Petitioners challenged a writ of seizure issued by the RTC to enforce a writ of replevin granted to PCI Leasing to recover machinery leased to Petitioners. Petitioners argued the machinery had become immobilized and part of their factory, making them immovable property. However, the lease agreement explicitly stated the machinery would remain personal property. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the writ of seizure, finding the parties agreed to treat the machinery as personal property in the lease agreement, estopping Petitioners from claiming otherwise.
Petitioners challenged a writ of seizure issued by the RTC to enforce a writ of replevin granted to PCI Leasing to recover machinery leased to Petitioners. Petitioners argued the machinery had become immobilized and part of their factory, making them immovable property. However, the lease agreement explicitly stated the machinery would remain personal property. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the writ of seizure, finding the parties agreed to treat the machinery as personal property in the lease agreement, estopping Petitioners from claiming otherwise.
Petitioners challenged a writ of seizure issued by the RTC to enforce a writ of replevin granted to PCI Leasing to recover machinery leased to Petitioners. Petitioners argued the machinery had become immobilized and part of their factory, making them immovable property. However, the lease agreement explicitly stated the machinery would remain personal property. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the writ of seizure, finding the parties agreed to treat the machinery as personal property in the lease agreement, estopping Petitioners from claiming otherwise.
Petitioners challenged a writ of seizure issued by the RTC to enforce a writ of replevin granted to PCI Leasing to recover machinery leased to Petitioners. Petitioners argued the machinery had become immobilized and part of their factory, making them immovable property. However, the lease agreement explicitly stated the machinery would remain personal property. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court upheld the writ of seizure, finding the parties agreed to treat the machinery as personal property in the lease agreement, estopping Petitioners from claiming otherwise.
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SERGS PRODUCTS, INC., and SERGIO T. GOQUIOLAY, petitioners, vs.
PCI LEASING AND
FINANCE, INC., respondent. [G.R. No. 137705. August 22, 2000] Summary: Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the RTCs decision and its Resolution denying reconsideration. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City issued a Writ of Seizure and denied petitioners Motion for Special Protective Order, praying that the deputy sheriff be enjoined from seizing immobilized or other real properties in (petitioners) factory in Cainta, Rizal and to return to their original place whatever immobilized machineries or equipments he may have removed. FACTS: PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI) filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for sum of money with an application for a writ of replevin. Respondent judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary expenses. In implementation of said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioners factory, seized one machinery with word that he return for the other machineries. Petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. PCI Leasing opposed on the ground that the properties were personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought to be seized were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. The sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties and he was able to take two more machineries. The parties appealed. The appellate court, citing the Agreement of the parties, held that the subject machines were personal property, and that they had only been leased, not owned, by petitioners; and ruled that the words of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the true intention of the contracting parties. ISSUE: WOR the said machineries are personal, not immovable and may be the subject of replevin. HELD: The SC ruled that the machines are personal property and therefore can be the subject of replevin. Pursuant to Rule 60 sec. 3 of the Rules of Court only personal properties may be the subject of replevin. However, petitioners contend that the subject machines used in their factory were not proper subjects of the Writ issued by the RTC, because they were in fact real property. Under Art. 415 par. 5 of the Civil code: machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works, are immovable properties. In the present case, the machines that were the subjects of the Writ of Seizure were placed by petitioners in the factory built on their own land and were essential and principal elements of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. However, the Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the case, the Lease Agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal property. Specifically, Section 12.1 of the Agreement states: The PROPERTY is, and shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in any manner to what is permanent. Clearly then, petitioners are estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.