abstract

keywords
Schmitt, Scheler, values, decisionism, concrete order thought
PAOLA PREMOLI DE MARCHI
Universit degli Studi di Padova
[email protected]
In his work on The Tyranny of Values (1954) Carl Schmitt argues that the use of values
to justify norms necessarily leads to fanaticism and violence, and therefore must be
rejected. This paper aims to show Schmitts philosophical assumptions that result from
the view of man as dangerous and selfsh, and of value as dependent from human will
and not from some objective knowledge. As Scheler objected to Weber, the rejection of
objective values cannot defend man from arbitrariness and irrationality. Schmitt himself
tried to justify norms with the sovereigns decision, but later realized that this way is not
suffcient.
NORMS WITHOUT VALUES.
PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON
CARL SCHMITTS TYRANNY OF VALUES
183 183
On October 23, 1959 the German jurist Carl Schmitt took part in a seminar
organized by his student Ernst Forsthoff in Ebrach, with a paper titled: The
Tyranny of Values. Refections of a Jurist on the Philosophy of Values.
1
The text was
published in a limited edition in the following year, then had a remarkable
success and saw several reprints and translations. By using the expression
tyranny of values, Schmitt meant that the use of values to justify norms
necessarily leads to fanaticism and violence, and therefore must be rejected.
Schmitt chose the topic of his paper because of the great infuence that
Schelers philosophy of values held on German legal thought in the 20
th

century. After the Second World War, there was a reawakened interest in
values, as part of the process of cultural reconstruction that was meant to
repair the horrible crimes against humanity perpetrated in the previous
decades. A new foundation was invoked, capable of rehabilitating and
protecting legally the wounded dignity of human beings (TW 21). A philosophy
of values was seen as the way to justify the sphere of human freedom, as
a response to the proclaimed value-free realm of science. Especially the
material value ethics of Scheler presented itself as the ideal solution for the
need to justify legal rules. Yet, in the text mentioned, Schmitt argues not only
that values are unable to offer a scientifc and therefore universal justifcation
to norms, but are the harbingers of hostility and confict.
This paper focuses on the premises of Schmitts perspective and aims to
show that the rejection of values as foundation of civil laws depends upon
some philosophical assumptions, even though Schmitt defned himself a
jurist and not a philosopher. This paper is then divided into fve parts: (1)
The frst part is dedicated to explain the historical background of Schmitts
notion of value (2) The second part introduces the content of Tyranny of
Values concerning the relation between norms and values. (3) The third
part explains the main thesis defended by Schmitt, namely the relationship
between the posing of values and aggressiveness, and investigates its
theoretical premises (4). The fourth part addresses the question of how
norms can be justifed without values, in Schmitts view. (5) The ffth and
fnal parts aims to reply to Schmitts rejection of values by drawing on some
insights by Scheler, who is the main exponent of the value theory attacked
in the Tyranny of Values.
1 Schmitt 2011, in the text indicated as TW. Quotations are taken from the German edition of
his work and all translations are my own.
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In order to understand Schmitts argument, we need to know the precise
meaning he attributes to the word value. The notion of value has
had an increasing success in ethical and political modern philosophy.
Thomas Hobbes played an important role in this history, for he denied the
ontological justifcation of the good; many thinkers who speak of values
shared his view and thus infuenced the meaning of value adopted by
Schmitt (see Hobbes 1651, I, 6).
In his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant distinguishes
between the price, which is the relative value of a thing, and its intrinsic
value or dignity, which belongs only to man and is an unconditional,
incomparable worth, infnitely above all price (Kant 1997, 41-42). Among
several expressions used by Kant, we see that the notion of value was
also infuenced by the development of modern political economy and in
particular by the theories of value by William Petty, Adam Smith, David
Ricardo and later Karl Marx. According to these theories, value has a
quantitative character, is not a feature of things in themselves, but is given
by its specifc historical conditions, like the amount of work necessary to
produce something within economic processes, its use and its exchange
value (Lunghini-Ranchetti 1998). In other words, value stems from human
valuating faculties.
Another thinker who infuenced the debate on values is Hermann Lotze,
who in his Logik (1884, 316-17) introduces the distinction between being,
of things that really exist, and values (Werte), which instead have validity
(Geltung). Even if Lotze thought that values have a metaphysical status,
although different from that of beings, this distinction favoured the
beginning of discussions on the separation between statements of fact and
value judgments.
