Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 122165 February 17, 1997
ALA MODE GARMENTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division), LUCRECIA V. GABA and ELSA I. MELARPES,respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions
1
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated
November 24, 1994 and June 26, 1995 in an illegal dismissal case
2
.
The following facts are not disputed:
Petitioner is a garments manufacturer and exporter. Private respondents were both employees of petitioner until May 7, 1993 when, upon
reporting for work, private respondents were disallowed from entering petitioner's premises.
Private respondents were first hired as sewers. They were, in time, promoted to the position of line leaders, each tasked with supervising thirty-
six (36) sewers.
On May 5 and 6, 1993, all the line leaders in petitioner's establishment did not report for work. Acting on what appeared to be a concerted action
to boycott petitioner's operations, petitioner verbally required private respondents to submit written explanations as to their absence.
On May 7, 1993, private respondents were not allowed to enter the premises of petitioner.
On May 10, 1993, both private respondents tendered their explanation letters to petitioner. Private respondent Gaba's letter states, thus:
5-10-93
Dear Sir:
Ipagpaumanhin ninyo ang hindi ko pagpapasok ngayon dahil ang anak ko po ay dadalhin ko sa Doctor at baka po dalawan
(sic) araw akong hindi makakapasok dahil po sa aking anak na (__________) ay naloloko sa kaya (sic) barkada kaya aking
inaasikaso pa.
Sana po ay ako ay maunawaan ninyo.
Lubos na Gumagalang,
(Sgd)
Lucrecia
On the other hand, private respondent Melarpes gave the following reason for her absence in her letter:
May 10, 1993
Dear Sir:
Ipagpaumanhin ninyo ang pag-absent ko noong May 5-6, 1993 dahil masakit ang pos-on ko at may dalang nag-tatai at
nagsusuka, at sorry po kung hindi ako nakapadala nang sulat o kaya tumawag sa telephone.
Aasahan ko po ang inyong consideration.
Respectfully yours,
(Sgd)
Elsa Melarpes
Thus, private respondent Gaba was absent on May 5 and 6, 1993 because her child was sick, while private respondent Melarpes was also
absent because she was ill on said dates due to her pregnancy.
Notwithstanding the submission by private respondents of their explanation letters, they were not allowed to resume their work. Petitioner
alleged that it advised private respondents to await the decision of management, pending a company investigation as to whether or not the real
reason for their absence was an intent to sabotage the operations of petitioner.
Significantly, however, petitioner never denied that the other line leaders who were also absent on May 5 and 6, 1993, had been immediately
allowed to resume their work despite their two-day absence.
On May 17, 1993, private respondents filed with the NLRC separate complaints for among others, illegal dismissal .
After submission of position papers, replies and rejoinders, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dated April 25, 1994 findi ng that private
respondents were illegally dismissed from service on the mere suspicion that their two-day absence was actually a boycott to derail the
operations of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter held that such suspicion was utterly unsupported by any evidence. The Labor Arbiter also found that
private respondents' right to due process was violated in the absence of compliance by petitioner with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing. The Labor Arbiter ruled, thus:
Well-settled is the rule that in termination cases, the employer has the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was for
cause. Failure in this regard, renders the dismissal unjustified and therefore, illegal (Gesulgon vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 561). In
the case at bar, except for respondent's bare allegation that complainants sabotage[d] its business operations which resulted
in huge losses, no evidence was adduced to support its contention. Neither did respondent submitted [sic] proof that the
company indeed incurred losses as a result of complainants' concerted action. Decisions could not be based on mere
conjectures or surmises but must be supported by evidence.
Furthermore, records are bereft of any showing that complainants were indeed afforded the due process requirement of the
law. What complainants submitted were letters-explanations regarding their absence but not with respect to the charge of
sabotage as alleged by respondent.
Moreover, granting arguendo, that complainants violated the company rules and regulations for having been absent without
prior approval by the management, still the penalty of dismissal is too severe a penalty, considering that this is the first
offense/infraction committed by them during their three (3) years of service with the company.
All told, complainants were indeed dismissed from the service without cause and due process. As such, they should be
reinstated to their former positions without loss of seniority rights with backwages not exceeding three (3) years . . . .
