Obligations of the Shipper, Consignee and Passenger

Cervantes v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125138, March 2, 1999
Purisma, J.

FACTS:
On March 27, 1989, the private respondent, Philippines Air Lines, Inc. (PAL), issued
to the herein petitioner, Nicholas Cervantes (Cervantes), a round trip plane ticket for
Manila-Honolulu-Los Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, which ticket expressly provided an
expiry of date of one year from issuance, i.e., until March 27, 1990.
On March 23, 1990, four days before the expiry date of subject ticket, the petitioner
used it. Upon his arrival in Los Angeles on the same day, he immediately booked his Los
Angeles-Manila return ticket with the PAL office, and it was confirmed for the April 2,
1990 flight. Upon learning that the same PAL plane would make a stop-over in San
Francisco, and considering that he would be there on April 2, 1990, petitioner made
arrangements with PAL for him to board the flight in San Francisco instead of boarding
in Los Angeles.
On April 2, 1990, when the petitioner checked in at the PAL counter in San Francisco,
he was not allowed to board. The PAL personnel concerned marked the following notation
on his ticket: TICKET NOT ACCEPTED DUE EXPIRATION OF VALIDITY.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the PAL agents in confirming subject ticket extended the
period of validity of petitioners ticket.

HELD:
The petitioner theorized that the confirmation by the PALs agents in Los Angeles
and San Francisco changed the compromise agreement between the parties. As aptly ruled
by the appellate court, petitioner, on March 23, 1990, was aware of the risk that his ticket
could expire, as it did, before he returned to the Philippines. Both PAL agents had no
authority to extend the validity or lifetime of the ticket. Petitioner knew this from the very
start when he called up the Legal Department of PAL in the Philippines before he left for
the United States of America. He had first hand knowledge that the ticket in question
would expire on March 27,1990 and that to secure an extension, he would have to file a
written request for extension at the PALs office in the Philippines. Despite this knowledge,
appellant persisted to use the ticket in question. Under Article 1898 of the New Civil Code,
the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his authority do not bind the principal, unless the
latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person (herein
petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal
cannot be held liable for the acts of the agent. If the said third person is aware of such
limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from the agent,
unless the latter undertook to secure the principals ratification.



Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-55347, October 4, 1985
Escolin, J.

FACTS:
On September 10, 1972, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Winifredo Tupang,
husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan,
Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the
train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train
could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena,
Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death.The train did not stop
despite the alarm raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead,
the train conductor Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and
requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena City found the
lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Winifredo Tupang is chargeable of contributory negligence.

HELD:
The petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo
Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit
on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the
train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair
at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a
person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations
and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of
its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court,
the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and
convincing evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law,
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it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted
to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly
and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling
off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR
from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral
damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside.







Extraordinary Diligence

Mecenas v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88052, December 14, 1989
Feliciano, J.

FACTS:
On the evening of 22 April 1980, at about 10:30 o'clock, the "Tacloban City" bound
to Bataan (barge-type oil tanker of Philippine Registry, owned by Philippine National Oil
Company and operated by PNOC Shipping Corporation) and the "Don Juan" bound to
Bacolod (owned and operated by Negros Navigation, Co., Inc) collided at the Talbas Strait
near Maestra de Ocampo Island in the vicinity of the island of Mindoro. When the
collision occurred, the sea was calm, the weather fair and visibility good. As a result of this
collision, the M/V "Don Juan" sank and hundreds of its passengers perished. Among the ill-
fated passengers were the parents of petitioners, the spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia
Mecenas, whose bodies were never found despite intensive search by petitioners. On 29
December 1980, petitioners filed a complaint in the then Court- of First Instance of Quezon
City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-31525, against private respondents Negros Navigation
and Capt. Roger Santisteban, the captain of the "Don Juan" without, however, impleading
either PNOC or PNOC Shipping. In their complaint, petitioners alleged that they were the
seven (7) surviving legitimate children of Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas and that the
latter spouses perished in the collision

ISSUE:
Whether or not Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban are liable for damages.

HELD:
Firstly, the "Don Juan" was more than twice as fast as the "Tacloban City." The "Don
Juan's" top speed was 17 knots; while that of the "Tacloban City" was 6.3. knots. Secondly,
the "Don Juan" carried the full complement of officers and crew members specified for a
passenger vessel of her class. Thirdly, the "Don Juan" was equipped with radar which was
functioning that night. Fourthly, the "Don Juan's" officer on-watch had sighted the
"Tacloban City" on his radar screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away.
Visual confirmation of radar contact was established by the "Don Juan" while the "Tacloban
City" was still 2.7 miles away. In the total set of circumstances which existed in the instant
case, the "Don Juan," had it taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have
easily avoided the collision with the "Tacloban City," Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well
have avoided the collision even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely.
In the petition at bar, the "Don Juan" having sighted the "Tacloban City" when it was
still a long way off was negligent in failing to take early preventive action and in allowing
the two (2) vessels to come to such close quarters as to render the collision inevitable
when there was no necessity for passing so near to the "Tacloban City" as to create that
hazard or inevitability, for the "Don Juan" could choose its own distance. It is noteworthy
that the "Tacloban City," upon turning hard to port shortly before the moment of collision,
signaled its intention to do so by giving two (2) short blasts with horn. The "Don Juan "
gave no answering horn blast to signal its own intention and proceeded to turn hard to
starboard.
We conclude that Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation are properly held liable
for gross negligence in connection with the collision of the "Don Juan" and "Tacloban City"
and the sinking of the "Don Juan" leading to the death of hundreds of passengers. We find
no necessity for passing upon the degree of negligence or culpability properly attributable
to PNOC and PNOC Shipping or the master of the "Tacloban City," since they were never
impleaded here.






































