FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 33592. March 31, 1931.]

Estate of the deceased Victorina Villaranda. EUSEBIA
LIM, petitioner-appellant, vs. JULIANA CHINCO,oppositor-appellee.
Perfecto Gabriel and Eusebio Orense for appellant.
Camus & Delgado for appellee.
1.WILLS; LACK OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY; COMA RESULTING FROM
CEREBRAL HEMORRHAGE. The alleged testatrix, a woman of about 80 years of age,
was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was kept prostrate
in bed, in a state of coma, for three days, at the end of which she was removed to a
hospital where she died four days later. Just before her removal to the hospital a will
was made for her by an attorney, who also signed her name thereto, purportedly at
her request. At the time the will was made the proof showed that the testatrix was in
a comatose condition and devoid of the power of articulate speech. Held, that
testamentary capacity was lacking and that the purported will was not valid.
STREET, J p:
This is a contest over the probable of a paper writing purporting to be the
will of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, a former resident of the municipality of
Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, who died in the Hospital of San Juan de Dios, in the
City of Manila, on June 9, 1929. The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and
the document produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of
properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to three collateral relatives,
Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This instrument was offered for
probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the instrument as executrix. Opposition was made
by Juliana Chinco, a full sister of the deceased. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
sustained the opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that the testatrix did
not have testamentary capacity at the time the instrument purports to have been
executed by her. From this judgment the proponent of the will appealed.
The deceased was a resident of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, and was
about 80 years of age at the time of her death. On the morning of June 2, 1929, she
was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral hemorrhage, and was taken in an
unconscious condition, seated in a chair, to her room. Doctor Geronimo Z. Gaanan, a
local physician of Meycauayan, visited the old lady, with whom he was well
acquainted, three or four times, the first visit having occurred between 6 and 7 p.m. of
June 3d. Upon examining the patient, he found her insensible and incapable of talking
or controlling her movements. On the same day the parish priest called for the
purpose of administering the last rites of the church, and being unable to take her
confession, he limited himself to performing the office of extreme unction. Doctor
Isidoro Lim, of Manila, was also called upon to visit the patient and he came to see her
two or three times. With his approval, it was decided to take the woman to the
hospital of San Juan de Dios in Manila, and on the morning of June 5, 1929, the
ambulance from this hospital arrived, in charge of Doctor Guillermo Lopez del Castillo,
a resident physician of the hospital. At about 11 o'clock a.m. on that day she was
embarked on the ambulance and taken to the hospital, where she died four days later.
The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was prepared by
Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila, whose wife appears to be related to
the chief beneficiaries named in the will. This gentleman arrived upon the scene at 9
or 10 o'clock on the forenoon of June 5, 1929. After informing himself of the condition
of the testatrix, he went into a room adjacent to that occupied by the patient and,
taking a sheet from an exercise book, wrote the instrument in question. He then took
it into the sick room for execution. With this end in view Gabriel suggested to Doctor
Lopez del Castillo that he would be pleased to have Doctor Castillo sign as a witness,
but the latter excused himself for the reason that he considered the old lady to be
lacking in testamentary capacity. Another person present was Marcos Ira, a first
cousin of the deceased and attorney Gabriel asked him also whether or not he was
willing to sign as one of the witnesses. Ira replied in a discouraging tone, and the
attorney turned away without pressing the matter. In the end three persons served as
witnesses, and two relatives of his wife. The intended testatrix was not able to affix
her signature to the document, and it was signed for her by the attorney.
The vital question in the case is whether the supposed testatrix had
testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to was signed. Upon this point
we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that she had not. The proof shows by a
marked preponderance that the deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a
comatose condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act. The
testimony of Doctor Gaanan and Doctor Lopez del Castillo is sufficient upon this point,
and this testimony is well corroborated by Paciana Diaz and Irene Ahorro. The first of
these witnesses was the one who chiefly cared for the deceased during her last illness
in Meycauayan until she was carried away to the hospital in Manila; and the second
was a neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of apoplexy first occurred and who
visited the patient daily until she was removed from Meycauayan.
The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the patient
was in a continuous state of coma during the entire period of her stay in Meycauayan,
subsequent to the attack, and that on the forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have
sufficient command of her faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the
physician from Manila, testified for the proponent of the will. His testimony tends to
show that the patient was not suffering from cerebral hemorrhage but from uraemic
trouble, and that, after the first attack, the patient was much relieved and her mind so
far cleared up that she might have made a will on the morning of June 5th. The
attorney testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased when the will
was made, and that he read the instrument over to her clause by clause and asked her
whether it expressed her wishes. He says that she made signs that enabled him to
understand that she concurred in what was written. But it is clear, even upon the
statement of this witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech.
Upon the authority of Perry vs. Elio (29 Phil., 134), the paper offered for probate was
properly disallowed.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so ordered,
with costs against the appellant.
Avancea, C. J., Johnson, Villamor and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Malcolm and Johns, JJ., concurred, but being absent at the date of the
promulgation of the opinion, their names do not appear signed thereto.
AVANCEA, C. J.
Separate Opinions
ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting:
I am of opinion that the will in question is genuine and that it was drawn up
and signed with all the legal requisites; therefore, I vote for its allowance, and the
consequent reversal of the judgment appealed from.
||| (Lim v. Chinco, G.R. No. 33592, March 31, 1931)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5263. February 17, 1954.]
1. WILLS; PROBATE; SIGNING IN THE PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND
AGUSTIN BARRERA, ET AL., proponents-appellants, vs. JOSE
TAMPOCO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Jesus G. Barrera for appellants.
Filemon Cajator for appellees.
1.WILLS; PROBATE; SIGNING IN THE PRESENCE OF TESTATOR AND
ATTESTING WITNESSES; CONFLICT IN TESTIMONY OF ATTESTING WITNESSES. Two
attesting witnesses testified that the will was signed by the testatrix and by the three
attesting witnesses in the presence of each other, while the other attesting witness
testified to the contrary. The court gave weight to the testimony of the first two one
of whom is an attorney and justice of the peace who drafted the will, the court also
considering the fact that the witness who testified against the due execution of the
will, signed the attestation clause stating that the will was signed by the testatrix and
the witnesses in the presence of each other.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIVES OF BENEFICIARIES AS ATTESTING WITNESSES.
The fact that the witnesses to the execution of the will are related to some of the
beneficiaries thereunder, is not sufficient to make them biased witnesses.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; READING OF WILL NOT NECESSARY. It is not necessary that
the will be read upon its signing and in the presence of the witnesses.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; OMISSION OF SOME RELATIVES AS BENEFICIARIES DOES NOT
AFFECT DUE EXECUTION OF WILL. The court did not attempt to discover the
motives of the testatrix in leaving her properties to the person named in the will and
admitting therefrom the oppositors. As the will was found to have been executed free
from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with the testatrix having
testamentary capacity, the court was compelled to give expression thereto.