3

Understandably, petitioner appealed the aforecited decision of the Labor Arbiter to respondent NLRC. Such appeal, however, was dismissed on
November 24, 1994.
Before respondent NLRC, petitioner advanced the theory that it could not be liable for illegal dismissal, since private respondents have not been
in fact dismissed from the service. Petitioner complained that after having told private respondents to wait for the decision of management,
private respondents "jumped the gun" on them, so to speak, by filing the complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondent NLRC, however, was the
least persuaded; it ruled:
With the record clearly showing that complainants were able to satisfactorily explain their absences with valid reasons, and
that they actually presented themselves for work on May 7, 1993, except that they were not accepted back by respondent, we
cannot but affirm the decision below.
4

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforecited decision, but respondent NLRC denied the same in a Resolution dated June 26,
1995 for having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following as grounds justifying the nullification of the herein assailed resolutions of respondent NLRC:
A. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
DISMISSED BY PETITIONER, WHEN THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWS THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
SIMPLY INSTRUCTED TO AWAIT MANAGEMENT'S DECISION REGARDING THE PENDING ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATION.
B. PETITIONER HAD REASONABLE GROUND TO CONCLUDE THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO REPORT
FOR WORK WAS A FORM OF CONCERTED ACTION DESIGNED TO SABOTAGE ITS OPERATIONS. THE NLRC
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT RULED OTHERWISE.
C. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT DISMISSAL WAS TOO SEVERE A
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' INFRACTIONS. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE GUILTY OF SABOTAGING
THE OPERATIONS OF PETITIONER. HENCE, THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL IS COMMENSURATE TO THE
INFRACTIONS COMMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
D. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO OBSERVE THE
REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS.
E. THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR BACKWAGES, HOLIDAY
PAY, SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE PAY, AND ATTORNEY'S FEES WHEN ITS FINDING OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS NOT
EVEN SUBSTANTIATED BY EVIDENCE.
The petition fails to convince us that respondent NLRC is guilty of grave abuse of discretion.
The crux of petitioner's argument is that it cannot be held guilty of illegal dismissal because there was no dismissal effected in the first place.
This claim is belied by the fact, undisputed by the petitioner, that private respondents were barred from entering the work premises while the
other line leaders supposedly part of the boycott were allowed to return to work. The failure of the petitioner to accept the private respondents
back after their absences constitutes constructive discharge or dismissal. A constructive discharge or dismissal is defined as a "quitting because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay."
Private respondents herein found it well nigh impossible to continue their employment, having been denied access into their workplace. The
case of Valiant Machinery and Metal Corp. vs. NLRC
5
, wherein this Court found the employer guilty of illegal dismissal when it did not allow its
workers to enter the company premises finds application to the situation at hand. As held therein:
The Court finds substantial evidence in support of the ruling of the NLRC that the private respondents were indeed dismissed
without cause. While there was no outright or open termination of the services of the employees, there is reason to believe the
company barred them from work because they were absent practically for one week when they were badly needed in the
factory.
Finding that there was, indeed, a dismissal, We hold that the same was made without compliance with the requirements laid down by law and
jurisprudence. In order to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in
Art. 282 of the Labor Code, and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which are the opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself.
6
Herein, the Labor Arbiter found that records are bereft of any showing that private respondents were indeed afforded the due process
requirement of the law. What private respondents submitted were letters-explanations regarding their absences but not with respect to the
charge of sabotage as alleged by petitioner.
7

Petitioner claims that the private respondents were only made to wait for the decision of the management pending investigation of the alleged
"sabotage" or boycott. It will be noted, however, that the private respondents were already barred from entering the company as early as May 7,
1993. They filed their complaint on May 17 of the same year. Ten days had lapsed before the said complaints were filed. Within those ten days
the private respondents were not allowed to work in the company and their status remained unclear. As aptly noted by the Solicitor General:
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there was a company investigation being then conducted, still petitioner should not
have ordered private respondents to await its decision on the matter but instead imposed on the latter preventive suspension
in conformity with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule XIV of Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, considering that
private respondents were accused of having sabotaged petitioner's operations which resulted in business losses, a clear
example of a serious and imminent, if not actual, threat to petitioner's property. Hence, having been placed in suspended
animation, so to speak, by petitioner, private respondents had every reason to believe that they were dismissed by the former,
as they actually were, thereby warranting the filing of the complaints for illegal dismissal.
