pan-Arabic, secular
movement which started in Syria during the 1950's - Ba'ath meaning "renaissance" or
"rebirth" in Arabic. However, far more important in Muslim history was the Mongol
destruction of Baghdad in 1258 and killing of the last Caliph. Muslims believe this
historical event brought down God's scourge upon them, and the appropriate response
is to recover the purity of the early companions [Salafs] of the Prophet, called Salafism
after the term for "venerable forefathers" or "early companions." A central component
of this response is the notion of jihad, but far more important for Westerners to try to
understand is the fairly-complicated concept of "caliph" which is, again, a term
Muslims would prefer non-Muslims try not to meddle with.

With respect to political correctness over issues and terms like Islamofascism, it may
or may not be useful to sort out which things Muslims find insulting and which things
they just need to get over about. Cartoons are but one example, but nonetheless, it is
important to be sensitive to genuine socio-cultural differences. There are twenty-one
(21) nations where some form of Arabic is the national language, and although not all
Arabs are Muslims, the notion of an "Arab world" or "Muslim world" has great appeal
to believers. This is because they see themselves as belonging to a super-nationality that
goes beyond traditional nation-state boundaries (it's called the Muslim umma or
Ummah, the community of believers). It's not that they aren't patriotic to their native
country; it's that their allegiance to this super-nationality is greater. Collectivity
arguments aside, much of this is because they desperately want a counterpart to the
Jewish notion of Zionism. It's almost impossible to understand the Arab or Muslim
mindset without reference to an intense hatred of most Jews and all of Zionism. Even if
the Jews were to leave the Middle East, Muslims would still feel threatened by Zionist
conspiracies because many Arabs see Jews as subhuman criminals who hide behind
democracy and work in the shadows. Christians are seen as a more insidious threat - an
irredeemable, immoral, corrupt, greedy, selfish, sinful, crusading people who hide
behind the name of capitalism (See answering-christianity.com). America is seen as the
second Israel, because it supports the Zionist entity. In the Muslim mindset, concepts
like tolerance, democracy, pluralism, and freedom are meaningless when spoken by a
Westerner because Arab trust, as among many in the Third World, has been broken by
years of colonialism, imperialism, capitalism, and globalism. Most Muslims see the
noble intentions of the West as mere slogans that disguise the true goals of political
domination, religious conversion, and economic exploitation.

Sociologically, most Muslims function under a rather unique patriarchal, extended

family system, unlike other extended family systems that might be found around the
world. In a traditional extended family system, aunts, uncles, cousins, grandparents,
etc. are treated as immediate family, but a Muslim household or co-joint household
might be larger, the defining attribute being that there can only be one breadwinner.
Patriarchy is evident in name-giving. All Arabs have at least three names, and they
keep their father's last name for life. Cultural prescriptions and prohibitions abound.
For example, standing close to one another, extended handshakes, feeling a person's
breath, and looking deeply in the eyes is approved of for men, but not for women. The
oppression of women in Islamic society has been extensively studied by many and has
basically reached no significant conclusions nor good recommendations for reform
(Ahmed 1993; Haddad & Esposito 1997). Local customs continually perplex Western
visitors. Some Arab nonverbal gestures are the complete opposite of those in the West.
For example, shaking your head up and down means "No" instead of Yes. Muslims are
extremely sensitive to insult by word and gesture, and probably more so with words
(some common English words are considered profanity). They believe words have
power. Like any converted religion, Islam tends to look backward for inspiration, but
Muslims scholars seem to systematically neglect any liberal, progressive, or Western-
friendly scholarship from their own history, such as the work of Ibn Khaldoun and
numerous writers during the Arab Golden Age (A.D. 750-1400). We shall see later than
most Islamic extremists want to go back before the Golden Age. It may not be
impossible for Islam to coexist peacefully in the modern world, but there are utilitarian
and practical problems in marshaling the best resources to find a suitable reform
strategy that benefits the most Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

THE THESIS THAT EXTREMISTS HAVE HIJACKED MAINSTREAM ISLAM

Interviewing and negotiating with terrorists (ideally, ex-terrorists) are probably the
only ways to prove at least some of the many forms of this hypothesis -- that radical
extremists have "brainwashed" the Muslim population in some way. It is also true that
increased American understanding is vital for any improved understanding of the
religious underpinnings of Islamic extremism of most relevance or interest, and for
that, a delineation of the scope of concerns is needed. As anyone on the receiving end of
terrorism has the right to be, victims are deservingly concerned with understanding at
least the following: (1) how easy it seems for some Islamic extremists to justify the
senseless slaughter of innocents in the name of religion; (2) how blowing yourself up
with as many other people around you can possibly be seen as religious obligation or
martyrdom; and (3) like El Fadl (2002) asks, how can a morality be so blindly convinced
it's the only way of life that it tramples all over the rights of others.

The following extremist movements are all currently active in the Muslim world, and
it is the thesis of writers like Esposito (1999) and others that these movements have all
engaged in hijacking mainstream Islam, much as Elijah Muhammad hijacked it to
claim whites were a race created by an ancient evil scientist (see Nation of Islam
homepage or Wikipedia article), although America has less to fear from the Black
Muslim movement than from more dangerous splinter groups like the five percenters
(an ideology popular with hip hop and rap musicians) or Jamaat al-Fuqra (a Pakistani-
American terrorist cult). Discussion of any extremism, of course, begs the question
"extreme to what?" and one would be hard pressed to define "mainstream" Islam in
any case. Sunni Islam and Salafism (explained below) are the most likely "mainstream"
contenders, but Islam is essentially an open religion that sees itself as a complete code of
life. All it takes to become a Muslim is to believe in the Six Beliefs, practice the Five
Pillars, and take an oath. How mainstream or orthodox a believer is depends upon how
fervently they practice their religion, and it is the translation of belief into practice that
has produced the most opportunities for extremists to hijack mainstream Islam (see
Wikipedia article on Islam).

• Islamism is a term describing the worldwide puritanical Islamic revival

movement that seeks to replace secular governments with Shari’a law and
establish theocracies throughout the world via relatively peaceful means; it's not
exactly a Muslim version of Zionism, but a throwback to the ideas of the 1928
Muslim Brotherhood that created an Islamic version of communism
• Islamofascism is a rather uncomplimentary term used to describe certain
extremists with political agendas who happen to be Muslims or use the cover of
Islam to seek an end to democracy, capitalism, individuality, human rights, and
modernization within a particular nationality and ultimately on the global stage;
with few exceptions which make something out of the fact that Yassar Arafat's
uncle worked for the Nazis (Trifkovic 2002), most experts believe there are no
meaningful historical connections between Islam and fascism
• Jihad is a controversial term in Islamic thought which technically refers to any
kind of struggle in the name of Islam, the means for spreading Islam and truth,
 and fighting for what is right and condemning what is wrong; Muhammad said
there were two types of jihad, "little jihad" or battle with one's attackers in holy
war, and "greater jihad" or purification of self by fighting a battle for what is
right; Koranic interpretation says jihad is of three kinds: against a visible enemy,
the devil, and one's self; depending upon context, jihad can mean good deeds,
personal struggle, armed defense, or holy war
• Jihadism, which might be called the religion of Jahiliya (a term referring to the
pre-Islamic era in Arabia, literally meaning ignorance), is a backward-looking
strand of Islamic extremism developed by the Pakistanis and Taliban which
considers itself the true Islam and sees a war of Armageddon or Plague of God
coming in which all non-Jihadists deserve to be killed and the Jihadists
themselves will benefit from rewards in both this life and heaven, but mostly in
heaven (See islamic-awakening.com)
• Qutbism is a radical form of conservative Islam developed in Egypt that
advocates armed struggle against any government which usurps God's authority;
many experts assume this to be Usama bin Laden's personal belief or part of his
twisted distortion of Islam
• Salafism is a mainstream type of Sunni Islam and fairly moderate belief about
being on the right path and the addition of analogue reasoning to a literal
interpretation of text, but it is quick to condemn those who innovate too much
from doctrinal interpretation; it considers the right path straight and fixed, to be
always followed, no matter how much much this trumps the rights, well-being,
laws, values, or morality of others, especially infidels; it maintain control over
believers, in part, by borrowing from Wahhabism, a denying of the right for
believers to contemplate any of the Divine attributes of God or what He looks like
(see The 99 Names of Allah)
• Sufism is a rather mystical, esoteric sect of Islam which consists of a
combination of moderate and extreme beliefs, for example, that God dwells in the
hearts of men, texts have hidden messages, and a personal means of worship
without public prayer is possible; other less commonly held beliefs include faith
in divine manifestations, the existence of invisible beings such as a genie, certain
magical practices, and an anti-technology bias; Sufis have historically been the
most common victims of Muslim genocide; i.e. fundamentalists regard Sufism as
a type of heretical pseudo-Islam; and although much of Sufism is about love,
spiritual journey, and having keen insight, militant versions of it have been
known to exist
• Wahhabism is a rather totalitarian-oriented form of Sunni fundamentalism
practiced mostly in Saudi Arabia and among many American Muslims (Malcolm
X 1987) and European immigrants which calls for a purification of Islam by
returning to basics, enforcing the women's dress code, removing corruption from
politics, restoring a Golden Age, and engaging in jihad as an obligation when it
comes to protecting Islamic interests or promoting the true purpose of Islam; like
the Shiite denomination and other sects, it relies upon the fatwa, or point of law
by a recognized authority, as a binding obligation of all Muslims, and since the
Rushdie affair, a fatwa has become associated with ordering a death sentence

THE BACKGROUND OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

 These have been rather complex characterizations of complex movements, so perhaps
some further background is in order to understand them better. For centuries, young
Muslim men have gathered at neighborhood madrasas (religious schools), run by
headmasters and mullahs (religious teachers) to study Islamic holy works and receive
free meals. The free meals really draw people out, even when they are offered to
celebrate some terrorist act of matyrdom, the latter being also rewarded by financial
gifts to families. However, sometime around 1979 (the date of the Iranian revolution),
the content of teaching at the madrasas took a violent turn. It was the purpose of the
Iranian revolution to spread Shiite fundamentalism throughout the world, and the first
enemy was the Sunni ruling parties in most Arab countries (hence the 1980-1989 Iran-
Iraq war since Iraq was ruled by Saddam Hussein, a Sunni socialist). Iranian-style
Shiite fundamentalism is characterized by dominance of the clergy (mullahs) in all
sectors of life, the eradication of all voices of opposition, and a kind of mindless
fanaticism to follow the orders of the Shiite leader - in this case Ayatollah Khomeini,
who represented what all Shiites believe - that there are twelve descendants of
Muhammad's cousin Ali who were handpicked to lead the Muslim world in jihad, or
holy war (Sunnis, by contrast, believe leaders should rise up from among the people).
Khomeini had long been preaching the virtues of suicide bombing (heavenly rewarded
terrorism) to terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas in his pre-1979 exile days.
Anyway, Shiite fundamentalism spread throughout Asia and Africa like wildfire,
especially in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan where Mullah Omar (a Shiite
madrasas dropout) created the Taliban in 1995. Usama bin Laden joined Mullah Omar
and based his al-Qa'ida organization in Afghanistan during 1996. Usama bin Laden
masterminded the September 11, 2001 attacks on America, and the next month (October
2001), the U.S. invaded Afghanistan. Later, in March of 2003, the U.S. invaded Iraq,
partly on suspicion that the Iraqi regime supported al-Qa'ida.

While the Shiite branch of Islam experienced a revival as early as 1979, the Sunni
branch of Islam started experiencing it's own revival of fundamentalism around 2001,
and an interest developed in ideas that had been around a long time, like Wahhabism,
which in many respects is the official ideology of university professors in much of the
Middle East. Recently, Sunni extremism has increased while Shiite extremism has
declined. Usama bin-Laden was raised a Sunni, and even though the Taliban rode the
coattails of the Shiite revolution, the Taliban also executed many Shiite citizens and
diplomats on soccer fields. To reconcile the tendency for Shiite extremism to result in so
many dead Shiites, people like Usama bin Laden embraced another ideology, Qutbism,
which allowed for a complimentary Sunni extremism which justifies a lot of dead
Sunnis. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the most well-known Sunni nations, and Sunnis in
general are sometimes considered more "reasonable" and moderate than the fanatical
Shiites. Fascination with martyrdom defines Shiites. Their central holiday remembers
the martyrdom of Hussein, one of Muhammad's descendents, and Shiites commemorate
by flagellating themselves with whips, a ceremony that some experts say spawns suicide
bombers (at least according to Jewish sources). Egyptian- and Saudi-style Sunni
fundamentalism is quite different, more rational, and more homicidal than suicidal.
To be sure, it, too, celebrates the idea of martyrdom, but Sunni fundamentalism is more
like a warrior religion that glorifies violence, brute force, or what Muslims call the
"greater jihad" -- a purification of self by fighting a battle for what is right.

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF JIHADISM

 Jihad is an Arabic word that literally means "combat" or "striving" and jihad is
sometimes regarded along with allegiance to the Iman as the violent Sixth Pillar of
Islam, although orthodox Islam only recognizes Five Pillars. The idea of jihad being the
violent Sixth Pillar comes from the Khawarij sect, which was part of the fundamentalist
Islamism movement that started in the early 20th Century. The Khawarij sect is named
after Dhul-Khuwaysarah, a man that Muhammad prophesied would have an
overprotective love of religion. The Khawariji interpretation of the role of
excommunication is completely the opposite of the Salafist interpretation of
excommunication (takfir). Salafism is rather restricted about who should be declared an
infidel and therefore excommunicated. Followers of the Khawariji interpretation, or
Jihadists, see few if any restrictions on who can be declared an infidel, and therefore
justify unrestricted warfare or terrorism against infidels. Even traditional Qur'anic
interpretations hold that those who reject Islam reject God, and one of the principal
characteristics of rejecting God (kufr) is the inclination toward violence and oppression,
encapsulated by the broad concept zulm, which means transgression against one's own
soul or human nature. Now, many if not most Muslims reject the duty to propagate
Islam by force and limit jihad to self-defense (Hashmi 2006), but then again, there is no
such thing as a pacifist movement in Islam, and most Muslims respect the necessity of a
continuous tension between incessant warfare and peace.

There is some controversy in Islamic thought as to whether jihad can be declared

before or after an enemy attacks, or in other words, in a pre-emptive strike or in self-
defense. A strict and literal reading of the Qur'an says self-defense only, but Islamic law
has always justified a first-strike position. Just saying that women ought to have a right
to vote is a crime of violence against all of Islam, and this can trigger a Jihadist reaction
against not only the person who said that, but against whomever they got that idea from
-- a kind of scorched earth policy or nipping things in the bud. The basis for most anti-
Americanism among Muslim extremists is part of the notion that any country that
would give women the right to vote, or all minorities equal rights, is probably a country
populated by infidels who are attacking Islam with crimes of violence. It may be
important to note the quite popular opinion in the Muslim world that it was under
attack by America first.

Jihad is also part of the name in at least two terrorist groups that make up the
shadowy umbrella group called Islamic Jihad, which has millions of supporters
throughout the Islamic world because these supporters agree with militaristic
interpretations of jihad. The two main groups are the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both formed in the mid-1970s with origins going back to the
1928 Muslim Brotherhood.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad: This is the Cairo-based group that assassinated

Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, and is responsible for a number of
other assassination attempts inside of Egypt up to 1993. Since then, it has
targeted American and Israeli interests around the world, and has a well-funded
network operating out of Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan,
Lebanon, and the United Kingdom. They succeeded in bombing one embassy in
Pakistan during 1995, and the CIA thwarted another embassy bombing attempt
in Albania during 1998. They are involved in a number of criminal activities,
besides terrorism, around the world.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad: This is a relatively small group that operates out of
 Syria and is fanatically dedicated to the killing of Jews and total destruction of
the state of Israel. By comparison, Hamas is a more moderate group. Formed
in the Gaza Strip during the mid-1970s, it has been the consistent target of
Israeli counterterrorism raids. They regularly conduct suicide bombing
infiltrations into Israel, but are also known to target other Arabs seen as too
moderate or too Western, having carried out attacks as far away as Malta and
in Jordan and Lebanon. In February, 2003, the FBI arrested their alleged
North American leader, a Univ. of South Florida professor, but in December,
2005, the trial resulted in acquittal.

Suicide bombings (a tactic that came into popularity around

1983) are a trademark of jihadists. The religious element involved
is that believers think they will attain a heavenly reward for their
sacrifice. The political element involved is that it sends a message
of how desperate and passionate the believers are. Expert opinion
is mixed on the effectiveness of suicide bombing as a strategy of
asymmetric warfare. Experts also agree that it is difficult if not
impossible to profile a suicide bomber. Some say it ultimately
backfires by turning public opinion against the bombers and those
who support them. Support often comes in the form of charitable
donations to the family of suicide bombers. Many poor parents in
the Arab world may be inclined to encourage their children to
become suicide bombers. For its photogenic value in a globalized
world of mass communication, suicide bombing is a weapon of
genius.

The Guarantee of Heaven for Islamic Martyrs

Suicide, under orthodox Islam, is a sin. However, Jihadists consider the

circumstances to cleanse the sin, making it the act of a holy martyr, not a suicide. The
actual percentage of Muslims who agree with this interpretation is hotly disputed, as is
the concept of martyrdom. A martyr is technically someone who dies for their religious
faith, but the outcome also matters, in terms of who gets to write history. Martyrdom,
therefore, is intimately tied up with Islamic arrogance that their goal of religious
domination will be victorious in the end. The study of all things in the end is known by
the religious term eschatology, and Islam contains strong elements of Zoroastrianism,
the world's first religion to have a full-blown eschatology. Many experts believe that
Zoroastrianism, a religion that existed from 1500 BC to 700 AD in Persia and still
popular in parts of Iran and India, had a significant impact on Islam. In a nutshell, the
basic idea that Zoraster had is that earth is a battlefield between good and evil, and that
good is destined to win out over evil, and anyone who allies themselves with good is
guaranteed to be part of this destiny. What Mohammed took from this is the idea that
whoever martyrs themselves for the sake of good goes directly to a special place in
heaven, or in a worst case scenario, goes to hell for a short time and then goes to heaven.
Satan, as the embodiment of evil, also plays a big role, as a real entity who tempts people
to renounce their faith, and the martyr with the most guarantee of a special place in
heaven is the one who fights Satan.

Demonizing America as the "Great Satan" makes it a fitting opponent in the

predestined war between good and evil. Heaven is more than a transcendental place to
Muslims. Orthodox Islamic eschatology holds that the afterlife is physical; people are
said to have bodies, and they will experience material pleasures, including unlimited
food, drink and sex. Heaven is known to some Muslims as the Gardens of Paradise
where unimaginable spiritual and sensual pleasures await. To other Muslims, the
rewards are quite imaginable, such as the 72 virgins waiting to have sex with each
martyr every day (their hymens miraculously regrow the next day). This account was
popularized by the media in 2001 when a CBS reporter interviewed a Hamas recruiter
who talked about it. According to one translation, the Koran 78:31 reads "As for the
righteous, they shall surely triumph. Theirs shall be gardens and vineyards, and high-
bosomed virgins for companions." Some Islamic scholars argue this is a false translation,
and that passages like that are referring to angels or heavenly beings. Other Islamic
scholars argue it's only 70 virgins instead of 72, and that your wife is always one of
them. Yet other Islamic scholars say the whole thing is intended to be taken in a
transcendental way, the pleasures of heaven being so great it's like having an eternal
erection or first-time sex all the time. See The X-Rated Paradise of Islam for examples
of other passages and translation controversies, but be warned this is a very anti-Islamic
hyperlink, and several defamation lawsuits are ongoing against it.

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF QUTBISM

Qutbism is named for the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb (pronounced SIGH-yid KUH
–taab) (1906-1966) who himself was a protégé of the Pakistani journalist Abul Ala
Maudoodi, and their collective ideas are sometimes called Maudoodi-Qutbism. It is
difficult to categorize their ideas collectively, as some scholars regard them as romantic
idealists longing for a return to a "purer" form of Islam, and others regard them as the
architects of all militant fundamentalism in Islam (Ruthven 2002). To be sure, both men
at first experimented with ways to incorporate Western thought into Muslim
philosophy, but ended up creating the Muslim equivalent of a Christian holy war
crusade. Qutb was radicalized sometime around 1949 after visiting the United States
where all he found was crass materialism, greed, and unbridled sexuality (see Qutb's
speech denouncing America). Upon his return to Egypt, Qutb joined the Muslim
Brotherhood and wrote radical books denouncing all things materialistic, modern, and
Western. His ideas would become the theoretical basis for many radical Islamic groups
of today -- including al Qaeda.

Qutb feared that decadent American influences, like jazz and dance, would invade
Egypt and all the Arab world unless something was done to stop it. It didn't help that
America was starting to support Israel around 1951. From a Qutbist viewpoint, the U.S.
replaces colonial Europe as the embodiment of evil, and the U.S. is the source of all the
ills and misfortunes in the Arab world. This radically changed the Muslim
Brotherhood, which was originally set up to hate communism, but gradually came to
hate America. To get some idea of how mainstream these ideas are, ask any Arab or
Muslim if the U.S. somehow tipped the balance of power in the Middle East to favor
Israel at the expense of Arab well-being, and you'll get a resounding "Yes" that this is
exactly the case, and that idea is Qutbism. Ask any Arab or Muslim if they think
American fads and fashions in music and dress are corrupting the morals of Muslim
youth, and you'll also get a "Yes" and that idea is Qutbism.

America is not only seen as decadent according to Qutbism, but as a pagan state.
American religious denominations are regarded as nothing more than providing
entertainment ceremonies. According to most mainstream Muslims, America is not a
religious society that takes God seriously. Americans commercialize religion and
worship material things like prosperity instead of God. Perhaps worst of all, America
has no sense of justice. A popular Muslim story goes like this: a couple once approached
Mohammed to ask for forgiveness in the eyes of Allah. Mohammed asked them
"forgiveness for what," and the couple said adultery. Mohammed asked if they were
drunk at the time, and the couple said no. So, Mohammed order them stoned to death.
The moral of the story is that Mohammed at least inquired about drunkenness as a
possible excuse for the crime, but even though the couple were surprised by the stoning,
they went to their death knowing that they carried no sins with them as they met
Allah.

Qutb is also famous for being an outspoken critic of secular Islamic governments
(empty shells with an Islamic flag, he called them). Arrested for treason in 1954, Qutb
was tortured and imprisoned for the rest of his life until executed by Egyptian President
Nasser in the Sixties. He felt that most Muslim societies including Egypt were lost in an
Age of Ignorance, and the solution was for the faithful to emigrate away from this
ignorance and form a new Islamic society. He also predicted a great battle would ensue
between the Muslim nations. Qutb did not go so far as to declare his fellow Egyptians
apostates (a word describing those who have denounced their faith), but he did call them
sinners. It can be seen, then, how important and pivotal a figure he was in getting
Muslims to call other Muslims the equivalent of infidels (apostates). He did this by
creating a whole new revolutionary ideology of takfir (excommunication).

Qutbism is the primary ideology of Dr. Ayman Zawahiri, Bin Laden's "number
two", and widely regarded as the mastermind behind the September 11, 2001 attacks on
the United States, and the connections are quite complicated. While in Egypt before
meeting Bin Laden, Dr. Zawahiri founded the At-Takfir w'al-Hijra movement which
declared that most Muslims are apostates because of their sins. By the late 1970s, Dr.
Zawahiri founded another group called Al-Jihad, also based on Qutbism, which reached
out to Palestinians, such as Abdullah Azzam, who served as Bin Laden's teacher and
mentor. By this time, the ideology had evolved into a conception of all Muslim
governments as illegitimate and needing to be replaced by terrorism to restore the
essential nature of Islam. Qutbism is also the primary ideology of Omar Abdel-
Rahman, leader of an Egyptian terrorist group who assisted Bin Laden in Afghanistan.

Abdullah Azzam, had originally been a member of the Palestine Liberation

Organization, but became disillusioned with its secularism. Azzam studied law and the
ideas of Sayyid Qutb to become a teacher in Saudi Arabia. There, one of his students
was Osama Bin Laden, and this teacher and student both came up with the idea to move
to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Dr. Zawahiri joined them a bit later, and al-Qaeda
was born. They rallied troops and supplies, using Bin Laden's money and ironically
enough, CIA support, and defeated the Soviets, with Azzam dying in battle during 1989.
Then, al-Qaeda set up shop in Sudan, but were expelled from there, so they set up
training camps back in Afghanistan for exporting terrorism. The ideology at this time
was that the "forces of ignorance" against Islam had to be fought militarily anywhere in
the world. Jihad in the al-Qaeda conception is that all jihad is military, and all Islam is
jihad. Anyone considered an apostate would be put to death by al-Qaeda. Dr. Zawahiri
became adept at using false passports, masquerading in disguise around the world, and
placed sleeper cells all over Europe and the U.S. The following is a quote by Dr.
Zawahiri in 1997:

al-Qaeda: "A conflict between the Muslim nation and the United States is
unavoidable. Israel is only the American spearhead in the war against Islam.
The forthcoming terrorist Jihad will not be limited to strikes against Israel.
With Allah's help, we know the United States well, and we also know its
weaknesses. The most vulnerable spot of the United States is to send them
the bodies of their sons. Therefore, we should throw in their faces the flesh of
their sons, minced and grilled. The United States must pay the price, and it
must pay dearly." (Ayman al-Zawahiri)
Note: The al-Qaeda organization is "base" for a number of Sunni extremist groups who
are the direct beneficiaries of Osama Bin Laden's resources and leadership. The most
well-known member groups of al-Qaeda are: the al-Zarqawi network and Ansar al-Islam
movement in Iraq (the link between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda); the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group, Jemaah Islamiyad in Asia, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
al-Zarqawi network (aka al-Tawhid): With bin Laden and his deputy, al-Zawahiri, on the
run, a new group has emerged, which operates separately but in the name of al-Qaeda.
Led by a one-legged Jordanian named Abu Musab Zarqawi (real name Ahmed Fadil
Nazzal al-Khalayleh), the al-Zarqawi network has bombed synagogues throughout
Europe, plotted to use biological weapons in Britain, and beheaded an American in Iraq.
Zarqawi is sometimes called the "second bin Laden," and is committed to the demise of
the West. While fighting in Afghanistan, Zarqawi lost a leg, and was treated for it in
Iraq, where he resumed operations by merging with the Kurdish Islamic terror group,
Ansar al-Islam, in Northern Iraq. He has clearly been an active terrorist second-in-
command.

AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF WAHHABISM

Wahhabism is named for Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), leader of a

movement to bring back the sternness and austerity that once existed in Islam before the
Arab Golden Age. Wahhabism is also the official religion of Saudi Arabia. In the late
18th-century, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab joined forces with those who would
become rulers of Saudi Arabia (especially Muhammad bin Saud), and together they
conquered the Arab peninsula in what historians have called the Wahhabi-Saudi
alliance, wiping out thousands of people because they loosely interpreted the Koran.
This alliance (and the Saudi royal family) attempted to take control of the whole Persian
Gulf, but met with British resistance in 1865. The alliance managed to increase its
territory in 1915, and in 1917 forced the British to pay them five thousand pounds a
month to cease their expansionism. The next significant date was 1932 (when the state
of Saudi Arabia got its name; also called the second Wahhabi conquest), and the Saudis
rounded up 400,000 people and carried out mass executions and amputations
(resurrecting the old lex talionis law of "an eye for an eye"). The regime invented
petrodollars during the 1960s with newfound wealth from oil, and by this time,
Wahhabism became associated with Salafism, making it appear less like a warrior
ideology and more like mainstream Islam. Theologically, Wahhabism is similar to
Hanbalism (based on the ideas of Ibn Hanbal), who argued with the Shiites and the
Khawarij sect about the Sixth Pillar of Islam among other things (Lang 2003).
Wahhabism has been the inspiration for Islamic reform movements around the world,
from Indonesia to Africa, and, of course, with the Taliban of Afghanistan. Some 80% of
mosques that exist in the United States are funded by Saudi money, but most American
Muslims practice a more peaceable and tolerant version of Sunni Islam that, in most
cases, is opposed to militant Wahhabism.

Wahhabists do not like being called by that name, as they prefer to think of
themselves as a Sunni or Salifi sect and be called "servers of the divine unity" or
unitarians. The Wahhabi-Saudi movement is a simplified and conservative form of
Sunni Islam that aims to cut down on luxurious living habits. Accordingly, Wahhabi-
oriented mosques are simple and without minarets. Adherents dress plainly and do not
smoke tobacco or use drugs. Television and photography are also looked down upon as
artificial two-dimensional representations of human beings (Algar 2002). It should be
noted that the so-called "Wahhabi lobby" is quite powerful and wealthy. Wahhabi
activists in Washington D.C. pose as workers for lobby groups such as the American
Muslim Council and American Muslim Foundation and contribute thousands of dollars
every year to the campaigns of American politicians in hopes of getting American
counterterrorism laws, like the Patriot Act, reversed. As examples of this powerful
influence, the Bush administration regularly orders the redaction (classification) of
intelligence reports linking Saudi wealth to the financing of terror, and the FBI has
faced numerous setbacks in the war on terror because the Wahhabi lobby persuaded
Congress to force FBI agents through sensitivity training (read news story).

Wahhabism is an extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism that is undeniably violent,

intolerant, and fanatical beyond measure. The Wahhabi mindset does not allow for any
conception of jihad other than "death to infidels" (they particularly dislike the United
States and regularly call it the "Great Satan") and Wahhabism doesn't conform to any
conception of fatwa that allows debate or argument. All who do not accept the Wahhabi
way must suffer the consequences. For example, strict punishment is prescribed for
those who listen to music other than the drum, or don't pay attention to the precise
details of their facial hair. The death sentence is given out for drinking or sexual
transgressions. Their goal is to take over the Muslim world and be the only voice of
Islam. They have many schools and organizations for teaching the Wahhabi way, such
as the Muslim Student Association, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the
Islamic Assembly of North America, some of which have been investigated by the FBI
for suspicion of terrorist financing (read news story), and they seem to support crimes
other than terror. The following excerpt is from a typical fatwa issued by a untypically
radical Wahhabi cleric, which gives you some idea of the level of fanaticism:

Wahhabism: "People should know that Jews are backed by

Christians, and the battle that we are in is not with Jews only, but also
with those who believe that Jesus is the son of Allah. I am against
America until this life ends, until the Day of Judgment. I am against
America even if the stone liquefies. My hatred of America is so strong,
if part of it was contained in the universe, it would collapse. She is the
root of all evil and wickedness on earth. Who else implanted the tyrants
in our land, and who else nurtured oppression? Make no allies, and
show no mercy or compassion toward them. Their women are yours to
take, legitimately. God made them yours. Why don't you enslave their
women? Why don't you wage jihad? Why don't you pillage them?"
(Shaikh Saad Al-Buraik, April 2002)
 The worst sin in Islam, according to Wahhabism, is "shirk" and the meaning is
exactly as it is in English - when one avoids doing their duty, work, responsibility, or
fighting. Shirk is conceived of as similar to associating partners with Allah, or
polytheism. Wahhabism maintains that there are three kinds of shirk: (1) major shirk,
which relates to aspects of worship, intention, obedience and fidelity; (2) minor shirk,
which relates to the act of showing off, even in a minor way; and (3) hidden shirk, in
which a believer might fall into inadvertently. Penalties for the third kind, which could
happen to you even without your knowing it, in your dreams, for example, including
killing you and everyone around you. That's a rather extreme way of enforcing
discipline, and it's more than the political purpose of making an example out of
someone; it's justified by religious underpinnings.