PARAS, J p:
Oliva Villapaa died in Tarlac, Tarlac, on December 13, 1948. On December
31, 1948, a petition was filed by Agustin Parrera in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
for the probate of the will executed by Oliva Villapaa on July 17, 1948, and for the
appointment of the petitioner as executor. According to the petition the properties
left by the testatrix are worth P94,852.96, and the heirs instituted are nephews and
nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. Jose Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco,
alleged grandchildren of the testatrix in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming
that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law, that the testratrix
lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence and pressure in its
execution, that the signature of Oliva Villapaa was obtained by fraud and trickery,
and that the testamentary provisions are illegal. Consorcia Lintang, Nemesio Villapaa,
Marcos Villapaa, Jesus Villapaa, Vicente Villapaa, Ursulo Villapaa, Avelina
Villapaa and Rosario Villapaa, alleged nephews and nieces, also filed an opposition
on substantially the same grounds on which the opposition of Jose and Victoriano
Tampoco was based. After protracted trial, and more than a year after the submission
of the case, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on August
11, 1951, disallowing the will. The court found that Oliva Villapaa had testamentary
capacity, that there was no forgery, fraud, trickery or undue influence in the execution
of the will, and that preterition of forced heirs is not a ground for denying probate;
but the will was disallowed because it was not the personal last will and testament of
the deceased and it was not based on the finding that Oliva Villapaa did not furnish
the names of the persons instituted as heirs and that the will was not read to her
before she signed it. The second ground is premised on the conclusion that attesting
witness Laureano Antonio was not present when Oliva Villapaa and attesting witness
Honorio Lacson signed the will; that Antonio only partially saw the signing by attesting
witness Modesto Puno; and that Oliva Villapaa saw Antonio sign only two or three
times. From this decision the petitioner has appealed.
According to appellant's evidence, two or three days before July 10, 1948,
Pilar Taedo called on Modesto Puno, a lawyer and justice of the peace of
Concepcion, Tarlac, and requested the latter to come to Manila for a conference with
Oliva Villapaa, aunt of Pilar. On July 10, 1948, Atty. Puno, complying with this
request, went to the house of Pilar Taedo in Singalong Street where Oliva was
staying. The latter, after preliminary greetings and courtesies, informed Atty. Puno
that she wanted him to prepare her will, giving the names of the heirs and the
properties to be left. Oliva Villapaa asked Atty. Puno to get the description of the
properties from the herein appellant, Agustin Barrera, husband of Pilar Taedo. Atty.
Puno noted the wishes of Oliva, and, as there was then no available typewriter, he
informed the old woman that he would prepare the will in his office in Concepcion
and come back with it on the following Saturday. As promised, on or July 17, 1948,
Atty. Puno returned to the house of Oliva Villapaa in Singalong, carrying with him
one original and three copies, in typewritten form, of the will he drafted in accordance
with the instructions of Oliva Villapaa. Atty. Puno arrived at about noon. He read the
will to Oliva to find out whether it conformed to her wishes, and she indicated that it
was all right. After lunch Atty. Puno manifested that two other witnesses were
necessary, whereupon Pilar Taedo requested Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio,
who were then living in the first floor of the house, to come up. Lacson and Antonio
did as requested. Asked by Oliva Villapaa if they could act as attesting witnesses to
her will, both agreed. Oliva Villapaa, Atty. Puno, Lacson and Antonio were then
seated around a small rectangular table in the sala, and at this juncture Atty. Puno
gave a copy of the will to Oliva, Lacson and Antonio, while he retained one. The
attorney again read the will aloud, advising the rest to check their respective copies.
As Oliva Villapaa agreed to the will, she proceeded to sign all the four copies, on the
lines previously placed by Atty. Puno, followed successively by Lacson, Atty. Puno and
Antonio, all in the presence of each other. After the signing, Atty. Puno gave the
original and a copv to Oliva, and retained the other two copies. Atty. Puno, Lacson and
Antonio stayed for a while and even ate merienda prepared by the sisters Pilar and
Beatriz Taedo. Oliva Villapaa delivered her will to Agustin Barrera for safekeeping
on October 17, 1948 when she was taken to the U. S. T. Hospital where she remained
until November 7, 1948. On this date her doctors lost all hope for her recovery and
Oliva Villapaa was brought to Tarlac, Tarlac, her home town, where, as already
stated, she died on December 13, 1948.
According to the evidence for the oppositors-appellees, the will presented in
court by the petitioner was not executed in accordance with law, in that attesting
witness Laureano Antonio did not see the testatrix and attesting witness Lacson sign
the will or any of its copies, that he saw Atty. Puno when the latter was already half
thru signing the document, and that the testatrix did not see Antonio sign all the
copies.
After a thorough study of the record and mature reflection on the conflicting
evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the trial court erred in denying probate
of the will.
Of the three attesting witnesses, namely, Atty. Modesto Puno, Honorio
Lacson and Laureano Antonio, the first two testified positively that the will was signed
by the testatrix and the three witnesses in the presence of each other, and that it was
read to the testratrix before being signed. In view of the opposition filed by the two
sets of oppositors, the third attesting witness, Laureano Antonio, had to be presented
by the petitioner but, contrary to expectations, Antonio testified that he arrived at the
scene of the execution of the will after the testatrix and Honorio Lacson had already
signed and after Atty. Puno was half through affixing his signatures, and that the
testatrix left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. By numerical superiority
alone, the weight of the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson out-balances the
probative value of the testimony of Laureano Antonio. Intrinsically, we cannot state
that Laureano Antonio spoke the truth on the witness stand, since, in the first place,
the attestation clause signed by him contradicts his pretense and, in the second place,
there is enough evidence on the record to show that in his conferences with Atty.
Barrera before taking the witness stand, Antonio never gave the slightest indication
that he was not present when the testatrix and the other witnesses signed the will or
that the testatrix left before Antonio finished signing. Modesto Puno is a lawyer and at
the time a justice of the peace, and it is improbable that he would unnecessarily risk
his honor and reputation. Indeed, the trial court gave the impression that Atty. Puno
was anxious to strictly meet the requirements of the law and in the absence, as in the
case at bar, of any reason for a hasty completion, we do not believe that Atty. Puno
would have allowed the signing of the will to be proceeded with unless three attesting
witnesses were already present. On the other hand, we can fairly state that there was
in fact no hurry on the part of any of the participants in the will, because the testatrix
Oliva Villapaa was not dying (she died some five months after the execution of the
will) and the parties could therefore take all the time that they wanted. Indeed, none
of the three witnesses, left the house of Oliva Villapaa and they even stayed therein
until after merienda time.
The fact that Atty. Puno is the brother of Jose Puno who is the husband of
Carmen Taedo, one of the beneficiaries of the will, and that Honorio Lacson is the
husband of Bibiana Lacson who is a first cousin of Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner
and husband of Pilar Taedo, is not sufficient to make them biased witnesses. If Atty.
Puno had any material interest, this fact should have caused him to be more careful in
seeing to it that the formalities of the law were strictly complied with, and this should
be true with respect to Honorio Lacson.

In deciding against the probate of the will, the trial court believed the
testimony of Laureano Antonio to the effect that he arrived at the place of the signing
at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and thereby found that a greater part of the
proceeding was finished, because Atty. Puno declared in one place that "the signing of
the testament commenced around between one o'clock and two o'clock" and in
another place that the signing took place "around between two and three o'clock;"
and Honorio Lacson declared that he was called by Pilar Taedo to act as witness at
around two o'clock or two thirty. From the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio
Lacson the court concluded that the signing actually commenced between one and
two o'clock. We are of the opinion that the specification of the time of the signing
refers to an immaterial or unimportant detail which, in view of the lapse of time,
might have been a mistake by one or the other participant in the execution of Oliva's
will. What is important and decisive and this should be impressed in the mind of an
attorney preparing and taking charge of the signing of will, is that the testatrix and
each of the three attesting witnesses must affix their signatures in the presence of one
another. In the case before us, Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson both attesting
witnesses, categorically affirmed that this procedure was followed. At any rate, even
under the testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, the signing could have taken
place at about or after two thirty, since the former declared that it took place
between two and three o'clock and Honorio Lacson stated that the time was two or
two thirty.
