A Level History M.

Nichols, SCIE 2011

MUSSOLINI
&
FASCIST ITALY
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
THE RISE OF FASCISM
The Nature of Italy 18701!1"
Italy had only truly been a nation from the 1870s, when Rome became its
capital. Even then, the Pope, in the atican, had refused to reco!nise the
Italian state and would not formally do so until 1"#".
Even thou!h Italy was a now a nation$state it could hardly be described as
unified in anythin! other than name. %here were massive disparities
between the &orth and 'outh, for e(ample.
%he &orth was wealthy, sophisticated and the home of the new )in!s of
Italy. It was where the ma*ority of Italian industry was concentrated and
saw itself as the power$house of the new country.
In contrast, the 'outh was dispara!in!ly +nown as il mezzogiorno. It was
poor, rural and bac+ward. In 1871, in the re!ion of ,asilicata, 88- of
people were described as illiterate. .any southerners /some fi!ures say
#0$00-1 were continuin! to die of malaria, a disease lar!ely under control
in the rest of Europe. 2n top of this, there was constant strife between
landowners and peasants, the former often hirin! the services of thu!s
belon!in! to the various or!anised criminals societies of the 'outh /the
Camorra in &aples3 the Ndrangheta in 4alabria and most famously La
Cosa Nostra in 'icily1.
5emocracy had only shallow roots, not helped by the Pope bannin! all
4atholics from even ta+in! part in elections. %his was a ban that was only
/partially1 lifted in 1"06. %here were various 7ualifications for votin!
ri!hts anyway and at best, Italy was only a pseudo$democratic state. 8p
until 188# only #- of males were entitled to vote, and even after 188#
the suffra!e was e(tended to only #9- of men. 8niversal male suffra!e
was only !ranted in 1"1#.
Even the Italian lan!ua!e was not standardised with many versions
dominatin! in the initial decades of unification. In 1870, it has been
calculated only #- of people spo+e what we would reco!nise as Italian.
Even the )in! spo+e Piedmontese, not Italian: 'icilians !ivin! evidence in
a famous .afia case in .ilan, had to have their dialect translated so the
court could understand them:
;overnment was not somethin! that was trusted in Italy, especially in the
'outh where there had been centuries of ,ourbon misrule. Even under
the new, <iberal constitutional system, Italian politics was still factional
and personal, with even dominant <iberal politicians li+e ;iovanni ;iolitti
compilin! dossiers on opponents. John Dickie in his e(cellent wor+ on
4oas &ostra even implicates !overnment in the rise and continued
e(istence of the criminal or!anisation. ittorio Emanuele 2rlando, the
Italian P. at ersailles, it is said was actually a fully inducted member of
the .afia:
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
;overnments were rarely stable and there were #" P.=s between 1870
and 1"##. Reli!ion complicated the issue, with 4atholic !roups bein!
vociferously opposed by the socialists. ;iolitti mana!ed to balance the
forces of radicalism and conservatism to an e(tent, but his policy of
transformismo had effectively collapsed by 1"16. >>I would only ma+e
Italy=s many problems much worse.
Il .e??o!iorno was the poor, bac+ward,
rural, malaria$infested part of Italy
ne!lected by the !overnment in Rome
and the politicians of the &orth
&orthern Italy and the cities
of .ilan and %urin were the
centres of Italian industry.
&orthern Italy was the
wealthy part of the nation
&orth$East Italy was
where most of Italy=s
battles in the @irst
>orld >ar were fou!ht.
'icily, was an
especially poverty$
and crime ridden part
of the nation
Emilia, Roma!na and
%uscany were centres
of fascist violence in
the early 1"#0s
Rome
was the
capital of
the new
nation
from
1870
%he Adriatic was an area Italy wished to
dominate but the Bmutilated victory= failed to
fulfil Italy=s imperial ambitions
<ibya, since 1"11, part of the Italian
empire
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#orl$ #ar O%e a%$ It& I'(a)t O% Italy
Italy entered >>I in 1"19. It did so in rather nefarious circumstances. It
had been a formal ally of ;ermany and Austria$Cun!ary, but chose
instead to fi!ht a!ainst them, and with ;,, Russia and @rance.
Italy=s motives were nationalistic and imperialist. It had si!ned the secret
%reaty of <ondon, promisin! to attac+ Austrian forces in return for territory
in the 'outh %yrol, the ,al+ans /%rentino, Istria, @iume, 5almatia1 and for
certain islands in the .editerranean. Italian aims were to dominate the
Adriatic and to unite all Italian spea+ers, where$ever they were.
%he >ar also helped to convert a former firebrand socialist and *ournalist$
editor of the left$win! Avanti newspaper, into a rabid nationalist. Cis
name was ,enito .ussolini.
Italy suffered appallin! casualties durin! the war with D90 000 dead, and
millions wounded and made homeless. %housands had been shot by their
own side supposedly for cowardice, but in reality to dis!uise the
incompetence and failure of Italian !enerals. 5efeat at the battle of
4aporetto was traumatic for the nation, but victory eventually came in
1"18 at the bloody battle of ittorio eneto.
%he end of the war, however, brou!ht only further social, economic and
political problems. Italy was ban+rupt. %he national debt stood at 89
billion lire in 1"1"3 Italy owed money to the 8'A and ;,3 inflation had
7uadrupled prices hurtin! the lower and middle classes especially. An
industry, which had been doin! well out of supplyin! war materiel, now
started layin! off wor+ers. 'tri+es and unemployment rose, the latter
reachin! # million by 1"1". %he e(tremist, pro$revolutionary 'ocialist
Party /P'I1 saw a massive rise in electoral support, which only alarmed
the conservative elements in society. %he peasants in the countryside
were also startin! to sei?e land and this alarmed the landownin! classes.
Italian society seemed to be unravellin!.
2n top of these woes came the Paris treaties, which refused to provide the
rewards Italy was e(pectin! from the %reaty of <ondon. Italy was
awarded the 'outh %yrol and %rentino, but !ot little else it had been
promised in 1"19 /nor were they !iven any of the ;erman colonies bein!
shared out in Africa1. Italian nationalists not only blamed the allies for all
of this, but also the <iberal politicians who had ne!otiated the treaty in the
first place. 4onservative and reactionary elements too+ to callin! the end
of >>I, Bthe mutilated victory=. 5isbanded officers felt humiliated and
an!ry with both their own politicians and perfidious forei!ners.
