SCADA

1
SCADA
This article is about the industrial control computer system. For the genus of butterflies, see Scada.
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) is a system operating with coded signals over communication
channels so as to provide control of remote equipment (using typically one communication channel per remote
station). The supervisory system may be combined with a data acquisition system by adding the use of coded signals
over communication channels to acquire information about the status of the remote equipment for display or for
recording functions. It is a type of industrial control system (ICS). Industrial control systems are computer-based
systems that monitor and control industrial processes that exist in the physical world. SCADA systems historically
distinguish themselves from other ICS systems by being large-scale processes that can include multiple sites, and
large distances. These processes include industrial, infrastructure, and facility-based processes, as described below:
Industrial processes include those of manufacturing, production, power generation, fabrication, and refining, and
may run in continuous, batch, repetitive, or discrete modes.
Infrastructure processes may be public or private, and include water treatment and distribution, wastewater
collection and treatment, oil and gas pipelines, electrical power transmission and distribution, wind farms, civil
defense siren systems, and large communication systems.
Facility processes occur both in public facilities and private ones, including buildings, airports, ships, and space
stations. They monitor and control heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems (HVAC), access, and energy
consumption.
Common system components
A SCADA system usually consists of the following subsystems:
Remote terminal units (RTUs) connect to sensors in the process and convert sensor signals to digital data. They
have telemetry hardware capable of sending digital data to the supervisory system, as well as receiving digital
commands from the supervisory system. RTUs often have embedded control capabilities such as ladder logic in
order to accomplish boolean logic operations.
Programmable logic controller (PLCs) connect to sensors in the process and converting sensor signals to digital
data. PLCs have more sophisticated embedded control capabilities, typically one or more IEC 61131-3
programming languages, than RTUs. PLCs do not have telemetry hardware, although this functionality is
typically installed alongside them. PLCs are sometimes used in place of RTUs as field devices because they are
more economical, versatile, flexible, and configurable.
A telemetry system is typically used to connect PLCs and RTUs with control centers, data warehouses, and the
enterprise. Examples of wired telemetry media used in SCADA systems include leased telephone lines and WAN
circuits. Examples of wireless telemetry media used in SCADA systems include satellite (VSAT), licensed and
unlicensed radio, cellular and microwave.
A data acquisition server is a software service which uses industrial protocols to connect software services, via
telemetry, with field devices such as RTUs and PLCs. It allows clients to access data from these field devices
using standard protocols.
A humanmachine interface or HMI is the apparatus or device which presents processed data to a human
operator, and through this, the human operator monitors and interacts with the process. The HMI is a client that
requests data from a data acquisition server.
A Historian is a software service which accumulates time-stamped data, boolean events, and boolean alarms in a
database which can be queried or used to populate graphic trends in the HMI. The historian is a client that
requests data from a data acquisition server.
A supervisory (computer) system, gathering (acquiring) data on the process and sending commands (control) to
the SCADA system.
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Communication infrastructure connecting the supervisory system to the remote terminal units.
Various process and analytical instrumentation
Systems concepts
The term SCADA usually refers to centralized systems which monitor and control entire sites, or complexes of
systems spread out over large areas (anything from an industrial plant to a nation). Most control actions are
performed automatically by RTUs or by PLCs. Host control functions are usually restricted to basic overriding or
supervisory level intervention. For example, a PLC may control the flow of cooling water through part of an
industrial process, but the SCADA system may allow operators to change the set points for the flow, and enable
alarm conditions, such as loss of flow and high temperature, to be displayed and recorded. The feedback control loop
passes through the RTU or PLC, while the SCADA system monitors the overall performance of the loop.
SCADA's schematic overview
Data acquisition begins at the RTU or PLC level and includes meter
readings and equipment status reports that are communicated to
SCADA as required. Data is then compiled and formatted in such a
way that a control room operator using the HMI can make supervisory
decisions to adjust or override normal RTU (PLC) controls. Data may
also be fed to a Historian, often built on a commodity Database
Management System, to allow trending and other analytical auditing.
SCADA systems typically implement a distributed database,
commonly referred to as a tag database, which contains data elements
called tags or points. A point represents a single input or output value
monitored or controlled by the system. Points can be either "hard" or
"soft". A hard point represents an actual input or output within the system, while a soft point results from logic and
math operations applied to other points. (Most implementations conceptually remove the distinction by making every
property a "soft" point expression, which may, in the simplest case, equal a single hard point.) Points are normally
stored as value-timestamp pairs: a value, and the timestamp when it was recorded or calculated. A series of
value-timestamp pairs gives the history of that point. It is also common to store additional metadata with tags, such
as the path to a field device or PLC register, design time comments, and alarm information.
