The Philippine Judges Association challenged the constitutionality of Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which withdrew the franking privilege from various courts and government offices. The judges argued that the law's title did not express its purpose, it did not pass the required legislative process, and it discriminated against the judiciary. The Supreme Court rejected the first two arguments, finding the title was sufficient and that legislative journals showed proper enactment. However, the Court agreed that withdrawing the privilege only from the judiciary and not from other government agencies like the President and Senators violated equal protection, as there was no substantial difference between those granted and denied the privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association challenged the constitutionality of Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which withdrew the franking privilege from various courts and government offices. The judges argued that the law's title did not express its purpose, it did not pass the required legislative process, and it discriminated against the judiciary. The Supreme Court rejected the first two arguments, finding the title was sufficient and that legislative journals showed proper enactment. However, the Court agreed that withdrawing the privilege only from the judiciary and not from other government agencies like the President and Senators violated equal protection, as there was no substantial difference between those granted and denied the privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association challenged the constitutionality of Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which withdrew the franking privilege from various courts and government offices. The judges argued that the law's title did not express its purpose, it did not pass the required legislative process, and it discriminated against the judiciary. The Supreme Court rejected the first two arguments, finding the title was sufficient and that legislative journals showed proper enactment. However, the Court agreed that withdrawing the privilege only from the judiciary and not from other government agencies like the President and Senators violated equal protection, as there was no substantial difference between those granted and denied the privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association challenged the constitutionality of Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which withdrew the franking privilege from various courts and government offices. The judges argued that the law's title did not express its purpose, it did not pass the required legislative process, and it discriminated against the judiciary. The Supreme Court rejected the first two arguments, finding the title was sufficient and that legislative journals showed proper enactment. However, the Court agreed that withdrawing the privilege only from the judiciary and not from other government agencies like the President and Senators violated equal protection, as there was no substantial difference between those granted and denied the privilege.
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Philippine Judges Association vs Prado
Digested by: RL Lagundino
FACTS: The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 (see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the petitioners).
ISSUE: WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds: 1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
HELD: 1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.
2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by President the President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look into the petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government. 3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it.
Remarks of Mr. Calhoun of South Carolina on the bill to prevent the interference of certain federal officers in elections: delivered in the Senate of the United States February 22, 1839