Vda. De Abeto v. PAL
G.R. No. L-28692, July 30 1982
Relova, J.

FACTS:
About 5:30 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960, Judge Quirico Abeto, with the
necessary tickets, boarded the Philippine Air Lines' PI-C133 plane at the Mandurriao
Airport, Iloilo City for Manila. He was listed as the No. 18 passenger in its Load Manifest.
The plane which would then take two hours from Iloilo to Manila did not reach its
destination and the next day there was news that the plane was missing. After three weeks,
it was ascertained that the plane crashed at Mt. Baco, Province of Mindoro. All the
passengers, including Judge Abeto, must have been killed instantly and their remains were
scattered all over the area. Among the articles recovered on the site of the crash was a
leather bag with the name "Judge Quirico Abeto."
PAL tried to prove that the plane crash at Mt. Baco was beyond the control of the
pilot. Further, deviation from its prescribed route was due to the bad weather conditions
between Mt. Baco and Romblon and strong winds which caused the plane to drift to Mt.
Baco. Under the circumstances, appellant argues that the crash was a fortuitous event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PAL is liable for violation of its contract of carriage.

HELD:
The prescribed airway of plane PI-C133 that afternoon of November 23, 1960, with
Capt. de Mesa, as the pilot, was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, denominated as airway "Amber l,"
and the prescribed elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The fact is, the plane did not take the
designated route because it was some 30 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco.
According to defendant's witness, Ramon A. Pedroza, Administrative Assistant of the
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would have not happened had the pilot
continued on the route indicated. And, Assistant Director Cesar Mijares of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration testified that the pilot of said plane was "off course."
It is clear that the pilot did not follow the designated route for his flight between
Romblon and Manila. The weather was clear and he was supposed to cross airway "Amber
I" over Romblon; instead, he made a straight flight to Manila in violation of air traffic rules.
At any rate, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by appellant as to how the accident
occurred, the presumption is, it is at fault.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay
the damages sought for by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier assumes
the express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that
might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of
the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code). This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved.


Extraordinary Diligence in Carriage by land; Obligation to Inspect

Nocum v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.
G.R. No. L-23733, October 31, 1969
Barredo, J.

FACTS:
Herminio Nocum, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. 120 then making a
trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of
the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its
conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
According to Severino Andaya, a witness for the plaintiff, a man with a box went up
the baggage compartment of the bus where he already was and said box was placed under
the seat. They left Azcarraga at about 11:30 in the morning and when the explosion
occurred, he was thrown out. PC investigation report states that thirty seven (37)
passengers were injured.
The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that the box belonged to a passenger
whose name he does not know and who told him that it contained miscellaneous items and
clothes. He charged him for it twenty-five centavos (P0.25). From its appearance there was
no indication at all that the contents were explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open
the box because he just relied on the word of the owner.
Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista of defendant company, added that they were not
authorized to open the baggages of passengers because instruction from the management
was to call the police if there were packages containing articles which were against
regulations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant failed to exercise its obligation to Inspect.

HELD:
It is undisputed that before the box containing the firecrackers were allowed to be
loaded in the bus by the conductor, inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the same
as to what was in it, since its "opening ... was folded and tied with abaca." In this particular
case before Us, it must be considered that while it is true the passengers of appellant's bus
should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control, as enunciated
in the decision of this Court cited by His Honor,
1
fairness demands that in measuring a
common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance that
should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their
common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything
dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be
lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He
cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his
baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words,
inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's baggage when such is not
outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries are already in danger of
being transgressed.
Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the representations of the
passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the
common safety of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be solicited, not
necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the needed
investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights
of the passenger. It is in this sense that the mentioned service manual issued by appellant
to its conductors must be understood.







































Batangas Transportation Co. v. Caguimbal
G.R. No. L-22985, January 24, 1968
Concepcion, C.J.

FACTS:
The deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose,
Batangas, was a paying passenger of BTCO bus, going south on its regular route from
Calamba, Laguna to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its regular driver.
Caguimbals destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. As the BTCO
bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was going to
alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed down
his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture, a calesa, then
driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming
from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Bian bus was about 100 meters
away likewise going northward and following the direction of the calesa; that upon seeing
the Bian bus the driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established by Magno Ilaw,
the very conductor of the Bian bus at the time of the accident; that as the calesa and the
BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the Bian bus following
the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the calesa;
that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70) kilometers an hour, the Bian bus
passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of
the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck the calesa
which was completely wrecked.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BTCO liable for damages.