WHAT DO ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS NEED OR WANT?

The Muslim world or religious universe is in serious need of self-restraint and internal
reform. The voices of moderate Muslims, who wish to live modern lives, unencumbered
by burqas, fatwas, and jihad, need to be heard, but they are on the defensive.
Moderates cannot compete with the roar of militant Islam's determination, money, and
violence. As a result, Islamic extremism, with its hatred of the West and goal of world
domination will probably continue to appear to many as the only kind of Islam. Islamic
extremism justifies terrorism, in the form of extermination of civilians (infidels) and
suicide bombing (in pursuit of martyrdom). Such extremists drape their language in the
context of enemies - enemies of God or enemies of Islam - and have no problem
recruiting large numbers of mujahideen (holy warriors).

The Muslim world of popular thought is

in need of a sense of humor, or at least some
type of cultural sarcasm. Intellectual
appeals won't do; it probably has to be at
some other level. To be sure, there are TV
shows, movies, and music in America that
seem so real, it's hard to tell the difference
between reality and fantasy. In America,
sometimes you hear of an American child
imitating violence in movies, or a child who
takes devil worship themes in rock and roll
seriously. But, imagine 98% of a population
who sees and hears these kind of "hidden
meanings" everywhere, and you've got a
good description of Muslim popular
thought. Conspiracy theories abound. In the
West, we think of them as bad jokes, silly
urban legends, or the kinds of things only an
idiot would believe. In the Muslim world,
people are deadly serious about conspiracy
theories, and everything from litter on the
streets to dogs that roam the West Bank are
all part of a Jewish plot to humiliate
Palestinians (Davis 2003). Muslims
seriously believe President Bush started a
war to avenge the assassination plot against
his father, and after 9/11, Muslims seriously
denied any Arabs were involved, and that
the attacks were part of a joint CIA and
Israeli plot, and photos were doctored by
Hollywood special effects technicians. Try
as you will, there's no way to convince
Muslims that their beloved conspiracies are
something otherwise. The Pew Global
Attitudes Project (at right) shows the level
of mistrust.

Speaking of humor, one of the best weapons of counterterrorism is ridicule since

terrorists fear that more than death. They fear losing at psychological warfare, at
having their leaders appear as bumbling idiots. Even dictators cannot survive a climate
of free speech characterized by satire and ridicule. One of the first things Fidel Castro
did, for example, after taking power was to put up signs saying "No
counterrevolutionary jokes here." In the Muslim world, pride, honor and shame are
profoundly important, so ridicule as a weapon might have some effect, although
backlash can be expected. Mike Waller's Fourth World Blog has long advocated the
weapon of ridicule.

So, what do the extremists want? If it were possible to list the "demands" of Muslim
extremists, and from a hostage negotiation point of view, it should always be possible to
list some rational demands, then this would be the list:

• A complete pull-out of all American and Western (infidel) soldiers from the
sacred territories of Islam (this would mean most of the Middle East, not just
Saudi Arabia)
• An end to any and all American and Western support for Israel (so that Israel
can wither away and die; or better yet, just disappear off the face of the earth)
• A change in the way international political and economic organizations, like the
U.N., treat the Muslim world (instead of tying financial aid to socio-political
reform, just send money with no strings attached)
• A pan-Islamic super-state consisting of many nations and territories (large
enough to encompass all of the Middle East, parts of Africa, and most of Eurasia)
• A purging of all Western-style influence and a hands-off policy by the rest of the
world (to be accompanied by a mutual respect for cultural differences in regard
to freedom, rights, democracy, education, medicine, social services, clothing, and
thought)
 Among the list of things
that most of the Western
world finds unacceptable is
the implied superiority and
effectiveness of Islamic
justice. It is difficult to
overstate how harsh and
backward most
conceptions of Islamic
justice look in practice.
Death is pretty much
proscribed as a penalty for
all sorts of offenses,
including "thought
crimes," manner of dress,
and careless speech;
definitely not things
associated with progressive
regimes, but certainly
"effective" in the extreme
sense of a totalitarian-style
deterrence.

Islamic conceptions of just war are likely to be unfamiliar to most Westerners.

Khadduri (1984) provides a neat little description of the Islamic approach as follows:

Islamic Conceptions of Just (Jihad) and Unjust War

1. Just wars are wars in the defense of 1. Unjust wars are motivated by the Ruler's
cities against foreign attacks personal advantage such as lust for power,
2. Just wars assert valid claims against a honor, or glory
foreign people who fail to honor a city's 2. Unjust wars are wars of conquest waged by
(or community of believers) rights the Ruler for the subordination of peoples other
3. Just wars are against foreign people than the people of the city (or community) over
who refuse to accept a public order which he presides
considered to be the best and most 3. Unjust wars seek retribution, the object of
suitable for them which can be achieved by means other than
4. Just wars are against a foreign people force
whose place in the world is considered to 4. Unjust wars lead to the killing of innocent
be that of servitude as the best and most men for no reason other than the Ruler's
suitable for them propensity or pleasure for killing

It is also true that in jurisprudence, Islam makes no distinction between civil society
and the state, that the individual is considered a limb of the collectivity, that Muslims
have duties vis-a-vis the community (umma), and that no individual rights exist in the
sense of entitlements. Many scholars have criticized Islam in terms of over-emphasizing
duties, not rights, which takes the form of a certain anti-individualism which runs
contrary to the idea of human rights.
INTERNET RESOURCES
A Field Guide to Islamic Activists
About.com Guide to Islamic Extremist Groups
Al Qaeda Training Manual
Answers to 7 Questions about Islam for Non-Muslims
Ariel Center for Policy Research
Bat Yeor's Website on Dhimmitude
BBC Article on the Roots of Jihad
BBC Special on Islam and the West
Dr. Godlas' Islamic Studies Website
Elijah Muhammad and the Black Muslims
Islam's Medieval Outposts: What's Taught in Muslim Madrasas
Muslim Public Affairs Council Review of Counterterrorism Policy (pdf)
Muslim Women's League
Muslims Against Extremism and Fundamentalism
PBS Special on Muhammad, Violence, and Jihad
Ridicule as a Weapon of War
Ridiculing Terrorists as a Weapon of War
The Arab Gateway: News of the Arab World
The Counterrevolution in Military Affairs as Fashionable Thinking
The Doctrine of Heaven (Paradise) Behind the Veil of Islam
The Roots of Anti-Americanism in the Arab World
The Saudi-Al Qaeda Connection
The Wahhabi Movement: History and Beliefs
The Wahhabi Myth: Is Osami bin Laden a Salifi or Wahabi?
Virgins? What Virgins?
Who Was Sayed Qutb?
Wikipedia: The War on Terrorism as a War on Islam
Wikipedia: Wahhabism and Islamist Movements

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Last updated: 06/05/06

Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 CYBERCRIME: THE INTERNET AS CRIME SCENE
"We need privacy from technology, but we need technology to obtain privacy"
- Lecture on Privacy and Cyberspace Law

Computers are the hottest crime tool today. People that know how to use them can
unlock doors few of us even know exist. By its very nature, the Internet is analogous to
the Wild West (Biegel 2003) where the law is mostly unwritten and power falls into the
hands of those with the best technology. Traditional concepts of privacy are now being
transformed before out eyes, and if you haven't already, I strongly suggest you read the
above highlighted lecture on Privacy and Cyberspace Law. You won't understand
cybercrime without understanding cyberspace law, and maybe privacy law behind that.
Cybercrime has many definitions (see Wall 2001 for a typical, academic essay over
definitional issues), but most experts believe it is the wave of the future, and it's here to
stay, not just a passing fad. With over one trillion dollars moved electronically every
week, the Internet is where the money is. The rates of cybercrime are skyrocketing.
The annual "take" by theft-oriented cybercriminals is estimated as high as $100 billion,
and 97% of offenses go undetected (Bennett & Hess 2001). Then, there are those who
just abuse the Internet and computer systems -- hackers or hooligans, whatever you
want to call them -- but cybercriminals nonetheless (at least in 48 states). Their
shenanigans are often detected, resulting in an average cost of $104,000 per incident in
damage, labor, and lost productivity (Brown et al. 2001). In addition, there's corporate
espionage (pdf), which some experts say is the real problem, with annual losses of
proprietary information in the $60 million range. Toss in organized crime, terrorism,
infowar, embezzlement, extortion, and a variety of other ways to offend or harm with
computers, and it's anybody's guess what the real cost is.

In this lecture, I'm going to try classifying all the possible methods of evil-doing with
computers. As a criminologist, I realize I'm on dangerous ground. Theory is weak, and
there are only many typologies. I also don't want to add to any legislative frenzy
because there are things here that are criminally wrong, deliberately wrong,
accidentally wrong, wrong for all the right reasons, and just plain annoying. Legal
systems everywhere are busy studying ways of passing new laws dealing with Internet
misbehavior, so the arena has become a sort of "test-bed" or "mini-society" where all
sorts of symbolic interactions and moral panics play out. My interest is less with the
criminals and more with the Internet, or what I call cyberspace (explained in a
moment), so I'm not all that concerned about whether mobsters, for example, keep
records of their finances on computers. I am concerned about this ethereal realm called
CYBERSPACE because I find it personally intriguing and full of potential. Barney
(2000) also finds it full of hope for democracy.

While I'm at it, I might as well chime in about "Internet Addiction" (sometimes called
being an "onlineaholic" or having the non-insurable diagnosis of "Internet addiction
disorder"). In a world of news feeds, instant messaging, emails, and games, it sometimes
seems like Blackberry devices might be called "Crackberry" devices because of their
addictive potential (like cell phones). I personally feel that Internet addiction can indeed
be a disorder as destructive as any obsessive disorder, although I would be hard-pressed
to describe the forensic or clinical outlines of this. Specialists estimate that 6 percent to
10 percent of Internet users develop a dependency, at least according to some experts
(e.g., Dr. Hilarie Cash, head of Seattle-based Internet/Computer Addiction Services; Dr.
Kimberly S. Young, head of the Center for Online Addiction in Bradford, Pa.; & Dr.
Maressa Hecht Orzack, the director of the Computer Addiction Study Center at
McLean Hospital in Belmont, Mass., and an assistant professor at Harvard Medical
School; but in contrast, Sara Kiesler, professor of computer science and human-
computer interaction at Carnegie Mellon University calls it a "fad illness"). However, I
think the following can be modestly stated -- Internet addiction exacts a toll on health
and family life; it aggravates pre-existing disorders; it can lead to further addictions
such as gambling or pornography; and it can lead to cybercrime. The "hook" involves
the ever-present hope of escape that the Internet offers to people who are longing for
something.

THE DEFINITION OF CYBER

First of all, anytime you use the prefix cyber-, you're talking about something
somebody is doing online. In other words, there has to be a modem or networking
involved somehow. Motion is always involved. Anything related to the Internet falls
under the cyber category when online. Besides being a prefix, it's also a verb, not a
noun. So plugging in some 3D game and donning your goggles to go "cyber" doesn't
count. There's always action, motivation, movement, and interaction when you cyber.
It's impossible to just be cyber. There's no steady state of being cyber. To cyber means
that you are constantly exchanging information, lots of information, and you are
constantly using technology to the max. You are doing both at the same time --
exchange of information technology is to cyber. It's an activity unique to the
Information or Knowledge Age we are entering, and by its very nature, it involves
sharing or giving away things.

Cyber activity is very different from the use of computers for traditional activities
where the purpose is to "stash" or "store" something and keep it from prying eyes.
Many criminologists don't grasp this distinction, and would argue that theft is theft
regardless of the medium used. However, I would argue that cyber theft is substantially
different, and cyberterrorism is substantially different from terrorism. Cybercrime is
also substantially different from computer crime. It's like the difference between people
who use computers for all they can be versus people who use computers as a tool like a
typewriter. In each case, the motivation might be the same, but the action or movement
is different. One could even argue that the motivation is different. Our criminal law
simply hasn't got enough concepts to grasp the element of mens rea when it comes to
cybercrime. For example, there are different kinds of glee, elation, and glory involved in
cyberspace that don't exist in the real world. There is an excess of information, not a
deficit or "coverup" of information. Nor are the concepts of white-collar crime of any
use, because you're dealing with something more revolutionary than just trying to make
money -- you're dealing with cyberspace and technoculture, two concepts that are
essential to any definition of cyber.

THE NATURE OF CYBERSPACE

Cyberspace is a bioelectronic ecosystem that exists anywhere there are phones, coaxial
cables, fiber optic lines, or electomagnetic waves (Dyson 1994). Nobody's really sure how
big the Internet is (see CAIDA's map of Internet) for a map), but 135 countries have
access, 54 world cities are the major hosts, and 72 million people logon every day. You
should get the idea that cyberspace is pretty big, in fact, bigger than anything that's ever
happened before in human history, and it's constantly growing, tripling in size every
year. There are 13 main servers -- known as "root" servers -- which control all traffic
on the Internet, and they are controlled by the U.S. Government (specifically the U.S.
Commerce Department). Notice I didn't say "owned" by the government. Those 13
computers are in private hands, but they contain government-approved, master lists of
the 260 or so Internet suffixes, such as ".com" and ".org." The master lists serve as the
Internet’s master directories and tell Web browsers and e-mail programs how to direct
traffic. Internet users around the world interact with them every day, likely without
knowing it. If the U.S. government wanted to, it could render a policy decision that in
one stroke could make all Web sites ending in a specific suffix essentially unreachable.
The history is that in 1998, the Commerce Department selected a private organization
with international board members (ICANN, or Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers) to decide what goes on those lists. Commerce kept veto power,
and indicated it would let go of control eventually, and maybe turn control over to an
international organization like the U.N. International Telecommunication Union, but in
2005, the U.S. reversed itself and said it would never cede control of the 13 main
servers. The U.S. Commerce department does, however, endorse having foreign
governments manage their own country-code suffixes, such as “.fr” for France.

Countries with the Most Hosts: Fastest Internet Growing Countries:

1. USA 6. Italy 1. China 6. Argentina
2. Japan 7. Netherlands 2. Brazil 7. Taiwan
3. Canada 8. Taiwan 3. Iceland 8. Hong Kong
4. Germany 9. Australia 4. Romania 9. Canada
5. UK 10. France 5. Poland 10. Portugal

Although humans created cyberspace, and are continually expanding it, the real
inhabitants are data, information, ideas, and knowledge. This is what is meant by the
Information or Knowledge Age. The real estate, or property, is intellectual and public.
No one "owns" it, or operates it with any central authority. Politically, it makes
governments obsolete. Economically, it can be replicated at zero cost, and unlike an
industrial economy where you can only consume so many widgets, the average person in
an information economy taps into all the world's knowledge and consumes information
as fast as they can. Humans can only benefit from this new medium if they exercise
their freedom.

Technoculture is best explained by reference to the CYBERPUNK movement that

began in the mid-80s. Hackers, crackers, and phreaks made up the cyberpunk
movement. Hackers could make magical things happen with computers, crackers would
break into computer systems simply for the pleasure of it, and phreaks would do similar
things with telephone systems. Other groups that joined the movement later were
cypherpunks, who popularized cryptography to get over on "the System", and ravers,
who used computer music, art, and designer drugs at massive all-night dance parties
and love-fests in empty warehouses. Literature that glorifies cyberspace and the people
on it is called cyberpunk literature. Here's a link to an online Dictionary of Cyberpunk
Slang.

THE CHALLENGES OF CYBERLAW

 A computer hooked up to the Internet is a publishing company, telephone, television,
library, megaphone, and more all rolled into one. This means that any administration of
justice for suspected evil-doing with computers is covered by the First Amendment
(freedom of speech) as much as the Fourth Amendment (freedom from search and
seizure). The traditional approach in this legal area involves thinking in terms of
certain protected zones or spheres of privacy. No one's really sure where Internet
freedom is protected in the Constitution. Cyberspace isn't really a zone or sphere.
Nobody really owns it, nobody considers it "home", reasonable people shouldn't expect
privacy from it, but not too many people want the government or anybody else sniffing,
snooping, or regulating every part of this special place. Those are the First Amendment
issues. The Fourth Amendment issues, such as those contained in the Personal Privacy
Act (PPA) and Title III of the Electronics Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), involve
people, not places, but the distinction between wiretapping unread mail (which law
enforcement can freely do) and wiretapping previously read mail (which requires
consent via Acceptable Use Policies) is less than perfect. When computer forensics
specialists seize and search a hard drive for all its contents, the only Fourth Amendment
issues they're concerned about are privileged relationships, work product, documentary
materials, and/or whether or not the data was intended for publication or
dissemination. It seems like we are not only criminalizing a special place, but the
person-based activity of having too much fun with computers.

The other challenging legal question is when does Internet activity involve actus
reus. In cyberspace, as in virtual reality, it's the impression that what one is
experiencing is real. It doesn't require tactile sensation to be virtually raped in a chat
room, but the consequences or trauma can be just as real. People can get married in
cyberspace, obtain college degrees, and do other things that have real consequences.
Plagiarism and copyright infringement is rampant on the web, and companies regularly
install cookies and engage in data mining. A lot of Internet content is inappropriate for
children. Just how many crimes are possible to commit in cyberspace is difficult to
determine, and to prove some harmful action took place. Computer impressions,
symbols, and persona do not make for anything more than conspiracy and inchoate
offense charges. When AI (Artificial Intelligence) systems come online, it will prove
difficult who had the thought first -- the person or the machine.

Then, there's the whole problem of jurisdiction. Where exactly does cyberspace
begin and end? In general, a government's jurisdiction extends to those individuals who
reside within its borders or to transactions or events which occur within those borders.
The Internet, like space, doesn't have any borders. A few states have been daring,
claiming that the flow of commerce, or financial stream, across their Internet nodes
gives them jurisdiction. However, it's unlikely that any state authority would issue a
warrant for an overseas offender who has less than minimal physical contact with U.S.
soil. The minimal contact requirement usually governs transborder technology-related
commerce (International Shoe Co. v. Washington 1945). International law enforcement
compacts also require dual criminality, which means that investigative cooperation only
exists if the offense has similar meaning in both nations. Sometimes, it's better to
prosecute overseas, sometimes locally, sometimes federally, and this leads to a lot of
disparities and inequities in the justice system.

What and when to seize are also baffling issues. Reactive response to hard drives
have become a pattern in law enforcement because they conveniently record voyages in
cyberspace. However, it might be easier, and more proactive, to monitor bulletin
boards, websites, posts, emails, finger and Usenet. The computer's role should
determine if the machine itself is to be seized or simply searched onsite. If the computer
was used to commit a crime, the entire system should be seized. If the computer was
used to store information about a crime, the hard drive, printer, and printout should be
seized. Other situations might call for a quick copy of the hard drive and all floppies.
The independent component doctrine requires that probable cause elements be present
before any peripheral devices are seized. Getting ISPs to turn over their log files in a
timely fashion, and getting upstream carriers to cooperate, are additional problems.

It must be remembered that this is an area, along with drugs, that helped develop the
practice of no-knock warrants. Judges apparently felt that hackers could install time-
delay devices or hot keys to permit quick disposal of evidence. A time-delay device
destroys evidence if the keyboard is not accessed for awhile, and a hot key program
erases data when a certain keystroke combination is depressed. Courts have also dealt
with the time element for when a computer search warrant keeps from going stale,
which is 3-6 months, the latter being the time when an unread message becomes a stored
message, for legal purposes (Becker 2000).

Cyberspace law is a patchwork of loosely-articulated protections, liberally punctuated

with loopholes and exceptions. Consider, for example, that there is privacy protection
for bank records but not for medical records; protection for videotape rentals, but not
magazine subscriptions; credit record protection, but not insurance records. New
business practices and new technological developments often make good laws quickly
obsolete. It's no wonder that cyberspace is the perfect breeding ground for crime
because cyberlaw is such a mess. 48 states have some version of a Computer Fraud and
Misuse Act (Title 18, Section 1030 of the Federal Criminal Code). This act was passed
into law by Congress in 1986, and has been amended at least five times to touch up the
language. There's also the Economic Espionage Act (Title 18, Section Chapter 90).
Most cybercrime is prosecuted at the federal level under either of these two acts. Let's
take a look at these two laws.

Computer Fraud and Misuse Act (last amended 1999): "Whoever knowingly
accesses a computer without permission...to obtain information...defined as
harmful to national defense, foreign relations..., or injury to the United States,
intentionally accesses the financial record of a financial institution, any computer
of any department or agency of the U.S., any protected computer involved in
interstate or foreign communication, any nonpublic computer that conducts
affairs for the government...with intent to defraud, extort, or cause
damage...shall be punished by fine and imprisonment for five to twenty years."
Economic Espionage Act of 1996: "Whoever intentionally or knowingly steals,
copies, receives, or conspires to benefit any foreign instrumentality by converting
any trade secret related to interstate or foreign commerce shall be subject to
criminal and civil forfeiture of all property used or derived from the offense as
well a fine from $500,000 to $5,000,000 and imprisonment from ten to fifteen
years."

State laws tend to be written as theft or fraud statutes, the evils being stealing and
undermining confidence. You might want to review the common law elements of theft,
fraud, and consumer fraud if you're unfamiliar with these offenses. CardCops, a
company that tracks and stings fraudulent (stolen) credit card use over the Internet,
estimates online fraud at ten times the rate of real world fraud. EscrowFraud.com
estimates that 99% of web sites a seller of something on the Internet tries to "steer" you
toward is "fake." Virtual returns of merchandise are almost as costly as virtual
purchases, and so-called carders regularly post sniffed credit card numbers in chat
rooms and on web sites. In the long run, it's the perception of dangerousness that hurts
e-commerce, but in the short run, it's the speed of offenders and the slowness of law
enforcement that is of concern. The typical state-level cybercrime statute is long, often
longer than federal code, and the wording is extremely general, but a short example
might be as follows:

Typical State Cybercrime Statute (circa 2000): "A person commits computer theft
or fraud when they knowingly and without authorization access or cause to be
accessed any computer or network for obtaining goods, services or information
with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession or use."

THE VARIETIES AND TYPES OF CYBERCRIME

Not everything computer-related is cybercrime, and not everything computer-related

is computer crime. A person using a stolen telephone code to make free calls, even
though the number is processed by a computer, is engaging in toll fraud, not computer
crime. A person who embezzles $200 from the ATM of a company they work for still
commits embezzlement, not cybercrime. The use of computers as incidental to another
offense is not cybercrime. There are plenty of laws on the books already to classify many
types of cybercrime. One way to do this involves thinking along the lines of asset
forfeiture, or whether computers make up the fruits or instrumentalities of crime. This
is a classification of cybercrime with the computer as target and computer as tool.

Computer as Target: This kind of activity is the wrongful taking of information or the
causing of damage to information. Targeting a computer just to obtain unauthorized
access is the hallmark of hacking, and the most serious criminal offense here is theft of
information, followed by maliciousness, mischief, and wayward adventuring.
Bypassing a password protected website to avoid payment would be theft of services,
and foreign intelligence break-ins would be espionage. These are all familiar types of
crimes, but hacking is typically done in furtherance of a larger scheme since the hacker
wants to exploit all computational and encryption capabilities of a hacked system in
order to weave through related computer systems. The activity can range from large-
scale disruption to elegant hacking. DNS rerouting and denial of service attacks are the
most disruptive. Subtle changes to a web page are elegant. Hackers also generally
collect password lists, credit card info, proprietary corporate info, and warez (pirated
commercial software). A list of specific offenses in this category might include:

• Arson (targeting a computer center for damage by fire)

• Extortion (threatening to damage a computer to obtain money)
• Burglary (break-ins to steal computer parts)
• Conspiracy (people agreeing to commit an illegal act on computer)
• Espionage/Sabotage (stealing secrets or destroying competitors records)
• Forgery (issuing false documents or information via computer)
 • Larceny/Theft (theft of computer parts)
• Malicious destruction of property (destroying computer hardware or software)
• Murder (tampering with computerized life-sustaining equipment)
• Receiving stolen property (accepting known stolen good or services via computer)

Computer as Tool: This kind of activity involves modification of a traditional crime by

using the Internet in some way. The traditional analogue here is fraud. It can something
as simple as the online illegal sale of prescription drugs or something as sophisticated as
cyberstalking. Pedophiles also use the Internet to exchange child pornography, pose
as a child, and lure victims into real life kidnappings. Laws governing fraud apply with
equal force regardless if the activity is online or offline, but a few special regulations
apply at the federal level:

• Internet fraud (false advertising, credit card fraud, wire fraud, money
laundering)
• Online child pornography; child luring (sexual exploitation; transportation for
sexual activity)
• Internet sale of prescription drugs & controlled substances (smuggling; drug
control laws)
• Internet sale of firearms (firearms control laws)
• Internet gambling (interstate wagering laws; lottery laws; illegal gambling
businesses)
• Internet sale of alcohol (liquor trafficking)
• Online securities fraud (securities act violations)
• Software piracy & Intellectual Property theft (copyright infringement; trade
secrets)
• Counterfeiting (use of computer to make duplicates or phonies)

INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

Another way of classifying cybercrime is to use a location-based approach that

distinguishes between insiders and outsiders. This is the approach the FBI uses (see
Director Freeh's testimony 2000), which is also based on an evaluation of societal costs
and the capabilities of law enforcement. It is also the approach one is most likely to
encounter in the published, scholarly literature (e.g. Nykodym, Taylor & Vilela 2005).
Such efforts are merely categorizations and are merely descriptive, but the geographic
profiling of hackers has been a law enforcement pastime for quite some time (Taylor
1991), as has criminal profiling in general (Nykodym et al. 2005). Opinions differ over
the most effective form of the profiling process, but it's somewhat true that the rest of
the country usually follows the lead of the FBI on such matters. If one were to visit the
now-defunct National Infrastructure Protection Center (now part of the DHS), one
could have seen how the problems of joint efforts reflect a changing set of priorities and
emphases, but one could also easily see how about half the tips relate to insiders (using e-
mail safely within your organization) and half to outsiders (cyberprotests by foreign
nationals).

Insider Threats: The disgruntled insider is the principle source of computer crime. As
much as 75% of computer crimes are done by employees. This makes cybercrime
against business the number one type of cybercrime, and it's growing, with the
estimated loss to business running about $500 million per year, in the form of crimes like
theft of proprietary information, theft of customer databases, and theft of product
databases. Their average age of an insider offender is 29, and they generally hold
managerial or professional positions (USDOJ CCIPS data of 2003 puts the age profile
like this -- 34% are between 20-29, 36% between 30-35, and 27% over 35). Older
offenders generally do more damage. The FBI regards disgruntled employees as
motivated by a perception of unfair treatment by management or snubs by co-workers.
Another fraction of incidents are caused by blunders, errors, or omissions. The FBI
regards the insiders here as incompetent, inquisitive, or unintentional. The difference
appears to be in the intent to disrupt. Crimes involving the computer only incidentally
are treated as traditional crimes -- theft, for example, if an employee tampers with the
payroll system (called "data-diddling"). However, even the FBI is continually
surprised, when under the plain view doctrine, they investigate an insider threat and
find examples of child pornography, organized crime connections, and even
recreational hacking. Employees often waste a lot of company time using their
network access to surf, shop, or engage in other instances of lost productivity. It
makes sense to profile the typical computer abuser. Every organization has them, and
here are some of the signs:

• missing computer supplies when the employee is around

• missing software when the employee is around
• numerous logon sessions, some attempts under different name
• sloppy password management
• unusual interest in computer system printout
• mixes personal equipment with company equipment

Insider profiling (Nykodym et al. 2005) aims to help organizations understand the
types of people that are likely to commit net abuse and/or cybercrime. Some common
characteristics of such people include: not showing fear from having managers around;
inclination to break the rules; and perhaps a keen sports fan (in the case of net abuse by
online gambling at work). Such persons are usually fairly secretive, hard to
communicate with, and quiet at work. Workplace cybercrime committed by managers
at work tends to adhere to the same profile, yet the amount of money "take" at work is
higher. Mid-or low-level employees, who commit the majority of cybercrimes at work,
tend to have more restricted access and subsequently a lower "take." However,
alliances between a manager and employee at work can be a difficult case to investigate
(detect and stop) because they are working on different levels of a hierarchy and have
more ways to hide the crime.

Insider cybercrime is generally divided into four (4) main categories (Nykodym et al.
2005): (1) espionage; (2) theft; (3) sabotage; and (4) personal abuse of the organizational
network. The espionage-oriented offender is similar to the outsider cybercriminal
(discussed below), and generally is after confidential or sensitive information, and
usually is part of the management team, sometimes the higher management (very
senior) team. Depending upon the race structure of the organization, the cybercriminal
would be white or black, but they are usually secretive individuals who do not want to
look different, and always try to blend in among others. Theft-oriented cybercriminals
are motivated by their own gain (despite what they might say about hate or revenge)
with their only goal the selling or using of valuable information for money. Such
criminals are usually very comfortable with their position in the organization, and they
tend to be young (either male or female) and still, relatively low in the organization's
hierarchy. The sabotage-oriented cybercriminal is like the espionage-oriented type (in
being influenced by a competitor), but sabateurs are not necessarily employed by the
organization, but consist usually of subcontractors, part-timers, and the like, who also
usually have one things in common -- they have personal motives, like revenge for some
mistreatment they perceive, like a layoff or missed promotional opportunity. Age, race,
and sex variation is quite diverse with this type.

Outsider Threats: Hackers are the most common group in this category. Their typical
age is between 14 and 19, and they are generally part of the cyberpunk subculture.
Hacking for illicit financial gain has been increasing, and less-skilled "script kiddies"
(using point-and-click software instead of programming) are increasing in
number. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks are also increasing, which plant a tool
such as Trinoo, Tribal Flood Net (TFN), TFN2K, or Stacheldraht (German for barbed
wire) on a number of unwitting victim systems. Then when the hacker sends the
command, the victim systems in turn begin sending messages against the real target
system. 2001 was also the Year of the Virus, and several large-scale hacks were
accompanied by viruses released in the wild, which led authorities to suspect that
hackers and virus writers were uniting. The FBI uses the following typology to classify
outsider threats:

• industrial espionage - theft of proprietary information or trade secrets

• terrorism - attempts to influence or disrupt U.S. policy
• national intelligence - attempts by foreign governments to steal economic,
political, or military secrets
• infowarfare - cyber attacks by anyone on the nation's infrastructure to disrupt
economic or military operations

Industrial espionage is a very high-stakes game which the U.S. plays along with
everyone else. There is a 1996 Anti-Economic Espionage law that defines "trade secret"
quite broadly, but arrests usually involve sting operations conducted against foreign
nationals attempting to bribe somebody (see Hacking and Industrial Espionage for
updates on the latest arrests). It's the perfect example of an exception to the insider-
outsider typology because sometimes, the crime originates with an employee who is in a
position to sell trade secrets, and other times, the employee is tempted by an outsider.