Another point invoked by the trial court against the probate of the will is the
circumstance that, while Atty. Puno testified that he placed the lines on which the
testatrix and the witnesses were to sign before he read the document to the testatrix
to whom he gave the original, witness Lacson testified that Atty. Puno read the
original after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reading Atty. Puno placed the
lines for signatures. This discrepancy again refers to a minor detail which is not
sufficient to negative the truthfulness of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson on the main
and important fact that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three attesting
witnesses in the presence of each other.
Oppositors-appellees presented in corroboration of the testimony of
Laureano Antonio, Joaquin Villapaa and Consolacion del Mundo. Joaquin Villapaa, a
painter, allegedly painted the house of Agustin Barrera in July, 1948 and saw the
execution of the will. Consolacion del Mundo allegedly was then the maid of Oliva
Villapaa. Apart from the fact that there is evidence to show that both Joaquin
Villapaa and Consolacion del Mundo were not yet employed in the house of Oliva
when the latter's will was executed, there is little or no reason for their version to
prevail over the positive testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, considering that
the latter's testimony is even corroborated by two other witnesses, Bibiana Lacson
and Beatriz Taedo. Certainly the story of Joaquin Villapaa and Consolacion del
Mundo can have no greater weight than that of Laureano Antonio.
In holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaa, the trial court found
that it was not read to her; and this finding was premised on the alleged contradiction
of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson regarding the sequence of the reading of the will
and the placing of lines for signatures, and regarding the question whether a copy or
the original was handed to the testatrix. As we have already observed, the discrepancy
relates to an insignificant matter which cannot vitally detract from the credibility of
Atty. Puno to the effect that upon arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaa at about
noon, he read the will to her with a view to finding whether she was agreeable
thereto. It is not necessary that said will be read upon its signing and in the presence
of the witnesses.
The trial court also concluded that the testatrix could not have furnished the
names of the heirs instituted under the will, because (1) Salvador Taedo, one of such
heirs, was long dead and (2) Marcelo Villapaa, another instituted heir, was non-
existent, since Oliva Villapaa did not have a grandson by such name. It is true that
Salvador Taedo was already dead and the testatrix knew about it, but it is not
uncommon for a woman of old age, confused by the big number of her relatives, to
commit the mistake of unwittingly mentioning a dead one. With respect to the
instituted heir, Marcelo Villapaa, while it appears that Oliva did not have a grandson
answering to that name, there is evidence tending to show that Pioquinto Villapaa, a
child of Ruperta Pineda, must have been referred to, because Oliva, who was the
child's god-mother, originally wanted said child to be baptized as Marcelo, after his
father. Moreover, if Atty. Puno had supplied the names instituted as heirs, he would
have consulted all the interested parties and would be sure that no mistake of the
kind was made.
As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of Oliva
Villapaa in leaving her properties to the person named in the will, and omitting
therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to state that the trial court itself found
the will to have been executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue
influence, with Oliva having testamentary capacity; and in such a situation it becomes
our duty to give expression to her will.
Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by Oliva
Villapaa on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed. So ordered without costs.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
||| (Barrera v. Tampoco, G.R. No. L-5263, February 17, 1954)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76648. February 26, 1988.]
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-
SANSON, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F.
HERNANDEZ, respondents.
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; NEW TRIAL; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE AND
AFFIDAVITS OF MERIT; REQUIREMENTS UNDER RULE 53 NOT COMPLIED WITH. Said
motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The
lone affidavit of a witness who was already presented during the hearing is hardly sufficient
to justify the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any
certainty as to their appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief
that they would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the
allegations in the affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the testatrix are mere
conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must state facts and not
mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. The affidavits are required to
avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be immaterial
or of any evidentiary weight. Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be
presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the
allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the witnesses were exerted only after the
decision of the appellate court was handed down. The trial lasted for about four years so
that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were admittedly known
to her. The evidence which the petitioner now proposes to present could have been
discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason
for concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been
able to discover said evidence.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR PURPOSE OF DELAYING PROCEEDINGS, PRO-FORMA. It is
very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of
delaying the proceedings. In fact, petitioner's son in his manifestation admitted that he had
to request a new law firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the
filing of a motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. This would explain the
haphazard preparation of the motion, thus failing to comply with the requirements of Rule
53, which was filed on the last day of the reglementary period of appeal so that the
veracity of the ground relied upon is questionable. The appellate court correctly denied the
motion for new trial.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RUNNING OF PERIOD OF APPEAL, NOT INTERRUPTED. The motion for
new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period for appeal. Since
petitioner's motion was filed on September 24, 1986, the fifteenth or last day of the period
to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the following day,
September 25. And when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October
30, 1986, it was obviously filed out of time.
4.ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; FINALITY THEREOF RENDERED FINDINGS OF PROBATE
COURT CONCLUSIVE AND NO LONGER SUBJECT TO REVIEW. Since the questioned
decision has already become final and executory, it is no longer within the province of this
Court to review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due execution
of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now conclusive.
5.ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE PROBATE COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS,
CONCLUSIVE. The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the
will in question was executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive
on the Supreme Court when supported by evidence. We have examined the records of this
case and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the
contested will was duly executed in accordance with law.
6.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; PRETERITION, JUSTIFIED. Petitioner alleges that her exclusion
from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason, being the only surviving
sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus demonstrating
the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix. In the case of Pecon v. Coronel, it was held
"The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly knit and
that the exclusion of a relative from one's estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the
ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of
preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to dispose of one's
estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force
in the Philippines since 1889 . . . " Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has
no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any
person having capacity to succeed. It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her
only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of
Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for
petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son Francis was instituted as an heir in the contested
will.
7.ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO DISPOSE ALL PROPERTIES, NOT AN INDICATION OF UNSOUNDNESS
OF MIND. Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix
failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind. We
cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides "A will shall be
valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should
not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept
the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed. In such cases, the testamentary
dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the
estate shall pass to the legal heirs." Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix
disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an
indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of
shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.
8.ID.; ID.; INSTITUTION OF BLOOD RELATIVES AS HEIRS, NOT AN INDICATION OF UNDUE
INFLUENCE. Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than
compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is
the testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might
as well die intestate.
9.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ALLEGATION OF UNDUE INFLUENCE MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. The contention of the petitioner that the will
was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the
will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not enough that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have been exercised.
The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial
evidence that it was actually exercised.
10.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILL ITSELF, MOST AUTHENTIC PROOF OF TESTATOR'S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY. Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the
respondent court "There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject
Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that deceased had testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself.
GANCAYCO, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 promulgated August 29, 1986 affirming in totothe decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXII 2 dated March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the holographic
will marked in evidence as Exhibit "H" as one wholly written, dated,
and signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola in accordance with
law while in possession of full testamentary capacity, and allowing
and admitting the same to probate.
"Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to
the executor, Eduardo F. Hernandez, as well as the certificate of
probate prescribed under Section 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED." 3
This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on
April 22, 1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking
the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on January 28,
1980. 4 The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless on March 29, 1981 at the
age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29, 1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent
motion for appointment of special administrator. 5 With the conformity of all the relatives
and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5,
1981 6 appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of
deceased.
On June 29, 1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the
deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to Probate of
Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by
the testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was
not in full possession of her mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue
influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries
named in the will; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the remainder of the
estate.

After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support
of the petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the
probate of the disputed will.
Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the decision. 8
On September 24, 1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new
trial. 9 Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson,
petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed
light as to the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the latter.
The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, 10 denied the motion for new
trial of petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of Merit attached to the
motion alleged that efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the
court's decision was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed
light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the undue influence exerted on
her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since these facts were brought to light
during the trial.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986 11 was likewise
denied by the appellate court in its resolution of November 20, 1986 12 on the ground that
the affidavit of one Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative
evidence and the motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration which is
prescribed by law.