8

The private respondents were never summoned by the management to air their side regarding the accusations of sabotage, but were only
required to give explanations regarding their absences. Thus, even if, as petitioner claims, that the dismissal was due to the role played by the
respondents in the alleged sabotage, the said dismissal is still invalid, as no notice was given and no hearing was conducted. To reiterate, the
twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees.
9

Moreover, the petitioner is inconsistent in its arguments. While contending that private respondents were not dismissed, it goes on to state that
dismissal in this instance is valid as petitioner had "reasonable ground to suspect that the absences were a form of concerted action."
10
It also
insists that private respondent Inocencio's absence due to abdominal pains, accompanied by loose bowel movement and vomiting, to be flimsy
at best, despite the fact
that said private respondent submitted a medical certificate to substantiate her claim.
11

On the contrary, as noted by the Solicitor General, the Labor Arbiter gave credence and weight to the justification given by private respondents
for their two-day absence as consistent with the truth, against petitioner's mere conjecture that the absences were a form of sabotage. Wel l
entrenched is the rule that when the conclusions of the labor arbiter are sufficiently corroborated by the evidence on record, the same should be
respected by appellate tribunals since he is in a better position to assess and evaluate the credibility of the contending parties.
12
If ever there is
anything that may be considered flimsy in this case, it should be the petitioner's lame justification for the dismissal of the private respondents. As
succinctly put by the NLRC:
Absent any proof that complainants (private respondents in this case) actually initiated what it termed a concerted action of its
line leaders to sabotage its business operations by absenting themselves all at the same time on May 5 and 6, 1993, the
respondent (herein petitioner) cannot just invoke sabotage that does not exist. Besides, what makes it difficult for respondent
to charge complainants of illegal strike, if such existed? That it miserably failed to show that there were other line leaders
(aside from complainants) who were likewise absent on said dates, we cannot but consign this defense to the "dustbin" of
afterthoughts.
13

We come now to the petitioner's claim that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding it liable for backwages, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, and attorney's fees. Other than the award for backwages, this Court finds no reason why the petitioner should not be made
so liable. As noted by the Labor Arbiter, and affirmed by respondent NLRC, petitioner failed to show proof that the holiday pay and service
incentive leave pay had been paid. Having been also compelled to litigate, the award of attorney's fees equivalent to five percent (5%) of the
total judgment award is also proper.
14
We find no reason to disturb said findings.
Anent the issue of backwages, We find that the Labor Arbiter erred in limiting the award of backwages for only a period not exceeding three (3)
years. Prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715, the rule was that an employee, who was illegally dismissed, was entitled to an award of
backwages equivalent to three years (where his case is not terminated sooner).
15
Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Art. 279 of the Labor
Code took effect on March 21, 1989. It states in part:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. . . . An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation is withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
(emphasis ours)
Private respondents' cause of action against the petitioner arose on May 7, 1993; their complaint for illegal dismissal was filed on May 17, 1993.
Since the dismissal took place after the passage of such law, and following the doctrine laid down in the case of Caltex Refinery Employees
Association (CREA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division)
16
, We hold that the private respondents are entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, as well as to other privileges and their full backwages inclusive of allowances, and to their other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time their compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement. Moreover, no deduction shall be allowed in accordance with the doctrine enunciated in the recent case of Bustamante
vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Evergreen Farms, Inc.
17
wherein this Court took the opportunity to clarify how Republic Act No.
6715 is to be interpreted:
The Court deems it appropriate, however, to reconsider such earlier ruling on the computation of backwages as enunciated in
said Pines City Educational Center case, by now holding that conformably with the evident legislative intent as expressed in
Rep. Act No. 6715, . . . backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee, should not, as a general rule, be
diminished or reduced by the earnings derived by him during the period of his illegal dismissal. The underlying reason for this
ruling is that the employee, while litigating the legality ([or] illegality) of his dismissal, must still earn a living to support himself
and family, while full backwages have to be paid by the employer as part of the price or penalty he has to pay for illegally
dismissing his employee. The clear legislative intent of the amendment in Rep. Act No. 6715 is to give more benefits to
workers than was previously given them under the Mercury Drugrule or the "deduction of earnings elsewhere" rule. Thus, a
closer adherence to the legislative policy behind Rep. Act No. 6715 points to "full backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e.,
without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned employee during the period of his illegal
dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for "full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi sermo est.
