G.R. No.

L-17931 February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PE!RO GIENE", #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& Au*#)or Ge$era+ o, )%e P%#+#((#$e&,
a$* HON. ISAEL A-HA., #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& Au*#)or o, )%e Ce$)ra+
/a$0, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act o. !"#$,
otherwise %nown as the &oreign '(change )argin &ee *aw, the Central +an% of the
Philippines issued on ,uly -, -$.$, its Circular o. $.. fi(ing a uniform margin fee of !./ on
foreign e(change transactions. To supplement the circular, the +an% later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for e(emption from the payment of
said fee, as provided in said Republic Act o. !"#$. 0everal times in ovember and
1ecember -$.$, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. 2 which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and
hardwood producers 2 bought foreign e(change for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde 2 which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues 2 and
paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,4"..5!. In )ay, -$"#,
petitioner made another purchase of foreign e(change and paid the sum of P",35..4! as
margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,4"..5!, relying upon
Resolution o. -.!$ of the )onetary +oard of said +an%, dated ovember 3, -$.$,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is e(empt from said fee.
0oon after the last importation of these products, petitioner made a similar re6uest for
refund of the sum of P",35..4! paid as margin fee therefor. Although the Central +an%
issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of
the +an% refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground that the
e(emption granted by the )onetary +oard for petitioner7s separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section !, paragraph 89III of Republic
Act o. !"#$. :n appeal ta%en by petitioner, the Auditor General subse6uently affirmed said
action of the Auditor of the +an%. ;ence, this petition for review.
The only 6uestion for determination in this case is whether or not <urea< and <formaldehyde<
are e(empt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of
0ection ! of Republic Act o. !"#$ reads=
The margin established by the )onetary +oard pursuant to the provision of section
one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign e(change for the
importation of the following=.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
89III. >rea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the e(clusive use of end?users.
@herefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
admitted and approved by this ;onorable Court, without preAudice to the parties
adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Petitioner maintains that the term <urea formaldehyde< appearing in this provision should be
construed as <ureaand formaldehyde< Bemphasis suppliedC and that respondents herein, the
Auditor General and the Auditor of the Central +an%, have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas <urea< and <formaldehyde< are the principal
raw materials in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the ational Institute of 0cience
and Technology has e(pressed, through its Commissioner, the view that=
>rea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under
certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce
when applied in water solution and e(tended with ine(pensive fillers constitutes a
fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
;ence, <urea formaldehyde< is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and
different from urea< and <formaldehyde<, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin %nown as <urea formaldehyde<. Petitioner contends, however, that the bill
approved in Congress contained the copulative conAunction <and< between the terms <urea<
and <formaldehyde<, and that the members of Congress intended to e(empt <urea< and
<formaldehyde< separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
glue called <urea< formaldehyde<, not the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this
view the statements made on the floor of the 0enate, during the consideration of the bill
before said ;ouse, by members thereof. +ut, said individual statements do not necessarily
reflect the view of the 0enate. )uch less do they indicate the intent of the ;ouse of
Representatives Bsee 0ong Diat Chocolate &actory vs. Central +an%, .5 :ff. GaE., "-.F
)ayon )otors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, *?-.### G)arch !$,
-$"-HF )anila ,oc%ey Club, Inc. vs. Games I Amusement +oard, *?-!4!4 G&ebruary !$,
-$"#HC. &urthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill 2 which uses the term <urea
formaldehyde< instead of <urea and formaldehyde< 2 is conclusive upon the courts as
regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President
BPrimicias vs. Paredes, "- Phil. --J, -!#F )abanag vs. *opeE 9ito, 4J Phil. -F )acias vs.
Comm. on 'lections, *?-J"J5, 0eptember -5, -$"-C. If there has been any mista%e in the
printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
'(ecutive 2 on which we cannot speculate, without AeopardiEing the principle of separation
of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system 2 the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by Audicial decree.