SCADA systems are significantly important systems used in national infrastructures such as electric grids, water
supplies and pipelines. However, SCADA systems may have security vulnerabilities, so the systems should be
evaluated to identify risks and solutions implemented to mitigate those risks.
Humanmachine interface
Typical basic SCADA animations
[1]
A humanmachine interface (HMI) is the input-output device through
which the human operator controls the process, and which presents
process data to a human operator.
HMI is usually linked to the SCADA system's databases and software
programs, to provide trending, diagnostic data, and management
information such as scheduled maintenance procedures, logistic
information, detailed schematics for a particular sensor or machine,
and expert-system troubleshooting guides.
The HMI system usually presents the information to the operating personnel graphically, in the form of a mimic
diagram. This means that the operator can see a schematic representation of the plant being controlled. For example,
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a picture of a pump connected to a pipe can show the operator that the pump is running and how much fluid it is
pumping through the pipe at the moment. The operator can then switch the pump off. The HMI software will show
the flow rate of the fluid in the pipe decrease in real time. Mimic diagrams may consist of line graphics and
schematic symbols to represent process elements, or may consist of digital photographs of the process equipment
overlain with animated symbols.
The HMI package for the SCADA system typically includes a drawing program that the operators or system
maintenance personnel use to change the way these points are represented in the interface. These representations can
be as simple as an on-screen traffic light, which represents the state of an actual traffic light in the field, or as
complex as a multi-projector display representing the position of all of the elevators in a skyscraper or all of the
trains on a railway.
An important part of most SCADA implementations is alarm handling. The system monitors whether certain alarm
conditions are satisfied, to determine when an alarm event has occurred. Once an alarm event has been detected, one
or more actions are taken (such as the activation of one or more alarm indicators, and perhaps the generation of email
or text messages so that management or remote SCADA operators are informed). In many cases, a SCADA operator
may have to acknowledge the alarm event; this may deactivate some alarm indicators, whereas other indicators
remain active until the alarm conditions are cleared. Alarm conditions can be explicitfor example, an alarm point
is a digital status point that has either the value NORMAL or ALARM that is calculated by a formula based on the
values in other analogue and digital pointsor implicit: the SCADA system might automatically monitor whether
the value in an analogue point lies outside high and low limit values associated with that point. Examples of alarm
indicators include a siren, a pop-up box on a screen, or a coloured or flashing area on a screen (that might act in a
similar way to the "fuel tank empty" light in a car); in each case, the role of the alarm indicator is to draw the
operator's attention to the part of the system 'in alarm' so that appropriate action can be taken. In designing SCADA
systems, care must be taken when a cascade of alarm events occurs in a short time, otherwise the underlying cause
(which might not be the earliest event detected) may get lost in the noise. Unfortunately, when used as a noun, the
word 'alarm' is used rather loosely in the industry; thus, depending on context it might mean an alarm point, an alarm
indicator, or an alarm event.
Hardware solutions
SCADA solutions often have Distributed Control System (DCS) components. Use of "smart" RTUs or PLCs, which
are capable of autonomously executing simple logic processes without involving the master computer, is increasing.
A standardized control programming language, IEC 61131-3 (a suite of 5 programming languages including
Function Block, Ladder, Structured Text, Sequence Function Charts and Instruction List), is frequently used to create
programs which run on these RTUs and PLCs. Unlike a procedural language such as the C programming language or
FORTRAN, IEC 61131-3 has minimal training requirements by virtue of resembling historic physical control arrays.
This allows SCADA system engineers to perform both the design and implementation of a program to be executed
on an RTU or PLC. A Programmable Automation Controller (PAC) is a compact controller that combines the
features and capabilities of a PC-based control system with that of a typical PLC. PACs are deployed in SCADA
systems to provide RTU and PLC functions. In many electrical substation SCADA applications, "distributed RTUs"
use information processors or station computers to communicate with digital protective relays, PACs, and other
devices for I/O, and communicate with the SCADA master in lieu of a traditional RTU.