Nietzsche made a decisive contribution to connect values to the human will,
with his theory of the devaluation of traditional values (good, beauty and
truth) and the transvaluation of all values , namely the overthrow and the
search for new values. In his attempt to release ethics from prohibitions and
obligations, Nietzsche uses the term value to express self-fulfllment and
happiness. Thus, value is that which enhances life, negative value that which
denies it. For Nietzsche all values are subjective and prospective, because
they are the result of assessments arising from the will to power (See Volpi
2009, 88).
In his famous work on Science as a Vocation, Max Weber (1946, 148 f.) is
indebted to Nietzsche for this view. He asserts that science must be value-
free, neutral with respect to values (wertfrei) and thinks that values are
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The History
of the Modern
Meaning of Value
185
posed by the free and subjective will of the human individual. The act of
establishing values is bound to the perennial confict between values and
world views. He therefore speaks of a polytheism of values that are emptied
of their original foundation, but which are nevertheless a source for wars.
The opposite side of the modern debate about values is represented by that
philosophy of values that initially developed as neo-Kantianism under
Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, and then fourished within
phenomenology under the infuence of Max Schelers work Formalism in
Ethics and non-formal Ethics of Values. For Scheler, values are qualities that we
experience, but which cannot be reduced to the empirical goods through
which we grasp them, nor to mere psychical phenomena. Just like colors are
distinct from coloured things, but are experienced in those things, values
are different from goods, but are experienced with them. Each individual,
people and nation has his own perspective with regard to the objective
order of values (ethos), but this does not contradict the fact that there are
objective values, because the total fullness of the realm of values cannot be
given to one individual, people, nation, or at one moment in history.
Therefore, the existence of the historical differences in morals is not an
objection to the objectivity of moral values, but is on the contrary required by
it. (1973, 493) Scheler in other words sees the variety of perspectives about
values more as an asset than as a cause of confict (See Simonotti 2011, Ch. 1).
Among the strongest opponents to the concept of values as valid in
themselves is Martin Heidegger (1950, 209), who rejects the idea of
objectively valid values as monstrous and without foundation. He attributes
to Nietzsche the primary responsibility for spreading the concept of value
in neo-Kantian philosophy and even in Christian theology. Nevertheless,
he believes that, as a result of this paradigm, value becomes a surrogate for
metaphysical concepts. In his Letter on Humanism, it becomes evident that
his criticism is motivated by his desire to overcome metaphysics, an interest
which is not shared by Schmitt. Yet the German jurist adheres to Heideggers
critique, because he agrees with the idea that value is the result of an act
of valuing and this actHeidegger saysis always a subjectivizing. Thus, it
is simply impossible to speak of objective values, even more, according to
Heidegger, thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against
being and when one proclaims God the altogether highest value, this is a
degradation of Gods essence (1993, 265).
Schmitts notion of value stems from Heideggers position and its theoretical
background. There are three main characteristics of value to be found in The
Tyranny of Values.
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The Tyranny of
Values by Carl
Schmitt
186
First, Schmitt says, the specifc characteristic of value lies in the fact that
instead of a being, it has only validity. (TW 41) The question if values have
some ideal existence or not is therefore irrelevant.
Secondly, and consequently, for Schmitt the value aspires to be actualized:
it is not real, but aims to become real (TW 36). Thus, the validity of values
is based on acts of taking position (Setzungen) (TW 39) and values , though
they may be considered high and holy, always are valid only for something
or for someone (TW 40), that is, always involve subjects with a sense of
value (wertfhlende Subjekte) (TW 41). The conclusion is that value always
results from an act of establishing, which is always an asserting, but also an
imposing; therefore, he who says they are valid, without somebody making
the assertion, is cheating (TW 57).
A third characteristic is that value is always due to a perspective, related
to a point of view (TW 41). This can be explained as a consequence of its
second feature: if a value is produced by an act of posing, it always depends
on the point of view of its creator. Values are always inserted in a system of
pure perspectivism, a system of relations and acquire value through their
mutual position, because, says Schmitt, points of view do not exist to be
fxed and maintained for themselves but it belongs to their function and
their meaning, to be changed when the reference plane is changed

(TW 42).
