BOOK REVI EW

Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (eds):

The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism
and Realism
Re.Press, Melbourne, Australia, 2009, 416 pp, $40.00 pbk
Geoff Pfeifer
Published online: 4 April 2012
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012
The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism is an engaging
anthology that brings together, in twenty-three essays and two interviews, a diverse
array of scholars (both established and at the beginning of their careers) whose
thought falls under the domain of the two terms in the subtitle. Though there is little
agreement to be found amongst these essays as to the specics of this new
speculative philosophy of realism and/or materialism (the two terms are not
meant to be synonyms), all of the thinkers in this collection share a critical stance
toward, andfor somean outright rejection of, what has been for quite some time
now a standard position in continental thought.
The position, which the essays in this collection challenge, exists across various
traditions in continental philosophy and is described by the editors of The
Speculative Turn in their introductory essay as the view that tacitly holds that we
can aim our thoughts at being, exist as beings-in-the-world, or have phenomenal
experience of the world, yet we can never consistently speak about a realm
independent of language or thought (pp. 34). In other words, this view holds that
we cannot get outside of subjectivity (or consciousness) in our attempts at making
sense of the world. This philosophical position goes by the name correlationism
in this collectionas it claims that the only reality we have access to is reality as a
correlate of thoughta moniker coined by Quentin Meillassoux, in his now fairly
famous 2006 book After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency.
Correlationism, is a form of philosophical anti-realism, as the editors of The
Speculative Turn point out (and as described above), insofar as it denies us any
access to the way things arethe realoutside of thought. All of the essays in this
collection seek to challenge correlationist domination by re-asserting in various
forms, a kind of realism and/or materialism that offers theoretical speculation as to
the nature of reality apart from thought (that is, apart from its correlation with
G. Pfeifer (&)
Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, MA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
1 3
Hum Stud (2012) 35:465469
DOI 10.1007/s10746-012-9218-0
thought) and as such, a reality that has an effect on, and in many ways determines
thought, rather than being determined by it. As the editors want to make clear,
however, none of the thinkers in this volume seeks a simple return to a pre-critical
philosophy, with its dogmatic belief in the powers of pure reason but rather each
seeks to recuperate a pre-critical sense of speculation as a concern with the
Absolute, while also taking into account the undeniable progress that is due to the
labor of critique (p. 3). While I can in no way deal adequately with each of the
twenty-ve contributions to this collection in this short review essay, I will attempt
to briey reconstruct some of the main lines of thought that are reected within its
pages.
After a very short interview with Alain Badiou, in which he both advocates for
the project of the book and attempts to distinguish his own thought from some of the
views here, there are a series of essays centered on exploring the nature and
importance of mind independent objects in philosophy and non-correlationist
philosophical speculation. This series is led off by Graham Harman who in an essay
exploring the work fellow Speculative Realist Ian Hamilton Grant, asserts his own
realist position, which he calls an object-oriented metaphysics (p. 22). Harman
describes this position as a metaphysics which steadfastly asserts the existence of
mind-independent objects that are unied entities with specic qualities that are
autonomous from us and other objects and exist even when we sleep or die, and
which unleash forces against one another whether we like it or not (p. 22). Harman
takes pains to point out, however, that we should not confuse his realism with a kind
of na ve common-sense realism. He argues, rather, that his realist position should be
seen as similar to a Platonist conception in which the world (and presumably its
objects) is not the world as manifest to humans (p. 26). Or at least, the world is
not exhausted by what appears to humans in thought. It is necessary on Harmans
accounting of things to attempt to think a reality beyond our thinking (p. 26).
