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Dible II, R. T. The Philosophy of Mysticism: Perennialism and Constructivism

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Article

The Philosophy of Mysticism:
Perennialism and Constructivism

Randolph T. Dible II
*


ABSTRACT
The encountering of the experiencer or observertranscendental subjectivity itselfat the
foundation of the world leads inevitably to the recognition of pure objectivity as ultimate reality
(which can be taken as its ultimate deconstruction, analogous to the apophatic or via negativa), from
which objects derive their value, weight, significance, meaning or objectivity. In this way, pure
objectivity can be seen as the supra-self-evident Axiological Axiom, so to speak, even Unconditional
Love, in romantic terms. This axiology (value theory) has a structure inverse to the relationship
between transcendental subjectivity as the radical unity of pure self-reference and on the other hand,
the world of forms, as mere traces (representations, indications) of the unique, original first
distinction Spencer-Brown speaks of at the foundation of his calculus. That is, all forms (i.e.,
distinctions, differences) would reduce to being the first distinction, also known as the marked state,
which I call penultimate reality (pure self-reference or transcendental subjectivity: the Spirit which
animates us), except that forms are complimentary to their content, which is their objectivity or value,
which would reduce to the unmarked state or ultimate reality. It is the incongruity of form (thoughts;
Whiteheads negative prehensions) and value (feelings; Whiteheads positive prehensions, or my
notion of objectivity, meaning and qualia; in short, the non-formal aspects of experience) that holds
forms open and keeps them from absolute reduction. This accounts for the brute, concrete
persistence of the functional illusion-- to use a term from Dzogchen Buddhism-- of the world. Thus
this system has an axiology of metaphysical objectivity grounded on the ideal of pure objectivity as the
source of all value, meaning and significance, itself the very fecundity of profundity, which is the
motive of drawing the distinction in the first place.

Key Words: mysticism, perennialism, constructivism, observer, subjectivity, Spencer-Brown, first
distinction, axiology, Whitehead, feeling, qualia.

1. Introduction
Recent academic research on mysticism is entrenched in an ideological clash between two
schools of interpretation of mysticism: perennialism (essentialism, or decontextualism), on the one
hand, and anti-perennialism (constructivism, intentionalism, or contextualism), on the other. The
former upholds the universality of the mystical experience, while the latter takes it to belike any
other human experience, they say completely conditional. I will begin by explaining what
mysticism means. I will then proceed to define and illustrate the two schools of interpretation
perennialism and anti-perennialismby the arguments of their representative pupils. My point is
that the two schools of interpretation commit the disjunctive fallacy, or the fallacy of exclusive
alternatives. Then, assessing the relation between mystical experience in practice, and systematic
metaphysical theory, I will propose process philosophy (i.e., from Heraclitus to Peirce and
Whitehead) as a framework for the debate, and my theoretical solution. In the end, upon reviewing
two strong alternatives called, respectively, a Middle Way (Jackson, 1989), and a middle ground
(Forman, 1993), I will suggest my own metaphysical understanding which is akin to the proposed
alternatives to perennialist and anti-perennialist interpretations of the purity of mystical experience.

Correspondence: Randolph T. Dible II, Senior Student, Department of Philosophy, SUNY at Stony Brook, NY
E-mail: [email protected] .
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2. Mysticism
Anthony Flew defines mysticism as direct or unmediated experience of the divine, in which the
soul momentarily approaches union with God. (Flew, 1979.) The 2005 Oxford Dictionary of
Philosophy states that mysticism is the Belief in union with the divine nature by means of the
power of spiritual access to ultimate reality, or to the domains of knowledge closed off to ordinary
thought. Religious scholar Ninian Smart proposes that mysticism is those inner visions and
practices which are contemplative. (Smart, 1978.) The problem with this is that although
contemplation may characterize mystical practice and tradition, the essentially mystical experience is
itself characterized by a quietude or peace contrary to contemplation, of the essence Robert Forman
refer to (with minimal stipulation) as the pure consciousness experience. In Smarts
characterization we find the constructivist bias.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article Mysticism by Jerome Gellman is taken from
his chapter in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Religion, Mysticism and Religious Experience.
Here is Gellmans definition:
A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual unitive experience granting
acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense-
perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection. (Wainwright, 2005.)
More specifically, the English philosopher Walter Stace (1886 1967) distinguished two
universal mystical states found in all cultures, religions, periods, and social conditions. These two
are the extrovertive and introvertive paths to the unitative experience of the One. While the
former achieves unity by going out through multiplicity looking outward through the senses, the
introvertive, monistic experience looks inward into the mind, to achieve pure consciousness
devoid of phenomenal content. Both achieve Oneness as sacred objectivity.
1