Should reinstatement no longer be feasible due to strained relations, the award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every
year of service, a fraction of six (6) months to be considered as one (1) year.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November 24, 1994 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the award of backwages or separation pay be computed according to the foregoing discussion.
Costs against the Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 130411-14 October 13, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO BELLO, accused-appellant.
MELO, Acting C.J .:
In a highly conservative and religious society like ours, no crime is perhaps more repulsive and disgusting than incestuous rape, and much more
so, rape by fathers of their minor daughters. As such, our Legislature has declared such offense undeserving of society's mercy, compassion,
and leniency, providing, that the offense should rightfully carry with it the supreme penalty of death. Regrettably, the imposition of said penalty in
the case at bar cannot be properly sustained due to the requirements of substantial justice and procedural rules not having been fully
satisfied.1wphi1.nt
Accused-appellant was charged with four (4) counts of rape committed against his own legitimate daughter, Jenalyn A. Bello, committed on
August 13, 14, 19, and 24, 1995. The first information alleged:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1995, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of Jenalyn A. Bello, a minor, twelve (12) years of age, by means of force
and intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Jenalyn A. Bello against
her will, and consent, with the aggravating circumstance of relationship.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(p. 9, Rollo.)
The three other informations were identically worded as the above information, except that they respectively charged that the rape therein
committed occurred on August 14, 19, and 24, 1995.
At the arraignment on February 13, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the prosecution presented its side through the lone
testimony of the victim which was summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General as follows:
THE RAPE OF AUGUST 13, 1995
Around 3 o'clock in the early morning of August 13, 1995, while Jenalyn was soundly sleeping in the bedroom of their house
together with her two younger brothers, her drunken father woke her up and ordered her to go to the kitchen. She walked to
the kitchen and he followed her. In the kitchen, he angrily ordered her to undress, promising to give her money. Realizing the
evil intent of her father, she gently pleaded: "Do not do that". Gripped with fear, however, Jenalyn followed his command.
Naked, he made her lie on a bench, laid on top of her and inserted his erect penis into her vagina. Feeling intense pain, she
continued her plea: "Do not do that." But he paid no heed. She called for her mother, who was then sleeping at the sala, but to
no avail. Jenalyn could not do anything but submit herself to the evil desires of the man whom she feared and from whose
hands she suffered several punishments. Appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of his own daughter.
(pp. 2-3, Appellee's Brief.)
THE RAPE OF AUGUST 14, 1995
Around 1 o'clock in the early morning of August 14, 1995, appellant woke up Jenalyn and sternly whispered: "Do not say
anything. Do not tell your mother. Anyway, you are not a virgin anymore." He, thereafter, ordered her to undress. At that time,
Jenalyn's mother was at the public market selling fish to the early fish buyers.
When she was already naked, appellant placed himself on top of her and inserted his private organ into hers. Jenalyn
repeatedly pleaded: "Father, do not do that!" He did not mind her. Instead, and in a jeer his father remarked: "Why are you
saying that, anyway you are no longer a virgin like your elder sister" (appellant was obviously referring to his daughter Jul iet
Bello who was also victimized by him, but lucky to escape his clutches). After he was through with his sexual carnage,
appellant just left the room.
Jenalyn cried the whole day, but her mother did not even ask what was bothering her. Sensing that her mother knew what was
happening, Jenalyn lost the courage to approach and tell her about the matter.
(pp. 3-4, Appellee's Brief.)
THE RAPE OF AUGUST 19, 1995
Around 3 o'clock in the morning of August 19, 1995, appellant replayed the sexual assault upon Jenalyn at the kitchen of thei r
abode while his wife was sleeping at the sala. After threatening her, he compelled her to lie on the floor. Appellant positioned
himself and inserted his erect organ into her vagina enjoying his bestial act. Unable to bear the pain, she repeated her plea:
"Father, do not do it anymore." Appellant bluntly replied: "Do not say anything." Her mother's lack of concern and her own fear
for her father, muted Jenalyn from crying for help.
