CASE DIGESTS

TORTS AND DAMAGES Table of Contents

Outline by Atty. Nicanor B. Jimeno & Atty. Linda Jimeno
st
(As of 1 Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176) 8 Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario 8 Elcano vs. Hi
ll 9 Cinco vs. Canonoy
10 Baksh vs. Court of Appeals 10 Dulay vs. Court of Appeal
s 11 Damage, Damages, Injury
12 People vs. Ballesteros
12 Custodio vs. Court of
Appeals 12 Board of Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
13 Art. 2176 of the Civil Code 14 Garcia vs. Florido
14 Andamo vs. Court of Appe
als 15
semester SY 2010-2011)

13
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. 15 Tayag vs. Alcantara 16 Quasi
Delict vs. Delict 17 Barredo vs. Garcia- Art. 2177 Discussion
17 People vs. Ligo
n 17 Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
18 Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 18 Philippine Rab
bit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People 19 Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract
20 Cangco
vs. Manila Railroad Co. 20 Fores vs. Miranda 21 Far East Bank and Trust Company
vs. Court of Appeals 22 Air France vs. Carrascoso
22 PSBA vs. Court of Appeals
24
Syquia vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Memorial Park and Cemetery, Inc. Vicente
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 25
24

Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 25 Negligence 26 Picart vs. Smith 26 Negligen
ce in special cases (Children) 26 JARCO Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeal
s and Spouses Aguilar Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Company
27 Ylarde vs. Aqui
no 28 Negligence (Experts/Professionals)
29 Cullion Ice, Fish and Electric Compa
ny vs. Philippine Motors Corporation US v. Pineda
30 BPI v. CA 31 Intoxication
3
4 US vs. Baggay
35 Degrees of Negligence 35 Marinduque vs.Workmens Compensation
3
5 Res Ipsa Loquitur
36 Ramos vs. CA
37 Batiquin vs. CA 39 D.M. Consunji vs. CA
4
0 Defenses (Plaintiffs negligence)
41 Manila Electric Co. vs Remonquillo
41 Berna
rdo vs. Legaspi 41 Bernal vs. House
42 PLDT vs. CA 42 Defenses (Contributory Neg
ligence) 43 Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals
43 Rakes vs. Atlantic
43 Philippine
Bank of Commerce v CA (Lipana) 44 Defenses (Fortuitous Event)
45 Juntilla vs. Fo
ntanar 45 Hernandez vs. Commission on Audit
46 Gotesco vs. Chatto and Lina Delza
Chatto 47 Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co 48 NAPOCOR vs. CA
49 Sout
heastern College Inc. v CA 50 ASSUMPTION OF RISK
51 Afialda vs. Hisole
51 Ilocos
Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court of Appeals 51 DUE DILIGENCE
52 Ramos
, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al 52 Metro Manila Transit C
orp. (MMTC) vs. CA 53 PRESCRIPTION
54 Kramer vs. Court of Appeals
54 Allied Bank
ing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 55 Causation (Proximate Cause)
55 Bataclan
vs. Medina 55 Fernando vs. Court of Appeals and the City of Davao
56 Urbano vs.
IAC 57 Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
57 Pilipinas Bank v. CA
58
26

29

Pilipinas Bank v. CA 58 Quezon City Government vs. Fulgencio Dacara 59 Remote caus
e, distinguished from Proximate case 60 Gabeto vs. Araneta
60 Urbano vs. IAC
61 C
oncurrent Cause, distinguished from Proximate 61 Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Cou
rt of Appeals 61 Subido vs. Custodio
61 TESTS of proximate cause- the BUT FOR test 6
2 Bataclan vs. Medina 62 Substantial Factor Test 63 Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC an
d Casiano Pascua et al. 63 Cause v. Condition 64 Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
64
Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo 64 Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co.
65 Effi
cient Intervening Cause
65 McKee vs. IAC 65 Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo
67 T
eague vs. Fernandez 67 Urbano vs. IAC
68 Last Clear Chance 68 Picart vs. Smith
6
8 Bustamante vs. Court Of Appeals
69 Phoenix Construction Inc. vs. IAC 69 Philip
pine Bank Of Commerce vs. CA (Lipana)
71 Glan Peoples Lumber And Hardware vs. IAC
72 Pantranco vs. Baesa
72 Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District 73 ANURAN vs. BUO
74 CANLAS vs. CA 74 Consolidated Bank vs. Court Of Appeals
75 ENGADA vs. CA
76 S
trict liability 77 Vestil vs. IAC
77 Things thrown from a building 77 Dingcong v
s. Kanaan
77 Death/Injuries in the course of employment
78 Afable vs. Singer Sew
ing Machine Company 78 Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Ca 79 Interference of Contractual
Relations
79 Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, et al. 79 So Ping Bun vs. CA
80 Guilatco vs. C
ity of Dagupan 81 Liability of Governmental Units
81 Worcester vs. Ocampo
81 J.
H. Chapman vs. James M. Underwood 82 Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai 83 Felina Rodriguez-L
una vs. IAC
84 Vicarious liability of Parents
84

Vicarious liability of Parents 84 Exconde vs .Capuno 84 Salen vs Balce 85 FUELLAS

v CADANO 85 Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez
86 Rodriguez-Luna v IAC
86 Cuadra vs. Monfort
86 Libi v. IAC
86 214 SCRA 16 (1990)
86 Tamargo vs CA 87 Vicarious liability of
teachers and heads of institutions 87 Mercado vs. CA 87 Palisoc vs. CA
88 Amador
a vs. CA 89 Pasco vs. CFI
90 YLarde vs. Aquino 90 Salvosa vs. IAC
91 St. Francis
High School vs. CA 92 PSBA vs. CA 93 Soliman vs. Tuason
93 St. Marys Academy vs.
Carpitanos
94 Vicarious liability of owners and managers of establishments 95 Ph
ilippine Rabbit vs. Philippine American 95 Vicarious Liability of employers
96 P
hiltranco vs. CA 96 Castilex vs. Vasquez
96 Filamer vs. IAC
97 NPC vs. CA
98 Lig
ht Rail Transit vs. Navidad 99 Mckee vs. IAC 99 Valenzuela vs. CA
100 Vicarious
liability of the State 101 E. Merritt vs Government Of The Philippine Islands
10
1 Inocencio Rosete vs.The Auditor General 101 Mendoza vs. De Leon, et al.
102 Fo
ntanilla vs. Maliaman 102 City of Manila vs. Teotico 103 Liability of employees
104 Araneta vs. De Joya 104 Engineers/Architect- Nature of liability 104 Lanuzo
vs. Sy Bon Ping
104 Malipol vs. Tan
105 Viluan vs. CA
105 Torts with Independent
Civil Actions (Violation of Civil and Political rights) Lim vs. Ponce De Leon 1
06 Aberca vs. Ver
107 MHP Garments vs. CA
107 Independent Civil Action (Defamati
on, Fraud and Physical Injuries) 108 Marcia et al. vs.CA
108 Madeja v. Caro
108
106

Madeja v. Caro 108 Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists 109 Defamation

110 MVRS vs. Islam
ic 110 Fraud
110 Salta v. De Veyra
110 Physical Injuries
111 Capuno v. Pepsi Col
a 111 Corpus v. Paje
112 Dulay v. CA
112 Intentional Tort (Abuse of Right) 113 Ve
layo v. Shell
113 Saudi Arabia v. CA 114 Globe Mackay v. CA
115 Albenson v. CA 1
16 Amonoy v. Gutierrez 117 UE v. Jader
118 Garciano v. CA, et al.
119 Barons vs.
CA 120 BPI vs. CA
121 Acts Contra Bonus Mora
122 Ruiz v. Secretary of National
Defense 122 Breach of promise to marry, seduction and sexual assault Wassmer vs.
Velez 123 TANJANCO vs. SANTOS
124 Bunag vs. CA 124 Constantino vs. Mendez
125 Qu
imiguing vs. Icao 126 Pe vs. Pe
126 Malicious Prosecution
127 Lao vs. Associated
Anglo American Tobacco 127 Que vs. IAC
128 Drilon vs CA 129 Public Humiliation
130 Patricio vs. Leviste 130 Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino
131 Unjust
Dismissal 132 Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
133 Derelection of duty
134 Amaro vs.
Sumanguit 134 Violation of human dignity and Privacy
134 Concepcion v. CA 135 C
oncept of Damages
136 Heirs of Borlado vs. Vda. De Bulan 136 Lazatin vs. Twano
1
36 Actual or Compensatory Damages
137 Algarra vs. Sandejas 137 Kinds of Actual D
amages 137 Integrated Packaging Corp. vs. CA
137 Attorneys fees
138
123

Attorneys fees 138 Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court 138 Interest

139 Crismi
na Garments, Inc. vs. CA 139 Mitigation of Liability
139 Cerrano vs. Tan Chuco
1
39 Moral Damages 140 Kierulf vs. CA
140 Proof and Proximate Cause
141 Miranda-Ri
baya vs. Carbonell 141 Del Rosario vs. CA
143 Raagas vs. Traya 144 Enervida vs.
Dela Torre 145 People vs. Bugayong
146 Francisco vs. GSIS
146 Expertravel & Tour
s, Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals 147 Unfounded suits
148 Editha and Glicerio Mijares
vs. CA and Metro Drug, Inc. 148 J Marketing vs. Sia 150 Cometa vs. Court of Appea
ls 151 Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc vs. NLRC
152 People of the Philippi
nes vs. Pirame 154 Arcona vs. Court of Appeals
155 Factors in determining amount
156 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
156 Gregorio Fule vs. Court o
f Appeals
156 Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals 158 Valenzuela vs. CA
158
Aurelio Sumaplong vs. Court of Appeals
160 Lopez vs. Pan-American World Airways
160 Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Spouses Chua
162 Who may recov
er? 163 Strebel vs Figueras
163 ABS-CBN vs. Court of Appeals 164 National Power
v. Philipp Brothers
165 Nominal Damages
166 Ventanilla vs. Gregorio Centeno
166
Robes-Francisco Realty and Development Corp. vs.CFI 166 People vs Gopio 167 Dr. A
rmovit, et al. vs. CA and Northwest Airlines, Inc. 168 Temperate Damages
169 Peo
ple vs. Singh
169 People of the Philippines vs. Edison Plazo 169 PNB vs. CA
170

Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176)

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario
73 Phil. 607 (July 8, 1942) Facts: A taxicab figured in a head-on collision with
a carretela. The carretela overturned, causing death to one of its passengers,
a 16-year old boy. A criminal case was instituted by the parents of the deceased
against Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former reserved the
right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The driver of the taxica
b was convicted. Subsequently, the parents instituted the present civil action f
or damages against Barredo, the employer of the taxicab driver. Barredo contends
that his liability rests only on the provision of the penal code and hence, sin
ce no civil action has been filed against Fontanilla, he too cannot be held civi
lly responsible. Issue: Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action against the
employer of the taxicab driver making him primarily and directly responsible un
der Art. 1903 of the Civil Code? Held: YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and disti
nct from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability. Under Article
1903 of the Civil Code, an employer is primarily and directly responsible for t
he negligent acts of his employee. There are two remedies available for the pare
nts to choose: . The first is under Article 100 of the Penal Code wherein the em
ployer is only subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the crime committed
by his employees. If the parents choose this remedy, the complainant must first
exhaust the properties of the employee, before the employers properties could be
made answerable. The other action is under Article 1903 of the Civil code (quasi
-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein the negligent employer is held primarily lia
ble, subject to the defense that he exercised the diligence of a good father of
the family in the selection and engagement of his employees.
.

In this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is more pract
ical to file for damages against the employer, who is more solvent than his empl
oyee. NOTE: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court prior to the effec
tivity of the new Civil Code. The principle enunciated in said case (that respon
sibility for fault or negligence under a quasi-delict is separate and distinct f
rom the negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code) is now specifically e
mbodied in Art. 2177 of the New Civil Code.
Elcano vs. Hill
77 SCRA 98 (May 26, 1977) Facts: Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally for kil
ling Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence, Reginald Hill is still a min
or and, under laws effective at the time, also legally married. Reginald is stil
l living and receives subsistence from his father, Marvin Hill. Reginald was acq
uitted on the ground that his acts were not criminal because of lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake. Issues: (1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar
the present civil action for damages? (2) Is Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liab
le? Held: 1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case does not ex
tinguish his liability arising from quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof
required in the criminal case differs from that required in a civil suit. To fin
d the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is requir
ed unlike in civil cases, preponderance of evidence is sufficient. The concept o
f culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation
of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil Cod
e provides that Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and distinct f
rom the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. However, p
laintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defend
ant. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a crimina
l act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted, provided that the offended pa
rty is not allowed, if he is also criminally charged, to recover damages on both
scores. And assuming awards made in the two cases vary, he would be entitled on

ly to the bigger award of the two. In other words, the extinction of civil liabi
lity refers exclusively to the civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Rev
ised Penal Code. The civil liability arising from quasidelict is not extinguishe
d even by a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted. 2. W
hile it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation by marri
age of the minor, such emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although
married, was living with his father and still dependent from the latter. ART 218
0 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of R
eginald. The minor may be emancipated, but that does not mean that he is no long
er under the responsibility of his parents.

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occu
rrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual. However, inasmuch as
Reginald is now of age (at the time the case reached the Supreme Court), it is a
matter of equity that the liability of Atty. Hill should be declared merely sub
sidiary to that of his son. Note: In this case, there is no doubt that Reginald
killed Elcano. His acquittal is based on lack of intent to kill, coupled with mis
take and not on the non-commission of the acts alleged.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
90 SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979) Facts: On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed a complaint for r
ecovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile a
nd a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos P
epito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot ar
ising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for pr
ivate respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the final determinat
ion of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides: (b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action a
rising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended
in whatever stage it may be found, unitl final judgment in the criminal proceedi
ng has been rendered. The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civ
il case. Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for dama
ge to property during the pendency of the criminal action. Held: Yes, the civil
suit for damages brought by the petitioner is based on quasi-delict predicated o
n Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Thus, the civil case may proceed as
a separate and independent civil action: Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or n
egligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The
separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also clearly recognize
d in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court: Sec 2. Independent civil action. In
the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of
the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecuti
on, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. The civil action referre
d to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should b
e suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising from
the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97336 (February 19, 1993) Facts: Private Respondent Marilou Gonzales fi
led an action for damages against Gashem Baksh for the alleged violation of thei
r agreement to get married. Gonzales is 22 years old, single, Filipina, a pretty
lass of good moral character and has a reputation duly respected in her communi
ty; Baksh, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen and is an exchange student t
aking a medical course in Dagupan City. Gonzales alleges that before 20 August 1
987, Baksh courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condi
tion that they would get married after the end of the school semester. In fact,
Baksh visited Gonzalez parents in Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marr
iage. In August 1987, Baksh forced her to live with him in an apartment. Accordi
ng to Gonzales, she was a virgin before she began living with him. A week before
the filing of the complaint, Bakshs attitude towards her started to change. He m
altreated and threatened to kill her. During a confrontation in the barangay, Ba
ksh repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymo
re, saying further that he is already married to someone else. Issue: Whether or
not a breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong, thus making Baksh liab
le for damages. Held: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry is

not an actionable wrong per se . This notwithstanding, Article 21 of the Civil C

ode has expanded the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human fore
sight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or om
issions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. In the Philippine lega
l system, as envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be govern
ed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are inju
rious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress.
Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Art
icles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of
the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts. Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate cau
se for the woman to give herself unto him in sexual congress, and there is proof
that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to obtain her consent to the sexual act
, the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 is in order. The court took notice
that Gonzales is an innocent barrio lass and a typical Filipina, who under our c
ustoms would not have gave in to sexual congress with Baksh much more lived-in w
ith him, were it not for his promise to marry.
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
243 SCRA 220 (1995) [see infra] Facts: An altercation between Benigno Torzuela a
nd Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the Big Bang sa Alabang, Alabang Village, Munt
inlupa, in which Torzuela, a security guard in the said carnival shot and killed
Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to Torzuelas security agency.
Petitioner Maria Benita Dulay, widow of the deceased Atty. Dulay filed an action
for damages against Torzuela and SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD security agency, w
hich were impleaded as alternative defendants being the employer/s of Torzuela.
Petitioner Dulay alleged in her complaint that the incident resulting in the deat
h of Atty. Dulay was due to the concurring negligence of the defendants, Torzuel
as wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGU
ARD and/or SUPERGUARD SUPERGUARD filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Torzuelas
act of shooting was beyond the scope of his duties and that the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), and therefore, the civil l
iability is governed by the Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 100. Civil
liability of a person guilty of a felony. - Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable. SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for damage
s based on negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, could not lie, since
the civil liability under Art. 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art. 3
65 of the RPC. The RTC upheld the arguments of SAFEGUARD. Thus in their appeal,
the Dulays allege that: without stating the facts showing such negligence are mer
e conclusions of lawx x xRespondent judge also declared that the complaint was one
for damages founded on crimes punishable under Art.100 &103, RPC as distinguish
ed from those arising from quasi-delict. The CA affirmed the decision of the lowe
r court, hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.

distinguished from those arising from quasi-delict. The CA affirmed the decision
of the lower court, hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue: WON, Arti
cle 2176 covers only acts of negligence HELD: No. Contrary to the theory of SAFE
GUARD, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the C
ivil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the
doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but
also those which are voluntary and intentional. fault or negligence, under the art
icle covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and volunta
ry or negligent.
Damage, Damages, Injury
People vs. Ballesteros
285 SCRA 438 (January 29, 1998) Facts: Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother Eduardo
and Ronnel Tolentino along with Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam, Robert C
acal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid went to the barangay hall to attend a dan
ce. The group did not stay long because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Ga
lo and his companions who were giving them dagger looks. The group had barely le
ft when, within fifty meters from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upo
n from the rear. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people dead (Edua
rdo and Jerry) and four others injured. Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and
Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were iss
ued for the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder. The trial co
urt found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified
by treachery awarding the heirs of Eduardo and Jerry: 1. 2. 3. Compensatory dama
ges in the amount of PhP50,000.00 Moral damages in the amount of PhP20,0000 Actu
al damages in the amount of 61,785.00 (Jerry) & P35,755.00 (Eduardo)
Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in the award of damages? Held:
As to moral and to actual damages, yes. As to compensatory damages, no. Damages
may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an
injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences, which
the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actu
al or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompens
e for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the c
omplainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering,
moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximat
e result of the offenders wrongful act or omission. Before actual or compensato
ry damages could be granted, the party making a claim for such must present the
best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated
by his testimony. Here, the claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victim
s is not controverted, the same having been fully substantiated by receipts accu
mulated by them and presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damag
es is proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of J
erry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the polic
y of this Court, the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is given to the
heirs of the victims by way of indemnity, and not as compensatory damages. As r
egards moral damages, the trial court in its discretion may determine the amount
of psychological pain, damage and injury caused to the heirs of the victims, al
though inestimable. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this m
atter.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 483 (February 9, 1996)
Facts: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an apartment in Interior P. Burgos St
., Taguig, Metro Manila. There were tenants occupying the apartment at the time
of purchase. Taking P. Burgos St. as the point of reference, on the left side go
ing to Mabasas apartment, the row of houses are as follows: That of Custodio, the
n of Santos, then that of Mabasa. On the right side is that of Morato and a sept
ic tank. The first passageway from the apartment to P. Burgos St. is through the

se houses. The second passageway goes through the septic tank, with a width of l
ess than 1 meter. Sometime later, one of the apartments tenants vacated it. Mabas
a checked the premises and saw that the Santoses built an adobe fence, making th
e first passageway narrower. Morato also built an adobe fence in such a way that
the entire passageway was enclosed. Then the remaining tenants vacated the area
. Santos claimed that she built the fence because of an incident involving her d
aughter and a passing bicycle. She also mentioned that some drunk tenants would
bang their doors and windows. The RTC granted a right of way and damages in favo
r of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA modified it, ordering an award of damages
to Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way and award of damages in the SC.
Issue: Whether or Not the award of damages is proper. Held: Firstly, the Custod
ios are barred from questioning the grant of the right of way, because they fail
ed to appeal the decision. The decision has become final. As to the award of dam
ages, the CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents Mabasa. T
he mere fact that Mabasa suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recove
r damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of act
ion for a legal wrong inflicted by Custodio, and damage resulting to Mabasa. Wro
ng without damage, or damage without wrong does not constitute a cause of action
, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong. In the case at bar, there were no previous easements existing
in favor of Mabasa. The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and enj
oyment of ones property in a general and ordinary manner. Nobody can complain of
being injured here, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be consi
dered as a mere consequence of community life.

Board of Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw

20 SCRA 987 (1967) Facts: Maximo Kalaw was a general manager and chairman of the
board of NACOCO (National Coconut Corp.) Defendant Juan Bocar and Garcia were m
embers of Board. After the passage of a law that empowers NACOCO to buy, sell, b
arter, export their products, NACOCO embarked on Copra trading Activities. Kalaw
executed contracts. However, due to the typhoons, the copra industry was affect
ed, resulting to impending financial losses on the contracts executed by Kalaw.
A meeting was held with the board of directors and the disclosure of the impendi
ng loss was communicated to the members but no action was taken thereafter. Some
of the buyer like Louis Dreyful and Co. filed a suit against the Corporation fo
r damages due to undelivered copra. Settlement was made with the buyer. NACOCO o
n the other hand seeks recovery from Kalaw and the other directors charging them
with negligence under Art 2176 with bad faith or breach of trust for having app
roved the contracts. Issue: Whether or not Kalaw is liable for damages.

Issue: Whether or not Kalaw is liable for damages. Held: Kalaw had authority to
execute the contracts without need of prior approval due to the nature of his po
sition as general manager. Also, doubts were only thrown when the contracts turn
ed out to be unprofitable for NACOCO. Rightfully had it been said that bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purp
ose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a k
nown duty thru some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of
fraud. Applying this precept to the given facts herein, we find that there was
no "dishonest purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of wrong,
" or "breach of a known duty," or "Some motive or interest or ill will" that "pa
rtakes of the nature of fraud." Nor was it even intimated that the NACOCO direct
ors acted for personal reasons, or to serve their own private interests, or to p
ocket money at the expense of the corporation. As the trial court correctly obse
rved, this is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong i
s absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is want
ing.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 483 (February 9, 1996) Held: The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery
of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by
the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without d
amage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since dam
ages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which resu
lts from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. Th
ese situations are often called damnum absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff
may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establis
h that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to
the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that b
reach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there sh
ould be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffe
ring. Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions
which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such ot
her person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cas
es, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal inj
ury or wrong. In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual dam
age, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any leg
al injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, th
e damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. In the case at bar, although ther
e was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respon
dents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of
right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of t
he Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites conc
ur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was
damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
Garcia vs. Florido
G.R.No. L-35095 (August 31,1973) Facts: Petitioners German C. Garcia, his wife,

Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, boarded a public utility car owned and
operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vays
on, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City. While the car was ne
gotiating a slight curve on the national highway, it collided with an oncoming p
assenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by de
fendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the collision, petitioners sustained vario
us physical injuries which necessitated medical treatment and hospitalization. P
etitioners filed for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers
, respectively, of the public utility car and the passenger bus.Marcelino Inesin
and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer admitting the contract of carriage with p
etitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negl
igence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver. Respondents, Mactan Transit Co
., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the petitioners
had no cause of action for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of
the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a crimina
l case already for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through re
ckless imprudence," by the Chief of Police. Hence, with the filing of the crimin
al case, no civil action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal c
ase has been finally adjudicated. Therefore, the filing of the instant civil act
ion is premature, because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and
does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver,
Pedro Tumala, guilty of negligence. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may r
ecover damages under a separate and independent action while a criminal case is
pending. Held: Yes. Petitioners may recover damages for liability arising from q
uasi-delict. Under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules
of Court, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civi
l Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civi
l action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the crim
inal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately
. But it should be noted, however, that neither Sec. 1 nor Sec. 2 of Rule 111 fi
xes a time limit when such reservation shall be made. In the case at bar, there
is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action institut
ed by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the sai
d criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal of the accus
ed. Petitioners have two options from where they could recover damages fromthat a
rising out of the criminal act, and that under quasi-delict. Petitioners opted t
o recover damages under quasi-delict, which in effect operated as their abandonm
ent of their claim to damages under the pending criminal case. Therefore, petiti
oners may still recover damages from their civil action against the defendants.
Andamo vs. Court of Appeals
191 SCRA 195 (November 6, 1990)
Facts: Petitioner-spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parc
el of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious c
orporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivanc
es (including an artificial lake) were constructed, which allegedly inundated an
d eroded petitioners land; caused a young man to drown; damaged petitioners cr
ops and plants; washed away costly fences; endangered the lives of petitioners a
nd their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons; and exposed plants and other
improvements to destruction. Issue: Whether or not a corporation, which has buil
t waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damag
es under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Held: A care
ful examination of the complaint shows that the action is one under Articles 217
6 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delic
t are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negli
gence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the d
efendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, the waterpaths and

contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the l

and of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection betw
een the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners
. Such action, if proven, constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages.

recovery of damages. It must be stressed that the use of ones property is not w
ithout limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a thir
d person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners h
ave mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land i
n a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of oth
ers. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land
, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable car
e so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the
usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage t
o an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910) Facts: Defendant Manila Electric left some twenty or
thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the p
remises behind its power plant. Fifteen year old David Taylor is a son of a mech
anical engineer. Two years before the incident David spent four months at sea, a
s a cabin boy on an interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father
s office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. It appears tha
t he was a boy of more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both me
ntally and physically than most boys his age. David, along with Manuel, a 12 yea
r old, entered the premises of the defendant without permission. While playing,
the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some pieces and brought them home. In
the presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl , The two boys made a series of experi
ments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light so
cket and obtained no result. Next, they tried to break the cap with a stone and
failed. They then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was f
illed with a yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the ca
p while the other boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion foll
owed causing injuries to the boys and to Jesse. This action was brought by the p
laintiff, through his father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffe
red. Issue: Whether or not the company was liable for the injury sustained by pl
aintiff. Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligen
ce of the defendant of leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the prox
imate cause of the injury. When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in
an injury is the plaintiffs own acts, he cannot recover damages for the injury. T
he immediate cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiffs injury, was his
own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap. True, David Taylor may n
ot have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion whic
h might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course
he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred, but he well knew
that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet
he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion We are satisfied
that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that his age and his experience qualified him to understan
d the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoi
ded the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury i
ncurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his
own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries w
ould not have been incurred but for the negligence of the defendant in leaving t
he caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiffs own act was the proxim
ate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury NOTE for unde
rgraduates: Read the analysis of US turn-table case in the original.
Tayag vs. Alcantara
98 SCRA 723 (July 23, 1980) Facts: The Heirs of Tayag filed a complaint for dama
ges against Phil Rabbit Bus lines alleging among others that Pedro Tayag Sr. was
riding on a bicycle along McArthur highway on his way home. He was hit by the b

us driven by Villa which caused his death. Philippine Rabbit filed motion to sus
pend trial on the ground that criminal case against Villa was still pending. Whe
n Villa was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, Philippine Rabbit filed
a motion to dismiss the civil case. The heirs opposed alleging that their cause
of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict. The Judge indeed dismissed
the case, hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of Villa in t
he criminal case will result to the dismissal of the civil case based on quasi-d
elict. Held: No. The acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar t
o the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict. Article 31 of the Civil Cod
e provides: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or commission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed inde
pendently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter
. Evidently, the above quoted provision refers to a civil action based, not on t
he act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an o
bligation arising from other sources, like quasi delict. In the case at bar, the
allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners cause of action was
based upon a quasi-delict, to wit: That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at th
e time of the accident being driven by defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a fast
er and greater speed than what was reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent
, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to pe
rsons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulation.
That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the dili
gence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its emplo
yees, particularly defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in que
stion which resulted in the death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property
would not have occurred. The essential averments for a quasi delictual action a
re present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on t
he part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4)
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.\
Quasi Delict vs. Delict
Barredo vs. Garcia- Art. 2177 Discussion
73 Phil 607 (July 8, 1942)
Facts:(Supra) Issue: Whether or not plaintiffs may bring this separate civil act
ion against Fausto Barredo, making him primarily and directly, responsible under
article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. Held: Author
ities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a sep
arate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, a
nd individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime. Up
on this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquili
ana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are: 1. That crimes affect the public i
nterest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern. 2. That, consequently,
the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage. 3. That delicts are not as
broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted
that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as
begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction o
f the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
People vs. Ligon
152 SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987) Facts: Accused Fernando Gabat was riding a 1978 Volk
swagen Kombi owned by his father and driven by the other accused, Rogelio Ligon.
While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando called a cigarette vend
or, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. While the transaction was occurring, th
e traffic light changed to green, and the car suddenly moved forward. While the
car was moving, Rosales was clinging to the window but lost his grip and fell do
wn on the pavement. The bystanders rushed Rosales to PGH where he was treated fo
r multiple physical injuries until his death. Since Ligon did not stop the car,
Castillo, a taxi-driver chased him and sought the assistance of two police offic
ers in an owner-type jeepney. At an intersection, Castillo was able to overtake
the car and blocked it, while the jeep pulled up right behind. The police office
rs drew their guns and told them to alight from the car. They were brought to th
e police station. Ligon was then charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence.
A charge of robbery with homicide was likewise charged to Ligon and Gabat, sinc
e there was an allegation that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box of the vict
im. Ligon however was never apprehended after the police released him, so only G
abat was convicted by the RTC. An appeal was then brought to the SC, which ruled
that the guilt of the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Issu
e: Whether or not accused may be held civilly liable despite the finding of the
Court of Appeals that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Held: Ye
s. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it does not follow that he is free fr
om civil liability, since only preponderance of evidence is required in a civil
action for damages. The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability
of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which th
e civil liability might arise did not exist. In the instant case, a preponderanc
e of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liab
ility of Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with fault and negligence
caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabats wi
llful act of calling the victim to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks
of cigarettes set the chain of events which led to the death of the victim. Thr
ough fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver from moving fo
rward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help the victim while the
latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his ord
er to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat acquiesced in the drivers act of speedin
g away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
129 SCRA 558 Facts: Petitioner Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedena, Yo
lly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanaoc, Roberto Rosales, Villania, Garrido, Ortega
jr., Celestino, Kamlon and 14 Ricardo Does was charged of Grave Coercion. On Feb 1
964 around 9 am at Camarines Norte, The petitioners willfully and feloniously pr
evented Antonio Vergara and his family from closing their stall at the Public Ma
rket. Petitioners forcibly opened the door of the stall and brutally demolished
the stall using axes then carrying away the goods and merchandise. Such acts of
the petitioners where said to be pursuant to an ordinance. The damage amounted t
o 30K for actual damages and 20K for exemplary damages. Roy Padilla and company
also took advantage of their public position, being the Mayor of the said munici

pality and the others being policemen. The CFI finds them guilty. The CA acquitt
ed the accused but ordered them to pay jointly and severally 9,600 as actual dam
ages. Issue: WON the order of payment for damages is valid notwithstanding the a
cquittal of the accused. Held: Yes it is valid. Civil liability is not extinguis
hed where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty
of the crime charged. No separate civil action is necessary considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the crimi
nal proceeding. To require a separate civil action would only clod the court doc
kets and unnecessary duplication of litigation. A separate civil action may be w
arranted where additional facts have to be established.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
282 SCRA 188 (1997) Facts: Petitioner Dr. Cruz is a surgeon at Perpetual Help Cl
inic and General Hospital. She examined Lydia and found the latter to have myom
a in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hsyterectomy operation. On the day of
the operation, Lydias daughter noticed how untidy the hospital was. She asked t
hat the operation be postponed but Lydia said that Dr. Cruz told her she must be
operated as scheduled. During the operation, Lydias family was asked to buy ta
gamet ampules. Later they were asked to buy blood for Lydia at a blood bank. The
y were again asked to buy blood but the blood bank already ran out of type A. Th
ey also saw Lydia gasping for breath as the oxygen supply had ran out so they ha
d to go and buy oxygen for Lydia again. Later that night, Lydia went into shock
and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia was brought to the San Pablo Hosp
ital however the doctors were not able to save her. She was announced dead at 3:
00 AM the following day. Petitioner and her anaesthesiologist were charged with
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. The MTC, RTC, and the CA all found pe
titioner guilty (anaethesiologist was acquitted) on the ground that the clinic w
as untidy and they lack the needed facilities like blood and oxygen which are es
sential for the continuity of the operations they undertake. Issue: Whether or n
ot the conviction of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide as a consequence
of medical malpractice is supported by the evidence on record. Held: No. The ele
ments of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an a
ct; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it b
e without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offende
r, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligenc
e, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place
. The 4 element is lacking in the case at bar. The material damage was not prove
d to be the result of the reckless imprudence. In litigations involving medical
negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellants negligence
and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of
duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach an
d the resulting death of his patient. As shown by the experts presented by both
parties, the death of Lydia may have been caused by DIC (clotting defect). There
fore, the cause of death cannot be attributed to petitioners fault or negligenc
e. Furthermore, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to th
e standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing
under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession
at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the case a
t bar, no physician was asked to testify to show the standard care that needed t
o be observed given the present circumstances. Therefore, the conviction is not
supported by the evidence.
th
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People
GR No. 147703 (2004) Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangd
ang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
to triple homicide, multiple physical

Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty
and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide,
multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to imprisonm
ent. The court further ruled that in the event of insolvency of accused, Philipp
ine Rabbit, as its employer, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the ac
cused. Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become final and executor
y. Admittedly, accused jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mentioning
that Section 8, rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appe
al when appellant jumps bail. ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully p
articipated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of c
onviction independently of the accused. HELD: No. The accused cannot be accorded
the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the c
ourt or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment agains
t them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deem
ed to have waived the appeal. In the case before us, the accused-employee has es
caped and refused to surrender to the proper authorities; thus, he is deemed to
have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has become fin
al and executory. Petitioner admits helping the accused employee, hence, it part
icipated in the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the emp
loyer was deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to appeal, but i
t was not denied its day in court. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers are subsidiarily liable for the civil liabilities of their employees i
n the event of the latters insolvency. To allow employers to dispute the civil li
ability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a
final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to allow them
to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters co
nsent would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judg
ment. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conc
lusive upon the employer not only with respect to the formers civil liability, bu
t also with as to its amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated f
rom that of the employee.
Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
38 Phil 768 (October 14, 1918) Facts: Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Mani
la Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived in the pueblo of San Mate
o, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad company. Ever
yday, he comes by train to the companys office in the city of Manila where he w
orks and he uses a pass, supplied by the company, which entitles him to ride the
trains free of charge. One day, Jose Cangco stepped off the train, but one or b
oth of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons causing his feet to s
lip making him fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the platform
and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and l
acerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car mo
ved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. Cangco was drawn
from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injurie
s he had received were very serious. He was brought at once to hospital in the c
ity of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. He instit
uted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to rec
over damages from the defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligen
ce of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons
upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security
of passenger alighting from the trains. The trial judge concluded that, although
negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sac
ks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the ca
rs, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighti
ng from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was acco
rdingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed. I
ssues: 1. Whether or not Manila Railroad can excuse its liability upon the groun
d that the breach was due to the negligence of their servant. 2. Whether Cango i

s negligent when he alight from the moving train. Held: (1) No. Failure to perfo
rm a contract cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the n
egligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligen
ce in the selection and control of the servant. It cannot be doubted that the em
ployees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these sacks
on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plain
tiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted
an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessar
ily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasion
ed unless recovery is barred by the plaintiffs own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liabili
ty, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contribu
tory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined. It is important
to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contr
act of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plainti
ff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of
the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to sa
y, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpo
int from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imp
osed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the ex
ercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil
Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-c
ontractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article
relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual. (2) No. it is not
negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train. As pertin
ent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in t
his case the following circumstances are to be noted: The companys platform was
constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding gr
ound. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting pas
senger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing
the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as i
t was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surfac
e on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off whi
le the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing su
ch act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the a
ge, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily a
ffecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his dail
y custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be
no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step, which h
e was required to take, or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight wh
ile the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.

