Antonio v comelec

[G.R. No. 135869. September 22, 1999]

Facts: On March 23, 1992, respondent Antonio V. Hernandez filed with the Commission on
Elections his certificate of candidacy for one of the contested seats for councilors in the Second
District of Quezon City. In Item No. 6 of his certificate he gave as his address B 26 L 1 New Capitol
Estates, Quezon City. However, he did not indicate in the space provided in Item No. 12 therein his
Precinct Number and the particular Barangay where he was a registered voter. His biodata
submitted together with his certificate of candidacy gave his address as Acacia Street, Mariana,
Quezon City, which is a part of the Fourth District of Quezon City. In other words, his certificate of
candidacy and his biodata filed with the COMELEC did not expressly state that he was a registered
voter of Quezon City or that he was a resident of the Second District thereof within the purview of
Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of a candidate to indicate his Precinct Number and the particular
Barangay where he was a registered voter invalidates his certificate of candidacy.

Held: No. It may be gleaned from the provisions of Sec. 39, par. (a), of the Local Government Code
of 1991, earlier quoted, that the law does not specifically require that a candidate must state in his
certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number and the Barangay where he is registered. Apparently, it
is enough that he is actually registered as a voter in the precinct where he intends to vote, which
should be within the district where he is running for office. In the case at bar, his failure to state in his
certificate of candidacy his Precinct Number is satisfactorily explained by him in that at the time he
filed his certificate he was not yet assigned a particular Precinct Number in the Second District of
Quezon City. He was formerly a registered voter of Manila, although for the past two (2) years prior
to the elections he was already a resident of B 26, L 1 New Capitol Estates, admittedly within the
Second District of Quezon City

RUSTICO H. ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and VICENTE T. MIRANDA, JR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA
_
REYES, J .:
Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest involving a barangay position five (5)
days per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic
Act 6679
[1]
and the Omnibus Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to
annul the order dated August 3, 1998 of the Second Division of the
COMELEC,
[2]
dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rustico Antonio for having been
filed out of time pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and the order
promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998
are:
The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay
Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila. After the board of canvassers proclaimed
protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T. Miranda, Jr. filed
an election protest docketed as Election Protest Case No. 97-0017 against Antonio
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City (Branch LXXIX). The trial
court rendered aDecision dated 9 March 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly
elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila.
Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March
1998. Subsequently, Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27
March 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt thereof. Meanwhile, Miranda moved to
execute the trial courts decision. Rustico, in his Opposition to the Motion for
Execution or Execution Pending Appeal, argued against Mirandas motion for
execution. After the trial court denied the motion for execution, the records of this
case was forwarded to the Commission (Second Division).
On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this
Commission (Second Division) an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating as follows:
In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO, failed to perfect
his appeal within the five (5) days period prescribed for perfecting his appeal, as he
filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the
decision sought to be appealed.
The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his
appeal within the said period deprives the Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
The instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated
3 August 1998 of this Commission (Second Division).
[3]

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the appeal for the following reasons:
(a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days from receipt
of the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court. This is provided for by Sec. 9
of R.A. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code
(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providing for a
five-day period within which to appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Court could not prevail upon the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 6679 and Sec. 252
of the Omnibus Election Code;
(c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it disregarded the
provisions of Sections 5,6 & 7, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring the
filing of briefs by the appellant and the appellee. The questioned resolution of August 3,
1998 was issued motu propio and without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast
tracked;
(d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner as found by
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias is only four (4) votes the results being MIRANDA
1,171; ANTONIO 1,167. The peoples will must not go on procedural points. An
election protest involves public interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned when it
will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of its
public officials. [Macasundig vs. Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda. De Mesa vs. Mensias,
18 SCRA 533; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 808; Genete vs. Archangel, 21 SCRA
1178; Maliwanag vs. Herrera, 25 SCRA 175; De Castro vs. Genete, 27 SCRA 623]
(e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the COMELEC did not
appreciate the contested ballots.
[4]

In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
SEC. 21. Appeal From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party
may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the
promulgation of the decision.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of
the Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials
is governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads:
SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed
with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten
(10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall
decide the election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision
of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall
decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision
on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay
elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed.
Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition contesting the
election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan
trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the
filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be
appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the
regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission,
and whose decisions shall be final.
In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section
9 of Republic Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC rationalized thus:
Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code providing for a ten-day period to appeal prevails over the provisions of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-judicial bodies,
including this Commission, cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the
former prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation herein does not fall within the
generic situation contemplated therein.
No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section
3) grants and authorizes this Commission to promulgate its own rules of procedure as
long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in
1993 as amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is
promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated authority
which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the
decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on
Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision. Rule 22
Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions
of courts in election protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the
Commission for failure to file the required notice of appeal within the prescribed
period.
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9)
day from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4) days after the five-day
prescribed period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal must be
dismissed. For it is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and
within the period laid down by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal
within the prescribed period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeating the
right of appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring
jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals,
et.al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in the case at bar.
Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that rules of
procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. But far from being disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
received approbation and has constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a number
of decisions such as in the case of Pahilan vs. Tabalba (230 SCRA 205, at 211)
and Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702, at 704). In the more
recent case of Calucag vs. Commission on Electionspromulgated on 19 June 1997
(G.R. N.o 123673), the Supreme Court stated that:
Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to
hear the appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST BE FI LED WI THIN FI VE
DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE MTC DECISION(page 4-5).
The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this five-day rule within
which to file the required notice of appeal will make questionable the legislative
enactment providing for a ten-day period.
[5]

Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless
find the instant petition devoid of merit.
It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over rules of procedure
promulgated by administrative or quasi-judicial bodies and that rules of procedure
should be consistent with standing legislative enactments. In relation to the above-
quoted Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code, petitioner points out that in Flores vs. Commission on Elections
[6]
, this Court
had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or Municipal Court in election protest
cases involving barangay officials are no longer appealable to the Regional Trial
Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.
[7]
Petitioner submits that the dispositive portion in the Flores case only
declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 providing for
appeal to the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. The
dispositive portion of the Flores case reads:
1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial
court shall be appealable to the regional trial court:
Petitioner admits that the provisions in Republic Act No. 6679 and for that matter the
Omnibus Election Code providing for appellate jurisdiction to the Regional Trial
Court had been declared unconstitutional in the aforecited Flores case. A verbatim
comparison of both provisions reveals that they provide the same remedy, that is,
appeal from a decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court in barangay
election cases to the regional trial court. Both provisions provide that (1) results of a
barangay election may be contested by filing a sworn petition with the municipal trial
court within ten days from proclamation; (2) the MTC shall decide within thirty days
per Republic Act No. 6679 or fifteen days per Omnibus Election Code; and (3) the
decision of the municipal trial court may be appealed to the regional trial court within
ten days from receipt by the aggrieved party, which decision is final and non-
appealable. There is no appreciable basis to make a distinction between the two
provisions, except for their different numbers, to advance that they provide for two
different remedies. It would be superfluous to insist on a categorical declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the appeal provided for in Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code, as the same appeal in Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 6679 had already been
categorically declared unconstitutional. Further, Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code
[8]
as amended by the new law, Republic Act No. 6679
[9]
, has in effect, been
superseded by the latter. While the appellate procedure has been retained by the
amendatory act, Republic Act No. 6679 nonetheless supersedes the verbatim
provision in the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, it was not necessary for Flores to
mention Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering that as aforestated,
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 was a mere reenactment of the former law.
Petitioner is of the opinion, though, that the unconstitutionality extended only as
to which court has appellate jurisdiction without affecting the period within which to
appeal. According to petitioner, only the portion providing for the appellate
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in said cases should be deemed
unconstitutional. The rest of the provisions, particularly on the period to appeal, free
from the taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect in view of the
separability clauses contained in Republic Act 6779
[10]
and the Omnibus Election
Code.
[11]

We do not agree.
First, petitioners argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be
severed from the remedy or the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic
Act 6679 and survive on its own. The presumption cannot be sustained because the
period to appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy.
Aptly, the rules on statutory construction prescribe:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the
Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a statute
creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity, of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far
independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the legislature would
have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact the
other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without
causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a manner contrary to the
intention of the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can
have no legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must
express the legislative will independently of the void part, since the court has no
power to legislate.
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them
as a whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended
the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is
void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
[12]

In the instant petition, the exception applies. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679
and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, without the constitutionally infirm
portion on the appellate jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in barangay election
protest cases, does not remain complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed
and wholly independent of the portion which was rejected. In other words, with the
elimination of the forum, the period cannot stand on its own. Moreover, when this
Court stated that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is declared
unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the
municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court, it
meant to preserve the first two sentences on the original jurisdiction of municipal and
metropolitan trial courts to try barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced
by the petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is the
logical and sound interpretation of subject portion of the Flores case.
Second, what was invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and
not just the question of which court to file the petition. If the remedy itself is declared
unconstitutional how could the period to appeal possibly survive? How could the
time limit exist if there is nothing to be done within such time?
Third, we cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the
said laws, to maintain the ten (10) day period to appeal despite the declaration of
unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial court, Republic
Act No. 7166
[13]
amending the Omnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our
lawmakers to expedite the remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was
approved on November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which was promulgated on
April 20,1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was cognizant of
the ruling in Flores. Said law provides the same five (5) day period to appeal
decisions of the trial court in election contests for municipal officers to the
COMELEC. Section 22 thereof reads:
Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers. All election contests involving
municipal offices filed with the Regional Trial Court shall be decided
expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five (5) days
from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The
Commission shall decide the appeal within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for
decision, but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the appeal, which decision
shall be final, unappealable and executory.
There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer period to appeal to the
COMELEC should apply to election contests for barangay officials.
Fourth, since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the
COMELEC had to come in and provide for a new appeal in accordance with the
mandate of the Constitution. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC, Section 6,
Article IX-A
[14]
of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to
promulgate its own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
have provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking an appeal
[15]
consistent with the
expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not
clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests. Hence,
Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not in conflict with any
existing law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the laudable objective of
providing a uniform period of appeal and defy the COMELECs constitutional
mandate to enact rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases.
In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure are controlling in election protests heard by a regional
trial court.
[16]
The Court en banc has held inRodillas vs. COMELEC
[17]
that the
procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a
barangay election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
More recently, in Calucag vs. Commission on Elections
[18]
, the Court en banc had
occasion to state that:
It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the same arguments propounded
therein by the petitioner may no longer be employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code
states that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Said pronouncement of the
Court, having formed part of the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer be
countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed
with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days
after the promulgation of the MTCs decision. The erroneous filing of the appeal
with the RTC did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. xxx. The five-day
period having expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate appeal before
the COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and
the appealed decisions has become final and executory.
Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that
[r]ules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked because
the COMELEC did not require the parties to file their appeal briefs; that the dismissal
was issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and that dismissal of the
appeal defeats the peoples will on procedural points. Suffice it to state that the period
for filing an appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final
and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of the law.
[19]
Further, by virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that an appeal may be dismissed
upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a
notice of appeal within the prescribed period, the COMELEC is precisely given the
discretion, in a case where the appeal is not filed on time to dismiss the action or
proceeding.
The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing
the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The assailed orders of the Commission on Elections dated August 3, 1998
and October 14, 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.