(p. 4, Appellee's Brief.)
THE RAPE OF AUGUST 24, 1995
Around 9 o'clock in the morning of August 24, 1995, Jenalyn was at Sankalan Elementary school to attend her first periodical
examination. Realizing that she did not have enough paper for the examination, she returned home to ask money from her
mother to buy paper. When she reached home, she saw her father and brother J.R. She went straight to their comfort room as
she had then her menstrual period. From there, she proceeded to their bedroom to get something. Her father followed her and
asked if she still had classes. She answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, he ordered her to undress. She refused, saying
"Father, don't do that because I have my menstruation, besides, we are having now our periodical tests." Appellant insisted
that she undress. Afraid of his usual maltreatment, Jenalyn gave in. After satisfying his lust, appellant just left his devastated
daughter.
(p. 5, Appellee's Brief.)
On April 16, 1996, the scheduled date of the cross-examination of the complainant, accused-appellant, through his counsel de oficio, manifested
that he wished to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and to substitute the same with one of guilty. Convinced that accused-appellant
understood the consequences of his change of plea, the Honorable Mateo M. Leanda, presiding judge of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of
the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban City, allowed the same to be entered in the record of the four rape cases. The defense proceeded
to cross-examine complainant and thereafter presented accused-appellant for the purpose of proving mitigating circumstances. Later, accused-
appellant moved for the reinstatement of his plea of not guilty, but this was denied by the trial court in its order dated October 4, 1996.
On November 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts of rape, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds accused RODRIGO BELLO, alias "Rudy", guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of the consummated four counts of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Art. 225 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and he is hereby sentenced accordingly to suffer the
supreme penalty of DEATH, for each count. In addition thereto, the accused's estate, if any, is ordered to indemnify the
offended party, JENALYN A. BELLO, the sum of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos, for each count of rape, as the subjects of
this case, or the total amount of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The accused's properties is also condemned to
pay exemplary damages to the complainant in the sum of P20,000.00 per count, or a total of eighty thousand (P80,000.00)
pesos in all.1wphi1.nt
With costs de oficio.
(pp. 35-36, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant assails said judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in: (a) convicting accused-appellant despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and (b) in not allowing him to present additional evidence.
After a meticulous and objective evaluation of the record of this case, this Court is of the carefully considered opinion that the court a quo failed
to observe the required procedure for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.
Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure is explicit that "when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf." Under this Rule, three things are enjoined
upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence
on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires (Pamaran, Manuel, R., 1995 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Annotated, Rules 110-127, 1998
Edition, p. 307, citing People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 [1987]). This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave
abuse of discretion (People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 [1990]).
In People vs. Albert (251 SCRA 293 [1995]), we pointed out that the rationale behind the aforequoted rule is that courts must prove with more
care wherever the possible punishment is in its severest form death for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable and
experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.
A careful perusal of the record of this case reveals a measure of shortcoming on the part of the trial court to explain fully to accused-appellant
the consequences of his plea of guilty, the trial court failing as it did to conduct the requisite searching inquiry so as to determine whether
accused-appellant's plea possessed all the requirements of an acceptable one. The proceedings below on this point transpired as follows:
ATTY. ESBER:
For the accused. Before I proceed to cross-examine the witness, the accused intimated to me that he be allowed to change his
previous plea of not guilty to "yes guilty."
COURT:
ORDER
Before the cross-examination of the complainant in her joint testimony for all the four (4) rape cases, the defense counsel
moved the Court that the accused be allowed to withdraw his former plea of "Not Guilty" to the charge of "Rape" and substitute
the same with that of "Yes Guilty."
There being no objection from the prosecution, let the accused be re-arraigned.
SO ORDERED.
INTERPRETER:
Accused pleading guilty, Your Honor.
ATTY. ESBER:
With the change of the plea of the accused from a former plea of "Not Guilty" to "Yes Guilty" to the four (4) counts of Rape,
that a lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death be imposed.