Such speculative objects are, for Harman, site[s] of polarization, ambiguity, or
weirdness insofar as theyand their featuresare both autonomous; that is, they
are parts of a reality beyond our thinking, and also, as he points out, not completely
autonomous from one another and from us (p. 24). He goes on to argue that the
sphere of human access is not an ultimate reality to which all reality would be
reduced, but a phenomenal product of such a reality in other words, the
phenomenal worldthe world of correlationismis itself to be conceived of, from
this speculative position as produced by a reality that exceeds it, of which objects
are an integral part (p. 26).
Ian Hamilton Grant, in his response to Harman, attempts to show that Harmans
object-oriented realist positionwhich conceives of objects as constituents of the
real in excess of the idealdoes not go far enough. Grants speculative position
argues that what we must come to see is that the conditions upon which a given
objects existence depends do not belong to that objectthey are not its
conditions but conditions that possibilize it (p. 43). Grant argues further that,
Since conditions exceed the object, they are equally the conditions involved in
other existing objects and thus, not only do such conditions not belong to any
object as such, but they also do not end with the production of any particular object
(p. 43). Grants Speculative realism then is a realism of such conditions. He
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conceives of these conditions not as substances but rather as what he calls powers
which are the real that underlie the existence (and contribute to the production) of
objects. For Grant these powers are natural history in the precise sense that
powers are not simply formally or logically inseparable from what they do, but are
what they do, and compose being in its becoming (p. 46).
Ray Brassier, in his contribution to this collection, argues for a speculative return
to the distinction between concept and object, one that is done away with in
correlationist thought. Brassiers piece is, in this regard, a nice rounding out of this
rst sub-section of the book in that it calls to mind the collective project that
Harman and Grant are engaged in (despite differences in how they go about it). Both
are, in a way, doing exactly what Brassier recommends; they are both attempting to
get back to an objective world that is not simply dened by mind-dependant
concepts. Whether that world is populated by objects in Harmans sense or
powers in Grants, they both would agree with Brassier when he states that, it is
undoubtably true that we cannot conceive of concept independent things without
conceiving of them, that is, without making them into objects of cognition (and
hence correlates of thought), but it by no means follows from this that we cannot
conceive of things existing independently of concepts, since there is no logical
transitivity from the mind independence of concepts to that of conceivable objects
(p. 58).
After another piece by Grant, there are a series of critical essays on Meillassouxs
After Finitude. The rst four in this series (Alberto Toscano, Adrian Johnston,
Martin Hagglund, and Peter Hallward) offer up a variety of criticisms of
Meillassouxs speculative attack on correlationism as given in After Finitude.
Toscanos main line of criticism is that Meillassoux inadvertently undermines his
own materialism in his attempt at getting out of the ontological presuppositions of
correlationism by offering a logical solution, which is not as Toscano points out, a
materialist solution (p. 91). Hagglunds piece mobilizes Derridas conception of the
work of mourning, in connection with Derridas hauntological philosophy of
history, in order to mount a critique of Meillassouxs atheism. Johnstons
contribution also critiques Meillassouxs professed atheistic materialism arguing
that Meillassouxs thought harbors an unrecognized theology (p. 95). Both Hallward
and Johnston criticize Meillassoux for equivocating on the distinction between
metaphysical and natural necessity and confusing pure and applied mathematics
(pp. 110, 138140). Nathan Browns piece steps into defend Meillassoux from
Hallwards (and Johnsons) objections and in doing so, seeks to forge a bond
between Meillassouxs work and that of Louis Althussers brand of dialectical
materialism. There is, later in the book, a piece by Meillassoux himself, but it is a
translation of an essay written well before the critiques offered here and, though it is
a good representation of Meillassouxs overall position (and an excellent choice to
include given Z