@;'R'&:R', the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon !.J. "adilla Ba#tista $ngelo %a&rador 'e(es J.B.%. Barrera "aredes )izon
'egala and *a+alintal JJ. conc#r.
G.R. No. L-29618 February 27, 1969
ENRI23E 4. ORALES, petitioner,
vs.
A/ELAR!O S3/I!O, a& Co55#&&#o$er o, C#6#+ Ser6#'e, respondent.
R ' 0 : * > T I :
CAS-RO, J.:
The petitioner7s motions for reconsideration are directed specifically at the following
portion of our decision=
In the 0enate, the Committee on Government ReorganiEation, to which ;ouse
+ill "$.- was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that
section -# of the Act owes its present form and substance The provision of the
substitute bill reads=
o person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelor7s degree and has served either in the Armed &orces of the
Philippines or the ational +ureau of Investigation or police department of
any city and has held the ran% of captain or its e6uivalent therein for at least
three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city for at least J years with the ran% of captain andKor higher.
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
At the behest of 0enator &rancisco Rodrigo, the phrase <has served as officer
in the Armed &orces< was inserted so as to ma%e the provision read=
o person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelor7s degree and has served either in the Armed &orces of the
Philippines or the ational +ureau of Investigation or police department of
any city and has held the ran% of captain or its e6uivalent therein for at least
three years or any high school graduate who has served the police
department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed &orces for at
least J years with the ran% of captain andKor higher.
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an
addition to the phrase <who has served the police department of a city for at
least J years with the ran% of captain andKor higher,< under which the
petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate Bboth parties agree
that the petitioner finished the second year of the law courseC could possibly
6ualify. ;owever, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase G<who has
served the police department of a city or<H was dropped and only the Rodrigo
amendment was retained.
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as
amended at the behest of 0en. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the 0enate on third
reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change
made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase <or has served as chief of police with
e(emplary record<.
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the
different drafts of ;ouse +ill "$.- showing the various changes made. In what purport to be
the page proofs of the bill as finally approved by both ;ouses of Congress Banne( GC, the
following provision appears=
0'C. -#. *inim#m ,#alifications for appointment as !hief of a "olice $genc(.
2 o person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a
bachelor7s degree from a recogniEed institution of learning and has served either the
Armed &orces of the Philippines or has served as chief of police with e(emplary
record or the ational +ureau of Investigation or the police department of any city
and has held the ran% of captain or its e6uivalent therein for at least three years or
any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city or has
served as officer in the Armed &orces for at least eight years from the ran% of captain
andKor higher.
It is unmista%able up to this point that the phrase, <who has served the police
department of a city or was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the
;ouse bill division deleted the entire provision and substituted what now is section -# of the
Police Act of -$"", which section reads=
*inim#m ,#alification for appointment as !hief of "olice $genc(. 2 o person may
be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor7s degree from
a recogniEed institution of learning and has served either in the Armed &orces of the
Philippines or the ational +ureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police
with e(emplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with the
ran% of captain or its e6uivalent therein for at least three yearsF or any high school
graduate who has served as officer in the Armed &orces for at least eight years with
the ran% of captain andKor higher.
The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which
according to him was signed by an employee in the 0enate bill division, and can be found
attached to the page proofs of the bill, e(plaining the change in section -#, thus= .
0ection -# was recast for clarity Bwith the consent of 0en. GanEon I
Congressman )ontanoC.
It would thus appear that the omission 2 whether deliberate or unintended 2 of the
phrase, <who has served the police department of a city or was made not at any stage of
the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, more
specifically in the proofreading thereofF that the change was made not by Congress but only
by an employee thereofF and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some stylistic
preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the petitioner
would have us loo% searchingly into the matter.
The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the Audiciary under our system of
government. As we observed e(plicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office of the
legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that section -# is e(actly as it
is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the +ureau of Printing. @e cannot go
behind the enrolled Act to discover what reall( happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.
:therwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to
determine what act#all( did happen in the labyrinth of law?ma%ing with conse6uent
impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner
would li%e this Court to ma%e can be better done in Congress. After all, ;ouse cleaning 2
the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner 2
can best be effected by the occupants thereof. '(pressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy
of the attention not of an :liver @endell ;olmes but of a 0herloc% ;olmes.
@hat the first )r. ,ustice ;arlan said in -ardwood .. /entworth
-
might aptly be said
in answer to the petitioner= <If there be danger, under the principles announced in 0ield ..
!lar+, -53 >.0. "5$, "4-, that the governor and the presiding officers of the two houses of a
territorial legislature may impose upon the people an act that was never passed in the form
in which it is preserved in the published statutes, how much greater is the danger of
permitting the validity of a legislative enactment to be 6uestioned by evidence furnished by
the general indorsements made by cler%s upon bills previous to their final passage and
enrollment, 2 indorsements usually so e(pressed as not to be intelligible to any one e(cept
those who made them, and the scope and effect of which cannot in many cases be
understood unless supplemented by the recollection of cler%s as to what occurred in the
hurry and confusion often attendant upon legislative proceedings.<
!
Indeed the course suggested to us by the petitioner would be productive of nothing
but mischief.
+oth *arshall 0ield & !o. .. !lar+ and -arwood .. /entworth involved claims similar
to that made by the petitioner in this case. In both the claims were reAected. Thus,
in *arshall 0ield & !o. it was contended that the Tariff Act of :ctober -, -J$# was a nullity
because <it is shown by the congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of
conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress, and having reference to
;ouse +ill $5-", that a section of the bill as it finally passed, was not in the bill
authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of
Congress, and approved by the President.<
3
In reAecting the contention, the >nited 0tates
0upreme Court held that the signing by the 0pea%er of the ;ouse of Representatives and
by the President of the 0enate of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two houses
that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. And when the bill thus attested is signed
by the President and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed
Congress should be deemed complete and peachable.
5
In -arwood the claim was that an act of the legislature of AriEona <contained, at the
time of it final passage, provisions that were omitted from it without authority of the council
or the house, before it was presented, to the governor for his approval.<
.
The Court
reiterated its ruling in *arshall 0ield & !o.
It is contended, however, that in this Aurisdiction the Aournals of the legislature have
been declared conclusive upon the courts, the petitioner citing 1nited States .. "ons.
"
The
case cited is inapposite of it does not involve a discrepancy between an enrolled bill and the
Aournal. Rather the issue tendered was whether evidence could be received to show that,
contrary to the entries of the Aournals, the legislature did not adAourn at midnight of &ebruary
!J, -$-5 but after, and that <the hands of the cloc% were stayed in order to enable the
legislature to effect an adAournment apparently within the time fi(ed by the Governor7s
proclamation for the e(piration of the special session.< In answering in the negative this
Court held that if the cloc% was in fact stopped, <the resultant evil might be slight as
compared with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and
ma%ing the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory.<
4
This Court
<passed over the 6uestion< whether the enrolled bill was conclusive as to its contents and
mode of passage.
It was not until -$54 that the 6uestion was presented *a&anao .. %opez23ito,
J
and we
there held that an enrolled bill <imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts<. This
Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution despite the fact that the vote of three?
fourths of the members of the Congress Bas re6uired by the Constitution to approve
proposals for constitutional amendmentsC was not actually obtained on account of the
suspension of some members of the ;ouse of Representative and the 0enate.lawphi 1.n4t
Thus in *a&anag the enrolled bill theory was adopted. @hatever doubt there might
have been as to the status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in view of the dissent
of three ,ustices in *a&anag,
$
was finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in !asco
"hilippine !hemical !o. .. Gimenez.
