Uy Coque V Siosa

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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20392 November 20, 1923
ANDREA UY COQUE, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. JUAN NAVAS L. SIOCA, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
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GR Properties Deed Court GR No GR
No GR Supreme GR Property Law Business GR
Marriage Law VS GR Deed of Property Land Title Deeds
Page 1of 20 G.R. No. L-20392 - ANDREA UY COQUE, ET AL. vs. J UAN NAVAS L. SIOCA, ET ...
8/29/2014 http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1923/nov1923/gr_l-20392_1923.php
Crossfield and O'Brien for appellants.
Ruperto Kapunan for appellees.
STREET, J .:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Samar by the
plaintiffs, in the character of collateral heirs of Geronima Uy Coque, deceased, against
Juan Navas L. Sioca, husband of the said Geronima Uy Coque, and his codefendants, for
the purpose of securing a decree declaring fictitious certain transfers of property made by
Juan Navas L. Sioca to his various codefendants and to have the same set aside as fraud
upon the plaintiffs; to compel the said Navas to effect a division of the ganancial property
which had pertained to himself and Geronima Uy Coque during her life; to declare the
plaintiffs owners of the half of said property which pertained to Geronima; to require the
said Navas to deliver such half to the plaintiffs; to compel him further to pay to the
plaintiffs a sum of money as damages, together with costs of suit; and to obtain such
further and general relief as might be appropriate in the premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In due time the defendants answered, admitting the character and heirship of the plaintiffs
as heirs of Geronima Uy Coque, deceased, as well as certain other points alleged in the
complaint. By way of special defense the defendants set forth in their answer that the
transfers made by Juan Navas L. Sioca and which are the subject of attack in the
complaint were made by him to his respective codefendants for a good consideration and
in the lawful exercise of his powers as a manager of the conjugal partnership, composed of
himself and his wife, Geronima Uy Coque, deceased. Other matters involved in the
complaint were for the most part made subject of general denial; but by way of
counterclaim the defendants prayed the court to compel one of the plaintiffs, namely,
Andrea Uy Coque, to return to the defendant Navas certain jewelry and money pertaining
to the community estate, alleged to have been appropriated by her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the hearing the trial judge entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, comprising the
following features, namely, (1) a declaration of the nullity of the transfers in question; (2)
a declaration that certain property specified in the opinion pertained to the ganancial
partnership composed of the defendant Navas and his wife Geronima, and that the same
should be divided equally between said Navas and the heirs of Geronima, with the
exception of a certain portion, to wit, lot No. 1 of paragraph D, declared to be paraphernal
property of Geronima; (3) requiring the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs, as heirs
of said Geronima Uy Coque, or to her administrator, the sum of P152,800, which the court
found to be one-half the value of a quantity of hemp which had pertained to the
community estate and which constituted part of the property found to have been
fraudulently transferred by Navas to one of his codefendants, also requiring the defendants
to surrender one-half of certain other property described in the complaint, or its
equivalent; (4) and, finally, requiring the defendants to pay the costs of the action. From
this judgment the defendants brought the cause to this court by means of a bill of
exceptions, signed by the judge of the lower court in response to an order from this court
obtained in an action for the writ of mandamus.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the outset it should be noted that the attorney for the appellees challenges the
jurisdiction of this court over the appeal on substantially the same grounds and
considerations that were urged in opposition to the application for the writ of mandamus in
the case of Juan Navas L. Sioca et al., vs. Honorable N. Capistrano, as Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Samar, G.R. No. 19903.
1
However, a majority of the justices
participating in the decision of this case are of the opinion now, as in the mandamus case,
that the court has jurisdiction. Upon this point the writer of the present opinion and Mr.
Justice Avancea are not in accord with the court, but in conformity with the resolution of
the majority, we now proceed to deal with the case upon its merits as appearing upon the
record on appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the year 1883 a Chinese boy, named Lim Sioca, then of the age of about seventeen
years, arrived in the Philippine Islands and found his way to Catbalogan, in the Province of
Samar. Originally without means, he contrived in course of time to get a start as keeper of
a tienda, a business which was conducted by him for a time upon a petty sale. He says
that he had a Chinese wife whom he had left behind in China, but this was no obstacle to
the formation of an irregular matrimonial alliance with Geronima Uy Coque, a woman
apparently of Chines ancestry but born in this country. In the year 1904 the wife in China
died; and soon thereafter Lim Sioca, who had by this time adopted the Christian name of
Juan Navas, in addition to his original patronymic, was united in Christian marriage with
Geronima. No children were born to the pair, and they lived together harmoniously until
the death of Geronima which occurred on August 21, 1919.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It appears that Geronima Uy Coque, with her brothers and sisters, had inherited a
respectable property, the management of which had fallen to her, as the eldest of the
children. She was thus able to furnish a home for herself and her husband and apparently
a place in which to do business. The testimony for the plaintiffs also tends to show that the
capital used in the business thenceforth conducted by the conjugal partnership came in
great part, if not entirely, from Geronima Uy Coque; but Juan Navas Lim Sioca, whom we
shall hereafter designate by the shorter name of Sioca, says that he had about P1,500 of
his own money at the time he entered into relations with Geronima. However this may be,
it is evident that the business conducted by him received a notable impulse from the
alliance with her, and her resources and intelligence supplied one of the bases of the
success which followed. The evidence shows that, throughout the joint lives of the
spouses, as means were accumulated and money was available to let out at interest, the
management of loan was confided to her, and apparently she otherwise took an intelligent
and helpful part in the conduct of business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the course of years, owing to the intelligence and economical mode of life of the pair,
the invested capital continued to grow, and the business was extended, with the result
that by the time of the death of Geronima Uy Coque a great wholesale business had been
established in Catbalogan. Dependent upon and contributory to this establishment was a
retail tienda in Catbalogan and numerous other stores which Sioca had acquired or
established in various small ports on the Island of Samar accessible by water to
Catbalogan. To keep in touch with these Sioca maintained a fleet, from the home port of
Catbalogan, of more than a half dozen motor boats, launches and lorchas. By means of
this admirable apparatus of commerce, Sioca did a business of a varied character, but he
specialized in the buying and selling of hemp; and upon one of his lots in Catbalogan he
maintained a press for the baling of hemp, where great quantities of this commodity,
purchased in the local market or brought in by his boats from other ports and places, were
baled and prepared for export through the Manila market. Under the conditions described
it is evident that when the prolonged and phenomenal rise in the price of hemp occurred
several years ago, owing to conditions brought about by the World War, Sioca was in
possession of a business which, if properly managed, could not fail to make him rich.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the peak year of 1918 the sales of the wholesale establishment alone were reported to
the Collector of Internal Revenue for purposes of taxation at more than P572,000, without
reference to the business done in the different stores contributory to that establishment;
and Sioca admits that at the time he sold out the main business to Marcelo Navas there
was on hand in Manila and Catbalogan, and included in the sale, sufficient hemp to realize
the gross amount of P235,152.25.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the period of fifteen or twenty years during which the business of Sioca and his wife was
expanding in the manner stated, they came to feel the need of finding some Chinese
youths whom they might bring up according to their own system and whom they might
prepare for the larger duties incident to the conduct of the business. This desire was felt
no doubt the more for the reason that the pair were childless. Moreover, they were rather
close and sparing in their expenditures, and it seemed to them that Chinese boys brought
in from China would be less expensive than native help. On one occasion Geronima
complained that their employees who were natives of this country were extravagant
because they smoked cigarettes so much and were accustomed to throw away the stubs
before they were half smoked up. In conformity with this idea, a Chinese boy named Tiu
Quim Chiu was brought to the Islands in the year 1907. This boy claims to be the son of
one Tiu Sin Set, who had been associated with Sioca in business. Nevertheless after the
boy arrived in the Islands he went into the establishment of Sioca in Catbalogan and was
brought up in Sioca's household in all respects as if he were Sioca's son.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On March 14, 1910, Tiu Quim Chiu was taken to the parish priest in the pueblo of
Tarangan and was there baptized with the Christian name of Marcelo Navas. The certificate
of baptism recites that the boy was then thirteen years of age and that he was the son of
natives from the City of Amoy. The certificate upon which he was passed through the
Customs by the immigration authorities indicates that he is somewhat older than appears
from the certificate of baptism. The testimony of witnesses for the plaintiffs is to the effect
that the baptism of Marcelo was done at the instance of Sioca and wife. However this may
be, in the family circle Marcelo was always treated as a child of said spouses; and he called
Geronima mother. Moreover, he ate at their table, and was educated at the expense of the
same persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Between the years 1913 and 1918, three other boys were brought in at intervals and
became likewise members of the Sioca circle. These youths are Tan Cao, Lim Isiu and Tan
