SAROCAM VS INTERORIENT MARITIME 493 SCRA 502

(2006)FACTS:
On June 27, 2000, petitioner Benjamin Sarocam was hired
byInterorient Maritime and Demaco United Ltd., for 12-month
contract
as bosun on borad M/V Despina.
While navigating to China,Sarocam suffered lumbar sprain when he
accidentally fell from aladder. On Nov 15, 2000, he was examined and
was found to haveneuromyositis and diabetes. The examining physician
prescribedmedicine and recommended signing of and hospitalization. He
wasrepatriated on Nov 30, 2000.On Dec 5, 2000, petitioner was
referred to the company-designatedphysician. Sarocam was given
medicine for his back pain and diabetesand was advised to return for a
checkup. On Dec 13, he returned tothe clinic with normal resul
ts; petitioner was then declared fit forduty.
On Mar 20, 2001, petitioner executed a release and quitclaim in
favorof his Interorient Maritime where he acknowledged receipt
of $405 assick wages. However on Nov 2001, petitioner filed a
complaint withNLRC for disability benefit, illness
allowance/reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and fees. To
support his claim, hepresented medical certificates issued by his 3
personal doctors,recommending Grade VIII disability under POEA
schedule of disabilitygrading.LA dismissed the complaint citing that he
was not entitled to disabilitybenefits because he was declared fit for
duty and had previouslyexecuted a release and quitclaim in favor of his
employers and hadalready received his sickness allowance. NLRC
affirmed the same.
Sarocams argument: the quitclaim he executed is invalid, as the
amount he received was much lower than what he should havereceived
under the POEA standard employment contract. Quitclaimsare frowned
upon by the courts as they are contrary to public policy.
ISSUES:

W/N SAROCAMS EXECUTION OF A RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM
ESTOP HIM FROM CLAIMING DISABILITY BENEFITS UDNER THE
POEASTANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
HELD:
While the petitioner may be correct in stating that quitclaimsare
frowned upon for being contrary to public policy, the Court has,likewise
recognized legitimate waivers that represent voluntary and
reasonable settlement of a workers claim which should be respected
as the law between the parties.
Where the person making thewaiver has done so voluntarily, with a
full understanding thereof,and consideration for the quitclaim is
credible and reasonable, thetransaction must be recognized as
being a valid and bindingundertaking.
In the present case, Sarocam wrote the release and quitclaim with
hisown hand. From the document itself, the element of voluntariness
inits execution is evident. He also appears to have fully understood
thecontents of the document he was signing, as the important
provisionthereof had been relayed to him in Filipino.Not all waivers and
quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents areasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not laterbe disowned simply because of
a change of mind.
It is only wherethere is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from anunsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of the
settlement areunconscionable on its face, the law will step in to
annul thequestionable transaction.
But where it is shown that the personmaking the waiver did so
voluntarily, and the consideration for thequitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must berecognized as a valid and binding
undertaking.
Let it be emphasized that the constitutional policy to provide
fullprotection to labor is not meant to be a sword to
oppressemployers.
The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor doesnot prevent us
from sustaining the employer when it is in the right.



FIRST DIVISION


BENJAMIN L. SAROCAM,G.R. No. 167813
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
cralaw
INTERORIENT MARITIME cralawPromulgated:
ENT., INC., and DEMACO
UNITED LTD.,
Respondents.cralawJune 27, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N



CALLEJO, SR., J.:


cralawBefore the Court is a Petition for Review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
84883, which affirmed the February 19, 2004[2] and April
27, 2004[3] Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NCR Case No. 01-11-2492-00.

The Antecedents

cralawOn June 27, 2000 petitioner Benjamin L. Sarocam
was hired by Interorient Maritime Ent., Inc. and Demaco
United Ltd., for a twelve-month contract as 'bosun on
board M/V Despina. His basic monthly salary was
US$450.00 on a 48-hour work week, with a fixed overtime
pay of US$180.00 per month for 105 hours, supplementary
wage of US$70.00, and vacation leave with pay of 2.5
days.[4]

cralawWhile the vessel was navigating to China, petitioner
suffered lumbar sprain when he accidentally fell from a
ladder.[5] On November 15, 2000, he was examined and
found to have neuromyositis with the waist and diabetes.
The examining physician prescribed medicine and
recommended the signing off and hospitalization of
petitioner.[6] His employers agreed to repatriate him
on November 30, 2000.