Fores vs. Miranda

105 Phil 266 (March 4, 1959)
Facts: Miranda was riding a jeepney driven by Luga. While the vehicle was descen
ding Sta. Mesa bridge at high speed, the driver lost control. It swerved and hit
the bridge wall, resulting to injuries to the passengers and Miranda. Miranda b
roke some bones in his right arm. The driver was charged with serious physical i
njuries through reckless imprudence, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced according
ly. Fores, owner of the jeepney, claimed that one day before the accident, she s
old the vehicle to a certain Sackerman. In the meantime, Miranda prays for moral

damages. Issues:

1. 2.
Whether or not approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for the sa
le of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to
operate the same. Whether or not an award for damages is proper.
Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is still valid and binding
between the parties, approval of the Public Service Commission is necessary for
such sale, as provided for by Sec. 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Ac
t 146). As to the second issue, the award of moral damages is not proper. It has
been held that moral damages are not recoverable in damage actions predicated o
n a breach of contract of transportation, in view of Art. 2219 and 2220 of the n
ew Civil Code: ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogo
us cases: 1. 2. a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries quasi delicts
causing physical injuries
ART. 2220. Willfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant a
cted fraudulently or in bad faith. The exceptional rule in Article 1764 provides
that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverabl
e unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. The me
re carelessness of the carriers driver does not per se constitute or justify an i
nference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier, as in the case at ba
r. In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed that the lawmakers inte
nded in article 2220 to limit recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract
in bad faith. The fact that negligence may be so gross as to amount to malice, m
ust be shown in evidence, and a carriers bad faith is not to be lightly inferred
from a mere finding that the contract was breached though negligence of the carr
iers employees. The award for moral damages is eliminated.
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals
241 SCRA 671 (February 23, 1995) Facts: Private respondent Luis Luna applied for
and was accorded a Fareastcard issued by petitioner FEBTC. Upon his request, a
supplemental card was issued to Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her c
ard and FEBTC was forthwith informed. Due to bank policy, petitioner recorded th
e lost card, along with the principal card as a hot card or a cancelled card. In Oct
ober, Luis used his card to pay for lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila.
However, after verifying with the bank, the card was not honored and Luis had to
pay cash. He was embarrassed by this incident. Luis, through counsel, wrote to
petitioner and asked for the payment of damages. The VP of the bank wrote a lett
er to Luis and expressed his apologies in their failure to inform the latter of
the banks security policy. Also, the VP sent a letter to the hotel to assure th
e latter that the private respondents were very valued clients. Still feeling ag
grieved, private respondent filed a complaint for damages in the RTC. The RTC ru
led in their favor and ordered FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary damages. CA affi
rmed the said decision. Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper. He
ld: NO. In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant
is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of contract. (
Art. 2220 NCC) While it is true that the bank was remiss in neglecting to person
ally inform Luis of his own cards cancellation, there is no finding that there
was deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to Luis. Neither could
FEBTCs negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so g
ross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a consciou
s and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral o
bliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or
bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive des
ign or ill will. Thus, the award of moral damages is inordinate and substantiall
y devoid of legal basis. Exemplary or corrective damages are awarded, in the cas
e of quasi-delicts, if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross ne

gligence as to approximate malice. And in case of contracts and quasi-contracts,

it is awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton, fraudulent
, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Thus, the award of exemplary damage
s is improper. NEVERTHELESS, the banks failure to honor its credit card issued
to Luis should entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Arti
cle 2221 of the Civil Code: Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defenda
nt, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Air France vs. Carrascoso
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 Facts: Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil enginee
r, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes.
Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Mani
la to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of
the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the first class seat that he was
occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a whi
te man who, the Manager alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to vac
ate his first class seat, the plaintiff refused, and told defendants Manager that h
is seat would be taken over his dead body. A commotion ensued, and, according to
said Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tou
rist class; when they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a hot discussion
with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacifi
ed Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man and plaintiff reluctantly gave
his first class seat in the plane. Carrascoso filed a case for damages. The CFI o
f Manila sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral dama
ges; P10,000 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare b
etween first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome. T
he CA slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoss plane ticket. Issue: WO
N Carrascosos action is planted upon breach of contract, with the existence of ba
d faith, entitling him to the award of damages. Held: There was a contract to fu
rnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Tehe
ran leg. The said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first
class transportation at Bangkok. The evidence shows that defendant violated its
contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating cir
cumstances that defendants Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of threatening t
he plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the ai
rplane to give the first class seat that he was occupying to, again using the word
s of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a white man whom he (defendants manager) wished to
accommodate, and the defendant has not proved that this white man had any better ri
ght to occupy the first class seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for,
and for which the corresponding first class ticket was issued. The responsibili
ty of an employer for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well s
ettled in law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioner,
his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any perso
n who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damag
e.

damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, h

eld upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are reco
verable. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right
to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, i
njurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that an
y rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger give
s the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Thus, Where a steamship c
ompany had accepted a passengers check, it was a breach of contract and tort, giv
ing a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her, that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejec
tion; though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. Althou
gh the relation of passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature
the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. And in another case, Where a
passenger on a rail-road train, when the conductor came to collect his fare, ten
dered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, an
d told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fa
re from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passe
nger which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by cal
ling him a lunatic, and the Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carri
er liable for the mental suffering of said passenger. Petitioners contract with C
arrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carasscosos action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of publ
ic duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper
. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample to po
wer to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condit
ion is that defendant should have acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppres
sive, or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from
his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this is in addition to m
oral damages.
PSBA vs. Court of Appeals
205 SCRA 729 (February 4, 1992) Facts: Carlito Bautista, a student of PSBA, was
stabbed while on the second floor of Philippine School of Business Administratio
n (PSBA) by some elements from outside the school. Carlito died. His parents, fi
led an action for damages against PSBA and the school authorities (President, Vi
ce-President, Treasurer/Cashier,Chief of Security and Vice Chief of Security). B
oth the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of parents. Issue: Whether or not
PSBA and the school authorities can be held liable under 2176 and 2180 for quasi
-delict. Held: No. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that pupils or studen
ts of the educational institution should have caused the damage. Article 2180, i
n conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in lo
co parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the cases of Exconde, Mendoza
, Palisoc, and more recently, in Amadora vs. CA. In all such cases, it had been
stressed that Article 2180 plainly provides that it is the students who must hav
e caused the damage before the educational institution can be held liable for qu
asi-delict. In the case at bar, the assailants were not students or pupils of PS
BA but were elements from outside the school. Hence, PSBA and its school authori
ties cannot be held liable under Article 2180. The circumstances of the present
case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos Bautista since they
entered into a contract the moment Bautista enrolled in the school. There being
a contract, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. However, should the
act which breaches the contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Articl
e 21 as ruled in the Air France case, then there is a cause to view the act as c
onstituting quasi-delict. In the case at bar however, there is, as yet, no findi
ng that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the
formers negligence in providing security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be, a finding of negligence, the same cou
ld give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. In other word
s, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability.

The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless
the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21. Therefore,
PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable for quasi-delict under Ar
t. 2180.
Syquia vs. Court of Appeals and Manila Memorial Park and Cemetery, Inc.
217 SCRA 624 (January 27, 1993) Facts: Juan Syquia, father of deceased and the p
rivate respondent executed a Deed of Sale of a memorial lot and an Interment Ord
er, where the private respondent was authorized to bury the remains of the decea
sed in accordance with its procedures. Preparatory to transferring the remains t
o the newly-purchased lot also in Manila Memorial Park, the concrete vault encas
ing the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground. It was th
en discovered that said vault has a hole and after one hour or less water draine
d out of the hole. Pursuant to the authority granted by the MTC the concrete vau
lt was opened and it was discovered that the interior walls of the concrete vaul
t showed evidence of total flooding and the coffin as well as the clothing and e
xposed parts of the deceaseds remains were entirely damaged. A complaint was file
d by petitioners (parents and siblings of deceased) for quasi-delict, alleging t
hat there was breach of respondents contractual obligation to provide a sealed va
ult. RTC dismissed the complaint since there was no guarantee in the contract th
at the vault shall be waterproof and since there was a pre-existing contractual
relation defendant cannot be guilty of quasi-delict. The RTC also sustained the
explanation given by the private respondent, that the hole had to be bored throu
gh the concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will float and the gra
ve would be filled with water. CA affirmed RTCs decision hence the instant petiti
on. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of quasi-delict. Held: No. Al
though a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude
the existence of a culpa aquiliana, SC find no reason to disregard the responde
nts Court finding that there was no negligence. Article 2176 provides that Whoe
ver by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence
, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is n
o pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delic
t . The agreement between the parties governed their relations and defined their
respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on t
he part of the private respondent it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of th
e Civil Code, to wit: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guil
ty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the te
nor thereof, are liable for damages. Petitioners claim that the vault provided b
y private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof. In this regard SC
held that there was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and in the Rules and Regu
lations of the private respondent that the vault would be waterproof. Seal" is de
fined as any of various closures or fastenings that cannot be opened without rup
ture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." It is
therefore clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". The law defi
nes negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the natur
e of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of th
e time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or legal provision provi
ding the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the obliga
tion is that which is expected of a good father of a family. The circumstances s
urrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the hole negate the alle
gation of negligence.
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
332 SCRA 356 (2000) Facts: Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman at Siliman Univers
ity, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. She was giv
en by the conductor an extension seat at

Facts: Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman at Siliman University, took a passenge

r jeepney owned and operated by Vicente Calalas. She was given by the conductor
an extension seat at the backdoor of the jeepney at the rear end. On their way,
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passe
ngers, just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena which
is owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney, which
injured Sunga. Sunga then filed action for damages against Calalas for violation
of contract of carriage, in failing to exercise the diligence required by him a
s a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand filed a third-party complaint aga
inst Francisco Salva. Issue: Whether or not Calalas can blame Francisco Silva as
the proximate cause of the loss. Held: No. There was a contract of carriage bet
ween the parties, which was violated, hence, proximate cause is immaterial. The
Supreme Court found Calalas guilty of violating the contract of carriage as a dr
iver failed to transport Sunga safely to her destination, being negligent in (1)
not properly parking the jeepney; (2) taking more passengers, than the allowed
capacity; and (3) the fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed in
a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. The determ
ination of the proximate cause of the damage incurred, whether it was the collis
ion between the jeepney and the truck or the negligence of the driver is immater
ial. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions of quasi-deli
ct, not in actions involving breach of contract. Where there is a pre-existing c
ontractual relation between parties it is the parties themselves that create the
obligation and the law will merely regulate the relation created. (Since there
was a contract of carriage here in the case at bar).
Negligence
Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918) Facts: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on Carla
tan Bridge, San Fernando. He pulled his pony over the bridges railing on the righ
t instead of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly approaching. His pony was u
nfortunately frightened when the automobile passed so close to them. The horse w
as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb
was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As
a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. Pica
rt seeks to render the sum of Php31,000 as damages. CFI- La Union absolved Smith
. Issue:

Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last clear chance i
s attributable to him?
Held: The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of last cle
ar chance even though the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the bridge. Defenda
nt has had the opportunity to avoid the accident after realizing that the neglig
ence by the plaintiff could not have placed him in a position of better safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It w
as his duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other person
s were on the bridge to take the other side and pass far away from the pony to a
void collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was ne
gligent in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the pers
on who has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of t
he other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. Th
e law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of

ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and rendered judgment that Pica
rt recover of Smith the sum of P200, with costs of both instances. The court hel
d that the sum awarded was estimated to include the value of the horse, medical
expenses of Picart, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, an
d lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.

Negligence in special cases (Children)

JARCO Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Aguilar
GR No. 129792 (December 21, 1999) Facts: Petitioner Jarco is the owner of Syvel
s Department Store in Makati City. Respondent spouses are the parents of Zhienet
h Aguilar. On May 9, 1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2 floor of Syvels.
As Criselda was signing her credit card slip, she felt a sudden gust of wind an
d heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her 6 yr. old daughter Zhiene
th pinned down on the floor by the stores giftwrapping counter/structure. Zhien
eth was crying and screaming for help. She was rushed to the Makati Medical Cent
er and was operated on. The next day, she lost her speech and fourteen days afte
r, she died. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained
. Spouses Aguilar demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitaliza
tion, medical bills, wake and funeral expenses but petitioners refused to pay. S
pouses filed a complaint for damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint an
d ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her
act of clinging to it. The court also held that Criseldas negligence in allowin
g her daughter to freely roam around the store contributed to the accident. In a
bsolving petitioners from liability, the court reasoned that the counter was sit
uated at the end corner of the 2 floor as a precautionary measure, hencce, it co
uld not be considered as an attractive nuisance. On appeal, CA reversed the judg
ment and found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dan
gerous counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted L and it was top heavy
and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supporte
d by its narrow base. It was also established that 2 employees already requested
the management to nail the counter because it was shaky but the latter did not
take any action. The management insists that it has been there for 15 years and
it has been stable. The Court of Appeals also declared that Zhieneth was absolut
ely incapable of negligence or tort. It also absolved Criselda of any negligence
, finding nothing wrong in momentarily allowing Zhieneth to walk while she signe
d the document. Moreover, the allegation that Zhieneth clung to the counter whic
h caused the same to fall on her was denied by Gonzales in his testimony. He sai
d that when the doctor asked Zhieneth what she did, the child answered nothing,
i did not come near the counter, the counter just fell on me. The CA awarded a
ctual and compensatory damages. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration b
ut the court denied the same. Hence, this appeal. Issues: 1. 2. Whether the deat
h of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence. In case of a finding
of negligence, whether the same was attributable to the store management for ma
intaining a defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to exercis
e due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
nd nd
Held: An accident pertains to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly throu
gh human agency, an

Held: An accident pertains to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an

event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly throu
gh human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected
by the person to whom it happens. On the other hand, negligence is the failure
to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are intrinsically cont
radictory; one cannot exist with the other. The test in determining the existenc
e of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of PICART V. SMITH, thus: Did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and c
aution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The court held that Zhieneths tragedy
and death can only be attributed to negligence. The testimony of Gonzales perta
ining to Zhieneths statement formed part of the res gestae under Section 42, Ru
le 130 of the Rules of Court. All that is required for their admissibility as pa
rt of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a st
artling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood
as witnessed by the person who testified in court. it is unthinkable for a chil
d of tender age and in extreme pain to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted wi
th her life. Zhieneth performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Howeve
r, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stabl
e the counters base. Anent the negligence imputed to Zhieneth, the court applie
d the rule that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed in
capable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. And even if contributory
negligence can be attributed to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over the co
unter, no injury should have occurred if the counter was stable and sturdy. Cris
elda too, should be absolved from contributory negligence. Zhieneth held on to h
er mothers hand, Criselda momentarily released the childs hand when she signed
her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable for Criselda to
let go of her child. When the counter fell on her child, Criselda was just one
foot away.

Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric Company

57 Phil 478 (November 5, 1932) Facts: At 2PM in the afternoon, trouble developed
in a wire used and operated by Manila Electric Company for the purpose of condu
cting electricity and lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. Noguera notic
ed that the wire was burning and the connections smoking. He then told Soco to t
elephone the Malabon station of defendant. Soco transmitted the message at 2.25
p.m. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an
inspector. At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school was dismissed and the children wen
t home. Among these was Alberto Del Rosario with two of his friends. When they c
ame upon the place where the wire was down, Albertos friend tried to touch it b
ut was stopped by his other friend, Jose. Alberto, saying he has the habit of to
uching wires, touched the wire despit Joses warning, got electrocuted, and was
pronounced dead when brought to the hospital. The parents of Alberto filed for d
amages against the company. The engineer of the company says that it was customa
ry for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least once in
six months, and that all of the companys inspectors were required in their dail
y rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. There is nothing in the rec
ord indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire. Issue: Whether
or not negligence can be imputed to the defendant company, making it liable for
damages. Held: Yes. The Court is of the opinion that the presumption of negligen
ce on the part of the company from the breakage of this wire has not been overco
me, and the defendant is responsible for the accident. Furthermore, when notice
was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dis
patched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard th
e point of danger; but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone represe
nting the company appeared on the scene, and in the meantime this child had been

claimed as a victim. It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properl

y be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curios
ity as a 9-year-old boy. The fact that he ignored the warnings of his friend doe
s not alter the case. The Court therefore awards P1000 as general damages for lo
ss of service and P250 for expenses incurred for the death and burial of the boy
.
Ylarde vs. Aquino
163 SCRA 697 (July 29, 1988) Facts: Private respondent Soriano was the principal
of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public school in Tayug, Pangasinan, while Pri
vate respondent Aquino was a teacher therein. During the happening of the events
which led to the filing of the case, there were several concrete blocks in the
school which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World Wa
r II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
Sergio Banez, also a teacher therein, started burying them. Aquino, in order to
help, gathered eighteen of his male pupils after class and ordered them to dig
an excavation pit wherein the stone can be buried. It was continued the followin
g day by four of the original eighteen pupils. Among them is the son of the peti
tioners, Novelito. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete b
lock, Aquino and his pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left to borrow a key to
the workroom from Banez to get a rope, he instructed the pupils not to touch the
stone. Three of the four kids, including Novelito, playfully jumped into the pi
t. The other kid, without any warning jumped on top of the concrete block causin
g it to slide down towards the opening. Except for Novelito, the other kids were
able to go out of the pit. The concrete block pinned Novelito to the wall in a
standing position. As a result thereof, he sustained injuries. Novelito died 3 d
ays after. Petitioner-parents filed a suit for damages against both private resp
ondents. Petitioners base their action against Aquino on Article 2176 NCC for hi
s alleged negligence that caused their sons death while the complaint against S
oriano as the head of school is founded on Article 2180 NCC. The lower court dis
missed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exerc
ised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of
Novelito was due to his own reckless imprudence. This was affirmed by CA on appe
al. Hence the present petition. Issues: (1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for
damages under Art. 2180. (2) Whether or not Aquino is liable for damages under A
rt. 2176. Held: 1. No. The Court based their ruling on the doctrine enunciated i
n the case of Amadora vs. CA, Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as w
ell as non-academic. It provides further that teachers in general shall be liabl
e for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Thus, Soriano, as
principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitte
d by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give any inst
ruction regarding the digging. 2. Yes. It is very clear that private respondent
Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himsel
f of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten
to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to
be a very hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit ev
en after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby
and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to
the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation whe
n it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went t
o a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety; and (5)
left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. The
se negligent acts have a direct causal connection to the death of Novelito. A re
asonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavat
ion site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an ac
cident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning
"not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that

a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children.

Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would have made su
re that the children are protected from all harm in his

excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco
parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected fro
m all harm in his company. The defense that the digging done by the pupils was p
art of their Work Education was not sustained, since the nature of the activity
reveals a dangerous one and requires the attendance of adult laborers and not te
n-year old grade-four pupils. In fact, there was no showing that it was included
in the lesson plan for their Work Education. Further it is admitted that Aquino
decided all by himself to help his colleague. The finding of the lower court th
at the injuries were caused by Novelitos own reckless imprudence was not sustaine
d. The Court ruled that deceased was only 10 years old as such his actuations we
re natural to a boy his age. The degree of care required to be exercised must va
ry with ones capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or sim
ilar circumstances.
Negligence (Experts/Professionals)
Cullion Ice, Fish and Electric Company vs. Philippine Motors Corporation
GR No. 32611 (November 3, 1930) Facts: Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co. Inc. owne
d a motor schooner named Gwendoline. H.D. Cranston, the representative of Cuilio
n in Manila, decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline converted from gasolin
e consumer to a crude oil burner. He had a conference with C.E. Quest, the manag
er of Phil. Motors, who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that paymen
t shall be made upon completion of the work. The work began and conducted under
the supervision of Mr. Quest, and chiefly by a mechanic whom Quest took with him
to the boat. Cranston also directed the members of the crew of the Gwendoline t
o assist in the work, placing them under the command of Quest. Upon inspection o
f the engine, Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed, hence one was in
stalled. The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel. A
temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short d
istance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with t
he carburetor by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the
point where it was connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tan
k and dripped down into the engine compartment. To paraphrase, a device was made
where the engine can be converted from gasoline to crude oil, switching back an
d forth. Later, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding, and that the g
asoline, or other fuel, was dripping freely from the lower part to the carbureto
r to the floor. This fact was called to Quests attention, but he said that, whe
n the engine had gotten to running well, the flooding would stop The boat was ta
ken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the
first run, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. As the boat was comi
ng in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made wit
h the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done, the mechanic,
or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment late
r a back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot bac
k into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were cove
red with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue.
A case for damages was filed. Issue: Whether or not the loss of the boat is char
geable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. Held: YES. When a person ho
lds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he
will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of
one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. The temp
orary tank in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elev
ation from the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostati
c pressure in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburet
or could sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the
result was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburet
or, already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quic
kly communicated to the highly inflammable material nearby. The leak along the p
ipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation, w
hich a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken prec
autions to avoid. Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the

engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experien
ced in the doing of similar work on boats. Possibly the dripping of the mixture
form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his m
ind an adequate impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill th
at would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engi
nes on boats. There was here, on the part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent ina
dvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning of the
Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in
no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quests car
elessness or lack of skill.
US v. Pineda
37 Phil 456 (January 22, 1918) Facts: Santiago Pineda is a registered pharmacist
and the owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, prese
nted a copy of a prescription to Pineda. On other occasions, Santos had given th
e medicine prescribed to his horses with good results. Under the supervision of
Pineda, the drugs were prepared and given Santos. Santos, under the belief that
he had purchased potassium chlorate, placed two of the packages in water and gav
e the doses to two of his sick horses. Another package was mixed with water for
another horse, but was not used. The two horses, who took the drugs, died afterw
ards. Santos took the drug packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. It
was found that the packages contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorat
e (a poison). When sued Pineda alleges that he did not intentionally sold the po
ison and that what the law (to which he is indicted) forbids is the sell any dru
g or poison under any "fraudulent name. ISSUES: Whether or not Pineda can be held
liable for the death of the horses, assuming he did not deliberately sold poiso
n. HELD: Yes. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from t
he careless sale of poison and medicine, we do not deem it too rigid a rule to h
old that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whet
her it be through negligence or mistake. The care required must be commensurate
with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superi
or knowledge of the business which the law demands. As a pharmacist, he is made
responsible for the quality of all drugs and poison he sells. If were we to adhe
re to the technical definition of fraud it would be difficult, if not impossible
, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have
to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material r
epresentation; that it was false; that when he made it he knew that it was false
or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive asse
rtion; that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the pu
rchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance upon it, and that the purchaser su
ffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known princi
ples on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force.
It would leave the innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the go
od faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendo
r. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law. The rule
of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and
the vendee in this case do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions.
It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an examination of a compound
of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrant
s that he will deliver the drug called for.
BPI v. CA
216 SCRA 51 (November 26, 1992) Facts: A person purporting to be Eligia G. Ferna
ndo, who had a money market placement evidenced by a promissory note with a matu
rity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity

Facts: A person purporting to be Eligia G. Fernando, who had a money market plac
ement evidenced by a promissory note with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 a
nd a maturity value of P2,462,243.19, called BPIs Money Market Department. The
caller wanted to pre-terminate the placement. However, Reginaldo Eustaquio, Deal
er Trainee in BPIs Money Market Department, told her that "trading time" was ov
er for the day (Friday). He suggested that she call again the following week. Th
e promissory note the caller wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an earlie
r 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981. Later th
at afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer w
ho before had handled Fernandos account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left
to attend to the pretermination process. The caller presenting herself as Ms. F
ernando phoned again and made a follow-up with Eustaquio the pretermination of t
he placement. Although Eustaquio was not familiar with the voice of the real Eli
gia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G.
Fernando by "verifying" the details the caller gave with the details in "the le
dger/folder" of the account. But neither Eustaquio nor Bulan who originally hand
led Fernandos account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at
her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination. Informed that t
he placement would yield less than the maturity value, the caller insisted on th
e pretermination just the same and asked that two checks be issued for the proce
eds, one for P1,800,000.00 and the second for the balance, and that the checks b
e delivered to her office at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare t
he "purchase order slip" for the requested pretermination as required by office
procedure. From his desk, the papers, following the processing route, passed thr
ough the position analyst, securities clerk, verifier clerk and documentation cl
erk, before the two cashiers checks were prepared. The two cashiers checks, to
gether with the papers consisting of the money market placement was to be preter
minated and the promissory note to be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de
Castro and Celestino Sampiton, Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respe
ctively, in BPIs Treasury Operations Department, both authorized signatories fo
r BPI, who signed the two checks that very morning. Thereafter, the checks went
to the dispatcher for delivery. In the same morning when the checks were to be d
elivered, the caller changed the delivery instructions; instead that the checks
were to be delivered to her office at Philamlife, she would pick the checks up h
erself or send her niece, Rosemarie Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then to
ld the caller that if her niece was going to get the checks, her niece would hav
e to being a written authorization from her. It was agreed that Rosemarie would
pick the checks up from the bank. Thus, Eustaquio hurriedly went to the dispatch
er to inform him of the new delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he ch
anged the delivery instruction on the purchase order slip, writing thereon "Rose
marie Fernando release only with authority to pick up. It was, in fact Rosemarie
who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by the delivery receipt. As
it turned out, the same person impersonated both Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemar
ie Fernando. Although the checks represented the termination proceeds of Fernand
os placement, not just a roll-over of the placement, the dispatcher failed to r
equire the surrender of the promissory note evidencing the placement. There is a
lso no showing that Fernandos purported signature on the letter requesting the
pretermination and the latter authorizing Rosemarie to pick up the two checks wa
s compared or verified with Fernandos signature in BPIs file. Such purported s
ignature has been established to be forged although there 0was a "close similari
ty" to the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando. On a different day, a woman who
represented herself to be Eligia G. Fernando applied at China Banking Corporati
ons Head Office for the opening of a current account. She was accompanied and i
ntroduced to Emily Sylianco Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom C
uaso knew to have opened, earlier that year, an account. What Cuaso indicated in
the application form, however, was that Fernando was introduced by Valentin Co,
and with her initials on the form signifying her approval, she referred the app
lication to the New Accounts Section for processing. The application form shows
the signature of "Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil status, n
ationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax account number, and initial depos

it of P10,000.00. This final approval of the new current account is indicated on

the application form by the initials of the cashier, who did not interview the
new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it.
The woman holding herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in
controversy. Her endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the dep
ositors specimen signature. CBCs guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of
endorsement was then stamped on the two checks, which CBC forthwith sent to cle
aring and which BPI cleared on the same day. Two days after, withdrawals began.
The maturity date of Eligia G. Fernados money market placement with BPI came an
d the real Eligia G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. Sh
e disclaimed having preterminated her placement. She then executed an affidavit
stating that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never
received nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back of the
checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of the promis
sory note evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued her a new
promissory note to evidence a roll-over of the placement. BPI returned the two c
hecks in controversy to CBC as supported by Eligia G. Fernandos affidavit, for
the reason "Payees endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the checks for r
eason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led to the filing of this case wit
h the Arbitration Committee. The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and
ordered CBC to pay the former with interest. - However, upon CBCs motion for rec
onsideration, the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration Commit
tees decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to pay CBC.
BPI then filed a petition for review with the Regional Trial Court which dismiss
ed said petition but modified the award by including a provision for attorneys fe
es in favor of CBC, among others. The court of appeals affirmed the trial courts
decision. ISSUES: Who between BPI and CBC should be held liable? Whose negligenc
e was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks made by the impost
or? HELD: In the present petition, Fernandos name in the checks were forged. The
checks are "wholly inoperative" and of no effect. However, the underlying circum
stances of the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. The
issue as to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the
forged checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks. The recor
ds show that petitioner BPI, as drawee bank and CBC as representing or collectin
g bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged checks. The
Arbitration Committee in its decision, analyzed the negligence of the employees
of BPI involved who are involved in the processing of the pre-termination of Fer
nandos money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the subject c
hecks. A) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere telephone call
, which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Fernando; b) The officer who used to h
andle Fernandos account did not do anything about the accounts pre-termination
; c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Fernandos purported sig
nature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing he
r niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature was in BPIs file; and d) the
surrender of the promissory note evidencing the money market placement that was
supposedly pre-terminated. The Arbitration Committee, however, belittled BPIs n
egligence compared to that of CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate
cause of the loss of the subject checks to the impostor. Banks handle daily tran
sactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the degre
e of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and of
ficials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For obvious
reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in t
he selection and supervision of their employees.

supervision of their employees. In the present case, there is no question that t

he banks were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees. The
Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower court, however
disagree in the evaluation of the degree of negligence of the banks. While the
Arbitration Committee declared the negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC
Board of Directors and the lower courts declared that BPIs negligence was grav
er. To the extent that the degree of negligence is equated to the proximate caus
e of the loss, we rule that the issue as to whose negligence is graver is releva
nt. No matter how many justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility
, they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extrao
rdinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The next
issue hinges on whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the f
orged checks by an impostor. BPI insists that the doctrine of last clear chance
should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. Under this
doctrine, where both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemp
oraneous, the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm an
d fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the p
rior negligence of the other party. Applying these principles, BPIs reliance on
the doctrine of last clear chance to clear it from liability is not well-taken.
CBC had no prior notice of the fraud perpetrated by BPIs employees on the pret
ermination of Eligia G. Fernandos money market placement. Moreover, Fernando is
not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the signature of Eligia G. Ferna
ndo with that of the impostor Eligia G. Fernando, which CBC did, could not have
resulted in the discovery of the fraud. Hence, respondent CBC had no way to disc
over the fraud at all. In fact, the records fail to show that respondent CBC had
knowledge, actual or implied, of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor and the
employees of BPI. BPI further argues that the acts and omissions of are the caus
e "that set into motion the actual and continuous sequence of events that produc
ed the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." BPI anchors
its argument on its stance that there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval between
the issuance and delivery of said checks by BPI to the impostor and their actua
l payment of CBC to the impostor. BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day tha
t elapsed from its issuance and delivery of the checks to the impostor is materi
al on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage, according to BPI, there was y
et no loss and the impostor could have decided to desist from completing the sam
e plan and could have held to the checks without negotiating them. BPIs content
ion that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day betwee
n the issuance and delivery of the checks bearing the impostors name as payee a
nd the impostors negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and d
epositing the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural o
r unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G. Fernando with
the connivance of BPIs employees, the impostor would complete her deception by
encashing the forged checks. There is therefore, greater reason to rule that th
e proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks by an impostor was due to
the negligence of BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rul
e that BPI must solely bear the loss. Due care on the part of CBC could have pre
vented any loss. The Court cannot ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed
their eyes to the suspicious circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals
made immediately after the account was opened. The opening of the account itself
was accompanied by inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while we d
o not apply the last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still th
e CBC employees had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC an
d BPI. They let the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of b
ank employees would have sufficed to seize it. Both banks were negligent in the
selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of the
forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to overcome the presumpti
on of negligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. It was the
gross negligence of the employees of both banks which resulted in the fraud and
the subsequent loss. While it is true that BPIs negligence may have been the p
roximate cause of the loss, CBCs negligence contributed equally to the success

of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under these circ
umstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that while CBC
may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the courts.
Intoxication
E.M. Wright V Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.
28 Phil 122 (October 1, 1914)
FACTS: Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street
railway. Wrights residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendants
tracks run. To enter his premises from the street, Wright must cross defendants
tracks. One night, Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to e
nter the premises of his home, the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, thr
owing the Wright from the vehicle, causing injuries. On the location where Wrigh
t crossed the tracks, the rails were above-ground, and the ties upon which the r
ails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the groun
d, making the tops of the rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of th
e street. Manila Electric admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its trac
ks, but it also claimed that Wright was also negligent in that he was so intoxic
ated, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the accident. The trial cou
rt held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiffs negligence was not
as great as defendants. It awarded Wright damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the negl
igence of Wright contributed to the principal occurrence or only to his own injury.
HELD: NO. Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to
be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. No facts, oth
er than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are stated which warrant the concl
usion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober
he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is im
possible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under th
e conditions described. A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the r
ails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of th
e unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the rails with such f
orce as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle
no matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a
sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusio
n which enters the realm of speculation and guesswork. Wright was not negligent.
No facts to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff
US vs. Baggay
20 PHIL 142 (September 1, 1911) Facts: Several persons were assembled in Baggay
s house to hold a song service called "buni." The Non-Christian Baggay without p
rovocation, suddenly attacked a woman named Billiingan with a bolo, inflicting a
serious wound on her head from which she died immediately. With the same bolo,
he likewise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisa
may, Calapini, and on his own mother, Dioalan.

For this reason, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in court charging Bagga
y with murder. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from menta
l aberration, the judge exempted Baggay from criminal liability but was obliged
to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman. The Baggays counsel and his heirs
appealed to this court. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not an insane person, exempt fro
m criminal liability can still be civilly liable. (2) Can the heirs of Baggay be
held civilly liable? HELD: (1) YES. Civil liability accompanies criminal liabil
ity, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also l
iable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done. Civil l
iability may arise from acts ordinarily punishable under the penal law, although
the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Such is
the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on
account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably a
nd justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though
they be performed unwittingly. His fellows ought not to suffer for the disastro
us results of his harmful acts inspite of his unfortunate condition. Law and soc
iety are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is de
clared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is
still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, b
ut this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may
have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. (2) Yes. The person
s who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile are those w
ho have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they pro
ve that there was no blame or negligence on their part. Should there be no perso
n having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be i
nsolvent, the lunatic shall answer with his own property, excepting that part wh
ich is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.
Degrees of Negligence
Marinduque vs.Workmens Compensation
99 PHIL 48 (June 30, 1956) FACTS: A truck driven by Procopio Macunat, belonging
to Marinduque Iron Mines, turned over and hit a coconut tree resulting in the de
ath of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. Macunat was prosecuted, c
onvicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. He paid nothi
ng, however, to the latter. Madadors wife now seeks compensation by Marinduque Ir
on Mines as the employer. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Mamador has a right to be c
ompensated by Marinduque Iron Mines. (2) Whether or not there was notorious negl
igence by Mamador for having violated the employers prohibition on riding haulage
trucks. HELD: YES. Marinduque Iron Mines alleged that the criminal case sentenc
ing Macunat to indemnify the heirs of Mamador was a suit for damages against a t
hird person, thereby having the effect of releasing the employer from liability.
The criminal case, however, was not a suit for damages against third persons be
cause the heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemni
ty ordered by the court. At any rate, even if the case was against a third perso
n, the court already decided in Nava vs. Inchausti that criminal prosecution of
the "other person" does not affect the liability of the employer. Marunduque als
o contended that the amicable settlement entered into by Mamadors widow and Mac
unat barred the widows claim against the employer because she has already elect
ed one of the remedies. This contention cannot be sustained because what the wid
ow waived was the offenders criminal prosecution and not all civil action for d
amages. 2. NO. Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not
negligence, ordinarily. It couldnt be, because transportation by truck is not d
angerous per se. Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haul
age trucks, its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it may be a
n evidence of negligence. Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared
negligence because the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety o
f the riders. Notorious negligence means the same as gross negligence which impl
ies "conscious indifference to consequences, or "pursuing a course of conduct whi
ch would naturally and probably result in injury."

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Layugan vs. IAC
167 SCRA 363 November 14, 1968 FACTS: Pedro Layugan testified that while he and
his companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck that was parked along
the right side of the National Highway, Godofredo Isidros truck, recklessly driv
en by Daniel Serrano bumped Layugan. As a result, Layugan had his left leg amput
ated. Defendant Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the acc
ident. Isidro said that Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being
a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly, while b
eing repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane right after th
e curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver
of the parked truck in installing the early warning device. Daniel Serrano, defe
ndant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before le
aving, he checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful
in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Layugan, while the same was at
a stop. Serrano also testified that, When I was a few meters away, I saw the tru
ck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but it did not
function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe
on the rear right was cut thats why the breaks did not function. Layugan, on th
e other hand, claims that a warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene la
mp was placed 3-4 Meters from the back of the truck. Isidro points to the driver
of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it would
, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there exists a presumption of neglige
nce on the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper.
ISSUES 1. Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent. 2. Whether or n
ot the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case. HELD: 1. NO. The test
by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be s
tated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used i
n the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Applying the defin
ition and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serra
no has been established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether the cargo truc
k was parked along the road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial
taking into account the warning

established by clear and convincing evidence. Whether the cargo truck was parked
along the road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into
account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m
from the back of the truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by
Serrano, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequenc
e of such accident, Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot
. 2. NO. In our jurisdiction, Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculia
r to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be e
stablished without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of
negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of
proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regul
ates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of pl
aintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked
when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent
and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge
and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which i
s the cause of the injury, or where theres direct evidence as to the precise caus
e of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrenc
e clearly appear. And once the actual cause of injury is established beyond cont
roversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable
when the circumstances show that no inference of defendants liability can reaso
nably be made, whatever the source of the evidence. In this case, it is inapplic
able because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the negligence
of the defendant driver. (Note: The discussion in this case of res ipsa loquitur
is merely stated in the obiter dictum.)
Ramos vs. CA
321 SCRA 584 (December 29, 1999) Facts: Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except
for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains caused by the presence of a
stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for the remo
val of the stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinations whi
ch included blood and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery. She a
nd her husband, Rogelio, met Dr. Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, for
the first time. They agreed on the date of the operation and the doctor decided
that she undergo a cholecystectomy operation. Erlinda was admitted in the hospita
l and was accompanied by her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz. At the operating room
, Cruz saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta Gutierrez, the other defen
dant, who was to administer the anesthesia. Although not a member of the hospita
l staff, Herminda Cruz introduced herself as the Dean of the College of Nursing
at the Capitol Medical Center and was allowed to stay inside the operating room.
Hours later, Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard so
mebody say Dr. Hosaka is already here. As she held the hand of Erlinda, she then s
aw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutier
rez say, ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang ti
yan. Due to the remarks of Dr. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. G
utierrez was doing. She noticed a bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the le
ft hand of Erlinda. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to cal
l Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived in the oper
ating room, Cruz saw him trying to intubate Erlinda. Erlindas nailbed became blui
sh and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately, thereaft
er, Cruz went out of the operating room, and told Erlindas husband (her brother) t
hat something wrong was happening. Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw Erlinda
was still in trendelenburg position. On that fateful day, she saw Erlinda taken
to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Erlinda stayed for about four months in the ho
spital and has been in a comatose condition. When asked by the hospital to expla
in what happened to the patient, Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka explained that the
patient had bronchospasm. After being discharged from the hospital, she has bee
n staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her
husband Rogelio incurring monthly expenses. She was diagnosed to be suffering f
rom diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage. The Ramoses filed a civil case for damage

s against the private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care
of Erlinda Ramos. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable. (2) Whether or not private respondents were negligent in the care
of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase of the operation and, if in the affirmat
ive, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate cause of Erlindas comatose
condition. (3) Is the hospital liable? Held: YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loqui
tur is appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the dam
age sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operatio
n presents a case for the application of the doctrine. In holding that res ipsa
loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is
applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under an
esthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its ow
n light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage. Re
s ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transact
ion speaks for itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that th
e fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances,
may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a pla
intiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet wi
th an explanation. However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law a
nd, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of
liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a
procedural rule. Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispe
nse with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the proc
ess of such proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the foll
owing requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1.The accident is of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused
by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendan
ts; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintif
f responsible is eliminated. In the above requisites, the fundamental element is
the control of the instrumentality which caused the damage. Such element of contr
ol must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. But it does not aut
omatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed
negligence. The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of th
e operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine p
erformance occurred. If there were such extraneous interventions, the doctrine o
f res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to explain
the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could. (2) YES. Private respondent
s were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part. Their neg
ligence was the proximate cause of her condition. Dr. Gutierrez failed to proper
ly intubate the patient. She admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on
the day of the operation. And no prior consultations with, or pre-operative eva
luation of Erlinda was done by her. She was unaware of the physiological make-up
and needs of Erlinda. This is an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility. Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cer
ebral anoxia which led to Erlindas coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her a
llergic response to a drug introduced into her system. Proximate cause has been
defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any effic
ient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to e
xercise the proper authority (as the captain of the operative team) in not determi
ning, if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. No evidence
on record exists to show that Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dr. Gutierrez pr
operly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent
Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same
time as Erlindas cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the l
atters operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his an
esthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. (3) We now discuss the respons
ibility of the hospital. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of fillin
g up specialist staff with attending and visiting consultants, who are allegedly n

ot hospital employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negl

igence in medical malpractice cases. The truth is, Private hospitals, hire, fire
and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. Whi
le consultants are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital a
sserts in denying all responsibility for the patients condition, the control exer
cised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the import
ant hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the pa
yment of wages. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which con
siders a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of othe
rs based on the formers responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. S
uch responsibility ceases when the persons or entity

only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the formers responsib
ility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when t
he persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a
good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of
proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burde
n shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should p
rove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent da
mage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of i
ts responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing
that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and s
upervision of the latter. Upon these disquisitions we hold that private responde
nts are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Batiquin vs. CA
258 SCRA 334 (July 5, 1996) Facts: Mrs. Villegas consulted Dr. Batiquin for pren
atal care. Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and nurses, performed a cae
sarian operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully delivered the latters baby. Af
ter leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and comp
lained of being feverish. She also gradually lost appetite, so she consulted Dr.
Batiquin at the latters polyclinic who prescribed certain medicines for her. H
owever, the pains still kept recurring. She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. Af
ter examining her, Dr. Kho suggested that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surger
y. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas she found whitish-yellow dis
charge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber which appeared to
be a part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of the infection of the ovaries
the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas. The piece of rubber allegedly found w
as not presented in court. There were also doubts as to the whereabouts of the p
iece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Khos testimony: 1) that he sent it t
o a Pathologist in Cebu and (2) he threw it away. But aside from Dr. Khos testi
mony, the Medical Certificate, the Progress Record, the Anesthesia Record, the N
urses Record, an the Physicians Discharge Summary mentioned the piece of rubbe
r. The trial court, however, regarded these documentary evidence as mere hearsay
, since those who prepared them did not testify in court. The trial court ruled
in favor of the defendants. The CA reversed the decision. Issues: Whether or not
Dr. Batiquin could be held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Held
: While Dr. Batiquin claims that contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Kho
s testimony, a reading of said testimony reveals no such infirmity and establish
es Dr. Kho as a credible witness. Dr. Batiquin failed to impute any motive for D
r. Kho to state any untruth, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired. Considering
that we have assessed Dr. Kho to be a credible witness, the rule of res ipsa lo
quitur comes to fore. In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to th
e doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the cesarean section we
re under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the Dr. Batiquin
were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of th
e foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villegas body, which,
needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. S
econd, since aside from the cesarean section, Villegas underwent no other operat
ion which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uteru
s, it stands to reason that such could only have been a byproduct of the cesarea
n section performed by Dr. Batiquin. Dr. Batiquin failed to overcome the presump
tion of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr.
Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber i
n private respondent Villegas abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
D.M. Consunji vs. CA
357 SCRA 249 (April 20, 2001) Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his dea
th. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with Jessie
Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform w

ith plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at
the 5 ton chain block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted
to connect the chain block with the platform came loose causing the whole platfo
rm assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core of
the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out fo
r safety. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages ag
ainst D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows p
rior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed th
e decision of the RTC in toto. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa lo
quitur is applicable to prove D.M. Consunjis negligence. Held: YES. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based i
n part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opport
unity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and there
fore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the pro
of of the happening of the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa l
oquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not re
adily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive co
ntrol of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must no
t have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the perso
n injured. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the b
asement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent
; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier, the construction s
ite with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury
is under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second re
quisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appell
ees deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also present. A reasonable pres
umption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner doe
s not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence aris
ing from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relat
ing to the incident.
Defenses (Plaintiffs negligence)
Manila Electric Co. vs Remonquillo
99 PHIL 117 (May 18, 1956) Facts: Efren Magno went to the house of Antonio Pealoz
a, his stepbrother, to repair a leaking media agua. The media agua was just below th
e window of the third floor of his stepbrothers house. Standing on said media agua,
Magno received from his son thru the window a galvanized iron sheet to cover th
e leaking portion. The lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the el
ectric wire of Manila Electric Company parallel to the media agua, causing his d
eath by electrocution. Magnos widow and children filed suit to recover damages fr
om the company. Trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals a
ffirmed the decision.