2ne fanatical nationalist and war$hero, called ;abriele 5=Annun?io, even
went to the e(treme of marchin! into the port of @iume and occupyin! it
for over a year. Ce was only removed, by an ineffectual Italian
!overnment, at the demand of the <ea!ue of &ations.
%he one$eyed 5=Annun?io was certainly an impressive fi!ureE man of
action, orator, charismatic leader and role model for another far more
dan!erous individual who shared his e(tremist viewsE ,enito .ussolini.
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Mu&&ol*%* a%$ Early Fa&)*&'
.ussolini had been born in &orthern Italy, in 1880. 2f humble ori!ins, he
was a committed revolutionary socialist up until >>I. Cowever, the >ar
/in which he served as a corporal1 turned him not only into a nationalist,
but also an advocate of a stron! man as the only individual able enou!h
to fi!ht a war and run a country properly.
Post$>ar, .ussolini became ever more ri!ht$win!, allyin! himself with
dis!runtled e($servicemen. Ce founded his own political movementE Fasci
di Combattimento in .ilan in 1"1", which, with its ori!inal rather
disparate membership, could only a!ree on its hatred of the <iberal state
and socialism. Even so, its a!enda still contained radical leftist, as well as
nationalist elements. Initially, @ascism did not !arner much support,
performin! badly in the &ovember 1"1" elections and not winnin! a sin!le
seat in parliament. Cowever, fascism would be redeemed by the threat of
socialism and communism, and by the !overnment=s failure to placate the
conservative classes in Italian society and their worries about such
revolutionary elements. In other words, it was circumstance, luc+ and
!overnment incompetence, as much as throu!h anythin! he actually did,
which would help .ussolini=s rise to prominence.
Italian politics was becomin! increasin!ly polarised with the moderate
parties bein! s7uee?ed in the middle. %he <iberal Italian P., &itti was
under pressure from both left and ri!ht. %he left saw his !overnment as
too moderate and un$dynamic3 the ri!ht despised it for not ta+in! tou!h
enou!h action a!ainst stri+ers and land reformers. >hen &itti=s successor,
;iolitti, also failed to ta+e harsh action a!ainst what the ri!ht saw as
revolutionary elements, e(asperated landowners, shop$+eepers and
industrialists started to turn to local fascist !roups to ta+e action. 'mall
fascist bands /+nown as Bblac+ shirts=1 too+ to assaultin! trades unionists,
burnin! down 'ocialist Party /P'I1 offices and pourin! castor oil down the
throats of political opponents. @ascists at this sta!e tended to beE e($
army officers and &42=s, shop$+eepers, farmers and the richer peasants.
%he northern provinces of Emilia and %uscany saw most fascist outra!es
with #00 dead and 800 wounded by the end of 1"#1. Italy seemed to be
lapsin! into a state of anarchy, but a chaos caused, ironically, lar!ely by
those most demandin! of law and orderFthe fascists themselves.
@ascist associations also had on their side dynamic leadership in the form
of ruthless and callous individuals li+e Italo ,albo and 5ino ;randi.
.ussolini himself, throu!h sheer force of personality, was able to assert
his overall dominance over these local ras. .ussolini also had the
oratorical and *ournalistic s+ills to present fascism as a national crusade
that would save Italy. Ce mana!ed to *ustify its use of violence as
Gsur!icalH and directed a!ainst not only the revolutionary elements within
the state, but a!ainst the <iberal state itself. Even with such overt threats
thou!h, ;iolitti was convinced .ussolini was still only a mere political
opportunist who could be wor+ed with. In .ay 1"#1, the <iberals and
fascists co$operated in the !eneral election. %he <iberal establishment,
therefore, has to bear some of the blame for the rise of a fascist
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
dictatorship in Italy. In these elections, the fascists won a credible 7- of
the vote and !ained 09 deputies, despite murderin! 100 of its opponents
durin! the election process.
Cowever, .ussolini astutely refused to wor+ with ;iolitti in !overnment3
he also presented @ascism as the only credible bulwar+ a!ainst
communism and he erased the leftist elements from the party=s ideolo!y.
.ussolini was helped by the factionalism of the <iberals and the
reactionary sentiments of the Popolari, the 4atholic party, which also
distrusted the <iberal state. Alon! with this, @ascist violence a!ainst the
left increased, as did .ussolini=s power within the @ascist movement,
which became officially a political party in 2ctober 1"#1, with .ussolini
confirmed as its leader one month later. .ussolini made overtures to the
Popolari /includin! concessions on issues li+e divorce1 and stressed in his
speeches what fascism was most opposed toE bolshevism and <iberalism.
@ascist ideolo!y, in fact, was never fully developed and always remained
rather ne!ative. @ascism would certainly never have the thin+ers and
ideolo!ues communism attracted. .ussolini himself saidE G2ur
pro!ramme is simpleE we wish to !overn ItalyH. Rather li+e a messiah
fi!ure, he aimed to be all thin!s to all men. a!ueness about policy would
help in this matter.
,y the end of 1"#1, fascism had #00 000, mostly, middle class members.
%he party, however, was developin! a rather dichotomous nature. 'plit
between conservatives who hated disorder and the radically violent,
.ussolini had to balance the conflictin! demands of both cli7ues. It can
never be denied that .ussolini was not, if nothin! else, a consummate
politician. iolence a!ainst the left increased in 1"##, with the police
often supplyin! the Fascisti with weapons. %he socialists called for a
!eneral stri+e, which was both ineffective and a disaster for them, as the
@ascists !ained further support from those fearful of revolution. %he left
were virtually handin! .ussolini support and power. As obson states,
.ussolini could represent his forces as the sole !uardians of law and order
and this was Ga crucial developmentH.
.ussolini became P. in 2ctober 1"##. Ce always claimed he had sei?ed
power throu!h a coura!eous coup d=etat, namely the B.arch on Rome=,
which henceforth became a prominent event in fascist mytholo!y.
In reality, and as with Citler, .ussolini was appointed to power with the
connivance of the establishment. Ce was handed the premiership by the
)in!, after consultation with <iberal politicians. Ce had arrived in Rome
for his audience with the )in! dressed smartly in a suit, rather than at the
head of thousands of paramilitary forces. %he latter were in reality
mobilised as the ultimate form of political blac+mail. ;iven that the
police and army were prepared to oppose them if ordered to do so, it is
doubtful if .ussolini could ever have achieved power by force anyway.