In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following errors:
"I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND
THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE PRESENTED IS MERELY
CUMULATIVE.
II
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE
AFORESAID MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
III
AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN,
DATED AND SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA.
IV
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
WILL WAS FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS
ACTUAL DATE OF EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT FROM
PROBABLE DISPUTES AS TO THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY
ON THE PART OF THE ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT THE TIME OF
ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION.
V
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE
HERMINIA MONTINOLA WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE
PRESSURE AND IMPROPER IMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART OF
THOSE STANDING TO BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED WILL.
VI
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL IN QUESTION TO PROBATE."
In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3, 1986, was substituted by
her heirs.
In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred
in denying the motion for new trial insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented
is not merely corroborative or cumulative.
On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial
was a pro-forma motion because it was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules
of Court. We find merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 53 provides
"Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals
becomes executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the
ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the Court below by the exercise of the
diligence and which is of such a character as would probably change
the result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing
the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered
evidence."
The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson alleged the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"3.That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted
efforts to locate witnesses whose whereabouts were not known to
us during the trial in the lower court, but I have finally succeeded in
tracking them down;
"4.That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case, law
convinced that they would testify under proper subpoena for
purposes of shedding light on the fact that the testatrix was gravely
ill at or about the time that the questioned will was allegedly
executed;
"5.That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances
under which the purported will was executed; and that they know
for a fact that there was `undue influence' exerted by petitioner and
other relatives to procure improper favors from the testatrix;
xxx xxx xxx" 13
Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53.
The lone affidavit of a witness who was already presented during the hearing is hardly
sufficient to justify the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed
without any certainty as to their appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only
on his belief that they would testify if and when they are subpoenaed by the court.
Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the
testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits must
state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. 14 The
affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered evidence
turns out to be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.
Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having
been discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that
efforts to locate the witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court
was handed down. The trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time
to find said alleged witnesses who were admittedly known to her. The evidence which the
petitioner now propose to present could have been discovered and presented during the
hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for concluding that had the petitioner
exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to discover said evidenced. 15
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix
as well as the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light
during the trial, and new evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative
which is generally not a ground for new trial. 16 Accordingly, such evidence even if
presented will not carry much probative weight which can alter the judgment. 17
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of
delaying the proceedings. In fact, petitioner's son in his manifestation admitted that he had
to request a new law firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the
filing of a motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. 18 This would explain the
haphazard preparation of the motion, thus failing to comply with the requirements of Rule
53, which was filed on the last day of the reglementary period of appeal so that the
veracity of the ground relied upon is questionable. The appellate court correctly denied the
motion for new trial.
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period
for appeal. 19 Since petitioner's motion was filed on September 24, 1986, the fifteenth or
last day of the period to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the
following day, September 25. And when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was
filed on October 30, 1986, it was obviously filed out of time.
Since the questioned decision has already become final and executory, it is no longer
within the province of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of the probate
court as to the due execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now
conclusive. 20
At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its merits, the petition will
also have to fail.
During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the
testatrix presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the contested will
and signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy
the requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil Code 21 in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76,
Revised Rules of Court, 22 for the probate of holographic wills.
As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to present competent proof
that the will was actually executed sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already
seriously ill and dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the supposed
inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, niece and constant companion of
testatrix, which upon careful examination did not prove such claim of antedating.
The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question
was executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme
Court when supported by evidence. 23 We have examined the records of this case and find
no error in the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was
duly executed in accordance with law.
Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme
or reason, being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate
relationship, thus demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.
In the case of Pecon v. Coronel, 24 it was held
"The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are
very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one's
estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in
the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of
preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty
to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since
1889 . . . "
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose
by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory
heir in her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved
two boxes of jewelry worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son
Francis was instituted as an heir in the contested will.
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose
of all of her estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind.
We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides
"A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution
of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate,
and even though the person so instituted should not accept the
inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance
with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall
pass to the legal heirs."
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real
properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of
unsound mind. The portion of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the
deceased in intestate successor.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory
heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the
testator's right to disregard non-compulsory heirs. 25 The fact that some heirs are more
favored than others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. 26 Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise, the decedent might
as well die intestate. 27
The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper
pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or
suspicion; as it is not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a
possibility that it may have been exercised. 28 The exercise of improper pressure and
undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence that it was actually
exercised. 29
Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent court
"There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject
Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that deceased had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the
Will itself which according to a report of one of the two expert
witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals the existence of significant
handwriting characteristics such as:
'1.Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing.
xxx xxx xxx
'3.good line quality.
'4.presence of natural variation. . . .' (Exhibit X).
The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality
could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was
indeed of unsound mind/or under undue influence or improper
pressure when she executed the Will."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit
with costs against petitioner. The decision of respondent court dated August 29, 1986
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21, 1985 is
hereby declared to be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
||| (Heirs of Montinola-Sanson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76648, February 26, 1988)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 106720. September 15, 1994.]
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND,respondents.
PUNO, J p:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No.
22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19,
1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs."
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the
late Annie Sand, who died on November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma
Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar
Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. prLL
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of
decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of
sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in
every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body
nor the signature therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and
corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise
opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot
located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be
conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will
to probate. It found, inter alia:
"Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide
only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no
reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix.
"For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in
question is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix.
The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was
not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers
to the question of its due execution, and not to the question of
identity of will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by
the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light
of the evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for
probate must be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be
deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.
"xxx xxx xxx
"While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners,
however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will
in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have
convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix
have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified
the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix.
Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that
the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
"xxx xxx xxx
"As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testatrix,
(private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court
that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited
her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time
the holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be
of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making
the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper
object of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act . . .
The will itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge
of the nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and
square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of
her bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that
she had even written a nursing book which contained the law and
jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient
showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
"In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution
and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in
favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
"Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for
the disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that
the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the
evidence adduced have not shown any instance where improper
pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private
respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still
alert at the time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the
time of her birth anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also
established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her
own. Her independence of character and to some extent, her sense
of superiority, which has been testified to in Court, all show the
unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured
to make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence
or improper pressure in question herein only refer to the making of a
will and not as to the specific testamentary provisions therein which
is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the
circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the
disallowance of the will herein.
"Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on
succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be
preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing
grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the
holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted
herein must be admitted to probate." 3 (Emphasis omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was
dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the
requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813
and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
"Article 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a
holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions."
"Article 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration
in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his
full signature."
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated,
or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations
made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent. llcd
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that wills shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
"(a)If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b)If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to
make a will, at the time of its execution;
(c)If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;
(d)If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his
benefit;
(e)If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and
he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of
fixing his signature thereto."
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
"Article 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(1)If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of
making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3)If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence
of fear, or threats;
(4)If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5)If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto."
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition
to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the
instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said
will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the
decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and,
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the
decedents. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not
executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and
814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate
of said will. This is erroneous. cdrep

We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded."
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the
subscription, attestation, and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and
806 of the New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as
provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code, thus:
"A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed." (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a
holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the
testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-
compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova, 132 SCRA
237, 242 (1984), this Court held: cdrep
"Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not
been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical
commentary when he said 'la omision de la salvedad no anula el
testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895.'" 8(Emphasis omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the
date of the holographic will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate
the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810).
The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which
the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
"Article 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it
himself in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.
"Article 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of
full age.
"In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper
corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by
the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.