Terrorists are known to use information technology to formulate plans, raise funds,
spread propaganda, and to communicate securely. For example, Ramzi Yousef,
mastermind of the first World Trade Center attack, stored detailed plans to destroy
United States airliners on encrypted files in his laptop computer. Osami bin Laden was
known to use steganography for his network's communications. A website that was
known as the Muslim Hacker's Club listed tips for things such as hacking the Pentagon.
A hacker known as DoctorNuker has been defacing websites for the last five years with
anti-American, anti-Israeli, and pro-Bin Laden propaganda. Other than by using
computers to communicate and coordinate, few examples exist of cyberterrorism, or
politically motivated attacks on computer systems. In fact, it is advantageous to a
terrorist group to keep the Internet working, as a means of communication and outlet
for propaganda. The main tools of terrorism remain guns and bombs, not computers.
There are a few instances of cyberterrorism, however, such as the 1998 attack on Sri
Lankan servers by the Internet Black Tigers, or the Mexican Zapatista movement of the
same year, which eventually teamed up with protesters of the World Trade
Organization. We have yet to see a significant instance of "cyber terrorism" with
respect to widespread disruption of critical infrastructures. However, the FBI and
many others, are concerned about the growth of something called hactivism, which is a
word that combines hacking and activism. These are politically motivated attacks, but
they may also be a form of electronic civil disobedience. Such attacks are usually
elegant. For example, the Zapatistas target the URLs of companies they think don't
support human rights. The attack is nothing more than adding the phrase
"/human_rights" to the end of the URL. The page returns a display that says "human
rights not found on this server", which is also found in the server logs. They don't
actually flood the server, just enough times to make sure it's noticed in the server logs.

Foreign intelligence services have adapted to using cyber tools as part of their
information gathering and espionage tradecraft. In a case dubbed "the Cuckoo's Egg,"
between 1986 and 1989 a ring of West German hackers penetrated numerous military,
scientific, and industry computers in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan,
stealing passwords, programs, and other information which they sold to the Soviet KGB.
Significantly, this was over a decade ago -- ancient history in Internet years.

Infowarfare usually involves foreign military forces against another foreign military
force. We know that several nations are already developing information warfare
doctrine, programs, and capabilities for use against each other and the United States.
China and Taiwan have been at infowar for years. Foreign nations develop such
programs because they feel they cannot defeat the United States in a head-to-head
military encounter and believe that information technology is our Achilles Heel.

CYBEREXTORTION

Cyberextortion is an outsider threat designed to obtain money, products, or favorable

considerations from an organization or an organization's individual employees using
illegal means of persuasion related to a computer intrusion or threatened computer
intrusion that would make it impossible or difficult for that organization to do business.
The method of attack is most typically a Denial of Service (DoS) although theft of data
or public ridicule (web defacement) are also common. The crime takes advantage of the
tendency for most businesses to NOT want their infrastructure vulnerability made
public. The target is typically a company that is involved heavily in e-commerce, and
there is some tendency for targets to be companies that outsource their help desk
function to places like India and Pakistan. Not much is known about cyberextortionists,
but a research study at Carnegie Mellon promises to shed some light on the subject.

This crime is a good example of a transnational crime. While it can occur within the
boundaries of a single nation (Japanese businesses, for example, tend to be
cyberextorted by Japanese criminals), it is more commonly found in the form of Russian
or Eastern European hackers, hired or coerced by some organized crime group into
finding American and European companies to break into. Banking organizations are a
particular target. The Bank victim is threatened with having all or most of their
customer's PIN numbers placed on the Internet somewhere, and a suprising number of
victims "pay up" rather than report the problem to law enforcement. Cyberextortion,
in its organized crime variety, also represents an interesting division of labor among
criminals since the hackers do specialized, technical work and their "handlers" do
specialized, nontechnical work.

A TYPOLOGY OF HACKERS

At the heart of cybercrime are the hackers. These people are the ones with the skills
to commit the crimes, and an interesting way to look at them is to focus upon the
lifestyles and personalities of hackers. Take it for what it's worth. None of these
personality characteristics have been validated by any empirical tests. The first
typology comes from Maxfield (1985):

• Pioneers -- those who are fascinated by evolving technology and explore it

without knowing exactly what they are going to find
• Scamps -- hackers with a sense of fun who intend no overt harm
• Explorers -- hackers motivated by a delight in breaking into computer systems.
The more geographically distant, or more secure the target it, the greater the
delight
• Game players -- those who enjoy defeating software or system protection, with
hacking seen as a sort of game itself
• Vandals -- those who cause damage for no apparent gain
• Addicts -- nerds who are literally addicted to hacking and computer technology

A second typology (Coutourie 1989) describes the relationship of a hacker to their

computer:

• Playpen -- in which the computer is seen as a toy

• Fairyland -- where cyberspace is an unreal world where wrong cannot be done
• Land of opportunity -- where there's nothing wrong with exploiting a vulnerable
system
• Tool box -- in which the computer is just a way to get other things done
• Cookie jar -- with the computer as a place to go borrow things now and again
• War game -- where hostile feelings are vented against machines rather than
people

There have been no attempts (that I know of) to apply these typologies to real-life case
studies, although allow me to give you some cases, and let you see if you can apply
anything yourselves:

Case Studies of Hackers

In 1972, "Capt. Crunch" aka John Draper, realized that
by blowing the whistle that came in Capt. Crunch cereal
boxes, he could replicate the tones necessary to place free
"Captain Crunch"
long-distance phone calls. He spent some time on
probation and in prison, then went to work for Apple
Computer.
Kevin Mitnick In 1994, Mitnick was the world's most wanted hacker for
breaking into Digital Equipment's computers and stealing
source codes. He served some years in prison, then became
 a book author.
In 1995, Poulsen, a friend of Mitnick's, broke into FBI
Kevin Poulsen computers. He spent some years in prison, and is now a
computer security journalist.
In 2000, this Canadian boy launched denial-of-service
attacks on CNN, Yahoo, and other major websites. He
"Mafiaboy"
ended up under house arrest and was restricted from
using the Internet.
In 2000, this Filipino computer science student unleashed
Onel DeGuzman the "ILOVEYOU" virus on the Net. He went unpunished
because the Philippines had no law covering the crime.

HACKERS AS TERRORISTS

Regardless of whether cyberterrorism will become the future's most prevalent form of
terrorism (a debatable issue in many circles, and dependent mainly upon whether the
field of terrorism studies ever figures out whether the "status" or demographics of the
perpetrator is as equally important as the "nature" of the act), it can be safely said that
hackers, like terrorists, tend to work in asymmetric, non-hierarchical formation, which
means that they do not have organizations like gangs and so forth. The concept of
netwar (Arquilla & Ronfeldt 2001) might or might not be useful at explaining these new
kinds of formations. Although the concept of netwar is at odds with traditional forms of
organization, criminal networks tend to have the following types of members, which can
be compared to the components of a terrorist cell:

Membership Roles/Components of Hacking/Terrorist Networks

Organizers -- core members who steer Leadership -- charismatics who lead
group group
Insulators -- members who protect the Bodyguards -- members who protect
core leaders
Communicators -- pass on directives Seconds in command -- pass on orders
Intelligence -- and counterintelligence
Guardians -- security enforcers
agents
Financiers -- fund raisers & money
Extenders -- recruiters of new members
launderers
Monitors -- advisors about group
Logistics -- keepers of safe hourses
weaknesses
Operations -- those who commit the
Members -- those who do the hacking
terror
Sleepers -- members living under deep
Crossovers -- people with regular jobs
cover

Netwar is the most likely way cyberterrorists would operate. They have an interest in
getting their message and/or demands across, so therefore would use the Internet to
disseminate information or misinformation. A number of terrorist groups already have
websites, and more can be expected. Hackers also seem to be evolving more in the
direction of hactivism. It is unlikely that terrorists will ever give up their traditional
weapons. The most likely scenario is a traditional attack that is simultaneously
accompanied by a PsyOp-like netwar. The definition of netwar is as follows:

NETWAR refers to information-related conflict at a grand level between nations

or societies. It means trying to disrupt or damage what a target population
knows or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. A netwar may
focus on public or elite opinion, or both. It may involve diplomacy, propaganda
and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception of or
interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases,
and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer
networks (Arquilla & Ronfeldt's RAND archives).

CYBERTERRORISM

Cybercrime and cyberterrorism are not coterminous. Cyberspace attacks must have a
'terrorist' component in order to be labelled cyberterrorism. The likelihood of a
cyberterror attack increases every day, as every day the Internet and countless other
computer systems are under increasing attack and/or used by terrorists in various
ways. "Use" by itself does not normally comprise cyberterrorism, just "use" which
borders on "offensive use" or "misuse" at least according to Kent Anderson's article on
Politically Motivated Computer Crime, pdf, however, thought on the offensiveness of
"supporter websites" is still evolving (Weimann 2006), and the Jamestown Foundation
probably has a good set of experts who analyze the websites of terrorist organizations
and supporters. In 1999, Time magazine reported that 12 of the 30 terrorist groups
deemed Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs) by the United States Department of
State had their own Web sites, and by 2005, a majority of the groups on the same list
have an online presence, some of which are hosted by American site hosting companies.
A determined attacker (or attackers) will soon learn what works and what doesn’t,
where the vulnerabilities are, how responses are patterned, and what methods are used
for detection, apprehension, and prosecution. Cyberterrorism is not a matter of if, but
when. Some definitions are given below:

CYBERTERRORISM is the premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the

threat thereof, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to cause
harm or further social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives, or to
intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives. (Source: Kevin
Coleman's 2003 article)
Cyberterrorism refers to premeditated, politically motivated attacks by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents against information, computer systems,
computer programs, and data that result in violence against non-combatant
targets" (Pollit n.d.)
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to
unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and the
information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or
its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to qualify as
cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or property,
 or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or
bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious
attacks against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism,
depending on their impact. Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are
mainly a costly nuisance would not. (Denning 2000 & 2001)

INTERNET RESOURCES
JUS 410 Lecture on CyberSpace Law
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
Cybercrime, Justice, Law and Society
Cybercrimes.net
Cyberpunk Top 100 Sites
Cyberspace and the American Dream
Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?
DHS National Infrastructure Protection Center
Federal Guidelines for Searching & Seizing Computers (1994)
Federal Guidelines for Searching & Seizing Computers (2001)
Hacking and Industrial Espionage
InfoSec and InfoWar Portal
Institute for Advanced Study of Information Warfare
MSNBC's Hacker Diaries
National Cybercrime Training Partnership
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
Navy Postgraduate School White Paper on Cyberterror (pdf
Prof. Rob Kling's Social Informatics web page
Reality Bites: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Use of the Internet
SocioSite: Power, Conflict, War, CyberWar, Cyberterrorism
The Modus Operandi of Hacking
The Zapatista Social Netwar in Mexico
U.S. Dept. of Justice Cybercrime Section
What is CyberTerrorism?
White House National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace

PRINTED RESOURCES
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Ballard, J., Hornik, J, & McKenzie, D. (2002). Technological Facilitation of Terrorism:
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Barney, D. (2000). Prometheus Wired: The Hope for Democracy in the Age of Network
Technology. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
Becker, R. (2000). Criminal Investigation. Gaithersburg, MA: Aspen.
Bennett, W. & K. Hess. (2001). Criminal Investigation. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Biegel. S. (2003). Beyond our Control: Confronting the Limits of our Legal System in the
Age of Cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brown, S., F. Esbensen & G. Geis. (2001). Criminology. Cincinnati: Anderson.
Clifford, R. (2001). Cybercrime: The Investigation, Prosecution and Defense of a
Computer-Related Crime. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.
Collin, B. (1996). "The Future of Cyberterrorism," paper presented at the 11th Annual
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Denning, Dorothy. (2000). "Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as
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Denning, D. (2001). "Is Cyber Terror Next?" New York: U.S. Social Science Research
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Deutch, J. (1996). "Statement Before the U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee,
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Dyson, Esther et al. (1994). Cyberspace and the American Dream. EFF [article website]
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Naughton (eds.) Annual Editions: Criminal Justice 04/05. Dubuque, IA: Dushkin.
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Press.
Kalathil, S. & Boas, T. (2003). Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the
Internet on Authoritarian Rule. Washington DC: Brookings.
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60-67.
Lessig, L. (1999). Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. NY: Basic Books. [author's
website]
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surveillance in the Information Age. London: Routledge.
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Data Processing Audit, Control and Security Newsletter. Arlington: Automation Training
Center, October.
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Crime." Digital Investigation 2(4): 261-267.
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Characterization: Auditing the Hacker Mind. NY: Syngress.
Piper, T. (2002) "An Uneven Playing Field: The Advantages of the Cybercriminals vs.
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Last updated: 03/07/06

Syllabus for JUS 315
Syllabus for JUS 415 (Homeland Security)
Syllabus for JUS 426
Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 ECOTERRORISM
"Heaven is under our feet as well as over our heads." (Henry David Thoreau)

The ecology movement began quite early in history, and in its modern conceptions,
can be traced back to Lamarckism in 1801 and the ideas of Ernst Haeckel in 1866, both
of which rejected Darwin's principle of natural selection. The American
environmentalism movement likewise originated in the 19th Century, primarily in the
ethics of three New England writers: Ralph Waldo Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and
George Perkins Marsh. Ecology became part of student activism on college campuses
during the 1960s, and it was also about this time that big foundations were formed
which used the ecological bandwagon to seek political power. Ecoterrorism, or the eco-
terrorist movement, first appeared in England during the 1970s and spread to the
United States in the 1980s. The FBI was slow in recognizing this single- or special-
interest terrorism, but starting around 2001, the FBI now treats this type of domestic
terrorism as a high priority threat.

Statement by Director Louis J. Freeh to the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, 2001
Special interest extremists. Special interest terrorism differs from traditional right-
wing and left-wing terrorism in that extremist special interest groups seek to resolve
specific issues, rather than effect more widespread political change. Special interest
extremists continue to conduct acts of politically motivated violence to force
segments of society, including, the general public, to change attitudes about issues
considered important to their causes. These groups occupy the extreme fringes of
animal rights, pro-life, environmental, anti-nuclear, and other political and social
movements. Some special interest extremists -- most notably within the animal rights
and environmental movements -- have turned increasingly toward vandalism and
terrorist activity in attempts to further their causes.

Ecoterrorism involves extremist views on environmental issues and animal rights,

and is a fringe-issue form of terrorism aimed primarily at inflicting economic damage
on those seen as profiting from the destruction and exploitation of the environment.
Adherents go way beyond mainstream environmentalists and animal activists to acts of
violence justified on grounds that mainstream efforts aren't enough, and they often
compare themselves to anti-slavery abolitionists or opponents of Nazi death camps. It
operates on the concept of leaderless resistance, and is sometimes referred to by
experts as the type of terrorism most likely to be seen throughout all the 21st century. It is
very important to distinguish environmentalism from ecoterrorism. Environmentalists
work within the system for preservation; and ecoterrorists seem to want to destroy
civilization as we know it in order to save the planet. Greenpeace, for example, is a
mainstream environmentalist group, but the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) is an
ecoterrorist group. It's important to understand that extreme ecoterrorists do NOT
really want to preserve the environment or protect endangered species (like
environmentalists); they are better characterized as wanting to destroy the world in
order to save it. Their goal is the destruction or degradation of mankind - an end to
anthropocentrism.
 There are many varieties of ecoterrorists, ecofeminism and ecoanarchism being
the two main ideologies. It is not a united movement, and there are no known leaders.
It crosses political lines since there are as many right-wing members as left-wing
members. There is no political agenda, no government to overthrow, and it can exist
under any type of rule: capitalist, socialist, or dictatorship. Ecoterrorists lead fulfilling
and law-abiding lives most of the time when they are not driven by some all-consuming
passion that something needs to be done -- and violently -- right now. As a form of
techno-exotic terrorism, it has the most ambivalent attitude toward technology.

ECOFEMINISM

Let's begin with an overview of ecofeminism, which for the sake of brevity is a cross
between radical and postmodern feminism. The term was coined by Francoise
d'Eaubonne in 1974. Radical feminism involves a cosmology of Mother Earth (men as
hunters-despoilers and womyn as nurturing gatherers). Postmodern feminism involves
conversation and discourse about New Age ways of living (such as vegetarian lesbianism
and raising earth-conscious children). True believers worship the Goddess (Brigid,
Tana, or Cerridwen) and adore a Golden Age (Eden) that existed during the Pleisocene
Age. Wicca, or witchcraft, is probably the most popular expression of those beliefs,
although there are many flavors of Wicca. Celtic mythology plays a part, and the
movement is decidedly pagan or neo-pagan. Organized religions, like Christianity, are
rejected because they teach dominion over nature. Men are seen as war-mongers who
like to blow things up, destroy nature (Mother Earth), and exterminate all life on the
planet. Fanaticism within the ecofeminist movement holds that extermination of the
exterminators is a moral commandment, so the appropriate targets (for vandalism) are
military weapons production centers, corporate and small business polluters,
manufacturers of pesticides or herbicides, and anything having to do with nuclear
energy, or weapons of mass destruction.

Militant non-violent environmentalism goes back to the 1960s as a left-wing

movement that was part of campus unrest and the "hippie" revolution. Nader's Raiders
were perhaps the most militant group in those days, but by 1971 evolved into Ralph
Nader's umbrella group called Public Citizen. Other mainstream militant groups
include the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and Greenpeace. In the case of
Greenpeace, a Canadian-led splinter group, calling itself the Sea Shepherds, broke off to
advocate more direct violence, such as sinking whaling and drift netting ships, sailors
and all. It all started in 1977 when environmental activist Paul Watson, believing that
nonviolent direct action tactics did not go far enough to protect animal life in the
world’s oceans, split off from Gandhi-inspired Greenpeace to form the Sea Shepherd
Conservation Society. This new organization raised the stakes on the high seas by using
acts of destruction, such as cutting drift nets, ramming whaling ships, and attacking
commercial fishing operations (Long 2004). Whereas Watson saw himself as a savior of
life on Earth, many others saw him as a new breed of environmental ecoterrorist. Most
splits occur within such groups between those prepared to destroy property and those
prepared to kill people. Resistance and protest against pollution has, of course, existed
for centuries. Environmentalists who work within the political system for change are
called Greens, and the Green Party has been highly successful throughout Europe,
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Canada.
 Some radical, or so-called deep ecologists tend to advocate violence and
ecoterrorism. Deep ecology is a movement started by a Norwegian philosopher, Arnie
Naess, in 1972 which posits that nature has value apart from its usefulness to humans. It
seeks to replace anthropocentrism with ecocentrism, and advocates we identify with
trees, animals, and plants instead of our own egos and families. An ecocentric viewpoint
is one in which we develop a less dominating and aggressive posture towards the Earth.
Some feminists embrace deep ecology because they see a connection between
anthropocentrism and androcentrism - man-centeredness. Criticisms of the deep
ecology movement are easy to come by, as their thinking isn't all that deep, and in most
cases, consists of reactionary ideology which justifies violence. For example, most
people don't know that the mass murderer Charles Manson and his "family" practiced
an early form of deep ecology -- in their mantra of ATWA (Air, Trees, Water, Animals)
-- which advocated revolution against pollution or a holy war where people die trying to
do something about it. Most modern forms of deep ecology, however, have evolved into
fairly nonviolent forms of "bioregionalism" which advocates decentralized community
self-rule within political boundaries redrawn to reflect the natural contours of differing
ecosystems, but still, there must be some revolution to redraw these boundaries.

ECOANARCHISM

There are many varieties of ecoanarchism, but a common theme tends to be loss of
dignity at the hands of technology and how it is destroying our way of life.
Ecoanarchists can trace their heritage back to the 1811-1816 Luddite movement in
England where textile workers broke into the factories to destroy the machines. The
Luddites are considered a precursor of modern labor unions, but they practiced guerilla
warfare, reporting to a fictional general out in the woods called General Ludd. The
variation known as ecosocialism traces its roots to Peter Kropotkin, and post-Marxist
ideologies tend to be either ecocommunalists or social ecologists. Kropoktin's
encyclopedia article on anarchism stands as a classic read.

Ecosocialists concentrate on capitalism as the main force behind environmental

degradation; ecocommunalism is a term that encompasses a diverse range of green
anarchist theories promoting a utopian vision of human-scale, cooperative communities;
and social ecologists see capitalism as a subset of the greater problem -- imposed social
hierarchy. Most ecoanarchists believe in non-hierarchical, decentralized, self-governing
forms of rule. However, there is such a thing that might be called right-wing
ecoanarchism. Ecofascism, for example, posits that population control is more
important than the problems of capitalism or technology. Enforced curfews, national
"lights-out" laws, are land control in response to immigration problems are all forms of
ecofascism. More radical groups, such as the Church of Euthanasia, advocate
cannibalism to rid the world of human population problems. There are also
ecotechnocrats, who propose an end to the waste of technology and its use for
ecological purposes.

The movement known as social ecology holds that ecofeminists and deep ecologists
do not go far enough. Social ecologists see all the world's social problems as being
environmental problems, homelessness, for example, being the product of rainforest
devastation. They argue that racism, sexism, and third world exploitation are all
environmental problems. They criticize ecofeminists and deep ecologists for engaging in
nature mysticism, but they agree with deep ecologists that governments must go, and the
Earth needs to be divided up into biospheres.

Most, if not all, ecoanarchists idolize the Unabomber, Ted Kaczinski, who from 1978
to 1996 waged a one-man war against industrialization and technology (see Case Study
below). His targets were scientists, businessmen, and quite often, innocent people, the
latter a matter of no great concern to him. Bombing is, of course, the favorite tool of an
anarchist, but ecoanarchists advocate monkeywrenching, a term taken from Edward
Abbey's 1975 book called The Monkey Wrench Gang. The book describes how to engage
in economic sabotage, such as pouring sugar in the crackcases of bulldozers, driving
metal stakes through the trunks of trees scheduled for logging, and pulling up survey
stakes to stall land use development. Ecosabotage is the preferred means of action for
Earth First! (exclamation mark mandatory), a leaderless group originally founded by
Dave Foreman that spun off from Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth in 1980, which
allows anybody to use their name. It's not surprising that ecoanarchists target dams,
bridges, highways, power lines, ski lodges, and anything symbolic of industrial society.
Millions of dollars worth of machinery is smashed every year, and numerous
construction projects are interfered with to the point that developers give up.

Case Study: THEODORE KACZYNSKI, the Unabomber, Ecoanarchist

Depending upon your point of view, the Unabomber is either a terrorist, an
anarchist, or a serial killer. His ingenious homemade mail bombs killed three
people and wounded 23 others in 16 separate incidents in the United States
from 1978 to 1995. In 1995 the New York Times and Washington Post
published his Manifesto, and the FBI spent over $50 million in the largest
manhunt in agency history. In 1996, after he was arrested in his one-room
plywood shack in the mountains of western Montana, agents discovered an
unkept 53-year old Harvard University graduate and former mathematics
professor at the University of California at Berkeley.
Brought to court in 1997, he was declared as suffering from paranoid
schizophrenia, but competent to stand trial. The charges were murder and
illegally transporting, mailing, and using bombs. The prosecution sought the
death penalty, but Kaczynski avoided trial by pleading guilty to a sentence of
4 life terms with no possibility of parole. He is currently being held in the
“Supermax” prison at Florence, Colorado.
The Unabomber targeted university professors with research
specializations in computer science, genetics, engineering, and psychology.
He also targeted corporate executives in the airline and advertising
industries. In one case, he targeted the owner of a small computer store. He
tried to throw off investigators with pieces or fragments of his bombs
containing the initials FC, which stand for Freedom Club, a known terrorist
organization opposed to all forms of science and technology. His Manifesto,
entitled Industrial Society and Its Future, claimed an affinity with anarchists
and radical environmentalists opposed to the industrial technological system.
Scholars who have analyzed his manifesto find it little more than a remake of
1960's counterculture ideas taken from Jacques Ellul's book, The
Technological Society.
Psychiatrists say his mental condition stems from an ambivalence toward
women (he couldn't reconcile the fact he was good-looking but couldn't
 maintain any lasting relationships). Others say he secretly sought to become
a woman. He presents himself as extremely concerned about the loss of
human emotions in an age where super computers are taking over the world.

THE ANIMAL LIBERATIONISTS

Probably the most exotic form of ecoterrorism involves animal rights extremism, but
it's probably not so exotic since Peter Singer legitimized it in his book Animal Liberation
in the mid-1970s. There are many people who believe that anything with a face has a
soul and should be returned to its natural environment. There are also Ghandian
conceptions of justice that question our belief that if a thing is not alive, can it feel no
pain? Sometimes, people are guided by the concept of biocentrism, a belief that
humans are no more important, and probably less important, than other animals.
Humans should therefore be degraded in a kind of role reversal straight from the movie,
Planet of the Apes. Groups include the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), the Animal
Rights Militia, the Band of Mercy, the Paint Panthers, and an organization with a strong
web presence called Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, or SHAC (Huntingdon Life
Sciences being a firm that contracts with other companies to do pharmaceutical testing
on animals). Activists and law enforcement agents tend to call these groups
"movements." ALF is the oldest group, was originally formed in England during the
1970s, and the FBI regards it much more as a terrorist group than a "movement." ALF
advocates monkeywrenching and violence, as does the ELF. Highly visible and
publicity-seeking, they show no hesitation in bombing or bomb-hoaxing people on their
doorsteps -- people such as furriers, butchers, restaurant owners, veterinarians,
zookeepers, and above all, doctors who do medical research on animals. Sometimes,
they even target homeowners who abuse or neglect their pets. Threats and acts of arson
and firebombing are commonplace at colleges and universities where animals are used
in research or education - just ask any Biology professor who does animal vivisection in
the classroom. Among animal liberationists and other ecoterrorists, there was a belief
that AIDS was nature's way of telling mankind that she (Mother Earth) was unhappy
and did not want humans to pass the year 2000 and for her followers to monkeywrench
the millennium. There's a strange tendency for ecoterrorists to worship anniversary
dates, and to spraypaint, deface, or disrupt McDonalds restaurants quite frequently.
ALF is made up of autonomous underground “cells” and has at least two publications
devoted to their activities: Underground and No Compromise.

Less extremist animal liberationism involves throwing buckets of blood on people

wearing mink fur coat, or passing out leaflets saying "animal killers" in front of animal
research corporations. Animal rights activists are usually from the middle or upper
class, and not all of them want to see humans extinguished from the planet. They want a
reduced number of humans, and for humans to take their rightful (lower) place in the
natural scheme of things. For these reasons, they oppose medical research into
Alzheimer's, cystic fibrosis, cancer, AIDS, and spinal cord injuries, not just because
research into a cure involves animal research, but because it's nature's way of letting
humans die. They also don't like domesticated animals. Cattle and sheep, which were
introduced to the land by humans, have to be removed. Dogs and cats are certainly a
perversion of nature. Indigenous animals like the grizzly bear and spotted owl have to
be protected at all costs. If humans are attacked and eaten by wild animals, so much the
better, since that's just nature's way. A few animal liberationists go so far as to sabotage
efforts at spraying for mosquitoes, no so much that they believe in insect rights, but
because they want humans to resume their rightful place in nature. They basically want
humans to die more.

Other animal liberationist groups, such as SHAC, use Internet websites for
questionable activities: to report on the activities ("direct actions") of its supporters;
and to list maps, along with addresses and phone numbers, of where a supporter might
find corporations, along with a list of current employees, who engage in animal testing
or research. People who have had their names, addresses, and phone numbers posted
on one of these Internet sites have had their property vandalized, received harassing
calls, or faced demonstrations outside their home and workplace. In some cases, people
have been physically attacked for having their name on a SHAC website. These activist
websites seem to just barely skirt the law, and are considered by the FBI to be
protected on First Amendment grounds. The websites are reminicent of an anti-
abortion (self-described anti-choice) activist who, back in 1998, posted the names and
addresses of abortion doctors where three such doctors got killed [The anti-abortion
"Nuremberg Files" now exist at a website out of the Netherlands]. In that case, a U.S.
District Judge ruled in 1999 that such websites constituted a threat to kill. However,
modern websites get around that legal precedent by posting a "disclaimer" which reads
something like the following:

Typical Disclaimer Found on Activist Websites

"This web site, [fill in name of group], its hosts, designers, contributors, and
sponsors are not responsible for actions on the part of any individual which prove
defamatory, injurious, or prejudicial to any of the entities [corporations, employees,
or researchers] named herein, their families, or acquaintances. This publication is
intended for informational purposes only, and is not intended to incite any criminal
action on the part of its readers, visitors, or recipients."

ECOTERRORISM tends to occur more in the Western United States (in places like
Colorado and Oregon), although it has reached as far East as North Carolina and the
New England states. Most of the nation's animal research labs are located in the
Midwest, however, in places like Michigan State and University of Iowa. Ecoterrorist
acts include vandalism, sabotage, bombing, arson, liberation of animals, destruction of
research data, theft, assault, murder, and infliction of economic loss. Law enforcement
tends to classify many incidents as vandalism, but in any given year, approximately ten
(10) major acts of ecoterrorism are committed in the United States, and they are well-
planned attacks, the economic damage of each one costing about $1 million. No group,
individual, or organization involved in altering the natural environment is immune from
these attacks, and there appear to be no qualms about targeting innocent civilians.

Counterterrorist efforts might focus on working with more moderate preservationist

groups and/or helping re-educate some of the more deluded fanatics and extremists.
The level of emotional motivation and commitment runs high among ecoterrorists.
They are a difficult group to profile, and other than for the animal liberationists,
maintain fairly good levels of secrecy. Ecoterrorists utilize the Web to post their diaries
of action, adopt the technique of an anonymous communiqué to take credit for attacks,
and invite fellow travelers to action in their name. Most members are intelligent,
reasonable people, so perhaps dialogue or communication is possible, or perhaps they
will attend to some other trend than the stifling of progress. They remain well-poised to
become the dominant force in domestic terrorism for years to come.

THE ANTI-SUV MOVEMENT

Towards the end of the year 2000, a new form of ecoterrorism emerged among
mischievous middle-aged Americans who grew tired of gas-guzzling SUVs (Sports
Utility Vehicles) and decided to place homemade stickers on them as a form of protest.
These mad taggers are mad about the impact of SUVs on the environment, and a short
collection of their stickers is as follows:

• "I'm Changing the Climate. Ask Me How."

