Statutory construction is used by courts to determine the meaning of laws and their application to cases. It involves various methods and principles like considering the purpose and spirit of the law. This document discusses key cases that illustrate when and how statutory construction is used. It establishes that legislative intent must be determined from considering the whole statute and courts can develop law to fill gaps, but should not engage in judicial legislation. Statutory language is followed literally only when there is no ambiguity, otherwise purpose and harmony with other laws is considered.
Statutory construction is used by courts to determine the meaning of laws and their application to cases. It involves various methods and principles like considering the purpose and spirit of the law. This document discusses key cases that illustrate when and how statutory construction is used. It establishes that legislative intent must be determined from considering the whole statute and courts can develop law to fill gaps, but should not engage in judicial legislation. Statutory language is followed literally only when there is no ambiguity, otherwise purpose and harmony with other laws is considered.
Statutory construction is used by courts to determine the meaning of laws and their application to cases. It involves various methods and principles like considering the purpose and spirit of the law. This document discusses key cases that illustrate when and how statutory construction is used. It establishes that legislative intent must be determined from considering the whole statute and courts can develop law to fill gaps, but should not engage in judicial legislation. Statutory language is followed literally only when there is no ambiguity, otherwise purpose and harmony with other laws is considered.
Statutory construction is used by courts to determine the meaning of laws and their application to cases. It involves various methods and principles like considering the purpose and spirit of the law. This document discusses key cases that illustrate when and how statutory construction is used. It establishes that legislative intent must be determined from considering the whole statute and courts can develop law to fill gaps, but should not engage in judicial legislation. Statutory language is followed literally only when there is no ambiguity, otherwise purpose and harmony with other laws is considered.
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Statutory Construction it is the various methods and tests used by the courts for
determining the meaning of law.
I. General Principles in defining Statutory Construction
Whether the promotional scheme is a lottery or a gift that violates the provisions of the Postal Law (Caltex v. Palomar)
In the case at bar, there is no requirement in the rules that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. The scheme is merely a gratuitous distribution of property by chance which does not violate the provisions of the Postal Law. Construction is used where there is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. Hence, the Court is tasked to look beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to unmask the real element and pernicious tendencies that the law is seeking to prevent.
What is Statutory Construction?
It is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and the intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. (Caltex v. Palomar)
When does statutory construction come in?
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. (National Federation of Labor v. Eisma; Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas)
1. National Federation of Labor v. Eisma Construction is required to determine jurisdiction.
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. However, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority, which organizes the court; and it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the basis of the law or statute in force.
2. Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas Adoption under para 1 of Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. In the present case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys. Therefore, the general rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction.
Necessity of Statutory Construction Rules of Statutory Construction are tools used to ascertain legislative intent. They are not rules but mere axioms and experience. Rules of Statutory Construction help the court help the court resolve bad cases. Thus, where there is ambiguity in the language of a statute, courts employ canons of statutory construction to ascertain its true intent and meaning. LEGISLATIVE INTENT The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
VERBA LEGIS If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and express a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey.
STATUTES AS A WHOLE A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a meaning which is different from the one actually intended. A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be presumed that the legislature has used any useless words, and because it is dangerous practice to base the construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may be qualified by other portions.
SPIRIT AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous consequences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law. When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
Nature of the rules of Statutory Construction
The situs of construction and interpretation of written laws belongs to the Judicial department. It is the duty of the courts of Justices to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of th government.
Overlap of Statutory Construction
When is it construction and when is it judicial legislation?
To declare what the law shall be is a legislative power, but to declare what the law is or has been, is judicial. However, the court do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law. The Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of the existing law and jurisprudence. (Floresca v. Philex Mining)
1. Floresca v. Philex Mining Does CFI (RTC) have jurisdiction over the complaint?
Pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code which provides that: No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. It argues that the application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. Yet, the Court argues that the Court can legislate, pursuant to Article 9 of the New Civil Code. However, even the legislator himself recognizes that in certain instances, the court do and must legislate to fill in the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply.
How must legislative intent be ascertained?
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. (Aisporna v. CA)
1. Aisporna v. CA Legislative intent of the Insurance Act: whether an insurance subagent or proxy covered in section 189 of Insurance Act.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
When should Statutes be Literlly Construed?
1.Kapisanan vs. MRC Where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.
When Literal Construction is not Favored?
1. Paras v. Comelec Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election". It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
What is the rule on executive construction?
1. PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations
The court still and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.
When is Executive construction not given weight?
1. Phil. Apparel Workers Union v. NLRC
There was no grant of said increases yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of the Undersecretary of Labor. It must be noted that the letter was based on a wrong premise or representation on the part of the company. The construction or explanation of Labor Undersecretary is not only wrong as it was purely based on a misapprehension of facts, but also unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the commission, and ordered the company to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in PD 1123.
2. IBAA Employees Union v. Inciong
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. From Article 92 of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 850, and Article 82 of the same Code, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. So long, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. Where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed.
3. Chartered Bank Employees Union v. Ople
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or overtime pay differentials. When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit.
Difference of a rule and an opinion?
1. Victorias Milling v. SSC
When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes; a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets pre-existing law.
Subjects of Construction How should the Constitution be construed?
1. Sarmiento v. Mison The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves.
2. Perfecto v. Meer Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution. The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
3. Endencia v. David Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.
4. Nitafan v. CIR Whether the intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to exempt justices and judges from taxes as it was in the 1935 Constitution. In the present case, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. The constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable.
May the preamble be referred to in the construction of Constitutional Provisions?
1. Aglipay v. Ruiz Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In the present case, the purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the country.
Remarks of Mr. Calhoun of South Carolina on the bill to prevent the interference of certain federal officers in elections: delivered in the Senate of the United States February 22, 1839