"If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the
testator must identify them over his signature.
"Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language."
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the
requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code and not those found in Articles
813 and 814 of the same Code are essential to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of
the house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct
and must be affirmed. LexLib
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not
powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions
of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself indubitably stated in her holographic
will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led
oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety.). Thus, as
correctly held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property,
which she shares with her father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with
respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94 in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of
decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property. No costs. LexLib
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
||| (Spouses Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and
LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees, vs. HELEN CHRISTENSENGARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
1.PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP; U.S. CITIZENSHIP NOT
LOST BY STAY IN PHILIPPINES BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. The citizenship that the deceased
acquired in California when he resided there from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by his stay
in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States until 1946, and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.
2.ID.; VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS; MEANING OF "NATIONAL LAW" IN
ARTICLE 16, CIVIL CODE; CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IN CALIFORNIA TO BE APPLIED IN CASE
AT BAR. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply
to any general American law, because there is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its own private
law applicable to its citizen only and in force only within the state. It can therefore refer to
no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case
at bar, the State of California, prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for
its citizens domiciled in other jurisdiction. Hence, reason demands that the California
conflict of law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
3.ID.; ID.; DOMICILE; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING ALIEN'S DOMICILE IN THE
PHILIPPINES. An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to California,
resided there for nine years, came to the Philippine in 1913, and very rarely returned to
California and only for short visits, and who appears to have never owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, shall be considered to have his domicile in the Philippines.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF RESORTING TO THE LAW OF THE DOMICILE IN DETERMINING
MATTERS WITH FOREIGN ELEMENT INVOLVED. The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF DOMICILE BOUND TO APPLY ITS OWN LAW AS DIRECTED IN
THE CONFLICT OF LAW RULE OF DECEDENT'S STATE; APPLICATION OF THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE. The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should refer the case back
to California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the
case will then be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the question has to be
decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of
the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, California,
and especially because the internal law of California provides no legitime for natural
children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines)
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
6.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE LAW TO BE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. As the
domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the Philippines, the validity
of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledge natural child of the latter's legacy,
should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the law of California.
LABRADOR, J p:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N.
Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among other things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to
the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without
issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will
was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
"3.I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named Maria
Lucy Christensen (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at
No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
"4.I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no
descendents except my above named daughter, Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney.
xxx xxx xxx
"7.I give, devise and bequeath unto Maria Helen Christensen, now
married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in
any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me,
and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust
for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred
Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal
thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
"12.I hereby give devise and bequeath unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said Maris Lucy Christensen Daney (Mrs. Bernard
Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may
have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: . .
."
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria
LucyChristensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of
opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines,
and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should
govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California
alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the
forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent apply, should be
applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an
acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and
of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal.
286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence
this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY,
IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING
TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE
LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE
OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO
THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the
time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts
admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
"In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of
record show that the deceased Edward E.Christensen was born on
November 29, 1875, in New York City, N. Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in
the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901,
on board the U.S. Army Transport 'Sheridan' with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California,
U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
"In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States
and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913, during
which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento,
California.
"Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the
year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for
the United States and came back here the following year, 1929.
Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
"Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the
Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon
liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to
the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees' Collective Exhibits '6',
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622. as Exhibits 'AA', 'BB' and 'CC-Daney'; Exhs.
'MM', 'MM-1', 'MM-2-Daney', and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.
"In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and testament (now
in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in
Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the
City of Manila on April 30, 1953." (Pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided
there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California
very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears
never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
"Sec. 16.Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from
mere temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally,
however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence." (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact
that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
"The terms 'residence' and 'domicile' might well be taken to mean
the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has
been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be
domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in
a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes,
between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one,
while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to
have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is
clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only
for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home,"
he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile.' Residence, however, is a
term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist
that any one use is the only proper one." (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
"ART. 16.Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning
of the term "national law" as used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent is a
citizen, in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, which is as follows:
"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,
and is governed by the law of his domicile."
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied.
We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other
hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
case Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof,
which is that given in the above-cited case, should govern the determination of the
validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in
the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
which is the Philippines.
The theory or doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
"The problem has been stated in this way: 'When the Conflict of Laws
rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is
the reference to the corresponding rule of the Conflict of Law of that
foreign law, or is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of
the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law, minus its
Conflict of Laws rules?
"On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose
to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of
Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once
having determined that the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not
have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in
the 'endless chain of references' which has so often been criticized
by legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the
reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why
the original reference should be to the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going
on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the
opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look
always to internal law as the rule of reference.
"Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to
the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from adoption of
their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only
way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the
dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the
litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation
will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been
against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts,
and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with
respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted
the renvoi.
"The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where
the title to land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of
divorce is challenged. In these cases, the Conflict of Laws rule of the
situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is
applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs,
will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere." (Goodrich, Conflict
of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
"X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France,
leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France.
The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
among X's next of kin.
"Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There
the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables
calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile.
Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for
the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and
decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer
the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying
the Massachusetts state of distributions. So on the surface of things
the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action:
(a) either to apply the French laws as to intestate succession, or (b)
to resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French
court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will
follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
"This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the
conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-
of-laws rule of which, in turn refers the matter back again to the law
of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term
for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
"After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further question may
arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such
foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it
has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been
the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and
the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as
the 'Renvoyer' to send back, or the Ruchversweisung', or the
'Weiterverweisung', since an affirmative answer to the question
postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in
toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to
be decided according to the law of the forum . . . (15 C.J.S. 872.)
"Another theory, known as the 'doctrine of renvoi', has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of
the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into
account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as
to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the
law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities." (2 Am. Jur. 296.)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application
in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 509-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
"The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the
conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules
of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
"Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following
theses:
"(1)Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the
application of foreign laws.
"(2)Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the
court shall respect:
"(a)The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind
its nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires
that said personal statute shall be determined by law of the domicile,
or even by the law of the place where the act in question occurred.
"(b)The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it
be certain that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in
attributing the determination of a question to the same system of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
"If, for example, the English Law directs its judge to distribute the
personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium
in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire
whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon
death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law
of nationality that is the English law, he must accept this
reference back to his own law."
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code as its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the
conflict of law rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.
"When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more estates,
and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution of the property,
the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death
will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of the situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control
devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary disposition of the property. Here, also, it is not that the
domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state.
The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict
of Laws rules at the situs of the property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general
convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the
point; 'The general principle that a disposition of personal property
valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid everywhere, is one of
universal application. It had its origin in that international comity
which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and in this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take
but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of
the rule is more apparent than ever.'" (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws,
Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as
the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of
California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce
the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the
conflict of law rules law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of
California as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code,
then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict of laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return
of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of law rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil.,
105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130;
and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil., 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can
not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each
case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
||| (Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.]
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE'S BANK &
TRUST COMPANY, executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM
PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET
AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors-appellant.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E.A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J .R. Balonkita for appellees People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
1.PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; LAW APPLICABLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE INTESTATE
AND TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION OF AN ALIEN; SCOPE OF ARTS. 16 (2) AND 1039, CIVIL
CODE. Article 16, par. 2, and Article 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four
items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
2.ID.; LEGITIMATES; FOREIGN NATIONALS. It is evident that whatever public policy or
good customs may be involved in our system of legitimates, Congress has not intended to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For its has chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGNER'S WILL; CASE AT BAR. Appellants point out that the decedent
executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming
that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law, for as this Court ruled in the Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil., 867) case, a
provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. The parties admit that the
decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the
testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
BENGZON, J.P., J p:
This is a direct appeal to us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the
executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States."