3. Perennialism
The term philosophia perennis was first popularized by Leibniz, who took it from the sixteenth
century theologian Augustinus Steuchius 1540 work. Steuchius used it to describe the originally
revealed absolute truth made available to man before his fall, completely forgotten in that lapse, and
only gradually regained in fragmentary form in the subsequent history of human thought. (Ibid.)
Leibniz used it to describe what was needed to complete his own system. He called it an analysis of
the truth and falsehood of all philosophies, ancient and modern by which on would draw the gold
from the dross, the diamond from its mine, the light from the shadows; and this would be in effect a
kind of perennial philosophy. (Thackara, 1984.)
As an ideal aim, the perennial philosophy has a more universal history. For instance, in
speaking of the existence of the soul after death, the Roman statesman Cicero stated that he had the
authority of all antiquity on his side when he said these things are of old date, and have, besides, the
sanction of universal religion
2
. Alexandrian inspirer of Plotinus and the Neoplatonic movement,
Ammonius Saccas (third century CE), had a similar goal of reconciling different religious
philosophies.
3
Rennaud Fabbris article Introduction to the Perennialist School says the ideal of
such a philosophy is much older, and one can easily recognize it in the Golden Chain (seira) of
Neoplatonism, in the Patristic Lex primordialis, in the Islamic Din al-Fitra or even in the Hindu

1
Ibid. Objectivity here means not merely the objectivity that the ordinary sensorial-phenomenal objective
world objects have, but in contrast, more like the objects of universal truth of mathematics and logic, verities
eternally true in all possible universes. This notion is perhaps best phrased pure objectivity, what one would
expect the transcendental ultimate reality to consist of. It is formless objectivity. It is an ideal state, which is
not to say it isnt also real, even immanent in material reality. Later, I will show how such a notion completes
my proposed solution in a metaphysics similar to the Objective Idealism of Peirce and Organic Realism of
Whitehead.
2
Thackara, 1984: quoting from Tusculan Disputations I.12-14.
3
Thackara 1984.
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Sanathana Dharma
4
, although this last connection has been the subject of debate between Swami
Vivekananda (an Advaita Vedantin) religious scholars, like Fritjof Schuon and Georg Feuerstein.
Also as an ideal aim, the great logician and father of Pragmatism Charles Sanders Peirce, in the
Introduction to his Principles of Philosophy
5
expressed his outline of a theory so comprehensive that,
for a long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology, and in whatever other
department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of details. The first step toward this is to find
simple concepts applicable to every subject
6
. As an ideal rather than a product, a perennial
philosophy has never been formulated in complete detail and with final perfection
7
. The ordinary
usage of the term philosophia perennis or perennial philosophy does not necessarily indicate an
ideal aim, although that may be implied, but instead it tends to indicate an end product, a school of
thought unifying the disparate religions, seeing their differences as mere surface feature, most
pronounced in mysticism.
Constructivists will dispute the actuality of ideal states, wisely suggesting that claims of actually
experiencing pure or transcendental states of experience, consciousness or being are not empirically
verifiable, in the ordinary sense, certainly not in the sense naturalism or empirical science (and
metaphysically, materialism) seeks. But mystics recognize that there is a higher validation which
cannot be represented, for if merely represented, articulated or expressed, looses its meaning. This
validation is that of being it, rather than merely seeing it. It is called Knowledge Through Identity,
but what it is knowledge of is not anything that can be called an object, but rather, the very
objectivity that is manifested in all objects. It can be called a certainty, perhaps, but in any case it is a
circumstance that needs to re-enter academic discussion for a better appreciation of the purity of
mystical experience, and to be explicit of its place in the hierarchy of knowledge. This later need is
sought by metaphysics in its ideal aim beyond the material.
In recent times, Aldous Huxleys 1945 book The Perennial Philosophy popularized this pole of
interpretation called perennialism for the public, in the name of that title. Huxley called this the
Highest Common Factor which is not only of divine inspiration and origin, but shares the same
metaphysical principles. (Fabbri, 2009.) Before Huxleys popularization of the term, French author
Rene Guenon (1886 1951) wrote at length about the Sophia Perennis (Eternal Wisdom,) or
Primordial Tradition. Guenon has inspired Fritjof Schuon (1907 1998) as well as the Ceylonese
scholar Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877 1947), who are also considered founding members of the
esoteric Traditionalist school of perennialism of the interwar period.
Huxley called this the Highest Common Factor which is not only of divine inspiration and
origin, but shares the same metaphysical principles.
8
Before Huxleys popularization of the term,
French author Rene Guenon (1886 1951) wrote at length about the Sophia Perennis (Eternal
Wisdom) or Primordial Tradition. The ensuing school of thought is called Traditionalism, although
the basic tenet of Traditionalism is that it is immemorial and found in all authentic traditions, and
has much in common with the ancient Hindu Sanatana Dharma (Eternal Doctrine.) Guenon has
inspired Fritjof Schuon (1907 1998) as well as the Ceylonese scholar Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877
1947), who are also considered founding members of the esoteric Traditionalist school of
perennialism of the interwar period. Following Guenons view, Traditionalists add to perennialism
the view that modern civilization is a pseudo and decadent civilization which manifests the lowest
possibilities of the Kali Yuga (the dark age of the Hindu cosmology)
9
, and they add the necessity of