Siu. As these boys got big enough to do anything, they were set to different appropriate
duties by Sioca, when not in school; and they grew up as if a part of Sioca's
establishment. Sioca claims that one of these boys, Lim Isiu, is his own son, having been
born to Sioca's Chinese wife in China about the year 1900. If this is true it supposes that in
the year 1899 Sioca was in China, and he claims to have made a visit to China during that
year. Other testimony tends to show that Sioca was in Samar during the whole of the year
1899 and his presence at that time in the province is fixed with considerable certainty by
one of the witnesses, supposing the witness to speak the truth, by the circumstance that
Sioca was arrested that year for dealing in contraband opium, and that he further acted as
an informer to the Americans during that year, giving them valuable information
concerning the activities of the insurrectos in that province. The trial judge, upon
considering the evidence, came to the conclusion that Lim Isiu is not in fact a son of Sioca
but a nephew, being in fact the son of one of Sioca's brothers. The point whether Lim Isiu
is the son or the nephew of Sioca is of no importance; and it is sufficient to record that he
was treated as an actual or adopted son by Sioca - very much as the other three of whom
mention has been made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As Sioca's business began to expand in the early years, he had around him more than one
native of China who assisted in different capacities in the conduct of the business; and in
the year 1909 the internal-revenue license was taken out in such form as to show that the
business of Sioca was a partnership conducted, under the style of "Tiong Juat," by four
persons, to wit, Sioca himself and three others, namely, Tiu Sin Set, Tan Yengco, (Yana),
and Ignacio Tan Ingco; and oral testimony given by witnesses for the defendants shows
that such a partnership had existed from 1907. However, no scrap of writing has ever
existed proving the information of any such partnership. The trial judge fond as a fact that
this partnership was purely fictitious, and we do not hesitate to say that in our opinion this
conclusion is an irresistible inference from the evidence. It is a matter of common
knowledge that persons having the status of Chinese merchants are freely passed through
the customhouse by the immigration authorities when they wish to go to China and return
upon visits to their native land, and they are allowed to bring into this country the
members of their Chinese families, - a privilege not conceded to Chinese laborers. As a
consequence of this Chines residents here have a strong desire to become certified as
merchants; and where a man like Sioca has around him a number of faithful helpers, not
infrequently of kin, the temptation to admit such persons into the fictitious relation of
partners is too strong to be resisted by persons of the clannish character of the Chinese
people. It is believed therefore that in order to permit the three persons above mentioned
to have the status of merchants and to visit China from time to time Sioca became party
to the fictitious declaration of partnership referred to.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
An additional incentive undoubtedly was that Sioca wanted to get in more boys from
China, and more than one of the three who came in later were, if we mistake not, brought
in by some one or another of the titular partners in the "Tiong Juat." The business, it is
needless to say, in all its ramifications and details continued under the guidance of Sioca,
without the least external indication that any interest in the business whatever was vested
in any other person beside himself, and so the situation remained until the climax came in
1919.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That the partnership was a mere figment of imagination and made little or no impression
upon the mind of Sioca, is indicated by the circumstance that when he was called as a
witness and asked when "Tiong Juat" was established, he said that it was created in 1904,
when all other witnesses who had testified about the matter placed it in 1907; and it was
only after careful questioning on the part of his skillful and discerning attorney that he was
brought around to modify his statement and declare, in conformity with his other
witnesses, that this partnership had been created in 1907.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In 1915 one of the supposed partners died in China, and later still another died; and in the
latter part of 1917 Sioca thought it desirable to take out the internal-revenue license in the
future exclusively in his own name. However, the authorities of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in that province required some sort of a showing to the effect that the other three
in whose names the license had appeared from 1909 to that date no longer had any
interest in the business. In order to meet this requirement four persons got together in
Catbalogan in January of the year 1918 in order to put an end to the supposed
partnership. These four persons were Sioca himself and Tan Yengco (Yana), as original
members, and two other persons, Tan Tiongco, assuming to act as representative of his
deceased brother, Ignacio Tan Ingco, and Tiu Quim Chiu (Marcelo Navas) assuming to act
in representation of his father Tiu Sin Set. Upon this occasion a document, dated January
24, 1918, was drawn up and acknowledged before a notary public, purporting to put an
end to the: "Tiong Juat," or partnership to which reference has been made. The material
recitals and statements contained in this document are these:
1st. That by a verbal agreement between us made on the first of January of the
year 1907, we have formed a general mercantile partnership under the name
and style of "Tiong Juat" for the purchase and sale of merchandise from Europe
and of this country, doing business in the first avenue in the populated part of
Catbalogan, Samar, P.I.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2nd. That the partners Ignacio Tan Yengco and Tiu Sin Set having died in their
respective towns in China, we have by mutual agreement appointed Mr. Juan
Navas Lim Sioca to make an inventory and a liquidation of the partnership.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3rd. That in view of the fact that the inventory and liquidation have already been
finished, said partnership known as "Tiong Juat" is hereby declared dissolved,
and the aforementioned agreement void and of no effect, each receiving the
share corresponding to him, as found in the liquidation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
4th. And in order that each of us may freely engage in his respective trade and
business without any difficulty, we have executed these presents for such
purposes as may be proper.
Among recitals contained in the document from which we have quoted two are especially
noteworthy, namely, first, the statement that the partnership in question was created by
verbal agreement on January 1, 1907; and, secondly, the acknowledgment that each
member thereof, or his representative, was receiving, contemporaneously with the
execution of the document, the part in the assets of the partnership which pertained to
him according to the result of a liquidation already effected by Sioca. Armed with this
paper, Sioca caused the internal-revenue license to be changed and thereafter the
business appeared in the office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue as being conducted in
the name of Sioca alone.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The next incident important to be noted consists in the execution by Geronima Uy Coque
of the document Exhibit 15, dated March 11, 1918, and acknowledged on the same date
before a notary public. This document is a gratuitous deed of transfer by which Geronima
Uy Coque transfers, or purports to transfer, to her husband her entire half interest in the
community property pertaining to herself and husband. Said document is in terms as
follows:
I, Geronima Uy Coque, wife of the Christian Chinaman Juan Navas, Sioca, both
residents of the municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, P.I., and his
legitimate heir of all the property acquired or to be acquired during his marriage,
by these presents make known, that I convey and transfer one-half of the
interest I may have in the aforesaid property to my aforesaid husband Juan
Navas Sioca, who may dispose as absolute owner of all said property, whether
personal or real, and of the business in which he is engaged, and he may
exercise his right to transfer the same to other persons and make its distribution
among his children as he pleases. Be it also known that I stand responsible to
my said husband Juan Navas Sioca, his heirs and successors in interest, for all
the aforesaid property which corresponds to me by inheritance, the title to which
I bind myself to defend now and forever against all lawful claims that may be
presented.
Considered with reference to its juridical effects, this document is of course a patent
nullity, being in direct contravention of two explicit provisions of the Civil Code, namely,
article 1334, which declares that all donations between spouses made during the marriage
shall be void; and article 1458, which expressly prohibits the husband and wife from
selling their property to each other except under certain conditions not material to be here
noted. Worthless, therefore, as this document is for the purposes for which it was
intended, it is nevertheless important as affording indubitable proof of the motives that
actuated the parties; for we find it there stated that the transfer was made in order that
the transferee, Juan Navas Sioca, might have absolute power of disposal, not only of the
real estate but of the business in which he was engaged, "and that he might exercise his
right to transfer the same to other persons and make its distribution among his children as
he pleases." (Emphasis ours.)chanrobles virtual law library
The word children as used in this document can refer to no other persons than the four
Chinese boys from whom Sioca and his wife had informally adopted; and the design
evidently was to enable Sioca the more freely to dispose of the property for the purpose,
among others, of the division of it among those boys. Subsequent developments were in
complete harmony with this design.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
About a year after the document last above mentioned was executed, the health of
Geronima Uy Coque began rapidly to fail, and she died on August 21, 1919, after having
been helpless for several weeks or months. In evident anticipation of this event, and as we
believe with the purpose of getting practically all of his property beyond the reach of the
collateral heirs of his wife, Sioca executed a series of documents, by which he stripped
himself of nearly everything he possessed. The transferees in these several documents
were the four Chinese boys who had been brought up, or were being brought up, by Sioca
in his household and in his business. In addition to these, one other Chinese, one Tan Po,
is named. One of these, documents (Exhibit D) appears to have been executed on June
27, 1919, and it was acknowledged on June 30 of the same year, before a notary public.