By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children:
Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria CristinaBellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed
that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a)
$240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, and Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each
and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry
A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis, and AnnaBellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and
Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died, a resident of San Antonio, Texas,
U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and
to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and
filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition"
wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the
delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00
each or a total of P120.000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the
"Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his
first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor. 1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the
lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this
case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on
June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law
must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar vs.Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said
doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a
domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even assuming
Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but
would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflict of law rule adopting the
situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the
properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it
should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested
on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order
of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
"Art 16.Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
"However", intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
"Art. 1039.Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent."
Appellants would however counter that Article 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code,
stating that
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws, or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country."
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code aforequoted. This is not
correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of
this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change
the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must
have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision
in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate successions. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over
general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his
Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended
Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's
intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court
ruled in Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect
that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas,
U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs
against appellant. So ordered.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
||| (Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, June 06, 1967)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999.]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA
D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-
Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
Midpantao L. Adil for petitioner.
Carag, Esparagoza & Associates for private respondents.
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
Aniceta died in 1969 without her estate being settled. After Alejandro's death, petitioner,
who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for
the probate of the latter's will and testament. The probate court admitted the will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion
to Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to
the Court ofAppeals but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellant's brief within
the extended period granted. The dismissal become final and executory and a
corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals. The
lower court, to implement the final and executory order, issued a writ of execution. Judge
Zain B. Angas set aside the Order directing the issuanceof the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence, not final in character. Private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals which nullified the assailed
Orders of Judge Zain. Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contended that in issuing the
assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he was
particularly designated to hear the case.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court ruled that a final decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting
aside the Order that had attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the
entryof judgment made by the Court of Appeals. The Court stressed that a
lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or ordersof a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of the courts and nullify the essence of review.
The Court also reiterated the rule that a judgment on a probated will, albeit erroneous, is
binding on the whole world. With respect to the last will and testament, the Court upheld
the trial court in holding that the rules of intestacy shall apply. According to the Court,
although the will is extrinsically valid, its provisions however are not in accordance with the
laws of succession rendering it intrinsically void, hence, the law mandates that the
rules of intestacy shall apply.
1.REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; A FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OR
ORDER CAN NO LONGER BE DISTURBED OR REOPENED NO MATTER HOW ERRONEOUS IT
MAY BE. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened
no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has
attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by
the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set aside
decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the
hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. It has been
consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or order of the
trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will
became final and the question determined by the court in such order can no longer be
raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the character of res
judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in connection
therewith being for once and forever closed. Such final order makes the will conclusive
against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. DACcIH
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RAISING ISSUES PREVIOUSLY LITIGATED BY OTHER COURTS WOULD AMOUNT
TO FORUM SHOPPING; FORUM SHOPPING ALSO OCCURS WHEN THE SAME ISSUE HAD
ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED ADVERSELY BY SOME OTHER COURT. The only instance where
a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the
will, as she preciselyappealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the
only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate
son ofthe testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for
relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered
that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely
by some other court. It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and
his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
3.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; EVEN IF A WILL WAS VALIDLY EXECUTED, IF THE TESTATOR
PROVIDES FOR DISPOSITIONS THAT DEPRIVES OR IMPAIRS THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF THEIR
LEGITIME OR RIGHTFUL INHERITANCE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS ON SUCCESSION, THE
UNLAWFUL PROVISION/DISPOSITIONS THEREOF CANNOT BE GIVEN EFFECT. Under the
Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and
was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine
and not a forgery, that he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not
expressly prohibited by law from making a will. The intrinsic validity is another matter and
questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and
testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or
rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when
the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on
this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that thisCourt finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the
party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision
orcourt action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order.
4.CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; THE RULES OF INTESTACY SHALL APPLY IN CASES WHERE A WILL
IS EXTRINSICALLY VALID BUT THE INTRINSIC PROVISIONS THEREOF ARE VOID; CASE AT BAR.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional
rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution,
the will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside
from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can
be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If
the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity
thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity that is
whether the provisionsof the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In this case,
the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the
trial court.
5.ID.; ID.; TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS OF PROPERTIES NOT BELONGING EXCLUSIVELY TO
THE TESTATOR OR PROPERTIES WHICH ARE PART OF THE CONJUGAL REGIME CANNOT BE
GIVEN EFFECT. Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife," is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not
belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an
order that has become final and executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose
from the following antecedents: llcd
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter.
Sometime in 1977, after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken
care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's
last will and testament. In 1981, the courtissued an order admitting Alejandro's will to
probate. Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion
To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued an
order, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late
Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and
testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring
the oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and
Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective estates
shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy
upon payment of estate and other taxes due to the government." 1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation
since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were
not married to each other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellant's brief within the extended period granted. 2 This dismissal became final and
executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith
issued by the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the
lower court to implement the final and executory Order. Consequently, private
respondents filed several motions including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to
them the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late Alejandro.
When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private respondents filed a motion for
cancellation of said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed
the motion. LLjur
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas setting aside the final
and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the
issuance of the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory",
hence not final in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order
even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991.
Thus, private respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the
two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private
respondents before the Court of Appealswas a petition under Rule 65 on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in
issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because
he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the
Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the January 30, 1986 Order which
declared the intrinsic invalidity of Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate of the late
Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the premises thereon to third
parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner has no
interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30,
1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entryof judgment
made by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or set
aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would be to negate the
hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. It has been ruled that a final
judgment on probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from a judgment or
order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order
allowing the will became final and the question determined by the court in such order can
no longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion. The
matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired the
character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions
in connection therewith being for once and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the
will conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic
validity of the will sought to be probated, 7particularly on three aspects: cdtai
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the
execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
and the due execution of the last will and testament. 9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator
was of sound and disposing mind at the timeof its execution, that he had freely executed
the will and was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the
will is genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary age and that
he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised
even after the will has been authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was
validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when
the courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is
intrinsically void. Such determination having attained that character of finality is binding on
this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that thisCourt finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the party had the
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the
party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision
orcourt action, then it is deemed to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand
that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed
by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut
finis sit litium the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or
less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful. 16 The only instance where a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the intrinsic invalidity of the
will, as she precisely appealed from an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the
only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate
son of the testator, the same constitutes res judicata with respect to those who were
parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for
relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be remembered
that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue had already been resolved adversely
by some other court. 18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro
and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely interlocutory, hence it can still
be set aside by the trial court. In support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely
declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the
basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to another particularly
when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30,
1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three
legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will. But it
should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said that the estate of the late
spouses be distributed according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but
to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine
the intrinsic provisions of the same will. cdtai
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights
that testacy is preferred to intestacy.20 But before there could be testate distribution, the
will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside
from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and that no one is
presumed to give Nemo praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate
can be done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic
validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic
validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity
that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of succession. In
this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by
the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal
properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his "only beloved wife", is not a valid
reason to reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions ofproperties not
belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of the conjugal regime
cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in
the intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that
she was not married to the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. cda
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
||| (Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108581, December 08, 1999)

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122880. April 12, 2006.]
FELIX AZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA
CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, respondents.
TINGA, J p:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia
E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give
legal recognition to the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the
opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all
self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the
instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which
does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any
one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is
just aching for judicial rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive
catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful
compliance with all the detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room
for doubt as to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise
imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills that they be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed with
indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its
legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to
probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981.
Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc,
Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-
unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin
at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang
habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La
Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at
ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng
bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan
sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa
mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero
28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din
ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa
inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten
Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan
sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24,
Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay
walang pasubali't at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang
nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na
kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng
Hunyo, 1981. TcDHSI
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling
dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana
na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang
nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon, sa harap ng
lahat at bawa't sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa't isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawa't dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981
LAMBERTO C. LEAO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite
on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila.
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y.
BAUTISTA
NOTARIO PUBLIKO
Until Dec. 31, 1981
PTR-152041-1/2/81-
Manila
TAN # 1437-977-8 1
Doc. No. 1232;
Page No. 86;
Book No. 43;
Series of 1981
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand
margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent,
namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided
abroad. Petitioner prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued
to the designated executor, Vart Prague.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented
herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. 2 Geralda
Castillo claimed that the will is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so
it could be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner,
particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, all centering on petitioner's
right to occupy the properties of the decedent. 3 It also asserted that contrary to the
representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs,
namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was
subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in
1965, 4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her
mother by three (3) months. 5
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in
accordance with law. She pointed out that decedent's signature did not appear on the
second page of the will, and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin
arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August
1992. 6 The RTC favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the
will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the
modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will . . . with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes;" 7 and from this
perspective, rebutted oppositor's arguments that the will was not properly executed and
attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the
testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in
mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization ofthe interpretation of the
law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in
view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is
authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with
law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that
at the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the
following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga
Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang
huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N.
Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong
ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing
tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon, sa harap ng lahat
at bawa't sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda
sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
bawa't isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa
kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa't dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement and is considered by thisCourt as a substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositor's contention that the attestation clause was not
signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof,
this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses
on the left margin of the second page ofthe will containing the
attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom
thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and
attestation of the will.
With regard to the oppositor's argument that the will was not
numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part ofeach page
and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it
is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The
first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions,
and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation
clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a
serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the
failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the
second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation
clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositor's assertion that the signature of the
testatrix on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three
subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish
the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due
execution of the will. 8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted
his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995,
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for
probate. 9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void and
undeserving of probate. 10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the
number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely
directory, rather than mandatory, and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the
substantial compliance rule." 11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code,
which we replicate in full.
Art. 805.Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses,
it shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806.Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the
office of the Clerk of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages ofthe will. But an examination of the will
itself reveals several more deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the
number of pages of the will. 12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this
requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left
uncomplied with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the
process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca 13 and In re: Will of Andrada. 14 In Uy Coque,
the Court noted that among the defects of the will in question was the failure of the
attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the will. 15 In ruling that the
will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration which
remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be
stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that
the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the
will and in the absence of a statement of the total number ofsheets such removal might
be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following
sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the
attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages
and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter
attended with much greater difficulty." 16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to
state the number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for
the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the
attesting clause is fatal." 17 It was further observed that "it cannot be denied that the . . .
requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will may be tampered
with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be
considered material." 18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino 19 and Taboada v. Hon.
Rosal, 20 wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact
that the attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the
appellate court itself considered the import of these two cases, and made the following
distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show
that the attestation does not state the number ofpages used upon
which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and
undeserving of probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in
"Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and
Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195,"
to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does
not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written.
However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in
the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the
case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra,"
although the attestation in the subject Will did not state the
number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in
the last part of the body of the Will:
"xxx xxx xxx
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires
that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages
or sheets upon which the will is written, which
requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective
safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or
omission ofsome of the pages of the will to the
prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to
be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy
Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho,
50 Phil. 30; Quintovs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs.
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases
seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a
statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the
will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the
effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be
supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration
or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is
different. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of sheets or pages upon which the will is
written,however, the last part of the body of the will
contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages,
which circumstance in our opinion takes this case
out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the
realm ofsimilar cases where a broad and more liberal view
has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from
being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page
165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the
notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages
used in the:
"xxx xxx xxx
We have examined the will in question and noticed that
the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect
were it not for the fact that, in this case, it is discernible
from the entire will that it is really and actually
composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first
page which contains the entirety of the testamentary
dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the
bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left
margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos"
comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that
"this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages
including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring
supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the
will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even
contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the
number of pages of the will should be stated. 21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950,
at a time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos,
considering that the requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will
is extant from Section 618. 23However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in
force a rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation
clause is concerned, that may vary from the philosophy that governed these two cases.
Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue
and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation
or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the
requirements of article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated
that "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on
[wills] in this project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with
the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This
objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the
execution of wills." 24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification offered by
the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that such
liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon
the testator." 25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals 26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado,
speaking for the Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal
formalities required in the execution of the attestation clause in wills. 27 Uy
Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples of the
application of the rule of strict construction. 28 However, the Code Commission opted to
recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under
Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article
809 should be applied:
. . . The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages
are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each
and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal,
and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation
clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. 29 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision,
considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation
clause is one of the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself,
the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that
the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other, 30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his
estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission
which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to
extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance
to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied
except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself." 31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a
visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses
signed in one another's presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is
the only textual guarantee of compliance. 32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was
written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the
clause to state the number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against
possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase
or decrease in the pages. 33 The failure to state the number of pages equates with the
absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if
the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the situation
in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise
the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the
members of the Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they
saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards
against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills. 34 Compliance with these
requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort
that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the
manner established in the will. 35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed
in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator's
incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an
examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should
necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their
averments before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro 36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three
witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the
page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin." 37While
three (3) Justices 38 considered the signature requirement had been substantially complied
with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation
clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although
the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is
correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum ofthe facts
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by
the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom
thereof negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law
and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the
legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all
its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses
at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to
add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the
absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. 39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly
segregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will,
from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental
witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct from
each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others,
that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the
attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned
attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed
the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses' undertakings in the clause, since the
signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different
avowal. SHcDAI
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the
attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause.
Without diminishing the value of the instrumental witnesses' signatures on each and every
page, the fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances
reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not
the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page
thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses
have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the
instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also
hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The
importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from
the other requirements under Article 805 and entrusted into a separate provision, Article
806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited
flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko
at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila." 40 By no
manner of contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. 41 It involves an extra
step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to
the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies
that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the
executor. 42Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the document was
subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred
that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word
"ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the
executors of the document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would
nonetheless remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be
"acknowledged", and not merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any
textual proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses
executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a
will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless
act. 43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to
declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as
their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus
allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the
execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the testator. It
also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making
the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under
Article 806. A notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a
notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the
will in question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental
witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each
page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will
on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-called "logical end" 44 of the will
on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters on each page,
but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused
the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory. 45 Taken in isolation,
these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as
these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt
on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the requirements
under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the
probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. ESHAcI
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur.
||| (Azuela v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122880, April 12, 2006)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74695. September 14, 1993.]
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner, vs. HON.
RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO
QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate
Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases),
and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.
Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.
1.CIVIL LAW; PROBATE OF WILL; ART. 808, NEW CIVIL CODE; SCOPE OF THE TERM
"BLINDNESS". The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez provides an insight
into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit: "The rationale behind the
requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he
may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . ." Clear from the
foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one
reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their
execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course
for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as
it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining
whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so conformably with his
instructions.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; WILL MUST BE READ TWICE; PURPOSE. Article 808 requires that in case of
testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the
instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of
the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is
contrary to his instructions.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, ACCEPTABLE; REASON. This
Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where
the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of
fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in
order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed
aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator's will.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's
will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and
the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked,
that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that
the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated
to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the
execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the
contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado
already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes
even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely
for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 1986 1 of the First Civil Cases
Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the Order dated 27 June 1983 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting
to probate the last will and testament 3 with codicil 4 of the late Brigido Alvarado.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled
"Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly
revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch
4 of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private
respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of
the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged
document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9
December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng
Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa Nobiembre 5,
1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to
generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma.