4
Fabbri, Renaud, http://www.religioperennis.org/documents/Fabbri/Perennialism.pdf.
5
Peirce, C. S., Collected Papers, 1931-1935. In this quote Peirce is advocating a metaphysical system more
than mysticism per se, but it shows Peirces perennial ideal aim.
6
Ibid., I, vii, Section 1
7
Leomker, Leroy, 2003
8
Fabbri, Renaud, http://www.religioperennis.org/documents/Fabbri/Perennialism.pdf.
9
StateMaster Encyclopedia entry on the Traditionalist school,
http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Traditionalist-School.
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an initiatory spiritual path found in a traditional religion. The necessity of participating in a religious
tradition was emphasized in Schuons adaption called Religio Perennis.
Anti-perennialists will dispute the achievement or actuality of ideal states, wisely suggesting that
claims of pure or transcendental states are not empirically verifiable, in the ordinary sense, certainly
not in the sense naturalism or empirical science (and metaphysically, materialism) seeks. But mystics
recognize that there is a higher validation which cannot be represented, for if merely represented,
articulated or expressed, looses its meaning. This validation is that of being it, rather than merely
seeing it. It is called Knowledge Through Identity, but what it is knowledge of is not anything that
can be called an object, but rather, the very objectivity that is manifested in all objects. It can be
called a certainty, perhaps, but in any case it is a circumstance that needs to re-enter academic
discussion for a better appreciation of the purity of mystical experience, and to be explicit of its place
in the hierarchy of knowledge. This later need is sought by metaphysics in its ideal aim beyond the
material.

4. Constructivism
In the context of the contemporary scholarly studies of mysticism, constructivism denotes the
conceptual and cultural (and religious and cognitive-linguistic) context (or construction) of the
mystical experience. It could also be called pluralism or contextualism. The tendency of
constructivists, or anti-perennialists, is to avoid the perceived problems with perennialisms
conflation of religious views, which is good, but by claiming that mystical experiences differ from
context to context, which misses the essence of the mystical experience as an ideally unconditioned
experience of pure consciousness or subjectivity itself. More precisely, anti-perennialism, going by
the name of constructivism, profits from a contemporary paradigm shift in epistemology toward
the view that there are no human experiences except through the sociolinguistic relations which
mediate them. (Forman, 1990.) Representatives of mystical constructivism are Steven Katz, Robert
Gimello, Hans Penner, and Wayne Proudfoot (Forman, 1993.) Katzs basic and repeated claim is that
there are NO pure (unmediated) experiences. (Katz, 1978, 1983.) In the words of secular-religious-
studies pioneer Ninian Smart, experiences are always in some degree interpreted: they as it were
contain interpretations within them. No perception can be quite neutral. (Smart, 1978.)
The general argument for mystical constructivism is that all experience is constructed, involving
at least some concepts, which are themselves determined by the sociolinguistic and cultural context,
among a myriad other factors, and so mystical experiences must differ from context to context, and
mystic to mystic. Stephen Katz has focused on the pre-experiential conditions of the mystics
circumstance and how this experiential pattern informs the resultant experience. (Katz, 1978.)
These are noble causes, assuming there is no access to the transcendental, or that mystics dont
generally have that access. The essential problem with this view is that it appears true, and for the
descriptive or interpretive or even just the expressive level (for all practical purposes) it is true, but it
implies that there cannot be that sort of purity ever achieved in the world, by a meditator or
whatever. Furthermore, that assumption is found to be true when analyzing it with the gross tools of
thought stationed in the world, to which we are accustomed. The meditators goal is to refine the
understanding of the world and its constituent thoughts (the mind) enough to come into contact
with, or to realize what was already there: the transcendentally unique empty set of experiences,
sometimes identified with the true Self, pure subjectivity.
Of course, interpretation is contextual, but mystical experience is supposed to be an attempt at
decontextualization in direct, unmediated experience, with the goal of a state of pure content-less
(and so context-less) experience. Robert Forman has developed this idea and calls it a pure-
consciousness event or experience (Forman, 1990.) The pure-consciousness event is an alleged
emptying out of all experiential content and phenomenological qualities. (Gellman, 2005.)
Constructivists have argued that pure-consciousness events are impossible because of the kinds of
beings that we are (Katz, 1975). One should certainly suspect the possibility of idealization of the
purity of the experience, in the sense that it may mislead us. Certainly, defenders of the pure-
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consciousness event may be exaggerating their claims, although this does not discount the
possibility of PCEs. Furthermore, the meaning of pure consciousness events may depend on ones
definition of consciousness. The founder of the phenomenological movement Husserl, for instance,
denies the possibility of consciousness not of anythingunintentional consciousness is impossible,
he saysall consciousness is intentional.
10