The other conveyances here referred to (Exhibits A, B, C, E, and F) were executed upon
various dates between July 2, 1919, and July 11 of the same year. Taking them up in
order, we find that by the conveyance Exhibit A Sioca transferred to Tan Siu for the stated
consideration of P4,000 two lots in Catbalogan, with the residential house standing on one
and a warehouse located on the other. By the conveyance Exhibit B Sioca transferred to
Tan Cao for the stated consideration of P1,000 a lot in the municipality of Tarangnan. By
the conveyance Exhibit C the same Sioca, for the recited consideration of P2,500,
transferred to the same Tan Cao all the interest which Sioca possessed in a tienda
belonging to Sioca in the municipality of Tarangnan. By the conveyance Exhibit D Sioca
transferred to Lim Isiu, for the recited consideration of P10,000, a parcel of land with the
buildings and improvements thereon in the town of Catbalogan. By the conveyance Exhibit
E, the same Sioca, for a recited consideration of P18,000, transferred to Marcelo Navas
(Tiu Quim Chiu), all of Sioca's right, title and interest in the business located in
Catbalogan. In this sale is included all of the furniture and all credits pertaining to Sioca
and relating to the business which he had previously conducted in Catbalogan, with the
exception of the boats. By the conveyance Exhibit F, the same Sioca, for a recited
consideration of P12,000, transferred to the Chino Tan Po, resident of the municipality of
Wright, in the Province of Samar, the seven boats which were being used by Sioca in the
conduct of his business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
By the documents above mentioned Sioca disposed, on paper at least, of nearly everything
of value that he and his wife had possessed; and there was included in one of these
transfers certain paraphernal property of the wife. To make it perfectly clear that he had
no further interest in the properties thus conveyed, he caused to be drawn up an affidavit
(Exhibit G), in which he enumerated the few remaining pieces of property, of
comparatively small value, which he still owned. This document was acknowledged before
a notary public on August 18, 1918, or three days before Geronima Uy Coque died.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Notwithstanding the changes thus made in the nominal ownership of the various properties
conveyed by Exhibits A to F, inclusive, Sioca remained in possession of all of said
properties and continued to do business as before. Publicity was not given in any way to
these changes of ownership, and the very existence of said transfers was unknown to the
heirs of Geronima Uy Coque for several months.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the second paragraph of article 1413 of the Civil Code it is declared that no alienation in
fraud of the wife which the husband may make of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership shall prejudice her or her heirs; and in conformity with that precept this action
was primarily instituted to set aside the conveyances above mentioned as fraudulent. That
the action is in this respect well founded and that said conveyances were made with a view
to putting these properties beyond the reach of Geronima Uy Coque and her heirs is in our
opinion clearly apparent from the proof and capable of most complete demonstration. In
this connection we shall quote a lengthy passage from the appealed decision which
supplies an answerable argument against the good faith and honesty of the transactions in
question. In the brief for the appellants in this court some of the details stated in this
excerpt have been challenged, but a careful perusal of the evidence will show that the
more important facts herein stated are proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence,
and even the minor details are supported by testimony at least as credible as the denials
and assertions contained in the testimony for the appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Says the trial judge in the appealed decision:
The defendant Juan Navas Sioca sold the properties in question for the price of
forty-eight thousand two hundred and seventy pesos (P48,270). On the date of
the sale, he had two thousand nine hundred ninety-nine (2,999) bales of hemp
stored in Manila, and six hundred thirty six (636) bales and one thousand piculs
of loose hemp in Catbalogan, making a total of eight thousand two hundred
eighty-five piculs, which, at the rate of twenty-four pesos and fifty centavos
(P24.50) per picul, are worth two hundred two thousand nine hundred eighty-
two pesos and fifty centavos (P202,982.50).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The eight thousand two hundred eighty-five (8,285) piculs of hemp were
included in the sale for the aforesaid price of P48,270.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Juan Navas Sioca, in explaining why he sold all his business, together with all the
properties and goods pertaining thereto, says that he owed the purchaser, Tan
Po, seventeen thousand pesos (P17,000); that he owed the Chinaman Tiu Sin
Set, father of the purchaser, Tiu Quim Chiu, fifteen thousand ninety-nine pesos
and ninety-three centavos (P15,099.93); that he owed the same purchaser, Tiu
Quim Chiu, the sum of eight hundred pesos (P800.); that he owed the
purchaser, Lim Isiu, a youth nineteen years old, the sum of one thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500) for his salaries; that he owed the purchaser, Tan Siu, a
youth eighteen years of age, the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000) for his
salaries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The purchasers are members of the household of the vendor, and dependents
upon him for support.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Said Tan Po, a resident of Wright, is the purchaser of the seven vessels
mentioned in paragraph "A" for the price of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000).
The deed of sale executed on July 2, 1919, is Exhibit F of the plaintiff and Exhibit
3 of the defense. This purchaser Tan Po had a small retail store of cigars, pots,
etc., in the municipality of Wright. His business was of such a nature and in such
a condition as not to require the acquisition of any vessel. This Tan Po bought
the seven vessels for a large business, such as that of Juan Navas, and the
vessels being of no use for the purchaser, were left at the vendor's place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the testimony of the vendor Juan Navas and the purchaser, Tan Po,
the former owed the latter the sum of seventeen thousand pesos (P17,000), and
the seven vessels were sold for twelve thousand pesos (P12,000), as payment
on account of the seventeen thousand pesos (P17,000). But no document or
competent proof was introduced to establish this debt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is, besides, the circumstance that, after the sale of the vessels, the vendor
Juan Navas Sioca has been using them as formerly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the month of June, 1920, after the execution of said deed of sale, this
purchaser Tan Po made a voyage from Catbalogan to Wright on board the launch
Biri one of the vessels sold, and paid as freight for said voyage the sum of
twenty pesos (P20) to the engineer? Martin Banasta who made that voyage by
order of Juan Navas Sioca, to whom the engineer turned over, later, the twenty
pesos (P20).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the months of September and October of the year 1919, and June of 1920,
the vendor Juan Navas Sioca carried timbers from Tacloban to the Catbalogan
Trade School on board the launches sold, under a contract with the principal
teacher of the Trade School, named Vicente Macasiran, who paid Juan Navas
Sioca, through the provincial treasurer, the sum of four hundred twenty pesos
(P420) for the transportation of said timbers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Chinaman Tan Siu is the purchaser of the properties described in paragraph
B for four thousand pesos (P4,000), Exhibit A of the plaintiffs and 4 of the
defense, which is the deed of sale executed on July 11, 1919. This purchaser,
Tan Siu, is eighteen years old; he came to the Philippines 1915 at the age of
thirteen years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the evidence of the plaintiffs, Tan Siu was bought for five hundred
pesos (P500) by Juan Navas and his wife, and taken to the Philippines by the
Chinaman Yana Tan Yengco, whose child he appears to be in the certificate
issued to him when he landed in this country. And according to the evidence of
the defense, Tan Siu is the son of said Tan Yengco. But now the undisputed fact
is that, since his arrival, Tan Siu has resided always in the house of Juan Navas
Sioca and never in that of Tan Yengco, from whom he did not receive a parental
treatment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to Juan Navas Sioca, he sold the three properties in question to Tan
Siu, who on the date of the sale was seventeen years of age, because he owed
him the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000) as salaries for his services. So that
this young man, who did not yet know how to work when he arrived, being then
but thirteen years old, earned the sum of four thousand pesos (P4,000) from
1915 to the date of the sale, that is, during three years approximately. Just what
specific salary per month Juan paid to this young man, it does not appear. Nor
was any mention made in the evidence of the amount or amounts this young
employee had taken during those three years on account of his salaries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This debt of four thousand pesos (P4,000) was not proven by any documentary
evidence. About this debt there is nothing but the mere testimony of the seller
Juan Navas Sioca.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Chinaman Tan Cao is the purchaser of the properties mentioned in
paragraph C for three thousand five hundred pesos (P3,500) Exhibits B and C of
the plaintiffs, which are the deeds of sale executed on July 8, 1919. This
purchaser, Tan Cao, is in China, and was there prior to the commencement of
this action. According to the evidence of the plaintiffs, he was also bought by
Juan Navas Sioca and his wife. His age does not appear. According to the deeds
of sale in his favor, Exhibits B and C, he is of age; but the attorney and notary
who prepared Exhibits B and C, is the same author of the deeds of sale in favor
of Tan Siu and Lim Isiu, Exhibits A and D, wherein he made it appear that they
were of age when they were, in fact, only seventeen ang eighteen years old.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It is a fact, about which there is no question, that this purchaser Tan Cao never
resided in any other place than the store and house of Juan Navas Sioca.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the document Exhibit B, the vendor Juan Navas Sioca admits having received,
at the execution thereof, one thousand pesos (P1,000), which was the price of
the lot mentioned in Exhibit B, and in Exhibit C, that is the deed of sale of the
store, the vendor, Juan Navas Sioca, states that he had previously received two
thousand five hundred pesos (P2,500), which was the purchase price of the
business or store.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Lim Isiu is the purchaser of the properties mentioned in paragraph D for the
price of ten thousand pesos (P10,000), the deed of sale which, Exhibit D of the
plaintiffs and Exhibit 6 of the defense, was executed on June 27, 1919. This
purchaser was nineteen years old at the time of the execution of said document.
