G.R. No.

L-3342 April 18, 1951

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET
ALS., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
ANG CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO
LEE, and LEE BUN TING,respondents-appellants.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing and Zalazar for appellants.
Hector Bisnar and Rafael Dinglasan for appellees.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:
This is an appeal by Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee, and Lee Bun Ting from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Capiz, issued in the intestate estate proceedings of the
deceased Lee Liong, holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an
extrajudicial partition and the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination
of Civil Case No. V-331 of the same court, entitled Rafael Dinglasan, et al., vs. Lee Bun
Ting, Claro Lee and Ang Chia, in her personal capacity and as administratrix of the
estate of Lee Liong.
Rafael Dinglasan et al. filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Capiz on February
16, 1948, against Ang Chia, her son Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land located at Capiz, Capiz, and damages in
the amount of P1,000 a month. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for the
appointment of a receiver to which counsel for the defendants objected, and it was only
at the hearing of said motion when plaintiffs discovered that there was pending in the
same court a case concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. In view thereof, the
motion for the appointment of a receiver was withdrawn and the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratrix of the
estate, who is the same widow Ang Chia, who was already a party-defendant in her
personal capacity. In order to protect their interests, the plaintiffs also filed in the
intestate proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-
administrator of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix in the
amount of P500 be increased to P20,000. By their claim in intervention, the plaintiffs
made of record the pendency of the aforesaid civil case No. V-331 and prayed that the
intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated.
On June 21, 1948, the administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention
and objected to the motion for the increase of her bond and for the appointment of a co-
administrator. On August 4, 1948, the court issued an order denying the petition for a
co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000, and as regards the petition not to
close the intestate proceedings until after civil case No. V-331 shall have been decided,
the court stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the proceedings is
presented in due time and is objected to by petitioners. The court however took
cognizance of the pendency of said civil case No. V-331. The administratrix did not
appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of the
proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had
already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. To this motion the petitioners
objected, whereupon the court issued on July 15, 1949, an order holding in abeyance
the approval of the partition and the closing of the proceedings until after the decision in
said civil case has been rendered. From this order the administratrix and the heirs
appealed and now assign the following errors:
I
The lower court erred in taking cognizance of and being guided by the supposed
"claim" of petitioners-appellees.
II
The lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by the
petitioners-appellees.
III
The lower court erred in ordering the administratrix to file an increased bond of
P5,000.
Under the first assignment of error, the appellants question the validity of the order of
the lower court of August 4, 1948, whereby the court took cognizance of the civil case
filed by the appellees against the administratrix to recover possession of lot No. 398 and
damages, and required the administratrix to file a new bond of P5,000, contending that
by taking such action the court assumed jurisdiction over the case which it cannot do
because its jurisdiction as probate court is limited and especial (Guzman vs. Anog and
Anog, 37 Phil. 61). They claim further that probate proceedings are purely statutory and
their functions are limited to the control of the property upon the death of its owner and
cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral questions. (I Woermer, The American
Law of Administration, 514, 662-663.) Appellees on the other hand claim that said order
of August 4, 1948, is not the subject of this appeal, as no appeal has been taken by the
appellants from said order and the same has long become final; so that the present
appeal is only from the order of the lower court dated July 15, 1949, which denies the
motion of the appellees to terminate the intestate proceedings on the ground that they
have already agreed on the extrajudicial settlement of the estate and to relieve the
administratrix of the obligation of filing an increased bond.
There is merit in the claim of the appellees. It really appears from the record that the
order increasing the bond of the administratrix to P5,000 was issued on August 4, 1948,
and from said order no appeal has been taken by the appellants which has become final
long ago and that the present appeal is only from the order of the lower court dated July
15, 1949. It is true that the lower court in its later order of July 15, 1949, reiterated its
order to the administratrix to file a new bond in the amount of P5,000 within 30 days
after receipt thereof, but this cannot have the effect of receiving the former order of
August 4, 1948, nor does it give the appellants the right to question in this instance the
validity of said order, which has long become final. Moreover, an order requiring the
filing of a new bond by the administratrix is interlocutory in nature and is solely
addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
The act of the lower court in taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 is not tantamount
to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling of this court which
says that "when questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of
the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of
administration proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as probate court, has no
jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a Court of First Instance to try and determine
ordinary actions. . . ." (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil., 61, 62-63.)
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only
pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in
litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left
subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance
of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said
civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the
determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-
331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of
record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot
therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the
intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason
that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings
until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that
"action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal,
may be commenced against the executor or administrator". What practical value would
this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without
first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part
of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action
and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
(Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, supra). These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are
to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice
of the heirs. Another rule of court provides that "after a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative
of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to
appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by
the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the
interest of the deceased." (Section 17, Rule 3.) This rule also implies that a probate
case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an ordinary case wherein an
administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be also to render said rule
nugatory.
Wherefore, the Court affirms the order appealed from, with costs against appellants.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Jugo, JJ., concur.

















Case Digest:

Intestate Estate of the deceased Lee Liong. RAFAEL A. DINGLASAN, ET ALS. v.s.
ANG CHIA, as Administratrix of the above intestate, LEE BING HOO alias CLARO
LEE, and LEE BUN TING

Facts:
Rafael Dinglasan filed a civil case in the CFI of Capiz against Ang Chia, her son
Claro Lee and one Lee Bun Ting to recover the ownership and possession of a parcel
of land located in Capiz. He also filed a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The
counsel for defendants objected on the basis that there was a pending case in the same
court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion
and filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion of Ang Chia (widow), the
administratix of the estate, as a party-defendant. The plaintiffs also filed in the intestate
proceedings a verified claim in intervention and a motion praying that a co-administrator
of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratrix be increased. The plaintiffs
made of record the pendency of the civil case and prayed that the intestate proceedings
be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the
administratrix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in intervention and objected to the
motions made by the plaintiffs. The trial court denied the petition for a co-administrator
but increased the bond to P5,000 and stated that it would act thereon if a motion to
close the intestate proceedings is presented in due time and is objected to by
petitioners. It also took cognizance of the pendency of said civil case. The administratrix
did not appeal from said order nor file a new bond and instead moved for the closing of
the proceedings and her discharge as administratrix on the ground that the heirs had
already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The petitioners objected.
Subsequently, the CFI of Capiz issued in the intestate estate proceedings an order
holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extra-judicial partition the
closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of the civil case of the same
court. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
WON the lower court may hold the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
the termination of the separate civil action.

Held:
Yes. A probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of ordinary
case because to hold otherwise would render some rules in the ROC nugatory. Section
1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against the executor or administrator" What practical value would this provision have if
the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply
because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step
to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares
that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but
claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be
submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. Section 17, Rule 3 also
implies that a probate case may be held in abeyance pending determination of an
ordinary case wherein an administrator is made a party. To hold otherwise would be
also to render said rule nugatory. Thus, the court is justified in taking cognizance of said
civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case
will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and
distribution of the estate.