Now, and this is Schmitts crucial argument, every position of value involves
a potential aggressiveness. Since value must be actuated, each value must
also be imposed on others, who want to assert different values.
Aggressiveness is inherent to the thetic-posing structure of value, and
continues to be produced by the concrete actuation of value. [...] The
ambivalence of values causes it to become more and more virulent as soon
as these values are invoked by concrete people against other people as well
concrete. (TW 45)
According to Schmitt, then, as soon as the imposing and enforcing become
really serious, [] the confict between evaluators, de-valuators, re-
evaluators and exploiters is inevitable (TW 46). The destructive potential
of values includes subjective values, but also objective values, such as those
in Schelers material ethics: the higher values have the right and duty
to subdue the lower ones, and values should destroy the disvalues. This,
Schmitt concludes, is the tyranny of values. (TW 48)
This expression is taken from Nicolai Hartmann, The signifcance Schmitt
gives it, however, is different from its original meaning. This is already
evident in the passage quoted by Schmitt himself of Hartmanns Ethics
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(2002-2004, II, 425-6). Hartmann says, every value when once it has gained
power over a person has the tendency to set itself up as sole tyrant of
the whole human ethos, and indeed at the expense of other values. This
tendency does not adhere to values as such, but to them as determining
human conduct and feeling: Hartmann simply wants to show the potential
danger of values in the moral behaviour of individuals or groups, when
they take on a leading role at the expense of other values, for example when
justice prevails over brotherly love or vice versa. For Hartmann the remedy to
this danger is a mature Ethos in which a balance between the values involved
is found.
Schmitt, on the contrary, applies the term tyranny of values to the political
sphere, to indicate that any attempt to justify the rule of law with values
necessarily leads to an ideological war with those who have different value
perspectives. For Schmitt, those who appeal to values frst discriminate
between values and non-values, then between friends and enemies,
and fnally impose their own values by attempting to annihilate their
opponents.
Schmitts notion of tyranny of values is based on his equivocal
understanding of asserting values and aggressiveness. To understand
the reason for this confusion a broader inquiry of Schmitts philosophy is
needed. Even though Schmitt does not seem to be interested to investigate
the ultimate philosophical foundations of his assertions, his idea of a
tyranny of values presupposes some more general beliefs concerning
anthropology, value theory and epistemology.
Regarding his view on the human being, Schmitt is clearly infuenced by
the modern idea of man shared by Hobbes and Machiavelli, which, in last
analysis, is based on a pessimistic view of individuals and social relationships.
In the Concept of the Political (Schmitt 1996), as well as in Dialogue on Power
(Schmitt 2008, 18) he states that man is not by nature good and pacifc, but
bad and dangerous. This view helps us to understand why Schmitts Tyranny
of Values asserts a relation of cause-effect between the posing of values and
aggressiveness. However, in his comments on The Concept of the Political, Leo
Strauss notices that the affrmation of mans bellicosity is not unshakably
certain, since Schmitt himself qualifes the thesis of mans dangerousness
as a supposition, and the choice between pessimism and optimism as an
anthropological confession of faith (Schmitt 1996, 58). Therefore, Strauss
concludes, Schmitts anthropological premise is not demonstrated, and the
opposite could be true (Strauss 1996, 111).
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The Relation
between Values
and Aggression
a) The
Anthropological
Premise
188
If we turn to the initial question of the relationship between values and
norms, then we can say that, from Schmitts perspective, it is correct
to conclude that values cannot justify rules nor have in themselves a
normative force. If values, as Schmitt thinks, are only the result of a
subjective act of valuing and asserting, the attempt to base norms upon
them cannot but lead to bankruptcy and the only way to impose values is
force. We fnd this conclusion already in Hobbes and Machiavelli (see Berlin
1980, 75).
Some further analysis of Schmitts notion of value would however be
needed. First, Schmitt seems to have the tendency to separate ethics from
the other felds of human action, without a clear description of its essential
features. Hobbes describes man in the state of nature as evil, that is, like
beasts that are moved by their drives and thinks that this is an innocent
evil, because moral duty is given by social structures. In The Concept of the
Political, Schmitt, as noticed by Strauss, speaks with sympathy of this evil
that is not to be understood morally. Nevertheless, Strauss has shown
that this presumed moral neutrality is wrong, and thus that sympathy
is inappropriate, since what Schmitt admires is not morally neutral,
but a defciency. Therefore, mans dangerousness, revealed as a need of
dominion, can appropriately be understood only as moral baseness (1996,
115) In The Tyranny of Values we see a similar lack in distinguishing clearly
between what is morally neutral and what is morally relevant. Schmitt is
inclined to ignore the difference and the relationship between the political
and the ethical sphere.