He came from China to Catbalogan in 1913 when he was thirteen years of age.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
According to the evidence of the defense, that is, according to the testimony of
Juan Navas Sioca and Lim Isiu himself, the latter is a son of Juan Navas Sioca.
But the court finds that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that Lim
Isiu is not Juan Navas Sioca's child, but his nephew. Lim Isiu was born of a
Chinawoman in China in 1900, and the supposed father was in Catbalogan,
without having left the Philippines in the years 1898 to 1901. The very treatment
which Lim Isiu received from Juan Navas Sioca in these transactions is a
corroboration of the fact that Lim Isiu is not a son of Juan Navas Sioca.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the document Exhibit D, the payment was made in two
installments; five thousand pesos (P5,000) prior to the execution of the
document and the balance of five thousand pesos (P5,000) at the signing
thereof. But according to the purchaser, the payment was made as follows: For
the first payment the purchaser borrowed two thousand pesos (P2,000) from
Nicolas Tan, and one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) from a Chinaman
named Simo. Both amounts, which, together with the one thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500), due from the vendor to the purchaser for the latter's salaries, as
found in the liquidation made at the execution of the deed, constituted full
payment of the five thousand pesos (P5,000), were furnished or lent by the
father-in-law of the purchaser named Tan Po.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
These loans, apparently unconditional and without any security, are not shown
by any document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This purchaser began to live with the vendor in the year 1913, upon his arrival
from China at the age of thirteen years. According to Navas Sioca, this Lim Isiu
began to earn, as employee, four hundred pesos (P400) in the first year, and
five hundred pesos (P500) thereafter. This Lim Isiu went to China in 1917, where
he married, and returned to Catbalogan a few days prior to this transaction. So
that Lim Isiu could not have served as an employee for more than three years
computed from 1913, when he was thirteen years old, until the date of the sale.
Aside from the fact that the amount of the salary given is not in proportion to
the small service which this youth could have rendered, if the expenses for the
round trips, the marriage, and other personal expenses are taken into
consideration, which Lim Isiu had to pay with money from his master, Juan
Navas, on account of his salaries, the amount of one thousand five hundred
pesos (P1,500), found as balance in the liquidation made of such salaries upon
his return from China, cannot be justified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This purchaser has been, for the last two years, in charge of the store in Wright
referred to in paragraph G. He bought for ten thousand pesos (P10,000), without
any money of his own, the camarin (shed) and the hemp press, which had
nothing to do with his business, and required a large capital to operate, which he
did not have. This purchaser did not take possession of said properties, which
continued in the hands of the vendor Juan Navas Sioca.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant Tiu Quim Chiu, known also as Marcelo paragraph "E" under
numbers 1, 2, and 3, for nineteen thousand five hundred ninety pesos
(P19,590), the documents of which were executed on June 7, 1919, Exhibit E of
the plaintiffs and 11 of the defense, as to property No. 1, and on February 16,
1920, Exhibit 14 of the defense as, to No. 2. No document was presented
concerning the purchase of property No. 3. This purchaser is a young man
twenty-three years of age. According to the evidence of the plaintiffs, he was,
like Tan Siu and Tan Cao, bought by Juan Navas Sioca. And according to the
evidence of the defense, Tiu Quim Chiu is a son of a Chinaman Tiu Sin Set. But it
is a fact, proven and undisputed, that this Tiu Quim Chiu arrived at Catbalogan
from China in 1907; that the spouses Juan Navas Sioca and Geronima Uy Coque
had him baptized on March 14, 1910, in the parish church of Tarangan, Samar,
giving him the name of Marcelo Navas Sioca, which they caused to appear in the
baptismal certificate; that since his arrival from China he has been living in the
house of the spouses as adopted child, enjoying a treatment and consideration
as such until the date of the transaction in question; that during the said period
of time he was studying in the public schools of the Government, wherein he
reached the second year of High School in 1918, when he stopped due to
sickness; that while in the house and store of Juan Navas Sioca, his status was
that of a real child, performing duties of trust and confidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
An examination of all of the transactions involved in this case clearly shows that
this Tiu Quim Chiu has won Juan Navas' great distinction and confidence to such
a degree that their interests can be said to have become identified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
According to the explanation given by the purchaser, the payment was made as
follows: Fifteen thousand ninety-nine pesos and ninety-three centavos
(P15,099.93) was the debt due from the vendor to Tiu Sin Set, father of the
purchaser, and eight hundred pesos (P800) was the value of the house in
Tarangan, built by the purchaser on the lot of the vendor. Both amounts were
applied on the payment of the nineteen thousand five hundred ninety pesos
(P19,590). Nothing was said about the three thousand six hundred ninety pesos
and seven centavos (P3,690.07) lacking to complete the payment of nineteen
thousand five hundred ninety pesos (P19,590).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
No complete evidence was presented of the aforesaid debt of fifteen thousand
ninety-nine pesos and ninety-three centavos (15,099.93).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The sale of the business, the gross receipts of which amounted to five hundred
seventy-two thousand five hundred fifteen pesos and twenty-six centavos
(P572,515.26) in 1918, and to three hundred nineteen thousand five hundred
seventy-eight pesos and eighteen centavos (P319,578.18) in 1919 (property No.
1 of paragraph E), included the furniture, all the debts and credits in favor of,
and against, said business, with all the hemp and rice in stock in the warehouse
and stores, as well as the books of the business, specially the eight thousand
two hundred eighty-five (8,285) piculs of hemp in the warehouse appraised at
two hundred two thousand nine hundred eighty-two pesos and fifty centavos
(P202,982.50), a part of the goods in stock, that were sold for the price of
eighteen thousand pesos (P18,000). The purchaser Tiu Quim Chiu immediately
after the execution of the deed of sale, Exhibits E and 11, went to China to get
married, or to take his wife to Catbalogan in October, 1919, free from all cares
about the large business and properties which he had just bought, as if he had
acquired nothing, leaving the properties purchased in the hands of the vendor
himself. If Tiu Quim Chiu were the real owner of the properties in question, he
could not have left in the manner he did.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A very important circumstance is to be noted. The purchase of the business by
Tiu Quim Chiu did not include the basis of said business, that is, the hemp press
and the camarin (shed) in which it was installed, which properties appear to
have been purchased by Lim Isiu (Exhibits D and 6). The press and the camarin
were bought by Lim Isiu, who did not need them, while Tiu Quim Chiu, who
needed them for his business, did not purchase them. But in spite of this division
of the ownership of these properties which should not be separated, the
important fact is that the business and the hemp press continued to operate,
united to each other, as if they belonged to one single owner, in the same way
they did before the transaction.
We entirely agree with the trial judge that these conveyances are fictitious, in the sense
that they were made upon fictitious considerations; and they were without a doubt
executed for the purpose of defrauding Geronima Uy Coque and defeating the rights of her
heirs. Most preposterous of all, perhaps, is to suppose that the sale of the fleet of boats to
Tan Po was made in good faith - something for which he had no possible use and over
Page 10of 20 G.R. No. L-20392 - ANDREA UY COQUE, ET AL. vs. J UAN NAVAS L. SIOCA, E...
which he has at no time exercised the slightest dominion. And it is not pretended that he
paid any cash consideration whatever, the supposed consideration consisting of a
preexisting debt concerning which there is not the slightest documentary evidence. The
three boys, Tan Siu, Tan Cao, and Lim Isiu, could not possibly have commanded the
resources necessary to make the purchases attributed to them, and as to two,
consideration is claimed to be, in whole or in part, the value of their unpaid salaries for
past services. Of course the conveyances to these three, as well as that made in favor of
Marcelo Navas, were merely made in furtherance of the design, already revealed in Exhibit
5, of making a division among Sioca's "sons." Neither of these three boys has at any time
exercised any of the external indicia of ownership over the property which they claim to
have purchased, their pretense being that they leased the properties back forthwith after
purchasing them to Sioca, or let them to his successor, Marcelo Navas.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This last named person acquired the wholesale business in Catbalogan with all the
property and outstanding credits pertaining thereto, but no steps were taken by him at the
time of the transfer to assert ownership or obtain possession. It is true that after he had
made two trips to China, coming back in the autumn, he began to take a more intimate
part in the conduct of business, and he claims that his vendor Sioca had now become his
agent in the management of things. Also at the end of the year the internal revenue
license for the conduct of the business was taken out in the name of Marcelo Navas, and
an important business house in Manila with whom Sioca had business relations was
informed of the change.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is not claimed that Marcelo gave present value for what he received; the consideration is
said to consist in part of a debt owing to Marcelo's father, Tiu Sin Set, from the liquidation
of the famous partnership "Tiong Juat," of which something has already been said. One
would suppose that after that fictitious entity had been wiped completely off the slate by
the document executed in January, 1917, nothing more would have been heard of it,
especially as it was stated in that document that each of the partners was receiving his
share in the proceeds per the liquidation effected by Sioca. But the memory of that
fictitious entity has been revived for the purpose of serving as a justification of these
transfers by Sioca; and it is asserted that Sioca did not pay the amounts due his former
partners upon liquidation as stated in the document Exhibit 15, which indebtedness
remained outstanding until they began to press him in 1919. It was for this reason, so
Sioca asserts, that it became necessary for him to sell out everything so hurriedly in June
and July, 1919, in order to satisfy those claims, which being accomplished, Sioca was left
with little or nothing and dependent upon Marcelo Navas even for employment. It is
impossible, upon a careful examination of the evidence before us, to give credence to such
a pretension.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We do not question the power of the defendant Sioca to make a valid conveyance,
disposing of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership, either during the line of
his wife or afterwards. That power Sioca undoubtedly had, as is fully established in
numerous decisions of this court, beginning with the case of Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose (41
Phil., 713). But the proper exercise of the husband's power as administrator of the
community estate supposes that he acts in good faith, and where a transfer is made upon
a fictitious consideration and for the purpose of defrauding the wife and her heirs, the
transaction is devoid of validity, not because of any lack power on the part of the husband,
but because of the inherent nature of the transaction itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Much of the oral proof submitted in this case has reference to the point whether "Tiong
Juat" was a real association in the nature of the partnership between four persons
mentioned as participants therein, or whether it was a purely artificial arrangement
conceived for the purpose of enabling its alleged members freely to make trips back and
forth to China in the character of merchants and incidentally to enable them to import
young Chinamen as members of their respective families. This proof relative to "Tiong
Juat" is of course pertinent to the question whether the sales which are under attack in
this case were made in good faith and as a result of a necessity imposed upon Sioca by the
liquidation of said association; but it does not otherwise affect the case, for it is to be
remembered here that the supposed partnership had been dissolved before the
conveyances in question were made, and all of its property had, by such dissolution,
become vested exclusively in Sioca and in his hands was community property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing exposition of the facts of the case, as we see them, renders unnecessary
any elaborate discussion of the numerous assignments of error made in this court by the
appellant, and a few words will suffice to dispose of the greater part of said errors. The
first assignment is directed to an error of the court in admitting certain testimony objected
to by the attorney for the appellants in the lower court. The objection is based upon the
relevancy of the testimony referred to; and in the analysis of the case, we have ignored
said testimony as immaterial. Its admission therefore does not constitute reversible error,
if error in any sense.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The second assignment is directed to the error of the court in refusing, over the offer
made by the appellants' attorney, to permit the introduction of certain proof concerning
the constitution of "Tiong Juat," the names of the associates who created it, and the
amount due from Sioca to the alleged partners at the time of its dissolution. We believe
that the testimony thus offered was legally relevant as bearing upon the good faith of the
subsequent sales which were made by Sioca, ad the trial judge was technically in error in
rejecting it. Nevertheless, we note that his Honor did not consistently maintain his position
with respect to the exclusion of the items of proof offered; and at a later stage of the trial
the same facts which the court had excluded, as indicated, in this assignment, were
developed from the same and other witnesses with abundant iteration. It results that
whatever error may have been committed in connection with the exclusion of the
testimony to which this assignment as directed is not reversible error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Assignments Nos. 3 to 7, inclusive, are directed to supposed errors of the court in
sustaining objections to certain testimony or in striking out evidence upon the points
mentioned in said assignments. The testimony thus ruled out is before us in the record,
and has been considered by this court for what it is believed to be worth. With respect to
the eight assignment practically the same observation may be made as noted above
concerning the second. Assignments Nos. 9 to 13, inclusive, are directed to supposed
erroneous findings of the court upon points of fact which in our opinion are either
immaterial or sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. The same is true of the
errors assigned under Nos. 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24. Assignments Nos. 15, 18
and 25 are directed to questions of law, or mixed questions of law and fact, which are
disposed of adversely to the appellants' contention as a consequence of the conclusions
stated in this opinion upon the main issues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Assignments Nos. 14 and 26 in our opinion are meritorious, and the errors therein
suggested will be pointed out, but for purposes of convenience our plan of treatment will
follow the order of the dispositive part of the appealed decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The trial judge first pronounces the several conveyances made by Sioca to Tan Po, Tan
Siu, Tan Cao, Lim Isiu, and Tiu Quim Chiu to be of no effect. The declaration of the nullity
of these instruments is correct; but it will be noted that when this declaration is taken in
relation with subsection (3) of the last paragraph of the decision, the practical effect is that
the conveyances referred to are nullified only to the extent of the one-half interest of
Geronima Uy Coque in those properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The trial judge next declares that all of the properties described in paragraphs A to G,
inclusive, of the decision, with the exception of lot No. 1 of paragraph D, is community
property of Sioca and wife. The property thus declared to be community property includes
everything that had been transferred by Sioca to his codefendants, except lot No. 1 of
paragraph D, as well as several parcels of little value which were retained by Sioca unsold;
and we are of opinion that no reversible error prejudicial to the defendants was committed
in this pronouncement. With the sole exception of lot 1 of paragraph D, everything here
declared to be community property, so far as appears, was acquired by Sioca after he
entered into marital relations with Geronima Uy Coque and the whole must be presumed
to be community property (art. 1407, Civ. Code). It is true that Sioca says that he had a
capital of P1,500 when he married Geronima, but this point cannot be considered as
established; and no question is made upon it in the appellants' brief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Concerning lot 1 of paragraph D, it appears that this property originally belonged in
common to Geronima Uy Coque and her brothers and sisters, having descended to them
from their parents. There were six of these heirs, four of whom, Juan, Geronima, Andrea
and Segundo Uy Coque, were each entitled to one-fourth of one-half and one-sixth of the
other half, and two of whom, Valentina Tingzan and Teodoro Tingzan, were entitled to one
-sixth of one-half. Now, Andrea Uy Coque, Valentina Tingzan, and Teodoro Tingzan
assigned their portions to Geronima Uy Coque, which gave her seven-twelfths, and the
other five-twelfths were purchased by Sioca. It results that, in addition to the seven-
twelfths which pertained to Geronima as her separate (paraphernal) property, she was
entitled to one-half of the remainder as her ganancial interest. The exact extent of her
participation in this lot was therefore nineteen twenty-fourths; and in declaring her to be
owner of only three-fourths (or eighteen twenty-fourths) the trial judge erred indeed, but
the error was prejudicial to the heirs of Geronima Uy Coque (who have not appealed)
rather than to the appellants. The argument submitted in this court against the correctness
of the finding that Geronima was the owner of the portion of this lot just stated is rested
manly, if not entirely, upon the supposed effects of the document Exhibit 5, by which
Geronima attempted to convey all her interest in the community property of Geronima was
not included in that transfer, it is evident that said document would, as already
demonstrated, be legally ineffective, as being in contravention of the express provisions of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant Sioca disclaims any interest whatever in the item of property noted in
subdivision 9 of paragraph F of the appealed decision and which was declared by the trial
judge to be community property, consisting of a tienda located in the barrio of Silanga,
Samar. Sioca says that this tienda belongs to Tan Suico, Suya, in partnership with Tima.
From acts of ownership exercised by Sioca with respect to this tienda it might be inferred
that it is his property and pertains to the community estate. Supposing, however, that the
Chinos mentioned by Sioca are its real owners, the judgment in this case will not be
binding upon them since they are not parties. The same observation holds good with
respect to item No. 7, a tienda in the municipality of Villareal, of which Sioca says that he
owns only one-half, the other half belonging to one Siwa. None of the parties mentioned
by Sioca as owners or coowners with him in connection with these properties have
intervened to assert their claims in this case; and the situation must be left with the
observation that as they are not parties they will not be absolutely bound by the decree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
After having made his pronouncement as to the nullity of the conveyances made by Sioca
to his codefendants and as to the ganancial character of the properties above referred to,
the trial judge proceeds to give effect to the legal consequences of his findings; and to this
end he orders Sioca and his codefendants to pay to the plaintiffs, or to administrator of
Geronima Uy Coque as their representative, the sum of P152,800, being one-half of the
proceeds of the hemp included in the sale made by Sioca to Marcelo Navas. This order is in
our opinion incorrect not only as regards the persons upon whom this obligation is placed
but as regards the amount due.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The legal effect of requiring Sioca and his codefendants to pay the sum of money
mentioned is to make all of the defendants jointly liable for said sum, whereas the liability
for this money cannot properly be extended beyond the two persons (Sioca and Marcelo
Navas) who made away with the proceeds of the hemp. There is no proof that Tan Po, Tan
Cao, Lim Isiu, and Tan Siu had anything to do with that act; and there is nothing to
indicate that there was any general conspiracy such as should make all of the defendants
equally liable for the proceeds of the hemp.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The court estimated the total value of the hemp which was on hand at the time of the sale
of the business to Marcelo Navas at P305,600, one-half of which, or P152,800, represented
the share of Geronima Uy Coque. We are of the opinion that the data contained in the
proof is not adequate to sustain this estimate in its entirety; and we think it safer to fix the
value of this hemp at the precise amounts which Sioca admits having received for it in
money, or P253,152.25. That the amount of money so received by him could not have
been less is proved not only by his admission, but by the statistics irrefutably showing that
hemp in a quantity sufficient to realize that sum, or more, was deposited in Manila or
Catbalogan at the time of the sale.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While it is undeniable that Sioca converted into money hemp of the value stated, he says
that there were debts outstanding in Manila against him to the extent of P235, 152.25 and
that as he had to pay off these debts, there was a net balance of only P18,000 for Marcelo
Navas. And this is the breath of air by which this despoiler of his wife's estate would
dissipate responsibility for this large sum of money. Not one scratch of paper, such as a
receipt or old statement of account from any creditor whatever, from which the existence
of a debt of any sort could be even remotely inferred, has been introduced in evidence. Yet
it is certain that if there had been any such debts paid off by him, he could readily have
produced documents in support of such fact. We believe him to be a fraudulent spoliator of
a large fortune against whom everything is to be presumed, in accordance with the maxim
omnia prsumuntur contra spoliatorem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A single circumstance suffices to show the purely false and artificial character of Sioca's
pretense to have paid debts to the extent claimed. It will be remembered that in the
document of July 7, 1919, executed by Sioca in favor of Marcelo Navas, the consideration
was stated to be P18,000, paid to the entire satisfaction of the vendor. Now, the hemp was
at all sold for weeks, or even months, after that document was executed, yet it will be
noted that when the sale was finally effected the hemp brought precisely such an amount
that when debts to the amount of P235,152.25 were paid off, there remained a balance of
exactly P18,000 to be returned over to the new owner. In other words it is apparent that
the amount of the supposed debts was arbitrarily fixed to tally with the consideration
stated in the prior conveyance of July 7, 1919, and this was done, oddly enough, in total
disregard of other elements of value in the property sold.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Estimating the value of the hemp, or its proceeds, at P235,152.25, the half-interest of
Sioca therein will be found to be P126,576.13, leaving an equal amount for the estate of
Geronima Uy Coque. This, and not the amount found by the trial judge, constitutes the
portion pertaining to her collateral heirs in the proceeds of the hemp, subject, however, to
the usufructuary interest of Sioca, concerning which more will be said further on in this
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Subsections 2 and 3 of the dispositive parts of the appealed decision are concerned with
the disposition of the real property involved in the litigation; and the effect of this part of
the decision is to require the defendants to surrender to the administrator of Geronima Uy
Coque three-fourths of lot 1 of paragraph D and one-half of the other parcels. A more
correct way of wording the judgment with respect to these lands would have been to
declare the collateral heirs of Geronima Uy Coque to be the owners in her right of the
portions of property indicated and to require the defendants to respect the rights of said
heirs as coowners; and in so far as the appealed decision disposes, or seems to dispose,
otherwise, it must be modified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, though the point has not been brought into discussion in the assignments of
error, it is necessary to point out that Sioca's usufructuary interest in the property which
he transferred to the several defendants undoubtedly passed to each transferee
respectively. (Art. 480, Civ. Code.) The result is that each transferee named in the several
deeds became the lawful owner of the properties conveyed in those deeds to the extent of
the one-half interest which lawfully pertained to Sioca, plus his usufructuary interest in one
-half of the remainder; and said deeds can be declared fraudulent against the plaintiffs
only in so far as relates to what is left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At this point it becomes desirable to say a few words concerning the character of the
action. The complaint states a complex cause of action, namely, first, to set aside various
conveyances as having been executed by the defendant Sioca in fraud of his wife and her
heirs; and, secondly, to compel Sioca to account for and surrender the deceased wife's
share in the community property or, as we take it, to enforce a liquidation of the
community estate. That an action in each of these aspects is maintainable goes without
saying, and there was no impropriety in joining the two in a single proceeding, as was
desirable and even necessary in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendants interposed an answer to the merits in the court below, and no objection
was there made at any time by demurrer or otherwise to the form of the proceeding.
Furthermore, no error has been assigned in this court directed to any defect either of form
or substance in the proceeding. Nevertheless it is suggested in the lengthy discussion
under assignment No. 26 that if the plaintiffs desired to call Sioca to account for the
property pertaining to his wife, they should have proceeded against him as her
administrator; and it is stated in the brief that Sioca was administrator of his wife at the
time this action was instituted. Our attention has not been called to any proof in the record
showing the fact to be as stated, but we may doubtless take judicial notice of it, as the
records of this court show, in a former proceeding that came to us upon appeal, that the
same Sioca had been removed as administrator of his wife and another person appointed
in his stead. If the defendants had desired to invoke the supposed rule of law
discapacitating the plaintiffs from maintaining this action so long as Sioca occupied the
position of administrator of his wife, the question should have been presented in their
answer. As no objection was made in the Court of First Instance to the maintenance of the
action in its aspect of a proceeding to compel the defendants to account for the deceased
wife's share in the community property, the objection will not now be entertained in this
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
But we think there is another sound and sufficient reason why it was proper for the court
to entertain the present action not only for the purpose of decreeing the nullity of the
questioned deeds but for the purpose of compelling Sioca and his codefendants to
surrender the property which had been appropriated by them. It is an accepted doctrine of
equity jurisprudence that when a court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy for one
purpose it will retain it for all purposes, to the end that the litigation may be completely
concluded. In this connection the maxim is applicable that equity does nothing by halves.
There can be no question that the court could properly take cognizance of the action in its
aspect of a proceeding to set aside the fraudulent deeds, and having thus acquired
jurisdiction over the subject-matter for that purpose, no error was committed in giving
complete relief. It is quite obvious that if the court had stopped short of the requirement
that the defendants should pay over and surrender money and property to the extent
allowed by us in the present judgment, he ends of justice would have been frustrated. A
husband who has turned spoliator of his wife's estate and who has been removed as
administrator may be required to pay over the wife's share to her legal representative and
to account for such portion thereof as he may have squandered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The preceding discussion conducts us to the point where it is necessary to confront the
practical problem presented by the existence of the usufructuary right of Sioca in the
estate of his deceased wife and the final liquidation of the estate into whose hands soever
the property may have come; and it is evident at once that the case is not now in a
condition where we can say the last word, and there are certain steps in the liquidation
which will require further proceedings in the court of origin.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As the spouses comprising the community partnership with which we are concerned left
neither ascendants not descendants, the surviving husband is, or was, entitled to one-half
of the deceased wife's property in usufruct (art. 837, Civ. Code; Sarita vs. Candia, 23 Phil.,
443). And as we have already seen, this right of the husband undoubtedly passed by his
transfer to his several codefendants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, the wife's share in the proceeds of the hemp amounts, according to our
previous computation, to the sum of P126,576.13. One-half of this amount is P63,288.06,
which represents the unencumbered portion pertaining to the collateral heirs, the plaintiffs
in this action, and which should be immediately paid by Sioca and his codefendant Navas
to the administrator of the deceased wife. If not duly paid, execution therefor should be
issued jointly and severally against these two only.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the remaining sum of P63,288.06, which pertained to Sioca in usufruct, the plaintiffs
are in law entitled to the capital, subject to the usufructuary right now vested in Marcelo
Navas. A specific portion of said sum should either be fixed, as representing the shares of
the respective parties, or other adjustment should be attained compatible with the
purposes contemplated by the law; but in any event the parties are privileged, under
article 838 of the Civil Code, to come to an amicable agreement, if they see fit, in default
of which the adjustment will be made by judicial decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Again, the various defendants (except Sioca) who assert title to different pieces of real
property conveyed by him to them respectively likewise acquired his usufructuary interest
in said respective parcels, in addition to the undivided half that pertained to Sioca as
member of the community partnership. It is impossible for us in the present state of the
case to determine the value of said usufructuary interest or to assign any specific piece of
property to any of said claimants in satisfaction thereof. This problem therefore also
remains for future solution in the ultimate liquidation of the whole estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
By way of abbreviation of the foregoing, it is our judgment: (1) That the deeds Exhibits A
to f, inclusive, whose validity have been impugned in this cause, were properly declared
void by the trial court, as having been made in evident fraud of the rights of the plaintiffs
as collateral heirs of Geronima Uy Coque; (2) that the defendants Juan Navas L. Sioca and
Marcelo Navas (Tiu Quim Chiu) are jointly and severally liable for the sum of P63,288.06,
which they are required to pay to the representative of Geronima Uy Coque, and in default
thereof execution for said sum may issue jointly and severally against them in due course;
(3) that the defendant Marcelo Navas (Tiu Quim Chiu) is entitled to the usufructuary right
of Juan Navas L. Sioca in another equal sum of P63,288.06, the corpus, or capital, of
which belongs to the plaintiffs; (4) That the various transferees mentioned in the deeds
Exhibits A, B, C, E and F severally acquired by those deeds an undivided one-half interest
in the several properties therein conveyed, plus the usufructuary right of Juan Navas L.
Sioca therein, and that Lim Isiu, as transferee in the deed Exhibit D, thereby acquired an
undivided one-eighth interest in the property therein conveyed, plus the usufructuary right
of Juan Navas L. Sioca in the whole; and, finally, that the remaining interest in each of
said properties belongs to the plaintiffs; (5) that the cause be remanded for further
proceedings in which the usufructuary interest will be determined and division of the
properties in question effected in conformity with the law and consistently with the
principles settled in this decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, affirming the appealed decision in so far as the same is in harmony herewith
and reversing the same in so far as the sane is inconsistent herewith, the cause is
remanded for execution and further proceedings, without special pronouncement as to
costs of this instance. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

JOHNS, J ., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library
The majority opinion is learned and exhaustive, and, yet, upon the important questions, I
think it is fundamentally wrong.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts leading up to, and surrounding, the execution of what is known in the record as
Exhibit 15, executed March 11, 1918, are well stated, and there is no question as to its
authenticity. It reads as follows:
I, Geronima Uy Coque, wife of the Christian Chinaman Juan Navas Sioca, both
residents of the municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, P.I., and his
legitimate heir of all the property acquired or to be acquired during his marriage:
Be it known by these presents that I convey and transfer one-half of the interest
I may have in the aforesaid property to my aforesaid husband Juan Navas Sioca,
who may dispose as absolute owner of all said property, whether personal or
real, and of the business in which he is engaged, and he may exercise his right
to transfer the same to other persons and make its distribution among his
children as he pleases. Be it also known that I stand responsible to my said
husband Juan Navas Sioca, his heirs and successors in interest for all the
aforesaid property which corresponds to me by inheritance, the title to which I
bind myself to defend now and forever against all lawful claims that may be
presented.
It is also true that at the time it was executed, neither Geronima Uy Coque nor Juan Navas
Sioca had any children, and that any property which either of them then had was largely
the result of their combined efforts as husband and wife. It is also true that they lived
together as husband and wife for some little time after Exhibit 15 was executed, and that
any and all conveyances to any of the other defendants, of which the plaintiffs now
complain, were made by Juan Navas Sioca during the lifetime of Geronima Uy Coque, and
that she must have known and been fully advised of the nature of every one of the
transactions which her husband made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In legal effect, the majority opinion finds as a fact, which is true, that the defendants to
whom the conveyances and transfers were made by Juan Navas Sioca had been raised and
treated by the husband and wife as their own children, and to all intents and purposes,
they recognized and dealt with them as such. They took them in their own home, educated
and trained them in their business, and clearly indicated by their treatmen and conduct
that it was the purpose and intent of the husband and wife that the boys, whom they had
raised and educated, should succeed them in the business which had grown and become
established with their aid and assistance. It was in this situation and under such conditions
that Exhibit 15 was executed by Geronima Uy Coque, now deceased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is contended, and the majority opinion holds, that Exhibit 15 is void under article 1334
of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
All donations between spouses made during the marriage shall be void.
