Marina Dizon-Rivera, executrix-appelle vs.

Dizon et al, oppositors-appellants

Facts:
Agripina Valdez, the testatrix, was survived by 7 compulsory heirs; 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate
granddaughter. 6 of the 7 compulsory heirs are oppositors-appellants except Marina Dizon- Rivera, the
executrix-appellee.

She left a valid will and named the compulsory heirs as beneficiaries together with 7 other legitimate
grandchildren.

In her will, she divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties. It appeared that Marina and Tomas
received more than their respective legitime as compared to the other compulsory heirs.

Marina proposed that the oppositors receive the properties assigned to them by the testatrix and each
shall receive a certain amount of differential to complete their respective legitimes. The amount shall be
taken from the cash and or properties of Marina and Tomas. On the other hand, oppositors proposed
reduction of the amounts designated in the will.

CFI Pampanga favored Marina's project partition. It ruled that oppositors' proposal will result as though
Agripina has not left a valid will because it assigns values different from what is intended by her.

"(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed
and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and the oppositors differ in
respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in order to fully restore the
impaired legitime. The proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of
intestacy, which is in controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has
chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This is legally
permissible within the limitation of the law, as aforecited." With reference to the payment in cash of some
P230,552.38, principally by the executrix as the largest beneficiary of the will to be paid to her five co-
heirs, the oppositors (excluding Tomas Dizon), to complete their impaired legitimes, the lower court ruled
that "(T)he payment in cash so as to make the proper adjustment to meet with the requirements of the law
in respect to legitimes which have been impaired is, in our opinion, a practical and valid solution in order
to give effect to the last wishes of the testatrix."

Aggrieved, oppositors filed their appeal to the SC raising the following.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises
imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction;
2. Whether the appellants are entitled to the devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, or merely to
demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code; and
3. Whether the appellants may be compelled to accept payment in cash on account of their legitime,
instead of some of the real properties left by the Testatrix;

Held:
The issues raised present a matter of determining the avowed intention of the testatrix which is "the life
and soul of a will. In consonance therewith, our Civil Code included the new provisions found in Articles
788 and 791 thereof that "(I)f a testamentary disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of
doubt, that interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "(T)he words
of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy.

The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments

1. Decisive of the issues at bar is the fact that the testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a
partition of her estate by will. Thus, in the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her
death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for
probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she
expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property in her estate and
designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom
she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in the
first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code, providing that "(S)hould a person make a partition of his
estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the
legitime of the compulsory heirs." This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right
of compulsory heirs to their legitime. The Civil Code thus provides the safeguard for the right of such
compulsory heirs:

ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime belonging
to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied.

ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive.

This was properly complied with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition, wherein the five
oppositors-appellants namely Estela, Bernardita, Angelina, Josefina and Lilia, were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her will, and the differential to
complete their respective legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash and/or properties of
the executrix-appellee, Marina, and their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were favored by
the testatrix and received in the partition by will more than their respective legitimes

2. The burden of oppositors' contention is that the testamentary dispositions in their favor are in the
nature of devises of real property, citing the testatrix' repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her
assignment or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs. From this erroneous premise,
they proceed to the equally erroneous conclusion that "the legitime of the compulsory heirs passes to
them by operation of law and that the testator can only dispose of the free portion, that is, the remainder
of the estate after deducting the legitime of the compulsory heirs ... and all testamentary dispositions,
either in the nature of institution of heirs or of devises or legacies, have to be taken from the remainder of
the testator's estate constituting the free portion."

Oppositors err in their premises, for the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole context of
the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small properties of little
value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole
estate through her will. The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions
acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-
half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent that her testamentary dispositions
were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly
borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs
in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of
my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
Oppositors' conclusions necessarily are in error. The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix,
being dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the
estate, as contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely provides that
"(O)ne who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the
provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by oppositors' own
theory of bequests, the second paragraph of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the
executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in
providing that "(T)he devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,provided its
value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as legitime." For
"diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as
well die intestate." 18 Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by
will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other cited codal provisions upholding
the primacy of the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice
the legitime of the other compulsory heirs.

3. Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of the
estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are not available
for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and the
heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as
solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her
named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee