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Locus Classicus

This passage from Aristotle's De Anima discusses the agent intellect and possible intellect. The agent intellect makes objects intelligible by abstracting them from their physical qualities, allowing the possible intellect to receive and understand them. There is debate around whether the agent intellect is separate from the soul like the possible intellect, or completely separate even from the soul. The key points of debate are how to correctly interpret Aristotle's view of the relationship between the agent intellect and soul, and which interpretation makes the most sense.

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118 views2 pages

Locus Classicus

This passage from Aristotle's De Anima discusses the agent intellect and possible intellect. The agent intellect makes objects intelligible by abstracting them from their physical qualities, allowing the possible intellect to receive and understand them. There is debate around whether the agent intellect is separate from the soul like the possible intellect, or completely separate even from the soul. The key points of debate are how to correctly interpret Aristotle's view of the relationship between the agent intellect and soul, and which interpretation makes the most sense.

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pseudo78
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Locus Classicus: De Anima, 3.5.

Since further, just as in every nature, there is something which is indeed the matter of each
genus, and is in potency all those things [in the genus, and there is another which is a cause and
productive !ecause all those things are in its ma"ing, as art stands to matter, these different
things also must e#ist in the soul. $nd so there is an intellect of such a "ind to !ecome everything,
and another of such a "ind to ma"e [it into everything, as in the manner of a fi#ed disposition,
such as how light acts. %or in a some sense, light too ma"es colors e#isting in potency, colors
e#isting in act.
$nd this separa!le, and impassi!le, and unmi#ed intellect is a su!stantial !eing in act. %or the
agent is always superior to the patient, and the principle &originating force' is always superior to
the matter.
$gain, "nowledge in act is identical to the thing ["nown( !ut "nowledge in potency, is prior in
time in the one thing [individual. )owever, it is not entirely [prior in time. *t [the intellect or the
agent intellect+ sometimes does not "now, !ut it is not sometimes "nowing.
,his intellect alone is separated, which it is truly. $nd this alone is immortal and continuous.
*t does not remem!er, moreover, !ecause, it is impassi!le( the passive intellect is destructi!le,
and without this, the soul understands nothing. [,ranslated !y -ar" Smillie, copyright .///
*n this passage, it is universally agreed that $ristotle is descri!ing
two intellectual activities: one is to receive intelligi!le o!jects li"e
matter receives form [the possible intellect, the other is
productive, li"e an agent cause, ma"ing o!jects intelligi!le &or
capa!le of !eing "nown intellectually' [the agent intellect. ,he
things we "now, as they e#ist according to $ristotle at least, are
physical, sensi!le &things we can sense', and
only potentially intelligi!le &something "nowa!le !y our minds'. So
!efore we can intellectually or mentally "now some thing &say
"now that 0illy is a human !eing1human !eing is a conceptual or
intellectual reality', a sensi!le o!ject must first 2!e made2 into
something intelligi!le. $ristotle calls this process 2a!straction,2
and a!straction is the wor" of the 2agent intellect.2 ,he intelligi!le
o!ject is received in the possi!le intellect, which can 2move2 from
"nowing one o!ject to "nowing another. 0ecause it changes, we
are aware of what we "now1since the agent intellect receives no
changes &it is impassi!le', we are unaware of its activity.
,he variant understandings concern the meaning of 2!eing
separate2 here. *s the agent intellect separatefrom the body the
way the possi!le intellect is1so that we have two separate
intellectual powers in one soul. 3r is it completely separated from
even the human soul+ $le#ander of $phrodisias seems to have
interpreted $ristotle in this latter way. $l"indi, following him,
considered the agent intellect as a spiritual !eing, a separated
*ntelligence.
So there are two pro!lems here. &4' 5hat is the correct
interpretation of $ristotle &or are !oth readings possi!le and fair'+
&.' 6o matter what $ristotle meant, what understanding of the
agent intellect ma"es !est sense &if any'+

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