That depends upon the construction which is placed upon the exhibit. It should be
construed with reference to the surrounding facts and circumstances, and the conditions
under which it was executed. The instrument was signed by Geronima Uy Coque in the
presence of two witnesses, and was duly acknowledged before a notary public. There is no
claim or pretense that she signed it through any fraud or undue influence, or that she did
not know or understand the nature and contents of the instrument.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The transfers and conveyances of which plaintiffs now complain were all made immediately
after the execution of Exhibit 15 and during the lifetime of Geronima Uy Coque, and
presumably with her knowledge and consent, as the record shows that after the execution
of the instrument, she continued to live in the house with Juan Navas Sioca up to the time
of her death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For aught that appears in the record, they shared each other's marital secrets and enjoyed
each other's confidence and respect. Based upon such undisputed facts, Exhibit 15 is more
in the nature of a power-of-attorney from the deceased to her husband, and it empowered
and authorized him to do exactly what he did do. In other words, the conveyances, which
were made by the husband through and under Exhibit 15, were, in legal effect, the joint
conveyances of husband and wife, and were made with the knowledge, consent, approval
of the wife. In the very nature of things, both of them wanted and would naturally prefer
that their joint property should go and descend to the boys whom they had raised and
educated in their own home, and who had aided and assisted them in the establishing and
conduct of the business, in preference to unknown and collateral heirs of whom they had
never seen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In other words, Exhibit 15, was executed by the deceased wife to her husband to enable
him to transfer their joint property to the boys whom they had raised and educated, and to
authorize him to do the identical thing which he did do, and it should not be construed as a
donation between spouses under article 1334 of the Civil Code. It should rather be
construed as a power-of-attorney or a conveyance in trust for certain specific purposes
which were carried out and perfected by the husband in the manner understood and
agreed upon between him and his wife in her lifetime. That is a reasonable construction
and gives legal force and effect to that portion of Exhibit 15, which reads: "And makes its
distribution among his children as he pleases," which would otherwise be a nullity, for the
simple reason that neither the husband nor the wife ever had any children, unless the
defendants here should be deemed and treated as their children.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The stubborn fact remains that Exhibit 15, was executed by the wife, and that by virtue of
it, the transfers were made by the husband to the defendants, and that they were made
during the lifetime of the wife and under conditions which clearly imply that they were
made with her knowledge and consent. If so, there was not and could not be any fraud in
the sales or transfers, and the wife would be estopped to defeat or set them aside. If she
would be estopped to set them aside, with much stronger reason her collateral heirs
should be estopped.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is said that the conveyances were fraudulent. How and in what way were they
fraudulent? Who was defrauded, and by whom was the fraud committed? The alleged acts
were committed during the lifetime of the wife and with her apparent knowledge, consent
and approval. There is no claim or pretense that it was a fraud upon her or her rights. If
not, how could it be a fraud upon her collateral heirs and unknown kindred, who now seek
to set aside and annul settlements of property rights, which were made by the deceased
wife, through whom plaintiffs now claim title as her collateral heirs? Who has been
defrauded? When and by whom was the fraud committed? The real fraud in this case is on
the part of the plaintiffs, who seek to set aside and annul settlements of property rights,
which were made to carry out the wishes and respects of the living to dispose of their
property to the four boys whom they had raised and educated in their own home which
was made in preference to unknown and collateral heirs. Suppose, as the majority opinion
finds, the sales and transfers were made for an inadequate consideration, who was
defrauded? The husband, who made the conveyances, was at the time the owner of one-
half of the property conveyed, and his wife then living was the owner of the other half, and
Exhibit 15 expressly recites that it was made, so that the husband could make the
disposition of the property "among his children as he pleases," who must be construed as
the defendants in this action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Legally speaking, he made a disposition of the joint property not only among his children
as he pleased, but he made it among his children as pleased his wife, who authorized him
to make the distributions and transfers to the four boys whom they deemed and treated as
their children.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence is conclusive, and the defendant Sioca admits, that he received P235,152.25
from the sale of hemp, and the majority opinion finds that is the base of his liability. It
ignores and overlooks the fact that under oath Sioca testified that he used all of the money
to pay the debts of the business, and that his testimony upon that point is not disputed or
denied. In the absence of any proof, the majority opinion holds that, because he did not
give a list of the creditors, his testimony is false and unworthy of belief. That is a novel
principle of law. When Sioca testified that he used that amount of money with which to pay
the debts, he was under oath, and that would be at least prima facie evidence of the truth
of his statement. The burden would then devolve upon the plaintiffs to show that Sioca's
testimony was false, and on cross-examination they would have a right to have him testify
as to whom he paid the money, and when it was paid and for what it was paid, and to
require him to furnish a list of the creditors, and a detailed statement of all the facts. This
was not done. Plaintiffs did not cross-examine Sioca upon that point, and because he was
not cross-examined and his testimony is not disputed in the record, that majority opinion
holds that the evidence as to the amount of money which Sioca received is true, but as to
the amount of the debts, it is false and unworthy of belief. That is truly a novel legal
principle, and, yet, the whole majority opinion is founded upon that legal principle.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We have been taught, and the authorities hold, that where a witness testifies to a fact,
which is not disputed or denied, that it is at least prima facie evidence of the truth of that
fact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Again, the record shows that there has never been any administration of the partnership
estate of the deceased wife, and that he husband is still living and a defendant in this
action. As the surviving husband of the conjugal estate, and under numerous decisions of
this court, he is legally entitled to the possession and control of the partnership estate
pending a settlement of the affairs of the partnership even as against the administrator of
the estate. Yet, in the face of those decisions, a personal judgment is rendered against the
surviving husband for the value of the property without any administration, or even an
attempt to have an administrator appointed for the estate of his deceased wife. In such
and administration, the debts, if any, of the deceased would be paid out of the assets of
the estate, after which a final distribution would be made among the legal heirs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In re Estate of Amancio (13 Phil., 297), this court held:
"The husband is by law the manager of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 1412,
Civil Code.) His debts, contracted during marriage, are its debts. (Art. 1408.)
Upon the death of the wife he becomes the surviving partner, and we do not
doubt that he is the person called upon to settle the affairs of the partnership. It
could not have been intended that, upon the death of the wife, leaving the
husband surviving, the property which the husband had administered and in
which he was directly interested, should be taken out of his hands and delivered
over to an administrator appointed in proceedings for the settlement of his wife's
estate, and we hold that, where a conjugal partnership is dissolved by the death
of the wife, the surviving husband is the administrator of the affairs of the
conjugal partnership until they are finally settled and liquidated."
For the purpose of settling the affairs of a dissolved partnership the surviving husband is
entitled to the possession not only of all the property belonging to the partnership, but
also to the bienes parafernales of the wife.
. . . The proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the wife could not be
terminated until the husband had liquidated the affairs of the partnership and
delivered to the administrator of the wife's estate the part belonging to it, all in
accordance with articles 1418 to 1426 of the Civil Code, and section 685 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
This decision has been followed and approved in 17 Phil., 479;
1
31 Phil., 157;
2
40 Phil.,
569;
3
and 41 Phil., 717.
4
Yet, in the face of those decisions a personal judgment is
rendered here against the surviving husband for the full value of the estate of the
deceased wife, and without an administration of her estate, and which, in legal effect,
deprives him of his right "to the possession of the property of the conjugal partnership
until he has liquidated its affairs." If, as the above authorities hold, the surviving husband
is entitled to the control and possession of the partnership estate pending a final
settlement by him of the business of the partnership, even as against the administrator of
the estate of the deceased partner, how and upon what legal principle can the collateral
heirs of the deceased partner maintain an action against the surviving partner to recover
the value of the estate of the deceased partner and obtain a money judgment therefore
until such time as there has been a settlement of the partnership affairs and an
administration of the estate of the deceased partner, or at least a demand and a petition
therefor? The majority opinion deprives the surviving husband of that legal right, and
takes the estate of the deceased partner out of the jurisdiction of the probate court, and
gives it to the collateral heirs of the deceased partner before the surviving partner has
settled the business of the partnership, or even the filing of a petition to have an
administrator appointed for the estate of the deceased partner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The legal right, if any, of the plaintiffs should be confined and limited to their respective
interests in the property of the deceased wife after there has been a full, final, and
complete settlement of the conjugal partnership, and an administration of the estate of the
deceased wife. Until that is done, plaintiffs ought not to have a cause of action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Our contention is very much strengthened by section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides that after payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, and the allowances, if any, made for the expense of maintenance of the
family of the deceased, the court shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons
entitled to the same, and in its order shall name the persons and proportions, to which
each is entitled, and "such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession," and
section 754, which provides: "But the heirs, devisees, or legatees, shall not be entitled to
an order for their share, until the payment of the debts and allowances mentioned in the
preceding section, etc., unless they give a bond with such surety or sureties as the court
directs, to secure the payment of such debts, expenses or allowances," etc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
These are plain statutory provisions. There is no claim or pretense that the plaintiffs have
even attempted to comply with either one of them. Yet, the majority opinion gives them,
as collateral heirs, a personal judgment against the surviving partner for the full par value
of the estate of the deceased partner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For all of such reasons, I dissent.
Johnsons, J., concurs.

Endnotes:
1
By resolution of December 29, 1922.
JOHNS, J., dissenting:
1
Rojas vs. Singson Tongson.
2
Sochayseng vs. Trujillo.
3
Molera vs. Molera.
4
Nable Jose vs. Nable Jose.

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