Schmitt also says that for the realization of the supreme value no price
is too high (TW 51). If the supreme value is the one that has no price,
according to Schmitt you must conclude that everything can be sacrifced
to pursue that value: the principle that the end does not justify the means is
not valid anymore, because no price will be too high to get the value that is
regarded as invaluable. Here again we can see the infuence of Hobbes, who
in the Leviathan (1651, X) says: the value or worth of a man is, of all other
things, His price. In Schmitts argument, however, we see that the analogy
with the economic concept of value can be misleading. In fact, to say that
the supreme value is priceless does not necessarily mean that any price can
be paid for its sake, as Schmitt thinks, but it can also mean that some values
are outside the logic of price, and require qualitatively different criteria
than that of market relationships to be valued. Kants notion of dignity
suggests this second meaning: priceless here means that the persons
dignity makes her incommensurable to any impersonal being, which has
a price, and therefore she must be appreciated and respected as an end in
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b) The
Axiological
Premises
189
itself, because her value is outside of our power.
Another concept used by Schmitt to argue in favor of a necessary
connection between values and aggressiveness is the relationship between
denial and duty. Schmitt mentions Schelers assertion that the destruction
of a negative value is a positive value and interprets it as a dangerous
invitation to repay evil with evil, and thus transform our world into a hell,
but hell into a paradise of values (TW 51). This is because the value for
Scheler implies an ought-to-be, which is especially evident when the value is
absent. If the duty emerges as a call to eliminate the non-value, this implies,
Schmitt concludes, that the annihilation of what is declared as a non-value
is a right and a duty (Scheler 1973, 82). This argument would clearly require
further research on why the difference among values must necessarily
lead to exclusion and cannot admit some kind of coexistence, and on the
relation between value and duty, but both inquiries are impossible if values
are subjective and one cannot fnd any objective reference for discussion.
The crucial question posed by the tyranny of values, then, is to be found in
Schmitts epistemological premises.
The notion of values as valid for someone is in fact nothing else than a
restatement of the view of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things,
namely of a theoretical relativism and ethical arbitrarianism. Schmitt
seems to be aware of this. In The Tyranny of Values, he says that the attempt
to give an objective foundation to values is just a new tool of the arrogance
that leads to strengthen the fght, without the slightest increase of their
objective evidence for those who think differently (TW 46). It is not possible
to distinguish between values and subjective beliefs and interests (TW
49), and the concept of a blindness of values defended, for example, by Dietrich
von Hildebrand is senseless (Hildebrand 1922, TW 68). He also notices that the
act of valuing as such does not save the goods, interests and purposes to which
it is applied, because is not suffcient to create legitimacy (TW 24).
If therefore, for Schmitt norms cannot be justifed with a reference to
values, one might ask how norms can be established. To answer this
question would require an investigation that transcends the limits of this
paper. Here, however, I suggest starting the research from the reading of
Schmitts On The Three Types of Juristic Thought (2004). In this work, Schmitt
introduces three forms of legal thought: normativism, decisionism, and the
theory of the concrete order. They correspond to three conceptions of the
essence and foundation of the law, since even in any natural or rational law
[] one will fnd the ultimate notion of Recht as either norm [rule] or decision
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c) The
Epistemological
Premises

How can Norms
without Values
be Justifed?
190
or order (Ibid. 43). In every legal theory there are elements of all three
views, but one concept of law is the fundamental one from which the others
are derived.
According to normativism, the norm is an absolute and creates order,
elevating itself above the individual case and the concrete situation. As
expressed by Chrysipp law is king, master over morality and immorality,
right and wrong. (Schmitt 2004, 45). Schmitt was always very critical of this
theory, and in On The Three Types of Juristic Thought says that normativism is
wrong because it ignores that laws always presuppose concrete persons who
apply them. He therefore rejects this theory not because it cannot justify the
norms content, but because it ignores that norms cannot be applied without
a reference to the concrete society, individuals, and communities (ibid. 51).