Magnos widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial c
ourt rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. T
he electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched
between poles on the street and carrying a charge of 3600 volts. It was installe
d there some two years ago before Pealozas house was constructed. During the const
ruction of said house a similar incident took place, with less tragic consequenc
es. The owner of the house complained to the defendant about the danger which th
e wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire farther from the house
by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was. Regulations of the Ci
ty required that all wires be kept three feet from the building.There was no insul
ation that could have rendered it safe, because there is no insulation material
in commercial use for such kind of wire (according to appellant, and this was no
t refuted). ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of negligence. HELD:
NO. It was the victim who was guilty of negligence. The liability of electric c
ompanies for damages or personal injury is governed by the rules of negligence.
Nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. The de
ath of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by
the too close proximity of the media agua to the electric wire of the company by r
eason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subseque
nt approval of said illegal construction of the media agua. The company cannot be
expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces
the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the installa
tion of its wires so as to preserve said distance. The violation of the permit f
or the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contribu
ted to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent
act of Magno himself. It is to be presumed that due to his age and experience h
e was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could n
ot have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in the
m.
Bernardo vs. Legaspi
29 Phil 12 (December 23, 1914) Facts: Due to a collision between the respective
automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to recover damag
es for injuries sustained by his car. Legaspi, on the other hand, filed a crosscomplaint alleging it was Bernardos fault. He also asks for damages. The lower
court found upon that both the plaintiff and the defendant were negligent in han
dling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and ext
ent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. ISSUE Whether or n
ot the parties may recover damages HELD: NO. Where two automobiles, going in opp
osite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the ev
idence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally neg
ligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes
thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages suffered.
Bernal vs. House
54 PHIL 327 (January 30, 1930) Facts: Fortunata Enverso with her daughter, Purif
icacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession on Holy Friday.
After the procession, accompanied by two other persons, they passed along a publ
ic street. Purificacion was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mo
ther and her friends. While in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & I
ce Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared which frightened the child. She turned to
run, but fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water running
in the gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother
and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot wa
ter. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the chi
ld died that same night. It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3r
d Degree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the
Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen. The defense was that the hot water was
permitted to flow down the side of the street with the knowledge and consent of
the authorities and that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and t

hat in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. T
he trial judge dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of th
e plaintiffs. Issue: Whether or not the action should be dismissed due to the co
ntributory negligence of the plaintiffs Held: NO. The death of the child was the
result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the publ
ic streets, endangering the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately enough to
fall into it. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the street
on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnorma
l in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No on
e could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened c
hild running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. . The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does result not operate as a bar
to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only in reduction of the damages.
PLDT vs. CA
G.R. No. 57079 (September 29, 1989) FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over
a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertake
n by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The Spouses Es
tebans complaint alleged that Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench wh
ich was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warn
ing light or signs. Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, leg
s and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband
suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered. PLDT, in its a
nswer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by Spouses
Esteban were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which shoul
d be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company, an independent cont
ractor which undertook the said construction work. The trial court ruled in favo
r of Esteban spouses whereas the CA reversed the ruling. Issue: Whether or not t
he Estebans can claim damages from PLDT. Held: NO. A person claiming damages for
the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault
or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be a
ffirmatively established by competent evidence. The accident was due to the lack
of diligence of Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the negligent omission
on the part of petitioner PLDT. The jeep was running along the inside lane of L
acson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the
accident mound. That plaintiffs jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to
hit the accident mound could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson
Street to the south of the accident mound. Plaintiffs jeep was not running at 25
kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed, he could have st
epped on the brakes the moment it struck the accident mound. The above findings
clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to
his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence
of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their
right to recover damages.
Defenses (Contributory Negligence)

Defenses (Contributory Negligence)

Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 422 (September 22, 1957) Facts: Genobiagon was driving a rig along T. P
adilla St. in Cebu City. The petitioners vehicle was going so fast not only bec
ause of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to over
take the rig ahead of him. As an old woman was crossing the street, Genobiagons r
ig bumped her and caused her to fall in the middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao
saw the incident and shouted at Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genob
iagon reasoned out that he did not bump the old woman and that it was the old wo
man who bumped him. The old woman was brought to the hospital but she died 3 day
s after. Petitioner was charged and convicted with the crime of homicide thru re
ckless imprudence. CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability fr
om 6,000 to 12,000. Hence, this petition. Issues: (1) Whether or not the court e
rred in the affirmation of conviction (2) Whether or not the court unjustly incr
eased the civil liability Held: (1) No. The alleged contributory negligence of t
he victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory n
egligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence
, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his
own negligence.

(2) No. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death i
n homicide or murder is 30,000 (at present 50,000, this case was decided in 1989
).
Rakes vs. Atlantic
G.R. No. 1719 (1907) Facts: The plaintiff Rakes, one of a gang of eight negro la
borers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails f
rom a barge in the harbor to the companys yard near the malecon in Manila. Plai
ntiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant Atlantic
, has proved that there were two immediately following one another, upon which w
ere piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of
the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without sid
e pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony
of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. A
ccording to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope.
At a certain spot at or near the waters edge the track sagged, the tie broke, t
he car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, brea
king his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee. In order to char
ge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on i
ts part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transp
orting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condit
ion, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as the depression i
n it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant to repair the weake
ned track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his judgmen
t. In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judg
ment below is not so specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does no
t justify the finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached to the
front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in eviden
ce make it clear that the persons necessary to operate the car could not walk up
on the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the emp
loyees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific fi
nding upon the instruction given by the defendant to its employees to walk only
upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon th
e ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car. Issue: Whether or not ther
e was contributory negligence on the part of Rakes. Held: While the plaintiff an
d his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this w
ay, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of th
e company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition

frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, an
d the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of thi
s particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderanc
e is in favor of the defendants contention to the extent of the general order b
eing made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in plac
ing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, a
lthough not as its primary cause. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding
which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the acc
ident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the accident and the inju
ry, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, a
nd those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contrib
uting under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to repl
ace it. this produced the event giving occasion for damages that is, the shinkin
g of the track and the sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the
plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was
an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of p
lace wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have
been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would
have been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one
of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the oc
currence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that
the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum d
eemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.

Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA (Lipana)

269 SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997) Facts: Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) mainta
ined two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection
with its business of selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Rome
o Lipana, RMCs GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalin
g P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said
funds to RMCs account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not cre
dited to RMCs account but were instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut
s husband, Bienvenido Cotas. Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the depo
sit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husba
nd as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was writte
n the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left
blank. PBCs teller, Azucena Mabayad, would validate and stamp both the original
and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despi
te the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Ir
ene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill
up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the
account number written thereon and make it appear to be RMCs account number. S
he made her company believe that the amounts she deposited were being credited t
o its account when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account of her hus
band. During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with mon
thly statements showing its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was neve
r the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing comple
te trust and confidence to PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the los
s of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money.

Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of RMC. Held
: In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the pri
vate respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74.
It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where the partie
s point to each other as the culprit. Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulat
e the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prud
ent and reasonable man would do. Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated a
s follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasona
ble care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the s
ame situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Applying the above test,
it appears that the banks teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in valida
ting, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and present
ed by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not comple
tely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respec
t to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified
to by Ms. Mabayad herself. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mab
ayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and
supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo B
onifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vi
ce-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the investigation of the inci
dent, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total dis
regard of the banks validation procedures. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucen
a Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and
supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffe
red by the private respondent, and not the latters act of entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners

Defenses (Fortuitous Event)

Juntilla vs. Fontanar
136 SCRA 624 (May 31, 1985) Facts: Juntilla was a passenger of a public utility
jeepney, being driven by Defendant Berfol Camoro, enroute from Danao to Cebu Cit
y. The jeepney had fourteen (14) passengers in the back and three (3) at the fro
nt, one of whom was Juntilla. Upon reaching Mandaue City, the right rear tire of
the jeepney exploded causing the vehicle to fall into a ditch and turn turtle.
As consequence, Juntilla was thrown out of the jeepney and sustained lacerations
to his right palm and suffered other injuries. Juntilla, still shocked, went ba
ck to Danao City for medical help but on his way discovered that his watch is mi
ssing. Juntilla then filed a case for breach of contract of carriage with damage
s before the City Court of Cebu, which found the respondents (the driver, the fr
anchise operator and owner) liable for the accident ordering the latter to pay d
amages, including the value of watch lost by petitioner during the incident. Upo
n appeal, the CFI, relying on a case decided by the Court of Appeals (Rodriguez
case), exonerated respondents on grounds that the blowing of tire is a fortuitou
s event, and therefore beyond the control of the latter. Issues: (1) Whether or
not the blowing of the tire a fortuitous event (2) Whether or not the respondent
s should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage. Held: No. A fortuito
us event has the following essential characteristics: (a) (b) (c) (d) The cause
of the unforeseen or unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the obligor to com
ply with his obligation must be independent of human will. The event must be imp
ossible to foresee or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill h
is obligation in a normal manner. The obligor must be free from any participatio
n in the aggravation if the injury resulting to the oblige
The Supreme Court held that the cause of the incident was NOT independent from h
uman will. The accident was caused EITHER by the negligence of the driver or bec

ause of the mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their d
rivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed the speed limits and to kno
w the correct measures to take when a tire blows up, thus ensuring the safety of
the passengers at all times. In the instant case, the Supreme Court found that
the jeep was overloaded with passengers (17, excluding the driver), and was spee
ding. The Court made the observation that a jeepney at a regular and safe speed
would not have jump into a ditch when the right rear tire blows up. Neither can
the driver and operator point liability to the manufacturer of the tire. The Sup
reme Court, citing Necesito et. al. vs. Paras, held that: xxx [A] passenger is e
ntitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect
in appliance (tire) purchased from a manufacturer,

whenever it appears
that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised th
e degree of carewith regard to the inspection and application of the necessary te
sts[T]he manufacturer is considered the agent or servant of the carrier as regards
the work of the appliance (tire) xxx Such rationale is based on the fact that t
he passenger has neither choice nor control over the carriers selection of the ti
re. Having no privity with the manufacturer or vendor of the tire, the passenger
has no remedy against the former, on the other hand, the carrier has. The sudde
n blowing up of the tire may have been caused by too much air pressure. The Sour
ce of the common carriers legal liability is the contract of carriage. The carrie
r binds itself to carry the passengers safely as human care and foresight can pr
ovide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for
all circumstances.

Hernandez vs. Commission on Audit

179 SCRA 39 (November 6, 1989) Facts: At the time of the incident in question, T
eodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing officer of
the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. As such
, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1, 1983 to encas
h two checks covering the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of t
he Project. He estimated that the money would be available by 10:00AM and that h
e would be back in Ternate by about 2:00PM. For some reason, the processing of t
he checks was delayed and was completed only at 3:00PM. Despite realizing that h
e would not reach ternate in time to distribute the salary of the workers, Herna
ndez nevertheless decided to encash them. He thought he had to do this for the b
enefit of the laborers, otherwise they would have to wait until the following Tu
esday, when the main office would reopen. And so, on the same afternoon he colle
cted the cash value of the checks and left the main office a substantial amount
of money. Hernandez realized that had two choices, to (1) return to Ternate, Cav
ite, the same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening; or (2) take the m
oney to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Tern
ate the following morning. He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. A
nd so, he took a passenger jeep bound for his house in Bulacan. While the vehicl
e was along EDSA, two persons boarded with knives in hand. One pointed his weapo
n at the Hernandez side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took the mon
ey he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, afte
r the initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up wit
h Virgilio Alvarez and overcame him after a scuffle. Hernandez sustained injurie
s in the lip arms and knees. Alvarez was subsequently charged with robbery and p
leaded guilty, but the robber who had the money escaped. On July 5, 1983, Hernan
dez filed a request for relief from money accountability under Section 638 of th
e Revised Administrative Code. Deespite favorable endorsement by Philippine Tour
ism Authority and the NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the Comm

ission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the

Philippine Tourism Authority and the NCR Regional Director of the Commission on
Audit, the Commission on Audit, through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr.
denied the Hernandez request. According to Tantuico, the loss of the P10,175.00
under the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence be
cause had he brought the cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the
Beach Park in Ternate, Cavite, immediately after encashment for safekeeping in
his office, which is the normal procedure in the handling of public funds. Issue
: Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding Hernand
ez negligent. Held: Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as foll
ows:
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or due to casualty. Notice to
Auditor. When a loss of government funds or property occurs while the same is in
transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other casualty, the officer accountable
therefor or having custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor General
, or the provincial auditor, according as a matter is within the original jurisd
iction of the one or the other, and within thirty days or such longer period as
the Auditor, or provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall pres
ent his application for relief, with the available evidence in support thereof.
An officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of li
ability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his accounts.
Applying the letter and spirit of the above-mentioned laws, and after considerin
g the established facts in the light of the arguments of the parties, this Court
inclines in favor of the petitioner. It is pointless to argue that Hernandez sh
ould have encashed the vouchers earlier because they were dated anyway on June 2
9, 1983. He was not obliged to encash the checks earlier and then again there mi
ght have been any number of reasons why he did so only on July 1, 1983. The poin
t is that he did encash the checks on that date and took the money to Marilao an
d not Ternate in view of the lateness of the hour. The question before us is whe
ther these acts are so tainted with negligence or recklessness as to justify the
denial of the petitioners request for relief from accountability for the stole
n money. It seems to us that the petitioner was moved only by the best of motive
s when he encashed the checks on July 1, 1983, so his co-employees in Ternate co
uld collect their salaries and wages the following day. Significantly, although
this was a non-working day, he was intending to make the trip to his office the
following day for the unselfish purpose of accommodating his fellow workers. The
other alternative was to encash the check is on July 5, 1983, the next working
day after July 1, 1983, which would have meant a 5-day wait for the payment of t
he said salaries and wages. Being a modest employee himself, Hernandoz must have
realized the great discomfort it would cause the laborer who were dependent on
their wages for their sustenance and were anxious to collect their pay as soon a
s possible. For such an attitude, Hernandez should be commended rather than faul
ted. As for Hernandezs choice between Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, on
e could easily agree that the former was the safer destination, being nearer, an
d in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to the two places. It is true
that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he should not be blamed f
or that. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and was one that could
be expected of a reasonable and prudent person. And if, as it happened, the two
robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highw
ay, and in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was
the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous
event covered by the said provisions, something that could not have been reasona
bly foreseen although it could have happened, and did. We find, in sum, that und
er the circumstances as above narrated, the petitioner is entitled to be relieve
d from accountability for the money forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of
July 1, 1983. To impose such liability upon him would be to read the law too ste
rnly when it should be softened by the proven facts.
Gotesco vs. Chatto and Lina Delza Chatto
210 SCRA 18 (June 16, 1992) Facts: Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter

, Lina, went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defe
ndant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets but even then
were unable to find seats. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, t
he ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and p
andemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, the mother and daughter managed to crawl un
der the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they
walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1)
day. Chatto filed a complaint for damages against Gotesco. Defendant tried to av
oid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was du
e to force majeure. The trial court ordered Gotesco to pay the plaintiffs moral
damages, actual damages, attorneys fees, plus the cost of the suit. The CA affi
rmed the decision. Issue: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to
an act of God or Force Majeure? Held: No. The collapse of the ceiling was not du
e to Force Majeur. Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reaso
n why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burd
en to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not h
ave collapsed without a cause. The fact that Mr. Ong could not offer any explana
tion does not imply force majeure. Petitioner could have easily discovered the c
ause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the re
al reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he di
d not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court
impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not
even passed the governments examination. Verily, post-incident investigation c
annot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant
is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court that the col
lapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn
this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the a
ccident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as forc
e majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceil
ing. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised
due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclose
d by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises
before the date of the accident. The fact that structural designs and plans of t
he building were duly approved by the City Engineer and that building permits an
d certificate of occupancy were issued, do not at all prove that there were no d
efects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that
no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. Besides, ev
en assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the
cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liabl
e because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial court denominated as gros
s. As gleaned from Bouviers definition of and Cockburns elucidation on force m
ajeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have exerc
ised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co
117 SCRA 832 Facts: Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board a vessel o
wned by Philippine Steam Navigation cargoes consisting of 1,528 cavans of rice a
nd 44 cartons of colored paper for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Oc
cidental. Bills of lading were issued by Philippine Navigation. The cargoes were
discharged in Negros Occidental Bureau of Customs Warehouse as complete and in
good order. At about 2:00 PM of the same day, the Customs warehouse was razed by
a fire of unknown origin, destroying the cargoes. The claims for the value of s
aid goods were rejected by Philippine Steam, herein respondent. Lower Court orde
red Philippine Steam to pay Servando damages, including legal interest from fili
ng of the case. They also awarded damages to Uy Bico the sum for the portion of
the cargo which was not recovered by her. The legal basis of the lower court for
its decision if Article 1736:
Common carriers have the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment
the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession until the same are del
ivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the pe

rson who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Art
icle 1738

It held that the delivery to the Bureau of Customs is not the constructive deliv
ery as contemplated in Article 1736, thus the common carrier continues to be res
ponsible. Issue:

Whether or not FIRE is a fortuitous event, absolving Respondents of any liabilit

y?
Held: Yes. The burning of the warehouse was an extraordinary event independent o
f the will of the respondents. The following characteristics of caso fortuito ar
e present. 1. the cause of the unforeseen event must be independent of the human
will; 2. it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; 3. the occ
urrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his ob
ligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must be free from any participation

impossible to avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible f

or the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner.4. the obligor must b
e free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor. When the proximate cause of loss is a fortuitous event or force majeur
e, the obligor is exempt from liability. This is provided for by Article 1174 of
the Civil Code.
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is othe
rwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

It should also be pointed out that in the Bill of Lading (BOL) existing on the c
argoes, the responsibility of the carrier has been limited as provided by Clause
14.: Not unless the loss or damage is caused by the negligence of the carrier,
the common carrier shall not be liable for such caused by force majeures, accide
nts of sea, war and public enemies. This is a mere reiteration of Article 1174.
Furthermore, the storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse while waiting wit
hdrawal by the petitioners was made with their knowledge and consent. Since the
warehouse belonged to and maintained by the government, it would be unfair to im
pute negligence to Philippine Steam, having no control over the same. There is a
lso no proof or showing that the fire can be imputable to the negligence of its
employees. Judgment appealed is set aside.
NAPOCOR vs. CA
GR Nos. 103442-45 (1993) Facts: The controversy stemmed from separate complaints
filed by several residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan against petitioner, National
Power Corp. The residents seek to recover actual and other damages for the loss
of lives due to the inundation of their town. The flooding was allegedly caused
by NAPOCORs acts of negligently releasing water in the spillways of Angat Dam (hy
droelectric plant). NAPOCOR, in its defense, maintains that (1) they exercised d
ue care and diligence in maintaining the power plant; (2) petitioners duly notif
ied the residents about the impending release of water with the onset of typhoon
kading and advised them to take necessary precautions; and (3) that the damages
incurred by private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force maje
ure. The lower court dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. T
he CA reversed the decision and awarded actual and moral damages (plus litigatio
n expenses) to the residents. The judgment was based on a patent gross and evide
nt lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation
of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the spill
ways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of NAPOCORs h
eadlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flash flood and inund
ation of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would
have been avoided had NAPOCOR prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining a water ele
vation, which would allow room for the expected torrential rains. The CA also re
jected the NAPOCORs plea that the incident was caused by a fortuitous event. Issu
e: Whether or not the incident was caused by a fortuitous event. Held: The SC re
ndered its decision based on the same errors in G.R. No. 96410, entitled Nationa
l Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al, according to the Court
, the proximate cause of the damage incurred by private respondents was due to n
egligence of the NAPOCOR. The early warning notice was insufficient. The SC cann
ot rule otherwise because its decision is now binding. To exempt the obligor fro
m liability under Article 1174 (Acts of God) of the Civil Code, the following mu
st concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable
; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfil
l his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any par
ticipation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor Thus, if upon the ha
ppening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fr

aud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor

of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which resul
ts in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability The principle embodied
in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasione
d exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be exclude
d from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. Thus it has been hel
d that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a
loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate ca
use of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss becau
se of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct
by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.
Southeastern College Inc. v CA
GR No. 126389 (July 10, 1998) Facts: Private Respondents Dimaano are owners of a
house in College Road, Pasay City while petitioner Corporation, South Eastern C
ollege, owns a four-storey school building along the same road. In October 1989,
a powerful typhoon called Saling hit the Metro. Buffeted by very strong winds, th
e roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing and
destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaanos house. An ocular inspection was co
nducted by a team of engineers. They found that one factor and perhaps, the most
likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is the impr
oper anchorage of the trusses to the roof beams, thus recommending the building
to be declared a structural hazard. Respondents filed a complaint based on culpa
aquiliana, alleging that the damage to their house rendered the same uninhabita
ble, forcing them to stay temporarily in other houses. The Dimaanos sought to re
cover actual, moral and exemplary damages, including attorneys fees and costs fro
m petitioners. In their answer, Southeastern averred that the building withstood
several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past without its roofi
ng giving way, and that typhoon Saling was an act of God. In giving credence to
the ocular inspection, the Trial court ruled in favor of the Dimaanos and ordere
d the Southeastern to pay the decreed damages sought. The Court of Appeals affir
med the decision but reduced the award of moral damages. Issues: Whether or not
the Southeastern College is liable for the damage. Held: No. The antecedent of f
ortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as an
event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. In order
that a fortuitous even may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that
he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason which the loss m
ay have been occasioned There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortui
tous even, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite
any amount of foresight, diligence or care. From these premises, we proceed to
determine whether Southeastern was negligent, such that if it were not the damag
e caused to private respondents house could have been avoided? At the outset it b
ears emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another ha
s the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence. The facts constitu
tive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not
merely by presumption or conclusions without basis of fact. The Dimaanos merely
relied on the ocular inspection, however by this basis, the relationship of caus
e and effect has NOT been clearly shown. On the other hand, petitioner elicited
from private respondents city building official, Jesus Reyna, that the original p
lans and design of petitioners school building were approved including the certif
icate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the least, prima facie e
vidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject school building.

approved including the certificate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are
, at the least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a
subject school building. As to the damages, it is not enough that the damage be
capable of proof but must be actually proved with reasonable degree of certaint
y, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compen
satory damages are borne.

ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Afialda vs. Hisole
85 Phil 67 (November 29, 1949) Facts: Loreto Afialda was employed by Hisole spou
ses as caretaker of their carabaos. While tending to the animals, he was gored b
y one of them and later died as a consequence. His sister then filed a complaint
against the spouses Hisole. The spouses filed a motion to dismiss, which the co
urt granted. Plaintiff now seeks to hold defendants liable under art. 1905 of th
e Civil Code which states that The possessor of an animal or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape
from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case the damage shou
ld arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffere
d it. Issue: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable when the damage is
caused to its caretaker. Held: No. The owner of an animal is answerable only for
damages caused to a stranger, and that damage caused to the caretaker of the an
imal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent or at fault under a
rt. 1902 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the animal was in the custody of
the caretaker. It was the caretakers business to try to prevent the animal from
causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. Being injured by the anim
al was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and f
or which he must take the consequences. There was no allegation of negligence on
the part of the Hisole spouses. Thus, they are not liable.
Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court of Appeals
179 SCRA 5 (November 6, 1989) Facts: In the evening of June 28 until the early m
orning of June 29, 1967, typhoon Gening buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte
and brought heavy rains and flooding. Between 5:306:00AM, Isabel Lao Juan (Nana
Belen) along with Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured out of her house and
traversed waist-deep flood to proceed to a store, which she owns to check if her
merchandise have been damaged. Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed ay! and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help but fear dissuaded them be
cause on the spot where the deceased sank, they saw an electric wire dangling fr
om a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried
to go to Nana Belen but he turned back because the water was grounded. Ernesto
informed Antonio Yabes that his mother in law had been electrocuted and together
they went to the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask INELCO to cut
off the current. Subsequently, the search for the body began and such was found
two meters from an electric post. In another place at about 4:00 A.M., Engineer
Antonio Juan of the NAPOCOR noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter
which indicated such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. He the
n went out for inspection and saw grounded and disconnected lines which were han
ging from posts to the ground. Since there were no INELCO linemen in sight, he d
ecided to go to the INELCO office but it was closed. On the way to INELCO, he pa
ssed by Guerrero St. and saw and electric wire about 30 meters long and the othe
r end of the wire was seeming to play with the current of the water. At about 8:
00 A.M., he went out for inspection again and learned about the death of Nana Be
len. He tried to help revive the deceased but his efforts proved futile. He also
noticed a hollow wound on the left palm of the victim. In the afternoon, he wen
t on an inspection trip again and the wire that he saw on Guerrero St. earlier w
as no longer there. Dr. Castro examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00
A.M. and noted that the skin was grayish or cyanotic which indicated death by el
ectrocution. The wound on the left palm was an electrically charged wound or a f

irst degree burn. The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cau
se of death as circulatory shock electrocution. An action for damages was inst
ituted by the heirs of the deceased. INELCO, through its officers and employees
who testified, claims that on and even before June 29, their electric system did
not suffer from any defect that might constitute hazard to life and property. M
oreover, it was alleged that the lines and devices were newly installed and they
had installed safety devices to prevent injuries to persons and damage to prope
rty in case of natural calamities. INELCO also alleged that they had 12 linesmen
charged with the duty of checking the areas assigned to them. Fabico Abijero ev
en testified that in the early morning of June 29, he passed by the intersection
of Guerrero and Rizal streets and did not see any broken wires. He said that wh
at he saw were many people fishing out the body of the deceased. INELCO also pre
sented Dr. Briones who said that without an autopsy, no doctor or medico-legal c
an speculate the cause of death. Moreover, he said that cyanosis (lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood) appears only in a live person. INELCO also said that
the deceased was negligent because she installed a burglar deterrent by connecti
ng a wire from the main house to the iron gate, thus charging the latter with el
ectric current whenever the switch is on. INELCO then conjectures that the switc
h must have been left on, causing the deceased electrocution when she tried to o
pen her gate.

Held:
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed. Issues: (1) Whether or not the de
ceased died of electrocution. (2) Whether or not petitioner INELCO may be held l
iable for the death of Isabel Lao Juan. (3) Whether or not the maxim volenti non
fit injuria can be applied in the case at bar.
(1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can
lead to no other conclusion than that they were burns and there was nothing els
e in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a burn except
the dangling live wire of petitioner company. In the issue of the burglar deter
rent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch was left on is mere speculati
on, not backed up with evidence. (2) YES. While it is true that typhoons and flo
ods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it w
as not said eventuality which directly caused the victims death. It was through
the intervention of petitioners negligence that death took place. As stated by
Engr. Juan in his testimony, he saw no INELCO lineman and that the office of IN
ELCO was closed. The SC held that in times of calamities, extraordinary diligenc
e requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid
any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The petitioner was negli
gent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public. Furthermore, th
e court held that when an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of
the defendant (in this case the petitioner) to produce an injury, the defendant
is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduc
t or omission. (3) NO. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances wh
ich impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsidin
g typhoon. She went to her grocery store to see to it that the goods were not fl
ooded. It has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, tha
t when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequence
s, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in
peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Clearly, an emergency
was at hand as the deceaseds property, a source of her livelihood, was faced w
ith an impending loss. Furthermore, she was at a place where she had a right to
be without regard to petitioners consent as she was on her way to protect her m

erchandise.
DUE DILIGENCE
Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I., et al
19 SCRA 289 (1967) Facts: The car owned by Placido Ramos, while being driven by
his son Augusto, collided with a truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven
by i Andres Bonifacio. Ramos filed a case at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. C
FI found Bonifacio negligent and declared that Pepsi Cola failed to exercise the
due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Pepsi and Bon
ifacio are held solidarily liable to pay P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000 moral
damages, P2000 exemplary damages and P1,000 Atty. fees.

CA affirmed the decision of CFI regarding Bonifacio but absolved Pepsi Cola from
liability stating that Pepsi has sufficiently proved due diligence in the selec
tion of its employees. Issue: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence
in the selection of its driver. Held: Yes. When it was proven that the employer
had carefully examined the erring driver as to his qualifications, experience an
d record of service, such evidence is sufficient to show that the employer exerc
ised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the driver a
nd rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the employer was negligent. Juan Ana
sco, personnel manager of Pepsi stated that before Bonifacio was hired, his back
ground, experience, physical capacity was checked. Also, he was asked to submit
clearance and also asked to take theoretical and practical driving examination.
Pepsi was also a member of the Safety Council. Petitioner can no longer assail t
he credibility of Anasco. Findings of CA are binding on SC. A motion for reconsi
deration was made stating that respondents violated the Motor vehicle law. It wa
s said that the truck was overweight and running beyond the speed limit and that
it was not equipped with a rear vision mirror and with a helper. Such allegatio
ns failed to show their basis. Patrolman Pahate did not affirm such allegations.
Also, a special permit may be granted for overweight trucks and the absence of
such permit was not proven. In Quasi delicts, the motor vehicle owner is not an
absolute owner against all damages caused by its driver. The owners responsibilit
y ceases once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damages.

Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) vs. CA

223 SCRA 521 June 21, 1993 Facts: Appellant Nenita Custodio boarded a jeepney dr
iven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo.
The jeepney collided with an MMTC bus at the intersection of DBP Avenue and Hone
ydew Road. MMTC bus was driven by defendant Godofredo Leonardo. Both drivers fai
led to slow down or blow their horns. As a result of said incident, Custodio was
thrown out through the windshield and sustained serious physical injuries. She
was sent to the hospital and regained consciousness only after a week. Appellant
, assisted by her parents, filed a complaint for damages. Defendants denied the
material allegations. MMTC for its part presented Milagros Garbo, its training o
fficer, and Christian Bautista, its transport supervisor, as two of its witnesse
s. Garbo testified that the companys bus drivers undergo a series of training p
rograms, examinations, clearances, interviews and seminars for their selection.
Bautista on the other hand, testified that he ensured the drivers were in proper
uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations and fit to drive before the s
tart of duty. The trial court found both drivers negligent for non-observance of
appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual pre
cautions when approaching an intersection. It however, absolved MMTC, stating th
at it was careful and diligent in selecting its employees and strict and diligen
t in supervising them as shown by the evidence. The CA modified the said ruling,
holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants. According to the CA,
MMTC failed to substantiate its allegations that it exercised the diligence of t
he good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. It
pointed out the fact that Garbo and Bautista failed to present documentary evid
ence to support their claims, such as the clearances and test results of Leonard
o or the written guidelines. As such, the testimonies fall short of the required
evidentiary quantum. Issue: Whether or not the evidence of MMTC is sufficient t
o show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selec
tion and supervision of its employees. Held: No. The SC agrees with the ruling o
f the CA. In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to
support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is
, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his cas
e. Corollary, defendant must likewise prove its own allegation to buttress its c
laim that it is not liable. In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant,

who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the tri
al such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. In th
e case at bar, petitioners attempt to prove it diligentissimi patris familias i
n the selection and supervision of employees must fail as it was unable to buttr
ess the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate
the apparent biased nature of the testimony. MMTC only gave oral testimonies as
its evidence, no documentary proof was submitted upon request to further bolste
r its defense. The mere formulation of various company policies on saftey withou
t showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitio
ner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. The SC does not fin
d the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the dili
gence of a good father of a family. Hence, applying Art. 2180 in relation to Art
. 2176, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the other defendants.
PRESCRIPTION
Kramer vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 518 (October 13, 1989) Facts: On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a fishing
boat owned by the petitioners was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila.
Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat collided with an in
ter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines, owned by the private respondent Tra
ns-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. T
he captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Boar
d of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an invest
igation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime colli
sion. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea
and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the p
rivate respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collisio
n. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision o
f the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the
second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his professi
on as a marine officer. On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint
for damages against the private respondent in the RTC. The private respondent fi
led a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescriptio
n. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period
for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasidelict like a mariti
me collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed
their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accr
ued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that a
ccordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-y
ear prescriptive period. Petitioners contended that maritime collisions have pec
uliarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training a
nd experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analy
ze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive peri
od was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action
accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date of the decision of the board become fi
nal. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners holding that in ascertaining negligence r
elating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical asp
ects attendant to such collision, and that the Board was constituted precisely t
o answer the need. CA reversed the decision, holding that it is clear that the c
ause of action of the petitioners accrued from the occurrence of the mishap beca
use that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by t
he aggrieved party. It said that if the tolling of the prescriptive period would
hinge upon the discretion of a government agency, said alternative could entail
hazards. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the action for quasi-delict is
barred by prescription. Held: Yes. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an act
ion based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The prescrip
tive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The right of acti
on accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, na
mely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever
law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respec

t such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes
place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.

Allied Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

178 SCRA 526 (October 13, 1989)

Facts: In 1977, Joselito Yujuico obtained a loan from GEN BANK in the amount of
PhP500,000 and as evidence, it issued a promissory note payable GEN BANK. At the
time private respondent incurred the obligation, he was a ranking officer of GE
NBANK and a member of the family which owns the controlling interest in the bank
. In 1980, the Central Bank issued a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing fu
rther business. Four days after, another resolution was issued ordering the liqu
idation of GENBANK. Later, ALLIED Bank acquired all the assets and assumed all t
he liabilities of GENBANK, including the receivable due from private Yujuico. Up
on Yujuicos failure to pay, ALLIED Bank filed a complaint against private respond
ent for the collection of a sum of money. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in a
special proceeding finding that the liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith
. This decision declared the liquidation of GENBANK null and void. It was then t
hat Yujuico filed the third party complaint for damages alleging that by reason
of the tortious interference by the Central Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, he
was prevented from paying his loan. Issue: Assuming that the Central Bank is gu
ilty of tortious interference, has the claim of Yujuico under the third party co
mplaint prescribed? Held: YES. An action for damages arising from quasi-delict o
r alleged tortious interference should be filed within four (4) years from the d
ay the cause of action accrued. Since the cause of action accrued on 25 March 19
80 (the time when Central Bank issued a cease and desist order against GENBANK)
and the third party complaint was filed only on June 17 1987, the action has pre
scribed. It is from the date the act or omission violative of the right of a par
ty that the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptiv
e period must be reckoned. (Espaol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans)The third pa
rty complaint should not be admitted.
Causation (Proximate Cause)
Bataclan vs. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126 (1957) Facts: Bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated
by its owner, Mariano Medina, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pa
say City, driven by Conrado Saylon. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan. Whi
le the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front
tires burst causing the vehicle to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch
on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed
to leave the bus, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passeng
ers seated beside the driver, namely Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woma
n behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.
After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch ma
de of bamboo with a wick on one end. These men presumably approached the overtur
ned bus, and almost immediately, a fire started, consuming the bus, including th
e four passengers trapped inside. It would appear that as the bus overturned, ga
soline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassi
s, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and ar
ound it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the c
all for help set it on fire. The heirs of the deceased brought an action to reco
ver from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney
s fees. Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was n
ot the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, includi
ng himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it. Held: The Court he
ld that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, th
e leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that th
e coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, m
ade not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conduct
or themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the res
cuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area w
here lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and
effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men wi
th a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of t

he bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. Wh
at is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the neglige
nce of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witnes
s, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, o
r at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline ta
nk and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gaso
line when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even f
rom a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to hav
e cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch t
oo near the bus.
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals and the City of Davao
G.R. No. 92087 (May 8, 1992) Facts: Morta, market master of Agdao Public Market
requested with the City Treasurer Office the emptying of a Septic tank in Agdao.
An invitation to bid was issued to Bertulano, Catarsa, Bascon, Bolo and Suner.
Bascon won the bid and signed the purchase order. Prior to the signing of purcha
se order, Bertulano with four other companions- Liagoso, Fernando and Fajardo Jr
. was found dead inside the septic tank. While, Garcia died in the Regional Hosp
ital after being rescued by a fireman. Autopsy revealed diminution of oxygen and
intake of sulfide gas as cause of death. Investigation by the City Engineer Off
ice learned that the 5 victims entered and re-emptied the tank without clearance
and consent. The heirs of the deceased filed a case for damages contending that
it was the gross negligence of the City of Davao for failing to clean the septi
c tank for 10 years which resulted in the accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas,
and was therefore the proximate cause of the death of the laborers. They further
contend that the market master failed to supervise the area where the tank was
located as a further reflection of the public respondents negligence. Petitioners
also insisted on the application of Article 24 of the New Civil code. Art. 24. I
n all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental we
akness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protec
tion. Issue:

WON proximate cause of death is the own negligence of the plaintiffs?

Held: Yes. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous s
equence unbroken by and efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and wit
hout which the result would not have occurred. While it may be true that the pub
lic respondent had been negligent in the re emptying of the septic tank annually
since 1956, the negligence is not a continuing one. The public respondents have
immediately responded to such issue upon invitation to bid on the service of em
ptying the tank. Public Respondents have also shown in court that people in the
market have been using the toilet for their necessities and remained uninjured.
As proven by Respondents, the septic tank was air-tight as provided for by regul
ations. The accident of toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely to happen un
less one removes its covers. The accident occurred because the victims have onth
eir own and without authority opened the tank. Bertulano who has offered his ser
vices to clean the septic tank is presumed to know the hazards of his job. His a
nd his mens failure to take precautionary measures for their safety is the proxim
ate case of the accident. The Court also cited Culion vs. Phil Motors Corp. When
a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professiona
l skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the skill
of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work he attempts to do. Furthermore,
the surreptitious way the victims did the job without clearance from the market
master and or the security jobs goes against their good faith. Moreover, Article

24 of the NCC is inapplicable as

s between the victims and City of
ations as the victims did not win
ascon, that the contract to clean
Urbano vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-72964) (1988)

there is total absence of contractual relation

Davao that will give rise to contractual oblig
the bidding. It was not to Bertulano, but to B
the septic tank was awarded.