PROS. CAA:
In the meanwhile, we would like to be allowed to present evidence if only to determine the degree of the culpability of the
accused pursuant to the Rules of Court.
COURT:
ORDER
After the re-arraignment, the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to the four (4) counts of Rape. However, the Court insisted that
Fiscal Caa should continue presenting the evidence constituting the testimony of complainant to comply with the
requirements of law on procedure to determine the gravity of the offense charged and, likewise, the defense is required to
present evidence to satisfy the requirement of the law.
SO ORDERED.
(tsn, April 16, 1996, pp. 2-3.)
Evidently, there is no showing that accused-appellant was put on the stand for purposes of inquiring whether he fully comprehended the legal
consequences of his plea of guilt. The original record of this case is completely bereft of any document concerning accused-appellant's
supposed re-arraignment. We cannot presume that the re-arraignment of accused-appellant was regularly conducted. We cannot lean on this
rebuttable presumption especially when a man's life is at stake. We cannot anchor our judgment based on mere speculations and conjectures.
Rather, we must be positively convinced. Where a capital offense like incestuous rape becomes the subject of a positive plea, it becomes
imperative for the trial court to administer a searching inquiry and receive evidence undisputably showing that the accused admits his guilt freely,
voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of such a plea (People vs. Albert, supra). And a plea of guilty is
improvidently accepted where no effort is even made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense may
result in the imposition of the death penalty (People vs. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633 [1997]).
A "searching inquiry", under the Rules, means more than informing cursorily the accused that he faces a jail term but so also, the exact length of
imprisonment under the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. Not infrequently indeed, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment, or upon bad advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions (People vs. Dayot, supra).
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper "searching inquiry", it would be well for
the court, for instance, to require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or by making him reenact the
manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or by causing him to furnish and explain to the court missing details of significance (People vs.
Estomaca, 256 SCRA 429 [1996]). In the case under review, the record does not reveal any information about the personality profile of accused-
appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. Questions pertaining to the age, socio-
economic status, and educational background of accused-appellant which may provide contributory insights for a proper verdict in this case were
not propounded by the trial court.
Further, the trial court did not bother to explain to accused-appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape pursuant to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659 violation of which he was charged with. The trial judge also failed to inform accused-appellant that he would be made to
indemnify his victim. As a result, accused-appellant was not properly accorded his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him, which is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the Constitution (People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058,
March 29, 1999).
Likewise, there is no showing that accused-appellant was specifically warned that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be
given the death penalty under Republic Act No. 7659. He was categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any circumstance
affect or reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or as it may have been erroneously suggested to him. Such mistaken belief on the
part of accused-appellant which may have impelled him to plead guilty is demonstrated in his testimony, to wit:
PROS. CAA:
Q: Knowing the contents of the four Informations during the re-arraignment, you pleaded "Guilty" to each of
them?
A: I was afraid because, according to them, I will be hanged and I do not want to be hanged because who
will support my wife and my children. My wife has no work.
(tsn, May 9, 1996, p. 6.)
COURT:
Q: As a whole, you deny these four (4) incidents of Rape you have committed against your daughter?
A: I do not know about that.
Q: Inspite of the fact that previously you entered a plea of "guilty" to each of these four (4) counts?
A: Because I am afraid, I might be killed.
(tsn, ibid., p. 5.)
These repeated and emphatic declarations of accused-appellant should have attracted the attention of the trial court that accused-appellant did
not have full knowledge of the consequences of his plea. The trial judge at this instance should have informed and forewarned accused-
appellant, in ordinary language, of three things: First, that accused-appellant's plea of guilty cannot be considered mitigating as it was made after
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, thus, foreclosing the application of Paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code. Second, that the penalty of death shall be imposed when the rape is committed by a father against a minor daughter, in accordance with
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Third, that inasmuch as death is a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the offense, as provided by Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code. Verily, accused-appellant cannot be reasonably expected to fully understand all the implications of his plea without the necessary
detailed elucidation on the part of the trial judge. Clearly, the latter failed to observe the quantum of care which the Court had prescribed for the
valid admission of a plea of guilty by an accused. As a dispenser of justice, the trial judge should have endeavored to discharge his duties
competently and efficiently so as not to erode public confidence in the judiciary.