)in! ittorio Emmanuele, !ave in to .ussolini, perhaps, because of the
fear of civil war3 perhaps because his nearest rival to the throne, the 5u+e
of Aosta was a @ascist and close ally of .ussolini3 but more probably
because he was in sympathy with fascism and disli+ed <iberalism.
!"ssolini in one of his t#pical
propaganda poses $ %here
"niforms %ere an obvio"s
feat"re
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
obson is +ind to him and says he certainly didn=t +now he was openin!
the !ates to a @ascist dictatorship. %he admittedly .ar(ist, Antonio
;ramsci would be more critical referrin! instead to a Gcowardly rulin!
stratumH. Dennis !ack &mith prefers to hold all sections of Italian society
to blame and not *ust <iberal politicians, pointin! out the lac+ of
widespread support !iven to the Italian state from its very inception.
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SUMMARY OF REASONS #HY MUSSOLINI CAME TO +O#ER
+OLITICAL
,LON- TERM.
+OLITICAL
,SHORT TERM.
ECONOMIC
RELI-IOUS
&
SOCIAL
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Mu&&ol*%*/& Early Year& *% +o0er 1!1112
.ussolini, it must be stressed, did not become a dictator the moment he
was appointed to power in 1"##. Cowever, over the ne(t few years he
would be both personally inclined and forced, by the more radical
elements of his own party, into assumin! the role of BIl 5uce=.
Ever the canny politician, .ussolini realised he would have to initially
proceed cautiously and so he formed a coalition !overnment /in much the
same way as Citler would also do in 1"001. 2f 16 senior ministers, only 6
were @ascists. %he others comin! from the Popolari and <iberal !roupin!s,
and were prepared to co$operate believin! they could use the @ascists to
destroy their common, left$win! enemies. .ussolini, however, was
determined to be nobody=s pawn and +ept all the most powerful
!overnment posts for himself. Ce had also not denounced violence or
intimidation as political weapons and was determined to +eep utilisin!
them.
Ce would persuade parliament to provide him with enormous powers,
hintin! that they would only be temporary and were necessary to deal
with the present, leftist threat. In reality, the threat was over$estimated3
the brea+down in law and order had lar!ely been caused by the @ascists
themselves, and .ussolini had no intention of ever !ivin! up his supra$
constitutional powers. Ce demanded and /usin! his oratorical s+ills to
!reat effect1 was !ranted the ability to rule by decree, a favourite device
of dictators. Ce now did not need parliament=s consent to do what he
wanted. Prominent <iberals li+e ;iolitti and @acta supported his action.
In 5ecember 1"##, .ussolini established the @ascist ;rand 4ouncil to
stren!then his hold on the party, and he set up a militia which, in effect,
!ave him a private army of 00 000 men.
Ce wooed employers and industrialists, and !ained their support, by
droppin! plans to loo+ into ta( evasion. Ce even mana!ed to !ain the
tacit support of the Pope by plans for bannin! contraception and re$
introducin! reli!ion into state schools.
In 1"#6, .ussolini passed the infamous Acerbo law, which virtually
!uaranteed a continuous @ascist ma*ority in parliament by le!islatin! that
any party, which !ained #9- of the vote could have #I0 of the seats in
parliament:
Ce was able to !et away with this blatant fi( because people were sic+ of
wea+ coalition !overnments and wanted decisive action to cure Italy=s
problems. %hey also believed it would be only a temporary emer!ency
measure. 2nce a!ain, conventional politics supported .ussolini=s actions.
Ironically, in the elections of 1"#6 the @ascists didn=t even need the law to
!ain #I0 of the available seats. Cowever, the important industrial centres
of .ilan and %urin did not return @ascist deputies in any !reat numbers.
&ot all Italians were as !ullible as .ussolini hoped they would be.
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Cowever, not everythin! was !oin! .ussolini=s way. In 1"#6, a popular
and hi!hly respected socialist deputy, named ;iacomo .atteotti, was
murdered by @ascist thu!s. %here was a !eneral outcry and reaction
a!ainst @ascist violence. .ussolini himself came under a lot of criticism
and calls to resi!n. Cowever, he continued to be supported by the )in!
and conventional politicians still more afraid of civil war and the <eft, than
the @ascist dan!er to the state.
.ussolini rewarded their faith in him by steppin! up his ambitions of
becomin! a permanent dictator. In 1"#6, he introduced censorship3
banned political meetin!s3 @ascists themselves demanded more power
and decisive action from their leader. In 1"#9, free trade unions and
political parties were abolished. A secret police /2RA1 was set up and
special political courts established. Elected mayors were replaced by
appointed @ascist podestas' and in 1"#D the charade of parliamentary
!overnment was swept away. In 1"#8, even the )in! was deprived of his
few remainin! powers. .ussolini was now dictator of Italy.
Cow had all this been possibleJ It was partly due to .ussolini=s own
political acumen and the actions of his followers. Ar!uably thou!h, it also
due to the short$si!hted collaboration of the liberal elite, includin! the
)in!. %hey had believed .ussolini would be a temporary aberration, and
somebody they could control and influence, that his actions would benefit
the whole of Italy, or at least only be detrimental to the <eft.
%he <iberal !overnment had failed to !ain all the country wanted at Paris3
had failed to crac+down on stri+ers and revolutionaries3 had alienated the
very classes who turned towards @ascism. It failed to stand up to @ascism
and to ma+e alliances a!ainst it. It fatally underestimated the dan!er it
faced from the far ri!ht.
obson also stresses the role of .ussolini himself, and calls him a
Gdynamic and dominant personalityH and a Gbrilliant propa!andistH.
.ussolini used his newspaper, BPopolo d= Italia=, very effectively to stir up
fear and paranoia.
.ussolini was also an opportunist 7uic+ to ta+e advanta!e of the
propitious circumstances he found himself in. Put simply, the time was
ri!ht. Ce altered his messa!e to fit his audience. %he very va!ueness of
@ascist ideolo!y was e(tremely useful in this re!ard. .ussolini played a
hu!e confidence tric+ on the Italian population and he !ot away with it.