Since about 1998, virtually all major PLC manufacturers have offered integrated HMI/SCADA systems, many of
them using open and non-proprietary communications protocols. Numerous specialized third-party HMI/SCADA
packages, offering built-in compatibility with most major PLCs, have also entered the market, allowing mechanical
engineers, electrical engineers and technicians to configure HMIs themselves, without the need for a custom-made
program written by a software programmer. The Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) connects to physical equipment.
Typically, an RTU converts the electrical signals from the equipment to digital values such as the open/closed status
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from a switch or a valve, or measurements such as pressure, flow, voltage or current. By converting and sending
these electrical signals out to equipment the RTU can control equipment, such as opening or closing a switch or a
valve, or setting the speed of a pump.
Supervisory station
The term supervisory station refers to the servers and software responsible for communicating with the field
equipment (RTUs, PLCs, SENSORS etc.), and then to the HMI software running on workstations in the control
room, or elsewhere. In smaller SCADA systems, the master station may be composed of a single PC. In larger
SCADA systems, the master station may include multiple servers, distributed software applications, and disaster
recovery sites. To increase the integrity of the system the multiple servers will often be configured in a
dual-redundant or hot-standby formation providing continuous control and monitoring in the event of a server
failure.
Operational philosophy
For some installations, the costs that would result from the control system failing are extremely high. Hardware for
some SCADA systems is ruggedized to withstand temperature, vibration, and voltage extremes. In the most critical
installations, reliability is enhanced by having redundant hardware and communications channels, up to the point of
having multiple fully equipped control centres. A failing part can be quickly identified and its functionality
automatically taken over by backup hardware. A failed part can often be replaced without interrupting the process.
The reliability of such systems can be calculated statistically and is stated as the mean time to failure, which is a
variant of Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). The calculated mean time to failure of such high reliability
systems can be on the order of centuries
Communication infrastructure and methods
SCADA systems have traditionally used combinations of radio and direct wired connections, although SONET/SDH
is also frequently used for large systems such as railways and power stations. The remote management or monitoring
function of a SCADA system is often referred to as telemetry. Some users want SCADA data to travel over their
pre-established corporate networks or to share the network with other applications. The legacy of the early
low-bandwidth protocols remains, though.
SCADA protocols are designed to be very compact. Many are designed to send information only when the master
station polls the RTU. Typical legacy SCADA protocols include Modbus RTU, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel. These
communication protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used. Standard protocols are
IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3. These communication protocols are standardized and recognized by
all major SCADA vendors. Many of these protocols now contain extensions to operate over TCP/IP. Although the
use of conventional networking specifications, such as TCP/IP, blurs the line between traditional and industrial
networking, they each fulfill fundamentally differing requirements.
With increasing security demands (such as North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) in the US), there is increasing use of satellite-based communication. This has the key
advantages that the infrastructure can be self-contained (not using circuits from the public telephone system), can
have built-in encryption, and can be engineered to the availability and reliability required by the SCADA system
operator. Earlier experiences using consumer-grade VSAT were poor. Modern carrier-class systems provide the
quality of service required for SCADA.
RTUs and other automatic controller devices were developed before the advent of industry wide standards for
interoperability. The result is that developers and their management created a multitude of control protocols. Among
the larger vendors, there was also the incentive to create their own protocol to "lock in" their customer base. A list of
automation protocols is compiled here.
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Recently, OLE for process control (OPC) has become a widely accepted solution for intercommunicating different
hardware and software, allowing communication even between devices originally not intended to be part of an
industrial network.
SCADA architectures
The United States Army's Training Manual 5-601
covers "SCADA Systems for C4ISR Facilities".
SCADA systems have evolved through four generations as follows..:
First generation: "Monolithic"
Early SCADA system computing was done by large minicomputers.
Common network services did not exist at the time SCADA was
developed. Thus SCADA systems were independent systems with no
connectivity to other systems. The communication protocols used were
strictly proprietary at that time. The first-generation SCADA system
redundancy was achieved using a back-up mainframe system
connected to all the Remote Terminal Unit sites and was used in the
event of failure of the primary mainframe system. Some first
generation SCADA systems were developed as "turn key" operations
that ran on minicomputers such as the PDP-11 series made by the
Digital Equipment Corporation
Second generation: "Distributed"
SCADA information and command processing was distributed across multiple stations which were connected
through a LAN. Information was shared in near real time. Each station was responsible for a particular task thus
making the size and cost of each station less than the one used in First Generation. The network protocols used were
still not standardized. Since the protocols were proprietary, very few people beyond the developers knew enough to
determine how secure a SCADA installation was. Security of the SCADA installation was usually overlooked.