But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the
notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it
was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three
instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who
followed the reading using their own copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death
on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna. 5 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the
following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as
required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make
a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed
under duress, or influence of fear or threats; that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of
the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or
trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the
Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made
to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within
the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto
were executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly
not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the
following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil
were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was
substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with
each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with
their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that
although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its
purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purposes of
Art. 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the
double-reading requirement of said article complied with?
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was
not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both
eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he
had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an
eye specialist on 14 December 1977.
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a
"blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:
"Art. 808.If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice;
once, by one of the subscribing, witnesses, and again, by the notary
public before whom the will is acknowledged."
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil
were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art.
808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate
issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Ophthalmology (Philippine Eye
Research Institute), 6 the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr.
Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent. 7 Dr. Roasa
explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no
longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his
first consultation. 8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the
testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to
do so because of "poor eyesight." 9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that
time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of
reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was
testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective,
" 11 or "blurred" 12 vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual
reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an insight into the scope
of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:
"The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when
he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so
that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes . . ."
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those
who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido
Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate
occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be
no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the
term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way
of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so
conformably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and
entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied
with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read
twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before
whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated
testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to
object if anything is contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an
instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged
will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them
only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the
single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains
that the only valid compliance is a strict compliance or compliance to the letter and since it
is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of
the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been
disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities
surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of
fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the
testamentary privilege. 14
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the
presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and
subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take
place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will
and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first
time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The
uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that
the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November
1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing
his conformity to the draft.15
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on 5 November and 29
December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the
will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and
Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's
physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the documents were of his own free
will. Brigido answered in the affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word
for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably
assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his
instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is
especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were
persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another
(Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be
strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do
not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's
will. 17
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and
its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement in Abangan
v. Abangan, 18 to wit:
"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution
of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So
when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's will, must be disregarded" (emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his
"Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside for
the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed
strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose
of the law, i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his
will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where
the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of
Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has
remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
||| (In re Alvarado v. Gaviola, Jr., G.R. No. 74695, September 14, 1993)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 76714. June 2, 1994.]
SALUD TEODORO VDA.. DE PEREZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ZOTICO A.
TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC
Bulacan, respondent.
1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE;
ALLOWANCE OF WILLS PROBATED ABROAD; EVIDENCE NECESSARY THEREFOR; CASE AT
BAR. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only
be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. . . . Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed
by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the
reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as
follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has
been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate
court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except for
the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF TESTATOR'S KNOWN HEIRS, LEGATEES, AND DEVISEES, A PRE-
REQUISITE THEREFOR; CASE AT BAR. This petition cannot be completely resolved
without touching on a very glaring fact petitioner has always considered herself the sole
heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings.
Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. The rule that the
court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given
as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27,
Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as
if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time.
Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim are entitled
to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . ."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; JOINT PROBATE OF SEPARATE WILLS PROPER IN CASE AT BAR; REASON. In
the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills
contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are
conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has
held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. Respondent
Judge's view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore
should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the
wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules
shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." A
literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in
the administration of justice.
QUIASON, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the
Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided
by respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
I
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
citizens, established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived
at No. 2896 Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18;
Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his
wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
"wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he
bequeathed all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
Jr. as trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
"If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased
her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all
respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo, p. 41). LibLex
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of
her will estates:
"If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased
me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all
respects, in accordance with such presumption" (Rollo, p. 31.)
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by
fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute
executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were
admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and
petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the
reprobate of the two wills ancillary to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked
that she be appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple
consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge
Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special
administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following
day, petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administratrix.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life
Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the
life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their
daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial Court granted the motion. cdrep
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation,
stating that said company had delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85,
representing the proceeds of the life insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered
to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit,
and the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for
the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan
Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion
(Cunanan heirs). He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May
19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and
therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be notified of the
proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment of the hearing on the motion
of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the
"Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and
therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to
intervene"; (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being
American citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of
New York laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in
relation to Art. 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was
presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals
are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by
institution" under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on
July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the
appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the
"brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had
been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the
sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due
process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified
of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment
committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is
qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the
Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence,
they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the
appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased
spouses. prLL

Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or
accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence
they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that
she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr.
because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the
decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77,
not Rule 76, because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines
and that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the
executor who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary
proceedings in this country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, he had willed all his wordly goods to his wife and nothing to his
brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed
$215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly
assigned assets of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the
Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide
equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and
place for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185). LLphil
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to
comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his
own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982
before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13,
1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan's executor to be then
distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that
they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by
virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provision of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of
Rule 76 on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be
complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be
nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix: (3) that she be ordered
to submit an inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to
surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the
regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the
American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the
estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the
suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the
estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed
this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00
"from the Surrogate's Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of
November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the
two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the
submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special
administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana
reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is
that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan
spouses and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed
on each and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law. cdphil
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York
governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner
for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country
within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second
portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the
Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said
order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last
will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all
orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February
21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property.
It considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records, p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final
settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner
filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the
strength of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the
country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses.
On August 19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April
30, 1985. LLphil
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a
motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and
therefore incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named
substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the
Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging
that respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits .
. . which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan
spouses including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the
said probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August
19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion
for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the
wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to
possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that
proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who
inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a
decree admitting to probate the wills in question. "However, respondent Judge said that
the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of
wills (Records, p. 381). LLjur
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the
foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an
order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not
a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45
days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent
Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to
disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate
probate proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second for reconsideration
stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of
New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what
the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills" (Records, p.
393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two
wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of
probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York
"where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in
separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July
18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate
proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they
even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the
grain of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-
407). LexLib
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration,
citing Benigno v. De La Pea, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, p. 411), but respondent Judge
found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that the adverse party had not been
furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had furnished a
copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and reiterated her motion for a
"final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of
two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in
a single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the
hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the
allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be
probated in separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills:
(a)two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn
and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and
"G");
(b)two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L.
Reagan is the Surrogate of the County of Onondaga which is a court
of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that
the Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills
of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c)two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore
stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which
were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d)the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh.
"G-3" "G-6");
(e)certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two
wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7"); prcd
(f)two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of
the Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F");
(g)certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate,
letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h)certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-
2");
(i)certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge
Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued
and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3"
and
"I-10");
j)the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings
were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k)decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they properly
executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were
admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and
personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l)certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the
genuineness and authenticity of each other's signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary
and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6")" (Rollo,
pp. 13-16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court's
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29,
1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
"Art. 816.The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes."
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-
429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]. Except for
the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. cdphil
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit
the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent
Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts
should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos
v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner's insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses
should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge's view that the Rules on allowance of wills is
couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should
be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and
simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." llcd
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in
the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100
[1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testators'
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two
wills contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability
are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has
held a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v.
Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed
to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she
only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is
merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for
the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
required. LexLib
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim are entitled
to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . .".
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills
of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan
are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
||| (Vda. de Perez v. Tolete, G.R. No. 76714, June 02, 1994)