!"ssolini gives #et another speech
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+o&&*3le 4ue&t*o%& 5 +la%%*%6 +ra)t*)e
>hat factors promoted the !rowth of @ascism in ItalyJ
B%he 'ocialist threat and the belief that Italy had suffered a
mutilated victory in >>I enabled @ascism to !row and ta+e power=.
Cow far do you a!ree with this statementJ
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The Fa&)*&t +ol*t*)al Sy&te' Ho0 It #a& Create$
%he system .ussolini aimed to create in Italy was very much a personal
dictatorship. Ce aimed to do so throu!h a cult of personality and throu!h
for!in! lin+s with the rich and influential 4hurch, army and industrialists.
.ussolini always put himself and his aims above those of his party. Ce did
not want so much a @ascist Italy as .ussolini=s Italy. %o the e(tent that
without him the whole system would collapse, he was successful in his
e!ocentrism.
Cow did he achieve political controlJ
Propaganda & Personality Cult
%he free press was suppressed. .ussolini had his own press office. Radio
and cinema were also tools for disseminatin! @ascist propa!anda. Radios
were installed everywhere, even in schools. %he media was used to
portray .ussolini as an almost super$human fi!ureE the new 4aesar. 'o
.ussolini was a man who sat up all ni!ht playin! chess3 he was a virtuoso
violinist3 a daredevil pilot, horse$rider and car racer3 a talented lin!uist3
an international statesman and conciliator3 even a !reat lover. <i+e the
Pope, he was infallible /B.ussolini is always ri!ht= ran the popular slo!an1.
Cis a!e was never mentioned3 his myopia dis!uised. Ce had read all 09
volumes of the Italian Encyclopaedia and every wor+ of classic literature,
includin! 'ha+espeare. Ce wor+ed #0 hour days, etc, etc.
.ussolini was certainly vain, but he was also deeply contemptuous of the
masses, often a feature of dictators /CitlerE G%han+ ;od the masses don=t
thin+H1. 4ertainly, accordin! to obson, the cult of personality achieved
its aim and .ussolini often escaped the wrath of the population=s an!er.
Mussolini & Government
.ussolini was determined to ma+e all decisions himself. %he )in! was
side$lined3 there was no cabinet !overnment3 .ussolini never sou!ht
advice3 he +ept all important posts for himself. Parliament was i!nored
and eventually abolished itself in 1"0" to be replaced by the meanin!less
4hamber of @asces and 4orporations. @ree elections were a thin! of the
past. Italy was now a sin!le party state. Even his own party was +ept
under strict control.
%he state bureaucracy was not pur!ed, but it was allowed to retain its
pre$@ascist, conservative membership, so lon! as it remained ac7uiescent.
.ussolini did not want state institutions li+e the army either to be
dominated by the @ascist party, as they mi!ht have challen!ed his
disinclination to really radical chan!e. %he army command was easily
bou!ht off and was sympathetic to .ussolini=s politics anyway.
Ce placated industrialists throu!h the idoni Pact of 1"#9, which banned
free trades unions. &ow these proud captains of industry could
le!itimately pay their wor+ers dirt$poor wa!es.
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%his policy of carrot and stic+ was to be typical of .ussolini=s attitude
towards potential obstacles.
2nly the *udiciary was ruthlessly pur!ed, and !enuinely free and fair
*ustice disappeared. .ussolini even occasionally interfered directly in
cases and decided on verdicts and punishments.
The Role of The Fascist Party (PNF)
As we have mentioned already, .ussolini wasn=t really willin! to share his
power, even with his @ascist collea!ues.
<i+e Citler, .ussolini was always less radical than many of his followers.
.ussolini created the ;rand 4ouncil to control his followers3 in 1"#0 and
1"#8 he pur!ed some dissident members from the P&@3 and he
channelled the violent into his militia. Cowever, it was the ras who forced
him to become more radical in 1"#6I#9, and .ussolini, in my opinion,
never really had the undisputed power someone li+e 'talin was to en*oy.
obson tends to disa!ree and claims .ussolini %as in total control.
.ussolini admittedly did tend to appoint mediocrities to positions within
the party and state, to ensure his overall dominance. .en of ability li+e
,albo /<ibya1 and ;randi /;,1 were !iven positions o"tside Italy. 2thers
li+e Roberto @arinacci were happy with the provincial powers they welded.
4onse7uently, no serious rival to Il 5uce ever emer!ed.
5ivide and rule was another strate!y used by .ussolini. 'o the militia
and army tended to be +ept at lo!!erheads3 the P&@ and the .inistry of
Education ar!ued over who should be in char!e of youth movements /the
2&,13 .ussolini would always ultimately then step in as arbitrator F and
ma+e the final decision.
Cowever, .ussolini couldn=t properly ma+e all the decisions he was
supposed to, especially as he was essentially a la?y man who went to bed
early a lot. 4onse7uently, his re!ime was characterised by what obson
calls Gconfusion, delay and incompetenceH.
upport & !pposition
2pposition to Il 5uce was both difficult and dan!erous, and never
amounted to much.
,y 1"#D @ascist s7uads had murdered around #000 opponents. %he 2RA
spied on dissidents3 the courts dealt severely with them. %he opposition
that did e(ist involved a few thousand brave individuals and centred
around the communists and the BKustice and <iberty= movement of the
e(iled 4arlo Roselli. In 1"07, Roselli was assassinated by @ascist a!ents,
in Paris.
5issenters were also dismissed from *obs and the old Roman punishment
of internal e(ile was used to isolate critics of the system. Penal colonies
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were set up on barren off$shore islands li+e <ipari and <ampedusa, but
never held more than 9000 individuals. @ranco=s camps held far more.
As well as the stic+, carrots were utilised. Kournalists= salaries were
doubled3 academics and intellectuals li+e .arconi were showered with
honours3 the achievements of the re!ime were played up. @orei!n
victories were especially useful propa!anda. .uch was thus made of
Lu!oslavia=s secession of @iume to Italy in 1"#D. .ussolini tried also to
associate modern Italy with the achievements of ancient Rome and the
Renaissance. Italians were constantly told they were a !reat people
whose time had come a!ain.
obson says all this propa!anda was probably not very effective, but that
.ussolini himself was immensely popular. Cis re!ime ca*oled rather than
enforced obedience out of people. >hile it must also be pointed out that
some critics of the re!ime, li+e ,enedetto 4roce, even mana!ed to
survive, despite all the oppressive apparatus. It is hard to ima!ine this
happenin! in Citler=s %hird Reich.