Third generation: "Networked"
Similar to a distributed architecture, any complex SCADA can be reduced to simplest components and connected
through communication protocols. In the case of a networked design, the system may be spread across more than one
LAN network and separated geographically. Several distributed architecture SCADAs running in parallel, with a
single supervisor and historian, could be considered a network architecture. This allows for a more cost effective
solution in very large scale systems.
Fourth generation: "Internet of Things"
With the commercial availability of cloud computing, SCADA systems have increasingly adopted Internet of Things
technology to significantly reduce infrastructure costs and increase ease of maintenance and integration. As a result
SCADA systems can now report state in near real-time and use the horizontal scale available in cloud environments
to implement more complex control algorithms than are practically feasible to implement on traditional
programmable logic controllers.
[2]
Further, the use of open network protocols such as TLS inherent in Internet of
Things technology provides a more readily comprehendable and manageable security boundary than the
heterogenous mix of proprietary network protocols typical of many decentralized SCADA implementations.
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Security issues
SCADA systems that tie together decentralized facilities such as power, oil, and gas pipelines and water distribution
and wastewater collection systems were designed to be open, robust, and easily operated and repaired, but not
necessarily secure. The move from proprietary technologies to more standardized and open solutions together with
the increased number of connections between SCADA systems, office networks, and the Internet has made them
more vulnerable to types of network attacks that are relatively common in computer security. For example, United
States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) released a vulnerability advisory that allowed
unauthenticated users to download sensitive configuration information including password hashes on an Inductive
Automation Ignition system utilizing a standard attack type leveraging access to the Tomcat Embedded Web server.
Security researcher Jerry Brown submitted a similar advisory regarding a buffer overflow vulnerability in a
Wonderware InBatchClient ActiveX control. Both vendors made updates available prior to public vulnerability
release. Mitigation recommendations were standard patching practices and requiring VPN access for secure
connectivity. Consequently, the security of some SCADA-based systems has come into question as they are seen as
potentially vulnerable to cyber attacks.
In particular, security researchers are concerned about:
the lack of concern about security and authentication in the design, deployment and operation of some existing
SCADA networks
the belief that SCADA systems have the benefit of security through obscurity through the use of specialized
protocols and proprietary interfaces
the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are physically secured
the belief that SCADA networks are secure because they are disconnected from the Internet.
SCADA systems are used to control and monitor physical processes, examples of which are transmission of
electricity, transportation of gas and oil in pipelines, water distribution, traffic lights, and other systems used as the
basis of modern society. The security of these SCADA systems is important because compromise or destruction of
these systems would impact multiple areas of society far removed from the original compromise. For example, a
blackout caused by a compromised electrical SCADA system would cause financial losses to all the customers that
received electricity from that source. How security will affect legacy SCADA and new deployments remains to be
seen.
There are many threat vectors to a modern SCADA system. One is the threat of unauthorized access to the control
software, whether it be human access or changes induced intentionally or accidentally by virus infections and other
software threats residing on the control host machine. Another is the threat of packet access to the network segments
hosting SCADA devices. In many cases, the control protocol lacks any form of cryptographic security, allowing an
attacker to control a SCADA device by sending commands over a network. In many cases SCADA users have
assumed that having a VPN offered sufficient protection, unaware that security can be trivially bypassed with
physical access to SCADA-related network jacks and switches. Industrial control vendors suggest approaching
SCADA security like Information Security with a defense in depth strategy that leverages common IT practices.
The reliable function of SCADA systems in our modern infrastructure may be crucial to public health and safety. As
such, attacks on these systems may directly or indirectly threaten public health and safety. Such an attack has already
occurred, carried out on Maroochy Shire Council's sewage control system in Queensland, Australia. Shortly after a
contractor installed a SCADA system in January 2000, system components began to function erratically. Pumps did
not run when needed and alarms were not reported. More critically, sewage flooded a nearby park and contaminated
an open surface-water drainage ditch and flowed 500 meters to a tidal canal. The SCADA system was directing
sewage valves to open when the design protocol should have kept them closed. Initially this was believed to be a
system bug. Monitoring of the system logs revealed the malfunctions were the result of cyber attacks. Investigators
reported 46 separate instances of malicious outside interference before the culprit was identified. The attacks were
made by a disgruntled ex-employee of the company that had installed the SCADA system. The ex-employee was
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hoping to be hired by the utility full-time to maintain the system.