-#
0pea%ing for the Court, the then ,ustice Bnow Chief
,usticeC Concepcion said=
&urthermore it is well settled that the enrolled bill 2 which uses the term <urea
formaldehyde< instead of <urea and formaldehyde< 2 is conclusive upon the courts
as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President BPrimicias vs. Paredes, "- Phil. --J, -!#F )abanag vs. *opeE 9ito, 4J
Phil. -F )acias vs. Comm. on 'lections, *?-J"J5, 0eptember -5, -$"-C. If there has
been any mista%e in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of
Congress and approved by the '(ecutive 2 on which we cannot speculate, without
AeopardiEing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system 2 the remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by Audicial decree.
+y what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding
that in all cases the Aournals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain
matters which the Constitution
--
e(pressly re6uires must be entered on the Aournal of each
house. To what e(tent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have
such matters entered on the Aournal, is a 6uestion which we do not now decide.
-!
All we
hold is that with respect to matters not e(pressly re6uired to be entered on the Aournal, the
enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
ACC:R1IG*L, the motions for reconsideration are denied.
!oncepcion !.J. 'e(es J.B.%. )izon *a+alintal 5aldi.ar Sanchez 0ernando and
!apistrano JJ. conc#r.
G.R. No. L-23771 A(r#+ 38, 1977
HERINIO A. AS-ORGA, #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& 4#'e-ayor o, a$#+a, petitioner,
vs.
AN-ONIO 9. 4ILLEGAS, #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& ayor o, a$#+a, -HE HON., -HE
E:EC3-I4E SECRE-AR., A/ELAR!O S3/I!O, #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& Co55#&&#o$er o,
C#6#+ Ser6#'e, E!3AR!O 23IN-OS, #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& C%#e, o, Po+#'e o, a$#+a,
AN3EL C3!IAA-, #$ %#& 'a(a'#)y a& C#)y -rea&urer o, a$#+a, CI-. OF ANILA,
9OSE SE/RANO, FRANCISCO GA-AI-AN, AR-IN ISI!RO, CESAR L3CERO,
PA!ERES -INOCO, LEONAR!O F3GOSO, FRANCIS .3SECO, APOLONIO GENER,
A/ROCIO LOREN"O, 9R., ALFONSO EN!O"A, 9R., SERGIO LO.OLA, GERINO
-OLEN-INO, ARIANO AGSALIN, E!3AR!O 23IN-OS, 9R., A4ELINO
4ILLACOR-A, PA/LO OCAPO, FELICISIO CA/IGAO, 9OSE /RILLAN-ES, 9OSE
4ILLAN3E4A a$* ARINA FRANCISCO, #$ )%e#r 'a(a'#)#e& a& 5e5ber& o, )%e
u$#'#(a+ /oar*,respondents.
$rtemio 3. "angani&an and 'enito 3. Sag#isag and !rispin ). Baizas and $ssociates for
petitioner.
"aredes "o&lador !r#z and 6azareno and $ntonio Barredo for respondent *a(or of
*anila.
'omeo %. 7aha(on for respondents !it( 8reas#rer of *anila etc. et al.
Office of the Solicitor General $rt#ro $. $lafriz $ssistant Solicitor General "acifico ". de
!astro Solicitor Jorge '. !o,#ia and Solicitor 'icardo %. "rono.e Jr. for respondents 8he
9:ec#ti.e Secretar( and !ommissioner of !i.il Ser.ice.
0ort#nato de %eon and $ntonio 3. 'a,#iza as amici c#riae.

A;ALIN-AL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of ;ouse +ill o. $!"", which
became Republic Act 5#"., <An Act 1efining the Powers, Rights and 1uties of the 9ice?
