General Makarov Warns of Possible Nuclear War: May 11, 2012 EIR Strategy 19

May 11, 2012 EIR Strategy 19
With regard to further actions, it is entirely up to

those who make the relevant decisions today. If our
signal is not heard, then, as I said on Nov. 23, we will
deploy other defense means, including the adoption of
tough countermeasures and deployment of the main
attack force.
The station has been put on combat duty, which
means that it has begun to work as a nished facility,
although a number of parameters are still to be built up
over time. . . .
General Makarov Warns
Of Possible Nuclear War
Gen. Nikolai Makarov, the chief of the General Staff
of the Russian Armed Forces, stated on Nov. 17, 2011,
I cannot rule out that, in certain circumstances, local
and regional armed conicts could grow into a large-
scale war, possibly even with nuclear weapons. Ad-
dressing the Russian Public Chamber, a Kremlin advi-
sory body which includes numerous policy
heavyweights, Makarov stated that Russia could be
involved in a conict where weapons of mass destruc-
tion could be used. . . . The possibility of local armed
conicts virtually along the entire perimeter of the
[Russian] border has grown dramatically.
Makarov was referring specically to NATOs ex-
pansion eastward since the collapse of the Soviet
Unionincluding efforts to get Ukraine and Georgia
to join NATOas well as the U.S.-led plan to place
missile defense systems along the Russian border. But
his remarks are also an unmistakeable warning in the
context of the British-Obama drumbeat for war against
Iran and Syria.
Then, on Feb. 15, 2012, Markarov said that Russia
has the right to use nuclear weapons if its sovereignty
is threatened. In an interview with the radio station
Ekho Moskvy, he said, We are certainly not plan-
ning to ght against the whole of NATO, but if there
is a threat to the integrity of the Russian Federation,
we have the right to use nuclear weapons, and we
will.
The general said, according to RIA Novosti, that
Russias nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of strate-
gic stability, and serious efforts are being taken by the
Russian government to modernize the countrys nu-
clear triad.
Dr. Theodore Postol:
BMD Threatens Russia
In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration turned
down Russian President Vladimir Putins offer of co-
operation on a radar system to protect against missile
threatsas a substitute for Bushs planned deploy-
ment of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in
Poland and the Czech Republic, which Russia saw as
a strategic threat. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) claimed that Bushs plan was no threat to
Russia, because the BMD system was too limited in
scope.
President Putin and Russian Chief of Staff Gen.
Col. Yuri Baluyevsky strongly disagreed, and prom-
ised an asymmetric response if the U.S. BMD de-
ployment in Europe went ahead. It turns out, a top
U.S. ofcial also disagrees.
NATO
Chief of the General Staff Gen. Nikolai Makarov: Russia
retains the right to use nuclear weapons if there is a threat to
its integrity.
20 Strategy EIR May 11, 2012
As Marsha Freeman reported in EIR,
Sept. 14, 2007, Dr. Theodore Postol of
MIT, a nuclear engineer and former sci-
entic advisor to the Chief of Naval Op-
erations, in an Aug. 28 brieng, declared
that the proposed U.S. BMD system is a
threat to Russia, and also proposed alter-
natives. Whats at stake, he stated, is a
policy confrontation with Russia, if
Russian complaints are technically legit-
imate.
Dr. Postol took apart a brieng
given in Europe in March by the direc-
tor of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency,
who had attempted to assure allies and
friends that the new system would not
be a threat to Russia. But the presenta-
tion used numbers that are incorrect,
for the speed of the Russian ICBMs
and of the interceptors, and the relative
distances involved, Postol said. Using the correct
numbers, it is clear that, minutes after a Russian
ICBM launch, the misssile could be intercepted by a
Polish-based missile. The bottom line he said, is
that a two-stage interceptor placed in Poland, could
take on all [Russian] ICBMs [stationed] east of the
Ural Mountains, launched toward the East Coast of
the United States.
Freeman explained that the Russians are concerned
that these BMD systems would be used to suppress
Russias retaliatory capability following a U.S. attack,
hitting Russian second-strike missiles in their boost
phase.
Dr. Postol expressed serious concerns about the
effectiveness of the U.S. interceptor system. It is
not clear this thing is going to work, he said. For
that reason, the current system is not a threat at all,
but could be perceived as the leading edge of a more
advanced system. The speaker quoted from Presi-
dential National Security Directive 23, of Dec. 6,
2002, which stated that the U.S. would begin to
deploy missile defenses as a starting point for
fielding improved and expanded missile defenses
later.
This, he said, would indicate to the Russians that
the current defense deployment in Europe is only the
leading edge of a much larger and more capable future
deployment.
The Same Thing Under Obama
Since Freemans report appeared, Dr. Postol has
continued to educate the public on the twofold danger:
alarming our NATO allies with a system that does not
work as promised, and alarming Russia with a system
that is a potential threat to its national security.
In a May 2010 article for the Arms Control Asso-
ciation, A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile De-
fense Plan, co-authored with George N. Lewis,
Postol warned that the Obama Administration, while
changing some features of the Bush BMD policy, has
replaced it with a new vision that is nothing more
than a ction and . . . could well lead to a foreign policy
disaster.
The United States could damage its relations with
allies and friends by pushing on them false and unreli-
able solutions to real security problems. It will antago-
nize Russia and China with massive defense deploy-
ments that have the appearance of being designed to be
exibly adaptable to deal with Russian and Chinese
strategic forces.
The authors concluded: This new missile defense
program could then lead to the usual results: giganti-
cally expensive systems that have little real capability
but create uncertainties that cause other states to react
in ways that are not in the security interest of the United
States.
Such as nuclear war?
Dr. Ted Postol on Russian TV, May 20, 2010.

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May 11, 2012 EIR Strategy 19

With regard to further actions, it is entirely up to

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