cralawOn December 5, 2000, petitioner was referred to the
company-designated physician, Dr. Teodoro F. Pidlaoan,
Medical Director of the Our Lady of Fatima Medical
Clinic. The x-ray of his lumbosacral spine revealed normal
results and his Fasting Blood Sugar test revealed 9.1 (NV
4.1-6.1 umol/l). Petitioner was given Alaxan tablet for his
back pain and Euglocon for his elevated blood sugar. He
was also advised to return for follow-up evaluation.
On December 13, 2000, he returned to the clinic with no
more complaints of back pains. His sugar examination
likewise revealed normal results. Petitioner was then
declared 'fit for duty effective on that day.[7]

cralawOn March 20, 2001, or barely three months from
being pronounced fit to work, petitioner executed a
release and quitclaim[8] in favor of his employers where
he acknowledged the receipt of US$405.00 as his
sickwages and freed his employers from further liability.


cralawHowever, on November 27, 2001, petitioner filed a
complaint with the labor arbitration branch of the NLRC for
disability benefit, illness allowance/reimbursement of
medical expenses, damages and attorney's fees.[9] To
support his claim, he presented the following: (1) a
medical certificate[10] dated July 25, 2001 issued by Dr.
Rimando C. Saguin recommending a Grade VIII disability
under the POEA schedule of disability grading; (2) a
medical certificate[11] dated July 27, 2001 issued by Dr.
Antonio A. Pobre, recommending the same Grade VIII
disability; and (3) a medical certificate[12] dated August
2, 2001 issued by Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo recommending a
Grade VI disability.

cralawOn July 11, 2003, Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam
rendered a Decision[13] dismissing the complaint, holding
that petitioner was not entitled to disability benefits
because he was declared 'fit for duty. The Labor Arbiter
noted that petitioner had previously executed a release
and quitclaim in favor of his employers and already
received his sickness allowance. Thus, he could not claim
for reimbursement for medical expenses due to lack of
pertinent substantiation. Petitioner's claim for moral
damages and attorney's fees were, likewise, not awarded
on the Labor Arbiter's ruling that there was no evidence of
bad faith and malice on the part of the employers.

The fallo of the Labor Arbiter's decision reads:

cralaw
cralawWHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises
considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
cralaw
SO
ORDERED.[14]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary



cralawPetitioner appealed the Decision[15] to the NLRC
onJuly 31, 2003 which issued its
Resolution[16] dated February 19, 2004, affirming the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, with the modification that
petitioner was entitled to US$1,350.00 or its peso
equivalent, representing his salary for three (3)
months. The NLRC ruled that petitioner should have been
reinstated by respondents considering that when the
former was declared 'fit for duty, his employment contract
had not yet expired. Thus, respondents were liable for his
salary corresponding to the unexpired portion of the
employment contract or three months' salary for every
year of the unexpired term whichever is less, pursuant to
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The fallo of the
Resolution reads:

cralaw
cralawWHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Appeal is DENIED. However, for reasons stated
above, the Decision dated 11 July 2003 is hereby
MODIFIED, ordering respondents-appellees to
indemnify complainant-appellant in the amount
of US$1,350.00 or its peso equivalent at time of
payment.

cralawSO
ORDERED.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


cralawPetitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
the NLRC denied on April 27, 2004.[18]He forthwith filed a
Petition for Certiorari[19] with the CA, assailing the ruling
of the labor tribunal.

cralawOn January 25, 2005, the CA rendered judgment
dismissing the petition.The appellate court declared that
the issues raised by petitioner relating to the credibility
and probative weight of the evidence presented were
factual in nature, hence, proscribed under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The CA noted that petitioner did not even
contest the due execution, voluntariness and veracity of
his own handwritten quitclaim. Thus, he was estopped
from assailing the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he
executed after receiving US$405.00 from
respondents.Considering that petitioner was examined by
the company-designated physician and did not protest the
findings thereon and later received sickwages, the
appellate court concluded that the NLRC was correct in its
ruling. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states:

cralawIN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is orderedDISMISSED. No
pronouncements as to costs.

cralawSO
ORDERED.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralaw
cralawPetitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
by the CA in its Resolution[21] datedApril 19, 2005.

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, raising the
following issues:
cralaw
I.

IN LIGHT OF THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN 'GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES, INC. VS.
NLRC, ET AL., 350 SCRA 629, CAN THE
RESPONDENTS' COMPANY-DESIGNATED DOCTOR
BE CONSIDERED COMPETENT AND RELIABLE
ENOUGH TO DECLARE PETITIONER AS FIT TO
WORK CONTRARY TO THE DECLARATIONS OF
THREE (3) INDEPENDENT PHYSICIANS
SIMILARLY FINDING HIM OTHERWISE?

II.

