Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 79255 January 20, 1992
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), petitioner,
vs.
BENIGNO VIVAR, JR., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC. (formerly
FILIPRO, INC.), respondents.
Jose C. Espinas for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This labor dispute stems from the exclusion of sales personnel from the holiday pay award and the change of the divisor in
the computation of benefits from 251 to 261 days.
On November 8, 1985, respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) a petition for declaratory relief seeking a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its
monthly paid employees for holiday pay in the light of the Court's decision in Chartered Bank Employees Association
v. Ople (138 SCRA 273 [1985]).
Both Filipro and the Union of Filipino Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the case for voluntary arbitration and appointed
respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as voluntary arbitrator.
On January 2, 1980, Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to:
pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the Code, subject only to the
exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82 and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the
Code. (Rollo,
p. 31)
Filipro filed a motion for clarification seeking (1) the limitation of the award to three years, (2) the exclusion of salesmen,
sales representatives, truck drivers, merchandisers and medical representatives (hereinafter referred to as sales personnel)
from the award of the holiday pay, and (3) deduction from the holiday pay award of overpayment for overtime, night
differential, vacation and sick leave benefits due to the use of 251 divisor. (Rollo, pp. 138-145)
Petitioner UFE answered that the award should be made effective from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, that their
sales personnel are not field personnel and are therefore entitled to holiday pay, and that the use of 251 as divisor is an
established employee benefit which cannot be diminished.
On January 14, 1986, the respondent arbitrator issued an order declaring that the effectivity of the holiday pay award shall
retroact to November 1, 1974, the date of effectivity of the Labor Code. He adjudged, however, that the company's sales
personnel are field personnel and, as such, are not entitled to holiday pay. He likewise ruled that with the grant of 10 days'
holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 and ordered the reimbursement of overpayment for overtime,
night differential, vacation and sick leave pay due to the use of 251 days as divisor.
Both Nestle and UFE filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration. Respondent Arbitrator treated the two
motions as appeals and forwarded the case to the NLRC which issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 remanding the case to
the respondent arbitrator on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to review decisions in voluntary arbitration cases
pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code as amended by Section 10, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and as implemented by
Section 5 of the rules implementing B.P. Blg. 130.
However, in a letter dated July 6, 1987, the respondent arbitrator refused to take cognizance of the case reasoning that he
had no more jurisdiction to continue as arbitrator because he had resigned from service effective May 1, 1986.
Hence, this petition.
The petitioner union raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not Nestle's sales personnel are entitled to holiday pay; and
2) Whether or not, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days and
whether or not the previous use of 251 as divisor resulted in overpayment for overtime, night differential, vacation and sick
leave pay.
The petitioner insists that respondent's sales personnel are not field personnel under Article 82 of the Labor Code. The
respondent company controverts this assertion.
Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article defines field personnel as "non-agritultural
employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty."
The controversy centers on the interpretation of the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty."
It is undisputed that these sales personnel start their field work at 8:00 a.m. after having reported to the office and come
back to the office at 4:00 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. if they are Makati-based.
The petitioner maintains that the period between 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. comprises the sales personnel's working
hours which can be determined with reasonable certainty.
The Court does not agree. The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably ascertained. The
company has no way of determining whether or not these sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m.
prior to field work and come back at 4:30 p.m, really spend the hours in between in actual field work.
We concur with the following disquisition by the respondent arbitrator:
The requirement for the salesmen and other similarly situated employees to report for work at the office at
8:00 a.m. and return at 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. is not within the realm of work in the field as defined in the Code
but an exercise of purely management prerogative of providing administrative control over such personnel.
This does not in any manner provide a reasonable level of determination on the actual field work of the
employees which can be reasonably ascertained. The theoretical analysis that salesmen and other similarly-
situated workers regularly report for work at 8:00 a.m. and return to their home station at 4:00 or 4:30
p.m., creating the assumption that their field work is supervised, is surface projection. Actual field work
begins after 8:00 a.m., when the sales personnel follow their field itinerary, and ends immediately before
4:00 or 4:30 p.m. when they report back to their office. The period between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 or 4:30 p.m.
comprises their hours of work in the field, the extent or scope and result of which are subject to their
individual capacity and industry and which "cannot be determined with reasonable certainty." This is the