Mu&&ol*%*/& L*fe 5 A Su''ary
5A%E ,RIE@ 5E'4RIP%I2&
1880,orn Kuly #" in Predappio, Italy.
1"1#Editor of the 'ocialist Party newspaper Avanti(
1"165enounces >orld >ar I, but 7uic+ly chan!es his mind, callin! for
Italy=s entry on the Allied side. E(pelled from the 'ocialist Party.
'tarts his own newspaper, )l Popolo d*)talia.
1"19Enlists in the Italian Army.
1"1"@orms the nationalistic, anti$liberal, anti$socialist movement, G@asci
di 4ombattimentoH, its name ta+en from the fasces, a symbol of
Roman discipline.
1"##@ascists threaten to march on Rome. Invited to form a !overnment
by )in! ictor Emmanuel III. 'ets about establishin! a totalitarian
re!ime.
1"#"<ateran %reaty with the atican stabili?es relations between 4hurch
and 'tate.
1"09Italy invades Abyssinia.
1"0D'i!ns a!reement with Citler creatin! the GA(is powersH.
1"60Italy enters >orld >ar II on the fall of @rance3 *oins ;ermany in its
war a!ainst the ,ritish in Africa and invades ;reece.
1"60.ilitary defeats lead to )in! ictor Emmanuel dismissin! him from
power. Imprisoned, but rescued by the ;ermans, who force him to
establish a puppet 'ocial Republic in northern Italy.
1"69>ith the Allied advance, he attempts escape to 'wit?erland, but is
captured and shot by Italian partisans, April #8.
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
S*'*lar*t*e& a%$ 7*ffere%)e& 8et0ee% Fa&)*&' a%$ Na9*&' a%$
Co''u%*&'
%he 'imilarities Italy M ;ermany Italy M 8''R
1. Rise to power
#. Personality of
dictators
0. Political style
6. Propa!anda
techni7ues
9. Repressive
.ethods
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
S*'*lar*t*e& a%$ 7*ffere%)e& 8et0ee% Fa&)*&' a%$ Na9*&' a%$
Co''u%*&'
%he 5ifferences Italy M ;ermany Italy M 8''R
D. Rise to power
7. Personality of
dictators
8. Political style
". Propa!anda
techni7ues
10. Repressive
.ethods
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Mu&&ol*%*/& So)*oE)o%o'*) +ol*)*e&
.ussolini=s economic and social policies were lar!ely failures. Ce i!nored
Italy=s a!e$old problems in his 7uest to create an economy and people
!eared towards war and forei!n e(pansion.
Initially, .ussolini was fortunate that the 1"#0s were a period of
prosperity. Cowever, a decline in fortunes from 1"#7 saw .ussolini re$
value the lire from 190 to "0 to the pound. %his was done for political
reasons and was a disaster economically. It made Italian e(ports far too
e(pensive. %he automobile and te(tiles industries suffered a decline in
orders. Protectionist policies and tariff barriers made many stable items
li+e food e(pensive. In contrast, .ussolini did help the steel, arms and
ship$buildin! industries.
%o its credit, the re!ime did handle the ;reat 5epression well at first,
creatin! *obs throu!h public wor+s schemes li+e CEP and a"tostrada
buildin!. Italians certainly did not suffer li+e ;ermans and Americans.
%he Institute for Industrial Reconstruction /IRI1 even successfully too+
over the role of ban+s in providin! loans and introduced new mana!erial
procedures.
Cowever, by 1"00 unemployment had risen to # million and the wor+in!
class were seein! a real decline in both their wa!es and livin! standards.
.ussolini would comment callously and indifferently that the Italian people
were Gnot accustomed to eat muchH and so could ta+e the privations
better than people of other nations:
.ussolini also aimed for a policy of autar+y, but never came near to
achievin! it. Italy was simply not wealthy or well or!anised enou!h to
feed its own people and provide all its own mineral resources.
.assive bud!et deficits and a down turn in livin! standards for ordinary
Italians were the conse7uence of his re$armament and e(pansionist
policies.
.ussolini=s corporatist ideas were desi!ned to create a consensus amon!st
the wor+in! and mana!erial classes to ma(imise harmony and efficiency.
%here would be a corporation to represent each type of industry. In
reality, as obson points out, the corporative revolution never
materialised. %he wor+ers were never !iven a !enuine say, and often
bosses bribed @ascist politicians into allowin! them to do what they
wanted anyway.
In the area of a!riculture, as with industry, there were minor successes,
but overall failure. .ussolini was not interested in the fundamental
problems of the peasant, but only in how far farmin! could contribute to a
stron!er, autar+ic Italy.
Cis B,attle for ;rain= /he also had other battles3 for steel, e.!.1 saw a
definite increase in !rain production from 9.9 million tonnes to over 7
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
million. Cowever, this was at the e(pense of wine, olive and fruit
production.
%he B,attle for <and= saw land reclamation and the /partial1 drainin! of the
malarial Pontine .arshes near Rome. Cowever, the overall amount of land
reclamation was insi!nificant.
%he B,attle for the 'outh= saw very little pro!ress bein! made a!ainst the
a!e old problems of poverty, illiteracy and crime. .ussolini was not
prepared to annoy his landownin! supporters by helpin! the peasantry of
the mezzogiorno. Even when he sent 4esare .ori to 'icily to confront
the mafia, his heart was never fully in the campai!n and .ori=s hands
were eventually tied.
In social terms, we can a!ain see .ussolini only helpin! those who were
most li+ely to help him. %o this e(tent, a!reement with the influential
4atholic 4hurch would be reached. Accommodation with the 4hurch
would brin! him support at home and presti!e abroad.
%he <ateran A!reement of 1"#" has been called .ussolini=s most lastin!
and profound success. Ce mana!ed to !et the Pope to, at last, reco!nise
the Italian state. %he Pope received 00 million pounds in compensation
for !ivin! up his claim to Rome, and became the ruler of the atican, an
independent country in its own ri!ht, complete with its own @ascist$built
railway station. Reli!ion would have a !reater status in state and school3
civil marria!e and divorce were outlawed3 and priests would be paid by
the state. Pius NI /1"##$0"1 must have been deli!hted with the
a!reement. .ussolini certainly was. It eliminated a potential source of
opposition to his re!ime.