DOES THE EXECUTION BY PETITIONER OF A
RELEASE AND QUITCLAIM ESTOP HIM FROM
CLAIMING DISABILITY BENEFITS UNDER THE
POEA STANDARD EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT?[22]


The Court's Ruling

cralawAs in the CA, the issues raised by the petitioner are
factual.He maintains that the diagnosis of his three (3)
personal doctors declaring him unfit to work is more
accurate and reliable than that of Dr. Pidlaoan, the
company-designated physician. These three physicians,
two of whom are orthopedic surgeons, are likewise in a
better position to determine his fitness or unfitness for
work, unlike Dr. Pidlaoan whose expertise cannot be
ascertained from the medical certificate he issued.
Petitioner thus assails the competence of Dr. Pidlaoan to
assess his fitness to work.

Petitioner avers that the quitclaim he executed is invalid,
as the amount he received as consideration therefor was
much lower than what he should have received under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract. He went on to argue
that quitclaims are frowned upon by this Court as they are
contrary to public policy.cralaw

cralawIt must be stressed that in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised.[23] The Court is not a
trier of facts and is not to reassess the credibility and
probative weight of the evidence of the parties and the
findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
as affirmed by the appellate court. Moreover,
the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are
accorded respect and finality when supported by
substantial evidence, which means suchevidence as that
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The Court does not substitute its
own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining
where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is
credible.[24]

In the instant case, the CA, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter
are one in their findings that based on the evidence on
record, petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits.

cralawPrescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds and
so rules that under the Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board
Ocean-Going Vessel or the POEA Standard Employment
Contract issued pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 4,
and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9, both Series of
2000, petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits.
Section 20-B, paragraph 2 of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract provides:

SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

x x x x

B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY
OR ILLNESS

cralawThe liabilities of the employer when the
seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness
during the term of his contract are as follows:

x x x x

2. cralawIf the injury or illness requires
medical and/or dental treatment in
acralawforeign port, the employer shall be
liable for the full cost of such cralawmedical,
serious dental, surgical and hospital treatment
as well as cralawboard and lodging until the
seafarer is declared fit to work or to
be cralawrepatriated.

However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still
requires medical attention arising from said
injury or illness, he shall be so cralawprovided
at cost to the employer until such time he is
declared fit cralawor the degree of his
disability has been established by
the cralawcompany-designated physician.


In the instant case, Dr. Pidlaoan diagnosed petitioner as
'fit for duty as gleaned from hisDecember 13, 2000 Medical
Report, to wit:

x x x x

Referred and consulted our medical clinic
on December 05, 2000 still complaining of on-
and-off low back pain aggravated by movements.
X-ray of the lumbosacral spine revealed normal
findings, Fasting Blood Sugar revealed 9.1 (NV
4.1 - 6.1 umol/l). Patient was given Alaxan tablet
2-3x a day for his back pain and Eugoclon 1
tablet daily for his elevated blood sugar and
advised to come back regularly for repeat blood
sugar and for follow-up evaluation on his back
pain.

Today, December 13, 2000, he came back with no
more complaints of back pain and repeat sugar
examination revealed already normal results.

DIAGNOSIS: Lumbar Strain
Diabetes Mellitus

RECOMMENDATION: Fit for duty effective
today, December 13, 2000.

x x x x

cralawSince he was declared fit for work, petitioner has no
more right to claim disability benefits under the
contractual provisions of the POEA Standard Employment
Contract.

cralawUnder Section 20-B, paragraph 3 of the said
contract, petitioner is obliged to submit himself to a post-
employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician within three working days upon his
return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do
so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the
same period is deemed as compliance. Failure to comply
with this mandatory reporting requirement shall result in
forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.It is
likewise provided that if a doctor appointed by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor
may be agreed jointly between the employer and the
seafarer whose decision shall be final and binding on both
parties.

Petitioner did not question the findings of Dr. Pidlaoan and
his recommendation.He questioned the doctor's
competency and the correctness of his findings only when
he filed the complaint against respondents before the
Labor Arbiter, roughly 11 months after petitioner was
examined by the doctor. Petitioner consulted his personal
doctors only in July and August 2001, long after he had
been examined by the company-designated physician.