My conclusion regarding mystical constructivism (or pluralism) is that it is certainly relevant at
the descriptive and interpretive level, when discussing mysticism in general. Its historical appearance
was necessitated by the rampant epistemological naivet and academic irresponsibility of the
overwhelmingly perennialist mystical literature. The worst problem with certain influential pieces of
perennialist literature was their uncritical (to say the least) representation of original sources. They
distorted the translations to make them seem identical. For example, in Mysticism East and West,
Rudolf Otto misrepresented Shankara and transformed Meister Eckhart into a sort of Shankaran Neo-
Plotinus. Huxley quoted little bits and pieces from one mystic after another, making them all
something like Advaitins. Perennialists lost what differentiates these great traditions. (Forman,
1993.) But constructivism has its own problems. That mysticism is essentially conditioned by
sociolinguistic concepts is an assumption. In Katzs words, There are NO pure (i.e., unmediated)
experiences. It is essential to the meaning and import of mysticism that there are indeed pure,
unmediated, unconditioned experiences, and furthermore it is as verifiable in direct experience as
possible. Meditation is the compliment of mediation, and the attenuation of mediation by
concentration is the essential characteristic of meditation. The clash between the Perennialists and
Anti-perennialists is a clash between apriori worldviews: the ageless debacle in understanding, the
communication breakdown between the Absolutists and relativists.

5. Ko-i, Marching Concepts
Roger R. Jacksons article Matching Concepts: Deconstructive and Foundationalist Tendencies
in Buddhist Thought (Jackson, 1989) deals primarily with a polarity within Buddhism between the
technique of deconstructive analysis, and foundationalism. But it begins with the Chinese concept
called ko-i which came from 1
st
and 2
nd
century C.E. translations of Indian religious and philosophical
ideas into Chinese. When the cultures first met, there were many foreign religious concepts, so
terminological equivalents were sought, and some seemed intuitive. Of course, there were major
problems with these first series of translations, such as the translation of dharma as Bodhi
(enlightenment) and even yoga into Chinese as tao, and nirvana was translated as wu-wei, non-
action. (Ibid., 561.) This style of translation was called ko-i, matching concepts. This is a common
phenomenon, says Jackson, when cultures meet. It can be extended to the assimilation of Eastern
philosophy into Western, for instance, Jackson points out the existent interpretations of the Buddha
through David Hume and William James, Nagarjuna through Ludwig Wittgenstein, Dharmakirti
through Immanuel Kant and Williard Quine, Tantrism through Heidegger, and Zen through Eckhart.
(Ibid., 562.) Of course, this is relevant to the perennialist position, from a critical standpoint of
pluralism.
Deconstruction is a technique more than an ideology, a technique to expose the ideological
underpinnings, the limitations, the illogic of all thought and interpretation. (Ibid., 564.) Its critical
purpose is to deflate the certainties to which human thought is prone. Jackson acknowledges
that foundationalism is not necessarily a target of deconstruction, but he says that it does seem to
form a natural polarity with deconstruction, to which its assumptions are diametrically opposed.
(Ibid.) It assumes that it is both necessary and possible to ground the construction of human