HELD:
In order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly to the
right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have
and should have seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" that his bus was
completely outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof,
the width of which being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. When Perez slowed
down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known, therefore,
that the Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO
bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the
road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to
allow the Bian bus to go through. Perez whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or
"extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a
situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent
upon the diligence of the Bian driver. Such obligation becomes more patent when we
considered the fact of which the Court may take judicial cognizance that our motor
vehicle drivers, particularly those of public service utilities, have not distinguished
themselves for their concern over the safety, the comfort or the convenience of others.


Mallari v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128607, January 31, 2000
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:
On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger jeepney
driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr.
collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp. (BULLETIN, for
brevity) along the National Highway in Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Petitioner
Mallari Jr. testified that he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Ford Fierra
which had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fierra, he saw the van of
respondent BULLETIN coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix
Angeles. The sketch of the accident showed that the collision occurred after Mallari Jr.
overtook the Fierra while negotiating a curve in the highway. The points of collision were
the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of
BULLETIN. The two (2) right wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of the
road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the shoulder of the
road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the passenger jeepney. The impact
caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its
passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his
injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Mallari Jr. and Sr. failed to observe extraordinary
diligence in transporting the passengers to their destination.

HELD:
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is
clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety (Section 41, RA 4136). When a motor
vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the
right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side
relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite
direction comes into view.
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the
BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider the
speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly occupied the
left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the
proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the
jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where overtaking was
not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time
of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court,
petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

PAL v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82619, September 15, 1993
Bellosillo, J.

FACTS:
On August 2, 1976, he was among the twenty-one passengers of PAL Flight 447 that
took off from Cebu bound to Ozamiz City. The routing of this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-
Cotabato. While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes before landing at Ozamiz City,
the pilot received a radio message that the airport was close due to heavy rains and
inclement weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead. Upon arrival at
Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options one of which
is to return to Cebu on Flight 560. However, there were only six (6) seats available in Flight
560 as there were already confirmed passengers for Manila and that the basis of priority
would be the check-in sequence at Cebu. Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but
was not accommodated because he checked in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 447. Station
Agent refused private respondent's demand explaining that the latter's predicament was
not due to PAL's own doing but to a Force Majeure. He accepted the free ticket to Iligan City
but under protest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not force majeure is a valid defense.

HELD:
The relation of the carrier and passenger continuous until the latter has been landed at
the port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would
still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience
and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination. The
appellate court correctly ruled that the steps taken by defendant airline company
towards this end has not been put in evidence, especially for those seven who were not
accommodated in the return trip to Cebu, only 6 or 21 having been accommodated. It
appears that that plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2 days later. If the cause of the
non-fulfillment of the contract is due to fortuitous event, it has to be the sole and only
cause. Since part of the failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver
its passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendant's failure to provide comfort
and convenience to its stranded passengers using extraordinary diligence, the cause of
non-fulfillment is not solely and exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something
which defendant airline could have prevented, defendant becomes liable to plaintiff.



Bill of Lading and Other Formalities; BOL as a Receipt

Magellan Manufacturing v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 95529, August 22, 1991
Regalada, J.

FACTS:
Choju Co., Ltd purchased from Magellan Manufacturing marketing Corp (MMMC)
136, 000 Anahaw Fans for $23, 220. MMMC contracted with F.E. Zuellig, a shipping agent of
Orient Overseas Container Lines, Inc., (OOCL) specifying that he needed an on board bill
of lading and that transshipment is not allowed under the letter of credit.
MMMC paid F.E. Zuellig the freight chargers and secured a copy of the BOL which
was presented to Allied Bank. The bank then credited the amount of $23, 220 covered by
the Letter or Credit to MMMC. When MMMCs President James Cu, went back to the bank
later, he was informed that the payment was refused by the buyer for lack of BOL and there
was transshipment of goods. The Anahaw fans were shipped back to Manila through OOCL,
who are demanding from MMMC P246, 043.43 (freight chargers from Japan to Manila,
demurrage incurred in Japan and Manila from October 22, 1980 to May 20, A981). MMMC
abandoned the whole cargo and asked OOCL for damages. OOCL argued that the BOL
clearly shows that there will be transshipment and that petitioner was well aware that MV
Pacific was only up to HongKong where the subject cargo will be transferred t another
vessel for Japan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the BOL which reflected the transshipment against the Letter of
Credit is consented by MMMC.

HELD:
Yes. Acceptance of the bill without dissent raises the presumption that all terms
therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed to by him and, in the
absence if fraud or mistake, he is estopped from thereafter denying the he assented to such
term. It is a long standing jurisprudential rule that a bill of lading operates both as a receipt
and as a contract. It is a receipt for the goods shipped and a contract to transport and
deliver the same as therein stipulated. As a contract, it names the parties, which includes
the consignee, fixes the route, destination, and freight rates or charges, and stipulates the
rights and obligations assumed by the parties. Being a contract, it is the law between the
parties who are bound by its terms and conditions provided that these are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. A bill of lading usually becomes
effective upon its delivery to and acceptance by the shipper.
It is presumed that the stipulations of the bill were, in the absence of fraud,
concealment or improper conduct, known to the shipper, and he is generally bound by his
acceptance whether he reads the bill or not.