The second legal theory is decisionism. Schmitt is considered the founder
of this theory, which he introduced in the 1920s, to solve the question of
the political situation called state of exception. In Political Theology he says
that norms demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which they can
be applied and there exist no norm that is applicable to chaos; therefore,
when the normal order has been destroyed or endangered, the sovereign is
called to decide about what is right and therefore legal. (1996, 13). Thus, he
quotes a principle mentioned by Hobbes in the Latin edition of the Leviathan
(even within a different context), that auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem. In
On the three Types of Juristic Thought he explains that it is not the command
as command, but the authority or sovereignty of an ultimate decision with
which the command is given that is the source of all Recht (2004, 60). The
sovereign decision is the absolute beginning (ibid. 62).
Over the years, Schmitt recognized that decision must not be the only
source of law. Probably the access of the Nazis to power and their attack
against values and traditions prompted Schmitt to take interest in
protection of certain institutions of state such as marriage, property and
churches (1965, 170-182). Even if On the Three Types of Juristic Thought was
published a few months after that Schmitt joined the Nazi Party, in this
work Schmitt seems to defend another source of law, namely, the concrete
order of the already existing institutions, communities and interpersonal
relationships. According to this third legal theory, norms stem from the
already existing social order, so to refect the views about justice and values
of social groups, associations and institutions.
Unfortunately, after the work On the Three Types of Juristic Thinking, Schmitt
no longer addressed in detail the issue of the foundation of law. The reason
probably is that, as a jurist, he was more interested on how laws can become
effective and order social life than on their justifcation. Nevertheless, the
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mentioned work shows that even the jurist cannot avoid any reference to
objective values: Schmitt clearly refers to notions as legal order, peace,
normalcy, right, as well as to some basic communities like family, as they were
endowed by positive importance in themselves. He probably did not see the
inconsistency between the defense of these entities, and the thesis introduced
twenty years later in the Tyranny of Values that norms cannot be justifed with
objective values.
In a short essay of 1923 on Weber, Scheler says that he abandons all
questions which go beyond his concept of science [] to a completely
a-rational, individual option of the will and therefore to the mere struggle
between parties and group. Then we read:
His [Webers] radical error is the assertion that the material values have
only subjective signifcance, and that there can be no binding knowledge
of objective phenomena and values, goods or systems of goods beyond
positive science, nor is it possible for representatives of different systems of
values to convince one another or to fructify one another intellectually
(Scheler 1989, 94).
This critique can also be applied to Schmitt: values are rejected because
their meaning is considered a mere option of the will. But Scheler says that
the abandonment of issues that refer to morality, religion and the view
of the world to irrational powers is a complete misunderstanding of their
nature and therefore exclusion of philosophy and wisdom. The wisdom
pursued by philosophy is the only knowledge that is able to bind together
things like knowledge of being, the consciousness of value and systematic
readiness of the will to obey the demands of obligation which arise from
the synthesis of the knowledge of being and the consciousness of value.
Through wisdom, continues Scheler the soul maintains the beautiful
dynamic equilibrium of the manifold energies which constitute it, by
constantly transforming goodness into knowledge and knowledge into
goodness. (ibid.)
Schmitt cannot pursue this ideal because of his negation of both terms of
the relation: knowledge and goodness. He attacks a philosophy of values
by rejecting any objective foundation to values, but the result is that he
denies any foundation also to philosophy. The deepest root of the notion
of tyranny of values, then, is above all of an epistemological nature: in
denying that human knowledge can inquire into essential data of human
experience, Schmitt also rejects any autonomous status to philosophical
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Conclusion:
a Reply of
Scheler to
Schmitt
192
thinking. According to Schmitt, the condition of the human being requires
not philosophy, but a political structure, which alone can protect the life of
men against war and confict. Scheler, on the contrary, thinks that all the
different human activities (i.e. science, action upon the world, leadership of
men) are simply differing means to form the human personality under the
guidance of wisdom and with the aim of leading steadily upwards towards
it, and have as their ultimate justifcation this formation of man (1989, 95).
The outcome of the resort to values as justifcation for norms, then, should
be the exact opposite of the tyranny described by Schmitt: if laws refect the
hierarchy of importance in the world, they contribute to enrich the wisdom,
which allows humanity to fourish.
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