10
There are other terminological issueswith regards to philosophical stipulations on consciousness,
experience, existence etc.which seem moot points, and often the stipulation of transcendental or pure
experience is simply that it is to be taken as the limit case or boundary conception of the term. It may also be
that the term consciousness is too loaded for faithfully meaning what the mystic intends. Pure consciousness
may be criticized as pure unconsciousness, proponents advocating awareness, but either way, a purification of
ones own being is implied.
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knowledge on firm epistemological or ontological foundations. A foundation itself needs no support,
though it supports all other beliefs. It presumes that certain beliefs are either self-justified or
irrefutable. (Ibid.) Examples of foundations in the Western philosophical tradition are given as
Platonic forms, Cartesian clear and distinct ideas and the Thomistic God. Without these
foundations, knowledge lacks certainty, but deconstruction has the advantage, says Jackson, of not
requiring dubious certainty. foundationalism in the West [has] generally been grounded in some
ontological or epistemological absolute, such as Being, or the Cogito, or some transcendental
subject. (Ibid., 566.) Buddhism, however, says Jackson, has a non-absolutist foundationalism
based on perception and inference which doesnt grant absolute certainty, but objective certainty.
This distinction in Jacksons understanding of Buddhism is relevant to the foundationalist tendencies
within perennialism generally. Perennialism tends to be of the absolutist foundationalism. There is
a sense in which deconstruction is to foundationalism as mystical constructivism is to perennialism,
but we have to keep in mind the stipulations of these termsi.e., our use of constructivism and
Jacksons use of deconstruction are not opposed, but are both representative of anti-perennialism.
The really relevant point in Matching Concepts is Jacksons negotiation of these two poles in
his understanding of Buddhism. He identifies his method with the Buddhist middle way of avoiding
extreme views. Poles is the metaphor he employs when speaking of Buddhism generally, but he
has a notion of frames for the differing particular positions on the spectrum within Buddhism.
These frames refer to whether it is primarily a deconstructive enterprise that is framed by
foundationalism, or a foundationalist enterprise framed by deconstruction. (Ibid., 567.)
Deconstruction however, is simply a technique, insists Jackson, not an ideology, so rather than being
a position, it may employ a temporary perspective, but as a technique for exposing the incongruities
inherent in any position, it is called a meta-position, although it must be admitted to be a
position in some meaningful sense. (Ibid.)
Jacksons conclusion is that in Buddhism, the two poles must be balanced via the Middle Way.
The innermost frame tends to be the strong foundationalist assertion of worldly and religious
conventionalities. That frame is surrounded and sublated by a wider frame that involves the
ultimate deconstruction of those conventionalities. (Ibid, 584.) That frame, in turn is surrounded by
a still wider weak foundationalist frame, and its ultimate deconstruction involves conventional
foundations themselves deconstructed, and so on. It would seem that this process leads to
philosophical and spiritual frustration, but, argues Jackson, the philosophical and spiritual failure is in
the attitude that would seek finally to resolve the deconstruction-foundationalism polarity in favor
of one or the other. (Ibid., 585.) The metaphor he ends with is that of the Buddhist who must walk a
difficult tightrope, balancing two truths, holding a pole weighted deconstructively on one end, and
foundationally on the other, knowing that if her equilibrium is lost, the fall will be a long one. As long
as both are under her control, however, passage will be possible and the goalwhich is no goal, but
a goal neverthelesswill be attained. Jackson adds that in many Mahayana traditions, a Buddha is
defined by his or her ability to balance the two truths.
This is Jacksons take on the Buddhas middle way: one of Buddhisms most basic metaphors is
that of holding to a middle between extremes, whether of hedonism and asceticism, eternalism and
annihilationism, or, simply, is and is not. (Ibid.) Jacksons view is a suggestion to balance
deconstructionism and foundationalism in Buddhism, but his elaborate framework has a simpler
analog in my brand of process metaphysics. The analogy only reaches so far, as Jackson calls his
position non-absolutist foundationalism, and mine is more in the Whiteheadian vein of absolute
idealism on a realistic basis (Process and Reality, pp. xiii), or Peirces objective idealism (The
Architecture of Theories), wherein the real is no less ideal.