• "Bin Laden Used Your Gas Money"
• "If You Love America, Get Rid of Your SUV"
• "I Don't Care About the Air"

Apparently, the movement can be traced to a 1996 Sierra Club report on how
wasteful the thirteen miles per gallon fuel efficiency of SUVs are. SUVs and other light
trucks are also permitted to emit 29% to 47% more carbon monoxide (CO) and 75% to
175% more nitrogen oxides (NOx) than passenger cars. The tagging of SUVs (and
sometimes gas pumps) is a form of civil disobedience or protest that is more often
humorous than harmful, but the strong glue used for such stickers is irritating and hard
to remove. In addition, the practice makes many SUV owners mad enough to call the
police and pursue prosecutorial action. In most cities, the crime is only one of
unlawfully posting an advertisement and carries a fine of about $250.

Sometimes, the mad taggers go too far. In 2001, an arson attack destroyed 30 SUVs at
a dealership in Eugene, Oregon, and since then, there have been nearly a dozen similar
attacks at SUV dealerships nationwide. One such attack at a dealership in Girard,
Pennsylvania had the shadowy Earth Liberation Front (ELF) claim responsibility. In
November of 2002, a group of self-described ELF activists also slashed tires and
splashed chemicals on some 30 SUVs parked on streets in Richmond, Virginia. This
kind of destruction is more wanton and malicious. Most experts believe the Anti-SUV
movement represents the latest evolution of targeting by ELF, who at one time, prior to
1998, confined their activities to logging and mining companies. Two examples should
suffice to illustrate the contrast:

Examples of Anti-logging vs. Anti-SUV Movements

In June, 2001, fires were set at the Schoppert Logging Company in Eagle Creek,
Oregon. Schoppert was contracted to log U.S. Forest Service land. Three logging
trucks were damaged by the use of incendiary devices, costing about $50,000. If
convicted, the defendants could receive up to 80 years in prison. A co-conspirator
and tree-sitter named Tre Arrow was later taken into custody by Canadian authorities
for shoplifting a pair of bolt cutters. Tree-sitters have been injured and even
murdered by logging companies, such as the case of David Chain, where a logger
intentionally let a tree fall on him.
Also in June, 2001, Jeffrey Luers was sentenced to 22 years in prison for the
burning of three SUVs in Eugene, Oregon, with the help of a friend named "Critter"
to make a statement about global warming. Cost was about $40,000 and an arson
 specialist testified at trial that it seemed some care was taken at the scene of the crime
to ensure no one would get hurt. In 2004, the FBI issued an alert for J12, or June
12th, as an anniversary date when ELF might seek retaliation for the conviction of
Leurs.

ELF AS AMERICA'S BIGGEST DOMESTIC THREAT

Although debatable, ELF, or the Earth Liberation Front, will be considered here as
the most active, most dangerous, and largest domestic terrorist group in America (at
least the FBI seems to think so). ELF first surfaced in 1996 when they set fire to a U.S.
Forest Service truck in Oregon, which caused little damage, but have since escalated
into major damage events in populated areas. ELF is a militant offshoot of the group
Earth First! and before that, have roots in such 1970s groups as the Environmental Task
Force, which went around the country blowing up crop dusters because they were
spreading harmful pesticides. They believe in saving the planet from the damage being
done to it by pollution, logging, mining, and real estate development. Their strategy is
that by destroying property and inflicting financial damage, they can convince people to
stop environmentally harmful practices. Like ALF, ELF operates without leadership
and structure, and it may even be inappropriate to call ELF a "group." Activists "join"
ELF by carrying out "direct action," leaving behind some slogans or initials at the crime
scene, and then posting their accomplishment on one of the group's web sites.
According to the ELF website, 75 "direct actions" occurred in 2003, of which half were
claimed in the name of ELF (or ALF), and rest were either anonymous or in the name of
what were called "revolutionary cells" such as the Animal Liberation Brigade, Direct
Action Front, the Frogs, or the Vegan Dumpster Militia.

In 2004, the FBI has been actively tracking and arresting suspected "ringleaders" of
ELF, such as the 23-year old responsible for a 2003 firebombing of a Hummer
dealership. He was caught after sending emails to a major newspaper claiming
responsibility for the crimes. Another shadowy 38-year old "ringleader" was caught in
2004 using fake IDs and attempting to shoplift some boltcutters from a Canadian store.
The FBI's strategy has been to make high profile arrests and attempt to demonstrate the
group's vulnerability. Meanwhile, the property damage keeps adding up.

• a 2004 firebombing of newly constructed homes in Seattle, costing $1 million

• a 2003 arson of a condominium complex in San Diego, costing $50 million
• a 2003 arson of a Hummer dealership and 3 other car dealerships in Los Angeles,
costing $2 million each
• a 1998 arson at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado, costing $12 million
• since 1996, numerous crimes in 14 states, totalling over $100 million in damage
nationwide; see map, which is from Maxim Magazine's 2004 article (Denson
2004)
 Numerous FBI-led Joint Terrorist Task Forces and anti-terrorist analysts have tried
to track down, arrest, prosecute, and convict members of ELF, but they are a difficult
group for law enforcement to deal with. Superior encryption tools are used whenever
members communicate with one another electronically or via their centralized websites,
and ELF's autonomous cell structure defies surveillance and infiltration. The FBI
claims ELF has simply had dumb luck that nobody has been killed yet, but ELF
maintains that it carries out well-planned acts of economic sabotage. There is no known
way to profile ELF members as different from other environmentalists who might live in
co-ops on organic farms. NIJ-funded research is underway, however, to develop pre-
incident indicators of when such extremists seem to get desperate enough to go on
another arson rampage, like they did in 2003, where theories abound from speculation
involving upset over the war in Iraq to the influence of other factors, like when the
group thinks enough endangered species are at risk, or the cause of getting Americans to
change their lifestyles need to be placed in the public eye again. Unfortunately, there
are few criminological theories of ecoterrorism developed yet, and it may very well be
some time before all the necessary research is completed.

PYROTERRORISM

Ecoterrorism may very well be the only kind of terrorism which has spawned its own
"backlash" terrorism -- pyroterrorism. The only other kind of terrorism that has
produced a backlash is cyberterrorism, and that has been in the form of vigilante
activity. With ecoterrorism, however, and I should note that there is little evidence to
prove it, suspicion has it that the rash of forest fires in recent years may have been
caused by ANTI-ENVIRONMENTALISTS who are "fed up" with all the pro-
environmental, tree-hugging nonsense (as they see it). The official story that most
governments usually give out is that forest fires are caused by lack of rain, lightning, or
careless campers, but it may very well be that disgruntled anti-environmentalists (who
are sympathetic to the concerns of timber companies) deliberately set the fires.
Pyroterrorism is suspected to be the case more in Australia and Latin America than in
the United States.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Anarcha-Feminism
Animal Liberation Front (ALF)
Center for the Defense of Free Enterprise
CrimethInc
Earth Liberation Front (ELF)
Earth First! Solidarity Links
EarthShare.org
EcoFem.org
Ecofeminism Webring
Eve Online
InContext Journal
Infoshop Anarchy Hub
Stop Eco-Violence
Transition Strategies to a Green Society
Unabomber Manifesto

PRINTED RESOURCES
Abbey, E. (1972). The Monkeywrench Gang. NY: J.B. Lippincott.
Arnold, R. (1997). Ecoterror: The Violent Agenda to Save Nature. NY: Free Enterprise
Press. [Sample excerpt]
Coleman, Daniel A. (1994). Ecopolitics: Building a Green Society. New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press.
Denson, B. (2004). "Summer of Fire," Pp. 140-49 in Maxim Magazine, March (75th)
issue.
Eckersley, Robyn. (1992). Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric
Approach. Albany: SUNY Press.
Laqueur, Walter. (1999). The New Terrorism. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Long, D. (2004). Ecoterrorism. NY: Facts on File.
Nilson, Chad & Tod Burke. (2002). Environmental Extremists and the Eco-Terrorism
Movement. Pp. 1-6 ACJS Today Volume 24 Issue 5 (January/February).
Smith, B. (1994). Terrorism in America. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Taylor, B. (Ed.) (1995). Ecological Resistance Movements. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Taylor, B. (1998). "Religion, Violence, and Radical Environmentalism: from Earth
First! to the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front,” Journal of Terrorism and
Political Violence, 10(4): 1-42. [author's website]
White, Jonathan. (2002). Terrorism: An Introduction. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Last updated: 06/14/04
Syllabus for JUS 429
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 INSURGENCIES, PEACEKEEPING, AND NATION RE-BUILDING
"The belief in the possibility of a short decisive war is one of the most ancient and dangerous
illusions" (Robert Lynd)

Insurgency is a word meaning armed revolt, insurrection, or rebellion aimed at

overthrowing or subverting a government or regime in power -- any duly constituted
regime, including elected or non-elected officials will do. The official U.S. Defense
Department definition is "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."
Counterinsurgency is also called low-intensity conflict or operations other than
war (OOTW), and it is a most complex form of warfare, a form similar to, but not quite
the same as guerrilla warfare, although sometimes an insurgency is called a "small war"
and frequently involves irregular fighting forces. Sometimes the fighting forces are so
irregular that they involve suicidal maniacs and/or the criminal element (see Lecture on
Suicidal Terrorism). Insurgents often make demands that cannot (and should not) be
negotiated with, and they are known to "trade" or "sell" hostages with other groups.
Consider two groups in post-conflict Iraq -- the Islamic Army of Iraq and the Swords of
Righteousness. The first group has been involved in everything, from assassination
attempts to hanging the bodies of American contractors from bridges, and the second
group seems to specialize in kidnapping humanitarian workers. Sometimes they release
videos, other times not.

Fighting an insurgency is not the same as fighting a regular war. It requires a special
military strategy where psychological offensives are normally more important that
armed combat (Collins 2002). Further, strategy will often be complicated by ethical or
moral factors, basically because asymmetric warfare is likely to be involved (the enemy
won't fight fair). Also, because insurgencies rely so much on "force multipliers"
themselves, they are best fought with force multiplying forces, such as joint special
operations forces (SOF), and a large part of this should involve peacetime contingency
operations, peacekeeping (PK) operations, and stability operations, although sometimes
a rescue operation can be launched. While some insurgencies will use the tactics of
terrorism, an insurgency differs from terrorism in that insurgency violence is usually
contained within a specific geographical area, and in this respect, is somewhat like
domestic terrorism if like a subtype of terrorism at all. An insurgency also differs from
terrorism in that it is driven more by diffuse anger than a specific cause, and it may be
impossible to identify the leader or spokesperson for an insurgency movement. One
thing that terrorism and insurgencies have in common, however, is the contest for the
"hearts and minds" of the populace, making it a kind of psychological warfare.
Revolutionary ideology is often involved (but not required) whereby both sides to an
insurgency usually claim they are the only ones who can legitimately meet the needs and
expectations of the people. Insurgencies are probably best defined as an extreme form
of political and civil unrest. Criminal justice and law enforcement are urgently needed
during an insurgency, but standard doctrine indicates that such civilian forces should be
commanded and controlled by a military command for effective interagency cooperation
that integrates military counterguerrilla action with the complex of separate and joint
civil and military operations. Some decisiveness (but not necesarily destructiveness) is
called for. Certain attrition-based strategies can be used successfully, but so can
destructiveness strategies. The history of counterinsurgency is filled with many lessons
(and mistakes) to learn from.
 Fighting an insurgency is not the same as fighting a war on crime. At some point, the
insurgents are quite likely to use proxies or criminals to do their work, but what mostly
happens is that ordinary criminals and/or disgruntled segments of the population will
jump in on the action. This later tendency is what academics call "primitive rebellion"
or criminal banditry, and it has been noted ever since Hobsbawm (1965), but see the
more recent U.S. Army War College (2005) document entitled "Street Gangs: The New
Urban Insurgency" which compares mutated forms of terrorist-insurgents to criminal
street gangs, or Louise Shelley's Nexus of Organized Crime and Terrorism (pdf) which
explores more high-level connections between criminals and terrorists such as the
commingling of funds from money laundering. It should be noted that few
criminologists have ever thoroughly modeled the explanations for how criminal and
political motivations mix and morph during an insurgency, not because it can't be done,
just because it hasn't been done or is difficult to carry out research on. Thomas, Kiser
& Casebeer (2005) is a good start in directions that are needed.

THE CHALLENGES OF FOURTH-GENERATION WARFARE

Since the way a society conducts warfare tells a lot about its social structure and the
beliefs it holds dear, it helps to have some kind of theoretical perspective on warfare to
begin with, and a Darwinian perspective (war evolves) is as good as any, which in fact is
the approach taken by Hammes (2004) who outlines the following four stages in the
history of warfare:

• First-generation war (1GW) -- the kind practiced by Napoleon in the 19th

century, involving line and column attacks, and dependent most of all upon
patriotism to provide a continuous supply of manpower
• Second-generation war (2GW) -- the kind displayed during the two World Wars
in the 20th century, involving campaigns of movement which eventually get
bogged down in trench warfare where defense assumes supremacy over offense,
and mostly dependent upon a strong economy and superior firepower
• Third-generation war (3GW) -- the kind exemplified by Hitler's blitzkrieg actions
during WWII, involving the projection of power and maneuver warfare over vast
distances quickly to wipe out an enemy's command and control, and mostly
dependent upon propaganda to rob the enemy of their will to fight
• Fourth-generation war (4GW) -- the kind that focuses deeply in the enemy's rear,
like an evolved form of insurgency, which uses all available networks (netwar) -
political, economic, social, international organizations, the media, the Internet,
and world opinion - to make the enemy's goals seem unobtainable or too costly.
This is the only kind of war America has ever lost, and it has done so three times
(Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia).

Terrorism, ruthlessness, and asymmetric tactics characterize fourth-generation war.

For example, the enemies of the U.S. have long learned the lesson that to defeat superior
firepower, all that is necessary is to push women and children to the front, and to
practice classic Maoist insurgency tactics:

• Di jin, wo tui (When the enemy advances, we withdraw)

• Di jiu, wo roa (When the enemy rests, we harass)
• Di pi, wo da (When the enemy tires, we attack)
• Di tui, wo jui (When the enemy withdraws, we pursue)
 A war of attrition at one's own pace, accompanied by extensive international
propaganda, is the fastest way to weaken an enemy's resolve. Traditional battlefields
and battlespaces don't matter. What matters is whether the press is covering the story,
and whether, for example, there are reporters and/or academics who see the insurgent's
side of it as a genuine, resistance movement. This tactic -- the Sandinista refinement --as
Hammes (2004) calls it, is NOT the same as Che Guevara's "foco" theory of insurgency,
which holds that a small focus group of guerrillas will stimulate a spontaneous uprising.
In fact, it is important for today's revolutionaries to disavow and dissociate themselves
from anything resembling Communist doctrine. The broadest base of allies must be
obtained, such as the support which comes from peace groups and religious institutions.
The moral high ground must appear to have been taken, so the Palestinians, for
example, will present the image of youngsters throwing rocks (avoiding the more
practical method of throwing Molotov cocktails) and portray Hamas and terrorist
groups as providers of medical care and social services. It must always appear that the
fighters are oppressed, impoverished people fighting for human dignity. The goal is to
change world opinion. If taken prisoner, the fighters must be ordered (as the al-Qaeda
training manual instructs) to claim they were beaten and abused. If all else fails, it's
time to use an accelerated birth rate to simply out-demographic the enemy. The
interesting thing about fourth-generation war is that the fighters don't even have to win;
they simply have to stay the course until the other side gives up or gets distracted by
something else.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

While much of a peacekeeping operation should be governed by operational law (see

Lecture on OPLAW), there are many important unsettled issues. Obtaining a clear
definition is probably the most important issue. Peacekeeping (and to some extent,
counterinsurgency too) can be defined as any unilateral or multilaterial intervention
into the civil affairs of a foreign country which is designed to contribute to a more secure
and stable environment, help support the constitutional process, protect citizens,
facilitate the repatriation of refugees, help stand up a provisional or interim
government, and set the stage for the arrival of a multinational force. Peacekeeping
usually involves two phases: a combat or stabilization phase; and a post-conflict, nation
re-building phase (It should be noted that many insurgencies also have two phases, at
least according to much of the classic literature). Peacekeeping is primarily a military
operation because the military is often the only agency with sufficient resources for these
tasks. A civilian component may also be involved in periods of stabilization and
reconstruction, but that depends upon what sort of "mission" the Department of State is
willing to authorize for volunteers and NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations).
Soldiers who are assigned to peacekeeping operations usually wear distinctive insignia
and helmets, e.g., U.N.-sponsored peacekeepers are readily distinguished by their blue
helmets. The United States has steadfastly maintained that its peacekeepers should have
immunity from prosecution by the International Criminal Court.

A Brief History of Peacekeeping

Although there are several good examples of the early origins of peacekeeping,
such as the U.S. occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, modern peacekeeping is
essentially a post-Cold War phenomenon in which the U.S. acts in the role of
strengthening the deterrent effect of the U.N. or lends its weight (as the only
remaining superpower) to a strengthened role for the U.N. and most recently, for
 NATO which is gearing up for the peacekeeping function. Peacekeeping is not the
same as a superpower acting as the world's policeman. The U.N. Charter
specifically reserves the right to engage in peacekeeping for itself, and although a
few U.S. presidents have utilized the War Powers Act for unilateral military
intervention, the more common path today is for the U.S. to contribute, along with
other nations, what military force the U.N. needs, and to follow Presidential Decision
Directive 71 (PDD 71) in strengthening the criminal justice systems around the
world. Since 1992, the year when modern international peacekeeping operations
seem to have been established, the U.S. has taken on assignments in about seven
countries, and the U.N., since its inception in 1948, has launched 56 such missions,
13 of which are still active. With the notable exception of places where the U.S.
determines it has a vital interest or is engaged in the war on terrorism, the average
contribution of U.S. troops to U.N. peacekeeping missions only runs around 6
percent. The following map shows ongoing U.N. peacekeeping operations:

Where insurgencies arise, the typical situation involves an emerging democracy which
is trying to come to power in a Third World area which often happens to not be a
sustainable area for life and the people have relatively high expectations of the emerging
government. Another situation where insurgencies are frequently found is with existing
governments that are on the verge of collapse and have been using bullies or thugs to
keep order on the streets, or in some cases, engaging in atrocities against their own
citizens. In such cases, insurgent groups rise up in revolt toward what is just short of a
civil war, and that's what makes insurgency different and similar to terrorism - if it was
a civil war, the fighting would follow some rules. Like terrorists, insurgents don't
usually care if innocent noncombatants get hurt. A typical insurgency contains numerous
acts of sporadic mass violence that closely resemble terrorism, and in some cases, exceed
the problems of terrorism. Another situation in which you'll find an insurgency is when
there's regime change. For example, when the U.S., U.N., or multi-national coalition
invades a country to throw out some dictator or terrorist supporter, there's going to be
resistance to the occupation of that country afterwards, usually by loyalists to the
previous regime, and among other identity-based groups in the population. Insurgency
in this case typically involves ethnic, tribal, gang, or mob violence, and is rarely
organized, but you will still find organized cells of insurgent resistance that carry out
organized terrorist-style acts. Insurgency situations also arise in the presence of
peacekeepers, diplomats, tourists, and charitable organizations that visit foreign lands.
Many insurgencies have started over well-intended religious missionary work, and
others have started because a segment of the population thinks that the visitors are there
to ravish their women.
 There are at least approximately five (5) types of insurgent groups. Let's discuss them
as the possible kinds of resistance movements seen in a nation rebuilding effort, and
hold off, for a moment, on the conceptual problem of trying to define a "resistance
movement."

THE FIVE TYPES OF INSURGENTS

TYPE #1: Regime Loyalists -- These are people who consist of the old military and
security forces of the previous regime, and would include all the volunteer, civilian
militia groups, as well as all the intelligence assets (domestic spies and snitches) for the
previous regime's officials. They are not criminals, and many are, in fact, quite well-
educated, wealthy, and speak English. Their employment records and histories are
likely to have been kept secret, so there's no use in trying to work off some central
directory of government employees. This makes their exact number unknown. Their
modus operandi, however, is quite predictable. They operate on the basis of inspiration,
not taking orders directly from anybody, but dispensing attacks whenever they think the
moment is right, almost as if they could read the minds of their leaders. When they
attack, they do so with reach, skill, strength, and sophistication, and the attacks are
coordinated in military fashion to include distractions and account for counterattacks.

TYPE #2: Disaffected Citizens -- These are untrained, leaderless, delinquents and
criminals for the most part, who will do anything for money, anything in hopes of
making an illegal profit, and may or may not be genuinely angry about the occupation of
their country. Their weapons are frequently homemade weapons or what they can find,
and their attacks are quite unpredictable and on an ad hoc (occasional) basis. The
problems they present are much like the problems of gang behavior on the homefront,
and their actions are sometimes predicable from reading the graffitti they seemingly put
on everything. Their modus operandi is not too smart, however, as they always seem to
exposing themselves in crowds where they try to whip up a protest into mob violence,
and then they get killed. The smarter ones, like citizens in general, keep their role down
to serving as spotters for other insurgent groups.

TYPE #3: Terrorists -- These are terrorists who may have been operating in the
country beforehand, or terrorists who have come into the country after the occupation.
Either way, they represent the same kind of threat, which is that they are usually well-
armed, well-trained, and have an interest in weapons of mass destruction. Standard
terrorist ideology calls for a "scorched Earth" policy after a safe haven has been
occupied, so it isn't past them to use some biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon to
destroy the whole area, civilians and all, to get at the occupiers. Actually, it seems the
continued influx of terrorists to the region works against their interests, as they spend a
lot of time or organizational matters such as "Who's in charge" and so forth.

TYPE #4: Foreign Fighters -- These are people from neighboring countries who either
sympathize with the cause of one or more other insurgent groups, or hate the occupiers
so much, for their own reasons, that they jump at the chance to immigrate and fight the
enemy, "infidels" who have invaded the Muslim world, for example. Generally, they
have little or no military training, and their connection to a cause is usually quite
religious, but the locals often don't want them around. Most come on their own, or at
the prompting of some religious leader back home, and only a few of them have any
resources or money to operate successfully, but they represent a wild card.
 TYPE #5: Criminals -- These are most likely narcotraffickers, narco-guerrillas, or
other aspiring drug- or crime kingpins and their henchmen. They will do almost
anything for money or power, although some have ruthless loyalty to a cartel, cabal, or
other transnational criminal organization. Local gangs also present a problem. The
criminal element is the most vicious, attacking and preying upon ordinary civilians.
They almost never have any stated goals or political philosophy. Their objective is to
create havoc for the "hell" of it.

ORGANIZATION OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Although resistance movements are known primarily for uniting people across ethnic,
age, and gender lines (i.e., women and children are recruited into the resistance), the
ultimate goal of a resistance movement is to break down the ties of people with their
duly constituted government, and to do so by a strategy of attrition (lassitude or
weariness). Such movements are not very selective about what it takes to accomplish
this, and the intensity of attacks will vary (sometimes being quite focused). They will
seize upon any source of discontent among the people to rally support for the
"movement" -- a hatred of anything. In other words, resistance movements are not
politically well-organized, at least at first, in their so-called "passive" stage.
Insurgencies benefit from chaos, mob violence, societal breakdown, and psychological
turmoil. The (usually) charismatic leadership of an insurgency doesn't really provide
vision or guidance, other than to excite the people into action - militant action where
somebody gets killed or property gets destroyed. Leaders gain prestige by how quickly
they can mobilize people into action, and most groups use multiple leaders since the
movement would be doomed if a single leader were assassinated. Note that this is not
leaderless resistance (as found in some forms of terrorism); instead, it is the concept of
collective leadership.

At some point, the resistance movement selects an ideology that has great appeal to
the most number of people. Often, this ideology is copied in whole or part from the
literature on anti-colonialism or anti-imperialism (e.g., Lenin, Mao, Guevarra,
liberation theology, etc.). Ideological conflicts will inevitably arise within the movement
because the group must be vague enough for broad appeal and specific enough to
address important issues. Additionally, insurgents will have to be ambiguous about how
they plan to accommodate differences among the various groups within society once
they do come to power and get the chance to institute reforms. It is extremely difficult
to sort through the ideological machinations of an insurgent movement; and it is also
extremely important to distinguish the true ideals that fuel the movement from
propaganda. In the secondary stages of an insurgency, armed conflict becomes less
important than the practice of psychological warfare.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Insurgency and counter-insurgency are asymmetric forms of non-traditional

warfare. The insurgents are fighting for the most effect with limited resources, and the
counter-insurgents are fighting for the hearts and minds of the population. In this sense,
both sides are engaged in PsyOps (Psychological Operations), also abbreviated PSYOP
or PSYWAR (psychological warfare). A psychological warfare campaign is a war of the
mind, and involves the use of communication, television, radio, loudspeakers, leaflets,
newspapers, books, magazines, music, and posters to deliver a message that supports
loyalty to the objectives of those in power. In a technical sense, PsyOps are not a form of
force, but a force multiplier that uses nonviolent means in a violent environment. On
the other hand, PsyOps have been a recognized weapon of war ever since Alexander the
Great. Today, the U.S. military recognizes three kinds of PsyOps:

• Tactical -- addressed to a specific group of insurgents or an identifiable enemy

• Strategic -- a carefully planned campaign against a larger target audience or
population
• Consolidation -- aimed at assisting civil authorities to restore law and order

The use of propaganda is a prominent feature of psychological warfare, and the CIA,
among others, often classify propaganda as one of three kinds. So-called "black"
propaganda consists of planted material that makes it look like the enemy insurgents are
bad people. Doctored sound- or video-recordings of them saying they don't really care
about their own people or that they are cross-dressing perverts are some examples.
Then, there's "white" propaganda, which is usually easy to obtain and verifiable, that
can truthfully point out how bad the other side is. The population would be informed,
for example, that an insurgent leader has six illegitimate kids with women from the
other side. Finally, there's "grey" propaganda, of the half-truth, half-falsity variety,
otherwise known as misinformation or blowback. Grey PsyOps involve cover and
deception, and are sometimes extremely complex and intricate affairs.

The most frequently used means of

conducting PsyOps are by radio broadcast
and by dropping leaflets. During World
War II, the Soviets and Germans dropped
leaflets containing sexual propaganda,
suggesting to the citizenry that the enemy
behind the front lines were ravishing the
native women. North Koreans still use this
technique today to keep their soldiers
stirred up. The U.S. has a formal ban on
sexual propaganda, and prefers to drop
simple leaflets letting the citizenry know
which radio frequencies to tune into, for
example, like the leaflet shown. Numerous
libraries of leaflet drops over Iraq can be
found on the Internet.

Similar leaflets were dropped over Afghanistan, Kosovo, Grenada, Somalia,

Vietnam, during the first Gulf War, and the Invasion of Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom,
2002-03). Leaflet varieties range from the simple "Surrender or Die" theme to "Safe
Passage" tickets for deserters when hostilities are most active, and information leaflets,
loudspeaker teams, and radio broadcasts tend to replace leaflets when hostilities are
declining.

Radio and television broadcasts for the "hearts and minds" of people, in terms of
propaganda and counter-propaganda, have reached new level of sophistication in recent
years. Most viewers are familiar with Radio Free Europe, for example, but Clandestine
Radio Watch tracks the surging development of this phenomena worldwide. In 2004,
the United States launched a Virginia-based, satellite TV station known as Al Hurra (the
Free One) which is intended to be a fair and balanced answer to outlets like Al Jazeera,
the Qatar-based satellite network that fans so much anti-Americanism in the Middle
East. The U.S.-funded Al Hurra channel cost $60 million in seed money plus $40 million
added by Congress to get started, but it reaches 80% of Iraq's population with over-air
transmitters. The former Iraqi regime's (Saddam Hussein's) state-owned television
station was taken over by a U.S. venture group, out of San Diego (SAIC, or Science
Applications International Corp.) that now calls itself Al Iraqiya and resembles Al
Jazeera in many ways. Both Al Jazeera and Al Iraqiya are broadcast 24/7 in Arabic. Al
Jazeera is considered by many in the Arab world as the "voice of truth" because, despite
repeated requests by the U.S. to the Emir of Qatar (who subsidizes Al Jazeera to the
tune of $30 million a year), the Emir keeps repeating he believes in freedom of the press
and Al Jazeera enjoys total freedom. From time to time, Al Jazeera receives videotapes
from Osama bin Laden and/or Ayman Al-Zawahiri, which they edit before airing. U.S.
requests for the original, uncut, raw tapes go unanswered.

The Problem with Television Stations

Television stations as a tool in the war on terrorism may have limited
effectiveness, and in fact, may produce countereffective reactions (if the broadcasts
are seen as too strongly tilted or too dull). In the Middle East, for example, where
over 100 TV stations exist, Al Hurra tends to rely upon the attractiveness of their
female news reporters (which backfires) as a way to counter dullness, and other
news reporting is seen as too strongly tilted pro-American. Effectiveness might be
increased by abandoning any attempts at "real-time" news reporting, abandoning
entertainment programming, and just sticking to documentaries and educational
programming. A strong web site also helps with today's media.

To be successful at winning over the "hearts and minds" of a populace, the best
strategy is to utilize many different, interagency efforts and initiatives. These joint and
independent efforts all need to be effectively coordinated, and in this regard, see the
GAO Report on Interagency Coordination relative to countering Arab anti-
Americanism. Propaganda can have a "thermostat effect" which heats up or cools
down a crisis, and propaganda can also have a "wildfire effect" when it gets out of
control and produces long-term, unpredictable effects. Some of these long-term,
undesirable effects include the creation of zealots who, years after a crisis, are still
carrying out hate crime against a demonized enemy of years ago. Other extremists may
construct conspiracy-type distortions based on "outdated" ideas from earlier
propaganda. Certain beliefs and attitudes, emotions and feelings, can rather easily lead
to political extremism and fanaticism. Many of the crazies and fanatics in the world
today exist because some government, somewhere, engaged in propaganda. It's a
dangerous, dirty business, and no self-respecting government ought to engage in it
because it borders on being state criminality (Johns & Borreo 1991).

THE VARIETY OF INSURGENTS

Insurgents are referred to by many names: insurrectionists (defying authority at

every turn), revolutionaries (seeking the creation of a new government), dissidents
(seeking the return of an old or exiled government), secessionists (seeking the
establishment of a spin-off state), extremists (creating general mayhem and chaos),
militias (paramilitary groups trying to keep the peace), and gangs (groups organized
for criminal purposes). There's a variety of many more names, and one can often use
whatever they feel most comfortable with -- rebels or insurgents -- to refer to the many
different groups that spring up. There are also fugitives from justice, as in the case
when you have war criminals that have melted into the countryside.

In any country with an insurgency problem, there's usually one or two main rebel
groups, which themselves may have a variety of spin-off groups, called factions (a
dissenting group within a dissent group), splinter groups (who have broken away
completely from a main group), cliques (small exclusive groups), or juntas (a political
or military faction). Spin-off groups tend to also, like terrorists, create cadres (small
cells of people organized for rapid expansion) and cabals (small cells of people,
sometimes related, organized for secrecy). Militias are the most problematic of spin-off
groups, as they, like some of the other groups, can be right wing or left wing; that is,
pro-regime or anti-regime; supporting the collapsing government or opposing the
collapsing government. These people generally police the streets in the name of their
cause, and if they are right wing (supporting the existing government) and hunt down
other groups, they are engaged in a form of vigilante counter-insurgency. However,
their atrocities may be worse than those of the former regime itself, hence the need for
reigning in vigilantism.