Finally, a plea of guilty must be an unconditional admission of guilt. It must be of such nature as to foreclose the defendant's right to defend
himself from said charge, thus leaving the court no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law (People vs. De Luna, 174 SCRA 204
[1989]). An accused may not foist a conditional plea of guilty on the court in the sense that he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty will
be meted unto him. Likewise, a formal plea of not guilty should properly be entered if an accused admits the truth of some or all the allegations
of the information, but interposes excuses or additional facts which, if duly established would exempt or relieve him in whol e or in part of criminal
responsibility (People vs. Albert, supra). The ungrammatical answers of accused-appellant to equally fractured questions during his direct
examination is, on this point, revealing:
ATTY. ESBER:
Q: What happened to Jenalyn, who is now being a subject matter of this case? The question now is: Is it
your own will that what happened to Jenalyn is intentionally done by you?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why do you say that it was not done intentionally by you?
A: Because, that time, I was drank. I usually do not drink I am not a habitual drinker.
Q: As a follow-up question. Do you mean to convey that because you were drank at that time you do not
know what you were doing?
A: No, sir.
(tsn, May 9, 1996, p. 4.)
COURT:
Q: One of the charge against you for Rape was allegedly committed, according to the Information, was on
August 13, 1996, do you know that?
A: I do not know, Your Honor.
Q: So, you do not know what happened to you and your daughter on this particular date of August 13, 1995?
A: I do not know. I was not even at home on that day.
Q: Where were you then?
A: I was at my place of work.
Q: Did you, at any time, met your daughter and have a contact with her on said date the whole day?
A: No, sir, because I have an overtime with my work.
Q: Your daughter testified in court that she was raped by you on August 13, 1995, was she telling a lie?
A: Yes, she was telling a lie because she is being coached by her sister and by her aunt.
Q: Your daughter testified in court under oath that on August 13, 1995, at 10 o'clock in the evening, while
she was in the bedroom, she was awakened by you and you inserted your penis in her vagina, is this true?
A: That is a lie because my wife, myself and my daughter are sleeping together.
Q: Your daughter further testified that on August 14, 1995, at 1 o'clock in the early morning, you requested
her to boil water in her kitchen because you were drank, you took advantage of her, you layed her down and
took advantage of her. Did you hear that statement of your daughter here in court?
A: Yes, I have heard the testimony but I did not do it.
Q: Another incident. On August 19, 1995, at 3 o'clock in the early morning, you woke her up while she was
sleeping in the bedroom and then told her to go to the kitchen, and while at the kitchen you commanded her
to undress, and then you even told her that before you will die you should be able to abuse herself first or
have sexual intercourse with her. Did you hear that statement of your daughter here in court?
A: She is telling a lie.
Q: As a whole, you deny these four (4) incidents of Rape you have committed against your daughter?
A: I do not know about that.
Q: Inspite of the fact that previously you entered a plea of "Guilty" to each of these four (4) counts?
A: Because I am afraid, I might be killed.
(tsn, p. 5, May 9, 1996.)
It is without doubt that accused-appellant was adamant in his denial of the charges filed against him. Such being the case, the trial court should
have required accused-appellant to plead anew to the charges, or at least, it should have directed that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him
since said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty. Thereafter, the court a quo should have proceeded with the trial of the case to
determine the guilt or innocence of accused-appellant (People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119 [1966]).
Let it be clearly understood that the administration of justice, including among other things, the punishment of guilty persons and the protection
of the innocent, is the very reason for the existence of courts. While justice demands speedy administration, courts are in duty bound to be extra
solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of his inevitable
conviction. Any court which abets injustice or neglects to ascertain the truth with the use of all the faculties at its command abdicates its most
important function and forfeits its very right to existence (Nitafan, David G., Arraignment in Serious Offenses, 251 SCRA 161 [1995]).1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting accused-appellant Rodrigo Bello of four counts of rape is hereby vacated. The four
rape cases are REMANDED to the court of origin for proper arraignment and trial of the accused, with instructions that the same be given
topmost priority and the proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and circumspection.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave on official business.