6. Mysticism and Metaphysical Systems
When viewing mysticism generally, one may be struck by a distinction between mystical
traditions which involve meditation and practice an economy of just enough content in experience to
achieve no content (content-less consciousness, Formans pure consciousness event),
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characterized by religious and ascetic practices, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the more
philosophical mysticism from the likes of Plotinus, Bradley and Schopenhauer, and even more
broadly construed, idealist metaphysical systems from the likes of Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, and
Peirce. The explanation of the details of such mystical traditions and metaphysical systems is a
project beyond the scope of this investigation, but I can argue that the distinction between these two
categories is merely that of praxis and theory, stemming from a common motive: either the pure
consciousness event, or something like it. Mysticism and idealist metaphysics, generally construed,
are not different. The Buddha had his theories, and Descartes had his meditations.
Jacksons metaphors of informed frames and the Buddha balancing on a tightrope may be a
solution to the two schools of interpreting mystical experience, and Formans solution called
Tirthawhich will be discussed in the next section may be a middle ground perspective of both
perennialism and constructivism. But perhaps the metaphysical formulation of these metaphors is
best construed in the framework of process philosophy. I suggest this because process, based on
events rather than entities, or actions rather than atoms, is an ontological category (that of
becoming, which accounts for being) which already encompasses opposites, extremes, and has the
power to understand contradictions.

7. Tirtha
In Robert Formans 1993 Sophia article, Of Deserts and Doors: Methodology of the Study of
Mysticism, he presents these two viewsperennialism and constructivismand critiques them
both in a plea for the recognition of differences, but only where there are differences, and offers
the possibility of a third alternative, a middle ground which he names Tirtha (from Sanskrit,
passageway or crossing place), after the Hindu temple doorways through which one gains access
to the gods, but also leaves the temple for the desert outside. In Formans theory, tirtha means a
passageway or crossing place at the entry or exit to a Buddhist temple, and this door-frame is akin to
Jacksons frames. But rather than a balance between biases in endlessly deconstructed foundations,
Forman proposes a middle ground perspective on the mysticism debate. Our Tirtha, threshold,
stands between the closed room of constructivism and the borderless desert of perennialism.
(Forman, 1993, p. 40.) This alternative recognizes that mystical experience centered on the pure
consciousness event shows no signs of being constructed, but recognizes also that the processes
leading up to it are completely inter-dependently originated in their contextuality.
Assuming the existence of what is meant by pure consciousness event, this seems to be the
best view. Forman argues for the existence of the pure consciousness event on the grounds of its
universality or uniqueness: this new approach allows for the possibility that cross-culturally
parallel descriptions of pure consciousness may actually refer to cross-culturally parallel experiences.
For without content, there is no particular feature or characteristic to distinguish two experiences
(Ibid., 41.) This latter point is reminiscent of the unique and singular existence of the empty set in
mathematics. The assumption of the existence of pure experience is the key assumption, which
cannot be demonstrated, but only proven as a super-self-evident axiom, that is, proven only after
one has had or become the experience or event in question. This kind of higher knowledge,
beyond sensually-mediated experience (and Forman suggests it is even beyond inference,) has been
called Knowledge through Identity. (Forman, 1999, Merrell-Wolff, 1973.)
11
Its evidence is so
pervasive we cant help but overlook it, for it is us in our own beingwe dont see it to know it, we
be it to know it. That direct, first-hand knowledge which cannot be transmitted second hand is not
the exclusive knowledge of elite meditators, but is the ultimate reality, which is always already the
case, just as the metaphysical intuition of the Infinite
12
is necessary to grant signification to the finite.

11
Spencer-Brown also seems to suggest it as the difference between being and seeing being, in the AUM
conference transcripts, 1973.
12
Guenon distinguishes the metaphysical Infinite from the mathematical Infinite by simply referring to the
former as the Absolute Infinite, because, he says, the mathematical Infinite is often the merely indefinite
countability of otherwise finite beings (Guenon, 2003.) In recognizing the uniqueness of this Absolute Infinite, I
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Of course, calling it Objectivity in Itself presumes there being some form or formless sort of
subjectivity, and certainly there seems no escape from the perspectivity of subjectivity, as Descartes
found(ed.) But this alternative interpretation of mystical experience (Formans Tirtha) can
demonstrate, for philosophical inquiry, that there is indeed an exit, via the Tirtha or temple doorway
between the constructed building or temple, and the desert outside, the unmarked state.
Next we will look at my threshold. Rather than a metaphorical doorway, my metaphysical
exodus from the perennialist-constructivist debate is a metaphysical structurenot a structure as in
a building, but only a foundation, a corner-stone: more precisely Being is taken to be Spencer-
Browns first distinction, which is the crossing to the beyond of being (epekenia tes ousia,) and it is
deconstructed, erased, or crossed, just like Jacksons frames, and Formans Tirtha, but precisely,
Spencer-Browns forms.
13
Every frame is formed and every form framed; this is the doctrine of the
unmarked cross. Although the play of signifiers (percipience, perspection, or perspectivity), is
endless, Pure Subjectivity is the exit and the entry, the end and the beginning.