4hurch and state would collide over youth or!anisations, but it was not
until the year of his death that Pius NI fully realised he had made a deal
with the devil, as anti$'emitic laws were introduced.
An area in which 4hurch and @ascism was in full a!reement however, was
over the role of women. >omen were to stay at home and have lots of
babies. 4ontraception was outlawed. %he B,attle for ,irths= demanded
that women have as many children as possible. It was the patriotic thin!
to do. .ussolini wanted more soldiers for his armies and colonists for his
empire. Cis plan was to increase the population from 60 to D0 million by
1"90. .others would be encoura!ed to have an avera!e of 1# children
each: %a( incentives for married men with children /D or more would earn
ta( e(emption1 and penalties for child$free bachelors /heavier ta(es1 were
introduced. <oans and medals were !iven out and every year .ussolini
met and awarded women who had had the bi!!est families in their
province. 4ertain *obs were only open to the fertile and women were
often sac+ed to ma+e way for men durin! times of hi!h unemployment.
%he B,attle for ,irths= was lar!ely a failure as the birth$rate actually
declined up to 1"0D and the population did not reach D0 million until near
the present day. >hile women still made up 00- of the wor+force in
1"00, a fall of only 0- since 1"#1.
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
E7ually, with the youn! .ussolini had ideals that rarely encountered
reality. Ce wanted a fit, a!!ressive, militarised and fully indoctrinated
youth. .ussolini=s portrait was hun! in schools3 his sayin!s were to be
learnt by heart3 his bio!raphy studied li+e a classic of literature. Cistory
became biased and Italo$centric. .embership in the ,alilla /2&,1 became
compulsory for boys and !irls, and ran to 7 million by 1"07.
@or adults, indoctrination too+ the form of the dopolavoro or!anisation,
which was desi!ned to be both a provider of leisure activities, in lieu of
the now defunct unions, and a way of creatin! an Italian "bermenschen.
It also ensured control of the wor+force after wor+ as well as durin! it. %o
its credit, the dopolavaro system was fun, and popular with ordinary
Italians and provided many with their first !limpse of the theatre. Even
those in the mezzogiorno had access to a dopolavoro clubhouse.
2ther @ascist policies, however, only alienated people. %hey were forced
to use the @ascist salute instead of a handsha+e3 to say voi instead of lei+
to refer to 1"## as Lear I3 and women were to dress modestly and not
ta+e part in beauty contests, in case they lost and Italy loo+ed bad: .a+e
up and trousers were also to be discoura!ed. 'uch petty re!ulations only
irritated Italians and hardly helped with the re!ime=s popularity. In
obson*s succinct phrase, Gthere was outward conformity, but little inner
convictionH.
Mu&&ol*%*/& I'(a)t o% Italy
Aspect of @ascist state .a*or 4han!eJ .inor 4han!eJ &o 4han!eJ
'tructure of ;overnment
Powers of .onarchy
'tate 'ecurity Apparatus
%he Armed 'ervices
Personal @reedoms
Electoral 'ystem
%he Economy
%he .afia
Everyday <ife
Reli!ion
@orei!n Policy
%he >ealthy
)l !ezzogiorno
Re!ime=s
>inners
Regimes Losers
Re!ime=s
<osers
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Mu&&ol*%*/& Ar'e$ For)e&
.ussolini, of course, was a militarist who wanted to re$create the Roman
empire, to ma+e the .editerranean an Italian la+e, and to ma+e Italy a
respected and feared world power.
Ce often boasted of Italy=s B8 million bayonets=, and of Bblottin! out the
sun= with his air force. %he reality was a lot different.
In 1"09$08, Italy had spent 11.8- of national income on armaments,
over twice the amount ;, spent and nearly as much as &a?i ;ermany was
spendin!. %his money thou!h was primarily spent on inade7uate
weaponry /tan+s which could be penetrated by bullets3 radios that didn=t
wor+, and under$powered rifles1 and lu(urious officers 7uarters: obson
in fact describes the Italian armed forces as Ginefficient and incompetentH.
%he navy was the best of the three services, but it lac+ed a!!ressive
7ualities and its submarines were technically inferior. 1I0 of them were
sun+ within three wee+s of Italy !oin! to war in Kune 1"60.
%he air force was the worst. Its main fi!hter was a @iat 4R6# bi$plane,
which couldn=t even fly in &orth Africa as it lac+ed sand filters. Its AA
!uns even shot down Italo ,albo in 1"60, over &. Africa.
%he army was never 8 million stron!, and was fitted out with anti7uated
weapons and a lac+ of armoured vehicles. 2fficers were promoted for
political reasons and were lar!ely incompetent. %his of course, was
.ussolini=s direct fault. It is not surprisin!, therefore, to hear that within
D months of !oin! to war /i.e. as early as autumn 1"601, most Italians
were sic+ of the >ar and wanted peace.
@iat 4R$6# bi$plane, which
proved useful in 'pain, but
inade7uate in >>II
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
A% A&&e&&'e%t of Mu&&ol*%*/& Italy
+ol*)y Su))e&&e& Fa*lure&
8attle for -ra*%
8attle for Steel
8attle for La%$
8attle for 8*rth&
8attle for
the South
Co%)or$a%t 0*th
the +a(a)y
The Cor(orate State
& Autar:y ,I%)l;
8attle for the L*ra.
The Ar'e$ For)e&
NorthSouth 7*<*$e
+ro3le'& of
+o<erty
Co''u%*)at*o%&
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
The E%$ of Mu&&ol*%*
>>II was a disaster for Italy. 'he had entered the war 7uite unprepared
for a lon! drawn out conflict. 5espite .ussolini=s boasts, Italy was not a
world power by 1"60 and even stru!!led to cope with Lu!oslav and ;ree+
forces. ,y 1"60, Italy had !iven up and .ussolini had been removed from
office. 000 000 troops and 190 000 Italian civilians would eventually die
in the >ar.
%he fact that .ussolini was deposed !ives a lie to his belief that he was
the sole power in Italy. Even his own son$in$law 4ount 4iano, plotted
a!ainst him. %he )in! was still on his throne and with the help of the
@ascist ;rand 4ouncil and prominent @ascists li+e @arinacci and 5e ,ono,
had .ussolini arrested: .ussolini was eventually rescued from
imprisonment by '' commandos and wrea+ed his reven!e on 4iano and
de ,ono by havin! them shot. Ce created a short$lived and chaotic
@ascist state in the north of Italy called the Republic of 'alo.