cralawPetitioner's invocation of this Court's ruling
in German Marine Agencies v. NLRC[25]militates against
his claim for disability benefits. As explicitly laid in the said
case, it is the company-designated physician who should
determine the degree of disability of the seaman or his
fitness to work, thus:

cralawx x x In order to claim disability benefits
under the Standard Employment Contract, it is
the company-designated physician who must
proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent
disability, whether total or partial, due to either
injury or illness, during the term of the latter's
employment. x x x It is a cardinal rule in the
interpretation of contracts that if the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulation shall control.There is
no ambiguity in the wording of the Standard
Employment Contract ' the only qualification
prescribed for the physician entrusted with the
task of assessing the seaman's disability is that
he be company-designated.[26]

cralawDr. Pidlaoan examined and treated petitioner from
the time he was repatriated up to his recovery and
subsequent assessment as fit for duty on December 13,
2000. As in theGerman Marine case, the extensive medical
attention extended by Dr. Pidlaoan enabled the latter to
acquire familiarity, if not detailed knowledge, of
petitioner's medical condition. No doubt such specialized
knowledge enabled Dr. Pidlaoan to arrive at a much more
accurate appraisal of petitioner's condition, as compared
to another physician not privy to petitioner's case from the
very beginning.[27] Indeed, the assessment of the three
other personal doctors of petitioner could not have been
that reliable considering that they based their conclusions
on the prior findings of Dr. Pidlaoan; moreover, they
examined petitioner 7 or 8 months after he was assessed
as fit to work and treated him for only one day.


The only requirement stated in the POEA Standard
Employment Contract, as explained in the German Marine
case, is that the doctor be company-designated, and no
other. Though it is prudent and advisable to have a doctor
specialized in his field to examine the seafarer's condition
ordegree of illness, the contractual provisions of the
parties only require that the doctor be 'company-
designated. When the language of the contract is explicit,
as in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention
of the drafters thereof, the courts may not read into it any
other intention that would contradict its plain import.[28]

cralaw
Furthermore and most importantly, petitioner did not
question the competency of Dr. Pidlaoan and his
assessment when the latter declared him as fit for duty or
fit to work.

cralawAdditionally, petitioner, instead of questioning the
assessment of the company-designated doctor, executed a
release and quitclaim in favor ofrespondents, around three
months after the assessment. In executing the said
document, petitioner thus impliedly admitted the
correctness of the assessment of the company-designated
physician, and acknowledged that he could no longer claim
for disability benefits.

cralawWhile petitioner may be correct in stating that
quitclaims are frowned upon for being contrary to public
policy, the Court has, likewise, recognized legitimate
waivers that represent a voluntary and reasonable
settlement of a worker's claim which should be respected
as the law between the parties. Where the person making
the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full
understanding thereof, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as being a valid and binding
undertaking.[29]

cralawIn the instant case, petitioner, by his own hand,
wrote the following in the March 20, 2001release and
quitclaim:

cralawThat I have read this paper from beginning
to and [sic] and understand the contents thereof.

cralawThat I know this paper that I am signing.

That I know that signing this paper settles
and ends every right or claim I have for all
damages including but not limited to loss of
earning capacity [sic] of past and future
maintenance. [sic] support [sic] suffering [sic]
mental anguish. [sic] serious anxiety and similar
injury.

cralawThat I have received the amount of
US$405 or P18,630.

cralawThat I know that upon receipt of the above
amount I waive all claims I may have for damage
against the vessel's owners and her agents,
insurers, charterers, operators [sic]
underwriters, p.i. clube [sic], shipper and all
other persons in interest therein or thereon,
under all and all other
countries.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawFrom the document itself, the element of
voluntariness in its execution is evident. Petitioner also
appears to have fully understood the contents of the
document he was signing, as the important provision
thereof had been relayed to him in Filipino. Thus, the
document also states:

cralawNa alam ko na pagkatanggap ko nang
halagang ito ay pinawawalang bisa at iniuurong
ko nang lahat [ng] aking interes, karapatan, at
anumang reklamo o damyos laban sa barko, may-
ari nito, mga ahente, seguro at lahat-lahat ng
may kinalaman sa barkong ito maging dito sa
Pilipinas o anumang
bansa.[31]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawLikewise, the US$405.00 which he received in
consideration of the quitclaim is a credible and reasonable
amount. He was truly entitled thereto, no more and no
less, given that he was sick for only less than a month or
from November 15, 2000 to December 13, 2000. The same
would not, therefore, invalidate the said quitclaim. As we
held in Periquet v. National Labor Relations
Commission:[32]

cralawNot all waivers and quitclaims are invalid
as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where
there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled
from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
terms of settlement are unconscionable on its
face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction. But where it is shown
that the person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he
was doing, and the consideration for the
quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and
binding
undertaking.[33]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


cralawAs a final note, let it be emphasized that the
constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is
not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not
prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the
right.[34]

cralawWHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84883
are AFFIRMED.Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.