)ayor of the City of )anila, &urther Amending for the Purpose 0ections Ten and 'leven of
Republic Act umbered &our ;undred ine, as Amended, :therwise Dnown as the Revised
Charter of the City of )anila.<
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed=
:n )arch 3#, -$"5 ;ouse +ill o. $!"", a bill of local application, was filed in the ;ouse of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April !-,
-$"5. &orthwith the bill was sent to the 0enate for its concurrence. It was referred to the
0enate Committee on Provinces and )unicipal Governments and Cities headed by 0enator
Gerardo ). Ro(as. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by 0enator Ro(as, that instead of the City 'ngineer it be the
President Protempore of the )unicipal +oard who should succeed the 9ice?)ayor in case
of the latter7s incapacity to act as )ayor.
@hen the bill was discussed on the floor of the 0enate on second reading on )ay !#, -$"5,
substantial amendments to 0ection -
1
were introduced by 0enator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the 0enate. The amendment recommended by
0enator Ro(as does not appear in the Aournal of the 0enate proceedings as having been
acted upon.
:n )ay !-, -$"5 the 0ecretary of the 0enate sent a letter to the ;ouse of Representatives
that ;ouse +ill o. $!"" had been passed by the 0enate on )ay !#, -$"5 <with
amendments.< Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the
one recommended by 0enator Ro(as and not the Tolentino amendments which were the
ones actually approved by the 0enate. The ;ouse of Representatives thereafter signified its
approval of ;ouse +ill o. $!"" as sent bac% to it, and copies thereof were caused to be
printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the 0ecretary of the ;ouse of
Representatives, the 0pea%er of the ;ouse of Representatives, the 0ecretary of the 0enate
and the 0enate President. :n ,une -", -$"5 the 0ecretary of the ;ouse transmitted four
printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affi(ed his signatures
thereto by way of approval on ,une -J, -$"5. The bill thereupon became Republic Act o.
5#"..
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by
respondent City )ayor drew immediate reaction from 0enator Tolentino, who on ,uly .,
-$"5 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of ;ouse +ill o. $!"" signed into law
by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the
0enate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the
0enate floor. As a conse6uence the 0enate President, through the 0ecretary of the 0enate,
addressed a letter dated ,uly --, -$"5 to the President of the Philippines, e(plaining that
the enrolled copy of ;ouse +ill o. $!"" signed by the secretaries of both ;ouses as well
as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he
considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subse6uent letter
dated ,uly !-, -$"5 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the 0enate
President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never
been approved by the 0enate and therefore the fact that he and the 0enate 0ecretary had
signed it did not ma%e the bill a valid enactment.
:n ,uly 3-, -$"5 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of
both ;ouses of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially
withdrawing his signature on ;ouse +ill o. $!"" Bwhich had been returned to the 0enate
the previous ,uly 3C, adding that <it would be untenable and against public policy to convert
into law what was not actually approved by the two ;ouses of Congress.<
>pon the foregoing facts the )ayor of )anila, Antonio 9illegas, issued circulars to the
department heads and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators andKor managers of business establishments in )anila to disregard the provisions
of Republic Act 5#".. ;e li%ewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to the 9ice?)ayor presumably
under authority of Republic Act 5#"..
Reacting to these steps ta%en by )ayor 9illegas, the then 9ice?)ayor, ;erminio A. Astorga,
filed a petition with this Court on 0eptember 4, -$"5 for <)andamus, InAunction andKor
Prohibition with Preliminary )andatory and Prohibitory InAunction< to compel respondents
)ayor of )anila, the '(ecutive 0ecretary, the Commissioner of Civil 0ervice, the )anila
Chief of Police, the )anila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to
comply with the provisions of Republic Act 5#"..
Respondents7 position is that the so?called Republic Act 5#". never became law since it
was not the bill actually passed by the 0enate, and that the entries in the Aournal of that
body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
:n April !J, -$"., upon motion of respondent )ayor, who was then going abroad on an
official trip, this Court issued a restraining order, without bond, <enAoining the petitioner 9ice?
)ayor ;erminio Astorga from e(ercising any of the powers of an Acting )ayor purportedly
conferred upon the 9ice?)ayor of )anila under the so?called Republic Act 5#". and not
otherwise conferred upon said 9ice?)ayor under any other law until further orders from this
Court.<
The original petitioner, ;erminio A. Astorga, has since been succeeded by others as 9ice?
