Cheng V Sy

Cheng v Sy
Facts:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC-Manila against respondent spouses
William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos.171762 and
71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 before the MeTC-Manila.

On March 16, 2004, the RTC, dismissed the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime.

Later, the MeTC dismissed, on demurrer, the BP Blg. 22 cases on account of the failure of petitioner to
identify the accused respondents in open court.

On April 26, 2005, petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC, Manila, a complaint
for collection of a sum of money with damages based on the same loaned amount of P600,000.00
covered by the two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases. The RTC-Manila,
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the amount
of P600,000.00 with damages was already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section
1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which the court denied in its Order dated June 5, 2006.

Petitioner argues that since the BP Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000 Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure promulgated on December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given only
prospective application. Petitioner also points out that she was not assisted by any private prosecutor in
the BP Blg. 22 proceedings.
Issue:
W/N the petitioner is entitled to collect the sum of money against respondent

Held:
The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the
corresponding civil action to collect the amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the criminal
action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases.

During the pendency of both the estafa and the BP Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability
was impliedly instituted and remained pending before the respective trial courts.

Prior to the judgment in either the estafa case or the BP Blg. 22 case, petitioner, as the complainant,
cannot be deemed to have elected either of the civil actions both impliedly instituted in the said criminal
proceedings to the exclusion of the other.

The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt produced the legal effect of a reservation by the petitioner of her right to
litigate separately the civil action impliedly instituted with the estafa cases.

However, although this civil action could have been litigated separately on account of the dismissal of
the estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was deemed to have also elected that such civil
action be prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even
to cases already pending at the time of their promulgation.

Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when
the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of
the civil and criminal cases.

However, in applying the procedure discussed above, it appears that petitioner would be left without a
remedy to recover from respondents the P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. This could prejudice
even the petitioners Notice of Claim involving the same amount filed in Special Proceedings.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor
during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Faced with the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioners recourse pursuant to the prevailing rules of
procedure would have been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount loaned to respondents
corresponding to the bounced checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed requiring only a
preponderance of evidence on the part of petitioner. Her failure to appeal within the reglementary
period was tantamount to a waiver altogether of the remedy to recover the civil liability of
respondents. However, due to the gross mistake of the prosecutor in the BP Blg. 22 cases, we are
constrained to digress from this rule.
We take into consideration the trial courts observation when it dismissed the estafa charge in Criminal
Case No. 98-969953 that if there was any liability on the part of respondents, it was civil in
nature. Hence, if the loan be proven true, the inability of petitioner to recover the loaned amount
would be tantamount to unjust enrichment of respondents.

Cheng V Sy

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