State support or sponsorship of an insurgency by an outside (host) nation is a regular

part of foreign policy, and is called a proxy war. Such outside support is usually given
for geopolitical reasons, and may involve assistance with weapons, money, material, or a
safe place to organize and train (safe haven). Diasporas, or immigrant communities
established in foreign countries, frequently support insurgencies in their homeland.
Refugees, guerrilla movements, religious organizations, wealthy individuals, and even
human rights organizations have all been involved in supporting insurgencies, for a
variety of reasons.

Counter-insurgency operations are sometimes referred to as peacekeeping

operations, and are generally launched by another nation or group of nations (like the
U.N. or NATO) as part of a humanitarian relief effort. More precisely, the goal is to: (1)
get the existing government or militias to cease atrocities (usually accomplished by air
strikes); (2) get opposing sides to agree to a cease fire or disarmament (usually
accomplished by sending in diplomats); and (3) restore some sense of civil law and order
(usually accomplished by sending in criminal justice experts). Humanitarian relief is put
in place whenever it's safe to do so.

STRATEGIC NATION REBUILDING

It's important to make at least some distinctions between nation rebuilding and
standard warfare or other war-like actions which are bound by the dictum that "if you
blow things up, you have to rebuild it." Since at least the 1945 War with Japan, the
standard expectation has been that, after an invasion or occupation, annexation of
territory may take place and/or the establishment of a friendly government will occur.
This has been the traditional American approach as a "liberator" instead of an
"occupier" [for occupation law and its relation to nation rebuilding, see Lecture on
OPLAW]. Although the U.S. has some experience, since MacArthur in Japan and
rebuilding Germany after WWII, at provisional or interim "constitutional-like"
methods, these successes have relied primarily upon roundtables or revolving doors
where at least some previous regime legality is left in place, in accordance with
international law mandating preservation of the status quo. The U.S. is not yet skillfully
experienced with what might be called "total nation rebuilding" where the breakdown
has involved the loss of both legitimacy and legality. Nation rebuilding in such climates
usually result from an OOTW (Operation Other Than War) or Low-Intensity Conflict,
and can involve some extreme tactical resistance (Gallagher 1992; Poole 2004) which
takes a long time to deal with.

Nation rebuilding has the defining feature of mixing military and civilian forces,
particularly in areas involving justice, negotiation, or dispute resolution. Military forces
should never be deployed alone to engage in nation building. One of the most basic of all
rules in international law is that you don't wage war on civilians, but in the sense of an
occupier's "war on chaos" or "war on crime," that's exactly what certain occupations
do. The insurgents are going to try and kidnap or kill as many innocent civilians as they
can, and the counter-insurgents are going to be unable to distinguish criminals from
combatants. It's true what Max Weber (1914/1978) said about legitimacy -- neither pure
imposition nor pure agreement will achieve it. If you use strong-arm military tactics,
you run the risk of uniting all the different factions, and then you've got a guerilla war
on your hands. If you act too slowly or softly, a chain reaction takes place, and you've
got countless acts of mob violence on your hands. To do nation rebuilding effectively,
you need to have power and legitimacy. For power, there has to be an overwhelming
police (mixed with military) presence. The RAND corporation estimates that twenty
(20) security personnel for every thousand (1000) inhabitants is sufficient to establish
such a presence, and produces no question about "who's in control" especially when
combined with a massive gun control effort. Other experts say you only need ten (10)
security personnel for every thousand (1000) inhabitants, especially if those personnel
are specialists and coming from an all-volunteer military. Whatever the size of your
force, your next step is to establish legitimacy, and conventional wisdom has it that, at
least according to Elster's (1994) notion, you've got to establish electoral freedom and an
interim constitution (called "midstream legitimacy") that eventually leads to adherence
for the principles of plurality, publicity, and legality (called "upstream legitimacy"). The
following are some other selected ideas on the topic -- presented as option A and option
B.

Option A (Selective Intervention): You can let the civil violence run its course, or at
least let selected acts of insurrection go unpunished. There's actually a school of thought
that supports this idea of just letting things run its course. International law, despite
whatever other values it may contain, requires a certain amount of tolerance. The
principles of national sovereignty and noninterference mean that one nation doesn't
normally interfere in the internal affairs of another nation, and the trick is to tolerate
those parts of an insurrection that have the most to do with internal affairs (such as
family or real estate issues). This strategy, of course, rewards the insurgency, and it will
probably escalate to horrible dimensions. It will be terrible to see all those dead bodies
and faces of starving children on the television screen every night (the CNN effect), but
sometimes it's prudent to let the civil unrest reach its natural conclusion, and let the
indigenous people of that country handle it themselves, much like a natural disaster --
such as a flood, earthquake, or volcanic disruption -- with the rebuilding effort focused
on recovery of things that matter (such as health services, critical resources, and
humanitarian relief). Playing out this strategy runs the risk of being labeled a
colonialist exploiter (which is what you'd definitely be accused of if you partitioned the
country into separate zones or provinces), but being called bad names is something
you're going to be accused of anyway, even in humanitarian situations (needy nations
sometimes resent receiving charity). It may be better to preserve your economic vital
interests than save your political face or try to achieve political solutions in an
insurgency situation. The U.S. democratic system doesn't travel well, and democracy
cannot be exported wholesale to some other place. It must be a product of
internal domestic development in a society. There are actually degrees of "letting
things run its course" and most nations, do not, of course, ever follow the fully extreme,
non-interventionist route. Far more likely to happen is that, with a relatively ignored
insurgency, there will be more directed and targeted violence at expatriates, foreigners,
and other targets of opportunity, and there is the risk that violence will spill over into
internecine conflict on other lands.

Option B (Fiscal Law approach): You can engage in both humanitarian and political
rebuilding in the form of leaving behind better roads, schools, food, hospitals, etc., and
civilized nations adhering to the principle of civility have always thought that these
"pre-political" acts of kindness and love will have important consequences for human
dignity. The problem, however, is that during active upheavals of social upheaval, most
humanitarian aid will be intercepted and monopolized by one or more of the insurgency
groups. It can be almost guaranteed that the food, first aid, and supplies will never get in
the hands of those starving children you saw on television. Insurgency groups have even
been known to kidnap and execute Red Cross or Christian groups trying to get
humanitarian aid into the country. Protection of humanitarian aid efforts and/or the
notion that a threat to human rights anywhere is a threat to human rights everywhere
are the only two good reasons for mounting an enforced humanitarian aid operation. In
fact, it may be precisely at this point in the endgame -- when humanitarian efforts fail --
when it is time for the occupying power to "dump" the rebuilt nation on the world's lap
-- or perform the handoff in some politically feasible manner. It's important to
emphasize exactly how politically correct the handoff must appear because dumping
must not appear to have occurred. However, it will always appear to be done abruptly,
and it is never perfect. No transition plan in the world is likely to be satisfactory to all
parties. If you leave an interim government in power assisted by your advisors, it will
quickly be seen as having no legitimacy (a puppet government). Your hardest choice
may involve a complete pull-out or withdrawal, leaving what precious few democratic
institutions you've built in place and subject to fate. Your worst fate may involve a
seemingly unsolvable refugee problem, and refugees flock not only out of safety but in
order to obtain any handouts. Over 7 million refugees have been restricted or
segregated in camps or settlements for a decade or longer (e.g., 300,000 Angolans in
Zambia, Congo-Kinshasa, and Namibia; 2 million Afghans in Iran and Pakistan;
100,000 Bhutanese in Nepal; and 500,000 refugees from Sudan).

Although far from a blueprint for nation-rebuilding (if anything like a perfect
"blueprint" existed), the example of Iraq's Coalition Provisional Authority is
illustrative of the magnitude involved in re-establishing a nation from scratch. Iraq's
CPA is based on the idea of restoring the ministerial form of government in transitional
form. Ministries are the same as executive cabinet agencies, and they should have the
power to propose laws that are approved by a temporary civilian administrator. As
long as we are discussing the concept of what since 2002 has been called the idea of
"Provincial (Provisional) Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), it might also be important to
point out that, as Schnaubelt (2005-06), that tensions are inherent whenever "civilian"
and "military" responsibilities intersect when attempting to implement frameworks or
models. The organization chart which follows should be illustrative:

THE POST-INSURGENCY BREAKDOWN OF SOCIAL ORDER

Let's take a look at exactly what's involved in a country after an insurgency problem.
Some of these are similar to crime problems, but they go way beyond that to describe
the total breakdown of a country. There's usually a lot of the following going on:

• murder -- innocent people are killed by the thousands

• genocide -- sometimes a whole ethnic or religious group is wiped out
• child abuse and neglect -- children are beaten, killed, or starved to death
• homelessness -- homeowners are thrown out of their homes
• robbery -- anyone found outside is beaten and robbed
 • rape -- the whole family system breaks down; any female is fair game
• enslavement -- hostages are taken for sexual or personal purposes
• torture -- cruel and unusual methods of pain are inflicted on thousands
• executions -- wholesale groups of people are lined up for firing squads
• no police protection -- armed vigilantees and militias will roam the streets

The regular police will have all disbanded, fled into the hills, or been absorbed into
some militia group, divided up along ethnic lines, or worse yet, become an even more
reactionary, counter-counter insurgency group. It should be obvious that one of the
main purposes of counter-insurgency is to restore legal order, to act as some sort of
international police force. However, no military service in the world is designed for this
purpose. The military is trained to take and hold territory, not demonstrate how proper
search and seizure techniques ought to work. By the time you get any kind of ground
force in place, it's too late to conduct any crime prevention or community oriented
policing. A military occupation force is definitely needed to provide stabilization and
restore order.

The CIA did a study in 1994, called the State Failure Task Force Report, the findings
of which coincide with the findings of Kaplan (1994) and Rotberg (2003), which helped
to determine what the primary factors were that lead to total social breakdown. They
determined three primary factors:

• international trade -- most of the countries that fell into chaos were drowning
in debt and had depleted all their natural resources. They had nothing to export
that other countries wanted, and they had to borrow money from IMF to import
even the most basic things that would give their citizens a decent standard of
living.
• infant mortality -- overpopulation, urbanization, overcrowding, stillborn
deaths, crib deaths, and fatal childhood diseases characterized most child-raising.
No food, water, product, or environmental safety was in place. Disease was
rampant. Medical professionals, like anyone with advanced degrees, had long left
the country in a brain drain.
• undemocratic elections -- the government and people just couldn't seem to
implement the idea of honest and fair elections. Whole ethnic groups were
excluded, elections were rigged, and ballots were either undercounted or
overcounted. Tribalism and vigilante responses to crime and disorder were
prevalent.

Seventy percent (70%) of all insurgency problems can be predicted with just the first
three factors, two years in advance. When a country breaks down, it becomes prime
breeding ground for criminal organizations, terrorist training camps, and an economy
of smuggling. It's not a pretty site when a country breaks down, but the interesting
sociological question is whether social order breaks down. Chances are that some
customs, folkways, and norms will remain, and the temptation of theocracy is that mores
will cohere these remaining social building blocks into some sense of theodicy or
predictability. In a post-insurgency situation, the people will flock to the religious
institutions even more than before. A diversity of religious institutions is therefore
important to have in place, or at least some other social institutions that provide
countervaling values. The more secular and this-worldly an occupying power leaves a
re-built nation, the better.

THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE

During the Cold War between Communism and Capitalism, both the Soviets and the
U.S. played an enormous number of games, or proxy battles, by stirring up trouble,
supporting insurgent groups, and generally meddling in the internal affairs of other
nations. Neither side in the Cold War really had to look hard for places to stir up
trouble, as the whole world is full of numerous places where ethnic unrest, territorial
disputes, and communal conflicts have existed for centuries. Such places throughout the
world can be called cultural cleavages, and many of them go back as far as the
Ottoman Empire or any other major war where territories were broken up in treaties.

The U.N. Charter specifies that all societies have some stake in each other. It speaks of
human rights and self-determination. Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter specifically
authorizes the use of an international military presence for the formation of an
international civil administration. This is called the establishment of a provisional
government until an indigenous government can be reestablished. The U.N. declares
peacekeeping operations by passing various Resolutions. At any given time, the U.N. has
about a dozen such active Resolutions, which means there are 12 peacekeeping
operations going on someone in the world.

Another item that triggers action, sometimes unilateral action, is the CNN effect, or
when people get sick and tired of seeing starving children and needless bloodshed on
television. It's unknown exactly how the news networks like CNN decide upon which
stories to cover, but sometimes special coverage of some troubled area of the world
produces the political will for some civilized nation to act. Other times, civil unrest can
go on for decades (such as the Sudan or Afghanistan) or be especially current (such as
Chechnya), and the public will not be moved by any amount of media coverage.

SELECTED INSURGENCIES AND COUNTER-INSURGENCIES

CONGO -- In 1994, an aircraft was about to land in Rwanda carrying the Presidents
of Rwanda and Burundi. The plane was attacked upon landing by political extremists,
killing both Presidents. The population of Rwanda at the time was 90% Hutu and 10%
Tutsi. The distinction between Hutu and Titsi is no apparent from culture, language,
appearance, or name. The Tutsi were warriors and cattle herders, favored by the
German and Belgian colonial administration who gave them special identity cards. The
Hutu were farmers who came to power in 1962 when the colonists left. After the plane
attack, extremist Hutu groups formed to assault the more moderate Hutu and try to
wipe out the Tutsi. As the crisis played out, the Tutsi received military support from
Uganda and seized control of Rwanda, but not before 800,000 Tutsi had been killed.
Millions of Hutu were killed or drove out into Zaire. Zaire changed its name to Congo
after accommodating so many of the refugees from the Rwanda massacre, or genocide.
In 2001, the President of the Congo was assassinated. This is a good example of total
breakdown and an area still ravaged by the legacy of unmet justice.

INDONESIA -- In 1997, the entire Asian financial market collapsed. All Asian
countries from South Korea downward to Malaysia were involved in a central Asian
bank that managed exchange rates, loans, and a stock exchange. The collapse was due to
a tradition of loose regulation and political favoritism that resulted in many bad loans.
Most Asian currency was floating high against the dollar prior to 1997, so foreign
investment flowing in from the West was converted to local currency with high interest
rates of return. This had the effect of inflating the stock and national assets of Asian
countries. When investors and the IMF came to believe that the high values of Asian
stock were artificially inflated, speculative pressures rapidly eroded value to a point well
below any international rate of exchange, so that even in American money, debts could
not be paid off nor could any return on investments be given. The IMF cut off loans to
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea. Indonesia was the first to see
insurgency violence on account of this. In 1998, native Indonesians started attacking
Chinese immigrants, seeing them as a scapegoat. In 1999, militia groups, assisted by
rogue army units, terrorized the civilian population of East Timor, in the wake of an
election on independence. This is an example of an emerging democracy attempting to
emerge.

SOMALIA -- This country was originally a Soviet satellite which switched to the
American side after the Soviets backed their enemy, Ethiopia, in a 1977-78 war.
Ethiopia, with Russian and Cuban backing, won that war, and seriously undermined the
legitimacy of the Somalian government. Somalia borrowed some $3 billion to fund
agriculture exports to Saudi Arabia, but ended up depleting their soil during the 1980s,
and started having trouble paying back the debt. In 1991, the leader of Somalia, Siad
Barre, abandoned rule and fled the country. Various militia groups and clan warlords
took over the country, executing at least 350,000 civilians. Italy tried to step in, as did
Djibouti and Egypt, with some success as keeping things relatively quiet, but pictures of
mass starvation in 1992 led the U.N. to invoke Chapter 7 and send a military force of
500 Pakistani soldiers in. All 500 of them were quickly captured, held prisoner, and
many were executed. Algeria stepped in, but ended up siding with warlords against the
U.N. With the start of 1993, the U.S., with U.N. approval, sent in a Marine
Expeditionary Force of 28,000 troops, but American television viewers were soon
treated to the sight of a dead marine being dragged behind a truck speeding through the
town of Mogadishu. Diplomatic and humanitarian efforts failed, with all aid going into
the hands of two warlords, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aideed. All in all,
18 American Marines were killed in 1993, so the U.S. withdrew. The U.N. has sent in
numerous peacekeeping forces since then, and the U.S. Rangers conducted an
unsuccessful secret manhunt mission for the worst of the warlords, but the country has
remained without a government since 1991. This is an example of a country that has
descended into chaos.

YUGOSLAVIA -- This country has always had a communist orientation and been a
friend of the Soviets, but toward the end of the Cold War, around 1990, it started
warming up to capitalism, and the IMF let them borrow $20 billion, which they
promptly wasted away. They also did nothing to manage their ethnic diversity.
Yugoslavia is a nation of Serbs, but the Serbs exist in other countries also. The first sign
of trouble appeared in BOSNIA during 1991 between the Serbs there (French-speaking
Serbs) and the Croatians (a Muslim group that was given their land by the Germans).
Factions broke out between Serbs, Croatians, and Muslims, starting in Croatia,
spreading to Slovenia, and then to Bosnia. The Serbs were the minority group in all
three countries, and with Yugoslavian backing, starting artillery assaults on the cities of
the majority groups. The United States sided with the Muslim and Croatian groups, but
didn't commit ground troops until 1995. By that time, millions of Croatians and
Slovenians had been killed or displaced. In Bosnia, Serb troops also kidnapped and
highjacked humanitarian aid supplies. In 1999, the problem area shifted to KOSOVO
where the factions were between ethnic Serbs and the majority Albanians. The
Yugoslavian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, whipped up Serbian nationalism, and all the
police and political institutions in Kosovo became Serbian. Albania and Macedonia
promised to stay out of it while the U.S. sent diplomats. Again, humanitarian relief
workers were kidnapped or killed. The U.N. had granted discretionary power to the
Secretary-General, but the U.N. Security Council was deadlocked, so NATO undertook
an air strike operation against Milosevic, assuming U.N. authority. It was the first
offensive operation NATO, a defensive organization, ever undertook. The operation
almost brought Russia into the fray, but they had their own insurgency problem in
Chechnya and elsewhere. This is an example of the difficulties in rebuilding.

IRAQ -- When the coalition forces liberated Iraq from its regime in 2003, there was a
period of civil unrest, including looting, which was allowed to run its course for a short
while. Then, the counter-insurgency effort shifted to the priority of capturing the
fugitive war criminals. To assist in this effort, the Defense Department printed up a
small number of playing cards with the faces of these war criminals on them. The use of
such playing cards was an old military tradition that the DIA wanted to re-implement.
The cards were called Personality Identification Playing cards, and for the Iraqi Top 55,
they looked like the following:

LESSONS FROM NATION-REBUILDING IN IRAQ & AFGHANISTAN

There is perhaps nothing more important on the world stage than the outcomes of
constitutional institutions and processes in states which have been rebuilt. Also
important are the long-range implementions of sovereignty, sustainment, and freedom.
If Iraq manages to succeed in this process, it will have become a shining beacon of
freedom in the Middle East, and if not that, at least a testimonial to those soldiers who
gave their lives. The following are some basic elements needed for a Constitution-based
freedom tailored for a Middle Eastern country. Exactly how these basic elements are
spelled out in the actual wording of a Constitutional process is not important; what's
important is that the values are codified.
 A democratic government based on a federalist model - Swiss, German, or
American, it doesn't matter which one - where all the separate states and provinces
are unified and drawn upon geographical lines rather than ethnic lines; where
minority rights are guaranteed - such as the Kurdistan model of allotting a specific
number of parliamentary seats to key minority groups; where there is also a
guarantee of equality for all people, including women and built-in rights for women
in regards to things such as polygamy and honor killings; where rational economic
planning and fair distributions of oil profits are considered; and the government
operates in ways that are consistent with Islamic values without being subservient to
theocratic law.

Numerous resources need brought to bear on any such project, particularly social
science and analytical expertise. On the former, North Carolina's Research Triangle
Institute (RTI) got the $167 million contract for rebuilding the local governance
infrastructure in Iraq, and they effectively use their survey data-gathering skills to
develop some consensus on what the people there want and/or need. They also conduct
training sessions for Iraqi officials on how to build democratic (meaning transparent
and accountable) institutions important to the political economy. RTI's approach is
known as "democratic decentralization" which is a type of institution building based on
analytical identification of diverse interest groups and selection of leaders for those
groups. No self-nominations or interviews are conducted to select leaders as the whole
idea is to create a system of checks and balances by having many relatively powerless
leaders rather than having a few popular warlords gain power. Warlordism was a
problem with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and militias and cadres of this type
need to be analyzed or looked at from both exogenous and endogenous viewpoints
(Thomas, Kiser & Casebeer 2005). Warlordism (as thuggish units) usually don't have
the attitude, structure, or effectiveness of professional military units, or insurgents, but
they are nonetheless masters of the more "criminal" realms of a society. The whole trick
with a nation the size of Iraq, like Afghanistan, is to develop some type of federalism
model, in which you have decentralized authority in provinces and towns, but
centralized authority in the nation's capital. Rebuilding efforts depend heavily upon
what engineers from companies like Halliburton and five other companies can do to get
the infrastructure for basic services, like transportation, electricity, water and sewage,
agriculture, health, and education up and running again. Lots of other contractors are
involved in both construction projects, small business development, and the tasks of
management consulting; companies like Aegis Defense Services, DynCorp, Erinys
International, and Vinnell Corp.

THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE MILITARY, RESERVISTS, AND CIVILIANS

It's not well-known, but a rather large industry has evolved from the old days of guns-
for-hire mercenaries, and these Private Military Firms (PMFs) play a key role on the
global stage in doing jobs that, in many cases, involve insurgencies and tasks too
dangerous for regular soldiers to do. Singer (2003) was the first to document the rise of
this industry which he called the "coalition of the billing." Private soldiers may be
especially useful when a low-profile force is needed to solve an awkward, potentially
embarrassing situation that develops on the fringes of policy. It is also the case that the
death of private soldiers don't carry the same political baggage as the death of American
G.I.s. As of 2005, there are as many as 60 different security firms doing private military
work for the U.S. government. A significant presence exists in places like Latin America
(to fight the drug war), and PMFs account for at least 30% of the work being done in
Iraq. Firms like MPRI and Blackwater USA can provide not only tactical and strategic
services, but "boots on the ground" as armed security escorts for peacekeeping
operations. Some PMFs, like Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR), provide military support
services, such as delivering military equipment, preparing meals for soldiers, delivering
mail, and putting out oil-field fires, as well as handle inprocessing and outprocessing of
personnel in and out of the region. Some, like CACI, have assisted with interrogations
of prisoners, although not without some scandal. Others, like DynCorp (who have
removed their web presence) have also been involved in scandal, but continue to play a
rather large role overseas and at home (administering the Justice Department's asset
forfeiture program, for example). Still others, like the now-defunct Executive
Outcomes, engage in actual combat using former soldiers. During the first Gulf War,
one of every 100 Americans in that region worked for a PMF. Today in Iraq, one of
every 10 Americans works for a private military contractor. Since there are only a
limited number of military reservists that can be called up for active duty (a politically
unpopular option), PMFs provide the outsourcing often needed to conduct effective
nation re-building. For the most part, these firms operate very professionally, and only
a small number of "bad apples" have been involved in scandals.

PMFs should NOT be considered mercenaries because mercenaries are prohibited by

the Geneva Convention. Most private soldiers have military training, usually special
forces training, and while some came out of retirement for patriotism, others are
attracted to the money. Private soldiers can make more than $250,000 a year. The U.S.
government is billed around $1,000 per man per day, but that is still cost-effective for
the U.S. because there are no recruitment, education, or training costs. That is also a
bargain compared to what foreign-based PMFs charge. Over 50 different countries
have such firms (some of which should perhaps be called mercenaries), and these foreign
firms charge as much as $2 million a month or $40 million a year to make some rebel or
insurgency problem "go away."

The Reserves consist of seven groups and even include retirees: the Army National
Guard; the Army Reserve; the Naval Reserve; the Marine Corps Reserve; the Air
National Guard; the Air Force Reserve; and the Coast Guard Reserve. Reservists work
for the federal government while the National Guard works for state government, and
neither group has any choice under Title 10 of the U.S. Code to activate if called, but
they can volunteer if they like. The Secretary of Transportation can also (under Title
14) call up the Coast Guard Reserve, but they can only be used domestically, and for 30
days. The following table lists the three most common ways in which Reservists are
called up: PRC standing for Presidential Reserve Call-up, which means for mission
purposes the President has deemed required; Partial Mobilization meaning a war or
national emergency exists; and Full Mobilization meaning Congress has declared war,
and every able-bodied man (or woman) between the ages of 17 and 45 (the unorganized
militia) is eligible to be called-up.

PRC Partial Mobilization Full Mobilization

10 USC 12304 10 USC 12302 10 USC 12301(a)
Authority
(Presidential) (Presidential) (Congressional)
Number Subject 200,000 (of whom not 1,000,000 Unlimited
 to Involuntary more than 30,000 may
Call-Up be "Inactive" reserve)
Reserve
Selected Reserve (Units, Ready Reserve Total Reserve (Units, IMAs,
Categories
IMAs, AGRs) and (Units, IMAs, AGRs, IRR/ING, Retirees,
Subject to Call-
certain IRR members AGRs, IRR/ING) Standby Reserve)
Up
Length of Time Duration of War plus 6
270 days 24 months
of Call-Up months

Civilians find many ways and places to contribute to post-conflict situations (but
they can also meddle and do otherwise). One of the lessons learned with post-conflict
Iraq is that civilians should NOT generally be used to train security forces, at least
initially. This is a job best left to the military. However, if "capacity building" is
important (as it always is in any framework of post-conflict reconstruction), there is a
need for civilian involvement, at least in the less law enforcement-related aspects of
criminal justice. As many books (e.g., Schnabel & Ehrhart 2005) and the CSIS
Framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (pdf) make clear, security is only one of
four pillars of reconstruction principles, all four as follows:

• security -- all aspects of a safe and secure environment must be addressed,

covering both collective and individual security, and most pressingly, securing
the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence, and the restoration
of territorial integrity. This pillar is a precondition for success outcomes in the
other pillars.
• justice/reconciliation -- the need for an impartial and accountable legal system
must be addressed, including a system for dealing with past abuses. Effective law
enforcement, fair laws, an open judicial system, humane corrections systems, and
both formal and informal grievance mechanisms are hallmarks of this pillar.
This pillar is often talked about as restoring "capacity" for the rule of law and is
sometimes guided by restorative justice principles.
• social/economic well-being -- fundamental social and economic needs must be
met, including emergency relief, restoration of essential services, laying the
foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of sustainable development.
• governance/participation -- legitimate and effective political and administrative
institutions and processes need to be in place, ideally incorporating a
representative constitutional structure, a strong public sector management corps,
and the creation of an active and open civil society which plays a role in keeping
government in check.

INTERNET RESOURCES
Africa Watch
Clandestine Radio Watch
CNN Special on Algeria's Insurgency Problem
CNN Special Report on Bosnia, Kosovo, and Yugoslavia
Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)
Crisis States Programme
CSIS PostConflict Reconstruction Project
East Timor: Another Somalia in the Making
Freedom Fighters, Dissidents, and Insurgents
George Mason's Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution
Global Policy Forum's Guide to Peacekeeping Operations
Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery
Jane's IntelWeb List of Insurgency Groups
Lyco's Infoplease on Indonesia
Palgrave Macmillan's Online Resource Center
Project on Insurgency, Terrorism, and Security
Psychological Operations and Psychological Warfare
Shock and Awe on the Air (Radio Broadcasts in Iraq)
Theoretical Aspects of Insurgency in the Contemporary World
Tom Barnett's Website (Pentagon's New Map)
U.N. Peacekeeping Website
Univ. New Brunswick's Guide to Peacekeeping Operations
US Army Center for Lessons Learned (secure website)
US Army Peacekeeping Institute at Ft. Carlisle
US CounterInsurgency Operations in Colombia
US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

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Chaplin, A. (2003). Terror: Mao's Legacy and Selected Cases of Terrorism in the 20th and
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[author's website]

Last updated: 04/06/06

Syllabus for JUS 415 (National Security Law)
Syllabus for JUS 427 (Intel Analysis)
Syllabus for JUS 429 (Terrorism)
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 SUPERTERRORISM AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
"The survival of our civilization is entrusted to technology so out of scale with our capacity to
grasp its implications." (Henry Kissinger)

ABC (Atomic, Biological, Chemical warfare - a slightly outdated WWII term) is also
known as NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical), CBRN (Chemical-Biological-
Radiological-Nuclear), WMD (weapons of mass destruction), superterrorism (Sprinzak
1998), or ultimate terrorism (Stern 2000). It involves weapons which have the capability
to extinguish life on the planet, or in other words, serve as doomsday devices, although
such weapons can also be used in a limited manner, as with so-called "biocrimes," for
example, as when a letter containing some agent is mailed to a victim, or as with so-
called "dirty bombs" which are only intended to produce radioactive contamination.
"Super" or "ultimate" terrorism, however, is as bad as terrorism can get. It's real
"Wrath of God" type stuff, involving huge climatic or pandemic events. To evil rogue
states who see no other way out, to lunatic terrorist groups worldwide and domestic, and
to religious fanatics bent on seeing the apocalypse, these are their weapons of choice if
they have crossed the line of moral repugnance about using them. Such weapons are
indiscriminate in who they kill and they get the job done. Biological agents, in
particular, are not only cheap and portable, but weapons with no return address that can
be somewhat easily used in a limited context. As real as the threat is from such
weapons, some experts say there's no need for panic because most terrorists use VPD
(visually pleasing destruction) or cyberterrorism (weapons of mass disruption) instead of
WMD (weapons of mass destruction) because the former produce the best twenty-minute
news story (if the terrorists are of the type concerned about media coverage; e.g.,
crusaders or the like). If history is any guide, producing and/or obtaining such weapons
has been a formidable task for terrorists and for many nations over the twentieth
century (Parachini 2001).

To be sure, many states have crossed the line and used WMD. There have also been
military factions within a sovereign state that took it upon themselves to release WMD,
or use a clandestine, non-state group to do its dirty work. It is the proliferation of such
weapons into the hands of these non-state, sub-national actors that draws the concern
of most experts (Hoffman 1997). The mindset of some terrorists is such that they are
drawn to explosions like arsonists are drawn to fire, so nuclear weapons are their
preferred choice. Other terrorists may have a preference for chemical weapons because
of their long-term incapacitating effect since lots of survivors tend to develop nerve and
brain damage over time. Still other terrorists may have a preference for biological
weapons because of their stealthiness and delayed impact since they mimic the effect of
natural disease outbreaks. There is a need for more scholarly research on this topic as
no one really knows who will use what, when, and where (despite Tom Clancy novels
which usually involve a convention or sports venue).