)ayor of )anila. Attorneys &ortunato de *eon and Antonio Ra6uiEa, with previous leave of
this Court, appeared as amici c#riae, and have filed e(tensive and highly enlightening
memoranda on the issues raised by the parties.
*engthy arguments, supported by copious citations of authorities, principally decisions of
>nited 0tates &ederal and 0tate Courts, have been submitted on the 6uestion of whether
the <enrolled bill< doctrine or the <Aournal entry< rule should be adhered to in this Aurisdiction.
A similar 6uestion came up before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of
)abanag, et al. vs. *opeE 9ito, et al. B)arch ., -$54C, 4J Phil. Reports -. @hile the maAority
of the Court in that case applied the <enrolled bill< doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the
6uestion has been laid to rest and that the decision therein constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both ;ouses of Congress
proposing an amendment to the B-$3.C Constitution to be appended as an ordinance
thereto Bthe so?called parity rights provisionC had been passed by <a vote of three?fourths of
all the members of the 0enate and of the ;ouse of Representatives< pursuant to Article 89
of the Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by ,ustice Pedro Tuason and concurred in by ,ustices )anuel
9. )oran, Guillermo &. Pablo and ,ose ). ;ontiveros, held that the case involved a political
6uestion which was not within the province of the Audiciary in view of the principle of
separation of powers in our government. The <enrolled bill< theory was relied upon merely to
bolster the ruling on the Aurisdictional 6uestion, the reasoning being that <if a political
6uestion conclusively binds the Audges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the Audges under the <enrolled bill rule< born of that
respect.<
,ustice Cesar +engEon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in by ,ustice 0abino Padilla,
holding that the Court had Aurisdiction to resolve the 6uestion presented, and affirming
categorically that <the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative Aournals are
conclusive upon us,< specifically in view of 0ection 3-3 of Act -$#, as amended by Act o.
!!-#. This provision in the Rules of 'vidence in the old Code of Civil Procedure appears
indeed to be the only statutory basis on which the <enrolled bill< theory rests. It reads=
The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress Bmay be provedC
by the Aournals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the cler% or secretary, printed
by their orderF provided, that in the case of acts of the Philippine Commission
or the Philippine *egislature, when there is in e(istence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be concl#si.e
proof of the provisions of such acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both ;ouses,
namely, by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the
printed copy of the approved bill.
2
It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of
authentication,
3
to signify to the Chief '(ecutive that the bill being presented to him has
been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or reAection.
7
The function of
an attestation is therefore not of approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has
passed both ;ouses. 'ven where such attestation is provided for in the Constitution
authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are mandatory such that their
absence would render the statute invalid.
1
The affirmative view, it is pointed out, would be in
effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to
the contrary
6
There is less reason to ma%e the attestation a re6uisite for the validity of a bill
where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill
before it is submitted to the President.
In one case in the >nited 0tates, where the B0tateCConstitution re6uired the presiding
officers to sign a bill and this provision was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated
enrolled bill was considered as conclusive proof of its due enactment.
7
Another case
however, under the same circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.
8
+ut in the case of 0ield .s. !lar+,
9
the >.0. 0upreme Court held that the
signatures of the presiding officers on a bill, although not re6uired by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the >nited 0tates are thus not
unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of 0ield .s. !lar+ as
follows=
The signing by the 0pea%er of the ;ouse of Representatives, and, by the
President of the 0enate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed Congress. It
is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional re6uirement that all bills which pass Congress
shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress,
an enrolled Act in the custody of the 0ecretary of 0tate, and having the official
attestations of the 0pea%er of the ;ouse of Representatives, of the President
of the 0enate, and of the President of the >nited 0tates, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and e(ecutive departments of the
government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and e(ecuting
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coe6ual and
independent departments re6uires the Audicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner statedF leaving the courts to determine, when the 6uestion
properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the
Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on <the respect due to coe6ual
and independent departments,< which re6uires the Audicial department <to accept, as having
passed Congress, all billsa#thenticated in the manner stated.< Thus it has also been stated
in other cases that if the attestation is a&sent and the same is not re,#ired for the .alidit( of
a stat#te, the courts may resort to the Aournals and other records of Congress for proof of its
due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of
decisions,
18
although they are silent as to whether the Aournals may still be resorted to if the
attestation of the presiding officers is present.