G.R. No. L-72964) (1988) Facts: Petitioner, Filomeno Urbano quarreled with Marce
lino Javier because the latter opened the irrigation canal which caused the floo
ding of the place where Urbanos palay was stored. Urbano hacked the right palm
of Javier with a bolo and caused an incised wound that was later treated. Urbano
and Javier agreed on an amicable settlement and petitioner paid for the hospita
l bills. 22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital, he had a locked jaw a
nd was having convulsions, caused by tetanus toxin. The doctor noticed that the
wound was infected. The next day, Javier died. Petitioner was charged with homic
ide and was later found guilty by the trial court. The IAC affirmed the convicti
on. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the barang
ay captain that Javier was found catching fish on the irrigation canal, 10 days
prior to his death. Issue: Whether or not the inflicting of the wound by petitio
ner was only a remote, and not a proximate, cause. Held: The inflicting of the w
ound is only a remote cause and petitioner cannot be held liable therefor. A pri
or and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause d
id nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of in
jury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independen
t cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negli
gent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances, which res
ult in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or c
ondition is the proximate cause. The incubation period of tetanus, ranges from 2
to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 d
ays. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. (NOTIC
E that it took Javier 22 days, from the time of the hacking, before he had sympt
oms of Tetanus) In the case at bar, the evidence on record does not clearly show
that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
hacking. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing
at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infe
cted with tetanus. However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear. Ther
e is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent inf
ection (failure to take the necessary precautions against tetanus) may have been
the proximate cause of Javiers death.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987) Facts: In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at
about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home f
rom a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss. During the cocktails phase of
the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving
his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and G
eneral Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceed
ing down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) sudd
enly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford
dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by
and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"),
was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the oncoming
traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner as to stick out onto t
he street, partly blocking the way of incoming traffic. There were neither light
s nor any socalled "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump
truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been driven home b
y petitioner Armando Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his em
ployer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following
morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car
to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a r
esult of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some

permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentur
es. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of P
ampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries wa
s the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to
him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered
that the proximate cause of Dionisios injuries was his own recklessness in driv
ing fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, witho
ut his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish
that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump tru
ck driver. Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident is the negl
igence of the driver or the negligence of Dionisio. Held: It was the negligence
of the truck driver. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionis
ios injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was p
arked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. , the collision of
Dionisios car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of
the truck drivers negligence. The truck drivers negligence far from being a "p
assive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. Th
e collision between the dump truck and the private respondents car would in an
probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without a
ny warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck c
reated an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Str
eet and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsib
le. In our view, Dionisios negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck drivers negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an effi
cient intervening or independent cause. respondent Dionisios negligence was "on
ly contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remaine
d the truck drivers "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisi
o may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the court
s TRIVIA: Did the headlights of Dionisio really turned off unexpectedly, as he c
laims? Remember, this happened during Martial law years when curfews were in eff
ect. It was 1:30 AM and Dinisio was drunk. Excellent!
Pilipinas Bank v. CA
G.R. No. 105410 (1994) Facts: As payments for the purchased shoe materials and r
ubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corpor
ation and Vicente Tui with due dates on October 10 and 12, 1979, respectively. T
o cover the face value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested
PCIB Money Shops manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00
from his savings account therein and have it deposited with his current account
with Pilipinas Bank (then Filman Bank), Bian Branch. Roberto Santos was requeste
d to make the deposit. In depositing in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired
from the teller the current account number of Florencio Reyes to complete the d
eposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was "815" and so this
was the same current account number he placed on the deposit slip below the depo
sitors name FLORENCIO REYES. Nothing that the account number coincided with the
name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Ban
k, thought it was for Florencio Amador who owned the listed account number. He,
thus, posted the deposit in the latters account not noticing that the depositor
s surname in the deposit slip was REYES. On October 11, 1979, the October 10, c
heck in favor of Winner Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since
the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P
4,078.43, it was dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearin
g. On October 15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again
dishonored. Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when p
resented for payment on that same date met the same fate but was advised to try
the next clearing. Two days after the October 10 check was again dishonored, the
payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its f
ace value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was
redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the ch
eck was drawn against insufficient fund. Furious over the incident, he immediate

ly proceeded to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. Upo
n verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the
account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to the account of Reyes
upon being cleared by Florencio Amador that he did not effect a deposit in the
amount of P32,000.00. The transfer having been effected, the bank then honored t
he October 12, 1979, check.

Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of deposit was due to the erro
r of the representative of Reyes Held: No. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to
apply, it must be established that private respondents own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is w
ell defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and c
ontinuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the re
sult complained of and without which would not have occurred and from which it o
ught to have been forseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case
that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as
a natural and probable consequence." In the case at bench, the proximate cause
of the injury is the negligence of petitioners employee in erroneously posting
the cash deposit of private respondent in the name of another depositor who had
a similar first name. As held by the trial court:
Applying the test, the bank employee is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to
exercise the degree of care required in the performance of his duties. As earli
er stated, the bank employee posted the cash deposit in the account of Florencio
Amador from his assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger with
out, however, going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the d
eposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption, which was
proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear certainty, considering the amou
nt involved and the repercussions it would create on the totality of the person
notable of which is the credit standing of the person involved should a mistake
happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff in the course of his business were di
shonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a balance i
nsufficient to cover the face value of checks.
4
Quezon City Government vs. Fulgencio Dacara
G.R. NO. 150304 (June 15, 2005) Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of herein resp
ondent was driving the Toyota Corolla of his father along Matahimik St. in Quezo
n City. While driving, the vehicle rammed into a pile of earth (street diggings)
as the street was being repaired by the Quezon City government. As result, Daca
ra allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage
s when it turned turtled as it hit the pile of earth. Indemnification was sought
from the City Government but it yielded negative results. Dacara Sr. on behalf
of his minor son filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioner (QCG).
In its answer, QCG alleged that the diggings were provided with a mound of soil
and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or aft
er it which was visible during the incident. QCG claimed that they exercised due
care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid acci
dent. Such claim was disproved by the investigation report which stated that the
deep excavation was without any warning device. The RTC, on the basis of Art. 2
189 of the Civil Code, rendered judgment in favor of Fulgencio Dacara and ordere
d QCG to pay the former actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
costs of suit. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Issues: 1. 2. 3. Whether or n
ot negligence of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was the proximate cause of the accident.
Whether or not award for moral damages is proper. Whether or not award for exemp
lary damages is proper.
HELD: (1) NO. Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes the responsibility of the city government
relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control
and supervision over the same. Failure of the petitioner to comply with the sta
tutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se
which renders the City government liable. Petitioner pointed out that Fulgencio
was driving at the speed of 60kph which was above the maximum limit of 30kph wh
en he met the accident, so he can be presumed negligent based on Art. 2185. Such
a matter was not raised at any time during the trial and was only raised for th
e first time in their Motion for Reconsideration. The SC held it was too late to
raise such issue . (2) NO. Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages t
o be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physi

cal injuries. There can be no recovery or moral damages unless the quasi-delict
resulted in physical injury. In the case at bar, Fulgencio testified that he suf
fered a deep cut on his left arm. However, no other evidence such as a medical c
ertificate, was presented to prove such bare assertion of physical injury. Thus,
there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages. Moral
damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviat
e in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, b
esmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and sim
ilar injury inflicted on a person. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absenc
e of proof that the person experienced emotional and mental suffering. Mere alle
gations do not suffice, clear and convincing proof is necessary. (3) YES. Exempl
ary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right, it is subject to the discr
etion of the courts but cannot be awarded unless claimants show their entitlemen
t to moral, temperate or actual damages. In the case at bar, petitioners neglig
ence was the proximate cause of the incident, thereby establishing his right to
actual damages. Art. 2231 NCC mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary
damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Such a c
ircumstance obtains in the instant case. The City Government failed to show the
modicum of responsibility, much less, care expected from them by the constituent
s of the city. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street-digging
in a side street which caused the accident in the so-called premier city.
Remote cause, distinguished from Proximate case
Gabeto vs. Araneta
G.R. No. 15674 (1921) Facts: On Aug. 4, 1918, Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano
rode a carromata (horse driven carriage) to go to a cockpit on Calle Ledesma in
the city of Iloilo. Agaton Araneta stepped out into the street and stopped the
horse. Araneta protested to the driver that he was the first one who called for
the carromata. The driver Julio Pagnaya pulled on the reins (one which control t
he horse) of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta. Due to th
e rottenness of the reins, the bit (placed on the horses mouth for control) came
out of the horses mouth. Pagnaya got off the carromata and pulled over the same n
ear the curb and fixed the bit. While doing so, the horse moved forward and pull
ed one wheel of the carromata uo on the sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya. The carroma
ta struck a police telephone box and due to the crashing sound, the horse got fr
ightened and set out at full speed up the street.

Issue:
Basilio Ilano was able to get off the carromata but Proceso Gayetano retained hi
s seat and when he jumped from the rig, he sustained injuries which caused his d
eath.

Whether or not the act of Araneta is the proximate cause of the death of Gayetan
o.
Held: No. The mere act of Araneta of stopping the horse will not make him liable
. Evidence shows that when Pagnaya got out of the carromata to go the horses head
and fix the bit, an appreciable interval of time elapsed. The act of Araneta is
too remote from the accident to be considered as the proximate cause. By gettin
g off and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person pr
imarily responsible for the control of the animal. Also, evidence shows that the
bridle was old and the leather is weak and easily broken.

Urbano vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-72964 (1988) Facts: Supra Held: There is a likelihood that the wound
was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take neces
sary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javiers dea
th with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric C
o. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118). "A prior and remote cause cannot be mad
e the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the con
dition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if th
ere intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, suc
cessive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury w
ould not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed
in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior d
efective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (4
5 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
Concurrent Cause, distinguished from Proximate
Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. 130068 (1998) Facts: Supra Held: It may be said, as a general rule, that ne
gligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an inj
ury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than piaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingl
y, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved fr
om liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient
that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause wit
hout which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that su
ch cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of t
he concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negli
gence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent ror
tfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may
be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any o
r all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, i
t may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them
to the injured person was not the same. No actors negligence ceases to be a pro
ximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. E
ach wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his a
cts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint to
rtfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the tota
l damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two
or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct an
d proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to dete
rmine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is re
sponsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in in
jury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidaril
y liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
Subido vs. Custodio
L-21512 (Aug 31, 1966)
Facts: Agapito Custodio was a passenger of an LTB Bus. He was hanging on the lef
t side of the bus because it was full of passengers. A truck owned by Subido whi
ch was coming from the opposite direction sideswiped the LTB bus and injured Cus
todio who died as a result thereof. Both drivers were found negligent- the LTB b
us driver for having allowed a passenger to ride on the running board of the bus
and the driver of the truck for running at a considerable speed while negotiati
ng a sharp curb and running on the middle instead of on the right side of the ro
ad. The owner and the driver of the truck contended that the proximate cause of
the death of Custodio was the negligence of the driver of the LTB bus who allowe
d Custodio to ride on the running board of the LTB bus. Issue: Is there concurre

nt liability here in this case at bar? How does the negligence of both parties a
ffect the liability of both? Held: Although the negligence of the carrier (LTB b
us) and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the tr
uck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of dea
th of Agapito Custodio. In fact the negligence of the first two(2) would not hav
e produced this result without the negligence of petitioners herein (the owner a
nd driver of the truck). What is more, petitioners negligence was the last, in po
int of time, for Custodio was on the running board of the carriers bus sometime b
efore petitioners truck came from the opposite direction, so that, in this sense
petitioners truck had the last clear chance. The owner and the driver of the truck
were held jointly and severally liable, together with the LTB bus and its drive
r, to the heirs of Custodio.
TESTS of proximate cause- the BUT FOR test
Bataclan vs. Medina
102 Phil 181 Facts: supra Held: There is no question that under the circumstance
s, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The tri
al court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan wa
s not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, incl
uding himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the tim
e the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, pe
rhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death,
but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We disagree. A satisfactory defin
ition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisp
rudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:
. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any ef
ficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result wou
ld not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is t
hat acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting othe
r events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, e
ach having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final e
vent in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable res
ult of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person res
ponsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent pers
on, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passe
nger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected an
d extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if som
e highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is bur
ned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was
the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under t
he circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the prox
imate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the ve
hicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the
men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by
the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, a
nd that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to car
ry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns an
d flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescu
ers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the resc
ue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was t
o be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trap
ping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the
burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carri
er, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver an
d the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the
driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned b

us was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked th
e area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spille
d, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance,
and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or t
aken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal p
rovisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

Substantial Factor Test

Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC and Casiano Pascua et al.
G.R. No. 66102-04 (August 30, 1990)
Facts: On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers boarded a jeepney bound fo
r Pangasinan via Dau. Manalo drove the jeep owned by Magune and Carreon. Reachin
g Tarlac, the right wheel of the jeep was detached resulting to its 180 degree t
urn invading the other lane with the jeeps front facing south. The bus driven by
Del Rosario collided with the jeepney resulting in the death of three passengers
and physical injuries to some. Manalo was convicted of Multiple Homicide and Se
rious Physical Injuries. Manalo did not appeal. Three Civil Cases fro Damages do
cketed 1136; 39-40 was filed anchored on the contractual liability of the jeepne
y owner and Philippine Rabbits liability based on quasidelict. Trial court decide
d against the jeepney operator as well as the joint liability of his Insurance A
gency for Actual and Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its decisions on the f
ollowing: (1)Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver was running
really fast. (2) Unrebutted testimony of Police Inspector on the sharp angle tra
ck marks of the jeep; the observation of the skid marks. (3) Manalos Conviction o
n the Criminal Compalint (4)Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor, attesting to the c
ollision happening on the right of way of the bus. CA reversed decision. It orde
red Plaintiff bus operator and driver to pay jointly and severally the damages a
warded. It based its decisions primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear chanc
e. 2.) presumption of the responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to avoid
collision with the vehicle in front. 3.) the substantial test concluding Bus dr
iver negligent by not making an effort to avoid accident and being the physical
force causing the injury and death of passengers. Issue: Who has liability over
the injuries and death of victims? Held: The proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the jeepney operator for failure to exercise precautions need
ed. The carrier is presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso fortuito or
that he has observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles 1733,55-56
. Negligence was proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by the trial co
urt. Last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not aride where a passenger de
mands responsibility under culpa contractual. A negligent driver and its owner c
annot be exempted on the ground that the other party was likewise guilty of negl
igence. The substantial factor test is testing whether the actors conduct is a su
bstantial factor in bringing about harm to another. THE FACT THAT THE ACTOR NEIT
HER FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE FORESEEN THE EXTENT OF HARM OR MANNER IN WHICH THE E
VENT OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS LIABILITY. However, this test does not apply.
The court does not fault Reyes for not having avoided such sicne no other optio
ns are available to him. The other lane even though empty was narrow and covered
with tall grass. The wheels of the bus were also clear of the roadwasy except t
he outher left that hit the jeep. This clearly shows the attempt to hit the jeep
. Inability to avoid the jeep must have been due to the limitations of options.
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated with Modificat
ion that only the Operator and the Insurance Company is liable for the victims a
nd heirs. The driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrie
r in Breach of Contract as provided in Article 2180 and to make driver jointly a
nd severally liable is to make the carriers liability a personal one and not expl
icit.

Cause v. Condition
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
148 SCRA 353 (Mar 10, 1987) Facts: Supra Held: Cause and condition. Many courts
have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the harm and the existi
ng "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created onl
y a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is sa
id not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the se
nse of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing th
e result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the r
esult of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills ga
soline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable bec
ause of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has
done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the
very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape respons
ibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" rema
ins static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the h
ighway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause
" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distin
ction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all,
it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defen
dant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force inte
rvenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "c
ondition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.
Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo
G.R. No. L-8328 (1956) Facts: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of his stepb
rother to repair a "media agua" said to be in a leaking condition. The "media ag
ua" was just below the window of the third story. Magno received from his son th
ru that window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned arou
nd and in doing so, the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the e
lectric wire of the Manila Electric Company. He died by electrocution. His widow
and children filed suit to recover damages from the electric company. Issue: We
re the acts of Magno the proximate or the remote cause of the incident. Held: Ma
gnos acts were the proximate cause. It is clear that the principal and proximate
cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause,
but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swingin
g the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. Magno was expected, a
s a person who is deemed a professional in his line of work, to have looked back
toward the street and at the wire to avoid contacting with the iron sheet, the
same being length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote an
d proximate cause with respect to injuries, the following citation is helpful:
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote c
ause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or r
emote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient caus
e of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such co
ndition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an indepe
ndent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances
which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequen
t act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C. J. pp. 931-332.).

Furthermore, the owner of the house disregarded a city ordinance, declaring ille
gal the length of less than 3 feet distance between a building and the electric

pole. And added to this violation, was its approval by the city through its agen
t, possibly an inspector. The electric company cannot be expected to be always o
n the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between it
s wires and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet ha
d been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to pr
eserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its
duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly
followed by house owners and to

preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is it
s duty, to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictl
y followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal construction
s. Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construct
ion of the "media agua" was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely cont
ributed to it. And contrary to the case of Astudillo vs. Manila electric, in the
case at bar, the construction cannot be said to be a public place as it is a pr
ivate construction. The deceased person was also a person of age who is expected
to be more careful and knowledgeable as to what he is doing.
Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co.
G.R. No.15688 (November 19, 1921) Facts: Manila Railroad Co. operates a line thr
ough the district of Daraga. As one of its trains passed over the line, sparks w
ere emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was communicated to
four houses nearby, and they were entirely consumed. All of these houses were of
light construction except that of Rodriguezas, which was of strong materials, th
ough the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire occurred immediately aft
er the passage of the train, and a strong wind was blowing it. It doesnt appear w
hose house caught fire first, though Manila railroad claimed that it was first c
ommunicated to Rodriguezas house and spread to the others. The plaintiffs claim t
hat Manila Railroad was negligent in the following manners: a. in failing to exe
rcise proper supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive; b. in a
llowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without having
the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; c. in using in its
locomotive Bataan fuel, a fuel of known inferior quality which upon combustion,
produces sparks in great quanity. Manila Railroad, on the other hand, argued th
at Rodriguezas house stood partly within the limits of the land owned by it, thog
h exactly how far away from the companys track does not appear. It also claimed o
f notifying Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company, and that Ro
drigueza did not comply. Issue: Who should be liable? Held: Manila Railroad shou
ld be liable. Whether or not the fire may have been communicated through Rodrigu
ezas house, or directly from the locomotive is immaterial. With regards to the po
sition of Rodriguezas house, there is no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intrude
d upon the railroads property in the act of building his house. Rodrigueza may ha
ve assumed the risk of loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by th
e defendants locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he canno
t be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unla
wful negligent acts of Manila Railroad. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend
himselfagainst the possible negligence of another. The circumstances cannot be
imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action bec
ause, a) that condition was not created by himself, b) his house remained on the
ground by toleration and therefore with the consent of the Railroad co., and c)
even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify th
e defendant company in negligently destroying it.
Efficient Intervening Cause
McKee vs. IAC
211 SCRA 517 (68102) (1992) Facts: A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang and owne
d by private respondents Tayag and Manalo was travelling southward from Angeles
City to San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Manila. On the other hand, a Ford Esco
rt car driven by Jose Koh, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. Whe
n the northbound car was about 10 meters away from the southern approach of the
bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane
of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all
the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swer
ved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headl
ights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his l
ane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occur
red in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. T
he said collision resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee, and Loida Bo

ndoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and Arac
eli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort. In the statement of Ruben Gala
ng to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident, he admit
ted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour (48 kph). Two civil cases for da
mages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga. The first civil case was for damage
s for the death of Jose Koh. The second civil case, on the other hand, was for t
he damages for the death of one and a half year old Kim Koh McKee and the physic
al injuries sustained by George and Araceli. About a month later, a charge of re
ckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, physical injuries and damage t
o property was filed against Ruben Galang and was raffled in the same court wher
e the second civil case was assigned. In their Answer with Counterclaim for the
first civil case, private respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car w
hich "invaded and bumped the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as co
unterclaim, prayed for the award of attorneys fees, actual and liquidated damag
es, moral damages and business losses. In the second civil case, private respond
ents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency of another action an
d failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; the
y also filed a motion to consolidate the case with the first civil case pending
before Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. Both m
otions were denied by Judge Capulong. In the criminal case, a judgment of convic
tion was rendered against Ruben Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castaeda, Jr. d
ismissed the two (2) civil cases and awarded the private respondents moral damag
es, exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of
conviction but it was affirmed. Plaintiffs (McKee) on the other hand, appealed
the dismissal of the civil cases to the appellate court. The appellate court rev
ersed the decision of the trial court. The decision is anchored principally on t
he respondent Courts findings that it was Ruben Galangs inattentiveness or rec
kless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said tha
t the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents
), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it wa
s further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the def
ense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
and supervising the said employee. Private respondents filed a motion for recon
sideration alleging improper appreciation of facts and on the basis of which, re
spondent court affirmed the trial courts decision in dismissing the civil cases
. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this pet
ition. Issue: Whether or not Jose Kohs negligence was the proximate cause of th
e accident. Held: NO. The respondent Court held that the fact that the car impro
perly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred in said lane
gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligen
t. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately con
cluded that it was Jose Kohs negligence that was the immediate and proximate ca
use of the collision. This is an unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the p
etitioners convincingly shows that the car swerved into the trucks lane because
as it approached the southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the roa
d from the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. Jose Kohs entry into the la
ne of the truck was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that ti
me, a greater peril-death or injury to the two boys. Such act can hardly be clas
sified as negligent. No negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable
and ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by
swerving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the
opposite lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take
particularly where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters awa
y and could very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to th
e oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who su
ddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time t
o consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is
not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflec
tion may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he f
inds himself is brought about by his own negligence." Although it may be said th

at the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening cause, the negligent act
of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the
car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the
latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give t
he car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down a
nd swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary mea
sure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed tow
ards the car. Moreover, the truck drivers negligence is apparent in the records
. He himself said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hou
r along the bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30
kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a v
ehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck drivers subsequent neg
ligence in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to

mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the
truck drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper measures and
degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate cause of
the resulting accident. Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of
last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the
law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured
will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might,
by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences o
f the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person who had the las
t clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely responsible for t
he consequences thereof
Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo
G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)
Facts: Supra Held: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an actio
n if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened betwe
en such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated, a
nd efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happene
d but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition exce
pt because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective conditio
n, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J. p. 931.)
Teague vs. Fernandez
51 SCRA 181 (L-29745) (1973) NOTE: To easily remember, call this the Maghulos dil
i ka case. Facts: Realistic Institute is a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture owned and operated by defendant. It is located at the 2 floor of Gil-Arm
i Building. A fire broke out 10 meters away from the building. The students upon
seeing the fire panicked. The six instructresses tried to calm them down. Mrs.
Prieto, one of the instructresses even slapped three students to quiet them down
. The panic could not be subdued, thereby causing a stampede. No part of the bui
lding was burned. But after the panic was over, four students including Lourdes
Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs were found dead. Deceaseds five brothers and sist
ers filed an action for damages against Teague, as owner and operator of Realist
ic Institute. CFI dismissed the case. CA reversed, and awarded damages of P11,00
0. CA held that defendants negligence was the proximate cause of Hernandez death.
The negligence was primarily predicated on the violation of the city ordinance o
f Manila, which consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi bui
lding had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 met
ers each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a secon
d stairway under construction. Hence a petition for review was filed in SC. Issu
e: Are there independent causes/efficient intervening causes? Held: None. The pa
nic and stampede cannot be considered efficient intervening causes. It is true t
hat the petitioners non-compliance with the ordinance was ahead and prior to the
other events in point of time, in the sense that it was contemporaneous with its
occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the or
dinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which w
ould pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue ov
ercrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, i
t could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions i
f there was only one stairway available.
nd

The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of a

n injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident

, in the manner in which it happened was the very thing which the statute or ord
inance was intended to prevent.

Urbano vs. IAC

G.R. No. L-72964 (1988) Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Ur
bano from any liability for Javiers death. Held: Medically speaking, the reacti
on to tetanus found inside a mans body depends on the incubation period of the
disease. In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right
palm when he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident t
ook place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffer
ed the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, N
ovember 15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the a
ppellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically
probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanu
s because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking inc
ident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the ons
et time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second
day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javie
rs wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed
him was not yet present. Consequently, Javiers wound could have been infected
with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surroundin
g Javiers death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few
but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim m
ust be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon
him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however,
lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus wa
s an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to
the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to th
e crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Last Clear Chance
Picart vs. Smith
37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918) Facts: Supra. Note: This is the first time the doct
rine of last clear chance was introduced in Philippine Jurisprudence. Held: The
last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was h
is duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons we
re on the bridge to take the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid
collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upo
n the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was neglig
ent in the eye of the law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the person w
ho has the last clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is char
geable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the o
ther party. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by ref
erence to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The la
w considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordi
nary intelligence and prudence and

the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law consider
s what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intel
ligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
Bustamante vs. Court Of Appeals
193 SCRA 603 (February 6, 1991) Facts: A bus was traversing an inclined road. Th
e bus driver saw, from 30 meters away, a sand and gravel truck fast approaching
with its front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also observed that the truck was
heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance and believing that truck
driver was merely joking, the bus driver shifted from 4 to 3 gear to gain more
power and speed in order to overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a per
son along the shoulder of the highway. All of this happened while the truck was
descending and the bus was ascending the inclined part of the road. The two vehi
cles sideswiped each other at each others left side ripping off the said wall o
f the bus from the drivers seat to the last rear seat. Due to the impact, sever
al passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries th
ey sustained. The heirs sued the respective owners and drivers of both the bus c
ompany and the truck. The trial concluded that the negligent acts of both driver
s contributed to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident, t
hus the liability of the two drivers for their negligence is solidary. The drive
r and owner of the truck appealed, the Court of Appeals, in resolving the motion
for reconsideration, absolved the owner and driver of the truck based on the do
ctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus driver had the last clear chanc
e to avoid the accident and that it is his negligence which was the proximate ca
use of mishap. Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is correc
tly applied. Held: NO. The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applicable in th
is case. The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is thatthe negligence
of the plaintiff does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence
, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the
plaintiffs negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means
that even though a persons own acts may have placed him in a position of peril
, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. The practic
al import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negl
igent plaintiff, if he (the defendant) were aware of the plaintiffs peril, or sho
uld have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunity to avoid the accident. And this is true even if the plaintiff is gr
ossly negligent. The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between th
e owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger
demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owners on the
ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. The Court is co
nvinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doct
rine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is no
t a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit bro
ught by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the o
wner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
th rd
Phoenix Construction Inc. vs. IAC
148 SCRA 353 (March 10, 1987) NOTE: Emphasis is made on the obiter dictum. FACTS
: On November 15, 1975 (During the period of Martial Law) at approximately 1:30
AM, Leonardo Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati
from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or tw
o" of liquor. Dionisio alleged that while he was crossing the intersection of Ge
neral Lacuna and General Santos Streets in Bangkal, Makati, not far from his hom
e, when his cars headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "brigh
t" and thereupon saw a Ford dump truck looming some two and a half meters away.
The Ford dump truck, owned and operated by Phoenix Construction Inc. was parked

askew partly blocking and facing the way of incoming traffic. There were neither
lights nor any so-called "early warning" devices or reflectors set anywhere nea
r the dump truck. The dump truck had, earlier that evening, been driven home by
Carbonel, its regular driver. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collisio
n by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into t
he dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical inj
uries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of t
wo gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced an action for damages claiming that
the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck. Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the prox
imate cause of Dionisios injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast whil
e under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the sel
ection and supervision of the dump truck driver. ISSUE: Whether or not the last
clear chance doctrine should be applied, therefore exculpating Phoenix from payi
ng damages. HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that private respondent Dionisios
negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of
the injury remained the truck drivers "lack of due care" and that consequently
Dionisio may recover damages though are subject to mitigation by the courts (Art
icle 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). Obiter Dictum by Justice Feliciano: P
hoenix and Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear c
hance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner tru
ck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance"
of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having faile
d to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last cl
ear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Pica
rt vs. Smith but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has fo
und its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of t
hat doctrine of last clear chance was to mitigate the harshness of another commo
n law doctrine that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of contributo
ry negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligen
t, even if the plaintiffs negligence was relatively minor as compared with the
wrongful act or omission of the defendant.

wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last clear c
hance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been neglig
ent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the
common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the co
mmon law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by th
e plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in article 2179 of the civ
il code. Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be e
xtracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence
cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Articl
e 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligenc
e-the plaintiffs or the defendants-was the legal or proximate cause of the inj
ury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or phys
ics, as the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "interv
ening" or "immediate." The relative location in the continuum of time of the pla
intiffs and the defendants negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the rel
evant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance is
the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party, and the character and
gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the commun
ity. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) sho
uld be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unf
ortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become
necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck drivers own wrongfu
l act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out
the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable co
nsequences of his own negligent act or omission (NOTE: Parking the truck askew f
acing incoming traffic). Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and
burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society.
To accept the petitioners proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of Soc
iety. NOTE: The point in assigning this case is for students to realize that the
common law concepts of last clear chance and contributory negligence are counter-in
tuitive. Interestingly, contributory negligence in our jurisdiction does not mea
n that the plaintiff can no longer recover, but while he may recover, the liabil
ity of person ultimately responsible is mitigated. This is clearly visible from
our treatment of contributory negligence in Art. 2179, which states: Art. 2179.
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of d
ue care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the da
mages to be awarded. (n)
Philippine Bank Of Commerce vs. CA (Lipana)
269 SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997) Facts: Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC) mainta
ined two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection
with its business of selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Rome
o Lipana, RMCs GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalin
g P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said
funds to RMCs account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not cre
dited to RMCs account but were instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut
s husband, Bienvenido Cotas. Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the depo
sit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husba
nd as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was writte
n the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left
blank. PBCs teller, Azucena Mabayad, would validate and stamp both the original
and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despi
te the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Ir
ene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill
up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the
account number written thereon and make it appear to be RMCs account number. S
he made her company believe that the amounts she deposited were being credited t

o its account when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account of her hus
band. During the entire period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with mon
thly statements showing its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was neve
r the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing comple
te trust and confidence to PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the los
s of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money. Issue
: Whether the proximate cause of the loss is the banks negligence or that of RM
Cs. Held: It was the negligence of PBComs teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by
the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller,
which was the proximate cause of the loss. Proximate cause is that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause
, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The
banks teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially sta
mping and signing all the deposit slips presented by Ms. Yabut, notwithstanding
that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to PBComs SOP. I
n this case, were it not for the act of Ms. Mabayad, Ms. Irene Yabut would not h
ave had the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme. Lastly, und
er the doctrine of "last clear chance" where both parties are negligent, but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or wh
en it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed
to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impendi
ng harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. In this
case, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to
a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud
the company, the bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. Cons
idering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) ye
ar covering various deposits, it cannot be denied that RMC was likewise negligen
t in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company
would have been alerted of the series of frauds being committed by its secretar
y. Such omission by RMC is to be considered contributory negligence on its part,
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded. AWARD: Of actual damages,
RMC shall shoulder 40% of the loss, while PBCom shall pay 60% of the loss.
Glan Peoples Lumber And Hardware vs. IAC
G.R. No. 70493 (May 18, 1989) FACTS: Engineer Orlando T. Calibo was driving a Da
vao city-bound jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. Also abo
ard the jeep were Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos.

Maximo Patos. A cargo truck driven by Paul Zacarias and loaded with cement bags,
GI sheets and plywood was coming from the opposite direction and bound for Sout
h Cotabato. Just after the truck went across a bridge, it collided with the jeep
and as a consequence, Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained ph
ysical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side o
f the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep, including its
fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and re
sted on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the tru
ck, while the truck was stopped on its wheels on the road. A civil suit was file
d by the wife of Calibo against Zacarias and the owner of the truck. The lower c
ourt dismissed the case, and accepted the argument that even if there was neglig
ence on the part of Zacarias who intruded about 25 centimeters to the lane of Ca
libo, the latter had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The Court of A
ppeals reversed the decision on the ground that Zacarias saw the jeep already at
about 150 meters and Zacarias did not have a drivers license at the time of the
incident. ISSUE: To whose negligence is the accident imputable? HELD:. The evide
nce indicates that it was Engineer Calibos negligence that was the proximate caus
e of the accident. Assuming there was antecedent negligence on the part of Zacar
ias, Calibo had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. Both drivers had a
full view of each others vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. B
oth vehicles were travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per h
our. The survivors of the jeep admitted that the truck was already at a full sto
p when they collided with it. The logical conclusion is that the driver of the j
eep had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while at that distance of t
hirty meters away from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep a
way from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running a
t a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty w
as to seize that opportunity to avoid the mishap, not merely rely on a supposed
right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. The doctrine of
the last clear chance provides as a valid and complete defense to accident liabi
lity today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs Smit
h.
Pantranco vs. Baesa
179 SCRA 384 (November 1989) FACTS: On June 12, 1981, at approximately 7:00 ocl
ock in the morning, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their three children, a
long with spouses David Ico and Fe Ico, their son Erwin Ico and seven other pers
ons, were onboard a passenger jeepney on their way to Malalam River, Isabela, to
have a picnic in celebration of spouses Baesas fifth wedding anniversary. David
Ico was driving. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right at a speed
of about 20 KPH. A speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on-route to Manila, encro
ached on the jeepneys lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. Dav
id Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children, died w
hile the rest of the passengers sustained injuries. The jeepney is extensively d
amaged. The driver of the bus went into hiding, and has never been seen since. M
aricar Baesa through her guardian and Fe O. Ico filed separate actions for damag
es arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. The other victims settled with B
us Company. PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David Icos alleged negli
gence as the proximate cause of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligen
ce in the selection and supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez. ISSUE: Can
PANTRANCO invoke the defense of Last Clear Chance? HELD: No. Petitioner claims t
he driver of the jeepney had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and he
nce, was negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence the
opportunity to avoid the harm. The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, me
ans that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude recovery for the neglige
nce of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstan
ding his negligence. The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in
this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the
person who had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the exist

ence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it In
this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of t
he impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encr
oaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoul
der on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to i
ts own lane upon seeing the jeepney approach from the opposite direction. Both t
he trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident t
he Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila. At the time David Ico must have re
alized that the bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already too late t
o swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The Court held that th
e last clear chance doctrine "can never apply where the party charged is require
d to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application
of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered"
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
G.R. No. L-7644 (August 29, 1958) Facts: Metropolitan Water District owns and op
erates three swimming pools in Balara, Quezon City. It allows the public to use
the pools for a fee.

Dominador Ong, a 14-year old boy, went to the pool with his two brothers. At abo
ut 4:35 p.m., Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker room i
n an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and
Eusebio Ong went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool. Later t
hat day, a bather reported that a person was underwater for too long. Upon heari
ng this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ongs lifeless body.
Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried to revive the boy. Soon after, nurse Ar
mando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado V
icente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security g
uards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and
upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vi
cente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Phi
lippines. Meanwhile, Abao continued the artificial manual respiration, and when t
his failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tan
ks were exhausted. The investigation revealed that the cause of death is asphyxi
a by submersion in water. The parents of Ong brought this action for damages aga
inst Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and supervision of its e
mployees and if not negligent, they had the last clear chance to revive Ong. Iss
ue: Whether or not Metropolitan is negligent in operating the pool. Held: NO, Me
tropolitan is not negligent. Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. The swimming pools are provided with
a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine
kit. The bottoms of the pools are painted black so as to insure clear visibilit
y. On display in a conspicuous place are rules and regulations governing the use
of the pools Metropolitan also employs six trained lifeguards, all of whom were
issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared
by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on dut
y to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary
inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are securit
y guards who are available always in case of emergency. The record also shows th
at when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the emp
loyees of Metropolitan did everything possible to revive him. When they found th
at the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him wit
h camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective the
y applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while a
ll these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University o
f the Philippines who however arrived late. All of the foregoing shows that Metr
opolitan has done all that is humanly possible under the circumstances to restor
e minor Ongs life. For that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death T
HE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. The record does not
show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The doctrine of last clear c
hance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recover
y for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercisin
g reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to cla
imant notwithstanding his negligence. Since it is not known how minor Ong came i
nto the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any c
ompanion in violation of pool regulations and it appearing that lifeguard Abao re
sponded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called and immediately
exhausted all efforts to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no r
oom for the application of the doctrine.
ANURAN vs. BUO
17 SCRA 224 (May 20, 1966) FACTS: On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney, driv
en by Buo, was on the road to Taal, Batangas. It stopped to allow one of his pass
engers to alight. But the jeepney was parked in such a way that of its width was
on the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder
of the said road. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behi
nd, which such violence that three of its passengers died, while two other passe
ngers suffered injuries that required confinement in the Provincial Hospital. Th
e heirs of the dead and injured passengers filed a case against the respective d

rivers and owners of the truck and of the jeepney to recover damages. The Court
of First Instance absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it orde
red the truck driver and the owners to pay damages. Plaintiffs appealed to the C
ourt of Appeals insisting that the driver and the owners of the jeepney should a
lso be made liable for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the driver and owners of t
he jeepney should also be made liable. HELD: YES. It must be remembered that the
degree of diligence required of a carrier in transporting its passengers is utmo
st diligence (Art. 1755) and consequently, they are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraor
dinary diligence (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of neglige
nce is confirmed by the appellate courts finding that the jeepney driver parked t
he vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners of the jeep
ney must answer for injuries to its passengers. Obiter dictum on Application of
Principle of Last Clear Chance: The principle of last clear chance applies in a su
it between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not ari
se where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its obli
gations under a contract of carriage. For it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driv
er was likewise guilty of negligence. This principle does not apply in this case
.
CANLAS vs. CA
G.R. No. 112160 (February 28 2000) Facts: In August 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and
Vicente Maosca, decided to venture in business and to raise the capital needed t
herefor. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Maosca to mortga
ge two parcels of land situated in BF Homes, Paranaque. Each lot has a semi-conc
rete residential house in the name of the Canlas and his wife. Spouses Canlas ag
reed to sell the two lots to Maosca, for and in consideration of PhP 850,000.00,
P500,000.00 of which payable within one week, and the balance of PhP 350,000.00
shall serve as serve as Canlas investment in the business. Canlas delivered to Mao
sca the transfer certificates of title of the two lots sold. Maosca, on his part,
issued two postdated checks in favorof Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40,000
.00 and P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned out that the check covering the
bigger amount was not sufficiently funded. In sum, the spouses Canlas received
only PhP40,000.00, despite delivering the TCTs to the supposed vendee. On Septem
ber 1982, Maosca, with the use of the SPA previously issued by Canlas, was able t
o secure a P100,000.00 loan from a certain Atty. Manuel Magno by mortgaging the
same parcels of land, with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves a
s the spouses Canlas. On September 29, 1982, Vicente Maoscam, using the same parc
els of land as security and through the involvement of the same impostors who ag
ain introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses, applied and was approved of ano
ther loan by Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00. When the loa
n was not paid, the bank, extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage.