Chemical (gas) weapons have a long history. The most well-known incident involved
the Japanese cult group, Aum Shin Rikyo (Supreme Truth) who released fatal sarin gas
on the Tokyo subway system in 1995. Toxic gases were also detected by Czech and
Coalition troops during the First Gulf War. At least 25 nations possess complete CBR
capability, and 44 nations are suspected of being in the process of obtaining such
capability. The first chemical weapon used in battle was chlorine gas, which burns and
destroys lung tissue, is easily made from common table salt, and is desirable to use on
the battlefield because the big gas cloud usually wipes out an overpowering enemy.
Modern chemical weapons greater killing power (such as VX nerve toxin), and a lot less
of it is needed to kill vast numbers of people. Despite improvements in protective gear,
there really is no good way to protect people from a large-scale chemical attack.

Biological (germ) weapons were used in 1984 by a religious cult group in Oregon
known as the Rajneeshees, who tried to win a local election by sickening local
townspeople with a strain of salmonella sprayed on the salad bars in local restaurants.
The Bulgarian and South African governments have been known to use biological
materials to kill political opponents, and the 2004 Ukrainian election involved
allegations of poisoning. Biological warfare agents were banned by the U.S. in 1969, but
resurrected in 1990 under Project Clear Vision. The oldest germs are the cheapest and
most lethal -- anthrax, botulism, and the plague. Bacillis anthracis (anthrax) has a 95%
mortality rate, and can attack three ways -- cutaneous, intestinal, and respiratory. The
most well-known incident involving anthrax was the October 2001 case in which
somebody mailed letters containing inhalation spores of anthrax to three news reporters
and two U.S. Senators. The germ, ebola, by contrast, only has a 70% mortality rate and
smallpox 30%. Anthrax spreads easily, although the secrets for powderizing it to
military grade are classified at Ft. Detrick, the nation's biowarfare center. It is believed
that a freeze drying process is used to turn the spores into a powder, and then silica is
added to remove any electrostatic charge, making it more dispersible. One and a half to
three microns in size is the most dangerous. Designer powders are possible, which
includes heavier powders that can be left on the ground to become airborne after
awhile. There is evidence that the Soviets were working on designer germs, which are
created by mixing different kinds of viruses to mutate new organisms. By far, however,
the cheapest and easiest germ to produce is ricin, a toxic, incurable substance produced
as a by-product from the processing of castor beans, which is an easily-found recipe on
the Internet. The mortality rate of ricin varies with the method of delivery. The highest
mortality results from injection of ricin under the skin, and Cold War-espionage stories
abound with tales of spies who used assassination umbrellas that injected a pellet of ricin
from their tips. In 1993, Canadian authorities captured a neo-Nazi from Arkansas with
a carload of ricin trying to cross the border. In 1995, two Minnesota men associated
with a tax-protest group called the Patriots Council were convicted of possessing ricin
with intent to use. In October 2003, someone hand-delivered a package containing Ricin
to a mail-sorting center at a South Carolina airport, with a note complaining about
federal rules mandating 10 hours of rest in every 24 for long-haul truckers. The same
person or group sent traces of Ricin to Senators in 2004. Unlike anthrax, ricin is tough
to aerosolize and inhale, the easiest way to deliver a fatal dose being injection or
ingestion, and you need a lot for the latter.

With nuclear weapons, most concern centers on the former Soviet Union (despite
Nunn-Lugar legislation designed to help enhance Russian security) where so-called
loose nukes or weapons-grade plutonium might slip out. Russia is estimated to have
some 20,000 warheads still assembled, and about 170 tons of plutonium and 900 tons of
HEU (highly enriched uranium). Treaties, such as the 1995 non-proliferation treaty
which 182 nations signed, are regularly violated, and few countries contribute to post
Cold War nuclear security cleanups. CBR warfare does requires intensive intelligence
work on development, deployment, and delivery capabilities, but there is the less-
technical problem and concern regarding dirty bombs, formally called radiological
dispersion devices, which use conventional explosives to fling radioactive isotopes in a
plume of dust which can contaminate at least a 60-square block area. The al Qaeda
terrorist group is known to have made substantial efforts to buy black market isotopes.
Plutonium and weapons-grade uranium are well secured, but that is not true of many
lower-grade nuclear materials required for a dirty bomb. Cesium-137 in the form of
powdered cesium chloride is the most likely substance for a dirty bomb, and it is
commonly found in hospitals and industrial facilities. Other radioactive isotopes are
commonly found. Hospitals and research universities have cesium, strontium, cobalt,
and americium, and traces of americium are also in smoke detectors. Food processing
plants, oil monitoring facilities, and other industries also have devices that use cobalt. In
addition, the U.S. is one of the world's worst offenders regarding nuclear waste. There
are currently about 45,000 tons of nuclear waste stored in 131 sites across the country,
and by 2035, that amount is expected to grow to more than 115,000 tons. Nuclear waste
is usually in the form of spent fuel rods, and is highly radioactive and dangerous, and
will be for tens of thousands of years. Most expects advocate storing all of it under the
Yucca Mountain in Nevada, but first shipments aren't scheduled to arrive there until
2010. Launching nuclear waste into the sun isn't an option, not because it would hurt
the sun, but because using Earth's biggest rocket, the Delta 4, would require about 3,000
trips, and the risk of rocket explosion in Earth's atmosphere would be too great. The
best way to "destroy" HEU is to blend it with proliferation-resistant low-enriched
uranium (LEU).

Outside of Russia, there are additional places where nuclear security isn't up to
standard. Most countries consider US Energy Department security criteria too
demanding. India, for example, hasn't been cooperative, and China has secured only
one civilian reactor. In all, there are 43 countries with more than 100 research reactors
or related facilities that store enough highly enriched uranium nuclear materials to
make several bombs, and only about 20% of these sites are properly secured. Rather
than try to go after fairly better-protected Russian material, a superterrorist is far more
likely to go to India, China, Switzerland, or Italy (or somewhere else with relatively
looser security) and knock off the night watchman, lower the chain-link fence, and drive
off with sufficient materials for a nuclear device. After that comes the easy part of
assembling the nuclear weapon -- the recipe is on the Internet and keeps showing up on
the Internet despite best efforts to "police" the Internet for this kind of thing, and then,
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda are known to have CD-ROMs burned with downloads of
such Internet pages.

Planning & Strategy

The U.S. government has always had response plans in place in case of
superterrorism, and there are several agencies and organizations involved. FEMA
(Federal Emergency Management Agency) has long (since 1992) administered the
Federal Response Plan (FRP, or technically Public Law 93-288 - with additional copy of
FRP at FindLaw, with Amendments since 1997 discussed at FAS, but see reference to
the best left classified National Response Plan or NRP discussed in the box below). The
basic foundational or theoretical basis for having an overall response plan is to more
effectively enable the transition from crisis management (predominantly a law
enforcement response) to consequence management (restoration of services in which the
federal government helps out). While not the neatest organizational chart, let's take a
look at this pre-9/11 planning showing some of the many agencies and departments (27
in all) involved in the overall response.
 All of this changed with the 2001-created Department of Homeland Security, and
subsequent planning has changed the look of planning in general. Regular input now
comes from the scenario/drill/exercises known as TOPOFF (Top Officials) which have
been conducted since 2000. TOPOFF exercises are "no notice" drills that usually last 5-
7 days, and involve fictional attack by fictional terrorist organizations. The 2002
Bioterrorism legislation also has had an inpact, making billions of dollars available to
upgrade local hospital and water systems, increasing the number of smallpox vaccines,
making available potassium iodide tablets for radiation poisoning, and providing
more money to the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile - secret stashes of medicine at
locations throughout the United States. The development of vaccines for each and
every contingency is a current policy priority, but there is still a need to coordinate an
overall response plan.

Current Response Plans

When DHS was created, it was anticipated that DHS would no longer use the
Federal Response Plan (FRP) with FEMA as the coordinating body (Bullock et. al.
2005), and that the DHS directorate of Emergency Preparedness & Response (EP&R)
would develop something of its own. Something called the National Response Plan
(NRP) existed which better embraced the problems of intelligence sharing and multi-
agency, multi-jurisdictional authority with variants of incident command known as
"integrated" (real-time intel sharing) and "unified" (multi-agency/multi-juris), and,
additionally, by 2004, DHS announced something of its own, the National Incident
Managment System (NIMS) - a 152 page pdf document which claims to integrate
and unify the best practices of federal, state, and local incident response. FEMA has
since gotten back into the picture and established a NIMS Homepage which helps
explain, among other things, the importance of DHS's approach to an Incident
Command System (ICS). Emergency workers as well as average citizens can even
take a free, 3-hour online course on NIMS. NIMS is true to the basic principles of
incident command, the real-time intelligence sharing of integrated command, and the
best practices possible in unified command. Although NIMS requires certain
standard operating procedures, there is room for customization in implementation at
the local level (Walsh et. al. 2005).
Current response plans rely heavily upon statewide mutual aid, interstate mutual
aid, and parties to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, which provides
databases and advance teams to match what disaster-struck areas request what
unaffected areas can offer. DHS now also controls the Strategic National Stockpile.
Federal resources, both civilian and military, rally under the National Response Plan
(NRP), which is coordinated by a common framework that was built from the bottom
up -- the Incident Command System. The nation has strong resources, over 155,000
emergency medical technicians, some 600,000 police that can be called up, a million
firefighters, 1.6 million active military and 1.1 million in Reserves/National Guard.
Organizations like the Red Cross can usually muster an additional 50,000 volunteers,
if need be. Interoperability (radios and procedures that work together) has been
vastly improved. The National Response Plan groups agencies by 15 functions, all
coordinated by a "principal federal official" named by the Secretary of DHS, beyond
which "the appropriate White House entity" is in charge for issues that cannot be
handled by DHS.
 In terms of strategy, it should be noted that the U.S. has never ruled out the possibility
of using nuclear weapons in retaliation for biological or chemical attack from a foreign
source. This is not so much for deterrence as it is for reassurance. To understand this
kind of strategic policy, one needs to understand the long-standing practice of nuclear
deterrence, which was the basis of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, a strategy of
preemption is ascendant, the reason being that the only sure way of disintegrating a
stockpile of chemical and biological weapons about to be used is to nuke them. Nuclear
attacks on nuclear targets generally result in immediate destruction but the possibility of
increased harm through radioactive debris fallout is great and must be controlled.

The basic idea of deterrence is to prevent attack by threatening retaliation. The

military definition of deterrence involves a combination of magnitude and probability,
which means a large stockpile of weapons and the willingness to use them in a system of
layered precautions. The game of deterrence works best between two enemies who are
about evenly matched, as in the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Both of
these nations regularly aimed about 2,000 nuclear weapons at each other for many
years. This level of deterrent effect was overkill, as it would have destroyed both
countries completely. On a practical level, all you would need for nations this size is
about 700 nuclear weapons - which would destroy about 50% of the population and
65% of the economic infrastructure. These practical levels are known as plausible
deterrent requirements. Nuclear deterrence, however, works best on the basis of
overkill.

Efforts have been made to reduce the overkill capabilities of the U.S. and Soviet
Union. The START treaties, for example, curtailed the use of multiple warheads, a
prime contributor to overkill. When the Soviet Union broke up, the remaining central
state only retained control over about 20% of the former nation's nuclear capacity. This
meant that efforts had to be made to disarm or disable the remaining 80% of the former
Soviet Union's capacity throughout all the various emerging states and former satellites.
This has been accomplished mostly by disabling than by disarming. For example, the
batteries have been removed from missile guidance systems or the explosive bolt charges
have been removed from the covers of missile silos. Some 70% of the former Soviet
Union's land-based nuclear capability has been disabled or is not being regularly
maintained. We are currently in a START III phase which is aimed at curtailing nuclear
submarine forces by 2010 (although China has upped the submarine arms race in recent
years). Some key principles of the nonproliferation movement are that: Deterrence is
not the same as preventing war; and dismantling is not the same as eliminating war. For
more information on the subject of strategic arms control, see Lecture on International
Arms Restraint.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Chemical weapons are the most common type of CBR warfare. It's estimated that as
much as a third of the world's arsenal consists of chemical weapons, so there's a lot of it
stockpiled. Chemical warfare was first used by the British against the Kurds after the
end of World War I (which was also a gas war). During the 1960's, a chemical war took
place between Egypt and Yemen; during the 1970s, between Vietnam and Laos; during
the 1980s, between Russian and Afghanistan; and in the 1990s, between Iraq and the
U.S. Many chemical wars have gone unnoticed or unreported.
 Chemical weapons are classified by their effects: lethal, choking, hallucinogenic, etc.
They are dispersed by different weapon systems. An exploding weapon system sprays
the area with droplets, intended to contaminate clothing, implements, and terrain. A
dispersion weapons system disperses into the air so finely, the chemical evaporates and
is carried by the air to attack the respiratory system. Doctors and nurses are working
on procedures to handle chemical warfare casualties. The problem is acute since the
agents get on clothing as well as flesh and is easily picked up by those treating the
victims. To date, the most effective treatment for most forms of nerve gas is to get the
soldier to inject him or herself with Atropine (by jabbing a syringe into a major muscle
group, like the leg) soon after exposure. Atropine doesn't work with all agents, and you
become quite sick if you inject it and haven't been exposed. Chemical weapons are
better than biological ones because they're easier to calibrate and far less likely to
spread out and harm friendly personnel.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Biological warfare utilizes toxins, viruses, and bacterial agents. Toxin agents generally
are broken down into two major groups: cytotoxins and neurotoxins (the only major
military neurotoxins being the botulinum series). Toxins work in one of two ways:
postsynaptic and presynaptic. Postsynaptic toxins work by disrupting the nerve signals
at synaptic junctions were nerve endings meet muscle. Presynaptic toxins work by
accelerating the neural activity at synaptic junctions, and then stopping it completely.
Despite minor differences in the agony of death, the effect is the same, complete
muscular paralysis. Victims often drown in their own saliva. Some toxins can be
engineered to effect only a certain part of the body, and these are called necrotic toxins.
So-called "designer" toxins can make your limbs fall off, and others can affect only
certain body organs.

Virus agents infect the human body and work by multiplying or mutating, disrupting
cellular activity and eventually killing the target by massive convulsions or
hemorrhaging. Viruses used in warfare are militarily, bioengineered versions of
naturally occurring strains. Viruses, as opposed to most bacteria, are immune from
antibiotics. Bacterial agents, however, can be grown to resist antibiotics. Bacterial
agents make up more than half the military biological agents (e.g., anthrax, salmonella,
brucella, q-fever, cholera, and plague).

Several nations have engaged in biological warfare even though prohibited by a pact
signed in 1972. As a nation develops its biowarfare capability, there's usually a
recognition that its use is counterproductive. There have been several "near misses" and
accidents in nations' laboratories. The principle response to a biological attack is
nuclear (a kind of spite from the grave strategy), and there's a lot of research into finding
a more defensive way to survive. Biological warfare is too easy to start and too hard to
stop. Terrorists who use it can expect severe retaliation. In 1979, a "meat packing"
accident in Russia released an anthrax epidemic that killed over 1000 people. "Near
misses" have also occurred in American facilities.

Viruses are normally incubated from batches of existing strains found in preserved
tissues of infected bodies, but others are synthesized from published accounts of a
genome. In 2002, for example, New Scientist magazine revealed that scientists created
the first synthetic (man-made) polio virus, and the same technique could be used to
create ebola or the 1918 flu strain. These particular viruses have short DNA key pair
chains, and present technology allows short stretches of DNA to be custom-made. One
can also add key genes of a close relative. Ebola and smallpox replication, however,
requires key viral proteins as well as the genome, but the ebola virus is only slightly
larger than the polio virus. Smallpox has a rather lengthy chain, but its smaller cousins
do not, such as mousepox or camelpox. Anthrax, if it is synthesized, usually is a designer
variant in the small DNA chain variety.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

There are two main type of nuclear weapons: fission (A-bombs) and fusion (H-
bombs). Fission bombs were used on Japan in WWII. In fission bombs, a core of
fissionable material is needed, usually plutonium-239 or uranium-235, both isotopes of
regular plutonium and uranium. It is expensive and time-consuming to make these
isotopes, which are found in about 1% of all regular plutonium and uranium. It takes a
concentration of 20% of these isotopes to be classified as weapons-grade. Anything less
can only be used for nuclear power reactors. HEU, or U-235 can be dissipated by mixing
it with regular uranium, but there's no way to dissipate, dissolve, or dispose of weapons-
grade plutonium. Enriched plutonium isotope is about 90% pure, and if you inject it
into a nuclear reactor, it generates more plutonium.

To make a bomb, a core of weapons-grade material is encased at just below critical

mass (the point where chain reaction occurs). This means 20 pounds of plutonium or 40
pounds of enriched uranium (about the size of a football). A series of conventional
charges are then placed around the casing to go off simultaneously so that the core
implodes, rapidly compressing the core to start a chain reaction. Some types of fission
bombs fire lumps of core material at another lump through tubular guns. Fusion bombs
use a primary fission reaction to trigger a secondary explosion. The fusionable material
(usually a gas) goes "critical" and results in a secondary nuclear explosion. The
combined two-stage explosion is 100 times more powerful than a fission explosion alone.

An alternative to fission or fusion is a "dirty bomb" or radioactivity dispersal device,

a conventional bomb wrapped in radioactive materials that disperse as fallout when the
bomb explodes. Nuclear bombs can be made so small they fit inside a suitcase. Low-
yield nuclear bombs also exist, or what the U.S. military calls MOAB (mother of all
bombs), and you can see a video of one by visiting DefenseLink.

In standard warfare, nuclear weapons are usually NOT detonated at ground zero
(ground level) because this produces fallout (a rain of dust and ash particles). Fallout is
unpredictable, and depending on weather condition, can travel thousands of square
miles. Nuclear weapons are also NOT usually detonated in space because the
electromagnetic pulse or surge would knock out most of the world's electronic
equipment. A pulse unleashed high enough would only be limited by the earth's
curvature. Conventional nuclear warfare involves getting your bombs to go off just
about a half-mile or so above the surface. This way, you get the best shock wave effect,
both sideways and downward. The sideways pattern takes out the urban area, and the
downward pattern takes out any underground command center. The resultant shock
wave consists of a rather drastic increase in air pressure, hurricane-force wind, and the
strength of an earthquake. Anything within that shock wave zone will be vaporized and
disappear completely. Further out is a thermal pulse, a blinding flash of light that far
surpasses the sun in intensity. The thermal pulse also contains a fireball that ignites
anything combustible and has the ability to melt human flesh right off the bones.

In superterrorism, it is quite likely that a nuclear detonation WILL occur at ground

zero (ground level) because it is a simple matter for a terrorist group to "plant" at least
a 10-kiloton bomb (depending upon design; using the Hiroshima estimate of 12-kiloton
as the lowest estimated yield) nearby important landmarks in an urban area. No one
really knows the effect of setting off a nuclear weapon at ground zero in a city, but best
guesses are the density of the buildings might cut the radius of destruction by as much as
half. Freedberg (2005) discusses this possibility in some detail, as excerpted/annotated
below:

National Planning Scenario No. 1: "Surviving a Nuclear Attack on Washington DC"

(Freedberg 2005)
It so happens, thanks to L'Enfant's design (and the founding fathers obsession with
separation of powers), the executive and legislative branches are a mile and a half apart,
just far enough that no Hiroshima-style device can destroy them both. The reinforced
White House will sustain less damage than the sandstone-and-marble Capitol. Fuses will
blow and safeties will trip across many states, but intact will be major structures (without
perhaps the FBI building, the National Archives, and places along the Mall). Emergency
generators will kick in, as will Pentagon capabilities and Fort McNair, home to the
military's homeland defense command, Joint Force Headquarters-National Capitol
Region. Andrews, Bolling, Belvior, hospitals, and airports are likely to be all right. An
estimated 15,000 people will be immediately dead (those within a half-mile of ground
zero), and an additional 15,000 will be seriously injured. At the DHS alternative
command post (location undisclosed), backup numbers will be called until all first
responders are talking to one another. Meanwhile, Dept. of Energy scientists will be
tracking the plume cloud.
Everyone for miles will have seen the flash. Some will be blinded, most temporarily.
Phones won't work, and the streets will be gridlocked, preventing rescue vehicles from
getting through. In about 15 minutes, the real problem begins with the deadly fallout dust
settling to earth. An explosion which kills 15,000 people will have fallout dust that kills
an additional 200,000 people. The dust contains alpha particles (which can't penetrate
skin) and beta particles (which can't penetrate layers of clothing), but both are dangerous
if inhaled. Worst are the gamma particles in the dust. You would need a windowless
basement made as airtight as possible (with duct tape) to keep out the dust, and then you
would only have about 90% protection. There is no 100% protection from radiation
without a special bomb shelter. Likewise, there is nothing light enough that first
responders can wear to keep out the gammas. The best place to head (if you can get there
fast) is a high school gym (or wherever they're setting up tents), because that's the most
likely place where the decontamination teams are working. Radiation decontamination is
easier to do than chemical decontamination. All you need is to remove all clothing and
shower down to remove 90% of contamination. For most civilians, "sheltering in place" is
a good idea for 72 hours. First responders should probably wait 7 hours for the radiation
levels to fade down, but this depends on what rem levels the authorities deem safe. Two
weeks is the standard civil defense, cold war standard for an "all clear." Between two and
four weeks, depending upon how well sheltering, evacuation, and decontamination goes,
about 50,000 people will start to die from radiation sickness -- and about 50,000 more will
die over the next decade or so. Radiation sickness is strange and slow. It breaks up the
DNA code and stops cells from dividing, and repairing themselves. Tissue which needs
 new cells constantly tends to die first, like hair follicles (which explains why cancer
patients lose their hair during radiation therapy), then the digestive tract linings, then bone
marrow. Potassium iodide tablets (often sold as "antiradiation pills" on survivalist
websites) will only help a little by flooding the body with good iodide to flush out the bad,
but there are dozens of other radioactive isotopes in fallout dust, and it would be best to
utilize "chelating agents" like Prussian blue for inhalation risks. Expensive and time-
consuming hospital treatments exist (regimes of antibiotics, platelets to control bleeding,
and hormonal growth factors to help bone marrow regeneration), but there is no easy way
to provide this standard of care for tens of thousands of victims. Medical research is
underway (as with antidotes for biological and chemical agents) to develop promising
pharmaceuticals which will aid survival rates. During cleanup, the problem becomes
where to dump the heavily contaminated debris and soil from where most of the fallout
landed. For more on the aftermath, see Lecture on Disaster Trauma.

Nuclear smuggling is of great concern. Incidents of nuclear smuggling rarely point to

a particular buyer. In 1995, however, German authorities uncovered a major ring of
plutonium smugglers. It turned out the plutonium came from Russia. Russia has ten
nuclear reactors each producing a half-ton of weapons-grade plutonium per year
(enough for 100 missiles). Some Russian warheads ("Fat Boys") are missing or
unaccounted for. Also in the mid-1990s, more than 1,000 pounds of HEU -- enough
material to allow terrorists to build more than 20 nuclear weapons -- sat unprotected in
Kazakhstan. Recognizing the danger, the American government purchased the material
and moved it to Oak Ridge, Tenn. In October 2001, al Qaida claimed to have nuclear
weapons, with expertise or material from Pakistan. Part of the problem driving the
mysterious internation smuggling market is the fact you can't just manufacture nuclear
material and forget about it. These things require maintenance. Some of the radioactive
material (like Tritium) will lose 5-6% of its power each year. The conventional
explosives will degrade and become unstable and need to be replaced almost every year.
The electronics must be tested regularly, and the batteries must be periodically replaced.
Thousands of nuclear weapons are disassembled and reassembled (or discarded) every
year.

Estimates put the number of nuclear weapons in the world at about 55,000, with
about 30,000 (7,000 deployed) belonging to the US and 25,000 (6,000 deployed)
belonging to Russia. Deployed means the weapon is already mounted as a missile
warhead and ready to launch. Britain and France have about 600 each. China has about
400 and the Israelis have at least 200. India and Pakistan are believed to have about 100
each, which is probably the same amount for overlooked South Africa. North Korea
probably has less than 100, and various Middle Eastern nations, most notably Iran and
Iraq, probably have a smaller number in various stages of development. There's enough
nuclear weapons possessed by nations other than the US to shower every 100 square
miles of the US with a nuclear blast. Recent agreements would limit the United States
and Russia to 1,700 to 2,200 nuclear warheads each by 2012, compared with about 6,000
the United States now has (in 2002) and about 5,500 held by Russia.

Besides nuclear weapons, there are nuclear power plants to worry about. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission admits that plants are vulnerable to terrorist attack, and the
FBI receives many threats a year against such plants. Each plant has plans for a 50-mile
"accident" zone, and each main reactor area is hardened with a containment dome.
Unfortunately, it's the waste cooling pools which are most vulnerable. These pools are
stacked with thousands of pounds of waste fuel, and any loss of water would trigger an
inextinguishable waste fire accompanied by a hydrogen explosion. Waste pools are
quickly becoming replaced by military-grade earth and gravel mounds.

NATION STATE CAPABILITIES

Few states admit they possess weapons of mass destruction. The United States has
taken the lead in destroying many of its weapons, but still maintains a stockpile of about
30,000 tons of chemicals. Russia has declared 40,000 tons. India admits to only having
them for "defensive" purposes. Dealing in chemical weapons has always been a back-
alley business that nations have conducted in secret. Typically, U.S. officials will point
their finger at a list of "rogue nations." Third World nations feel free to stockpile
chemical weapons "without fear of repercussions from the international community."

The Middle East: The Middle East and North Africa are enmeshed in a destabilizing
arms race. In this part of the world, the belief that one state possesses a weapon of mass
destruction prompts another to establish its own program, which leads to another state
acquiring a weapons system, which leads to another state, and so on. The race has gone
on in earnest since the 1960s. Egypt was the first country in the Middle East to obtain
and use chemical weapons, and became motivated to do so by Israel's construction of the
Dimona reactor in 1958. Egypt also employed phosgene and mustard agent against
Yemeni forces in the mid-1960s, and some reports claim an organophosphate nerve
agent was also used. Egypt has also been suspected of continuing to conduct and
sponsor research on WMD. Israel has an extensive CBR weapons program which has
been in operation since 1974. Newspaper reports occasionally leak the locations of secret
Israeli facilities, such as those in the Negev desert. Syria began indigenous production in
the 1980s, and currently not only has a large stockpile of weapons, but the means of
delivery in the form of 500-kilogram aerial bombs and warheads for Scud missiles.
There are three main storage depots, two at Khan Abu Shamat and Furqlus, and
another at the Centre D'Etude et Recherche Scientifique near Damascus. Newspaper
articles typically leak the building of new facilities, such as the one near the city of
Aleppo. Iran's program first intensified during the Iran-Iraq War, and relied primarily
on mustard and phosgene, although Iran (like some other nations in this regions) has a
tendency to load regular artillery shells and casings with alternative agents. Their
missile guidance systems are courtesy of nations like China and North Korea, and their
nuclear aspirations, which the CIA first warned about in 1996, have been helped
considerably by the smuggling of Russian plutonium and HEU out of the Ulba facility in
Kazakhstan as well as blackmarket expertise provided by Pakistan. Most recently, Iran
has pursued nuclear capability quite earnestly. Iraq has been the site where tons of
precursor chemicals can be found, and weapons are everywhere. Iraq is believed to
have a number of secret depots or storage sites. Iraqi terrorist groups are of great
concern. Libya first used WMD against Chad in 1987 with blister and nerve agents. A
suspected secret underground facility exists at Tarhunah. Libya has expressed interest
in obtaining nuclear weapons, but in 2004, reversed course, and agreed to shut down its
weapons of mass destruction program and allow inspectors in. Saudi Arabia is believed
to have limited CBR capability in part because of getting "ripped off" by sellers in the
market. When it comes to weapons of mass destruction, most of the information on
Saudi Arabia (prepared for the Select Committees in Congress) is heavily deleted or
strictly classified.
Asia: China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Taiwan all have extensive chemical
weapons, and Burma for domestic use. Vietnam captured large stocks of U.S. munitions
at the end of the Vietnam War. Terrorist groups in this region have always been
interested in nuclear weapons. North Korea's stockpile of WMD is the largest in the
Asian region. North Korea has had chemical weapons since the 1960s, and sits on vast
quantities of blister, blood, and nerve agents. The North Koreans have excellent delivery
and dispersal systems, they constantly conduct WMD training exercises, and their
civilian population is extensively trained in defensive measures. Nobody knows their
nuclear capability for sure. The South Koreans have the chemical industry
infrastructure and technical know-how to produce sophisticated agents and designer
weapons. Newspaper leaks have always cited a more extensive program, but much of
this is paranoia and no cause for concern. South Korean details are classified because
the U.S. also stockpiles some of its own weapons in South Korea. India has an extensive
industrial infrastructure and the technical know-how to produce WMD. They are
regular producers of the precursor chemicals needed for chemical weapons, and they
are a nuclear power, possessing from 50-100 nuclear warheads with tons of backup
plutonium. For over two decades, they have been involved in an arms race with the
Pakistani program. Several Indian companies have been implicated in highly suspicious
chemicals shipments and are involved in the construction of chemical plants in states
that are developing chemical weapons. The United States has sanctioned some Indian
companies for these activities. Pakistan is a nuclear power with some 30-50 nuclear
warheads, a large stockpile of HEU, and a major producer (like India) of plutonium.
Rogue scientists from Pakistan have helped out other Muslim nations. It also has
excellent delivery systems for chemical and biological agents as well as a wide range of
other weapons. China is a world class superpower with over 400 nuclear weapons
(US=30,000; Russia=20,000; Britain=200; Israel=140; India=100). China also possesses
advanced delivery systems, including intercontinental ballistic missiles. A number of
Chinese companies and individuals have been sanctioned by the U.S. government for
their proliferation activities, and US-China relations have broke off because of nuclear
espionage. Taiwan has an aggressive high-priority program to develop both offensive
and defensive capabilities- the offensive capabilities which scare China and are the stuff
of numerous leaks and rumors. U.S. intelligence officials are careful not to say exactly
what Taiwan has or does not have. Burma's (Myanmar's) WMD program started in the
1983-1992 period and focused on chemical weapons and artillery for delivering chemical
agents. There have been many reports that Burma used chemical agents against
insurgents. Vietnam, for many years now, has been suspected of pursuing WMD.