8. Tarati
Independent of Formans Tirtha, I have come to a foundational metaphysical position which has
resisted my attempts at deconstruction over my years of philosophical study. This system is a
process metaphysics which accounts for the genesis of multiple realities, orders, levels or
dimensions, distinct from the unique ultimate reality, by analogy to the way Spencer-Browns Laws of
Form accounts for the genesis of forms and time from the unmarked state.
This structure can be articulated, beginning with the first principle, the One, the source, and
cannot be so articulated beyond that, before the beginning so to speak. The One or Being In-Itself,
in this system, is the dimensionless point construed as pure self-reference, formless subjectivity, and
the transcendental signifier. The ultimate is the transcendental signified in my system-- pure
objectivity, or objectivity without an object-- and it is the beyond of being, epekeina tes ousia. It can
be either pure and radical nothingness (which is impossible) or the Absolute Infinite, and it cannot be
articulated or actualized without passing through the penultimate to get to the non-ultimate or
conditional-conventional universe of discourse. This metaphysical system takes the ultimate reality
of the Infinite-- to express one such articulation of it-- as an axiom. This is an axiom not in the sense
of self-evident, for there is no Self or One ultimately (this system takes the Self or One to be merely
penultimate), only the reality beyond itself (beyond the qualifier In-Itself,) and is therefore called
Supra Self-evident. In fact, it can only be known to be the Infinite, rather than pure nothingness, by
deciding on the essence of the beyond of being.
For all purposes which may concern us (on this side of being, i.e., within the realm of finite
being), the beyond of being can only be one of two things or satisfactions of our conceptual
understanding: either 1. Pure and radical nothingness, for we can imagine nothing more possibly
ultimate, or, since that cannot be, 2. A beyond of being which overflows our determination of it as
beyond being, and becomes Being in the first place, but immediately ensues as everything else.
This latter notion is the Absolute Infinite, in a process metaphysics.
The starting point of this foundational system is this pen-ultimate reality, taken as the very
Principle underlying other metaphysical notions of first principles, as well as the differentiations of
the Peircian class of Firstness, and even Whiteheadian novelty, and it is known (insofar as it is said to
be known) by Knowledge through Identity (Merrell-Wolff) which is unmediated, but meditated, so
to speak. This foundational core is likely what Descartes meant to know, but claimed to think; that I

strive to imagine the Infinite as the overwhelming or overflowing nature of the beyond of beingepekeina tes
ousiafrom which Being bootstraps itself into existence, in the first place. After all, it seems to me, ultimate
reality must either be pure and radical nothingness (which is impossible) or the Absolute Infinite.
13
Spencer-Brown, George, 1969, Laws of Form. The work itself is far beyond the scope of this work, and
densely mathematical, metaphysically similar to the system of Peirce, and idealist to the core. Often taken as
the kernel or nucleus of systems theory, and as a calculus of mystical mathematics, Laws of Form has largely
unexplored metaphysical implications, but adopted by this author nonetheless.
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am. It is what Kant couldnt quite come to accept, however close he came to Pure Subjectivity in his
architectonic. It is from Kant that Schopenhauer came to his realization of what he calls the subject
of subjectivity, a phrase from Kants writings, as the Vedantic Paramatman.
I could call this system, following the style of Forman, Tarati which is Sanskrit for he crosses, a
term taken from George Spencer-Brown siblinghood for teaching the consequences of there being
nothing at all (Laws of Form) implied in his calculus of indications (the very same structure as
structure as codependent origination,
14
pratitya samutpada) of the First Distinction (which, Ill
add, is metaphysically, Difference In-Itself as much as Being In-Itself). I identify it with Pure Self-
Reference, or Pure Subjectivity, for the purpose of technically elucidating how multiplicity arises from
Unity.