On January 1983, the spouses Canlas wrote a letter informing the bank that the e
xecution of subject mortgage over the two parcels of land was without their auth
ority. They requested that steps be taken to annul the questioned mortgage. Issu
es: Is the mortgage with the bank valid? And if the answer is in the negative, s
hould the bank bear the loss? A contract of mortgage must be constituted only by
the absolute owner on the property mortgaged; a mortgage, constituted by an imp
ostor is void. Considering that it was established that the contract of mortgage
was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the s
pouses Canlas, the subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity. As to who
shall bear the loss, The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, the respo
ndent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last clea
r chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligen
t act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or wh
ere it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the oc
currence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid th
e impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arisin
g therefrom. The respondent bank did not observe the required diligence in verif
ying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Os
mundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. Not a single identification card was presented
by the impostor-loan applicants to show their true identity. And yet the bank a
pproved the loan on sheer finding that the signatures affixed on a deed of mortg
age previously executed in favor of a certain Atty. Magno matched the signatures
in the residence certificates presented by the impostors. In fact the deed of m
ortgage referred to did not bear the tax identification number of the spouses, a
s well as the Community Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas. Applying Art. 1173 I
t could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that
of a good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise t
he necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a registered or titled propert
y. Under such principle, the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the l
and registration law, accorded to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good
faith. Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss.
Consolidated Bank vs. Court Of Appeals
G.R. No. 138569 (Sept. 11, 2003) FACTS: LC Diaz and Co. (Diaz) is an accounting
firm. Diaz has a savings account with Consolidated Bank (the predecessor of Soli
dbank). In 1991, Diaz, through its cashier, Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash)
deposit slip for PhP900.00 and check deposit slip for PhP50.00. Macaraya instru
cted the firms messenger, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank. Ma
caraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and p
resented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. Since the trans
action took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Alli
ed Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank
to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbo
ok. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. Macaray
a, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank. When Macaraya asked for the passboo
k, Teller No. 6 told her that someone got the passbook but she could not remembe
r to whom she gave it to. Failing to g retrieve the passbook, Macaraya returned
to LC Diaz and reported the matter. The next day, L.C. Diaz CEO, Luis Diaz, calle
d up the bank to stop any transaction involving the stolen passbook. Diaz learne
d that an unauthorized withdrawal of 300,000 was made on same day the passbook w
as stolen. The withdrawal slip bore the signatures of authorized signatories, wh
o denied signing the same. A certain Noel Tamayo received the PhP300,000. In 199
2, Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of his money. The trial court ruled i
n favor of the bank, saying that possession of the passbook raises the presumpti
on of ownership and payments made upon production of the passbook shall have the
same effect as if made to the depositor. Noel Tamayo, at the time of the withdr
awal, had possession of the passbook and the withdrawal slip which bore signatur
es matching the specimen signatures in the bank. The trial court, using the rule
s on contractual obligations, said that the bank acted with care and observed th
e rules on savings account when it allowed the withdrawal , concluding that Diazs

negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. The Court of Appeals reversed,
saying that the teller of the bank should have been more careful in allowing the
withdrawal. It said that although L.C. Diaz was negligent in allowing a messeng
er to make its deposits and said messenger left the passbook, by applying the la
st clear chance doctrine, the proximate cause of the loss is attributable to the
bank. Issue: Is the last clear chance doctrine applicable in this case? Who is
the proximate cause of the loss? Held: The rules on simple loan or mutuum apply
in this case, hence, the bank was liable for breach of contract and not by virtu
e of a quasi-delict. Accordingly, the negligence of the bank is classified as Cu
lpa contractual AND NOT Culpa Aquilana, and therefore, the Last clear chance doc
trine is inapplicable. Because of a banks nature of business, a fiduciary relatio
nship is deemed written into every deposit agreement. This imposes a higher degr
ee of diligence than a good father of a family. While this does not convert the co
ntract into a trust agreement, the law requires of banks a higher standard of in
tegrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the contract. Wh
ile the passbook is in the banks hands, the law imposes a high degree of diligenc
e in safeguarding the passbook. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves
breach on the part of the defendant, there is the presumption that the latter wa
s negligent or at fault. The burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he was
not negligent. But in culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
the defendants negligence. Tellers must return the passbook only to the depositor
or his authorized representative. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its e
mployees under the principle of respondeat superior. And the defense of exercisi
ng the diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete
defense in culpa contractual unlike in culpa aquiliana. Had the passbook not fa
llen into the hands of the impostor, the loss would not have occurred. Hence, th
e proximate cause of the loss the banks negligence in not returning the passbook
to Calapre. But L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a wi
thdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an
impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
ENGADA vs. CA
G.R. No. 140698 (June 20, 2003) FACTS: On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in th
e afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloi
lo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. The Tam
araw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pickup, driven by Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamara
w, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to
its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on
collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swer
ved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up col
lided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. Th
e impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. S
eyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred P13
0,000 in medical expenses. ISSUES 1. Whether or not the Last Clear Chance doctri
ne is applicable in favor of Engada. HELD: No. It is a settled rule that a drive
r abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he shou
ld not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For failing to observe the duty of
diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their lane, petitio
ner must be held liable. Edwin Iran could not be faulted when, in his attempt to
avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.

liable. Edwin Iran could not be faulted when, in his attempt to avoid the pick-u
p, he swerved to his left. Engadas acts placed Iran in an emergency situation whi
ch forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situ
ation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best me
ans that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligen
ce if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Th
e doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chan
ce or opportunity to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of hi
s opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the
accident. However, the doctrine cannot be interposed in cases where the emergenc
y rule applies. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid Engadas pickup, which was
already on a head-on path towards Irans Tamaraw jeepney. No convincing proof was
adduced by Engada that Iran could have avoided a headon collision.
Strict liability
Vestil vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74431 (November 6, 1989) Facts: On July 29, 1975, Theness Tan Uy was bi
tten by a dog while she was playing with a child of Purita and Agustin Vestil in
the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita. Thenese was rushed
to the Hospital, where she was treated for "multipte lacerated wounds on the fo
rehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine d
ays but was readmitted a week later due to "vomiting of saliva." On August 15, 1
975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.Thene
ss developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and
asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies, which ultimately caused h
er death. The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable as the
possessors of the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Uys cl
aim that the Vestils are liable for the death of Theness, since they own the dog
that bit her. While the Vestils contend that the dog belonged to the deceased V
icente Miranda, and that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had w
itnessed it bite Theness. Issue: Whether or not the Vestils are liable for the d
amage caused by the dog. Held: ART. 2183 states The possessor of an animal or who
ever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case
the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who ha
s suffered damage. The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is no
t based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor
or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on t
he principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, p
leasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. While
it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part
of Vicente Mirandas estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. The Vestils contention that
they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptab
le. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if t
he animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it
does not matter either that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the chil
d into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers eve
n tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the belated allegations that Th
eness provoked the dog, the Vestils forget that the deceased was only three year
s old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she mi
ght have done to the animal. There is evidence showing that Theness and her fami
ly regularly went to the house of the Vestils once or twice a week. The Court fi
nds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has bee
n satisfactorily established. The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civi
l Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of th
e possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equ
ity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for hi
s utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may

cause.
Things thrown from a building
Dingcong vs. Kanaan
G.R. No. L-47033 (April 25, 1941) Facts: The Dingcong brothers leased the upper
floor of house owned by Emilia Saenz, where they established and managed the Cen
tral Hotel. A guest by the name of Francisco Echivarria occupied Room No. 10 of
the hotel for P30. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor the hous
e of Saenz and where they established a store named "American Bazaar" dedicated
to the buy and sell of articles and merchandise. Echivarria, before going to bed
, let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs. A bu
cket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water, but s
till the bucket overflowed. Water seeped through the floor and the merchandise i
n the bazaar below got wet and caused damages worth around P1,000.00 (considerab
le amount in 1941). The Kanaans brought an action for damages against the manage
rs, the brothers Dingcong, and Echivarria. During trial one of the Dingcong brot
hers died, but suit continued against the surviving Dingcong. Issue: Whether or
not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages. Held: Francis
co Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who, by his negligen
ce in leaving the faucet open, caused the water to spill on the ground and wet t
he articles and merchandise of the Kanaans. Jose Dingcong, the surviving co-rent
er and manager of the hotel, had complete possession of the house, and consequen
tly must also be responsible for the damages caused. As a co-lessee and manager
of the hotel, the Dingcongs have to answer for the damage caused by things that
thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil). The Dingcongs
likewise failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prev
ent the damages. They knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, as man
agers, they should have presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet,
but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks.
Death/Injuries in the course of employment
Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Company
58 PHIL 14 (March 6, 1933)

Facts: Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Compa
ny in the district of San Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City
of Manila. He was supposedly residing in his district according to the records
of the company. His compensation was on a commission basis of eight percent on a
ll collections made by him. One Sunday, Leopoldo, while riding a bicycle, was ra
n over and killed in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. I
t appears that Leopoldo had moved to Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notify
ing the company and that at the time of his death he was returning home after ma
king some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of t
he company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliv
er the amount collected to the company the next morning. The widow and children
of Leopoldo brought an action to recover from Singer under Act No. 3428 (Workmens
Compensation Act) Issue: May the heirs of Leopoldo recover from the corporation
considering the nature of his employment and the manner of the injury? Held: No
. The accident which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in purs
uance of his employment. At the time that he was run over by the truck, Leopoldo
was not in pursuance of his employment, but was on his way home after he had fi
nished his work for the day and left the territory where he was authorized to ma
ke collections for the defendant. The employer is not an insurer "against all ac
cidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the e
mployment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from pe
rsonal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or re
turning from his place of employment, because such an accident DOES NOT arise ou
t of and in the course of his employment. "The words arising out of refer to t
he origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while
the words in the course of refer to the time, place, and circumstances under w
hich the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intentio
n of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental inju
ries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, bu
t only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to th
e NATURE of the work in the scope of the workmans employment or incidental to s
uch employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to som
e risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason
of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally ex
posed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are
excluded. Furthermore, it appears that the deceased had never notified the defen
dant corporation of his change of residence from San Francisco del Monte to Mani
la, and that the company did not know that he was living in Manila on the day of
the accident. Neither does the company did not require its employees to work on
Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to use bicycles. These are additional
reasons for holding that the accident was not due to and in pursuance of the emp
loyment of the deceased. If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from Sa
n Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use of a bicycle in going back and f
orth, he did so at his own risk, as the company did not furnish him a bicycle or
require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so
in pursuance of his employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury su
stained by him.
Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Ca
G.R.No. 110295 (October 18, 1993) Facts: Lydia Geronimo is the proprietress of a
school canteen. On August 12, 1989, a group of parents complained before Geroni
mo that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that their
children bought from her store. Geronimo examined her stock and found that ther
e were indeed fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bo
ttles to the Department of Health Regional Office and was informed that the soda
samples she sent were adulterated. Because of this, the canteen had to close do
wn due to the big drop in its sales of soft drinks. On Geronimo filed a complain
t for damages against Coca cola. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Accordi
ng to Coca-Cola, under the law on sales on breach of warranty, more particularly

Article 1561 , the action should have been brought within six months from the d
elivery of the goods. Coca cola moved to dismiss on the basis of failure to exha
ust all administrative remedies and prescription. It contends that the existence
of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from the contract of sal
e) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since Geronimos caus
e of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should ha
ve been filed within six months from delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Art
icle 1571 of the Civil Code. Geronimo claims that the cause of action is based o
n injury to her right and can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1
146 of the civil code.
Issue: Has
the action prescribed? Can Geronimos action based on quasi-delict exist despite t
he pre-existing contract of sale?
Held: While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties ma
y, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liab
ility may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which break
s the contract may also be a quasi-delict. In Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands," this Court stated: "We have repeatedly held, however, that the existe
nce of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by t
he one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed
, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus
, in Air France vs. Carrascosa, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his
first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodatio
n and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to
recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters pa
rt, for, although the relation between the passenger and a carrier is contractua
l both in origin and nature x x x the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort. Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the
presence of contractual relations. Therefore, Geronimo has four years to file th
e case, reckoned from the time the cause of action accrued.
Interference of Contractual Relations
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, et al.
29 Phil 542 (February 18, 1915) Facts: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gi
lchrist was the owner of a theatre in Iloilo. They entered into a contract where
by Cuddy leased to Gilchrist a movie entitled Zigomar for exhibition in his theatr
e for a week for PhP125. Days before the delivering the film, Cuddy returned the
money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to cinema owners
Espejo and Zaldarriaga, who offered to pay a higher price for lease of the film.
Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance with prayer for damages against
Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. Issue: Whether such acts of Espejo and Zaldariag
a were actionable and if so under what legal principle. Can Espejo and Zaldariag
a their lack of evil motive use as defense by alleging that their intention was
purely for business?

Held: The only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract o
n the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the fil
m in their theater.There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does no
t relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and cau
sing its breach. Hence, they are liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by t
heir acts. The liability of the Espejo and Zaldriagga arises from unlawful acts
and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligation to i
nduce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gil
christ had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, bo
ok 4 of the Civil Code. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by
act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, s
hall be obliged to repair the damage so done. There is nothing in this article w
hich requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he
must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chap
ter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is requir
ed in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
So Ping Bun vs. CA
GR No. 120554 (September 21, 1999) FACTS: In 1963, Tek hua Trading, through its
Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a lease agreement with Dee C. Chuan
& Sons Inc. (DCCSI ) covering four stalls in Binondo. The terms of the contract
were initially for one year but after its expiry, they continued on a month to m
onth basis. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading was dissolved with the original members for
ming a new corporation named Tek Hua Enterprises, with Manuel Tiong as one of th
e incorporators. So Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok (Mana
ging director of defunct Tek Hua Trading), occupied the same stalls for his own
textile business under the name, Trendsetter Marketing. In 1989, the lessor, DCC
SI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises advising that it will be increasing rent.
Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts for signing. While the letter
s contained a statement that the leases will be terminated if the contracts were
not signed, the same were not rescinded. In 1991, Manuel Tiong (incorporator of
Tek Hua Enterrises) wrote a letter to So Ping Bun asking him to vacate the four
stalls:
Dear Mr. So, Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades w
ith your late grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I a
llowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for se
veral years to generate your personal business. Since I decided to go back into
textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my stocks. Therefore, pleas
e be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse.
You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons
that you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measu
re to protect my interest. Please give this urgent matter your preferential atte
ntion to avoid inconvenience on your part.
But instead of vacating the stalls, So Ping Bun was able to secure lease agreeme
nts in favor Trendsetter Marketing from D.C. Chuan. Tek Hua Enterprises filed a
suit for injunction and pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts bet
ween DCCSI and So Ping Bun and as well prayed for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not
So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous interference of contract. HELD: Yes. The ele
ments of tort interference are (a) existence of a valid contract (b) knowledge o
n the part of the third party of its existence (c) interference of the third par
ty is without legal justification or excuse. Since there were existing lease con
tracts between DCCI and Tek Hua Enterprises, the latter had property rights over
the leased stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DCCSI to execute the con
tracts in their favor was unlawful interference. As to the question of whether t
he interference may be justified, the Supreme Court stated that it is sufficient
that So Ping Buns conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wron
gful motives to conclude. Nothing on the record imputes deliberate wrongful moti
ves or malice on the part of So Ping Bun. Hence, while there is tortuous interfe
rence, this lack of malice precludes the award of damages. But while the lower c

ourts did not award damages. It does not relieve petitioner of the legal liabili
ty for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The Court of
Appeals correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the l
ease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages
. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by p
etitioners interference. But due to So Ping Buns action of interference, Tek Hua w
as forced to seek relief through the Court and thereby incur expenses to protect
his interests. Attorneys fees are in order.
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan
171 SCRA 382 (Mar 21, 1989) Facts: Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was
about to board a tricycle along a sidewalk when she accidentally fell into a ma
nhole that was partially covered by a concrete flower pot leaving a gaping hole
about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide and 150 cm deep. Florentina suffered a fracture o
n her right leg and as result thereof, had to be hospitalized. Florentina averre
d that she suffered mental and physical pain, and that she has difficulty in loc
omotion. She became incapable of reporting for duty within quite some time and t
hus lost income. She also lost weight, and is no longer her former jovial self.
Florentina sued the City of Dagupan. The City contends that the manhole is owned
by the National and the sidewalk on which it is found is located in Perez Blvd.
, which was also under the supervision of the National Government. While the low
er court held the City of Dagupan liable, the appellate court reversed the rulin
g on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan
had "control or supervision" over the Boulevard, where the manhole is located.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages? Ruling: Yes. Th
e City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public corporations fo
r damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by reason of the defecti
ve condition of roads is expressed in the Art. 2189 of Civil Code, which states:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death o
f, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of r
oads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their con
trol or supervision.
For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the defective road or stre
et to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires th
at either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter
of Dagupan City and is exercised through the City Engineer. This function of sup
ervision over streets, public buildings, and other public works is coursed throu
gh a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these last two off
icials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City
of Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the Ci
ty Engineer. The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable fo
r damages or injuries sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any
city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot be used to exempt
the city from liability. The charter only lays down general rules regulating th
e liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to
the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other publi
c works.
Liability of Governmental Units
Worcester vs. Ocampo
22 PHIL 42 (Feb. 27, 1912) Facts: Plaintiff, a former member of the Civil Commis
sion and Secretary of the Interior of the Insular Government, commenced an actio
n against the writers, owners, directors, editors and administrators of the news
paper "El Renacimiento (Muling Pagsilang) for recovery of damages resulting from
an alleged libelous editorial. Worcester alleged that the article attacked his i
ntegrity and reputation while he was in office. The editorial "BIRDS OF PREY was
in the form of a blind-item which though not directly pointing to the plaintiff
was alleged to charge the latter with malfeasance in office and criminal acts; w
ith the prostitution of his office for personal ends; with wasting public funds
for the purpose of promoting his personal welfare; with the violation of the law
s of the Philippine Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with takin
g part in illegal combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the o
bject of gain for himself and for others; and lastly with being "a bird of prey,
which, for Worcester, alluded to him as an eagle that surprises and devours, a v
ulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten meat, an owl that affects a petula
nt omniscience, and a vampire that sucks the blood of the victim until he leaves
it bloodless. After trial, the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in favor of W
orcester, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and Liquete who
were found to be in asubordinate position and found to have merely acted under t
he direction of their superiors) liable jointly and severally for moral and puni
tive damages Defendants contend that the editorial "Birds of Prey" does not refe
r to a determinate person; and that, conceding that it does refer to the plainti
ff, none of the defendants, except Teodoro M. Kalaw, chief editor or director is
responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of the alleged libelous a
rticle of the damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom. Issue: Whether or no
t the defendants are jointly and severally liable.] Held:Yes. Joint tortfeasors
are all the persons whocommand, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenan
ce, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it aft
er it is done, if done for their benefit. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and seve
rally liable for the tort which they commit. They are each liable as principals,
to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves. The defendants may have been sued separately for the commission

of the tort or as it were here, might be sued jointly and severally. It is not
necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. The person inj
ured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the wh
ole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It
is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrong
ful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that
his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the ot
hers. Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportio
ned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist paying an aliquot pa
rt. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
J. H. Chapman vs. James M. Underwood
27 Phil 374 (March 28, 1914) Facts: J.H. Chapman visited a man by the name of Cr
eveling, in front of whose house the accident occurred. Chapman wanted to board
a certain "San Marcelino" single-track street-car coming from Santa Ana and boun
d for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he hurriedly
, passed from the gate of Crevelings home into the street for the purpose of sign
aling and boarding the car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from th
e front or the rear platform. Chapman attempted to board the front platform but,
seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion, stopped beside the ca
r, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come within reach for h
im to board. While in this position, he was struck from behind and run over by U
nderwoods automobile. Immediately prior to the incident, Underwoods automobile, wh
ich was being driven by his chauffeur, followed behind a street car from Manila
bound to Santa Ana (Opposite direction of the San Marcelino street-car that Chapma
n wanted to board). Just before reaching the scene of the accident, the street c
ar being followed by Underwood took the switched off the main line to the left.
Thereupon, Underwoods automobile no longer followed that street-car nor went to t
he left, but either kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to
the right. The street-car which the Chapman intended to board was on the main l
ine and bound in an opposite direction. When the front of the "San Marcelino" ca
r (the one which plaintiff attempted to board) was almost in front of Underwoods
automobile, the latters driver suddenly went to the right striking and running ov
er Chapman. The trial court rendered decision in favor of the defendant. Issue:
Is defendant liable in the case at bar? Held: A careful examination of the recor
d leads to the conclusion that the Underwoods driver was guilty of negligence in
running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an incoming car upon the wro
ng side. The plaintiff, out to board the car, was not obliged to observe whether
a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against thos
e coming from the right. He knew that, according to the law of the road, no auto
mobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon his side of the ca
r. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only
ones under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car. Underwoo
d, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the facts
and circumstances of this case. As stated in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 P
hil. Rep., 663), the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article
1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. The ow
ner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for examp
le, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he
has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both cri
minally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On t
he other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the own
er having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injur
es a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although
present therein at the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either ci
villy or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the pr
esence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his acquiescence
, makes his drivers act his own. In this case, it DOES NOT appear that, from th
e time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to the commission of the i
njury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correc

t the act of his driver. Instead, it appears that the interval between the turni
ng out to meet and pass the street car and the happening of the accident was so
small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the dri
ver.

so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the

driver.
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968 Facts: On March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E
. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village, Marcial Caedo wa
s driving his Mercury car. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daught
ers. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with hi
s driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to
Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly
moderate speeds, their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahea
d of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by Pedro B
autista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled
around the rigs vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pe
dros son, Julian Bautista. Bernardo tried to overtake the carretela, instead of
slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until the lane was clear. Its rea
r bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose, and the car sk
idded to the other lane. Caedo tried to avoid the collision at the last moment b
y going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. Caedo and his family members
were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. Th
e CFI Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defenda
nts, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo.
ISSUE: Is Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, solidarily liable with the driv
er?

HELD:

No. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his dri
ver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due dilige
nce, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negli
gent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regul
ations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the drivers negligen
ce, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could
have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The basis of the ma
sters liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relation
ship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the serva
nt, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects
his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or dama
ge. In the present case the defendants evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had bee
n Yu Khe Thais driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo S
ons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he ha
d no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for havi
ng employed him at all may be imputed to his master. The time element was such t
hat there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks invo
lved and warn the driver accordingly. The law does not require that a person mus
t possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of d
riving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.
The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omissio
n to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in orde
r to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum
level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the la

w to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional dr

ivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers
services, would be effectively proscribed.
Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-62988 (February 28, 1985) Facts: Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a
vehicular collision. The collision took place on January 18, 1970, at the go-kar
t practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were the g
o-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by
Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no drivers license. Lunas heirs br
ought a suit for damages against Luis and his father, Jose dela Rosa at the CFI
Manila. The dela Rosas were sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, to the heir
s the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00
as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with
legal interest from the date of this decision; plus attorneys fees in the sum o
f P50,000.00, and the costs of suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. However, upon a motion for reconsideratio
n filed by the dela Rosa, the CA reduced the unearned net earnings to P450,000.0
0. ISSUES: (1) Did the court err in reducing the amount of unearned income? (2)
Should the award for attorneys fees have legal interest? HELD: (1)The award of
P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R.
Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was
P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual p
ersonal expenses. The CA sustained the trial courts conclusion with respect to
Lunas life expectancy of 30 years and his annual income and expense. In reducing
Lunas life expectancy from 30 to 10 years, the CA said that his habit and manne
r of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car rac
ing as a sport both here and abroad - a dangerous and risky activity tending to
shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged in car racing is not based on
any evidence on record. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct
statement but then go-kart racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for
go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger th
an foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error on the part of the Court
of Appeals to have disturbed the determination of the trial court which it had
previously affirmed. Similarly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce
the net annual income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses
but without at the same time increasing his annual gross income. It stands to r
eason that if his annual personal expenses should increase because of the "escal
ating price of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Lunas social standi
ng" [a statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to su
ppose that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources there
of.

(2) Yes. The attorneys fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-d
elict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be adjudicat
ed at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As with the othe
r damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date of the trial co
urts decision.
Vicarious liability of Parents
Exconde vs .Capuno
G.R. No. L-10134 (June 29, 1957) Facts: Dante Capuno, the 15 year old minor son
of Delfin Capuno and Boy Scout Organization member, attended a parade upon the i
nstruction of the City schools supervisor. Dante, with other students, boarded a
jeep and drove the same when it ran with the driver in his left. Shortly after,
Dante sent the jeep tumbling, killing two of its passengers. Issue: Whether or n
ot the father is liable for the acts of his son in a parade? Held: Yes. The civi
l liability imposed upon the father and mother for any damages that may be cause
d by the minor children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority the
y exercise over them, which imposes upon parents the duty of supporting them, kee
ping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means, while, on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish
them in moderation. The only way to relieve them is if they prove that they exer
cised all the diligence of a good father of a family. This defendant failed to d
o.
Salen vs Balce
G.R.No. L-14414 (April 27 1960) Facts: Gumersindo Balce, 14 years old, was convi
cted of homicide and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the am
ount of P2,000. The amount was not realized by the heirs after execution because
Gumersido had no property in his name so they demanded the father of the minor
to indemnify them. Issue: Whether or not the father is liable for obligations ar
ising from criminal acts? Held: Yes. While the court agrees with the theory that
, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime shall be governed by the p
rovisions of the Revised Penal Code, it disagrees with the contention that the s
ubsidiary liability of persons for acts of those who are under their custody sho
uld likewise be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision g
overning the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right witho
ut any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uph
old the theory of appellee as sustained by the trial court. A minor over 15 who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason th
e Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand c
onvicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civ
il Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinen
t portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or incapacity
, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children who lived
in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant ca
se because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obl
igations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that
while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.

FUELLAS v CADANO
G.R. No. 14409 (October 31, 1961) Facts: Rico Fuellas took the pencil of one of
his classmates. Pepito returned the pencil which angered Rico who then held Pepi
tos neck and pushed him on the floor. Their teacher separated them and ordered th
em to go home. Rico met Pepito outside and repeated what he did earlier which br
oke Pepitos right arm. Rico was later convicted for intentional felony with disce
rnment,and his father held subsidiarily liable for damages. Issue: Whether or no
t the father is liable should his minor child act with discernment in a criminal

offense? Held: Yes. Since Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code is silent as to
the subsidiary liability in case a minor child acts with discernment and become
criminally liable so the resort should be referring to the general law which is
the Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his death or in
capacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children w
ho live in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the ins
tant case because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and
not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdit
y that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother ma
y stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liabilit
y would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.
Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 34840 (September 23, 1931) Facts: Bonifacio Gutierrez, the 18 y/o son o
f Manuel Gutierrez, was driving the family car with other family members overly
speeding while approaching a bridge which caused an accident with a passenger bu
s injuring Narcisso Gutierrez (not related to Bonifacio and Manuel). It was late
r held that Bonifacio is incompetent to drive. Issue: Is the father liable for t
he act of his son? Held: Yes. The theory of the law is that the running of the m
achine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the scope of th
e owners business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because
of the relationship of master and servant.

Rodriguez-Luna v IAC
135 SCRA 241 (1985) Facts: Luis dela Rosa, 13 years of age and without a drivers
license, at that time while driving a Toyota car negligently killed Roberto Luna
who was driving a Go-Kart in a practice run. Later, Luis already became of age,
married, with two children, and living in Madrid says that he has no properties
so a writ of execution cannot be enforced against him. Issue: May the father st
ill be held liable despite the attainment of majority by his son at the time the
decision was promulgated? Held: Yes. Notwithstanding emancipation, he is still
liable but as a matter of equity, the liability shall become merely subsidiary.
Cuadra vs. Monfort
35 SCRA 160 (1970) Facts:Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13 years
old, together with three other classmates were assigned to weed the grass in the
school premises. Monfort pulled a prank to scare Cuadra by throwing a plastic h
eadband at her face and making it appear that it was an earthworm. Unfortunately
, the headband hit Cuadras right eye, blinding the same. Issue: Is the father lia
ble for his daughters acts? Held: No. In the present case there is nothing from w
hich it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by th
e observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of hi
s parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused
it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her
and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and s
upervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was con
cerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less
guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait
in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and
for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
Libi v. IAC
214 SCRA 16 (1990) Facts: Wendell Libi, minor, was dumped by his sweetheart Juli
e Anne after the latter found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie refused, prom
pting him to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann sta
yed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso. Later, Wendell took the key
of deposit box, opened it and, and took the gun stored inside. The gun belongs t
o his father, an agent of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). Wendell w
ent to his ex-sweetheart, killed her and then committed suicide using the same g
un. The parents of Julie Anne sued the parents of Wendell for damages. The Libis
contend that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antago
nized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Nar
cotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells death and then shot Julie Ann to
eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification. Issue: Is the father lia
ble for Wendells acts? Held: Yes. The father of Wendell did not exercise due dili
gence when he did not prevent the kid from having access to the key which opens
his safety deposit box. The court did not give credence to the story of the Libi
s. Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi,
owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroo
m. Each of the Wendells parents holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita
s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have
never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, th
at on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. In vie
w of these circumstances, it can be deduced that the spouses Libi have not exerc
ised the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun
away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the s
afety deposit box was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the
bag of his mother where the other key was.
Tamargo vs CA
G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992. Facts: A case based on quasi-delict was filed agai

nst the natural parents of Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, who shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle which caused her death. Prior to the incident, Adelberto has b
een the subject of adoption proceedings filed by Rapisura spouses and after the
incident, the same was granted. In the Bundocs answer, they said that the Rapisur
as are the ones who should be liable since parental authority had shifted to the
adopting parents from the moment a successful petition was filed. Issue: Who sh
ould be liable for the minors acts? Held: Parental authority is not retroactively
transferred to the adopting parents especially with regard to quasi-delicts. Th
e New Civil Code states that, The father and the mother, are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The basis of th
e vicarious liability rests upon the negligence in the obligation to supervise a
nd control the minor, and since the ones exercising parental authority and had p
hysical custody pending the adoption proceedings are still the natural parents o
ver the child, they should be the ones liable for any damage caused.
Vicarious liability of teachers and heads of institutions

Vicarious liability of teachers and heads of institutions

Mercado vs. CA
G.R. No. L-14342, May 30, 1960 Facts: Manuel Quisimbing, Jr., son of private res
pondents Ana and Manuel, Sr., was the classmate of Augusto Mercado in the Lourde
s School of Kanlaon, Q.C. A melee ensued between the two on account of the latte
rs (Augusto Mercado) pitogo, an empty nutshell used by children as a coin bank. The
said coin bank was lent several times. As Mercado attempted to obtain the same,
Manuel Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain
into the holes of the "pitogo". The fight started thereafter. Augusto gave succ
essive blows to Manuel, Jr., and as he clutched his stomach, which bore the brun
t of Augustos anger, Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a razor. Private r
espondents went to court asking for moral damages on account of a) the wound inf
licted by Augusto Mercado (2,000) , and b) moral damages due to the mental angui
sh of seeing their son wounded (3,000). Although originally dismissed by the CFI
of Manila, on appeal, judgment was rendered in favor of respondents, ordering p
etitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages and P50 as medical expenses. Petitioner
argues that since the infliction of the wound occurred in a Catholic School (du
ring recess time), through no fault of the father, petitioner herein, the teache
r or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the latter. Furthe
r, they claim that the award of moral damages was excessive. Issue: To whom does
responsibility over the childs actions pass to, the teacher or the parent? Was t
he award of moral damages excessive? Held: As to the first issue, the Supreme Co
urt held in Exconde vs. Capuno and Capuno that responsibility over the childs act
ions must pass to the teacher. However, this provision only applies to an instit
ution of arts and trades not to an academic educational institution. Further, up
on reading the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it would be see
m that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," contemplates a situ
ation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that control, dire
ction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. Such a situati
on does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.
Similarly, paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsibl
e for the damages caused by their minor children, cannot apply. The claim of pet
itioner that responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held t
o be without merit. As to the amount of moral damages, the Court held that while
moral damages included physical suffering, the decision of the court below does
not declare that any of the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code i
n which moral damages may be recovered, has attended or occasioned the physical
injury. The only possible circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages
are recoverable would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been commi
tted. It does not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever p
resented. Further, the offender was nine years old and did not appear to have ac
ted with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries on Manuel Quisumbin
g, Jr. Further, even if we assume that the CA considered Mercado guilty of a qua
si-delict when it imposed moral damages, the facts found by said court indicate
that Augustos resentment, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried
to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo fro
m Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury cau
sed to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or negligence for having interfered
with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy.
Palisoc vs. CA
G.R. No. L-29025 (October 4, 1971) Facts: Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Vi
rgilio L. Daffon were classmates and, together with another classmate Desiderio
Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the c
lasses were in recess, Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador
Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that
Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slight
ly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow o
n the face, followed by other fist blows to the stomach. Palisoc retreated, but

Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine
block causing him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First
aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken
to a hospital. He never regained consciousness. Trial ensued, with the trial co
urt giving credence to Cruzs version of the incident. The trial court found defen
dant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It
held that "(T)he act of Daffon in giving the deceased strong fist blows in the
stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls within the
purview of this article of the Code." The trial court, however, absolved from l
iability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute,
holding that Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply, as decided in Merca
do v. CA. Defendant was ordered to pay a) 6,000 for the death of Palisoc, b) 3,3
75 as actual and compensatory damages, c) 5,000 as moral damages, d) 10,000 for
loss of earning capacity and e) 2,000 as attorneys fees. Appeal is raised on a pu
rely legal question. Issue: Did the trial court err in absolving the defendantsschool officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable with defen
dant Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a result of their sons death? Held
: Yes. The Court ruled that the lower courts decision to absolve was based on Mer
cado v. CA, which was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exc
onde vs. Capuno, The dictum in such earlier case that "It is true that under the
law above-quoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any d
amage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody,
but this applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic ed
ucational institution." The case at hand was instituted directly against the sch
ool officials and squarely raises the issue of liability of teachers and heads o
f schools under Article 2180, Civil Code, for damages caused by their pupils and
students against fellow students on the school premises. There is no question,
either, that the school involved is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical
Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school. With th
is in mind, the Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head
and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute ( Valenton and Quibulue, respectiv
ely) are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for t
he death of the latters minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the schoo
ls laboratory room. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the pr
otective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for
that of the parents. It becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whol
e time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody f
rom dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on the
ir fellow students. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liab
ility to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in M
ercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have be
en set aside by the present decision.
Amadora vs. CA
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Facts: Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and whi
le in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. Daffon wa
s convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, a civil action f
or damages was filed against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the h
igh school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with D
affon and two other students, through their respective parents. The Court of App
eals, in reversing the CFIs decision, found that Article 2180 was not applicable
as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already e

nded, that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun and that in any ev
ent the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injur
y. The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the cus
tody of the private respondents.

Earlier, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose Gumban an u
nlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the pri
ncipal or taking any further action. As Gumban was one of the companions of Daff
on when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo, petitioners contend that t
his was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that their son
would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. Issues: Does
Article 2180 apply only to cases of tort which occur in schools of arts and trad
es? When is a student said to be in the custody of the school? Held: The Court hel
d that Article 2180 should apply to all schools regardless of its academic or no
n-academic status, since there is no substantial difference between the two inso
far as supervision, advice and insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. This is in line with the dissenting opinion penned by Justice JBL Rey
es in Exconde v. Capuno. The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance
should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature o
f their respective schools. No plausible reason exists for relaxing that vigilan
ce simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigil
ance where the school is non-academic. The teacher certainly should not be able
to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school wh
ere, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school were non-aca
demic. Further, following reddendo singgula singulis, in reading the provision, t
eachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establish
ments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices." The latter can be traced fr
om history, back when schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of
artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed the
m on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts an
d trades was such, a master, and was personally involved in the task of teaching
his students, who usually even boarded with him and came under his constant con
trol, supervision and influence. As regards the second issue, the Court held tha
t while the custody requirement does not mean that the student must be boarding
with the school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within t
he control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. The student is deemed to be in the custody of the scho
ol authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school an
d within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already end
ed. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pur
suance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate studen
t right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in th
e enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student continues.
Pasco vs. CFI
G.R. No. L-54357 (April 25, 1988)
Facts: On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner Pas
co, together with two companions, while walking inside the campus of the private
respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said university, was
accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis ali
as "Teng." Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petit
ioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized
at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to s
ave his life. Petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint
for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio A
raneta University which was docketed as Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was
impleaded as a party defendant based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Subseque
ntly, a motion to dismiss was filed by respondent school. Respondent court grant
ed the motion to dismiss, and likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsider
ation. Issue: Is the provision in the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civi
l Code equally applicable to academic institutions? Held: The court rules in the
negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads.
" Further, the court finds no necessity of discussing the applicability of the A

rticle to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) fo
r the issue in this petition. NOTE: Compare this with the immediately preceding
case.
YLarde vs. Aquino
G.R. No. L-33722 (July 29, 1988)
Facts: Supra Issue: Whether or not under Art. 2176 and 2180, both the teacher an
d the principal can be held liable for damages Held: As to the principal, he can
not be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of
an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. In line with the ruling
in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is onl
y the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable fo
r torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school
of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. So
riano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he hea
ds is an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearl
y admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give
any instruction regarding the digging. From the foregoing, it can be easily see
n that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Ci
vil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his sup
ervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent
any injury on their persons. However, petitioners base the alleged liability of
private respondent Aquino on Article 2176. Were there acts and omissions on the
part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have di
rect causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? The Court answered in the
affirmative. He is liable for damages. Clearly, private respondent Aquino acted
with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of service
s of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to
make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very h
azardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after the
y had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could b
e easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilou
s area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so
apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place wh
ere he would not be able to check on the childrens safety; and (5) left the chi
ldren close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. The contention
that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious
person is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would hav
e foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving th
em there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful hum
an being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is suff
icient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent t
o an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in
loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protecte
d from all harm in his company
Salvosa vs. IAC
G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 Facts: Within the premises of Baguio Colleges Fou
ndation (BFC), an academic institution, is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges Fou
ndation Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) Unit, which is under the fifth co
ntrol of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Jimmy B. Abon is its duly appointe
d armorer, who received his appointment from the AFP, and is not an employee of
the BCF. On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimm
y B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unl
icensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BC
F. Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of t
he crime of Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP. Castros heirs sued for
damages impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant Benjamin Sa
lvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive Vic

e President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and

Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges Foundation Inc. as party defen
dants. The trial court rendered decision sentencing Abon, Salvosa and BCF jointl
y and severally liable to the heirs of Castro.

defendants. The trial court rendered decision sentencing Abon, Salvosa and BCF j
ointly and severally liable to the heirs of Castro. ISSUE: Can Salvosa and the B
CF be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civ
il Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon?