.ussolini was eventually captured by partisans in April 1"69 and
e(ecuted. Ce was strun! upside down from a petrol station in .ilan,
alon!side his mistress, 4lara Petacci. %he re*oicin! crowds lau!hed at and
urinated on the corpses.
Poor 4lara, she at least hadn=t deserved such an i!nominious end.
.ussolini endin! up as many
of his opponents had
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
Re<*e0 of a Re)e%t Re<*&*o%*&t 8*o6ra(hy of Mu&&ol*%*
,A%$re0 Ro3ert& re<*e0& "Mussolini# 3y N*)hola& Farrell.
It was only a matter of time before a full$scale revisionist bio!raphy
praisin! ,enito .ussolini was published in En!lish, and the dictator has
certainly found a dou!hty defender in the former %ele!raph *ournalist
&icholas @arrell. %he author, who has lived for the past five years in Il
5uceOs birthplace of Predappio in the Roma!na, which is also where
.ussolini Pis buried li+e a minor deityP, has clearly inhaled deeply of the
local political aura.
%he dictator whom @arrell presents in his hard$hittin! boo+, complete with
a forest of footnotes and much fascinatin! ori!inal research, is pretty
much unreco!nisable to those of us who have been brou!ht up on the
bio!raphies by the liberal ,ritish historians 5enis .ac+ 'mith and Kasper
Ridley. @arrell ar!ues that .ussolini Premained at heart a 'ocialist to his
dyin! dayP. It was what !ave him his anti$4ommunist fervour, somethin!
that led him to be described by Pope Pius NI as Psent by ProvidenceP, by
4hurchill as Pthe !reatest law$!iver amon! livin! menP, and by President
Roosevelt as his Ponly potential ally in his effort to safe!uard world
peaceP.
%he problem with revisionist accounts is that they tend to
overcompensate. >hen .ussolini made the !ross strate!ic error of
declarin! war a!ainst the Allies in Kune 1"60, for e(ample, @arrell writes
that, althou!h 000,000 Italian soldiers and 190,000 civilians died as a
result, Pit mi!ht well have been a brilliant decisionP. %he truly brilliant
decision would have been to sit out the war li+e his fellow southern
.editerranean fascist dictator ;eneral @ranco.
Also controversial will be @arrellOs assertion that .ussolini Psaved more
Kews than 2scar 'chindlerP. Quite apart from the fact that 'chindler was
not a head of state and thus in no position to save as many as .ussolini,
neither did 'chindler pass the anti$'emitic laws that .ussolini did in
&ovember 1"08. @arrellOs e(planation that P.ussoliniOs anti$'emitism was
not biolo!ical racism but spiritual racismP does not sit well with his other
statement that Palthou!h not anti$'emitic, .ussolini became increasin!ly
anti$KewishP, and either would have loo+ed pretty sophistic to Kewish
doctors and lawyers who lost their professions due to his laws. %he fact
that .ussolini did not collude in the Colocaust hardly ma+es him a
Ri!hteous ;entile.
>here @arrell is on far stron!er !round is in his ar!ument that .ussolini
Pruled with the consent of the Italian peopleP throu!hout the 1"00s and
that he held power Pby and lar!e bloodlesslyP. At almost any period
between 1"#0 and 1"61, I suspect that .ussolini would have won any
election by a landslide. ,y the standards of the dictatorships, .ussoliniOs
was by far the least brutal. %here was repression of the 4ommunists in
the trade unions, but not the lar!e$scale torture and !enocide of political
opponents to be found elsewhere in Europe. Ce needs to be *ud!ed in the
conte(t of the insurrectionary Italian post$;reat >ar e(perience, rather
than by the peaceful liberal standards of ,ritish democracy.
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
PCe was a brilliant *ournalist,P writes @arrell of his hero, addin!, Pyou only
have to read an article by him to realise that he was not a buffoonP.
Perhaps not, but he acted li+e one in 1"60 by fallin! in with CitlerOs war
plans and assumin! the war was as !ood as over. E7ually breathless
remar+s of @arrellOs, such as, PIn addition to bein! a shrewd political
thin+er, .ussolini was a master political tacticianP, need to be set a!ainst
that critical blunder.
>hen @arrell defends .ussolini on the !rounds that Phe and @ascismR !ot
thin!s doneP, one can almost visualise him ta+in! down the times of the
trains with a stopwatch and notepad. &ot even .ussoliniOs worst enemies
deny that he radically altered the Italian economy, and in many ways
made it far more efficient. %he 7uestion of whether Italians had to pay too
much in terms of loss of liberty has been answered by @arrell in a
passionate and thou!ht$provo+in! way. &or will the <eft be happy with his
/true1 statement thatE P%he Italian partisan resistance was a lar!ely
irrelevant factor in the liberation of Italy.P
@arrell concludes his boo+ with the crowd in the Pia??ale <oreto in .ilan
lau!hin! at and urinatin! on the corpses of .ussolini, his mistress 4lara
Petacci, her brother and 19 others, before seven bodies were hun! upside
down from the steel !irders of the petrol station there. It was remar+ed
with surprise by the women present, who were *o+in! and dancin! around
this macabre scene, that 4lara Petacci wore no +nic+ers and that her
stoc+in!s were unladdered. @arrell is predictably censorious that .ussolini
was e(ecuted without due process of law, which is fran+ly naSve, but he
does e(plain that Petacci was not !iven time to find her +nic+ers before
she was ta+en away and machine$!unned.
,y the end of this hi!hly spirited, opinionated and rather remar+able
boo+, one does not !rieve for .ussolini, however much the author mi!ht
wish us to, but one does feel sorry for poor 4lara and very surprised that
any Italian F even a 4ommunist partisan F should have chosen to murder
an attractive and entirely apolitical woman.
Farrell*s hero and
oberts* villain ,
-hom do #o" conc"r
%ith.
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
H*&tor*o6ra(hy o% Mu&&ol*%* 5 =The 7ar: >alley/ ,+*er& 8re%$o%.
%he left$leanin! /rendon tends to view .ussolini as the archetypal
Gpolitical !an!sterH, a man for whom the theatre of politics was all
important, with very often little behind the posturin! facade.