Europe: During the Cold War it was generally assumed that all NATO and Warsaw
Pact states had access to the superpowers' chemical weapons, and it was an accepted
idea that chemical warfare would be likely in the event of a war between the two
alliances. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it is unclear
what the European policy is over chemical weapons. The only states that developed
indigenous production capabilities were Yugoslavia, Romania, the Czech Republic, and
France. (Britain produced large quantities of chemical weapons in the World War II-
era, but it disposed of them in the 1950s, dumping some in the sea and incinerating the
rest.) Some other states, including Bulgaria, may still retain munitions left behind by
Russian forces. The former Yugoslavia had extensive WMD capability as far back as
1995. The Human Rights Watch group concluded that the Yugoslav National Army
weaponized sarin, sulfur mustard, BZ (a psychochemical incapacitant), and irritants CS
and CN. When Yugoslavia broke apart, much of the program was inherited by Serbia,
but the program apparently is now inactive. Bosnia also was suspected of beginning an
alternative weapons program. Any declassified reports on Romania are heavily edited,
but U.S. intelligence has identified research and production facilities as well as stockpile
and storage facilities. Romania reportedly has developed a cheaper method for
synthesizing sarin (as did the former Czechoslovakia). France is known for using
diplomatic efforts to cover up its military operations, and probably does have an active
WMD program (not officially declared until 1987), although it's anyone's guess. Leaks
are common about France experimenting with new weapons and advanced dispersal
techniques, but France is also a leader in the nonproliferation movement. Bulgaria may
have some stockpile, but details of the stockpile are unknown. Bulgaria is a known
heavy producer of the biological agent, ricin, but almost any country involved in
production of products ranging from laxatives to brake fluid to nylon generates ricin as
a by-product.

Africa: South Africa is the country of most concern as the premiere weapons state in
the region, and they have an extensive WMD program. U.S. intelligence reports are
almost totally classified. Public evidence abounds, however, that their programs are
well-funded and have been underway since 1980. South Africa's weapons program
operates with procurement of equipment and materials handled through a sophisticated
network of front companies. Some South African officials have claimed all WMD
capability has been destroyed or dismantled, but this claim has never been verified by
outside inspectors.

A Note on the Environmental Impact

The first intensive dumping efforts began after World War II. The British dumped
tons of German gas weapons off the coast of Norway, and the United States, up to 1967,
dumped deadlier nerve gas off the coast of New Jersey, precisely 200 miles east of
Atlantic City, to be exact. These are just two of more than 100 sea dumpings that took
place from 1945 to 1970 in every ocean except the Arctic. Some environmentalists
consider these scattered sites to be a potentially deadly situation. After WWII, the Allies
also found Nazi arsenals containing mines, grenades, aerial bombs, and artillery shells
filled with yperite, phosgene, arsenic (levisite), and organophosphorous compounds
(tabun), so the Allies launched Operation Davey Jones Locker, and from June 1946 to
August 1948, dumped tons of chemical weapons off the Scandinavian coast. The Baltic
Sea has long been a main dump site. It is shallow water, but there are very deep valleys
on the sea floor. Similar trenches exist off the coast of Ireland, in the middle of the
Atlantic, and off the coasts of New York, Florida, California, and North and South
Carolina. The United States government stopped sea dumping in 1970. A number of
scientists and some respected international organizations believe it is best to leave the
underwater sites alone, especially if they are in deep water. Other experts disagree with
that conclusion. During the past four decades there have been several incidents
involving leakage of sea dumped weapons. For example, some material has shown up on
beaches and fishing nets. There is too many uncertainty to draw any firm conclusions.

Characteristics of Chemical/Biological Warfare Agents

 Blister Agents
Agents that cause blisters on skin and damage the respiratory tract, mucous membranes, and eyes.
Name/Symbol Means of Lethal Dosage Rate of Action Effects Antidotes/ Methods of Treatmen
Exposure
ulfur Skin Via inhalation: Delayed (tissue Pain is not immediate. Topical effects occur on Thorough decontamination using
Mustard (HD) contact 1,500 LCt damage occurs the skin (blisters), in airways (coughing, lesions, water
and/or within minutes of in rare cases resulting in respiratory failure) and
inhalation Via skin contact, but clinical in the eyes (itchiness, burning sensation, Prevention of infection using
exposure: effects are not possible cornea damage). Nausea and vomiting antibiotics
4,500 LD immediately can also result
evident). Effects Application of lotions/ointments to
manifested 2 to 24 soothe blisters
hours after exposure
ewisite (L) Skin Via inhalation: Rapid Pain and Effects are similar to mustard: skin blistering, Mustard has no known antidote
contact 1,300 LCt. Via irritation occur burning/watery/swollen eyes, upper airway
and/or skin exposure: immediately irritation, systemic blood poisoning British-Anti-Lewisite can mitigate
inhalation greater than some systemic effects of lewisite,
4,500 LD though it can itself cause some
Nitrogen Skin Via inhalation: Rapid Rash occurs Skin blistering, respiratory tract damage toxicity.
Mustard (HN- contact 1,500 LCt. Via within one hour;
) and/or skin exposure: blistering occurs
inhalation 4,500 LD between 6 to12
hours after exposure
Mustard- Skin Via inhalation: Rapid Stinging Skin blistering, burning in the eyes, inflamation
ewisite contact 1,500 LCt. Via sensation occurs of respiratory tract
and/or skin exposure: immediately;
inhalation 10,000 LCt blisters follow
hours later
hosgene- Skin Via inhalation: Rapid Extremely irritating to eyes, skin, and upper
xime (CX) contact 3,200 LCt Via respiratory system
and/or skin exposure:
inhalation 25 LD

Nerve Agents
Lethal substances that disable enzymes responsible for the transmission of nerve impulses.
Name/Symbol Means of Lethal Dosage Rate of Action Effects Antidotes/ Methods of Treatmen
Exposure
abun (GA) Skin Via inhalation: Very rapid Effects seen in eyes (contraction of pupils, pain, 4 steps to management of exposur
contact 400 LCt Incapacitating dim or blurred vision), nose (runny nose), and to nerve agents:
and/or effects occur within airways (chest tightness)
inhalation Via skin 1 to 10 minutes; • decontamination
exposure: lethal effects occur Nausea and vomiting also possible • ventilation
1,000 LD within 10 to 15
• antidotes
minutes Twitching/convulsions result when skeletal • supportive therapy
arin (GB) Skin Via inhalation: Very rapid muscle reached
contact 100 LCt. Via Incapacitating Therapeutic drug options:
and/or skin exposure: effects occur within Fluctuations in heart rate
inhalation 1,700 LD 1 to 10 minutes;
• Atropine and Pralidoxime
lethal effects occur Loss of consciousness and seizure activity can Chloride (autoinjectors
within 2 to 15 occur within one minute of exposue in cases of packaged together in kits
minutes exposure to high concentration of agent provided to military
oman (GD) Skin Via inhalation: Very rapid personnel)
contact 70 LCt. Via Incapacitating
 and/or skin exposure: effects occur within
inhalation 50 LD 1 to 10 minutes; Eventual paralysis, death
lethal effects occur
within 1 to 15
• Diazepam (anticonvulsan
minutes
drug)
VX Skin Via inhalation: Rapid
contact 50 LCt. Via Incapacitating Pretreatment option:
and/or skin exposure: effects occur within
inhalation 10 LD 1 to 10 minutes;
• Pyridostigmine (can
lethal effects occur
increase the lethal dose
within 4 to 42 hours
threshold significantly if
ingested prior to exposure
and if paired with
traditional therapeutic
options)

Novichok Novichok 5 Very rapid Assumed to be similar to the effects of other Assumed to be similar to treatmen
gents estimated to nerve agents listed above methods for other nerve agents
exceed listed above
effectiveness of
VX by 5 to 8
times.
Novichok 7
estimated at 10
times better.

Choking Agents
Substances that damage respiratory tract, causing extensive fluid build-up in the lungs.
Name/Symbol Means of Lethal Dosage Rate of Action Effects Antidotes/ Methods of Treatmen
Exposure
Chlorine Inhalation 3,000 Rapid Lethal effects No antidote once exposed
LCt manifest 30 minutes
after exposure Individuals should don gas masks
hosgene Inhalation 3,200 LCt Delayed, and other protective gear to preven
Shortness of breath, irritation of mucous inhalation
CG) Asymptomatic membranes; coughing; tightness of chest
period can last up to
24 hours Medical responses include:
Culminates in fluid build-up in lungs leading to
Diphosgene Inhalation 3,200 LCt Delayed, fatal choking
• Relocation to
DP) Incapacitating and
decontaminated
lethal effects felt
environment
after 3 or more
hours • Enforced rest
• Management of secretion
Chloropicrin Inhalation 20,000 Variable, Produces Vomiting, fluid build-up in lungs in airways
PS) LCt tears in seconds; • Oxygen therapy
lethal effects felt
after 10 minutes
• Prevention/treatment of
pulmonary edema

Blood Agents
Agents that interfere with the absorption of oxygen into the bloodstream.
Name/Symbol Means of Lethal Dosage Rate of Action Effects Antidotes/ Methods of Treatmen
 Exposure
Hydrogen Inhalation 2,000 to 5,000 Rapid effect, Agents inhibit cell respiration; heart and central
Cyanide (AC) LCt Exposure to low nervous system are susceptible
concentrations
causes symptoms in Cyanogen Chloride also greatly irritates eyes Agents are highly volatile; flush
1 or more hours. and lungs eyes with water; remove
Exposure to high contaminated clothing; rinse
concentrations In moderate cases: exposed skin with water
causes sudden
unconsciousness Antidotes: intravenous
• vomiting
Cyanogen Inhalation 11,000 Rapid effect, Lethal • dizziness administration of sodium nitrite
Chloride (CK) LCt concentration and sodium thiosulfate for
• deeper, more rapid breathing
produces effects detoxification purposes (i.e., to
within 15 seconds assist body's ability to excrete
of exposure; death In severe cases: cyanide from system)
following within 6
to 8 minutes • convulsions Pretreatment under development in
• respiratory failure the United Kingdom

• sudden loss of consciousness leading to

death

Riot Control (Incapacitating) Agents

Substances that rapidly produce temporary disabling effects.
Name/Symbol Means of Lethal Dosage Rate of Action Effects Antidotes/ Methods of Treatmen
Exposure
ear Agent 2 Inhalation 7,000 Rapid Instant pain in eyes and nose; tearing induced; Relocate to fresh air
CN) LCt coughing; chest tightness; vomiting if high
ear Agent O Inhalation 61,000 Rapid doses are swallowed or if individual is Thorough washing of exposed eye
CS) LCt especially sensitive and skin with water

sychedelic Inhalation N/A Rapid, Effects felt Induces altered states of consciousness,
Effects generally dissipate within
Agent 3 (BZ) within 30 minutes including hallucinations, stupor, forgetfulness,
15 to 30 minutes of departure from
confusion
contaminated area

Biological (germ) Agents

Organisms that disrupt synaptic or cellular activity.
Agent Name of
Rate of Action Effective Dosage Symptoms/Effects Prophylaxis/Treatment
Type Agent
Bacteria Incubation:
1 to 6 days Treatable, if antibiotics
Bacillus Fever and fatigue; followed by slight administered prior to onset of
Length of
anthracis 8,000 to 50,000 improvement, then abrupt onset of severe symptoms
illness:
Causes spores respiratory problems; shock; pneumonia and
1 to 2 days
anthrax death within 2 to 3 days
95% mortality Vaccine available
rate
Yersinia Incubation: 100 to 500 Malaise, high fever, tender lymph nodes, skin Treatable, if antiobiotics
pestis 2 to 10 days organisms lesions, possible hemorrhages, circulatory administered within 24 hours of
Causes Length of failure, and eventual death onset of symptoms
plague illness:
1 to 2 days Vaccine available
Variable
mortality rate
 Incubation: Flu-like symptoms, including fever and chills, Treatable with antibiotics
Brucella
5 to 60 days 100 to 1,000 headache, appetite loss, mental depression,
suis Causes
2% mortality organisms extreme fatigue, aching joints, sweating, and
brucellosis No vaccine available
rate possibly gastrointestinal symptoms.
Pasturella
tularensis
Incubation:
Causes Treatable, if antibiotics
1 to 10 days
tularemia administered early
Length of Fever, headache, malaise, general discomfort,
Also 10 to 50 organisms
illness: 1 to 3 irritating cough, weight loss
known as
weeks 30% Vaccine available
rabbit or
mortality rate
deer fly
fever
Treatable if vaccine administered
Incubation: early
average 12
days Length of Malaise, fever, vomiting, headache appear first,
Variola Sufficient quantities of vaccine
illness: followed 2 to 3 days later by lesions
virus available
several weeks 10 to 100 organisms
Causes
35% mortality
smallpox Highly infectious Note: World Health Organization
rate in un-
vaccinated conducted a vaccination campaign
individuals from 1967 to 1977 to eradicate
smallpox.
Incubation:
1 to 5 days Sudden onset of fever, severe headache, and
Viruses Venezuelan
Length of muscle pain No specific therapy exists
equine
illness: 10 to 100 organisms
enceph-
1 to 2 weeks Nausea, vomiting, cough, sore throat and Vaccine available
alitis virus
Low mortality diarrhea can follow
rate
Incubation:
Yellow 3 to 6 days
fever Length of Severe fever, headache, cough, nausea, No specific therapy exists
virus illness: 1 to 10 organisms vomiting, vascular complications (including
1 to 2 weeks easy bleeding, low blood pressure) Vaccine available
5% mortality
rate
Toxins Time to effect:
Saxitoxin minutes to
Produced hours
10 micrograms per
by algae in Length of Dizziness, paralysis of respiratory system, and
kilogram of body
shellfish illness: death within minutes
weight
such as Fatal after
mussels inhalation of
lethal dose
Botulinum
toxin
Time to effect:
Causes
24 to 36 hours Weakness, dizziness, dry throat and mouth, Treatable with antitoxin, if
botulism
Length of .001 microgram per blurred vision, progressive weakness of administered early
Produced
illness: kilogram of body muscles. Interruption of neurotransmission
by
24 to 72 hours weight leading to paralysis. Abrupt respiratory failure
Clostridiu Vaccine available
65% mortality may result in death
m
rate
botulinum
bacterium
Ricin Time to effect: 3 to 5 micrograms Rapid onset of weakness, fever, cough, fluid No antitoxin or vaccine available
 few hours
Derived Length of
per kilogram of
from castor illness: build-up in lungs, respiratory distress
body weight
beans 3 days High
mortality rate
Staphylo-
coccal
enterotoxin Time to effect:
B (SEB) 3 to 12 hours
30 nanograms per Fever, chills, headache, nausea, cough, diarrhea, No specific therapy or vaccine
Produced Length of
person and vomiting available
by illness:
Staphylo- Up to 4 weeks
coccus
aureus

INTERNET RESOURCES
A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF (pdf)
Biological Weapons Usage in the Twentieth Century
Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Chem/Bio/Nuclear Anti-Terrorism site
Chemical/Biological Arms Control Institute
CIA 2003 Report on Who has Weapons of Mass Destruction
Controlling Nuclear Warhead and Materials
Dept. of Peace Studies (Bradford) Biological Warfare Against Crops
DHS Center for Domestic Preparedness
Disinfopedia Article on WMD
Federation of American Scientists
GAO Report on the Threat of Chemical/Biological Terrorism (pdf)
High Energy Nuclear Weapons Archive
How Biological and Chemical Warfare Works
Jane's Chem-Bio Web
MSNBC's Anthrax & Bioterror List of Resources
National Resources Defense Council
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (pdf)
Peter Chalk's Presentation on BioTerrorism Threats
Stimson Center for a Nuclear-Free World
Weapons of Mass Destruction News
Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why (pdf)

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Last Updated: 03/25/06

Syllabus for JUS 415 (Homeland Security)
Syllabus for JUS 427 (Intel Analysis)
Syllabus for JUS 429 (Terrorism)
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 CIVIL LIBERTIES AND DOMESTIC
TERRORISM
"They that give up essential liberty in order to obtain a little temporary safety deserve
neither liberty nor safety." (Benjamin Franklin)

Democratic, free, open societies like the United States are soft targets for terrorism.
They are also the kind of societies most at risk of infringing on civil liberties with
counterterrorism. Security at the expense of liberty is no security at all. It leads to
oppression, minority disenfranchisement, corruption, bribery, voter fraud, organized
crime, militarization, and a diminished quality of life for everyone. We've seen this
pattern time and time again with what used to be some of the world's most shining
places -- Ceylon, Lebanon, Uruguay, e.g. -- turned completely into war zones where
regimes retain law and order at any cost. Converting democracies into dictatorships is,
in fact, one of the goals of (Marighella-style) terrorism -- getting governments to show
their repressive, true colors. "History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in
times of urgency... when the scourge is manifest... and the need for action is great"
(Thurgood Marshall)

Democracies are not perfect. They are fragile entities and experiments in progress.
Democracy involves a game of numbers in which everyone is assured equal footing at
the starting line (with fundamental freedoms), and then interest groups of like-minded
people fight peacefully for their privileges to become rights. These fought-for rights are
called liberties. They are always acquired, not bestowed, easily lost, and there are at
least five types:

• Economic liberty - to follow one's calling or avocation in life

• Personal liberty - to come and go as one pleases or to follow one's conscience
• Political liberty - to vote, participate in, and change one's form of government
• Civil liberty - to enjoy an absence of regulation and the freedom to pursue new
liberties
• Social and cultural liberty - to choose one's associates and be treated respectfully

The United States is not perfect. In fact, it's not even a true democracy. It's a
constitutional republic (which means the constitution is used to manage the always-
imperfect balance between civil rights and due process versus security and citizen
safety). People don't have a direct vote on each and every issue. They elect political
representatives who make the hard decisions, and the battle for newfound freedoms and
liberties has always been a battle for access and opportunity involving the "hearts and
minds" of politicians. Unfortunately, this pluralistic and sometimes amorphous
situation lends itself to partisanship, paranoia, conspiracy, and the vested interests of a
few who inflate every national security crisis into the need for some overly repressive
response. During a terrorism crisis, a "do anything, do something" knee-jerk response
is understandable, but there may be no need for haste in expanding new laws, new
agencies, or new government powers. By all accounts, American national security was
largely successful at regularly preventing more than half of all terrorist attacks,
including international terrorist attacks, resulting in a 25-year low during the 1990s
(CDT figures). In any hasty counterterrorism reaction, there's a tendency for the
principal weapons to be those which restrict civil liberties, expand surveillance, seize
and interrogate anyone, and act aggressively against threats and symbols.

While the U.S. has been relatively free from terrorism, other nations in the world
have not, and other nations in the world have carried out a wider variety of
counterterrorism programs. In the quest for maintaining law and order, some nations
have trampled upon the established rights and liberties of their citizens. A list of these
excessive countermeasures would include at least the following:

• Assassination - Israel, the U.S., and other countries have sanctioned this
• Culpability of facilitators - say, if a person created a website promoting terrorism
• Indefinite detention - Canada, France, Great Britain, and the U.S. all regularly
practice this
• Infringement on rights to assemble, worship, and speak - Germany and Great
Britain offer no religious exemption
• Internment - detaining nonnaturalized immigrants (see Malkin 2004 for a
defense)
• National ID cards - required in France, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal,
and Spain
• Racial profiling - Israel allows it without limitation; in the U.S., it's one among
many factors involved
• Rendition - or extraordinary rendition, to torture somebody in a country with
loose rules on torture
• Surveillance - closed circuit TV surveillance, with facial recognition, is common
in Great Britain (see Marx 2002 and Crank & Gregor 2005 for comparisons of
old, 20th century surveillance and new, post 9-11 surveillance)
• Suspicionless searches - Israel, for example, has no constitutional standards for a
stop and frisk
• Torture - Spain, Israel, and the U.S. have been known to tolerate this, or extradite
for this

While at the same time infringing upon civil liberties, democracies always seem to
fight terrorism with one hand tied behind their backs. That's because they must engage
in adversarial review, and justify their actions to the legislature, the courts, and public
opinion. The ultimate purpose of all this openness is to prevent two things from
happening -- (1) the betrayal of democratic principles (not staying the course and
remaining a democracy); and (2) the recruitment of fresh recruits for terrorism that
comes from the misguided rounding up and punishing of innocent civilians. Yet,
democracies must fight terrorism as a desirable, if not necessary duty. Too many failed
states, civil war zones, and safe havens or sactuaries for nihilism exist, and each of them
(or all of them) represent a threat to popular forms of government. Sometimes, fighting
terrorism involves using extreme means that are foreign to the principles of democracy
(e.g., assassination), but are seen as the lesser evil. "Liberal states cannot be protected by
herbivores" (Ignatieff 2004). What's important is that democracies who engage in
extreme measures ultimately stay the course, and remain democracies, true to their
founding principles. Nowhere is this friction point better found than in the way
democracies deal with their own "homegrown" problem -- the problem of domestic
terrorism.

TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN DOMESTIC TERRORISM

While debate rages over whether the U.S. ought to use an FBI model or a MI-5 model
to counter domestic terrorism, the FBI model seems to be the one that the nation relies
upon. The FBI conducts about 10,000 terrorism investigations a year, and of that
number, only about 200-400 cases are prosecuted a year. Prosecutions for international
terrorism (kidnapping, hostage taking) have run steady at about 50 a year, although
they jumped to about 200 a year since 9/11. Prosecutions for domestic terrorism
(explosives or weapons, threatening the President) fluctuate but seem to have been
increasing in recent years, from 147 in 1997, 166 in 1998, 187 in 1999, 194 in 2000 and
259 in 2001 (TRAC figures). Convictions rates are more certain for domestic terrorism
than international terrorism. Only one in ten domestic terrorists escape an average
seven-year prison sentence. The Justice Department’s Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA) defines domestic terrorism as groups or individuals who
seek to further their political goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force
or the threat of force. There is no foreign direction or foreign involvement.

Whereas in other parts of the world, species of domestic terrorists tend to be systemic,
in the U.S., they're cyclic. Domestic terrorism can involve right-wing, left-wing, anti-
government, pro-government, anti-tax, paramilitary, anti-abortion, anti-religious, anti-
ethnic, and militia groups. America has it all, but for the most part, much of domestic
counterterrorism in the U.S. is militia-watching. In dealing with right-wing domestic
terrorism, often a good counterstrategy is simply to watch, and let them know you're
watching (Laqueur 1999). This keeps them underground, and deprives them of
publicity and a wider audience. It's often said that journalists are terrorists' best
friends. Depriving terrorists of publicity acts as a deterrent. In most cases, the best
counterterrorism strategy involves advanced computer technology and informants.
However, domestic terrorists usually have an inordinate interest in cyberterrorism and
weapons of mass destruction, so more active countermeasures are sometimes called for.

American domestic terrorism was at one time a left-wing phenomenon with groups
such as the Weathermen and Black Panthers active in the 1960s and 70s. Before that, it
was anti-Catholic during the 19th century, and then became anti-black and anti-Semitic
in the 20th century. It has now evolved into diverse and divided right-wing
extremism consisting of White Supremacists, Tax Rebels, Militia Patriots, Christian
Patriots, Christian Reconstructionists, Anti-Abortionists, and Neo-Nazis. Such
extremism has not been confined to the United States -- it exists worldwide in places like
Germany and Italy. Israel even has right-wing terrorism. It embraces all the exotic
forms of terror -- cyber (groups operate over 200 websites at last count), eco- (they hate
the "tree huggers" but share a common vision), and WOMD (groups that have been
caught preparing biological, chemical, or radiological weapons). The extreme right does
not have a well-delineated party line, and is best seen as a breeding ground for terrorism
since there is no command-and-control structure. They take leaderless resistance to new
levels with self-made "phantom" cells which ensure the movement's survival even if
everyone else in the group is eliminated or compromised. The one thing they have in
common is HATE, although it is best to keep in mind that there are differences between
hate groups and domestic terrorism groups. Domestic terrorists usually hate liberals,
Democrats, lesbians, homosexuals, police, politicians, tax collectors, bankers, the media,
anyone from Washington D.C., New York City or Los Angeles, anyone not like them,
and anyone disagreeing with them. Some domestic terrorists hate war, but others can
be best described as being "pissed-off" rather than filled with hate. This was plainly the
case with the Weather Underground (most active from 1970-1974) which thought of
itself as idealistic and inspired over such matters as social justice, drugs, and sex (Ayers
et al. 2006).

AMERICAN LEFT-WING TERRORISM -- a series of movements that peaked

and died in 1984, their targets being military facilities, corporate establishments, and
the U.S. Capitol Building. A typical group was the United Freedom Front (UFF),
composed of four white males and three white females who operated from 1981-1985.
They raised funds by bank robberies from Connecticut to Virginia, murdering
numerous policemen along the way. They lived under a variety of false identities and
had a system of safe houses from Norfolk to Cleveland. They conducted extensive
surveillance of their targets prior to an attack. Other leftist groups of the mid-1980s
include the Red Guerrilla Resistance (4 bombings), the Armed Resistance Unit (3
bombings), and the Revolutionary Fighting Group (1 bombing). Their identities have
never been known, and it is believed the different names may be one and the same
group. An 80's spin-off of the old 1970s Weather Underground Organization (WUO,
or weathermen) called the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee (PFOC) was active on
the West coast. An East coast spin-off, more radical in ideology, adopted the name
M19CP and was captured in Baltimore safe house after a Brinks robbery in 1984.
AMERICAN RIGHT-WING TERRORISM -- dominant since the mid-1980s, and
strongly white supremacist and antigovernment, their enemies are Jews, Asians,
Blacks, and other "mud people". A national headquarters exists in Hayden Lake,
Idaho. A second and third headquarters is located in Arkansas (the Covenant, the
Sword, and the Arm) and in West Virginia (National Alliance). In regular contact
with other hate groups, such as the Klan, Skinheads, and Neo-Nazis, a common bond
is the desire to see a separate nation created out of five Northwestern states. They live
in compounds where extensive paramilitary and survivalist training occurs. They view
the U.S. government as ZOG (for Zionist Occupied Government). The most violent
1980s group was the Order (aka Silent Brotherhood), a spinoff of the Aryan Nations.
In the late 1980s, another far-right faction emerged, dedicated to tax protest and
revolt, targeting IRS agents and facilities. The two most common were the Sheriff's
Posse Comitatus (SPC) and Arizona Patriots. They advocate nonpayment of taxes
and regard Federal and State laws as unconstitutional. Like other groups, however,
they hold paramilitary practice. One such group, the North Carolina White Patriot
Party (WPP), was busted for engaging in such training, but re-emerged as the
Southern National Front.

THE VARIETIES OF RIGHT WING EXTREMISM

It is important not to confuse survivalists (those with a self-reliant bent who choose to
prepare on their own or in a small group rather than rely on the government to help
them survive) with terrorists. For far too long, the term "survivalist" has called to mind
paranoid separatists or white supremacists who give up the conveniences of modern
society, drop out of the government's databases and live in one-room, woodsy cabins like
the Unabomber. There are many law-abiding paramilitary and survivalist individuals
in America, and they are not domestic terrorists. A more useful, and yet controversial
distinction to make between far right groups and individuals is in terms of their
religious beliefs; i.e., religion or religious beliefs (controversial because religion cannot
or should not be used in profiling, however much it is the best separator). The most
extreme and non-religious element in this regard (which includes most neo-Nazis) is the
direction of either atheist or pagan believes, which have their closest affinity with
Nordic mythology. The names may change, but the story usually goes like this. Odin,
chief of the Norse gods, is said to have called all warriors to racial purification from
Valhalla, Viking heaven. Thor, god of thunder, is said to have reinforced Odin's call by
slamming his hammer. Pure Odinism has no direct nor remote connection to
Christianity, but many varieties of hybrids exist which are variants of Nordic
Christianity, which adds the element of serving Christ by purifying and protecting the
white race. Fascist groups which worship brute force tend to share some of the
symbolism in Nordic mythology and its varieties.

Another typical extreme and non-religious belief is Creatorism, a hate religion that
usually distinguishes skinheads from neo-Nazis. Creatorists believe the Creator left
humanity on its own, with each race fending for itself, and that the idea of an always-
loving God is a lie. They must therefore fight a racial holy war because that is what is
expected from their god. Race is religion to a Creatorist. The White Man's Bible
contains their mythology, which is based on a strange mixture of racism and herbal
medicine. Some survivalists patterns might be similar, but are not generally dangerous
unless some race-related holy war, or jihad, is involved. Certain forms of Islamic jihad
mimic this form of Christian jihad, but is directed more specifically against non-
believers and infidels who insult the religion.

Christian identity theology, popular among Aryan Nations and some Patriot and
militia groups, claims that white people are the true Israelites. It is a variation of what
was once called Anglo-Israelitism, and is perhaps the world's largest hate religion (with
the possible exception of Black Hebrew Israelism which holds that African Americans
are the true Jews and white people are descended from the devil). Christian identity
holds that Jews originated from an illicit union between the devil and Eve, and
nonwhites from animals or mud. It also posits that the pilgrims who came over in the
Mayflower were descendants of the original Caucasian Israelites.

Klan theology is an American nativist belief in the natural inferiority of black people,
based on the latter's descent from the curse of Noah's son Ham, which resulted in the
black race. Shem is the founder of the Asiatic peoples and is inferior to Japheth, the
father of white people. The Klan seeks to prevent the government from falling into the
hands of blacks. They believe that racism, homophobia, anti-Semitism, and hatred of
immigrants is both a religious and patriotic duty. Klan group activity is known
primarily for its cross-burning signature characteristic.

Christian reconstructionism seeks to eliminate democracy and replace it with a

theocratic elite that would govern by imposing an interpretation of Biblical Law. There
would be no such things as labor unions, civil rights laws, public schools, or women
allowed to work outside the home. Insufficiently Christian men would be denied
citizenship, perhaps executed. Capital punishment would also extend to blasphemy,
heresy, adultery, and homosexuality. This has been the theology of most anti-
abortionists.

Freewheeling fundamentalism is a fiercely independent, highly patriotic, free

thinking form of right-wing Christianity. It is a term coined by White (2002) to describe
the religion of the Patriot movement. This would include the tax rebels and various
militia. It involves taking what one wants or needs from established religion to justify
certain social or political beliefs. Beliefs most often center upon fear or hate of
centralized government (ZOG - Zionist Occupied Government) and conspiracies to
destroy America's sovereignty (NWO - New World Order). Many of these groups
oppose racism, and some claim they are not anti-Semitic. The so-called County
movement, however, is interested in establishing free white-people zones in places like
Idaho and Montana.