9. Conclusion
Ultimate Reality is the beyond of being, which overflows its own boundlessness to found all
finity, starting with pure subjectivity or pure self-reference which is Being in Itself, transcendental
Unity, which I therefore call penultimate realitythe original and originary Difference In-Itself, from
which all differences in the multiplicity of any construct have their meaning and significance as forms
of indication or reference (traces of the first distinction), and to which they all ultimately simplify. I
do not attempt to de-center Western ontology, but place the philosophy of Presence-as-Being within
a philosophy of Becoming or process, which distinguishes that which is given in the present, from the
very Presence of the present. This latter notion is what is meant by my use of Spencer-Browns first
distinction, I suggest. The First Distinction is also called the cross as it is read, in an injunctive
language (a process, like a recipe, or a machine language) rather than a descriptive language (a
natural language, a product of human communication,) as an instruction to cross itself (the act of
drawing a distinction or making a difference) out, thereby erasing itself. By this ontological erasure,
the notion of the first distinction can be read as a deconstructive tool and foundational event,
likening it to Jacksons frames, but it is the basis of Spencer-Browns forms.
In short, the encountering of the experiencer or observertranscendental subjectivity itselfat
the foundation of the world leads inevitably to the recognition of pure objectivity as ultimate reality
(which can be taken as its ultimate deconstruction, analogous to the apophatic or via negativa), from
which objects derive their value, weight, significance, meaning or objectivity. In this way, pure
objectivity can be seen as the supra-self-evident Axiological Axiom, so to speak, even Unconditional
Love, in romantic terms. This axiology (value theory) has a structure inverse to the relationship
between transcendental subjectivity as the radical unity of pure self-reference
15
and on the other
hand, the world of forms
16
, as mere traces (representations, indications) of the unique, original first
distinction Spencer-Brown speaks of at the foundation of his calculus. That is, all forms (i.e.,
distinctions, differences) would reduce to being the first distinction, also known as the marked state,
which I call penultimate reality (pure self-reference or transcendental subjectivity: the Spirit which
animates us), except that forms are complimentary to their content, which is their objectivity or
value, which would reduce to the unmarked state or ultimate reality. It is the incongruity of form
(thoughts; Whiteheads negative prehensions) and value (feelings; Whiteheads positive
prehensions, or my notion of objectivity, meaning and qualia; in short, the non-formal aspects of

14
This technicality is beyond the scope of this paper, unfortunately. I refer interested researchers to Laws of
Form, and Spencer-Browns other writings.
15
In this system, once again, the One or the Self is penultimate reality, the center and source of the world,
analogous to the Origin in an extensive continuum or Cartesian co-ordinate plane, from which any extensive
point of reference (or any form, or frame of reference) receives its value, meaning and significance from the
formless, dimensionless point of pure self-reference, the first difference of the system.
16
Form is here taken in the sense of George Spencer-Browns Laws of Form: We shall take the form of
distinction for the form; that is, form precisely as that which is comprised of distinctions. The Laws of Form is
a calculus of indications of the first distinction based on two simple axioms which govern the consequences of
just having drawn a distinction in an otherwise unmarked state.
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experience,) that holds forms open and keeps them from absolute reduction. This accounts for the
brute, concrete persistence of the functional illusion-- to use a term from Dzogchen Buddhism-- of
the world. Thus this system has an axiology of metaphysical objectivity grounded on the ideal of pure
objectivity as the source of all value, meaning and significance, itself the very fecundity of profundity,
which is the motive
17
of drawing the distinction in the first place.
This is my foundational theory, inspired by the metaphysical implications of George Spencer-
Browns Laws of Form, specifically his calculus of indications of the first distinction (the laws of form
themselves, expressed as two elegant axioms) interpreted as the very precise mathematical
formulation of the Buddha Sakyamunis doctrine of codependent origination or mutual co-arising of
form. I also extend it to Whiteheads metaphysical system from Process and Reality (Whitehead,
1929, 1978)although Whitehead does not speak of transcendental subjectivity or transcendental
superjectivity (the term for objectivity in his system) and I take form to mean Whiteheads
notion of subjective form, for the Spencer-Brownian form of distinction is the activity of
distinguishing, the injunction to cross the distinction,
18
and the process Whitehead identifies with
the experiencing subject itself (Ibid., p. 16.) The subject, or pure subjectivity, is also an ideal aim of
meditation, the pure consciousness of Asamprajnata Samadhi. Hence, pure subjectivity, in my
formulation, is to be construed as the formless boundary case or limit-concept of the Whiteheadian
subjective form or process, conforming with Whitehead: Process is the becoming of experience.
(Ibid, 166.)
It is no mere coincidence that Forman uses the Sanskrit for to cross beyond, Tirtha, and
Spencer-Brown uses the Sanskrit for to cross, Tarati, to designate a metaphysical system each feels
to be complete, for the first distinction is identical with the act of drawing it up, and once enacted is
erased (deconstructed). My formulation is original, but I adopt Spencer-Browns term in this context
as a metaphysical analogue of Formans proposed middle ground, Jacksons frames, and in my
indebtedness to the structure of Spencer-Browns calculus.

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