/rendon says, G@ascism was mainly matter of fantasyH and he describes
the melodramatic .ussolini as a man who was Gas much editor as
dictatorH.
.ussolini was not without his abilities, however, and he certainly !ot the
better of the Papacy in the <ateran treaties.
Cowever, he is more critical of what he describes as .ussolini=s
GantidiluvianH economic policies. %he battle for !rain by erectin! tariff
barriers a!ainst forei!n imports only subsidised inefficient Italian
a!riculture3 fodder became so costly that the amount of meat production
declined3 the battle for the lira overvalued it /at "0TP28&51 ma+in!
Italian e(ports more e(pensive, dama!in! industry and forcin! down
wa!es and increasin! unemployment. %he corporate state increased
bureaucracy and petty re!ulations and /rendon says it was always more
Grhetoric rather than realityH. >a!es in the re!ime were incredibly low,
with many only earnin! #9 lire a day. .any, in places li+e 4alabria and
'ardinia, survived by eatin! wild plants for half the year: %he poor were
not even allowed to emi!rate anymore, as the re!ime forbade emi!ration.
Italy was hit hard by the 5epression, a damnin! indictment of .ussolini=s
policies. %he value of stoc+s and shares declined by c.60- and
ban+ruptcies increased. Ce could not even ma+e the Italian people have
more children, as the birth$rate between 1"#7$06 fell, despite the battle
for births.
%he re!ime did have successes3 ;iuseppe Pa!ano and ;iovanni ;reppi
were ori!inal architects3 the new town of 'abaudia was a triumph. 2n the
whole however @ascist architecture was e(ecrable and /rendon says
.ussolini Gli+ed to set his bombast in concreteH.
A more commendable feature of the re!ime was the Institute for
Industrial Reconstruction bou!ht stoc+ in needy ban+s and corporations
and so !ave the state a sta+ehold in important enterprises. 2n the whole
thou!h /rendon is scathin! of .ussolini=s policies callin! them a mi(ture
of Gopportunism, improvisation and self$advancementH.
Aviation was used by .ussolini to promote his re!ime=s !lobal status, and
Italian planes and aviators, li+e Italo ,albo, bro+e many records.
Cowever, such eye$catchin! stunts only resulted in the ne!lect of the
airforce, which was so incompetent as to shoot down Air .arshall ,albo
himself:
Replica of a 1"## fascist club
SUMMARY OF THE HISTORIO-RA+HY ON MUSSOLINI
RO8SON MAC?
SMITH
FARRELL RO8ERTS 8REN7ON ,THEME.
!"ssolini*s
Personalit#
!"ssolini*s
Domestic
Policies
0ther
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
A C E R 8 O R E 7 F L A ? C M
S O - I O L I T T I I O @ A E
8 S ? 8 7 M O R I U > N 4 S A
+ H L I + A R I L M O A E T A
7 A N N U N A I O E R I E O O
@ 8 8 > # E R > N N N C ? R -
M Y E I > L A M E A 7 R A O I
T S N 7 T C L U 8 S Y O U I O
O S I O Y L B A H S R C N L R
I I T N O A 8 4 + O 7 E F I N
L N O I 8 # @ I O E N @ A B O
S I C O M M U N I S 7 E C E M
8 A L 8 O 8 L A C ? - U A R 7
F A R I N A C C I I E L S I M
S A 7 I T T O E T T A M E A N
S O T H E R E C F N O 7 N O L
1. 'ecret treaty brou!ht Italy into >>I M made promises that were not +eptUUUUUU
#. Port of UUUUUUUUUUwas ta+en over by the proto$fascist UUUUUUUUUUUUUUin 1"#0
0. <iberal politician who connived in the accession of the fascists UUUUUUUUUUUUU
6. @ascist thu!s made their enemies drin+ thisUUUUUUUUUUUU M hit them withUUUUUU
9. @ascist rule is dated from 2ctober 1"## and the .arch on UUUUUUUUUU
D. %hese laws were passed to !uarantee fascist control of the stateE UUUUUUMUUUUUU
7. %his socialist opponent of the re!ime was brutally murderedUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
8. %his left$win! critic of the re!ime thou!h %as able to surviveUUUUUUUUUUUUU
". ,arren island in the .editerranean where opponents of the re!ime were sentUUUUU
10. .ussolini=s troops invaded this area in 1"09UUUUUUUUhelpin! to destroy the <ea!ue
RE>ISION #OR7SEARCH ON MUSSOLINI/S ITALY
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A Level History M. Nichols, SCIE 2011
11. %his part of Italy +nown as the UUUUUUUUUUUUUUreceived little help from .ussolini
1#. Anti$.afia crusader whose hands were eventually tied by .ussoliniUUUUUUUUUUU
10. Able fascist bosses sidelined by a *ealous .ussolini EUUUUUUUUUUand UUUUUUUUU
16. Ce helped to depose .ussolini in 1"60 and was later shot by the dictatorUUUUUUUUU
O+INIONS ON MUSSOLINI 5 #HO SAI7 #HATC
6. .ussolini is a !reat man. Ce
has brou!ht order to chaos and
made Italy a respected world
power a!ain
1. .ussolini is a fool: Ce
has ta+en us into a war we
cannot possibly win. >e
warned him we would not be
ready until 1"60, but did he
listenJ
#. Il 5uce is a !enius: Ce has
brou!ht law and order to our
!reat nation and made Italy
internationally respected a!ain.
Ce obtained for us what the
allies had denied us at Paris.
0. .ussolini is a dictator. >ith his
Acerbo law and idoni Pact he is
destroyin! the rule of parliament
and the ri!hts of wor+ers, and to
thin+ he used to be one of us:
>hy aren=t the people protestin!J
7 .y friend, the 5uce, helped me out
with the anschluss and over
4?echoslova+ia3 I shall always be
!rateful to him.
9. Il 5uce is a fraud: Ce
promised to rid us of the
mafia, to do somethin!
about our terrible poverty
and hi!h illiteracy rates,
but he has done virtually
nothin!. I spit on him:
D. %he 4orporate state is a myth. %he
bosses *ust cosy up to the local party ras
and !et e(actly what they want. %he
wor+ers have no say in runnin! any
industry, in reality.

An admiral
A socialist deputy A nationalist veteran
A southerner
5er @uhrer
A forei!n statesman
A trade unionist
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