reason why effective supervision over field work of salesmen and medical representatives, truck drivers and
merchandisers is practically a physical impossibility. Consequently, they are excluded from the ten holidays
with pay award. (Rollo, pp. 36-37)
Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be
read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
While contending that such rule added another element not found in the law (Rollo, p. 13), the petitioner nevertheless
attempted to show that its affected members are not covered by the abovementioned rule. The petitioner asserts that the
company's sales personnel are strictly supervised as shown by the SOD (Supervisor of the Day) schedule and the company
circular dated March 15, 1984 (Annexes 2 and 3, Rollo, pp. 53-55).
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned rule did not add another element to the
Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause "whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer" did not
amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause "whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty." The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel.
Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee's actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable
certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such employee's time and performance is constantly supervised by the
employer.
The SOD schedule adverted to by the petitioner does not in the least signify that these sales personnel's time and
performance are supervised. The purpose of this schedule is merely to ensure that the sales personnel are out of the office not
later than 8:00 a.m. and are back in the office not earlier than 4:00 p.m.
Likewise, the Court fails to see how the company can monitor the number of actual hours spent in field work by an employee
through the imposition of sanctions on absenteeism contained in the company circular of March 15, 1984.
The petitioner claims that the fact that these sales personnel are given incentive bonus every quarter based on their
performance is proof that their actual hours of work in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty.
The Court thinks otherwise.
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales volume based on sales target; (2) good collection
performance; (3) proper compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5) minimal market returns;
and (6) proper truck maintenance. (Rollo, p. 190).
The above criteria indicate that these sales personnel are given incentive bonuses precisely because of the difficulty in
measuring their actual hours of field work. These employees are evaluated by the result of their work and not by the actual
hours of field work which are hardly susceptible to determination.
In San Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Democratic Labor Organization (8 SCRA 613 [1963]), the Court had occasion to discuss the
nature of the job of a salesman. Citing the case of Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, C.C.A. Okla., 118 F. 2d 202, the Court stated:
The reasons for excluding an outside salesman are fairly apparent. Such a salesman, to a greater extent,
works individually. There are no restrictions respecting the time he shall work and he can earn as much or
as little, within the range of his ability, as his ambition dictates. In lieu of overtime he ordinarily receives
commissions as extra compensation. He works away from his employer's place of business, is not subject to
the personal supervision of his employer, and his employer has no way of knowing the number of hours he
works per day.
While in that case the issue was whether or not salesmen were entitled to overtime pay, the same rationale for their
exclusion as field personnel from holiday pay benefits also applies.
The petitioner union also assails the respondent arbitrator's ruling that, concomitant with the award of holiday pay, the
divisor should be changed from 251 to 261 days to include the additional 10 holidays and the employees should reimburse the
amounts overpaid by Filipro due to the use of 251 days' divisor.
Arbitrator Vivar's rationale for his decision is as follows:
. . . The new doctrinal policy established which ordered payment of ten holidays certainly adds to or
accelerates the basis of conversion and computation by ten days. With the inclusion of ten holidays as paid
days, the divisor is no longer 251 but 261 or 262 if election day is counted. This is indeed an extremely
difficult legal question of interpretation which accounts for what is claimed as falling within the concept of
"solutio indebti."
When the claim of the Union for payment of ten holidays was granted, there was a consequent need to
abandon that 251 divisor. To maintain it would create an impossible situation where the employees would
benefit with additional ten days with pay but would simultaneously enjoy higher benefits by discarding the
same ten days for purposes of computing overtime and night time services and considering sick and
vacation leave credits. Therefore, reimbursement of such overpayment with the use of 251 as divisor arises
concomitant with the award of ten holidays with pay. (Rollo, p. 34)
The divisor assumes an important role in determining whether or not holiday pay is already included in the monthly paid
employee's salary and in the computation of his daily rate. This is the thrust of our pronouncement inChartered Bank
Employees Association v. Ople (supra). In that case, We held:
It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in the policy instruction, the
company practice indicates that the monthly salaries of the employees are so computed as to include the
holiday pay provided by law. The petitioner contends otherwise.
One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that the Chartered Bank, in computing
overtime compensation for its employees, employs a "divisor" of 251 days. The 251 working days divisor is
the result of subtracting all Saturdays, Sundays and the ten (10) legal holidays from the total number of
calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for all non-working days, the divisor should be
365 and not 251.
In the petitioner's case, its computation of daily ratio since September 1, 1980, is as follows:
monthly rate x 12 months

251 days
Following the criterion laid down in the Chartered Bank case, the use of 251 days' divisor by respondent Filipro indicates
that holiday pay is not yet included in the employee's salary, otherwise the divisor should have been 261.
It must be stressed that the daily rate, assuming there are no intervening salary increases, is a constant figure for the
purpose of computing overtime and night differential pay and commutation of sick and vacation leave credits. Necessarily,
the daily rate should also be the same basis for computing the 10 unpaid holidays.
The respondent arbitrator's order to change the divisor from 251 to 261 days would result in a lower daily rate which is
violative of the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits found in Article 100 of the Labor Code. To maintain the same daily
rate if the divisor is adjusted to 261 days, then the dividend, which represents the employee's annual salary, should
correspondingly be increased to incorporate the holiday pay. To illustrate, if prior to the grant of holiday pay, the employee's
annual salary is P25,100, then dividing such figure by 251 days, his daily rate is P100.00 After the payment of 10 days'
holiday pay, his annual salary already includes holiday pay and totals P26,100 (P25,100 + 1,000). Dividing this by 261 days,
the daily rate is still P100.00. There is thus no merit in respondent Nestle's claim of overpayment of overtime and night
differential pay and sick and vacation leave benefits, the computation of which are all based on the daily rate, since the daily
rate is still the same before and after the grant of holiday pay.
Respondent Nestle's invocation of solutio indebiti, or payment by mistake, due to its use of 251 days as divisor must fail in
light of the Labor Code mandate that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor." (Article 4). Moreover, prior to September 1, 1980,
when the company was on a 6-day working schedule, the divisor used by the company was 303, indicating that the 10
holidays were likewise not paid. When Filipro shifted to a 5-day working schebule on September 1, 1980, it had the chance to
rectify its error, if ever there was one but did not do so. It is now too late to allege payment by mistake.
Nestle also questions the voluntary arbitrator's ruling that holiday pay should be computed from November 1, 1974. This
ruling was not questioned by the petitioner union as obviously said decision was favorable to it. Technically, therefore,
respondent Nestle should have filed a separate petition raising the issue of effectivity of the holiday pay award. This Court
has ruled that an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the
judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has
also appealed. (Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989], citing La Campana Food Products, Inc. v.
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394 [1986]). Nevertheless, in order to fully settle the issues so that
the execution of the Court's decision in this case may not be needlessly delayed by another petition, the Court resolved to
take up the matter of effectivity of the holiday pay award raised by Nestle.
Nestle insists that the reckoning period for the application of the holiday pay award is 1985 when the Chartered
Bank decision, promulgated on August 28, 1985, became final and executory, and not from the date of effectivity of the Labor
Code. Although the Court does not entirely agree with Nestle, we find its claim meritorious.
In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 [1984], hereinafter referred to
as the IBAA case, the Court declared that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No.
9, issued by the then Secretary of Labor on February 16, 1976 and April 23, 1976, respectively, and which excluded monthly
paid employees from holiday pay benefits, are null and void. The Court therein reasoned that, in the guise of clarifying the
Labor Code's provisions on holiday pay, the aforementioned implementing rule and policy instruction amended them by
enlarging the scope of their exclusion. The Chartered Bank case reiterated the above ruling and added the "divisor" test.
However, prior to their being declared null and void, the implementing rule and policy instruction enjoyed the presumption
of validity and hence, Nestle's non-payment of the holiday benefit up to the promulgation of the IBAA case on October 23,
1984 was in compliance with these presumably valid rule and policy instruction.
In the case of De Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, 38 SCRA 429 [1971], the Court discussed the effect to be given to a
legislative or executive act subsequently declared invalid:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive
act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an
appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted
under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation and
presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the
judiciary is the government organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that
may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then,
if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution
in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1952]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738
[1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez
v. Cuerva and Co. (21 SCRA 1095 [1967]. (At pp. 434-435)
The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and resulting unfairness
must be avoided. It is now almost the end of 1991. To require various companies to reach back to 1975now and nullify acts
done in good faith is unduly harsh. 1984 is a fairer reckoning period under the facts of this case.
Applying the aforementioned doctrine to the case at bar, it is not far-fetched that Nestle, relying on the implicit validity of
the implementing rule and policy instruction before this Court nullified them, and thinking that it was not obliged to give
holiday pay benefits to its monthly paid employees, may have been moved to grant other concessions to its employees,
especially in the collective bargaining agreement. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that respondent Nestle's employees
are among the highest paid in the industry. With this consideration, it would be unfair to impose additional burdens on
Nestle when the non-payment of the holiday benefits up to 1984 was not in any way attributed to Nestle's fault.
The Court thereby resolves that the grant of holiday pay be effective, not from the date of promulgation of the Chartered
Bank case nor from the date of effectivity of the Labor Code, but from October 23, 1984, the date of promulgation of the IBAA
case.
WHEREFORE, the order of the voluntary arbitrator in hereby MODIFIED. The divisor to be used in computing holiday pay
shall be 251 days. The holiday pay as above directed shall be computed from October 23, 1984. In all other respects, the order
of the respondent arbitrator is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Grio-Aquino, Regalado,
Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Cruz and Nocon, JJ., took no part.
What if they report at 8:00 a.m. (when they start work) and report back at 4:00 p.m. (after which they go home)?
In addition, they receive an incentive bonus. They claim that that bonus based on their sales shows you can
determine their hours on the field.
NO. The SUPREME COURT says the incentive bonus is there precisely because there is no way to measuring
their actual hours of work.
You have to read it in conjunction with rules on holiday pay: excluded from its coverage are field personnel and
other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised. (Union of Filipro Employees vs. Vivar)