The B-$3.C Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill.
It does not re6uire the presiding officers to certify to the same. +ut the said Constitution
does contain the following provisions=
0ec. -# B5C. <'ach ;ouse shall %eep a ,ournal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, e(cepting such parts as may in its Audgment
re6uire secrecyF and the yeas and nays on any 6uestion shall, at the re6uest
of one?fifth of the )embers present, be entered in the ,ournal.<
0ec. !- B!C. <o bill shall be passed by either ;ouse unless it shall have been
printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its )embers at least
three calendar days prior to its passage, e(cept when the President shall
have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. >pon the last
reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the 6uestion
upon its passage shall be ta%en immediately thereafter, and
the (eas and na(s entered on the ,ournal.<
Petitioner7s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive
proof of a bill7s due enactment, re6uired, it is said, by the respect due to a co?e6ual
department of the government,
11
is neutraliEed in this case by the fact that the 0enate
President declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subse6uent
clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never
been approved by the 0enate. :bviously this declaration should be accorded even greater
respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact
and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made
by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The lawma%ing process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both ;ouses, and the certification does not add
to the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its passage. In other words
it is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Thus the B-$3.C Constitution says that <GeH very bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes law, be presented to the President.
12
In Brown .s. *orris s#pra, the
0upreme Court of )issouri, interpreting a similar provision in the 0tate Constitution, said
that the same <ma%es it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows
that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, of the
proof that it has <passed both houses< will satisfy the constitutional re6uirement.<
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the 0enate President, granting it to have been validly made, would
only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute.
;ence, it is pointed out, Republic Act o. 5#". would remain valid and binding. This
argument begs the issue. It would limit the court7s in6uiry to the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The in6uiry,
however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
conse6uently there being no enrolled bill to spea% of, what evidence is there to determine
whether or not the bill had been duly enactedM In such a case the entries in the Aournal
should be consulted.
The Aournal of the proceedings of each ;ouse of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution re6uires it. @hile it is true that the Aournal is not authenticated and is subAect to
the ris%s of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is
merely as%ed to in6uire whether the te(t of ;ouse +ill o. $!"" signed by the Chief
'(ecutive was the same te(t passed by both ;ouses of Congress. >nder the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the 0enate Aournal for
the purpose. The Aournal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the 0enate but were not incorporated in the printed
te(t sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not as%ed to incorporate such
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a ris%y underta%ing,
13
but to declare
that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law. This @e do, as indeed
both the President of the 0enate and the Chief '(ecutive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and subse6uently rectified by
the President of the 0enate and by the Chief '(ecutive, for this Court to perpetuate that
error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law
would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous conse6uences not
intended by the law?ma%ing body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so?called Republic Act
o. 5#". entitled <A ACT 1'&IIG T;' P:@'R0, RIG;T0 A1 1>TI'0 :& T;'
9IC'?)AL:R :& T;' CITL :& )AI*A, &>RT;'R A)'1IG &:R T;' P>RP:0'
0'CTI:0 T' A1 '*'9' :& R'P>+*IC ACT >)+'R'1 &:>R ;>1R'1 I',
A0 A)'1'1, :T;'R@I0' D:@ A0 T;' R'9I0'1 C;ART'R :& T;' CITL :&
)AI*A< is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The
temporary restraining order dated April !J, -$". is hereby made permanent. o
pronouncement as to costs.