izeks use of it as described below), it would have been nice, given

the extent to which Meillassouxs work is both discussed and acts as the backdrop
for much of the work in this volume, to see a response by Meillassoux himself to
some of the criticisms launched here rather than only something previously
published (though I realize that there may have been a multitude of reasons why this
was not possible).
The Speculative Turn 467
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Returning to the essays themselves, Browns piece marks a nice transition to a
series of essays that explore the social and political import of realist and materialist
thinking. Here we nd Nick Sirncek deploying the work of an number of thinkers
including Francois Laruelle (who also has an essay in this collection which appears
later and which can be consulted for further background to Sirnceks arguments),
Deleuze, and Hardt and Negri in an attempt to think a realism that is outside of what
he identies as the self-sufcient circle of capitalist production that was later
replicated in thought and which dominates and determines both society and forms
of philosophy produced within it (p. 173). It is the non-philosophical subject as
aided by Laruelles non-philosophy that is able to, on Sirnceks account, gain
access to this real.
John Protevi, in his contribution, which appears much later in the book but
nonetheless belongs to the subset of essays under discussion here, explores the
a-subjective, material genesis of affects in individuals. These are, Protevi argues, at
least partially the result of social practices, which have their existence in the body
politic that exists externally to any given individual subject and thus can be
considered as social objects which partially at least, construct both the thought of
individuals and the experience that individuals have of their own emotions (p. 375).
In a theoretically dense, but ultimately compelling essay, Reza Negarestani
points out the problems of a leftist politics based on speculative thought; arguing
that these problems arise, in part, because of the nature of speculative philosophys
attempt to think outside the human. Relegating humanity to being determined by the
preor extrahuman real, means (in some ways) that the humans ability to
participate in emancipatory projects is radically curtailed. Negarestani shows how
this has lead some thinkershis example is Nick Lands workto endow
capitalism itself with emancipatory powers. Thus, as Negarestani argues, for some,
speculative thought contributes to the cult of Capital and occludes both thinking
and praxis (p. 185). Negarestani goes on to argue, however, that this need not
happen, that speculative thought can be reoriented in such a way as to allow for a
radical political practice insofar as it can be put in service of a kind of auto-critique
of those who make use of its tools for the purposes briey outlined above. A
properly understood speculative philosophyread through a properly understood
Freudian theory of the death drivereveals, according to Negarestani, that
capitalism is not at all the real of the extra-human world harboring the potential for
an (anti-humanist form of) emancipation, but is instead all-to-human and exists in
rigid conformity to the anthropic horizon (p. 198).
Following this is an essay by Slavoj Z

izek in which he offers a materialist re-

reading of Hegel, which is also further explored in the interview with Z

izek found at
the end of this collection. While this has been a project of Z

izeks for some time

now, those who are familiar with his work in this area will nd that it takes on an
incredibly lucid air in this particular essay, and those unfamiliar with this way of
thinking of Hegel would do well to start here. Z

izek draws a connection in his essay

between his reading of Hegel and Meillasouxs realist project. Z

izek argues that,

against those that claim that Hegels system has no room for contingency and
indeterminacy, one should read Hegel as offering us an understanding of an
Absolute which is best characterized as nothing other than the open and contingent
468 G. Pfeifer
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process through which [the] Whole forms itself, a process which is itself never
nished or totalizing (p. 215). This, as Z

izek points out, can be productively read

alongside Meillassouxs post-metaphysical materialist ontology whose basic
premise is the Cantorian multiplicity of innites which cannot be totalized into
an all-encompassing One (p. 215). Meillassoux outlines the position Z

izek draws
on in the aforementioned essay, Potentiality and Virtuality which directly follows
Z

izeks own.
Next is Levi Bryants excellent piece entitled the Ontic Principle: Outline of an
Object Oriented Ontology. In it, Bryant offers a speculative realist position which
is again distinct from Harmans realism of objects and Grants realism of
powers insofar as it takes difference to be the minimal criterion for being
and hence foundational for understanding the being of objects. As Bryant puts the
claim, if a difference is made, then the being is (p. 269). In a proto-structuralist
fashion then, it is relationalityrather than thoughtthat denes the being of
objects for Bryant. The differences that are expressed in the relations between things
are what Bryant calls Inhuman or extra-human as, the being of difference is in
no way dependant on knowledge or consciousness, in other words, for Bryants
realism, difference is, whether or not we are, its existence is, in this way indifferent
to ours (p. 267). The collection continues with essays by Steven Shaviro, Bruno
Latour, Gabriel Catran, Isabelle Stengers, and Manuel DeLanda. Each of which
offers variations on, and investigations of, the themes of Realism and Materialism as
described above.
In all, the essays collected together in this volume offer the readerboth those
looking to understand this movement and those already well-versed in itan in-
depth look at the various, and sometimes conicting ways in which a number of
contemporary thinkers are working to understand, develop, and extend this new
philosophical movement. For anyone interested in this area or more generally, in
new developments in philosophical thinking, either from a critical perspective or a
non-critical one, this is welcome addition. It is, furthermore, open-access and
available for free download at the publishers website which makes it very easy for
anyone to gain access to.
The Speculative Turn 469
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