Cagampan, et. al. vs NLRC
Hours Worked

G.R. Nos. 85122-24 March 22, 1991

JULIO N. CAGAMPAN, SILVINO C. VICERA, JORGE C. DE CASTRO, JUANITO R. DE JESUS, ARNOLD J. MIRANDA, ,
MAXIMO O. ROSELLO & ANICETO L. BETANA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, & ACE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., respondents.

Facts:

On April 17 and 18,1985, petitioners, all seamen, entered into separate contracts of employment with the Golden Light
Ocean Transport, Ltd., through its local agency, private respondent ACE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.

Thereafter, petitioners collectively and/or individually filed complaints for non-payment of overtime pay, vacation pay and
terminal pay against private respondent. In addition, they claimed that they were made to sign their contracts in blank.
Likewise, petitioners averred that although they agreed to render services on board the vessel Rio Colorado managed by
Golden Light Ocean Transport, Ltd., the vessel they actually boarded was MV "SOIC I" managed by Columbus Navigation.
Two (2) petitioners, Jorge de Castro and Juanito de Jesus, charged that although they were employed as ordinary seamen
(OS), they actually performed the work and duties of Able Seamen (AB).

Private respondent was furnished with copies of petitioners' complaints and summons, but it failed to file its answer within
the reglementary period. Thus, on January 12, 1987, an Order was issued declaring that private respondent has waived its
right to present evidence in its behalf and that the cases are submitted for decision (Page 68, Records).

The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) rendered a Decision dismissing petitioners' claim for terminal
pay but granted their prayer for leave pay and overtime pay.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners, even without sufficient evidence of actual rendition of overtime work, would automatically be
entitled to overtime pay.

Ruling:

No. The NLRC ruling on the disallowance of overtime pay is ably supported by the fact that petitioners never produced any
proof of actual performance of overtime work.

The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for computing the overtime pay if and
when overtime work would be rendered. Simply, stated, the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof
that said work was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to overtime pay which
should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees the right to
overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be established.

Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour
work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his
personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair and unreasonable.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioners Cagampan and Vicera
are awarded their leave pay according to the terms of the contract.