AMERICA'S HOMEGROWN TERRORISTS

Army of God -- a loose knit collection of Christian extremists who take their cue
from Biblical interpretation of such passages as Joshua 5, and have been active since
1982 in the kidnapping and killing of doctors who work in abortion clinics as well as
numerous firebombings of abortion clinics; serial bomber Eric Rudolph was the most
well-known member of AOG, but his eventual 2003 capture in the hills of North
Carolina did nothing to slow the group's increasing level of organization. The Army
of God maintains walled compounds in North Carolina which propagandize about the
"New World Order," believe the Holocaust was fictional, and decry race-mixing.
There are close ties to the Church of Israel, a Christian Identity congregation in
Missouri which espouses the belief that only white people are descended from the
biblical Adam and Eve.
Creativity Movement -- the latest name for a cyberspace-intensive group formerly
known as World Church of the Creator (creativity meaning white supremacy and
racial holy war, RaHoWa), founded in 1973, and currently active in 22 states and 8
foreign countries, with murder, assault, and firebombing as trademarks, primarily on
race-mixed couples and Jews; and like Klan groups, leave their propanganda on front
yards, trying to appeal to disaffected Christians who might believe the Bible and
parts of it (like the concept of Hell) was a Jewish conspiracy; publishes the White
Man's Bible; active in Midwest states like Illinois (where leader Matt Hale is
awaiting trial on contract murder) and currently headquartered out of Wyoming.
National Alliance -- America's largest and most well-organized white supremacy
group that is anti-black, anti-Semitic, anti-gay, and affiliated with vanguard neo-Nazi
(skinhead), Klan, and fascist groups; created in 1970 by its charismatic founder,
William Pierce (who penned the Turner Diaries), out of disappointment in the 1968
presidential bid of Alabama governor George Wallace, splinter groups have been
active for decades, including armored car heists, machine-gunning a Jewish talk
show host, murder of suspected informants, and the well-known Timothy McVeigh
bombing in Oklahoma City; headquartered in Virginia, West Virginia, and North
Carolina with ties overseas, in the military, on college campuses, the music industry
(Oi music, a genre of white power heavy metal), and stock car racing.
Aryan Nations -- an openly neo-Nazi, Hitler-worship group with little connection to
prison gangs by the same name, headquarted in Idaho with subheadquarters in Ohio
and Pennsylvania and founded in 1975 by charismatic leader Richard Butler and tied
to many Klan and NA splinter groups; extremely militant survivalist ideology has led
 to random (or selective) murder (and intimidation) of Jews, immigrants who take
jobs away from Americans, civil rights leaders, priests (suspected of pedophilia), and
college professors (suspected of being too liberal); sending white powdery substances
in letters is a trademark.

The role of heavy metal music: Oi music has its origins in a genre of racist, neo-Nazi
skinhead music called Black Metal. There are other genres of heavy metal music that
stoke terrorist sentiments, but Black Metal, especially when influenced by pagan themes
(such as in the Norwegian band Mayhem, whose leader formed a group called Black
Circle), is especially dangerous. Black Circle believes that Christianity should be
violently expelled and replaced by a hybrid mixture of Satanism and paganism, and
Black Circle has been blamed for many church burnings worldwide. Many European
countries have banned post-1994 National Socialist Black Metal (NSBM as it's called)
for its extremely racist, anti-Semitic, and violent content. The result of such music bans
has done nothing except create a multi-million dollar underground, criminal music
industry.

PROFILING EXTREMIST GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS

Controversies over profiling are abundant. There is no "right" way to use profiling
effectively as a weapon in the war against terror. It may be counter-effective, who
knows? Research on whether profiling "works" is incomplete, and serious thought
ought to be carried out before contemplating the development of police-profiler-counter-
terror experts. Too often in domestic terrorism, particularly, the most readily available
profiling criterion is race or religion, and even though those might be the most salient
factors, false impressions would reverberate throughout society that persons of certain
religions or race were more criminal somehow. There's also quite a bit of controversy
over what distinguishes right-wing extremism from its "fringe" elements. Some say it's
the level of violence they're willing to engage in -- baby killing or nuclear devastation,
for example. The more orthodox approach considers conspiratorial delusions and
irrational spin-offs to be fringe, and by definition, you can't (or shouldn't) predict or
profile anything that delusional and irrational. There's an abundance of literature on
conspiracy theory by those who've tried, however (Robins & Post 1997; Knight 2001).
There's also some literature on what kinds of attacks and weapons domestic terrorists
would use (Laqueur 1999). It turns out that the most destructive kinds of weapons are
NOT the ones that domestic terrorists would seek to use. Most groups (via most
leadership) exercise some restraint by avoiding nuclear weapons that could kill
hundreds of thousands, and most groups also generally avoid localized, biological
weapons that could only kill hundreds. Body counts seem to be important to domestic
terrorists, so there may exist a preferred range in the number of victims -- chemical
agents that kill thousands, or possibly radiological "dirty bomb" weapons.
Cyberterrorism is also a "natural" habitat for domestic terrorism since viruses and
logic bombs can be set to detonate at certain times, perhaps a significant anniversary
date for the group.

One common trait of the less extreme right is rugged individualism, of the kind that
characterizes small-town Americans and farmers. Montana and Michigan are
strongholds of this feeling. The tax rebellion movement, for example, is especially strong
in the Midwest. Individualists see the U.S. government as an enemy for wasting money
on welfare for people who should not be in America in the first place. They also believe
any police official above the rank of local sheriff is under the control of a centralized
government intent on taking away their freedoms and liberties. They may or may not
advocate armed struggle, but they will most likely favor the idea of a militia, which is in
the spirit of the Founding Fathers and the Constitution. They read and interpret the
Constitution quite frequently, almost as frequently as the Bible. Their ranks include
people from all social classes.

Far right extremists, on the other hand, have a strong streak of anti-
intellectualism. Other than Nazism, it's been said the source of this is a reaction to the
increasing bureaucraticization of American life. They blame minority overpopulation
and loose immigration laws for creating a society of registration, permits, stickers, tests,
queues, and answering machines. Rather than think how to work the system, they seek
to destroy it, and simplify things by engaging in sporadic acts of offensive violence
against minorities, foreigners, homosexuals, government, and big business. They
genuinely believe the government is preparing concentration camps for them, with the
guards most likely recruited from the ranks of L.A. gangsters. Their ranks are drawn
from the working or lower middle class.

Fringe extremists see conspiracies everywhere, from secret messages on billboard

signs to subliminal messages in contemporary music to the way produce is arranged at
the grocery store. These are not "literal" conspiracies where there is an identifiable
purpose and agency. These are the kind of unreal, metaphorical conspiracies that
involve "a striking concurrence of tendencies, circumstances, or phenomena as though
in planned accord" (Knight 2001). It is crackpot, do-it-yourself sociology involving
delusions of persecution by unknown elements of a New World Order. They point to
Ruby Ridge and Waco as evidence of the need to move violently against the government
before the government moves violently against them and their families. Ironically, this
extreme tends to have the most well-organized leadership structure, drawing their
leaders from the ranks of fundamentalist preachers or former military officers.
Members are drawn from the ranks of drifters.

MILLENARIANISM AND TERRORISM

Extremism almost always takes the form of preparatory or defensive measures.

Weapons, food, tactics, logistics, identities, and bunkers are all laid out in advance. By
1997, it was estimated that there were some 600 fully-armed extremist groups waiting
for the impending government takeover and race war that would begin in the year 2000
(Laqueur 1999). In this context, it's customary to talk about millenarianism (or
chialism, which is the Greek derivative meaning the same thing) as a driving force of
terrorism. Strictly defined, millenarianism is any belief in the Second Coming of Christ
and establishment of His kingdom on earth as predicted in the Book of Revelation.
Broadly defined, it refers to any prophecy about the immanent destruction of the
present order and establishment of a new order. A millennium is a period of 1,000
years, and according to the Gregorian calendar, did not begin until January 1, 2001.
Others believe Christ was born in 4 B.C., so the millennium started in 1997. Others
predict the year 2033 (or maybe 2029, due to Dionysius' error) will hallmark the
millennium, 33 years corresponding to the lifespan of Jesus. Yet others make
calculation on the basis of the Islamic calendar (1420), Jewish calendar (5760), or
Chinese calendar (4697).
 Apocalypticism is the belief that the end of the world and of time are immanent, and
that the signs of this are visible. In fact, the AntiChrist may be believed to be already
among us. In Christianity, the Apocalypse is another name for what happens in the
Book of Revelation, with close ties to other Books, such as Daniel and Ezekiel, and in
some cases, is mostly an oral tradition. Apocalypticism is different from eschatology,
which refers more broadly to God's divine plan for mankind. An apocalyptic vision,
however, is kind of like a plan, or more accurately, an epiphany where one experiences a
call to action, eliminates any gray area between good and evil, and is able to clearly
identify one's opponent as pure and total evil. According to the vision of future events in
Christian theology, the first thing that happens is the Rapture (God judges the dead
and each and every household), followed by a 7-year Tribulation Period, and then a
calling of all nations and people to a final battleground where the Battle of
Armageddon occurs (Yahweh will gather all nations against Jerusalem to battle -
Zechariah 14:2). Shortly after the Battle of Armageddon, there is a Second Coming,
another millenium, and then a New Heaven and New Earth. Each apocalyptic vision
usually contains "signs" or "markings" of significant pre-cursor events, and variations
of these can usually be found by denomination. According to Islamic theology, Sura 57
of the Koran can be read as an apocalyptic prophecy fulfilled in the Trade Center
bombing. Respected Saudi theologians, like Sifr al-Hawali, and Abdullah Azzam, Bin
Laden's (now dead) mentor and the founder of MAK (the predecessor to Al Qaeda),
have nourished Islamic apocalypticism in the form of a cosmic battle that pits the
warriors for truth against the agents of Satan and evil in this world.

The most dangerous aspect of apocalyptic vision is not that it makes a perfect
terrorist indoctrination device, but that it promotes the use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. Every domestic terrorist captured by the FBI for dabbling in WOMD has
said they were attempting to stockpile such weapons for the upcoming apocalypse. In
1994, there was an Ohio militia group captured with sizable quantities of bubonic plague
cultures, and in 1995, a Minnesota Patriot group was preparing Ricin for use against
law enforcement officials. If there is anything that can be called a Bible for the lunatic
right fringe, it's a book called The Turner Diaries.

THE TURNER DIARIES: a 1978 millenarian novel by William Pierce, leader of the
neo-nazi National Alliance, under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald, and regarded
as the world's most controversial book. It is a fictional account of the activities of a
racist, anti-Semitic underground group which comes to control the world through a
series of terrorist acts. The book is a thinly-disguised how-to manual for blowing up
FBI headquarters in Washington along with other national monuments and how to
disrupt or destroy America's infrastructure. It describes how to forge money, engage
in bioterrorism, and use atomic bombs on several East Coast cities, European cities,
and all of Asia and Africa. Tim McVeigh's Oklahoma bombing, the Order's execution
of a Jewish talk show host, and numerous other incidents, including the dragging
death of a black man in Jasper were all linked to this book. In fact, the perpetrators
said the book inspired them. A less widely read sequel is the book Hunter, by the
same author, which describes the need to kill interracial couples and all law
enforcement officers.

The existence of "Christian terrorists" in the U.S. is a phenomenon that smacks of

heresy, and most Christians would probably take umbrage at juxtaposition of the words
"Christian" and "terrorist." However, Muslims must feel the same way whenever they
hear the term "Islamic terrorism." There are some remarkable similarities or parallels
between Middle Eastern terrorism and domestic terrorism, not so much in a real but
literary sense. In the Turner Diaries, for example, the book ends with a nuclear suicide
mission into the Pentagon, the great "Houston bombings" occurring on September 11,
and the number of dead in one mission almost matching exactly the number of 9/11
victims. The Order favors multiple simultaneous attacks, much like Al Qaeda. In fact,
if one was to substitute "Islam" for "White Race" in the Turner Diaries, one would
almost have Osama bin Laden's complete apocalyptic design of restoring the Islamic
caliphate (Leighton 2004).

PROFILE OF ERIC RUDOLPH: At right is a

2005 AP photo of Eric after a successful court
appearance where he avoided the death penalty
with a plea agreement. As with all his court
appearances, he only submitted his statement in
writing. This one read: "The fact that I have
entered an agreement with the government is
purely a tactical choice on my part and in no way
legitimates the moral authority of the government
to judge this matter or to impute guilt." One is
likely to infer that Eric is a stone-cold,
remorseless psychopath, but he claims to be a
devout Christian. Other statements: (1) "Abortion
is murder, and when the regime in Washington
legalized, sanctioned and legitimized this practice,
they forfeited their legitimacy and moral authority
to govern;" (2) "The lesbian nightclub attempted
to force society to accept and recognize this
behavior;" and (3) "I apologize for the Olympic
Park bombing and did not intend to harm innocent
civilians. It was an opportunity to shame the
United States for its legalization of abortion. The
goal was to knock out Atlanta's power grid and
shut down the Olympics." In Florida, Eric's father
died when Eric was 11, and the family moved to
NC where Eric was homeschooled but attended a
year at Western Carolina before joining the army
where he was kicked out after a year for smoking
marijuana. Afterwards, he grew marijuana and
helped out his brother's carpentry business as he
became increasingly paranoid and extremist.

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM

There are two main impacts, beyond the toll of death and devastation: economic and
psychological. Nations are sorely tempted to spend more fighting homeland terror than
international terror. Doing both exceeds the capacities of most deficit spending wartime
budgets. Following 9/11, the U.S. Congress allocated $60 billion, roughly five times the
counterterrorism budget for previous years. Homeland security is expected to average
$150 billion a year over the next decade, approximately half of the military's $345
million budget. The money will be spent on things like protecting nuclear power plants
to building up federal vaccine stockpiles. The nation is most concerned about protecting
its critical infrastructure from disruption and destruction. The eight critical
infrastructures of the U.S. include the electric power system, gas and oil (storage and
transportation), telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, water supply
systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire and rescue) and continuity
of government services. Threats to these infrastructures fall into two categories: physical
threats to tangible property ("physical threats"), and threats of electronic, radio-
frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications
components that control critical infrastructures ("cyber threats").

The psychological impact involves short-term and long-term trauma, especially in

children, who are most vulnerable to WMD attacks, and nothing exposes the weaknesses
and vulnerabilities of a national healthcare system like a campaign of domestic
terrorism. Emergency rooms become overworked, vaccines run out, and
decontamination teams are found in short supply. Stress and incident-related
counseling become of paramount importance (see Lecture on Psychological Effects of
Terrorism for information about the effects on victims and first responders too).

By far, however, the greatest threat of a war on terrorism is perhaps the loss of civil
liberties. Wartime powers often erode them to the point where they cannot be
regained. Protection against intrusive surveillance measures are difficult to win back
because technology is put into place. Loosening of the rules of evidence is difficult to
overcome because the legal system operates slowly by precedent. Now is the time to
carefully scrutinize anything in the name of anti-terrorism. America, has, in the past,
been able to reconcile the requirements of security with the demands of liberty, and it is
important to have faith, but it is also important to have a healthy dose of skepticism.

PUBLIC OPINION AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Many public opinion polls are unreliable and unnecessary, but in the case of
identifying tradeoffs between security and liberty, some are useful, and quite interesting,
as are the opinions of Americans on international issues (see PIPA and/or its Americans
and the World website for the recording and analysis of attitudes in this regard). Below
are the results of some recent polls taken since 9/11 which focus on how fear can lead
Americans to abandon, sacrifice, or tamper with civil liberties.

Americans willing to do the following:

77% Receive vaccination 70% Carry national ID card
33% Allow authorities to monitor e-mail & telephone
Source: Gallup Organization, June 11, 2002
Whether the government is doing its job:
67% Positive of way handled
Civil liberties willing to be infringed upon:
70% Approve creation of new Dept. of Homeland Defense
64% Approve allowing FBI to monitor libraries, churches and chat rooms
60% Say OK to give up some personal privacy to fight terrorism
 Source: Washington Post-ABC News, June 11, 2002

In November 2002, the top-secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court handed the
government broad new authority to wiretap phone calls, intercept mail and spy on the
Internet use of ordinary Americans. FISA (the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act),
as amended by the Patriot Act, now supports cooperation between intelligence and law
enforcement agencies in establishing probable cause for the issuance of wiretaps against
any American citizen suspected of aiding, abetting, or conspiring with others in
international terrorism. In the past, restrictions had prevented criminal investigators
and intelligence agents from sharing information.

It is much easier now for authorities to justify secret wiretaps and surveillance since
probable cause under FISA represents a lower threshold of evidence based on a record
of automatic approval for most warrant applications. Agents in the FBI's National
Security Law Unit can also now use an electronic system to draft surveillance
applications instantly. Citizens may never know who might be accessing their personal
and business e-mails, their Internet usage, their medical and financial records, or their
cordless and cellular telephone conversations.

Prototype computer monitoring systems such as those being developed at DARPA

(Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) would search for terrorists by probing
through networked databases of "transactional" information. Such data mining
projects make programs like DCS-1000, or Carnivore, seem antiquated. Such programs
proactively search the Internet for terrorist plots in progress. They flag for instance,
certain steps a terrorist might take -- cruising government websites on Monday, for
example, followed by foreign emails on Tuesday, followed by looking up how to make
explosives on Wednesday, etc. Such programs can be considered the Net cousin to
Echelon, which monitors mobile phone traffic. Officials believe that terrorists use the
Internet for many purposes ranging from recruitment and fund-raising to spreading
propaganda and scouting out potential targets. Officials scour the Internet, looking for
disguised or encrypted e-mails and statements on Internet discussion forums that drum
up anti-Western sentiment, in some cases setting up so-called "honey pots" or bogus
Web sites to attract the very people they are trying to monitor. Officials are also wise to
the possibility that when terrorists think they are being monitored, they release chatter
just to screw with people's minds.

INTERNET RESOURCES
ABC Domestic U.S. News
ADL's Poisoning the Web: Hate Groups Online
Apocalyptic Islam and Bin Laden
Captain Dave's Survival Center
CIA World Factbook on U.S.
Closeup Foundation Timeline of Domestic Terrorism
Information Resilience and Homeland Security
Lecture on the Philosophic Concept of Liberty
Lecture on Hate Groups
Militia Watchdog Links Page
Native American Groups
Preventing a Reign of Terror: Why Cracking Down on Militias is a Bad Idea
Southern Poverty Law Center's Hate Group List
Surveillance and Society Journal Homepage

PRINTED RESOURCES
Abanes, R. (1996). American Militias: Rebellion, Racism, & Religion. Downers Grove, IL,
InterVarsity.
Ayers, B., Dohrn, B. & Jones, J. (2006). Sing a Battle Song: The Revolutionary Poetry,
Statements, and Communiques of the Weather Underground. NY: Seven Stories Press.
Barkun, M. (1997). Religion and the Racist Right. Chapel Hill: Univ. of NC Press.
Cole, D. & Dempsey, J. (1999). Terrorism & the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in
the Name of National Security. Tallahassee: First Amendment Foundation.
Crank, J. & Gregor, P. (2005). Counterterrorism After 9/11: Justice, Security, and Ethics
Reconsidered. Cincinatti: LexisNexis Anderson.
Dees, M. (1996). Gathering Storm: America's Militia Threat. New York, HarperCollins.
Deflem, M. (Ed.) (2004). Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Criminological Perspectives.
San Diego: Elsevier.
Dershowitz, A. (2002). Why Terrorism Works. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Emerson, S. (1998). Terrorism in America: The Middle Eastern Connection Journal of
Counterterrorism & Security International 5:13-15.
Freilich, J. (2003). American Militias: State-Level Variations in Militia Activities. NY:
LFB Press.
George, J. & Wilcox, L. (1996). American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klansmen,
Communists, & Others. Amherst, NY, Prometheus.
Glick, B. (1989). War at Home: Covert Action Against U.S. Activists. Cambridge, MA:
South End Press.
Heymann, P. (1998). Terrorism and America. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Ignatieff, M. (2004). The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. Toronto:
Penguin Canada.
Knight, P. (2001). Conspiracy Culture: From Kennedy to the X-Files. NY: Routledge.
Kushner, H. (1998). Terrorism in America: A Structured Approach Springfield: Charles
Thomas.
Laqueur, W. (1999). The New Terrorism. NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
Leighton, P. (2004). "The Challenge of Terrorism to Free Societies in the Global
Village." Pp. 199-217 in M. Deflem (ed.) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism:
Criminological Perspectives. San Diego: Elsevier.
Levitas, D. (2002). The Terrorist Next Door. NY: Thomas Dunne Books.
Malkin, M. (2004). In Defense of Internment: The Case for 'Racial Profiling' in World
War II and the War on Terror. Washington DC: Regnery.
Marx, G. (2002). "What's New About the New Surveillance? Classifying for Change and
Continuity." Surveillance and Society 1(1): 19-29.
McGuckin, F. (1997). Terrorism in the United States. New York: H. W. Wilson.
Mullins, W. (1997). A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism. Springfield:
Charles Thomas.
Perlmutter, D. (2004). Investigating Religious Terrorism and Ritualistic Crimes. Boca
Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Robins, R. & Post, J. (1997). Political Paranoia: The Psychopolitics of Hatred. New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Ronczkowski, M. (2004). Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering,
Analysis, and Investigations. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
Smith, B. & Morgan, K. (1994). "Terrorists Right and Left: Empirical Issues in
Profiling American Terrorists." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 17:39-57.
Snow, R. (1999). The Militia Threat: Terrorists Among Us. New York: Plenum.
White, J. (2002). Terrorism: An Introduction (3e). Stamford: Thomson Learning.
Wills, G. (1999). A Necessary Evil: A History of American Distrust of Government. New
York: Simon & Schuster.

Last Updated: 03/06/06

Syllabus for JUS 427 (Intel Analysis)
Syllabus for JUS 429 (Terrorism)
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice
 THE MEDIA AND TERRORISM
"Such as it is, the press has become the greatest power in the Western World" (Alexander
Solzhenitsyn)

The free press is not free. It runs on money. What Americans are told and what
Americans are not told may depend upon this factor, as well as other factors which are
discussed here. It is first of all, important to become familiar with the global media
establishment and understand the conglomeratation which is taking place. In the
United States, there are approximately 1,600 daily newspapers in America, but only
about 50 cities exist with more than one daily newspaper. There is a discernable trend
away from the founding father's ideal of multiple newspapers in every city (the original
idea of free press) toward an over-reliance upon just one source or an increasingly
limited number of sources. For an overview of various theories about the meaning
and/or purpose of the free press, see Lecture on Freedom of Press. Change is rapidly
taking place. Today, the three (3) most powerful newspapers in the United States are
the: New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. All three, particularly
the New York Times, are extremely influential and, to some degree, set our national
standards about what is fashionable and what is trendy to think about. The Wall Street
Journal is America's largest business daily, with a circulation of over two million, and is
published along with Barron's and a number of publications by Dow Jones & Company
to guide business decisions at a number of levels. The Washington Post is influential
precisely because it influences government. Political leaders look to the Washington Post
for what issue has been given publicity and what issue has not, and then make decisions
on the basis of that. The Post has numerous holdings, including Newsweek.

Besides the above newspapers, one would be remiss not to mention USA Today, the
newspaper designed for the business traveler which is left under many hotel doors free
every morning (although the cost is picked up by consumers via hidden fees on the hotel
bill). USA Today is known for its bold and colorful graphics as well as its surveys of
public opinion. The paper has the widest circulation of any newspaper in the United
States (averaging over 2.25 million copies every day), and within the English-language
world, comes second behind The Times of India. Its circulation figures are a matter of
some dispute, as is its journalistic integrity (relative to the careful editing procedures at
other newspapers). More than a few political leaders and/or intellectuals regard USA
Today, in some opinions, as not suitable for good, quality information, but opinions
vary. USA Today is at least "interesting" in many respects as something in-between
"tabloid" and "serious" journalism.

The three (3) most-read magazines (in terms of news) are Time, Newsweek, and U.S.
News and World Report. The largest and most widely-circulated of this group is Time,
reaching at least four million, but Newsweek is close behind, with a circulation of over
three million. U.S. News and World Report also owns Atlantic Monthly and the New York
Daily News. Magazine reporting is all about advertising, as anyone who looks through a
magazine can tell from the 70% or more pages devoted to it, along with all the little
cards, inserts, and flyers that fall out.

The three (3) largest book publishers in America are: Random House, Simon &
Schuster, and Time Warner. Each of these has numerous subsidiaries, especially
Random House, which owns Crown Publishing Group, for example. Simon & Schuster
itself is a subsidiary of Viacom, Inc., a major player in television markets and with
children's books. Time Warner is also a player in television markets and includes
Warner Books, Little Brown, Book of the Month clubs, and music markets. Books have
at least the advantage of being peer-reviewed, which means that outside, disinterested
reviewers generally read over and correct things at steps along the way.

The three (3) major TV (television) networks are: ABC, CBS, and NBC. They
produce the most entertainment broadcasts in America, and hence, for most Americans,
they are also the primary source of news. Massive teams of technicians as well as
journalists are involved with this type of media. Television, like radio, is designed to be
portable, which means "twenty-second" clips in the form of video bites or sound bites.
Much of it goes stale very quickly, despite efforts by this type of media to recycle as
much as it can.

Due to recent waves of corporate mergers and acquisitions that have produced multi-
billion-dollar media conglomerates, there are three (3) well-known multi-media
conglomerates: Walt Disney Company, Time Warner, and Viacom. The hallmark of a
media conglomerate is that it not only owns production companies (to make its own
movies), but controls cable and/or other broadcast outlets for its productions (e.g.,
Disney owns Touchstone TV and Buena Vista TV), but Disney is unique in that it also
owns entertainment parks like Disneyland. In 1995, Disney acquired Capital
Cities/ABC Inc. which owns the ABC television network, its cable subsidiary, ESPN,
A&E, numerous radio stations, and numerous newspapers.

Time Warner is the second largest conglomerate, owning HBO, Warner Brothers
studio, and a large record company, known simply as Warner Music which makes a lot
of money off of rap and hip hop music. Time Warner also has several profitable
magazine ventures, such as Time, Sports Illustrated, People Magazine, and Fortune.

Viacom is the third largest conglomerate, and makes its money by producing TV
programs for the major networks and producing Hollywood feature films through
Paramount Pictures. Its publishing division includes Prentice Hall, Simon & Schuster,
and Pocket Books. In addition, it owns most Blockbuster Video stores, and is
extensively involved in satellite broadcasting, theme parks, and video games. Viacom
also owns Showtime, MTV, Nickelodeon, and other networks.

Number four and five are Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation, which owns Fox and
20th Century Fox Films. Number Five is Sony Corporation which owns Sony Music and
Sony Pictures. Sixth in power and influence might be Ted Turner and his TBS/CNN
empire, which has a near-controlling interest or stake in CBS. Finally, Seagram (the
liquor giant) can be mentioned as a seventh powerhouse, since it controls MCA and
Universal Pictures.

In terms of another media type (although a doubtful part of the establishment),

there's also the blogosphere, which should not be overlooked. Several influential blogs
(other than those which might be included in the Internet Resources below) include:
Athena, Counterterrorism, DailyKos, DefenseTech, Instapundit, IntelDump, Law and
Terrorism, Patriot Debates, Pentagon's New Map, TalkLeft, TigerHawk, and the
Volokh Conspiracy. This concludes our overview of what one needs to know about the
industry of today's media. An examination of selected issues follow.
 EMBEDDED REPORTING FROM WAR ZONES

Sometime around 2003, the U.S. government got the idea that it would be best to both
"counter" enemy propaganda as well as keep an "eye" on reporters by requiring them
to be "embedded" with soldiers in war zones. There was initially some resistance by
reporters who thought it was nothing more than a way to "co-opt" their journalistic
integrity, but by-and-large, most reporters went along with the plan (Geraldo Rivera
being the exception, because he was expelled from the program for revealing future
military plans). By the end of 2005, the embeddedness program was in full swing, and
over 600 reporters were involved in the Iraqi theatre of war. Katovsky & Carlson
(2003), as well as others, have written on this topic, and most analysis finds an increase
in reporter respect for soldiers via such programs. There are many virtues and vices
about this way of providing battle coverage. For the most part, it is exciting, live, and
while dramatic, not unnecessarily graphic. On the other hand, it can be incredibly dull,
and there is the additional worry about providing too much information that could help
the enemy. Clearly, war reporting has undergone certain changes in recent years.

MEDIA ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION

It used to be that media influence on public opinion was more "subliminal" (for lack
of a better word), but then, sometime around 1980, the media caught onto the idea of
"polling" (as unscientific as media polling is). Since 9/11, with the war on terrorism,
some say the media has gotten in the habit of constantly telling Americans what they
believe: You are dissatisfied ... You are getting more dissatisfied ... You are slowly
becoming utterly dissatisfied ... Your dissatisfaction is now reaching a fever pitch! In one
sense, this kind of sensationalism is driven by the short little attention spans of most
Americans, but in another sense, it is the inevitable byproduct of a market-driven world
of media as big business. The media itself views what they do in this regard as part of
their "watchdog" function; i.e., to have a loud "bark" but little "bite." They are, in
fact, engaged in overt political bias of the first degree because their purpose is not
simply to "inform" but to "express" and "evaluate." Gone are the days when the news
media simply informs.

MASS NEWS MEDIA AND SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION

Social differentiation is the process by which an institutional sphere of life becomes

more independent and separate from other institutional spheres of life. An example is
when "news becomes entertainment," and a sociologist might worry about this, as well
as other things like how the media has become a substitute for meaningful group
contact. It is understandable that in any modern society, the media will become more
powerful. It produces symbolic patterns that create the invisible tissues of society on the
cultural level just as the legal system creates the boundaries of a community on a more
concrete level (Alexander 1990). Plain facts are not just ordinarily produced in the
course of human events; they need to be organized and explained. How the news media
organizes its documentary categories represents the standardized way in which the
"norms" of society are evoked and maintained. Whether certain stories "make the
news" at all represents the "values" of society in terms of what is considered too profane
or too sacred to report upon. News journalism involves condensing and summarizing,
and imparting some kind of rationality, causality, and temporal order to facts. The
guiding assumption behind all journalistic ethics is that good reporting is better than
bad, and this is accomplished primarily by linguistic rules about the importance of
playing up the action; i.e., "if it bleeds, it leads." In this way, the news media promotes
what is "newsworthy," unambiguous, fresh, and doesn't require much self-reflection.

As Gans (1979) noted, the media industry does not seem to attract ideologues. Most
journalists keep their values to themselves. They did not become journalists to advocate
values or to reform society. However, there are times when the media will consciously
or unconsciously take up "advocacy" or activism. They are limited in their flexibility
and power with this since few people are willing to associate reason, legitimacy, and
enforceability with the news media. This is to say that few people run out and take
immediate social action in the wake of something they've read, seen, or heard on the
news media. In general, the news media promotes passivity, not action, but there are
exceptions.

TERROR TV AND OTHER REVOLTING USES OF THE MEDIA

INTERNET RESOURCES
Center for Media and Public Affairs
Coalition Against Terrorist Media
Current.org
Mediachannel.org
Mediamatters.org

PRINTED RESOURCES
Alexander, J. (1990). "The Mass News Media in Systemic, Historical, and Comparative
Perspective." Pp. 323-366 in J. Alexander & P. Colomy (eds.) Differentiation Theory and
Social Change. NY: Columbia Univ. Press.
Altheide, D. (2006). Terrorism and the Politics of Fear. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Gans, H. (1979). Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS, NBC, Newsweek & Time. NY:
Pantheon.
Katovsky, B. & Carlson, T. (2003). Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq. NY: Lyons
Press.
Kavoori, A. & Fraley, T. (Eds.) (2006). Media, Terrorism, and Theory: A Reader.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Nacos, B. (2002). Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The Central Role of the Media in Terrorism
and Counterterrorism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Schechter, D. (2003). Media Wars: News at a Time of Terror. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Last updated: 04/13/06
Syllabus for JUS 429 (Terrorism)
MegaLinks in Criminal Justice