Dorotheo vs. CA
Dorotheo vs. CA
Dorotheo vs. CA
December 8, 1999]
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Facts:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes.
The latter died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care
of Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and testament.
In 1981, the court issued an order admitting Alejandros will to probate.
Private respondents did not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically
Void. The trial court granted the motion and issued an order, declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late
Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and
declaring the oppositors as the only heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose
respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate
and other taxes due to the government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of
Alejandro prior to his death although she admitted that they were not married to each other, which was denied.
On appeal, the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief within the extended period granted. This
dismissal became final and executory on February 3, 1989. An Order was issued by Judge Zain B. Angas setting
aside the final and executory Order on the ground that the order was merely interlocutory, hence not final in
character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the distribution of the
estate of the deceased spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which nullified the two assailed Orders
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the case filed by private respondents before the
Court of Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become
final and executory still be given effect?
Held:
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated, particularly on three aspects:
whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will and testament;
compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
the testamentary capacity of the testator;
and the due execution of the last will and testament.
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and disposing
mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting under duress, fraud,
menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,that he was of the proper testamentary
age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from making a will.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is
always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that
deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on
succession,the unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the
courts had already determined in a final and executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such
determination having attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no longer be
disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of
which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must stand and should no longer be
reevaluated. Failure to avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party does not avail
of other remedies despite its belief that it was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have
fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy
and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time
fixed by law become final otherwise there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the
very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to
do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the slothful.The only
instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence,which circumstances do not concur herein.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law of successional rights that testacy is
preferred to intestacy. But before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the scrutinizing test and
safeguards provided by law considering that the deceased testator is no longer available to prove the
voluntariness of his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in nature and
that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur donare. No intestate distribution of the estate can be done
until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void,
the rules of intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically valid, the next test is to
determine its intrinsic validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of
succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic
provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse,
whom he described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to reverse a final and executory
order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are
part of the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties that were
disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the intestate
proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late spouses estate.
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot considering that she was not married to
the late Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.