Calderon Vs Carale

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254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Calderon vs. Carale
G.R. No. 91636. April 23, 1992.
*
PETER JOHN D. CALDERON, petitioner, vs.
BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman of
the National Labor Relations Commission; EDNA BONTO
PEREZ, LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO
III, MUSIB M. BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA,
VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III, IRENEO B. BERNARDO,
IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G. GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO
B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA, RUSTICO L.
DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN, and OSCAR N.
ABELLA, in their capacity as Commissioners of the
National Labor Relations Commission; and GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Appointments; The Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission are not
among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman
and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the third
groups of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
PETITION for prohibition to review the constitutionality
and legality of the appointments of the respondents.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rafael Antonio M. Santos for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Controversy is focused anew on Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the execu-
______________
*
EN BANC.
255
VOL. 208, APRIL 22, 1992 255
Calderon vs. Carale
tive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in
this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower
in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjourment of the Congress.
1
The power of the Commission on Appointments (CA for
brevity) to confirm appointments, contained in the
aforequoted paragraph 1 of Sec. 16, Art. VII, was first
construed in Sarmiento III v. Mison
2
as follows:
x x x it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first
group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on
Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed
out, while the 1935 Constitution includes heads of bureaus among
those officers whose appointments need the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other
hand, deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from
appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
x x x Consequently, we rule that the President of the
Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. x x x.
x x x In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out,
the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude
presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in
the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII. Consequently, there was no
reason to use in the
______________
1
Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution.
2
G.R. No. 79974, 17 December 1987, 156 SCRA 549.
256
Calderon vs. Carale
third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII the word alone after the word
President in providing that Congress may by law vest the
appointment of lower-ranked officers in the President alone, or in
the court, or in the heads of departments, because the power to
appoint officers whom he (the President) may be authorized by law
to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. (italics supplied)
Next came Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga,
3
this time
involving the appointment of the Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Adhering to the doctrine in
Mison, the Court explained:
x x x Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which
are to be made with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of
the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review or
participation of the Commission on Appointments. To be more
precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the
1.
Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by
the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the
Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights
pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is,
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
because they are among the officers of government whom he (the
President) may be authorized by law to appoint. And Section 2(c),
Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the President to
appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights.
Consistent with its rulings in Mison and Bautista, in
Teresita Quintos Deles, et al. v. The Commission on
Constitutional Commissions, et al.,
4
the power of
confirmation of the Commis-
_____________
3 G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
4 G.R. No. 83216, 4 September 1989, 177 SCRA 259, 260.
257
VOL. 208, APRIL 23, 1992 257
Calderon vs. Carale
sion on Appointments over appointments by the President
of sectoral representatives in Congress was upheld because:
x x x Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in
paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the
President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the
Constitution, it is indubitable that sectoral representatives to the
House of Representatives are among the other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution,
referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose
appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
From the three (3) cases above-mentioned, these doctrines
are deducible:
Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
2.
is required only for presidential appointees
mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article
VII, including, those officers whose appointments
are expressly vested by the Constitution itself in the
president (like sectoral representatives to Congress
and members of the constitutional commissions of
Audit, Civil Service and Election).
Confirmation is not required when the President
appoints other government officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
or those officers whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in
Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but
omits to provide for appointment thereto, or provides
in an unconstitutional manner for such
appointments, the officers are considered as among
those whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law.
Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law),
amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It
provides in Section 13 thereof as follows:
x x x
The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other
Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to
any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which
nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor
Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon
recommendation of
258
Calderon vs. Carale
the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
5
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino
appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC
representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The
appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After
said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon
issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989,
designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed
commissioners.
This petition for prohibition questions the
constitutionality and legality of the permanent
appointments extended by the President of the Philippines
to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting
the same to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by said RA 6715.
Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA
6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA
6715 is not, according to petitioner, an encroachment on the
appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16,
Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law,
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
of other officers appointed by the President additional to
those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article
VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the Mison
and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this
case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent
appointments to the respondents without submitting them
to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA
6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of such appointments.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that
RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses
Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments without
constitutional basis. Mison and Bautista laid the issue to
rest, says the Solicitor General,
_____________
5 Rollo, pp. 10-11.
259
VOL. 208, APRIL 23, 1992 259
Calderon vs. Carale
with the following exposition:
As interpreted by this Honorable Court in the Mison case,
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required
exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors,
public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the
members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to
the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized
by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments is required.
Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of
officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding
the phrase and other officers required by law at the end of the
first sentence, or the phrase, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our
Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions.
The original text of Section 16 of Article VII of the present
Constitution as embodied in Resolution No. 517 of the
Constitutional Commission reads as follows:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments
and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President alone, in the courts or in the heads of the
department.
Three points should be noted regarding subsection 3 of Section
10 of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution and in the original text of
Section 16 of Article VII of the present Constitution as proposed in
Resolution No. 517.
First, in both of them, the appointments of heads of bureaus
were required to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Second, in both of them, the appointments of other officers,
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law to
appoint are expressly made subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. However, in the final version of
Resolution No. 517, as embodied in Section 16 of Article VII of the
present Constitution,
260
Calderon vs. Carale
the appointment of the above mentioned officers (heads of bureaus;
other officers whose appointments are not provided for by law; and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint) are excluded
from the list of those officers whose appointments are to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. This enactment,
reflected in Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, clearly
shows the intent of the framers to exclude such appointments from
the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Third, under the 1935 Constitution the word nominate
qualifies the entire Subsection 3 of Section 10 of Article VII thereof.
Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the three
(3) stage process of nomination, confirmation and appointment
operates. This is only true of the first group enumerated in Section
16, but the word nominate does not any more appear in the 2nd
and 3rd sentences. Therefore, the presidents appointment pursuant
to the 2nd and 3rd sentences need no confirmation.
6
The only issue to be resolved by the Court in the present
case is whether or not Congress may, by law, require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments extended by the President to government
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose
appointments require confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
To resolve the issue, we go back to Mison where the Court
stated:
x x x there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from
time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
_______________
1)
2)
6
Memorandum for respondents, Rollo, p. 8.
261
VOL. 208, APRIL 23, 1992 261
Calderon vs. Carale
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress
may by law vest in the President alone.
7
Mison also opined:
In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were
two (2) major changes proposed and approved by the Commission.
These were (1) the exclusion of the appointments of heads of
bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; and (2) the exclusion of appointments made
under the second sentence of the section from the same
requirement. x x x.
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other
officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint.
Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners
fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of
the Constitution, more specifically under the third groups
of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the
President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably,
the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among
the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA
6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents
Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations
Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16,
Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto
appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on
appointments which are otherwise entrusted only
with the President.
Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative.
Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function.
The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature.
Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13
of RA 6715
_____________
7 Supra at pp. 553-554.
262
Calderon vs. Carale
amending Art. 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over
appointments of the Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see
it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the
mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof.
Supreme Court decisions applying or interpreting the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
8
No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the
Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc.
9
x x x The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
since this Courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim legis interpretado
legis vim obtinentthe interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law.
10
The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have
interpreted Art. VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner.
Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the
Supreme Court has interpreted it?
In Endencia and Jugo vs. David,
11
the Court held:
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act No.
590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation
or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office, found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial
officers.
x x x x x x
_____________
8
Art. 8, New Civil Code of the Philippines.
9
Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3), 1987 Constitution.
10
People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 27 February 1974, 55 SCRA 607.
11
G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, 31 August 1953, 93 Phil. 699.
263
VOL. 208, APRIL 23, 1992 263
Calderon vs. Carale
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass
any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before
its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive
of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would
be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur.,
914, italics supplied).
The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack
thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed
as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am., Jur., 919,
italics supplied).
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of
government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact
laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the
interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within
the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may
declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case
ascertained its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a
decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final
court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of
the law or of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled
by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the
Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither
wise nor desirable, besides being clearly violative of the
fundamental principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers.
12
(italics
supplied)
Congress, of course, must interpret the Constitution, must
estimate the scope of its constitutional powers when it sets
out to enact legislation and it must take into account the
relevant constitutional prohibitions.
13
x x x The Constitution did not change with public opinion. It is not
only the same words, but the same in meaning . . . . and as long as
it it speaks not only in the same words, but with the same
_____________
12
Ibid., pp. 701-702.
13
Swisher, Carl Brent, The Supreme Court in Modern Role, NYU Press, Inc.,
1958, pp. 34-35.
264
Calderon vs. Carale
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the
hands of its framers, and was voted and adopted by the people . . .
14
The function of the Court in passing upon an act of
Congress is to lay the article of the Constitution which is
invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide
whether the latter squares with the former and to
announce its considered judgment upon the question.
15
It can not be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended
by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure
from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where
the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of
confirmation over almost all presidential appointments,
leading to many cases of abuse of such power of
confirmation. Subsection 3, Section 10, Art. VII of the 1935
Constitution provided:
3. The President shall nominate and with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the
rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain
or commander, and all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; x x x
The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments over presidential
appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and
disapproval of members of Congress. The solution to the
apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or
legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional
convention or Congress sitting as a constituent
(constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return
to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a
hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 consti-
_______________
14 Ibid., former Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott vs. Sandford, 19
Howard 393, 407 (1857), p. 147.
15 Ibid., Justice Roberts in United States vs. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 62-63
(1936), p. 170.
265
VOL. 208, APRIL 23, 1992 265
Calderon vs. Carale
tutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to
apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says
and not in accordance with how the legislature or the
executive would want it interpreted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of
the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it
requires the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal
force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., See concurring opinion.
Cruz, J., See dissent.
Bellosillo, J., Took no part in the deliberations.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
I dissent on the basis of my dissent in Sarmiento v. Mison,
which I believe should be re-examined instead of being
automatically re-affirmed simply because of its original
adoption. I do not believe we should persist in error on the
ground merely of adherence to judicial precedent, however
unsound.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., Concurring Opinion
When the issues in this petition were first raised in
Sarmiento III v. Mison (156 SCRA 549 [1987]), I joined
Justice Cruz in a dissent because I felt that the
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII by the majority of
the Court results in absurd or irrational consequences. The
framers could not have intended what the majority ruled to
be the meaning of the provision. When the question was
again raised in Bautista v. Salonga (172 SCRA 160 [1989]),
I reiterated my dissent and, urged a reexamination of the
doctrine stated in Sarmiento v. Mison.
The issue is again before us. Even as I continue to
believe that the majority was wrong in the Sarmiento and
Bautista cases, I
266
Tale vs. Court of Appeals
think it is time to finally accept the majority opinion as the
Courts ruling on the matter and one which everybody
should respect. There will be no end to litigation if,
everytime a high government official is appointed without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, another
petition is filed with this Court.
I, therefore, VOTE with the majority to DISMISS the
PETITION.
Petition dismissed.
o0o
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