In April 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack
issued a Critical Infrastructures Report which discussed the extreme vulnerability of SCADA systems to an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event. After testing and analysis, the Commission concluded: "SCADA systems are
vulnerable to EMP insult. The large numbers and widespread reliance on such systems by all of the Nations critical
infrastructures represent a systemic threat to their continued operation following an EMP event. Additionally, the
necessity to reboot, repair, or replace large numbers of geographically widely dispersed systems will considerably
impede the Nations recovery from such an assault."
[3]
Many vendors of SCADA and control products have begun to address the risks posed by unauthorized access by
developing lines of specialized industrial firewall and VPN solutions for TCP/IP-based SCADA networks as well as
external SCADA monitoring and recording equipment. The International Society of Automation (ISA) started
formalizing SCADA security requirements in 2007 with a working group, WG4. WG4 "deals specifically with
unique technical requirements, measurements, and other features required to evaluate and assure security resilience
and performance of industrial automation and control systems devices".
The increased interest in SCADA vulnerabilities has resulted in vulnerability researchers discovering vulnerabilities
in commercial SCADA software and more general offensive SCADA techniques presented to the general security
community. In electric and gas utility SCADA systems, the vulnerability of the large installed base of wired and
wireless serial communications links is addressed in some cases by applying bump-in-the-wire devices that employ
authentication and Advanced Encryption Standard encryption rather than replacing all existing nodes.
In June 2010, anti-virus security company VirusBlokAda reported the first detection of malware that attacks SCADA
systems (Siemens' WinCC/PCS 7 systems) running on Windows operating systems. The malware is called Stuxnet
and uses four zero-day attacks to install a rootkit which in turn logs into the SCADA's database and steals design and
control files. The malware is also capable of changing the control system and hiding those changes. The malware
was found on 14 systems, the majority of which were located in Iran.
In October 2013 National Geographic released a docudrama titled, "American Blackout" which dealt with a
large-scale cyber attack on SCADA and the United States' electrical grid.
SCADA In the workplace
SCADA can be a great tool while working in an environment where operational duties need to be monitored through
electronic communication instead of locally. For example, an operator can position a valve to open or close through
SCADA without leaving the control station or the computer. The SCADA system also can switch a pump or motor
on or off and has the capability of putting motors on a Hand operating status, off, or Automatic. Hand refers to
operating the equipment locally, while Automatic has the equipment operate according to set points the operator
provides on a computer that can communicate with the equipment through SCADA.
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References
[1] Basic SCADA Animations (http:/ / www.integraxor.com/ en/ index. htm?sl=wk& menu=intro)
[2] How The "Internet Of Things" Is Turning Cities Into Living Organisms (http:/ / www. fastcompany. com/ biomimicry/
how-the-internet-of-things-is-turning-cities-into-organisms/ ) Retrieved September 16, 2013
[3] http:/ / www. empcommission. org/ docs/ A2473-EMP_Commission-7MB. pdf
External links
UK SCADA security guidelines (http:/ / www. cpni. gov. uk/ advice/ cyber/ scada/ )
BBC NEWS | Technology | Spies 'infiltrate US power grid' (http:/ / news. bbc. co. uk/ 1/ hi/ technology/ 7990997.
stm)
General Electric Industrial Automation Software Solutions (http:/ / www. ge-ip. com/ products/
automation-software-scada/ c250)
HMI software based on Microsoft .NET framework (http:/ / www. advancedhmi. com)
Dynamysk Engineering Services (http:/ / www. dynamysk. com/ Solutions_Engineering. html)
Invensys Software HMI and SCADA Solutions (http:/ / software. invensys. com/ solutions/ hmi-and-scada/ )
Back to Basics: SCADA (YouTube video sponsored by Schneider Electric) (http:/ / www. youtube. com/
watch?NR=1& v=bfxr5DikdP0)
Article Sources and Contributors
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Article Sources and Contributors
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Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors
File:SCADA schematic overview-s.svg Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:SCADA_schematic_overview-s.svg License: Public Domain Contributors: Bender235,
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File:SCADA C4ISR Facilities.pdf Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:SCADA_C4ISR_Facilities.pdf License: Public Domain Contributors: USACE
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