G.R. No.

L-19650 September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER GENERAL

FACTS:

In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded
gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase
of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed
can would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request,
arguing that the said contest violated the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in
its favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

Issue:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal property by lot,
chance, or drawing of any kind".

The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a lottery nor a gift enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution
of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such
as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery
are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of consideration, cannot be deemed al
lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to
draw a prize. The term gift enterprise also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the
chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not
they buy the appellee's products.

By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned it
is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the
word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so
construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.









Case Digest: Ortigas & Co. vs Feati Bank & Trust Co.
Facts:

On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and
Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in the Transfer
Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May
5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas
sent a written demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed according to the zoning
regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil
case No. 7706 was made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract
stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held:

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in promoting economic conditions,
social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment
of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the
power to promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution No. 27 was obviously
passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would
not be a conducive residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial and
commercial establishments.

Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v V.P. Eusebio Construction Inc.
Facts:
1. The State Organization of Buildings (SOB), Ministry of Housing and Construction, Baghdad, Iraq awarded the construction of the Institute of
Physical Therapy-Medical Rehabilitation Center in Iraq to Ayjal Trading and Contracting Company for a total contract price of about $18M.
2. Spouses Santos, in behalf of 3-Plex International, Inc., a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture
agreement with Ayjal wherein the former undertook the execution of the entire a project, while the latter would be entitled to a commission of
4%.
3. 3-Plex not accredited by the Philippine Overseas Construction Board (POCB) assigned and transferred all its rights and interests to VPECI.
4. The SOB required the contractors to submit a performance bond representing 5% of the total contract price, an advance payment bond
representing 10% of the advance payment to be released upon signing of the contract. To comply with these requirements 3-Plex and VPECI
applied for a guarantee with Philguarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified Filipino
contractors.
5. But what SOB required was a guarantee from the Rafidain Bank of Baghdad so Rafidain Bank issued a performance bond in favor of SOB on
the condition that another foreign bank (not Phil Guarantee) would issue the counter-guarantee. Hence, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was chosen to
provide the counter guarantee.
6.Afterwards, SOB and the joint venture of VPECI and Ayjal executed the service contract. Under the contract, the joint venture would supply
manpower and materials, SOB would refund 25% of the project cost in Iraqi Dinar and 75% in US dollars at an exchange rate of 1 Dinar to $3.37.
7.The project was not completed. Upon seeing the impossibility of meeting the deadline, the joint venture worked for the renewal or extension
(12x) of the performance bond up to December 1986.
8. In October 1986, Al Ahli Bank sent a telex call demanding full payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. Upon receipt, VPECI
requested Iraq Trade and Economic Development Minister Fadhi Hussein to recall the telex for being in contravention of its mutual agreement
that the penalty will be held in abeyance until completion of the project. It also wrote SOB protesting the telex since the Iraqi government lacks
foreign exchange to pay VPECI and the non-compliance with the 75% billings in US dollars.
9. Philguarantee received another telex from Al Ahli stating that it already paid to Rafidain Bank. The Central Bank authorized the remittance to
Al Ahli Bank representing the full payment of the performance counter-guarantee for VPECI's project in Iraq.
10. Philguarantee sent letters to respondents demanding the full payment of the surety bond. Respondents failed to pay so petitioner filed a
civil case for collection of sum of money.
11. Trial Court ruling: Dismissed. Philguarantee had no valid cause of action against the respondents. The joint venture incurred no delay in the
execution of the project considering that SOB's violations of the contract rendered impossible the performance of its undertaking.
12. CA: Affirmed.

Issue:
What law should be applied in determining whether or not contractor (joint venture) has defaulted?

Held:
The question of whether there is a breach of the agreement which includes default pertains to the INTRINSIC validity of the contract.

No conflicts rule on essential validity of contracts is expressly provided for in our laws. The rule followed by most legal systems is that the
intrinsic validity of a contract must be governed by lex contractus (proper law of the contract). This may be the law voluntarily agreed upon by
the parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law intended by them either expressly or implicitly (lex loci intentionis). The law selected may be implied
from factors such as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of the parties. Philippine courts adopt this: to
allow the parties to select the law applicable to their contract, SUBJECT to the limitation that it is not against the law, morals, public policy of
the forum and that the chosen law must bear a substantive relationship to the transaction.

In the case, the service contract between SOB and VPECI contains no express choice of law. The laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the
transaction and one of the parties is the Iraqi government. The place of performance is also in Iraq. Hence, the issue of whether VPECI
defaulted may be determined by the laws of Iraq.

BUT! Since foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, processual presumption will apply.

According to Art 1169 of the Civil Code: In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other party does not comply or is not ready
to comply in a proper manner what is incumbent upon him.

As found by the lower courts: the delay or non-completion of the project was caused by factors not imputable to the Joint Venture, it was
rather due to the persistent violations of SOB, particularly it's failure to pay 75% of the accomplished work in US dollars. Hence, the joint
venture does not incur in delay if the other party(SOB) fails to perform the obligation incumbent upon him.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that
the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to
petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said
motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial courts order as null and void, after
subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations narrows
the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity.
Peope v. Manantan

Facts:
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace",
the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of
peace is within the purview of Section 54.
Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.".
Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any
Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein
otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to
exclude justices of peace from its operation.

Issue:
Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election Code?

Held:
Yes, it is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the
kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term,
"judge.", which includes all kinds of judges.
A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes
all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said,
who are judges of facts.
From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First
Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA
180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the
broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or
thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been
clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded
from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does
not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule
merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various
judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the
prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give
reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".