HELD: No. Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teache
rs or heads of establishments of arts and trades are hable for "damages caused b
y their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their cust
ody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in
the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco paren
tis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise reasonable supervision
over the conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase used in [Art. 2180 so
long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and supervi
sory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils
and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including rec
ess time." In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the
school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced i
n the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporar
y adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call o
f his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area with
in which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises o
f a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "
protective and supervisory custody of the school, as contemplated in the law. J
immy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or
in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, peti
tioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

St. Francis High School vs. CA

G.R. No. 82465 (February 25, 1991)
Facts: Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis
High School, wanted to join a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class IC at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinands parents, spouses Dr. Romulo Cast
illo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son
to join but merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, wit
h the directive that he should go back home after doing so. Ferdinand went on wi
th them to the beach. During the picnic, one of the female teachers was apparent
ly drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but
in the process, Ferdinand drowned. The spouses Castillo filed a complaint agains
t St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosari
o Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves
, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for
Damages. The trial court decided against teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Arag
ones, Jaro and Cadiz, for failing to exercise the diligence required of them by
law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had foreseen. It dism
issed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin Illumin and Aurora
Cadorna for failing to show that they were responsible for Castillos death. On
appeal, the CA ruled that St. Francis HS and Illumin were liable under Art 2176
taken together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, who had satisfactorily explained why they we
re late in going to the picnic site were absolved of liability. ISSUES: (1) Were
the school and their teachers negligent? (2)Is Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2
176 of the New Civil Code is applicable? (3) Is the award of exemplary and moral
damages is proper? HELD: The school and the principle are neither guilty of the

ir own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them. They cannot b
e held liable for damages of any kind. Under Article 2180, par. 4, before an emp
loyer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in th
e performance of his assigned tasks. Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning o
f the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any ma
nner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application th
erefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any j
urisprudence. No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to
warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Arquio, class adviser
of I-C, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to pre
vent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
With these facts in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor
of respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds
to grant moral damages. Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, petitioner
s are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be asse
ssed against them. While it is true that respondents-spouses did give their cons
ent to their son to join the picnic, this does not mean that the petitioners wer
e already relieved of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good fat
her of a family in ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar,
petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence. H
ence, the claim for moral or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PSBA vs. CA
G.R. No. 84698 (February 4, 1992)
Facts: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 caused the death of Carlitos Bautis
ta while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Admin
istration (PSBA). His parents filed a suit in the RTC of Manila (Branch 47) pres
ided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for dama
ges against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death,
Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was esta
blished that his assailants were not members of the schools academic community
but were elements from outside the school. PSBA sought to have the suit dismisse
d, alleging that since they are being sued under Art 2180 of the Civil, the comp
laint lacks a cause of action because they, as an academic institution, were bey
ond the ambit of the rule . The courts denied the motion. ISSUE: Is the PSBA lia
ble under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code? HELD: Article 2180, in conju
nction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco pare
ntis. Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or i
nflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held
liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. This materia
l situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the as
sailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school co
uld be made liable. However, it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is exculpa
ted from liability. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment
, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligatio
ns which both parties are bound to comply with. The school undertakes to provide
the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with t
he necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the schools academic requirement
s and observe its rules and regulations. Because the circumstances of the presen
t case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows tha
t obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractua
l obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, wheth
er express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented the Court from
determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. Jurispr
udence indicates that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad fa

ith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as con
stituting a quasi-delict. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the
re is no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been brea
ched thru the formers negligence in

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, there is no finding that the
contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the formers neg
ligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court
to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could giv
e rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of C
angco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In
fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation
between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition
sine qua non to the schools liability. The negligence of the school cannot exi
st independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circums
tances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. As the proceedings have yet to c
ommence, only the trial court can make a determination of material facts.
Soliman vs. Tuason
G.R. No. 66207 (May 18, 1992) Facts: On 13 August 1982, Soliman, Jr., a regular
student of Republic Central Colleges (RCC), was in its campus ground and premise
s taking his morning classes. Jimmy B. Solomon, who was on said date and hour in
the premises of said school performing his duties and obligations as a duly app
ointed security guard under the employment, supervision and control of R.L. SECU
RITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin Serrano, shot Soliman on the abdomen w
ith a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustain
ed would have caused plaintiffs death were it not for the timely medical assist
ance given to him. Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages against private R
epublic Central Colleges, the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and Jimmy B. Solomon, a
security guard. RCC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that there was no cause o
f action against it, and that it is free from liability because RCC was not the
employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence was not respons
ible for any wrongful act of Solomon. They also argued that Article 2180, 7th pa
ragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers an
d heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their p
upils and students or apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the school. The court granted the motion to dism
iss.
ISSUE: Is RCC liable for damages? Held: Yes, but RCC is not liable under Article
2180 par. 5 of the Civil Code. RCC was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The e
mployer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was
the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is settled that wher
e the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watc
hmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches
to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. Like
wise, RCC is not liable under Article 2180 par 7. since there is no question tha
t Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he
being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., However, it does not
follow that RCC could not be held liable upon any other basis in law. In PSBA,
the Court held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a st
udent had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school
did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, howev
er, the Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established be
tween a school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the s
tudents who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligatio
ns for both parties. As PSBA states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortio
us in character may at the same time constitute breach of a contractual, or othe
r legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he suppose
d that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motio
n to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitio
ner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex lege o
n the part of respondent Colleges.

St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos

G.R. No. 143363 (February 6, 2002) Facts: From 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Marys
Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1
996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaig
ning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students rode a Mitsubishi jee
p owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Laraya
n, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
student of the same school. The jeep turned turtle. Sherwin died. Spouses Willia
m Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his p
arents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanuev
a and St. Marys Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City. The RTC
rendered judgment holding St. Marys Academy liable for damages, and the Daniels
subsidiarily liable. James Daniel II and Villanueva were absolved of liability
.
ISSUE: Is St. Marys Academy liable for damages? Held: No. Under Article 218 of
the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a mino
r child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, i
ts administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution eng
aged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies t
o all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the schoo
l, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to fie
ld trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the sc
hool premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 2
19 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages cau
sed by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their superv
ision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate
cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection
to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligen
ce of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim. The proximat
e cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, u
nbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without whi
ch the result would not have occurred. Considering it was the negligence of the m
inor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by V
illanueva which caused the accident, an event over which St. Marys Academy had no
control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, the school may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. Consequently, the sch
ool cannot be liable for moral damages. Though incapable of pecuniary computatio
n, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defend
ants wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the accident
was not attributable to petitioner.

the defendants wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate cause of the
accident was not attributable to petitioner. Incidentally, there was no questio
n that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never d
enied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of
any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehi
cle was being driven on the highways or streets.
Vicarious liability of owners and managers of establishments
Philippine Rabbit vs. Philippine American
G.R. No. L-25142 (March 25, 1975) Facts: In the complaint for damages filed by t
he Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda dro
ve recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along th
e national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by P
angalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of
the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not
be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting
to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The ca
se was dismissed based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-Americ
an Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued
for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the ma
nager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code. Issue:
Do the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterp
rise" (dueos o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 o
f the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of
a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted
in the vehicular accident from which the damage arose? Held: No. Those terms do
not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context o
f article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is us
ed in the sense of "employer". Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident alrea
dy mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of
his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. The bus company and its driver, in
their appellants brief, injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in
their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a bus
iness conduit of Balingit. That argument implies that the veil of corporate fict
ion should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and h
is wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. This issue was
not raised in the lower court. The legal issue, which Philippine Rabbit and Pang
alangan can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court
and which is within the issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules o
f Court).
Vicarious Liability of employers
Philtranco vs. CA
G.R. No. 120553 (June 17, 1997) Facts: The heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta instituted
n action against Philtranco. They alleged that on March 24, 1990, about 6:00 oc
lock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his easy rider bicycle along the
Gomez Street of Calbayog City. Philtranco Bus No. 4025 with plate No. EVA-725 d
riven by defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira, was being pushed by some person
s to start its engine. The engine started and continued running. It bumped Acues
ta and ran over him. Philtranco, on the other hand, alleged that Manilhig, warme
d up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calba
yog. While the bus was cruising along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking t
owards the same direction as the bus, suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerve
d left to the center of the road. The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that eve
n as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was bumped fr
om behind and run over by the bus. The trial court rendered judgment holding Phi

ltranco and Manilhig jointly and severally liable. The CA affirmed the trial cou
rts decision. Issues: (1) Is Article 2194, instead of Article 2180 of the Civil C
ode applicable, in other words, were Philtranco and Manilhig solidarily liable?
(2) Is the award of damages proper? Held: Yes. The case is action for damages ba
sed on quasi-delict under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code against petiti
oner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco, respectively. Under Artic
le 2194 of the Civil Code, the liability of the registered owner of a public ser
vice vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious
acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with th
e drive. Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
a quasi-delict is solidary. Since the employers liability is primary, direct a
nd solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is
to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or neglig
ence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Art. 2181. Whoever pay
s for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latt
er what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. The award of "P20
0,000.00 as death indemnity" not as compensation for loss of earning capacity. T
here is no evidence on the victims earning capacity and life expectancy. Only i
ndemnity for death under Article 2206 is due, which is fixed at P50,000.
Castilex vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 132266 (December 21, 1999) Facts: On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to
2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fue
nte Osmea Rotunda. Benjamin Abad was a manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial C
orporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794
. Abad drove the company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around th
e Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceedi
ng to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. The pick-up collided wit
h the

going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traf
fic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. The pickup collided with the motorcycle. Abad brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Ho
spital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital, where Vasquez subsequently died.
An action for damages was instituted. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and held Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex
Industrial Corporation jointly and solidarily liable for damages. The Court of A
ppeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable b
ut held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" wi
th the former. Issue: May the employer be held vicariously liable for the death
resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-iss
ued vehicle? Held: Castilex contends that the par. 5 of Article 2180 of the Civi
l Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in busin
ess or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and sellin
g furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, par. 4 shoul
d apply. This is not accurate. This court has applied par. 5 to cases where the
employer was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators and banks
. The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragr
aph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under par. 5 of Article 2180
, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for
the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it
is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done,
the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was act
ing within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was commit
ted. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the de
fense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. It is u
ndisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time
of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assi
gned task is a question of fact, which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals
resolved in the affirmative. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge pet
itioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it app
ears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employm
ent. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at th
e petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafte
r, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City, which is about seve
n kilometers away from petitioners place of business. It was when ABAD was leav
ing the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. ABAD was engaged in a
ffairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his du
ties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. Since there is lack of evid
ence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, pe
titioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and e
quity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequ
ences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
Filamer vs. IAC
G.R. No. 75112 (August 17, 1992) Facts: The private respondents, heirs of the la
te Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Cou
rt on October 16, 1990, which ruled that Filamer is not liable for the injuries
caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver f
or whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and tha
t Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an em
ployee of the petitioner. Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time jani
tor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an e
mployee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) ho
urs in the morning of each school day. Having a student drivers license, Funtec
ha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle w
hile the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. Allan Masa turned over t

he vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dange
rous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. A fast moving truck with glaring
lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a colli
sion. The Pinoy jeep hit Potenciano Kapunan.
Issue:

Is Filamer, Funtechas employer, liable?

Held: Yes. In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the directi
on of Allans house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was
not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but u
ltimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner sch
ool. Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer f
or which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing tha
t it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the
scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liabil
ity of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage. Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules im
plementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was prom
ulgated only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of th
e Labor Code on conditions of employment. It is merely a guide to the enforcemen
t of the substantive law on labor. The reliance on said rule is misplaced. An im
plementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liab
ility under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. There is evidence to s
how that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arisin
g from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omission
s are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exerci
se an absolute or limited control over (him)." Funtecha is an employee of petiti
oner Filamer. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting
within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of th
e burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on
its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision
over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the r
equired diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and A
llan.

FIlamer thus has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskil
led manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that
the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the s
upervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for
acts or omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Art
icle 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse again
st the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plai
ntiff.
NPC vs. CA
G.R. No. 119121 (August 14, 1998) Facts: On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4)
dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound
for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of the trucks w
ith plate no RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-oncollision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three (3)
persons riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen
other passengers. The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages agains
t NPC and PHESCO before the then CFI of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. The trial
court rendered a decision absolving NPC of any liability and holding PHESCO, Inc
. and Gavino Ilumba jointly and severally liable. On Appeal, the CA reversed the
trial courts decision and held that as Phesco is a labor only contractor, of Napoc
or the statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the
employer (Napocor) and the employee (driver Ilumba) of the labor only contractor
(Phesco). NPC is therefore liable and not Phesco. Issue: As between NPC and PHE
SCO, who is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck which figured in the
accident and which should, therefore, would be liable for damages to the victim
s? Held: Under the Memorandum, NPC had mandate to approve the "critical path net
work and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by PHESCO. Likewise, the manning s
chedule and pay scale of the workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmatio
n by NPC. Then too, it cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-cont
ract or lease, again NPCs concurrence is needed. Another consideration is that
even in the procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO, NPC
s favorable recommendation is still necessary before these tools and equipment c
an be purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide the money or funding that
will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. Furthermore, it must be emphasi
zed that the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of power ene
rgy facilities, is related to NPCs principal business of power generation. In s
um, NPCs control over PHESCO in matters concerning the performance of the latte
rs work is evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to wield such power to
be considered as the employer. Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that
PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only" contracting vis--vis NPC and as such, it is c
onsidered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an employeremployee relationship between the principal employer and the employees of the "l
abor-only" contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is respons
ible to the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had be
en directly employed by the principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a "laboronl
y" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-f
ated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic
that any person (the principal employer) who enters into an agreement with a jo
b contractor, either for the performance of a specified work or for the supply o
f manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of the latter. It is appar
ent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, as NPC argues, t
hat will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted b
y an injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the "labor only" c
ontractor. With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct employer, Article
2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and househol
d helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the forme
r are not engaged in any business or industry.

In this regard, NPCs liability is direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and
the driver. Of course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shal
l have recourse against PHESCO and the driver who committed the negligence which
gave rise to the action.
Light Rail Transit vs. Navidad
G.R. No. 145804 (February 6, 2003) Facts: On 14 October 1993, Nicanor Navidad, t
hen drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing
payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT t
racks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Nav
idad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued tha
t led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fig
ht started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad late
r fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, o
perated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the mo
ving train, and he was killed instantaneously. Nicanors widow filed a complaint f
or damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. T
he trial court rendered decision holding Prudent and Escartin jointly and severa
lly liable. On appeal, the CA exonerated Prudent from any liability and, instead
, held the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable.
Issue:

(1) Is LRTA liable? (2)Is Roman an employee of LRTA and also liable?
Held: (1)Yes. Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the
nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the d
uty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. The fou
ndation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to inde
mnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failur
e to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharg
e of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to
hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an inde
pendent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not re
lieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. Prudents liability
, If any, could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and relate
d provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Ar
ticle 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may a
rise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stat
ed differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have it
self constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract exist
ed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

However, the Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals t
hat "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for t
he reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly prove
n x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justifi
cation in our own review of the records of the case. (2) No. There being no show
ing that Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he mus
t also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between
the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Ro
man; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
Mckee vs. IAC
211 SCRA 517 (1992) Facts: Supra Issues: (1) Did Galangs negligence cause the col
lision? (2) Were Tayag and Manalo liable for damages? Held: Yes. The lower court
held that Jose Koh was negligent for improperly invading the lane of the truck.
This is unwarranted because it is manifest that no negligence can be imputed to
Koh. In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813) the Court held that:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act u
se that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would ha
ve used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
It is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable a
nd ordinary prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by s
werving the car away from where they were even if this would mean entering the o
pposite lane. The truck drivers negligence is apparent in the records. He himse
lf said that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along th
e bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometer
s per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic re
gulation. The truck drivers negligence was likewise duly established through th
e testimony of Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of
Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap. Clearly, therefore, it
was the truck drivers subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper meas
ures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the proximate
cause of the resulting accident. (2) Yes. It was the truck drivers negligence
in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was, in law, the
proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver, the private
respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily li
able for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows fr
om the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris ta
ntum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is that they exercised a
ll the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024 (1996) Facts: The petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela, was travel
ling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the dir
ection of Manila. Suddenly, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stop
ped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat
tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that
her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that cars c
ondition, she parked along the sidewalk. She was standing at the left side of th
e rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire
when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Ric
hard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. In he
r complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exe
mplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical and related expens
es amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings. Aft
er trial, the lower court sustained the plaintiffs submissions and found defend
ant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2
176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander Commercial, Inc.,

Lis employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 218
0. Issues: (1) Whether or not, the petitioner is guilty of contributory negligen
ce? (2) Whether or not, respondents employer, Alexander Commercial Inc, is liable
for the acts of its employee? RULING: (1) The SC ruled that the Valenzuela was
not guilty of contributory negligence. Valenzuela did exercise the standard reas
onably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed
to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one
of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidew
alk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she h
ad taken all reasonable precautions. (2) Likewise, the SC ruled that the relatio
nship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which ho
lds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in wh
ich the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercis
e the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the r
espondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in A
rticle 2180 of the Civil Code, hence, the court is of the opinion that Lis empl
oyer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage
caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
Vicarious liability of the State
E. Merritt vs Government Of The Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916 Facts: E. Merritt was riding on a motorcycle tra
velling at ten to twelve miles per hour when he collided with the General Hospit
al ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly

Facts: E. Merritt was riding on a motorcycle travelling at ten to twelve miles p

er hour when he collided with the General Hospital ambulance which turned sudden
ly and unexpectedly before reaching the center of the street and without soundin
g its whistle or horn in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act. The plaintiff suffe
red from fractures to the skull, material injury to the grey matter and brain an
d a broken right leg as a result of the collision. He was mentally and physicall
y impaired such that he lost his efficiency in constructing wooden buildings, wh
ich was his occupation. Act No. 2457 was enacted specifically to authorize E.Mer
ritt to bring suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for
the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is e
ntitled on account of said collision. The court found the chauffeur of the ambula
nce solely negligent and awarded plaintiff a total P14,741. Issue: Whether the G
overnment is legally liable for the damages resulting from the collision committ
ed by the agent or employee of the Government RULING: The SC increased the total
damages awarded to plaintiff to P18,075 since he was incapacitated for a period
of six months and not only for the time he remained confined in the hospital. T
he general rule is that the Government cannot be sued by an individual without i
ts consent. In accordance with Act No.2457, the plaintiff was authorized to brin
g action against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the colli
sion and to determine the amount of the damages, if any. However, Act No. 2457 d
oes not operate to extend the Governments liability to any cause not previously
recognized. According to the Civil Code Article 1903 (now Art 2180):
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not w
hen the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it perta
ined to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding arti
cle shall be applicable.
The responsibility of the state is limited to cases wherein it acts through a sp
ecial agent; a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or c
ommission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a specia
l official. This does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulate
d by law and the regulations. Therefore, the State is only liable for the acts o
f its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 (now Article 2180); and that the chauffeu
r of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent for which the S
tate is made liable.
Inocencio Rosete vs.The Auditor General
G.R. No. L-1120 (August 31, 1948) Facts: Inocencio Rosete and others filed a cla
im against the Government for damages caused to buildings belonging to the claim
ants, which were destroyed by fire from the contiguous warehouse of the Emergenc
y Control Administration, ECA, an office or agency of the Government. The fire w
as initiated by the reckless ignition of a cigarette-lighter by a certain Jose F
rayno y Panlilio near a five-gallon drum where gasoline was drained and stored i
n contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of Manila. The Insular Au
ditor denied or dismissed the claim of Rosete and others in the amount of P35,37
6. Issue:

Whether the government is liable for the damages sustained by the claimant under
article 1903 of the Civil Code (now Article 2180) ART. 1903. The obligation imp
osed by the preceding article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omis
sions but also for those persons for whom another is responsible.
Ruling: The pertinent provision reads as follows: The state is liable in the sce
ne when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have bee

n caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed,

in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable. The c
ourt citing Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands held that the state
is not liable for damages suffered by private individuals by government employe
es in the discharge of their responsibilities unless such act was committed by a
special agent, duly empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some
act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim. Since th
e officers of the ECA did not act as special agents and there is no negligence i
mputable to a special agent, the government is not liable for the damages result
ing from the negligence complained of. Act No. 327, authorizing the filing of cl
aims against the Government with the Insular Auditor, does not make any and all
claims against the Government allowable or the Government responsible for such c
laims.
Mendoza vs. De Leon, et al.
G.R. No. L-9596 February 11, 1916 Facts: Marcos Mendoza was the highest bidder f
or the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege in the municipality of Villasis, Pa
ngasinan, and was duly awarded the privilege under the provisions of Act No. 164
3 of the Philippine Commission. After a little more than a year, the municipal c
ouncil of Villasis, Pangasinan, through a resolution, awarded the franchise for
the same ferry to another person, forcibly ejecting Mendoza therefrom. The counc
il claimed that the ferry Mendoza was operating was not the one leased to him. M
endoza instituted an action for damages against the individual members of the Mu
nicipal Council. Issue: Whether the individual members of the Municipal Council
are liable to Mendoza for forcibly ejecting him from the leased ferry Ruling: A
municipality has a two-fold character of powers, namely governmental and proprie
tary. With respect to liability, numerous cases elucidate that the municipality
is liable for the acts of its officers and agents in the exercise of proprietary
or corporate powers, but it is not liable for the acts of its officers or agent
s in the performance of its governmental functions. Officers or agents of the Go
vernment charged with the performance of governmental duties are not liable for
the consequences of their official acts, unless they have acted willfully and ma
liciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury. In so far as its g
overnmental functions are concerned, a municipality is also not liable, unless e
xpressly made so by statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perform their
duties honestly and in good faith. But a municipality is not exempt from liabil
ity for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business fu
nctions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded
as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons
on contract or in tort is concerned. Mendoza had a vested right to the exclusiv
e operation of the ferry; and there is no evidence that there was justifiable re
ason for his eviction. The contention that Mendoza was operating a ferry that wa
s not leased to him is untenable since it was the vice-president himself who per
sonally placed him in possession thereof, a fact know to the council members. It
cannot be said that the councilors acted honestly for the interests of the muni
cipality. Therefore, they are jointly and severally liable for the damages susta
ined by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry
privilege in question.

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman

G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989 FACTS: Francisco Fontanilla, son of the spouse
s Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, died as a result of an accident when a pickup ow
ned and operated by the National Irrigation Administration, a government agency,
driven by Hugo Garcia (a regular employee of said agency) bumped the bicycle he
was riding. The deceased was thrown 50 meters from the point of impact, while h
is companion, who survived the incident, was thrown a bit further away. Neverthe
less, the NIA employees did not stop to assist the victims and instead sped away
. The trial court directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay

damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. Issue: Whether or n

ot the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees is legally
proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against the NIA Ruling:
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely: 1. Its public or governmenta
l aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. It
s private or business aspects where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer.

The National Irrigation Administration is a government corporation and exercises

proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. As a corporat
e body performing non-governmental functions, it is liable as an ordinary employ
er for the acts of its employees. As such, the NIA becomes answerable for damage
s caused by its employees upon the existence of negligence of supervision on its
part. At the time the accident took place, the employees and the driver did not
assist the victims and instead sped off even though there were dent marks indic
ating they were aware they hit something or someone. The strength of the impact
also indicated that they were driving at a high speed at the time the collision
occurred. There was evident negligence on the part of NIA when its supervisor wi
thin the group allowed the driver to travel at a high speed. Considering the for
egoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the
amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospi
talization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral d
amages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees of 20% of the total a
ward.
City of Manila vs. Teotico
G.R. No. L-23052 (January 29, 1968) Facts: Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an unco
vered and unlighted manhole when he attempted to board a jeepney at a "loading a
nd unloading" zone. As a result of the fall, Teoticos eyeglasses broke and its sh
ards pierced his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Aside from the lacerated wou
nd in his left upper eyelid, he also suffered from several contusions to his bod
y and an allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus injections administered to him
in the hospital. His medical expenses amounted to P1,400.00. As a consequence o
f the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the Ci
ty of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and
chief of police. The City of Manila and its officers contended that every time a
report that a cover of a manhole is missing, the Office of the City Engineer im
mediately had it replaced and that they were attentive thereto. The trial court
rendered a decision in favour of the City of Manila but the Court of Appeals sen
tenced the City of Manila to pay damages amounting to P6,750.00. Issue: Whether
the City of Manila is liable for payment of damages to Teotico Held: Between RA
409, the Charter of Manila, exempting the City from liability, and the Civil Cod
e, the Civil Code applies because its subject-matter is more particular. RA 409
refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the objec
t thereof. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death o
f, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road
, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control
or supervision.
Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since
the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Even assuming that the incident took place in
a national highway, it is not necessary for liability to attach that the defect
ive roads or streets belongs to the province, city or municipality from which re
sponsibility is exacted. What Article 2189 requires is that the province, city o
r municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Re
public Act No. 917 provides that the construction, maintenance and improvement o
f national, provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway Distr
ict Engineers and Highway City Engineers.
Liability of employees
Araneta vs. De Joya
G.R. No. L-25172 (May 24,
f the Ace Advertising. He
the United States to take
f directors failed to act

1974) Facts: Antonio de Joya was the general manager o

proposed that an employee, Ricardo Taylor, be sent to
up special studies in television. Although the board o
on the proposal, Taylor was still sent to the US, with

the assurance that Taylors expenses would be defrayed by parties other than the
company. Taylor received his salaries while abroad through checks and vouchers s
igned by Luis Araneta (vice-president), Vicente Araneta (company treasurer) or d
e Joya. The total costs of Taylors travel and study expenses was P 5,043.20. Ace
Advertising filed a complaint with the court for the recovery of the total amoun
t disbursed to Taylor since the travel and expenses were made without its knowle
dge, authority or ratification. A third-party complaint was filed by de Joya aga
inst Vicente Araneta, Luis Araneta and Taylor. Both Aranetas disowned any person
al liability, claiming that they signed the checks covering part of the travel e
xpenses and payroll in good faith since they were approved by de Joya. The trial
court ruled that de Joya was liable for the amount disbursed by the company but
dismissed the third party complaint, while the Court of Appeals held that accor
ding to the facts of the case, the two Aranetas were also privy to the unauthori
zed disbursement of the corporate moneys jointly with the appellant. Issue: Whet
her Luis Araneta is solidarily liable with de Joya and Vicente Araneta for payme
nt of the erroneously disbursed funds. Ruling: Luis Araneta is guilty of a quasi
-delict. His allegations of good faith were not substantiated and established. I
n fact, as vice-president of the company, Luis Araneta remained passive concerni
ng the unauthorized disbursement of corporate funds and approved three of the pa
yroll checks for Taylors salary. Luis Araneta evidently neglected to perform his
duties as an officer of the firm. Applying Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, i
t is proper that the other joint tortfeasors be made solidarily liable and shoul
der their proportional responsibility.
Engineers/Architect- Nature of liability
Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping
G.R. No. L-53064 September 25, 1980 Facts: Salvador Mendoza, driver of Sy Bon Pi
ng, recklessly and negligently rammed the residential house and store or Felix L
anuzo. The total damage to his property was P13,000 and he was deprived of his m
onthly income from the store of P300. In a complaint for damages instituted by L
anuzo independently from the criminal action, the trial court ruled that Sy Bon
Ping and Mendoza were jointly and severally liable to pay Lanuzo P 13,000.00 as
damages and P 300.00, representing Lanuzos monthly income, until the entire P 13,
000.00 has been paid in full. Issue:

Whether Sy Bon Ping, as employer, and Mendoza, as employee are solidarily liable
for payment of damages to Lanuzo
Held: Plaintiff predicated his claim for damages on quasi-delict, which may proc
eed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case. Salvador Me
ndoza is evidently primarily liable for his reckless driving resulting to the da
mage caused to Lanuzo under Article 2176 of the Civil Code Sy Bon Ping, as emplo
yer, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which expl
icitly provides: Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their emplo
yees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. Sy Bon Ping fail
ed to disprove the legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supe
rvision of this employee (Article 2180) and is primary and solidarily liable wit
h Mendoza. Nevertheless, Sy Bon Ping may demand reimbursement from Mendoza for w
hatever amount he will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the claim for d
amages.
Malipol vs. Tan
G.R. No. L-27730 January 21, 1974

Facts: Pantaleon Malijan was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante when he
was hit by a gasoline tanker, got thrown to the ground and was ran over by the t
ankers right wheel that got detached. Although he was brought to the hospital, Ma
lijan died that night from "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicu
lar accident." The gasoline tanker at that time was driven by Ernesto Labsan and
was used and owned by Lily Lim Tan for her gasoline business. The mother and mi
nor siblings of Malijan filed a complaint for damages against Tan and Labsan. Th
e trial court ruled that Labsan was primarily liable to pay the damages, and in
case he would not be able to do so, Tan would be subsidiarily liable. Issue: Whe
ther the trial court erred in ruling Labsan as primarily liable for damages, and
Tan as subsidiarily liable. Held: The court ruled that the trial court correctl
y denied the motion to set aside order of default and for new trial; however, th
e trial court erred in holding Tan subsidiarily liable. The action was based on
quasi-delict and not to demand civil liability arising from a crime, since the c
omplaint makes no mention of a crime. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the
liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damag
es caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. Therefore, t
he employer, Lily Lim Tan, must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily
, liable for damages awarded in the decision of the lower court, without prejudi
ce to the right to demand reimbursement from damages from Ernesto Labsan for wha
tever she would have to pay the relatives of the deceased.
Viluan vs. CA
G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 (April 29, 1966) Facts: The bus owned by Francisca Viluan,
and driven by Hermenigildo Aquino raced with the overtaking bus driven by Gregor
io Hufana and owned by Patricio Hufana. Aquino lost control of the bus, hitting
a post and crashing into a tree, after which it burst into flames wherein seven
persons were killed and thirteen others were injured. In the complaint for breac
h of contract of carriage and damages filed by the heirs of those who perished i
n the incident and Carolina Sabado, an injured passenger, Vilaun and Aquino file
d third party complaints against Gregorio Hufana and his employer, Patricio Hufa
na, contending that the incident was their fault. The lower court found that the
accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses a
nd held both the two drivers and their employers jointly and severally liable fo
r damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of concurrent negligence on
the part of the two buses but held that only Vilaun is liable because Aquino, a
s driver, cannot be made jointly and severally liable in a contract of carriage.
It ruled that the Hufanas cannot be made liable since the plaintiffs did not ame
nd their complaints in the main action so as to assert a claim against them. Iss
ue: Whether Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should be made equally liable although
they were third-party defendants and not principal defendants Held: The fact tha
t the respondents were not sued as principal defendants but were brought into th
e cases as third party defendants should not preclude a finding of their liabili
ty. Section 5 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, precluding a judgment in favor of a
plaintiff and against a third party defendant where the plaintiff has not amend
ed his complaint to assert a claim against a third party defendant, applies only
to cases where the third party defendant is brought in on an allegation of liab
ility to the defendants. It does not apply where a thirdparty defendant is imple
aded on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiffs, in which case no amend
ment of the plaintiffs complaint is necessary. In this case the third-party comp
laints filed by Viluan and Aquino charged Gregorio and Patrcio Hufana with direc
t liability to the plaintiffs. Amendment of the complaint is not necessary and i
s merely a matter of form since the liability of the Hufanas as third-party defen
dant was already asserted in the third-party complaint. Regardless whether the i
njury is quasi-delict or breach of contract of carriage, in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding
and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the t
wo vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Torts with Independent Civil Actions (Violation of Civil and Political rights)

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon

G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975 Facts: Jikil Taha sold a motor launch named M/L
"SAN RAFAEL" to Alberto Timbangcaya but a year later Timbangcaya filed a compla
int with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal that Taha forcibly took the motor l
aunch. Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fisca
l of Palawan, filed an information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon
Persons against Jikil Taha and instructed Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander
of Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch, which was already so
ld to Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon informed Maddela that the subsequent sale of th
e launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the sa
me. Lim filed a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. Lim co
ntended that there was a violation of his constitutional rights when the motor l
aunch was seized without a search warrant. As defense, de Leon and Maddela conte
nded that the motor launch was the corpus delicti in an ongoing investigation an
d filed a counterclaim for malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by L
im and Taha. The trial court upheld the validity of the seizure of the motor lau
nch and ordered Taha and Lim to pay for damages. Issue:

Whether the constitutional rights of Jakil Taha and Delfin Lim was violated, and
if so, whether they are entitled to damages
Held: The taking of the motor launch was ruled to be in violation of the constit
utional right of the parties against unreasonable searches and seizure as provid
ed in the Bill of Rights since it was effected without a search warrant, the aut
hority of which lies with a magistrate or judge and not a fiscal. With respect t
o damages, Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha were entitled to damages under Article 32 a
nd 2219 of the New Civil Code for the violation of their constitutional right. G
ood faith is not a defense against liability under Article 32 of the NCC. To be
liable it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of t
he plaintiffs and it is not required that the act was attended with bad faith or
malice. Therefore, Fiscal de Leon was liable to pay damages to Delfin Lim for v
iolating his constitutional right; but Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountabl
e because he acted upon the order of his superior officer believing that there w
as a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.
Aberca vs. Ver
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988 Facts: The intelligence units of the Armed Force
s of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were ordered by Gener
al Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist
(CT). The plaintiffs complained that in the execution of such order, the TFM rai
ded several places using defectively issued judicial warrants and arrested the pla
intiffs without warrant, confiscated personal property, interrogated plaintiffs
without council and employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence. The
plaintiffs filed an action for damages, which was dismissed by the trial court o
n the grounds that (1) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended,
(2) the defendants were performing their official duties and (3)the complaint s
tates no cause of action. Issue: Whether the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches condu
cted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guarante
ed under the Constitution, and if so, who should be made liable Held: The conten
tion that respondents are covered by state immunity for acts done in the perform
ance of their official duties was not accepted by the court because plaintiffs m
ay have been ordered to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the communist terror
ists but this did not amount to a blanket license or a roving commission untramel
led by any constitutional restraint. In carrying out their task and mission, cons
titutional and legal safeguards should still have been observed by respondents.

The plaintiffs cause of action were not barred by the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, which was explicitly recognized in PD No. 1755: H
owever, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quas
i-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public offic
er involving

However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a qua
si-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public offi
cer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law inclu
ding the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be broug
ht within one (1) year. Even if the suspension of the privilege of the writ of h
abeas corpus suspended petitioners right of action for damages for illegal arre
st and detention, it did not extend to suspend their right to demand damages for
injuries suffered through the confiscation of their private belongings, the vio
lation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protect
ion against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cru
el and inhuman treatment. As to who should be made liable for damages, the doctr
ine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. Article 32 speaks of an off
icer or employee or person directly or "indirectly" responsible for the violat
ion of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, the person direc
tly causing damage and the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for
the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Article 32 of the Civil Cod
e encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indi
rectly, responsible for its violation.
MHP Garments vs. CA
G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994 Facts: MHP Garments, Inc. had the exclusive fra
nchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, an
d insignias. When MHP Garments received information that Agnes Villa Cruz, Miras
ol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphern
alia without any authority, Larry de Guzman, an employee of MHP Garments, togeth
er with members of the police constabulary, went to the stores of Cruz, Lugatima
n, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public Market and seized these items. The seizur
e caused a commotion to the embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales. MHP G
arments instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendo
rs. The Provincial fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the
seized items. Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales instituteed an action for sums of mon
ey and damages against MHP Garments and de Guzman. MHP Garments contend that the
y should not be made liable for damages since they did not commit the act of sei
zure. Issue: Whether MHP Garments and de Guzman should be held liable for the se
izure of the goods in question although it was the Police constabulary who effec
ted the seizure Held: The seizure was conducted without a warrant in evident vio
lation of the constitutional right of the vendors. The facts of the case did not
justify the warrantless search and seizure of the vendors goods. There was suffi
cient time for de Guzman in behalf of MHP Garments to secure a warrant from the
time of receipt of the information and the raid of the stores. Although the Phil
ippine Constabulary conducted the raid, their omission as party to the complaint
does not exculpate MHP Garments and de Guzman from liability. The company was i
ndirectly involved in transgressing the rights of Cuz, Lugatiman and Gonzales. I
t was MHP Garments who instigated the raid and the raid was conducted with the a
ctive participation of their employee, Larry de Guzman, who apparently assented
to the conduct of the raid and is as liable to the same extent as the officers t
hemselves. The corporation is also liable to the same extent as the officers whe
n it received the goods for safekeeping and refused to surrender them for quite
a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Independent Civil Action (Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries)
Marcia et al. vs.CA
G.R. No. L-34529 January 27, 1983 Facts: A passenger bus operated by private res
pondent Victory Liner, Inc.,driven by its employee, Felardo Paje, collided with
a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latters death and in physica
l injuries to Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. An information for homicide and serio
us physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against the driver while
an action for damages was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, and the heirs o
f Clemente Marcia against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje. The trial co
urt initially convicted Paje of the offense charged, but on appeal, Paje was acq

uitted after it was found that he was not speeding and was diligent, but the col
lision, nevertheless, took place and was a fortuitous event. It further ruled th
at criminal negligence was wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil ne
gligence. The court dismissed the civil case against Paje and Victory Liner ruli
ng that they could not be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the criminal
action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure ac
cident. Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would result in the di
smissal in the civil case Held: The judgment of acquittal included a declaration
that the fact from which civil liability may arise did not exist. In acquitting
Paje, the court ruled that the event was an accident and that Paje was without
fault, and it is only proper that the civil case be dismissed. Furthermore, the
charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for r
eckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical inj
uries. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the C
ivil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the cri
minal prosecution, which provides:
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action fo
r damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brough
t by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the cri
minal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Therefore, it was only proper that the court dismiss the civil case against Paje
and Victory Liner since Paje was acquitted of the fact from which the civil cas
e arose.
Madeja v. Caro
211 Phil 469 (December 21, 1983) Facts: Dra. Eva Japzon is accused of homicide t
hrough reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madejo after an appendectomy.
The widow of Madejo filed a criminal complaint and reserved her right to claim f
or a separate action for damages. The judge dismissed the civil case because of
Rule 111 3(a) but the petitioner appealed to the SC by using Rule 111 Section 2
ROC in relation to Article 33 of the NCC, which states:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil actio
n entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is r
eserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed in
dependently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.) Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud
, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and disti
nct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil ac
tion shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.

The Court found the case impressed with merit. Issues: (1) Whether or not the ci
vil case can carry on independently of the criminal case. (2) Whether or not phy
sical injuries of Article 33 encompass other bodily injury in its definition Hel
d: (1)Yes. Rule 111 Section 2 creates an exception to the rule when the offense
is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may b
e filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservat
ion made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reserva
tion. (2)Yes. The Code Commission discussed that the term "physical injuries" is
used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in th
e Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries by consummated, fru
strated and attempted homicide but also any other bodily injury including batter
y based on the American Law.

Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists

GR No 135306 (2003) Facts: In 1987, Emelita Despuig, working as a grant-in-aid s
cholar at a Manila university and as an office worker at a government office in
Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency director, last March 15,
but afraid to lose her job and of being harmed she chose to keep her ordeal to
herself. On the second night, she was almost raped again by the same man, Catali
no Arafiles. However, the bellboy and the security guard noticed something suspi
cious as Emelita was fighting back while they were checking in the Flamingo Hote
l, thus the bellboy followed them to their room. Arafiles rushed to leave as soo
n as he paid money to the bellboy and the security guard not to report the same.
Emelita reported the same information to the police and she was interviewed by
Romy Morales, a journalist of Peoples Journal Tonight. During the following day,
the news was part of the headlines in the said newspaper. After a year of public
ation, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages arising from the said publication
against the journalist and its employer. Arafiles alleged that on account of the
grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item prepared
by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan, Jr., allowed for publication b
y respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of Philippine Journalists, Inc., and pu
blished by respondent Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on his
character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine Atmospheri
c, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he
became the object of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-c
razed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the
position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA. The RTC of Quezon City ruled in fav
or of Arafiles granting him awards for damages. 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal da
mages; 2.) P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages
; 4.) P50,000.00, as attorneys fees; and 5.) Costs of suit. . CA reversed RTCs dec
ision. MR from CA made by Arafiles was denied. Hence they elevated it to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the publication of the news item was not attended with ma
lice, hence, must free respondents of liability for damages. Held: Yes. There wa
s no malice in the article. Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the c
riminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall pro
ceed independently of the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderan
ce of evidence. Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damag
es that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil
action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely i
ndependent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because
it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised P
enal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising
therefrom In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published
work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole
. The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they
may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or r
estricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope,
spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. Arafiles brands the
news item as a malicious sensationalization of a patently embellished and salacio
us narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted rape incidents. Fo
r, so petitioner argues, the police blotter which was the sole basis for the new
s item plainly shows that there was only one count of abduction and rape reporte
d by Emelita. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint
may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. In determin
ing the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the
importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of di
scretion.
Defamation
MVRS vs. Islamic
GR 135306 (January 28, 2003) Facts: Bulgar, a local tabloid, published an articl

e in 1992 about the Muslims practical customs stating:

ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi
kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hi
ndi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa
tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tu
wing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang Rama
dan."
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines filed a complaint alleging the libelous
statement as insulting and damaging because words alluding to pig as the God of
Muslims were with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult, and disparage the Mu
slims and Islam. MVRS contended however, that they did not mention respondents a
s the object of the article, thus not entitled to damages. In defense, the artic
le was only an expression of their belief or opinion. The RTC dismissed their ca
se because there was no cause of action. The plaintiffs were not specifically id
entified for defmation. In 1998, the CA reversed the decision. Hence, this revie
w. Issue: Whether or not the Islamic Council was entitled to moral damages, exem
plary damages, attorneys feed, and costs of suit Held: No. Words that are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. Mere words of abuse whe
ther written or spoken do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages. There is NO identifiable pers
on who was allegedly injured by the article. Muslims do not have a single common
reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matt
er of the controversy. Requisites to recovery are the following: 1. Published a
statement 2. That was defamatory 3. Of and concerning the plaintiff To maintain
an action, the plaintiff must be the person with reference to whom the statement
was made as this is vital for a group or class to prove they have been defamed.
Fraud
Salta v. De Veyra
202 Phil 527 (September 30, 1982)
Facts: Amayra Salta was employed as branch manager of the Philippine National Ba
nk (PNB). As such, his duty was to grant loans or to recommend the granting of l
oans, depending on

Facts: Amayra Salta was employed as branch manager of the Philippine National Ba
nk (PNB). As such, his duty was to grant loans or to recommend the granting of l
oans, depending on the the amount of the loan applied for. PNB filed two civil c
omplaints against Salta charging him of indiscriminately granting certain loans
in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud, and manifest partiality, and upo
n securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. The two civil cases
were assigned to two different salas of the Court of First Instance of Manila. A
t the same time, the bank caused to be filed, a criminal case, based on the same
acts. Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case on the ground that the elem
ents of the crime charged were not proven. Based on his acquittal petitioner fil
ed a Motion to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. The two presiding judges
in the separate civil cases took diametrically opposing views. One judge denied
his motion and the other granted it. Hence, these petitions by the Philippine Na
tional Bank in one case and by Salta in the other. Issue: Whether or not the mot
ion to dismiss the civil cases should be affirmed or denied. Held: The motion to
dismiss should be denied and the other order granting such should be reversed.
The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is f
ully warranted under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The crim
inal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is frau
d. . Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil a
ctions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cau
se of action averred in the complaints. The following allegation in the complain
ts unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of frau
d: "That there was fraud committed by the defendant in granting the aforesaid lo
ans which rendered him liable for his acts, which fraud is positively and easily
identifiable in the manner and scheme aforementioned." The civil actions can be
maintained regardless of the outcome of the criminal action.
Physical Injuries
Capuno v. Pepsi Cola
G.R. No. L-19331 (1965) Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which o
ccurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola deliv
ery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision
proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio
Buan and Rizalina Paras. Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckles
s imprudence; the information was subsequently amended to include claims for dam
ages by the heirs of the three victims. While the criminal case was pending, the
Intestate Estate of the Buan spouse and their heirs filed a civil case. Include
d in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly p
aid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the Workmens Compensation Act. O
n June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and
Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for damages, in
cluding the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to t
he heirs of Capuno "under the Workmens Compensation Act." The Court approved th
e compromise and accordingly dismissed the case on the following June 17. At tha
t time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered only on April
15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the charges against him. P
rior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a c
ivil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippin
es and Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees motion, was dismiss
ed by the Court a quo in its order of February 29, 1960, from which order the pr
esent appeal has been taken. Issue: Whether or not the action had already prescr
ibed. Held: Yes. The action has prescribed. The civil action for damages could h
ave been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, C
ipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have b
een stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless im
prudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after
the lapse of more than five years. In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zac
arias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, SC held that
an action based on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code

as to the question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to
run, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the
day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The foregoing considerations dis
pose of appellants contention that the four-year period of prescription in this
case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi in
asmuch as they had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to ins
titute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without having ma
de it they could file as in fact they did a separate civil action even during th
e pendency of the criminal case and consequently, as held in Paulan v. Sarabia,
supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupt
ing the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
Corpus v. Paje
G.R. No. L-26737 (1969) Facts: On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the Vict
ory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided within the
municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resultin
g in the latters death and in physical injuries to two other persons. An inform
ation for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprude
nce was filed against Felardo Paje. In 1962, the heirs of Clemente Marcia reserv
ed their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Paje was convic
ted and pending appeal, the heirs of the Clemente Marcia filed a separate civil
action for damages based on the criminal act and praying that Victory Liner pay
jointly and severally the damages claimed by the heirs. Paje was acquitted by th
e CA. During the pre-trial of the civil case, the Court dismissed the same becau
se the cause of action being a quasi-delict has prescribed. Issue: Whether or no
t the dismissal of the case is proper by reason of prescription Held: Yes. The t
rial courts finding was correct that the cause of action has prescribed in 1962.
An action upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day t
he quasi-delict was committed, or from December 23, 1956, and the running of the
period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckle
ss imprudence. Six years have already lapsed.
Dulay v. CA
GR No 108017 (1995) Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno T
orzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa Alabang," Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. The widow of A
tty. Dulay filed an action for damages against the employer and the security gua
rd and prayed to be awarded actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, a
nd attorneys fees. She alleges that the Secuity agency has concurrent negligenc
e as Torzuela, their employee: Defendant TORZUELAS wanton and reckless discharg
e of the firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence of defendant S
AFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to exercise the diligen
ce of a good father of a family in the supervision and control of its employee t
o avoid the injury.

SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not s
tate a valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuelas act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of sho
oting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefore
is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: "ARTICLE 10
0. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. Every person criminally liabl
e for a felony is also civilly liable." 1. 2. However, petitioner contends furth
er that Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall govern and that it is independent f
rom the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revi
sed Penal Code. That the act of Torzuela is actionable under Article 33 of the N
ew Civil Code:

"ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil actio
n for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be b
rought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of th
e criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." Iss
ue: Whether or not the civil action is founded on quasi-delict and should the em
ployer be held jointly liable for damages. Whether or not physical injuries incl
ude consummated homicide for Article 33 to apply in the case Held: Yes to both i
ssues. The SC ruled in favor of the petitioner. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional. Private respondents further aver that Artic
le 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally committed pur
suant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA. However, the term "physical injuries" in Ar
ticle 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Ca
puno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines). It is not the crime of phys
ical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical i
njuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide

Intentional Tort (Abuse of Right)

Velayo v. Shell
100 Phil 186 (July 30, 1957) Facts: Commercial Air Lines, Inc., referred to as C
ALI, is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philipp
ines laws, and previously engaged in air transportation business. The Shell Comp
any of the P. I., Ltd., is a corporation organized under the laws of England and
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. CALIs operations needed fuel, t
hus it had a number of persons extending credit to said corporation. However, on
August 1948, CALI had financial difficulties and had to call on an informal mee
ting of creditors because they were in the state of insolvency. Soon thereafter,
the big creditors present in the meeting discussed preferences of credit. The c
reditors present agreed to the formation of a working committee to continue to o
rder of payment and to supervise the preservation of the properties of the corpo
ration while they attempted to come to an understanding as a fair distribution o
f assets among them. The committee consists of Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Agcaoili, and
Atty. Sycip. Creditors agreed not to file a suit. However, on the day of the me
eting of the working committee, they received a letter from Shell regarding its
transfer of credit of CALI to the Shell Oil based in the US. The American corpor
ation, Shell, then sued CALI for the amount of the credit thus assigned. A writ
of attachment was issued against a C-54 PLANE in Ontario International Airport.
And on January 5,1949, a judgment by default had been issued by the American cou
rt against CALI. The stockholders of CALI were unaware of this. On December 17,
1948, Velayo filed for a writ of injunction to stop the foreign court from prose
cuting the claim, and in the alternative, he prayed for damages in double the am
ount of the plane which was attached. The plaintiff having failed to restrain th
e progress of the attachment suit in the US by denial of the application of the
writ of injunction and the consequences on execution of the C-54 plane in the st

ate of California, USA, he confines his action to the recovery of damages agains
t the defendant. The complaint was dismissed, hence this petition. Issues: Wheth
er or not Shell acted in bad faith and betrayed the trust and confidence of the
creditors of CALI. Whether or not by reason of betrayal of trust, Shell should b
e liable for damages. Held: Yes. Chapter 2 of the preliminary title of the Civil
Code on Human relations provides: Article 19. Every person must, in the exercis
e of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give eve
ryone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. It is evident that Shell, upo
n learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will all probabili
ty, it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred cla
ims of other creditors, entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets. The te
legraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of other creditors of
CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled Shell to collect almost all
if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Supreme Court cannot countenance
such attitude at all,and much less from a foreign corporation to thedetriment o
f Philippine Government and local business. Shells transfer of credit would have
been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part in the working commi
ttee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors present that he had n
o authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to col
lect its credit from CALI by whatever means his principal deemed wise and were a
vailable to it. But then, such information would have dissolved all attempts to
come to an amicable conciliation and would have precipitated the filing of CALIs
voluntary insolvency proceedings and nullified the intended transfer of Shells cr
edit to American Shell. It may be said that article 19 only contains a mere decl
aration of principles and while such statement is essentially correct, yet We fi
nd that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and the sequence of the sa
me chapter, which prescribe the following: Article 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good cust
oms or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Saudi Arabia v. CA
297 SCRA 469 (October 8, 1998)
Facts: Private respondent Milagros Morada was a flight attendant of Petitioner C
ompany. During a stop-over in Jakarta, she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow
crew members Thamer and Allah (both surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in th
eir hotel room. While there, Allah left and Thamer attempted to rape her. She wa
s saved by hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later file
d a case against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. Whe
n Morada returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was aske
d to go to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to J
akarta but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return to Jed
dah but barred from Jakarta flights. The Indonesian authorities eventually depor
ted the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi govt., after 2 weeks of det
ention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was transferred to
Manila. Two years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to t
he police station where her

Two years later, she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Le
gal Officer of Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police
station where her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta i
ncident. Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case
against the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her pa
ssport and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah. A year and a half
later, she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certa
in Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a d
ocument written in Arabic. She was told that it was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, she signed a document to appear befo
re the court a week later. When the date of appearance came, she complied but on
ly after being assured by Saudias Manila manager that the investigation was a rou
tine and posed no danger to her. She was brought before the court and was interr
ogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a pl
ane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later
told to remain in Jeddah and her passport was again confiscated. A few days lat
er, she was again brought before the same court where the Saudi judge, to her as
tonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment and 286 lashes. Onl
y then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah for what happened in Jakarta. The court found her guilty of adultery;
going to a disco, dancing and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; a
nd socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. Facing
conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudi Arabian Air but
she was denied assistance of any kind. She asked the Phil. Embassy to help her.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case a
gainst her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to M
anila, she was terminated from the service by Saudi Arabian Air without being in
formed of the cause. She then filed a complaint for damages against Saudi Arabia
n Air and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country manager. Saudi Arabian Air filed a motion t
o dismiss raising the issues of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction
. Issues: Whether or not Morada had a cause of action (2) Which law should gover
n, Phil. Law or Saudi Law? Held: YES, she has a cause of action. She aptly predi
cated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, th
e aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept o
f torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no
. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provid
e in the statutes. Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law, Art.21 giv
es flesh to its provisions. She was the one made to face trial for very serious
charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition. Saudi A
rabian Air may have acted beyond its duties as employer in turning her over to J
eddah officials. Its purported act contributed to or even proximately caused add
itional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent, Morada. Saudi A
ir allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of Morada under t
he guise of petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, con
fidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Mak
kah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was wrongful. But these c
apped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person and reputation, for
which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to provide compensation or redress
for the wrongs done, once duly proven. 2. Philippine Law should be applied. Cho
ice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property
right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the
situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the pla
ce of wrongdoing. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one invol
ving torts, the connecting factor or point of contact could be the place or places w
here the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts pri
nciple in a conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). Th
is is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived priva
te respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. The SC held what is importa
nt here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the alleged inju

ry to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, h

ad lodged according to the private respondent. All told, it is not without basis
to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort. The SC finds it n
ecessary to apply the State of the most significant relationship rule, which shoul
d be appropriate to apply given the factual context of the case. In applying sai
d principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship,
the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to t
heir relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (A) the place whe
re the injury occurred; (B) the place where the conduct causing the injury occur
red; (C) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and; (D) the place where the relationship, if any, b
etween the parties is centered. There is basis for the claim that the over-all i
njury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. Private respondent is a resident F
ilipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engage
d in international air carriage business here. Thus, the relationship between the
parties was centered here.
Globe Mackay v. CA
176 SCRA 778 (August 25, 1989) Facts: Restituto M. Tobias, the private responden
t, was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MA
CKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to t
he engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious p
urchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands o
f pesos.
According to Tobias it was him who actually discovered the anomalies and reporte
d them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to
petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and Gene
ral Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
However, his superiors twisted the facts and alleged that it was Tobias who was
their number one suspect. This led to the different investigations including a l
ie detector test to make Tobias admit something he did not do. He was later on d
ismissed by Globe Mackay. Unemployed, Tobias tried applying for a new job in RET
ELCO.
However, the petitioner, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the l
atter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobia
s filed a civil case. The RTC awarded damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed
said judgment. Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to priva
te respondent. Held: Yes. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee ha
s committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such
as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmne
ss and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employe
r. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly un
called for. Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages i
n the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent. This does no
t, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Ci
vil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner th
at is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the lat
ter for the damage.
Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after t
he latters termination from work. The damage incurred by Tobias was not only in
connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the r
esult of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners such as the
filing of six criminal complaints which amount to malicious prosecution.

Albenson v. CA
G.R. No. 88694 (January 11, 1993)
Facts: Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed Industries mild steel plates
and as payment, it was paid with a check amounting to P2,575 drawn against the
account of E.L Woodworks.
The check was dishonored, Albenson, traced the origin of the check. The result f
rom the SEC shows that the president of Guaranteed Industries and the owner of E
.L Woodworks were one and the same with the name of Eugenio S. Baltao. Albenson
made extrajudicial demand but Eugenio Baltao denied that he issued a check, urgi
ng the petitioner to file a complaint through Fiscal Sumaway for violation of BP
22.
Fiscal Sumaway claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit
controverting evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deeme
d to have waived his right. Respondent Baltao, claiming ignorance of the complai
nt against him, immediately filed with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion f
or reinvestigation, alleging that it was not true that he had been given an oppo
rtunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway
, and that he never had any dealings with Albenson.
The complaint of Albenson was dismissed and Baltaos complaint was given merit and
the RTC ruled in favor of him. Issue: Whether or not Eugene Baltao is entitled
to such damages for abuse of rights and malicious prosecution. Held: No, the SC
found no cogent reason to award such damages in favor of Eugene Baltao. Article
19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of r
ights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are th
e following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe hones
ty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on a
ll rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Artic
le 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or gr
anted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. Whe
n a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined i
n Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committe
d for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible . . . ." What prompted petiti
oners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against private
respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on a bounce
d check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private respondent. I
t appears however, that there was a mistake in identity as there were three (3)
men having the name Eugenio Baltao that were all doing business in the building
where E.L Woodworks was situated. It was most probably the son, Eugene Baltao II
I who issued the check to Albenson, which Mr. Eugene Baltao never during the inv
estigation. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. An award of damages and att
orneys fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith. If damage
results from a persons exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria
. Nor is he entitled to compensatory damages because he did not present proof of
the cost of the medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a resul
t of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual l
oss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining
actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork a
s to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages b
ecomes erroneous. There is no evidence of the other party having acted in wanton
, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be
awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488
[1986]).The award of attorneys fees must be disallowed where the award of exem
plary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appe
als, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, there was no malicious prosecution against

private respondent, attorneys fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.

Amonoy v. Gutierrez
351 SCRA 731 (2001) Facts: The house of spouses Gutierrez was situated in a lot
foreclosed and bought by Sergio Amonoy. In April and May 1986, an Order of Demol
ition of the house was issued by the trial court but was enjoined by a temporary
restraining order (TRO) granted to respondents on June 2, 1986. In 1988, the TR
O was made permanent by the Court, but the house of respondents had already been
destroyed. The Court of Appeals held petitioner liable to respondents for P250,
000.00 for actual damages thereof. Hence, the appeal to the SC where petitioner
asserted the principle of damnum absque injuria. Issue: Whether or not the Court
of Appeals was correct in deciding that the Amonoy was liable to the respondent
s for damages Held: Yes. Amonoy invokes the principle of damnun absque injuria,
the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons right
s is a loss without injury for which the law gives no remedy. In other words, on
e who merely exercises ones rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held
liable for damages. The SC finds damnum absque injuria not applicable to this c
ase. Amonoy did not heed to the TRO issued by the Court. He was already in bad f
aith when he continued the demolition despite the issuance of a TRO. The demolit
ion of respondents house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not
only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. Amonoys liability is
premised on the obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to anoth
er by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently
and whether or not punishable by law.
UE v. Jader
G.R. No. 132344 (2000)
Facts: Romeo Jader, a law student enrolled in the University of the East, failed
to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was give
n an incomplete grade in the 1st semester of his last year (1987-1988). After co
mpleting his 2nd semester, Jader filed an application for the removal of the inc
omplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega. This was approved by Dean Ce
ledonio Tiongson after paying the required fee. He took the examination, and on
May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade, a five (5). Deliberat
ions were held, with Jaders name appearing in the tentative list of candidates fo
r graduation, but annotated with his deficiencies. Invitations were also made, w
ith

Deliberations were held, with Jaders name appearing in the tentative list of cand
idates for graduation, but annotated with his deficiencies. Invitations were als
o made, with Jaders name appearing as one of the candidates, albeit annotated as
to the tentative nature of the list. Jader attended the said graduation ceremony
, vested with all the rites symbolic of his graduation from law school. Believin
g he had successfully graduated, he took a leave of absence without pay to prepa
re for the bar examination. Upon his enrollment in the pre-bar review of the Far
Eastern University, however, Jader learned of his deficiency, dropped out of th
e same and ultimately did not take the bar examination. Jader sued UE for damage
s for suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputat
ion, wounded feelings and sleepless nights arising from the latters negligence. A
wards of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees, and cost
s of suit were also prayed for. UE denied liability, arguing that it never led J
ader to believe that he completed the requirements for a Law degree when his nam
e was included in the tentative list of graduating students. Trial ensued, with
the lower court ruling in favor of Jader, ordering UE to pay 35,470 with legal r
ate of interest, and 5,000 for attorneys fees and cost of suit. This was modified
by the CA to the effect of requiring UE to pay Jader an additional 50,000 for m
oral damages. Issue: Is UE liable to Romeo Jader, despite the formers allegation
that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred arose out
of his own negligence in not verifying the result of his removal exam? Held: UE
is still liable to respondent Jader. In a contract of education, since the cont
racting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to
deal with the formers agents, although nothing prevents either professors or stu
dents from sharing with each other such information. It is the contractual oblig
ation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and informati
on to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with a
ll the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be incl
uded among those who will graduate. In belatedly informing Jader, UE cannot be s
aid to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently esta
blished for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse
of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and techni
calities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of f
acts, would render the transaction unconscientious. The school exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the submi
ssion of reports involving the students standing, with exclusive control meaning t
hat no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which cau
sed the damage or injury. Being a university engaged in legal education, it shou
ld have practiced what it inculcates in its students, specifically the principle
of good dealings in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, the former provision
intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for th
e untold number of moral wrongs, impossible for human foresight to provide speci
fically in statutory law. UE failed to act seasonably and cannot feign ignorance
that Jader will not prepare himself for the bar exams, since that is precisely
the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. Liability arose fro
m its failure to promptly inform him of the exam results and in misleading the l
atter into believing that he had satisfied all course requirements. While UE was
guilty of negligence and liable to Jader for actual damages, he should not have
been awarded moral damages. At the very least, it behooved on Jader to verify w
hether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar ex
aminations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible enough to e
nsure that all his affairs were in order. The Court fails to see how he could ha
ve suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in
the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If Jader was i
ndeed humiliated, he brought this upon himself by not verifying all the requirem
ents including his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examinat
ion.

Garciano v. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 96126 (1992)
Facts: Esteria Garciano was hired to teach during the 1981-82 school year in the
Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. Before the school yea
r ended, she applied for an indefinite LOA because her daughter was taking her t
o Austria, her daughters place of employment. The application was recommended for
approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the Presid
ent of the schools Board of Directors. On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addresse
d a letter to the Garciano, stating that by way of the decision of school founde
r, Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the president of the PTA and the school faculty, they have
decided to terminate her services due to: a) absence of a written contract of e
mployment due to Garcianos refusal to sign one, and b) the difficulty of getting
a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position wi
thout a written contract. Upon Garcianos arrival from Austria, and after several
inquiries about the matter, the Board of Directors without the consent of the sc
hool founder signed a letter, reinstating Garciano to her former position, with
a statement declaring the previous communication received had been declared null
and void for not bearing the sanction or authority of the Board. Subsequently,
the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Dire
ctors resigned from their positions "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has re
acted acidly to the Boards deliberations for the reinstatement of Garciano. A c
omplaint for damages was filed in the RTC-Cebu against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labaj
o, and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust a
nd illegal dismissal. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Garciano, o
rdering Wiertz and Co. to pay 200,000 as moral damages, 50,000 exemplary damages
, 32,400 as lost earnings for 9 years and 10,000 as litigation and attorneys fees
. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the lower court, dismiss
ing the complaint and absolving Wiertz and Co. Following the denial of their mot
ion for reconsideration, Garciano seeks redress in the High Court. Issues: Did t
he CA err in absolving Wiertz and Co. from liability by faulting Esteria Garcian
o for her failure to report back to work? Should they be held liable for damages
? Held: The High Court ruled in the negative. It held that the board of director
s of the Immaculate Concepcion Institute, which possesses the authority to hire
and fire teachers and other employees of the school, did not dismiss the Garcian
o, but merely directed her to report for work. While the Wiertz and Co. sent her
a letter of termination through her husband, as discovered by the CA, Wiertz an
d Co. were aware of their lack of authority to do so. The letter of termination
they sent to Garciano through her husband had no legal effect, and did not preve
nt her from reporting for work. There was no reason why she could not continue w
ith her teaching in the school. No evidence had been presented to show that defe
ndants-appellants prevented her from reporting for work. An acidic reaction made
by Wiertz and Co. can be seen as nothing more than a reaction to what they perc
eived as an affront to their collective prestige. It would appear, therefore, th
at plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from her teaching job in the school a
nd has no right to recover damages from defendants-appellants. They actually did
nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the s
chools Board of Directors With regard to damages, liability under Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts
that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy. Given that
Garcianos discontinuance from teaching was her own choice, whatever loss she ma
y have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit
injuria. With respect to Garcianos claim for moral damages, since the right to
recover them under Article 21 is based on equity, he who comes to court to dema
nd equity must come with clean hands. In this case, Garciano is not without faul
t. Her indefinite leave of absence, followed by her failure to report in time fo
r the opening of classes, as well as her refusal to sign a written contract of e
mployment and her ignorance of the Boards order to return to work are reflections
of her fault.

Barons vs. CA
G.R. No. 126486 (1998) Facts: Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. (PDPI), appointed
Barons Marketing, Corporation (BMC) as one of its dealers of electrical wires an
d cables. The latter was given 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiffs e
lectrical products, to be reckoned from the date of delivery by Phelps Dodge of
its products. For the period covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, BMC purc
hased, on credit, from PDPI various electrical wires and cables in the total amo
unt of P4,102,438.30, which were subsequently sold to MERALCO. Sales invoices is
sued by PDPI to BMC stipulate a 12% interest on the amount due for attorneys fees
and collection. On September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of P3
00,000.00 out of its total purchases, leaving an unpaid account on the aforesaid
deliveries of P3,802,478.20. Demand for payment was made several times by PDPI,
which was responded to by BMC with a request that it be able to pay its obligat
ion in monthly installments of 500,000 at 1% interest per annum. The offer

made several times by PDPI, which was responded to by BMC with a request that it
be able to pay its obligation in monthly installments of 500,000 at 1% interest
per annum. The offer was rejected by PDPI, who reiterated its demand for full p
ayment. A complaint was filed by PDPI before the Pasig RTC against BMC for the r
ecovery of the unpaid balance for made deliveries worth 3,108,000, as well as in
terest, exemplary damages of at least 100,000, the cost of the suit, as well as
attorneys fees at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded. In response, BMC, altho
ugh admitting that the said purchases were theirs, disputed the amount claimed b
y PDPI, asserting that the acts were perpetrated to induce humiliation and in ab
use of PDPIs rights. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of PDPI, orderin
g BMC to pay for the unpaid balance of their purchases at 12% interest per annum
, attorneys fees at 25% of the preceding obligation, exemplary damages worth 10,0
00 and the cost of the suit. On appeal, the judgment was modified to adopt the o
riginal amount of unpaid deliveries (3,802,478.20) at 12% per annum and 5% of th
e said obligation as attorneys fees. Issue/s: Is PDPI guilty of abuse of right? I
f not, can PDPI recover interest and attorneys fees? Held: The Court held that BM
Cs theory that PDPI abused its rights by rejecting the formers offer of settlement
, subsequently followed by the filing of the present complaint was untenable. To
invoke Article 19 of the Civil Code, the defendant must act with bad faith or i
ntent to prejudice the plaintiff. Quoting Tolentino, abuse of right exists when i
t is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. Given thi
s premise, the Courts held that PDPIs act of rejecting BMCs offer to settle was no
t made to prejudice or injure BMC. It is also a fundamental rule that good faith
is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleg
ing the same. BMC, in this case, has failed to prove the bad faith of PDPI. On t
he contrary, the Court finds the reasons of PDPI to be legitimate. As pointed ou
t, the corporation had its own "cash position to protect in order for it to pay
its own obligations." With this in mind, BMCs prayer for moral and exemplary dama
ges must also be rejected, in lieu of Article 2219 (10). As to the second issue,
the Court ruled that the stipulation provided constitutes a penal clause, and t
hus, BMC is required to pay interest, attorneys fees and collection fees. However
, given the power of the courts to reduce the penalty whenever it is found to be
iniquitous or unconscionable, the Court believes that 10% of the principal amou
nt is adequate to cover both attorneys and collection fees.
BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 120639 (1998) Facts: Ricardo Marasigan, a lawyer by profession, was a c
omplimentary member of the BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC) from February 198
8 to February 1989. Said corporation issued him Credit Card No. 100-012-5534 wit
h a credit limit of P3,000.00. Said membership to BECC was renewed until Februar
y 1990 at an increased credit limit of P5,000.00. The contention arose when Mara
sigan failed to timely pay his account for October 1989 amounting to P8,987.84.
Through Marasigans secretary, BECC informed him that they are demanding immediate
payment of his balance, the deposit of a P15,000.00 to cover his future bills,
and threatened to suspend his credit card. A postdated check was issued by Maras
igan from the Far East Bank and Trust, Co. and was received by BECCs co-employees
on November 23, 1989. The same was forwarded to the collection department a wee
k later. 5 days after receipt, BECC served Marasigan a letter informing him of t
he temporary suspension of his credit card privileges and the inclusion of his a
ccount number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further us
e of his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that his membe
rship will be permanently cancelled unless he settles his outstanding account wi
th the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter. Marasigan, however, d
id not receive the letter before December 8, 1989, the day wherein he entertaine
d several guests at Caf Adriatico. Upon presentment of his credit card to foot th
e bill of P735.32, said card was dishonored. One of his guests, Mary Ellen Ringl
er, paid the bill by using her own credit card. Correspondence was sent out by M
arasigan, seeking that he be sent the exact bill due him as of December 15, 1989
, to withhold the deposit of his postdated check, and return the same due to his
instruction to stop payment. No reply was given by BECC, prompting Marasigan to

send another letter reminding the BECC that he had long cancelled whatever arra
ngement he entered into with the Corporation and requested for his correct billi
ng, less improper charges and penalties, and for an explanation within 5 days fr
om receipt thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989 despite assur
ance by defendants personnel-in-charge, otherwise court action shall be filed t
o hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by h
im. In turn, final demand was sent to Marasigan dated March 21, 1990 requiring h
im to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated fees and charges, wi
thin 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action, as well as replace the po
stdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for violati
on of the B.P. 22. Marasigan, in turn, demanded BECCs compliance with his earlier
request, or face court action. A complaint for damages against BECC was filed b
efore the Makati RTC. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Marasigan,
finding BECC had abused its right in contravention of Article 19 of the Civil Co
de. It ordered BECC to pay a) 100,000 as moral damages, b) 50,000 as exemplary d
amages and c) 20,000 as attorneys fees. On the other hand, the lower court ordere
d Marasigan to pay for his outstanding obligation worth 14,439.41. On appeal, th
e decision was affirmed but modified, ordering BECC to pay a) 50,000 as moral da
mages, b) 25,000 as exemplary damages and c) 10,000 as attorneys fees. Issue: In
canceling Marasigans credit card, did BECC abuse his right under the terms and co
nditions of their contract? Held: BECC did not abuse its right. To find the exis
tence of an abuse of right under Article 19 the following elements must be prese
nt: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The Court went on to di
stinguish damage, damages and injury, the latter being an illegal invasion of a
legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, wh
ile damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
In order to maintain an action for the injury, one must establish that such inju
ries resulted from a breach of duty which a defendant owed to a plaintiff - a co
ncurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person caus
ing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that a
n individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a br
each of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages
may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of th
e injury.
Acts Contra Bonus Mora
Ruiz v. Secretary of National Defense
G.R. No. L-15526 (1963) Facts: Allied Technologists, Inc. (ATI) and the Republic
of the Philippines entered into a contract for the construction of the Veterans
Memorial Hospital in September 11, 1950. Ruiz and Herrera were stockholders of
ATI. The construction of the said hospital was halted in 1955, followed by the f
iling of 2 civil cases in succession by Ruiz and Herrera against ATI, the Secret
ary of National Defense, Col. Nicolas Jimenez, the head of the Engineering Group
of the DND and Pablo Panlilio, as Auditor of the DND. The first case (CC No. 23
778) was dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954 as affirmed by the high Court
on July 7, 1955. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed on September 13, 1955.
On appeal, the high Court reversed the order of dismissal, under the impression
that the real controversy was confined merely between Panlilio, Ruiz and Herrera
over the 15% of the contract price, which was retained by the DND, which was or
iginally made to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in the course of
the construction. Civil Case No. 26601 was remanded to its court of origin for
further proceedings. Panlilio and ATI filed their amended answers, stating that
the amount retained by the DND was already paid to ATI, as sought for by the Rui
z and Herrera in their complaint. In view of this development, the trial court i
nvited the parties to a conference, in which the Ruiz and Herrera indicated thei
r conformity, to the dismissal of the complaint with respect to the retention of
the 15% of the contract price; but insisted upon the hearing of the second ques
tion, which sought the declaration and recognition of Ruiz and Herrera, as two o
f the three architects of the hospital. The trial court dismissed the complaint,

for being moot and academic.

architects of the hospital. The trial court dismissed the complaint, for being m
oot and academic. Issue: Did the lower court err in ordering the dismissal of th
e case? Held: The trial court made no error. Ruiz and Herrera contend that the o
nly ground relied upon by the trial court to dismiss the case without trial is t
he allegation that the amount retained by the DND had already been paid, yet exc
ept for this bare allegation, no evidence was adduced to prove the truth of the
same. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the same is true, neverthele
ss the first part of the first cause of action still remains, for which they had
insisted upon a hearing to establish their right to be recognized as two of the
three architects of the hospital; that because the pleadings do not show any gr
ound which might legally justify the action taken by the lower court, the latter
should not have ordered the dismissal of the entire case but should have ordere
d only the striking out of the moot portion of appellants first cause of action
, based upon Article 21 of the Civil Code. This cannot be given merit. As found
by the trial court, Ruiz and Herreras first cause of action is composed of: a) ju
dicial declaration or recognition that Ruiz and Herrera, together with Panlilio,
were the architects of the Veterans Hospital; and b) injunction restraining gov
ernment officials paying Panlilio the sum retained, as per stipulation contained
in the contract. By discarding the Secretary and other officials of the DND, as
defendants, Ruiz and Herrera could not expect the trial court to order them to
recognize and declare them co-architects in the construction of the hospital. An
d, as the amount retained by the Department on the contract price, which retenti
on was authorized by the contract, was, as sought by the appellants, already pai
d to the ATI, there is nothing more for the trial court to decide, even without
first ruling on the special defenses of Panlilio and ATI. Ruiz and Herreras relia
nce on Article 21 of the Civil Code is unfounded. They contend that the word "in
jury" in the said article, refers not only to any indeterminate right or propert
y, but also to honor or credit. However, although this article envisions a situa
tion where a person has a legal right which is violated by another in a manner c
ontrary to morals, good customs or public policy, it presupposes loss or injury,
material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said violation. The
pleadings do not show that damages were ever asked in connection with this case,
predicated upon the said article. Under the facts and circumstances in this cas
e, one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that the failure or refusal to ex
tend the recognition was an act contrary to morals, good customs or public polic
y.
Breach of promise to marry, seduction and sexual assault
Wassmer vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 (1964) Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, follow
ing their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 19
54 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left Wassmer with a note stating t
hat the wedding must be postponed, as Velezs mother opposes it. He also asked Was
smer not to fuss. The following day, however, Velez sent Wassmer another telegra
m, stating that nothing has changed, and he shall return very soon. Velez was ne
ver seen by Wassmer nor heard from again after that. Wassmer filed a suit for da
mages against Velez. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Judgment
was rendered in favor of Wassmer, ordering Velez to pay P2,000.00 as actual dam
ages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorneys fees; a
nd the costs of the suit. Velez filed a petition for relief from orders, judgmen
t and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Plaintiff moved
to strike it out, but the Court ordered the parties to explore at this stage of
the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement. Following
a series of failed attempts to amicably settle the matter, the court issued an
order denying defendants aforesaid petition. Hence, Velezs appeal to the high Co
urt. In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant ass
erts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to mar
ry. As stated in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, a mere breach of a promise to m
arry is not an actionable wrong. Issue: Should the lower courts decision be set as

ide, removing Wassmers right to claim damages? Held: The lower courts decision mus
t be affirmed, as what was done by the high Court in this case. The extent to wh
ich acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless
for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who willfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or pub
lic policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." The record reveals that
Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract marriage, set a wedding day
for September 4, 1954, Printed and distributed wedding invitations to relatives,
friends and acquaintances, purchased dresses and other apparel for the importan
t occasion and the like. And then, with but two days before the wedding, Velez s
imply left. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As sta
ted, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite d
ifferent. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 afore
said. Velez also contends that the moral damages awarded were excessive, and sho
uld be totally eliminated. This argument, however is devoid of merit. Under the
above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner." The high Courts opinion, however, is that cons
idering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemp
lary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
TANJANCO vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-18630 (1966) Facts: Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli Santos, the for
mer expressing and professing his undying love and affection for her who also, i
n due time reciprocated the tender feelings. In consideration of Tanjancos promis
e to marry Santos, she consented to Tanjancos pleas for carnal knowledge, as a re
sult of which Santos conceived a child. To avoid embarrassment and social humili
ation due to her pregnancy, Santos resigned from her job in IBM, Philippines as
a secretary, thereby unable to support herself and her baby. Tanjanco, on the ot
her hand, refused to marry Santos, as well as recognize their unborn child, prom
pting her to file suit to compel Tanjanco to recognize the unborn child she was
bearing, to give her support of not less than P430.00 a month, plus P100,000.00
in moral and exemplary damages and P10,000.00 attorneys fees. Tanjanco, in turn
, filed a motion to dismiss. The lower court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action. On appeal, the CA held that no cause of action was
shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but d
ecreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on A
rticle 21 of the Civil Code. It set aside the lower courts decision and directed
the same to proceed with the case. This prompted Tanjanco to appeal to the high
Court. Issue: Is Tanjanco correct in pleading that actions for breach of a promi
se to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction? Held: The Court ruled in t
he affirmative. The Appellate court erred by relying upon a memorandum submitted
by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft
of the Civil Code, which provided this example: "A" seduces the nineteen-year o
ld daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or cannot be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, a
s the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for brea
ch of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong h
as been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable
moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But unde
r the proposed article (now Article 21), she and her parents would have such a r
ight of action. Indeed, the CA overlooked the fact that the memorandum referred
to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced, which connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded. Given the circumstances of this case, t
he facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Santos, a woman o
f adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Tanjanco with repeated ac
ts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Ther

e is voluntariness and mutual passion in this case, for had the she been deceive
d, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and
wiles of the Tanjanco, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much l
ess for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut all sexual relations upon finding that defendant di
d not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made un
der Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no
error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the

conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other c
ause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Insta
nce in dismissing the complaint. The dismissal, however, must be understood to b
e without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of Tanjanco.
On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the childs own rights
are not here involved.
Bunag vs. CA
G.R. No. 101749 (1992) Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida Cirilo, after reach
ing a hotel/motel and having sexual intercourse, went to Pamplona in Las Pias, wh
ere they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, even filing an applicat
ion for a marriage license in Cavite. Bunag, Jr., however, withdrew the applicat
ion on October 1, 1973. Cirilos version of the case recites that she and Bunag we
re lovers. She also states was brought to the hotel/motel against her will where
Bunag succeeded in raping her, and that thereafter, she was allowed to go home
only after they were married. They then went to Bunags grandmothers house in Las P
ias where they lived as husband and wife, but on September 29, 1973, Bunag left a
nd never returned, bringing Cirilo humiliation and shame because of Bunags decept
ion. This was corroborated by Cirilos uncle, Vivencio, who added that Bunags fathe
r, Bunag, Sr. wanted to settle things and have the couple wed. Bunag, Jr., on th
e other hand, insists that he did not rape Cirilo. In fact, he and Cirilo had pl
ans to elope and get married. However, due to bitter disagreements over money an
d threats to his person, Bunag, Jr. broke off the engagement. A complaint for da
mages was filed by Cirilo for Bunag, Jr.s broken promise of marriage. In finding
that Bunag, Jr. had forcibly abducted and raped Cirilo, the trial court ruled fo
r Cirilo ordering Bunag, Jr. to pay P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as e
xemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and P10,000.00 for and
as attorneys fees, as well as the costs of suit. Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolv
ed from any and all liability. On appeal, the CA ruled to affirm the decision of
the lower court. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: Is Bunag, Jr. correct
in asserting that since the action involved breach of promise to marry, the tria
l court erred in awarding damages? Held: The high Court held that while it is tr
ue that in this jurisdiction, the time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to reco
ver money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
The award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to thos
e provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of
said Code, in relation to Article 2219 (10), any person who willfully causes lo
ss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adop
ted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numb
er of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provi
de for in the statutes. Under the prevailing circumstances, the acts of Bunag, J
r. in forcibly abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her
will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liabili
ty, only to renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days
, constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensa
te and reprehensible transgressions which justify the award of moral and exempla
ry damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2
219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Further, the dismissal of the crim
inal case against Bunag, Jr. for rape did not carry with it the extinction of th
e civil action.
Constantino vs. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227 (1992) Facts: Amelita Constantino worked as a waitress at Tonys Re
staurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was here where she met Ivan Mendez. Following
their first meeting, Mendez invited her to dinner at the Hotel Enrico. While din
ing, Mendez professed his love for Constantino. Constantino asked to be brought

home, to which Mendez agreed, on the pretext of getting something in return. Pro
mising to marry her, Mendez succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Constant
ino, then after confessing that he was a married man. This continued on to the m
onths of September and November. Constantino eventually got pregnant, and asked
for help from Mendez to support the child, but this plea fell on deaf ears. Cons
tantino was forced to leave her work as a waitress, as a result. This prompted C
onstantino to file for acknowledgment, support and the payment of actual, moral
and exemplary damages. In response, Mendez denied having sexual relations with C
onstantino and prayed for the dismissal of the case. He further prayed for the p
ayment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorneys fees for
the filing of the malicious complaint. The lower court ruled in favor of Consta
ntino, ordering Mendez to pay P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and
P3,000.00, as and by way of attorneys fees, as well as the costs of the suit. B
oth parties filed a motion for reconsideration, with the trial court finding mer
it in Constantinos motion, amending its decision by ordering Mendez to pay for ac
tual and moral damages, hospital expenses of P200.00, permanent monthly support
of P300.00, P5,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to recognize Michael Constantino as
the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez. On appeal, the CA dismissed the amended dec
ision. Issue: Is Amelita Constantino entitled to damages in this case? Held: The
high Court ruled in the negative. Amelitas claim for damages, which is based o
n Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, sits on the theory that through Ivans p
romise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity. The high Court, however, agre
es with the Court of Appeals that mere sexual intercourse is not by itself a bas
is for recovery of damages. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse
was not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire. At the time Amelita met Iv
an at Tonys Restaurant, she was already 28 years old and admitted that she was
attracted to Ivan. Her attraction is the reason why she surrendered her womanhoo
d. Had she been induced or deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could
have immediately severed her relation with Ivan when she was informed after thei
r first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he was a married man. Her
declaration that in the months of September, October and November, 1974, they re
peated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged
promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
Quimiguing vs. Icao
G.R. No. 26795 (1970) Facts: Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Fe
lix Icao. The parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confiden
tial relations. Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse w
ith Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent.
As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao, f
orcing her had to stop studying. Hence, she now claims support at P120.00 per mo
nth, damages and attorneys fees. Icao, on the other hand, moved to dismiss for
lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had be
en born. After hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendants motion a
nd dismissed the complaint. Quimiguing moved to amend the complaint to allege th
at as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby gir
l; but the court, sustaining Icaos objection, ruled that no amendment was allow
able, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Hence the appeal
directly to this Court. Issue: Was the trial court correct in sustaining Icaos mo
tion? Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. A conceived child, although as
yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purpos
es favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code. Ther
efore, an unborn child has a right to receive support from its progenitors, even
if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere." Further, for a married man to
force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original com
plaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim t
hat entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused, as mandated by Art
icle 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 2219 (3,10). Hence, Quimiguing
herself had a cause of action for damages under the terms of her complaint, and
the dismissal of the same constitutes an error on the part of the lower court.

Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396 (1962)

Facts: The case originates from the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita
Pe, who had gone missing on April 14, 1957 and at that time, was a single, 24 ye
ar old woman. Sometime in 1952, Alfonso frequented the house of Lolita on the pr
etext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the t
own of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. Eve
ntually, Lolitas parents found out and forbade Alfonso from going to their house
and from further seeing Lolita. Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with
her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa Extension, Quezon City
. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her bro
thers and sisters checked her things and found that Lolitas clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolitas ap
arador. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and t
he NBI but up to the present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts. This
prompted the filing of the current action with the CFI-Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclu
sive of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. Defendant, after denying som
e allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts all
eged therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action. The lower
court, finding that Alfonso had carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe, being
a married man himself, declared that Alfonso cannot be held liable for moral dam
ages, it appearing that Lolitas relatives failed to prove that Alfonso deliberate
ly and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. So it rendered a decision d
ismissing the complaint Issue: May the parents and siblings of Lolita Pe recover
damages based on the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a lov
e affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing them injury in a manner contrary to mora
ls, good customs and public policy? Held: The present action is based on Article
21 of the New Civil Code. Conversely, the trial court considered the complaint
not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that Alfonso deliberatel
y and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The high Court refused to al
ign itself to this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lo
litas affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who se
duced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him, as shown by
the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wa
nted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his vi
sits to the latters family who was allowed free access because he was a collate
ral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fe
ll in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Ga
san but also in Boac. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain o
f events than that Alfonso, through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her.
The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering t
he fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolitas
family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contem
plated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
Malicious Prosecution Lao vs. Associated Anglo American Tobacco
G.R. No. 47013 (2000) Facts: The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation (
AATC) entered into a "Contract of Sales Agent" with Andres Lao. Under the contra
ct, Lao agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the AATC to his bu
siness address in Tacloban City. Lao would in turn remit the sales proceeds to A
ATC. For his services, Lao would receive commission depending on the kind of cig
arettes sold, fixed monthly salary, and operational allowance. As a guarantee to
Laos compliance with his contractual obligations, his brother Jose and his fat
her Tomas executed a deed of mortgage in favor of AATC in the amount of P200,000
.00. Lao regularly remitted the proceeds of his sales to AATC, generating, in th
e process, a great deal of business. However, in February 1968 and until about s
even (7) months later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales report. He was
reminded of his enormous accounts and the difficulty of obtaining a tally there
on despite Laos avowal of regular remittances of his collections. Sometime late

r, Esteban Co, the vice-president and general manager of AATC, summoned Lao to P
asay City for an accounting where it was established that Laos liability amount
ed to P525,053.47. And so, Lao and his brother Lao Y Ka, enlisted the services o
f the Sycip Gorres and Velayo Accounting Firm (SGV) to check and reconcile the a
ccounts. Subsequently, AATC discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction
business so much so that it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of hi
s sales to finance his business. In the demand letter of April 15, 1979,counsel
for AATC sought payment of the obligations of Lao, warning him of the intention
of AATC to foreclose the mortgage. Attached to said letter was a statement of ac
count indicating that Laos total obligations duly supported by receipts amounte
d to P248,990.82. Ngo Kheng was sent by AATC to supervise the sales operations o
f Lao in Samar and Leyte. It was discovered that, contrary to Laos allegation t
hat he still had huge collectibles from his customers, nothing was due to AATC f
rom Laos clients. From then on, Lao no longer received shipments from AATC whic
h transferred its vehicles to another compound controlled by Ngo Kheng. Shipment
s of cigarettes and the corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of N
go Kheng. On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought a complaint for ac
counting and damages with writ of preliminary injunction against AATC before the
then CFI of Leyte in Tacloban City. The lower court ordered AATC to undergo a c
ourt-supervised accounting and to pay Lao: a) P180,000 representing actual loss
of earnings, b) moral damages in the amount of P130,000.00, c) exemplary damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, d) attorneys fees in the amount of P40,000.00, e)
the compensation of the commissioners pro-rata and f) the cost of the suit. Upo
n conclusion of the accounting, the lower court revised its ruling, declaring An
dres Laos accountability to AATC in the amount of P167,745.20 and ordering him
to pay same to AATC. On appeal, AATC was ordered by the CA to pay plaintiffs P15
0,000.00 actual damages for loss of earnings, P30,000.00 by way of moral damages
and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. The supplemental decision issued by the l
ower court, further, was reversed and set aside. During the pendency of civil ca
se, Esteban Co, as vice-president of AATC filed a criminal case for estafa again
st Lao. Without awaiting the determination of the criminal case, Lao lodged a co
mplaint for malicious prosecution. The court ruled in favor of Lao declaring tha
t the estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice and ordered A
ATC and Esteban Co to jointly and severally pay Lao: a) P30,000 as actual damage
s, b) P150,000.00 as moral damages, c)P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and, d) P
50,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs. Issue: Is AATC liable for malicious pros
ecution? Held: No. A reading of the complaint reveals that the complaint for mal
icious prosecution was founded on the filing of estafa against Lao. As such, it
was prematurely filed and it failed to allege a cause of action. The Court ruled
that the complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on Article
s 20 and 21 should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. The Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court. It should be stress
ed, however, that the dismissal of subject complaint should not be taken as an a
djudication on the merits, the same being merely grounded on the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of action. Malicious prosecution has been defined as
an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil
suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without proba
ble cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding i
n favor of the defendant therein.
1
Que vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-66865 (1989) Facts: The origin of this dispute goes back to when Que
and Nicolas were still in amicable terms. In July and August of 1975, Nicolas or
dered from Que certain amounts of canvass strollers which were delivered to and
accepted by Nicolas, who issued five checks therefore to Que worth P7,600. Nicol
as, however, ordered the bank to stop payment because of defects in the articles
sold which Que had not corrected. Que for his part argued that the allegedly de
fective articles were never returned to him until after he had filed the charge
for estafa and that Nicolas had earlier merely ignored his complaints about the

dishonored checks. Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas in the offic
e of the city fiscal of Caloocan City for the issuance of several dishonored che
cks upon presentment. The charge was dismissed for lack of merit, the investigat
ing fiscal holding that the controversy was an accounting matter that did not ne
cessarily involve deceit on the part of Nicolas. Subsequently, Nicolas filed his
own complaint for damages against Que with the CFI-Bulacan, for what he claimed
was his malicious prosecution by the latter. Que now claims harassment. In his
counterclaim, he averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the complaint in Bul
acan although he was a resident of Caloocan City; that the private respondent wa
s really indebted to him in any case and

averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed the complaint in Bulacan although he
was a resident of Caloocan City; that the private respondent was really indebted
to him in any case and that it was he who had suffered damages as a result of t
he unwarranted suit. Originally, the lower court held in favor of Antonio and aw
arded him the total amount of P80,500.00 in moral, exemplary, and nominal damage
s plus a P4,000.00 attorneys fee and the costs of the suit, finding was that Qu
e had acted maliciously in filing the estafa charge and in alleging that the pla
intiff had issued the dishonored checks with deceit. Ques motion for reconsiderat
ion was denied. A second motion for reconsideration was filed after a motion to
stay the running of the period of appeal was filed. This second motion found mer
it, and reversed the original decision, awarding Que 10,000 as moral damages. On
appeal, the IAC reinstating the original decision of the trial court in favor o
f Nicolas. Issue: Had Magtanggol Que instituted a malicious prosecution against
Antonio Nicolas? Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. It is evident that
Que was not motivated by ill feeling but by anxiety to protect his rights when h
e filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscals office. If he averre
d that the Antonio had no funds in the bank when he issued the postdated checks
and intended to cheat him, it was because the circumstances of the case as Que s
aw them led him to this conclusion. Even if the fiscal found that no deceit was
involved and that the petitioners claim was unfounded, the mistaken charge was
nonetheless, in the legal sense, not malicious. As previously held in Manila Gas
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, To constitute malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humi
liate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that
his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a
case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious p
rosecution. The criminal complaint filed by the petitioner was not a mere ploy to
enforce the payment of his account by Nicolas. There was here a genuine protest
over the abrupt and suspicious order to stop the encashment of the checks issue
d to him by the private respondent. On the contrary, there is a stronger suggest
ion of malice on the part of Nicolas when he filed his suit for damages against
Que in Bulacan, notwithstanding that the place of business was in Caloocan. Howe
ver, inasmuch as good faith is presumed, and applying this presumption both to t
he petitioner and the private respondent, we hereby rule that, absent sufficient
rebuttable evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice in their mutual relati
ons.
Drilon vs CA
G.R. No. 107019 (March 20, 1997)
Facts: Drilon and company seek the reversal of the C.A. resolution affirming the
orders of Judge Macli-ing denying their motion to dismiss the complaint of mali
cious prosecution filed by Homobono Adaza. General Renato de Villa on March 20,
1990 requested the DOJ to order the investigation of several individuals, includ
ing Adaza, which he believed participated in the fail December 1989 coup dtat. Suc
h was referred to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors for inquiry. Said te
am from sufficient basis for Adazas prosecution and their report became the basis
for the filing of a complaint for the crime of rebellion with murder and frustr
ated murder on April 18, 1990 before the RTC of Quezon City. Adaza then filed a
complaint for damages on July 11, 1990 alleging that the information filed again
st him was a clear case of wilful and malicious prosecution and that the crime o
f rebellion with murder and frustrated murder was non-existent in the statute bo
oks. Drilon and company filed a Motion to Dismiss Adazas complaint on the groun
d that it states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action on Oct
ober 15, 1990. On February 8, 1991, Judge Macli-ing denied petitioners Motion t
o Dismiss. Drilon and Company then filed on June 5, 1991 a petition for certiora
ri under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; alleging Judge Macli-ing had commi
tted a grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss Adazas compla
int on the ground that the later had sufficient cause of action. Issue: Whether
or not Adazas complaint has sufficient cause of action. Held: No, Adazas complaint

does not have a sufficient cause of action. In fact his complaint suffers a fat
al infirmity as it does not state a cause of action on its face and must thus be
dismissed. Malicious prosecution has been defined in the Philippine jurisdictio
n as, An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, c
ivil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without
probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proce
eding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting o
f legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (
Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956). The statutory basis for a civil
action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the provisions of the
New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 2
1, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To prove malicious prosecution the all
the following elements must be proven and concur: (1) the fact of the prosecuti
on and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that t
he action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action,
the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was ac
tuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. None
of the above requisites were shown in the complaint of Adaza, thus rendering it
dismissible under Sec. 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. The fact th
at Adaza was granted bail on account of a writ of habeas corpus is not sufficien
t ground for the filing of his complaint. Moreover a complaint for malicious pro
secution can only be filed if legal prosecution has been carried out without pro
bable cause. Probable cause has been proven by the special composite team of pro
secutors, and thus malicious prosecution has not been committed. The prosecutors
decision not to apply the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs. Hernande
z which enunciates that murder and common crimes committed as a necessary means
for rebellion must be complexed, cannot be held as malicious as the prosecutors b
elieved that the case against Adaza could be differentiated. The prosecutors bel
ieve that said acts of murder and frustrated murder committed by Adaza were not
necessary for the rebellion. Adazas error of failing to allege sufficient facts t
o constitute a cause of action for malicious prosecution on the face of his comp
laint should have been painfully obvious to Judge Macli-ing. The judges failure t
o notice such and denying the motion to dismiss the said complaint for said reas
on is indeed a grave abuse of discretion.

Public Humiliation
Patricio vs. Leviste
G.R. No. L-51832 (April 26, 1989) Facts: Fr. Rafael Patricio, director general o
f the 1976 town fiesta of Pilar, Capiz was was slapped in public by Bienvenido B
acalocos, who was then the president of the association of barangay captains of
Pilar, Capiz. The incident occurred on May 16, 1976 at about 10 p.m. during the
benefit dance at the public auditorium. Bacalocos was then drunk and hand injure
d his hand after smashing his bottle of alcohol on the table. Bacalocos then app
roached Fr. Patricio and suddenly hit the latters face with his bloodied hand. A
criminal complaint for slander by deed was filed, but was subsequently dismissed
. Fr. Patricio then filed a complaint for damages which was decided in his favor
on April 18, 1978 resulting in the award of moral damages of P 10,000, exemplar
y damages of P 1,000 and attorneys fees of 2,000. Fr. Patricio filed for a motion
of execution of judgement on June 9, 1978, but was informed that such could not
be done as a pending motion for reconsideration was apparently filed. Fr. Patri
cio then replied that the filing of said motion was without notice to him nor wa
s there proof of service, thus the case had become final and unappealable. Bacal
ocos replied stating that a copy of the motion had been served by ordinary mail
to the petitioner. On August 3, 1979 the trial court ordered the dismissal of Fr

. Patricios complaint stating that the motion for reconsideration must be given d
ue course and that the award of

On August 3, 1979 the trial court ordered the dismissal of Fr. Patricios complain
t stating that the motion for reconsideration must be given due course and that
the award of moral and exemplary damages was not proper as compensatory or actua
l damages have not been proven. Fr. Patricio then filed this petition for review
on certiorari, contenting that he had not been served notice of the motion for
reconsideration, nor was there proof of such service, that the sending of the co
py of said motion by regular mail did not cure said defect and finally that actu
al damages need not be proven before moral damages are given. Bacalocos replied
that the order of the court a quo worked to inform Fr. Patricio of the motion an
d gave the latter opportunity to be heard; curing the defect. Bacalocos also rea
soned that moral damages cannot be given as his act of slapping the priest was a
n accident cause by drunkenness and is absent of any bad faith. Issue: Whether B
acalocos is liable for damages? Held: Yes, he is liable for damages. With respec
t to the deficiency in the notice for the motion of reconsideration, the court d
eems the defect cured. Despite the fact that the notice was mailed via regular s
ervice and not registered mail, such technicality may be set aside because ultim
ately Fr. Patricio was able to appear before the court and have his side heard.
Such is the spirit and purpose of the rule on notice and hearing. As regards to
the complaint for damages, the lower courts theory that moral damages may only be
awarded when actual damages are proven is untenable. Moral damages may be award
ed in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of the Civ
il Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that physical injury was caus
ed upon the complainant. There is no question that moral damages may be recovere
d in cases where a defendants wrongful act or omission has caused the complaina
nt physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reput
ation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury; as
is, in the case at bar. Bacalocos assertion that bad faith was not present when h
e hit the priest is also wanting, due to the fact that it was proven that a long
time feud existed between their families. Further, Bacalocos cannot hide behind
the fact that he was drunk as he should be held responsible for all his actions
. Thus, Fr. Patricio may be awarded moral and exemplary damages, together with a
ttorneys fees for Bacalocos acts which are violation of article 21 in relation to
article 2219 of the New Civil Code.

Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino

Gr No. L-48250 (December 28, 1979) Facts: Jose J. Espino a civil engineer and an
executive at Proctor and Gamble was shopping at South Supermarket in Makati on
the morning of August 22, 1970. He had picked up a rat tail file from one of the s
helves, placed it in his shirt pocket, with a good part of it exposed, and forgo
t to pay for it when he got to the cashier. As he and his wife and daughters wer
e leaving the supermarket with their shopping bags, a security guard of the stor
e approached Espino and informed him that he had an item in his pocket which he
did not pay for. Espino immediately apologised and started to walk towards the c
ashier to pay for the item. He was then stopped by the guard and asked to go to
the back of the supermarket to write an incident report as this was supposedly t
he procedure of the establishment. Espino stated on the report that he put the i
tem in his pocket as he was talking with his helper while in the store and that
he merely forgot to present it to the cashier. Espino was then lead into the Sup
ermarket and the report was given to Nelia Santos-Fandino who was seated at a de
sk beside the first checkout counter. Nelia after reading the report remarked th
at this was another case of theft, to which Espino explained that he merely forg
ot the rat tail in his pocket and that he had the intention to pay for it. Neilia t
hen replied to the effect that that was the same thing all shoplifters say when
they are caught. This was done while people were lining up and paying for the it
ems they shopped. Espino was then made to pay a fine of 5 pesos, which Nelia rea
soned was a prize for the guard who apprehended him. Espino then paid the fine a

nd was made to line up at the cashier to pay for the item. As he waited in line
he was stared at and people were talking about him. Extremely humiliated by the
incident he immediately left the premises after paying. Espino filed a complaint
on October 8, 1970 founded on article 21 in relation to article 2219 of the New
Civil Code and prayed for damages. The CFI of Pasig, Rizal dismissed the compla
int; but the Court of Appeals reversed such. Espino was granted moral damages at
P 75,000, exemplary damages of P 25,000 Pesos, attorneys fees at P 5,000 and the
return of the P 5 fine. Grand Union Supermarket now appeals said decision citin
g that Espino was guilty of theft and that their action of apprehending and fini
ng him was merely an exercise of their right to protect their property as enunci
ated in article 429 of the New Civil Code. They also stated that there was proba
ble cause for his apprehension, that it was not done with malice or bad faith an
d the proximate cause for such was Espinos own actions. They also argued that eve
n if damages were in order, the amounts awarded were unconscionable. Issue:

Whether the act of apprehending Espino in such a manner would render the superma
rket liable?
Held: Yes, such actions do render the supermarket liable. The court believes Esp
ino committed an honest mistake when he forgot to pay for his item. This was pro
ven by the fact that he put it in his pocket while he was preoccupied and that h
e apologised and immediately moved to pay for such at the instance the guard ale
rted him. The fact that he was an engineer, an executive of Proctor and Gamble,
an esteemed member of society and a regular customer of the supermarket also bel
ies motive to steal an item of an insignificant amount, which he was more than c
apable of paying for. Further, he was also in the company of his family, a deter
rent from criminal activity. It is also evident from the facts of the case that
Espino was falsely accused of being a shoplifter in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy and thus may be awarded damages. His being identi
fied as a shoplifter in the incident report, being called such by Nelia and bein
g made to pay a fine with a threat to call the police and report the incident if
he would not do so, truly caused him humiliation and embarrassment. However, th
e amount of damages should be modified. Espinos forgetfulness was the proximate c
ause of the incident, and such contributory negligence would work to reduce the
damages awarded, as enunciated in article 2214 of the New Civil Code. The court
also considers the fact that the presence of shoppers in the premises was merely
coincidental as it is a public place and their presence was not actively called
for by the management in order to humiliate Espino. The court also believes tha
t the managements policy to have Espino brought to the back of the supermarket to
make a report and to present him to one of the officers was not intentionally d
one to humiliate him because the supermarkets business success would be compromis
ed if it was seen that their public relations with customers were intentionally
such. Moral damages are reduced to P 5,000, exemplary damages are deleted, attor
neys fees are reduced to P 2,000 and the P 5 fine must be returned.

Unjust Dismissal
Singapore Airlines vs. Pano Gr No. L-47739 June 22, 1983 Melencio-Herrera, J. Fa
cts: Carlos E. Cruz accepted employment as Engineer Officer with Singapore Airli
nes on August 30, 1974. His contract included a bond binding him for five years.
He signed the contract with B.E. Villanueva as surety. Later on Singapore airli
nes claimed that Cruz had breached the contract by going on unauthorized leave w
ithout pay without the requisite approval of his superiors. The airline sought p
ayment of liquidated damages of $53,968.00 or (P161,904.00); $883.91 or (P2,651.
73) as overpayment in salary; $61.00 or (P183.00) for cost of uniforms and acces

sories supplied by the company plus $230.00, or (P690.00), for the cost of a fli
ght manual; and $1,533.71, or (P4,601.13) corresponding to the vacation leave he
had availed of but to which he was no longer entitled; exemplary damages attorn
eys fees; and costs. Cruz argued that there could not be any breach of contract
as he was not actually required to serve for five years straight. He further po
sited that he had left the company on valid grounds which was accepted by the co
mpany, and thus no damages may be awarded. Villanueva on the other hand filled a
cross-claim against Cruz for any damages the former may be held liable against
the airline. Villanueva argued that he was not a surety but a mere guarantor.

may be held liable against the airline. Villanueva argued that he was not a sure
ty but a mere guarantor. On October 28, 1977, Judge Pano dismissed the complaint
, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack of jurisdiction; stating that the issue
stems from an employer-employee relationship and thus jurisdiction is vested exc
lusively with the Labor Arbiter as enunciated in article 216 of the Labor Code.
Singapore airlines filed for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied, thu
s their recourse to the Supreme Court. Issue:

Whether the case is cognizable by the Civil Courts or the Labor Arbiter?
Held: The Civil Courts hold jurisdiction over the case at bar. The case is actua
lly grounded on the breach of contract by Cruz and not on his employer-employee
relationship with the airline. This was clearly manifested by Cruzs refusal and f
ailure to report for duty without just cause and with malice and bad faith when
he took his unauthorized leave which was in contravention with the stipulations
of his contract. It is evident that the complaint was anchored on the effects of
Cruzs abandonment of work, which entitled the airline to damages. Singapore Airl
ines does not seek the application of Labor laws but of the Civil Code regarding
liquidated damages for the breach of a contract. Secondarily, the assertion of
Villanueva that he is a mere guarantor is definitely a civil issue outside of th
e Labor Arbiters jurisdiction. Thus, the case must be remanded to the proper Regi
onal Trial Court.
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
G.R. No. L-59825 (September 11, 1982) Facts: On December 20, 1977 at about 1 in
the afternoon Cosme de Aboitiz, the president and chief executive officer, went
to the Pepsi-Cola plant in Muntinlupa and shouted at Ernesto Medina, the former
plant manager and Jose G. Ong, the former plant comptroller. De Aboitiz did so i
n front of all the employees, exclaiming: GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU S
HUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU ARE FIRED (Medina). YOU TOO ARE F
IRED! (Ong) Medina and Ong filed a joint complaint for oral defamation on Januar
y 9, 1978 but the judge dismissed the complaint during the preliminary investiga
tion on the ground that such expletives were said not as an insult or to cause h
umiliation, but merely as an expression of anger and displeasure on the part of
de Aboitiz. Medina and Ong subsequently filed a petition for review which revers
ed the earlier resolution. Apparently de Aboitiz was angry because the Muntinlup
a plant had been delayed in the use of promotional crowns. Medina reasoned in hi
s complaint that his plant was not that only one which was delayed and thus ther
e was no cause for his humiliating dismissal. Further he opined that such remova
l was calculated in order to bring about the most humiliation as it was done in
front of all of his subordinates hours before the Christmas party; the dismissal
was executed by de Aboitiz himself and not another lower ranking officer, that
it was made just after they were awarded loyalty rings for their long service wi
th the company and that it was done just five days before Christmas. The court a
warded Medina and Ong P 300,000 in moral damages, P 100,000 in exemplary damages
, P 5,000 in litigation expenses and P 10,000 and P 200 per appearance as attorn
eys fees. De Aboitiz moved to dismiss said complaint on the ground of lack of jur
isdiction, but was subsequently denied because the case was declare to be a civi
l case for damages and not one regarding their employer-employee relationship, w
hich would in the latter case be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. On January 23,
1981 de Aboitiz again filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground that P.D.
No. 1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Batasan Pamb
ansa Bldg. 70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of the Labor C
ode vested exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiter and included Art. 248, th
ereof ... "which may include claims for damages and other affirmative reliefs."
Thus, the case was regarded by the court a quo as now being within the jurisdict

ion of the Labor Arbiter. Said court also ruled that because said presidential d
ecree was a curative statute, it could be applied retroactively and thus the cas
e was dismissed. Issue: Whether the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 did indeed rem
ove the case from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts? Held: No, said law did n
ot do so. The Labor Code has no relevance in the case as it does not provide the
reliefs sought for by Medina and Ong. Said reliefs could only be granted by the
Civil Code as it is an action for torts and damages. Medina and Ong did not all
ege any unfair labor practice in their complaint. Thus this case is governed by
the Civil Code and not the Labor Code. The petition is granted and the case rein
stated to be decided on the merits.

Derelection of duty
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
Gr No. L-14986 (July 31, 1962)
Facts: On October 5, 1958 Jose amaro was assaulted and shot near the city govern
ment building of Silay, Negros Occidental by a police officer. He, together with
his father and witnesses went to the office of Ambrosio Sumanguit, the chief of
police of the city to complain. However instead of gaining assistance they were
harassed terrorized and were forced to give up prosecuting the crime. Amaro sti
ll persisted and obtained the aid of the city attorney who was about to file an
information for the illegal discharge of firearm against one of the police offic
ers. Because of this, the harassment by the chief of police continued, trying to
force the Amaros to give up and sign prepared affidavits exculpating the police
from dereliction of duty with regard to the above said crime.

The complaint was dismissed upon Sumanguits motion, on the ground that it does no
t it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Issue: Whe
ther such dismissal is valid on such ground? Held: No, such dismissal was invali
d. Although the complaint did not specifically allege so, it was an action predi
cated on articles 21 and 27 of the Civil Code. The facts presented although vagu
e do constitute an actionable dereliction of duty as enunciated in article 27 as
the chief of police refused to give them assistance without just cause, when it
was said officers duty to perform such. Although the complaint was imperfectly d
rafted, ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain, such are not grounds for dismissal
of the case under Rule 8. The proper procedure would be to ask for a bill of par
ticulars under Rule 16 to fix said curable defects. The Amaros have recourse to
file their complaint for illegal discharge of firearm directly with the city att
orney and/or file an administrative complaint against the chief of police. Both
of which do not preclude an action for damages under article 27 of the Civil Cod
e. Thus, the dismissal is set aside and the case remanded to the appropriate cou
rt for further proceedings.

Violation of human dignity and Privacy

St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. C.A.

St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. C.A. GR No L-46061 (November 14, 1984) Facts: S
t. Louis Reality Corp. caused to be published on the December 15, 1968 Sunday Ti
mes an advertisement featuring the house of Dr. Conrado J. Aramil. Said advertis
ement was entitled Where the Heart is, showed a picture of Dr. Aramils house but wi
th the family of Arcadio S. Acradio depicted as the owners. It also had written
text stating that the Arcadios had purchased such house in Brookside Hills villa
ge at an affordable rate. Such was done without the permission of Dr. Aramil. Up
on seeing a reprint of the advertisement on the same paper on January 5, 1969, D
r. Aramil immediately wrote said reality corporation stating that the latter did
not obtain permission to post his house in the advertisement and depict it as b
eing owned by another family. Dr. Aramil explained that it has caused him humili
ation as his colleagues and friends who recognize his house or have been to such
have uttered remarks questioning the ownership of his house, his integrity, if
he rented the house from the Arcadios and even that his wife was that of another
husband. He then warned the corporation that he would pursue legal action if su
ch acts were not explained satisfactorily to him within one week of receipt of t
he letter. Said letter was received and answered by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer
of said corporation who was in charge of advertising. He immediately stopped its
publication and contacted Dr. Aramil to apologise. However no rectification or
apology was ever published. Dr. Aramils counsel demanded actual, moral and exempl
ary damages of P 110,000 from the corporation on February 20, 1969. The corporat
ion answered by claiming that it was an honest mistake and that a rectification
will be made. The corporation published a new advertisement on March 18, 1969 wh
ich again portrayed the Arcadio family, but this time with their real house. How
ever no apology or rectification was included. This led to the filing of a compl
aint for damages against the said corporation on March 29, 1969. The lower court
and appellate court ruled in favor of Dr. Aramil; awarding him P 8,000 as actua
l damages, P 20,000 as moral damages and P 2,000 for attorneys fees. Issue:

Whether the case is covered by article 26 of the Civil Code?

Held: Yes, the case falls under said article which warrants the award of damages
to Dr. Aramil. Said article provides that "every person shall respect the digni
ty, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons".
"Prying into the privacy of anothers residence" and "meddling with or disturbin
g the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though t
hey may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for d
amages, prevention and other relief". Such article was violated when the corpora
tion released an advertisement depicting Dr. Armils home to be that of another, w
ithout Dr. Aramils permission. Further, bad faith and negligence was evident as t
he corporation refused to publish a rectification or apology despite demands.

The damages awarded are proper being enunciated by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219
of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts mentioned in Artic
le 26.
Concepcion v. CA
Gr No 120706 (January 31, 2000) Facts: Nestor Nicolas and family were leases of
an apartment owned by Florence Conception located at San Joaquin, Pasig City. Ne
stor was engaged in the business of supplying office equipment, appliances and o

ther fixtures to government agencies. He had convinced Florence to join in by in

putting capital in exchange for an equal division of profits earned. The problem
started when Florences deceased husbands brother, Rodrigo Conception, suddenly co
nfronted Nestor at his apartment on the second week of July 1985. He accused Nes
tor of being an adulterer, receiving P 100,000 from Florence to go to Baguio wit
h his family, but secretly returning to Manila to have a tryst with Florence. Ne
stor even accompanied Rodrigo to ask the relatives whom the rumor allegedly came
from, they however denied any knowledge. Rodrigo again accused Nestor of being
an adulterer when they met Florence at the terrace of her residence when the two
confronted her about the rumor. Both Nestor and Florence denied such. Rodrigo c
ontinued to harass Florence via phone, even saying that he would kill her if any
thing should happen to his mother. As a result Nestor felt ashamed and embarrass
ed to face his neighbors as they had heard or had been present during Rodrigos co
nfrontation. His business was also in decline as Florence discontinued her capit
al input. Moreover, his wife, Allem started to distrust him and constant fightin
g ensued due to the rumor spread by Rodrigo. Nestor then demanded that Rodrigo m
ake a public apology and pay damages. Rodrigo refused to do so and reasoned that
he was only protecting his familys reputation. The RTC and Court of Appeals rule
d in favor of Nestor, awarding him P 50,000 for moral damages, P25,000 for exemp
lary damages, P 10,000 for attorneys fees and the cost of suit. Issue: Whether th
e awarding is with basis or not?

Held: Yes, such decision is with legal and factual basis. First, Rodrigos claim t
hat the awarding was without legal basis is bereft of merit. His actions of conf
ronting Nestor in the latters apartment and hurling accusations that Nestor was a
n adulterer within view and hearing range of the public is indeed a violation of
articles 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code as such an act is indeed a form of defam
ation and intrudes into the privacy of Nestors home and family life. Further, und
er article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical sufferin
g, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feeli
ngs, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act or omission. Such was manifest when Nestor was so humil
iated that he could not face his neighbours, his constant quarrels with his wife
and the decline of his business. Rodrigos second contention that the facts and c
ircumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked misunderstood or glossed ove
r by respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. The court
sees no such error. The totality of the evidence and facts presented truly show
that Rodrigo had defamed Nestor. The minor inconsistencies of the testimonies an
d affidavits of witnesses do not debunk Nestors case; in fact they are a badge of
its authenticity as experience would dictate that minor inconsistencies are to
be expected. Rodrigos final contention is that the appellate court did not take i
nto account the fact that the lower courts judge who penned the decision was not
the original judge who heard his case; and is thus not in a position to properly
weigh the facts and circumstances of the case leading to a flawed decision. The
court finds this untenable. First off the Supreme Court as a rule respects the
finds of the lower court and shall not disturb such unless it finds good reason
to do so. No such reason in this case exists or has been proven. The mere fact t
hat the lower court judge who penned the decision was not the one who heard the
case does not destroy the presumption of regularity of the judges performance. Th

e judge is presumed and held to have made his decision after reviewing the facts
and circumstances which are kept in the records of the case. Thus the totality
of the facts and circumstances lead the court to believe that indeed Rodrigo had
defamed Nestor and is thus liable for damages. The damages previously awarded a
re affirmed.

Concept of Damages
Heirs of Borlado vs. Vda. De Bulan
G.R. 114118 (2001) Facts: A parcel of land owned by Serapio Borlado, grandfather
of petitioners, was sold for consideration to Francisco Bacero who in turn sold
it to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon, respondents herein. Th
e respondents had been in continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted, adverse and exclu
sive possession of the lot until petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physic
al possession thereof from them. Respondents filed an ejectment suit against pet
itioners, which was decided in their favour. The court ordered petitioners to va
cate the land and to pay to respondents a total

Respondents filed an ejectment suit against petitioners, which was decided in th

eir favour. The court ordered petitioners to vacate the land and to pay to respo
ndents a total amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay as wel
l as attorneys fees and the cost of suit. Issue:

Whether the CA erred in declaring the respondents as owners of the lot.

Held: The petition was denied since the issue involved was factual and did not f
all under the exceptions that the SC may not review factual findings of the CA o
n appeal via certiorari. However, the court modified the judgment with respect t
o the award of the cavans of palay as a form of damages in the absence of legal
basis since "Palay" is not legal tender currency in the Philippines.
Lazatin vs. Twano
GR No. L-12736 (July 31, 1961)
Facts: Properties of appellant Lazatin were levied and sold in public auction to
satisfy a judgment in favour of herein appellees Twao and Castro. Lazatin deposi
ted the redemption price with the Sheriff before the expiration of the redemptio
n period. To ensure payment of claim in the present action, Lazatin secured a wr
it of attachment on the amount deposited. Issue: Whether the estate of Lazatin i
s liable to pay damages for the alleged malicious attachment Held: The defendant
s, Twao and Castro, are not entitled to moral damages. The law on damages is foun
d on Title XVII of the Civil Code but rules governing damages laid down in other
laws, and the principles of the general law on damages are adopted in so far as
they are not in consistent with the Code. Moral damages may be recovered, among
others, in cases of malicious prosecution. But in order that moral damages may
be recovered in connection with a writ of attachment, malice must exist. The Rul
es of Court requiring the attachment plaintiff to provide a bond from which the
costs and all damages are to be enforced should the court find that the plaintif
f is not entitled to the attachment merely provides recovery on the bond based o
n the undertaking and not from any tortious act. Consequently, the appellees may
recover only the actual damages and not moral damages.
Actual or Compensatory Damages
Algarra vs. Sandejas
GR No L-8385 (March 24, 1914) Facts: Plaintiff filed a civil action against defe
ndant for injuries resulting from an automobile collision due to the latters faul
t. At the time of the accident, plaintiff sold the products of a distillery and
made an average of P50 per month. As a result of the collision, plaintiff incurr
ed medical expenses, and suffered business losses with only four out of his twen
ty regular customers remaining. The lower court refused to grant plaintiffs claim
for injuries to his business due to his enforced absence therefrom. Issue: Whet
her plaintiff is entitled to damages for injuries to his business Held: An actio
n for damages is based on Article 1902, which provides: A person who, by act or o
mission, causes damage to another where there is fault or negligence shall be ob
liged to repair the damage so done. Actual damages include not only loss already
suffered, but loss of profits which may not have been realized. Under both Ameri
can Law and the Spanish Civil Code, actual damages for a negligent act or omissi
on include those foreseen at the time of the injury or its necessary consequence
. Evidently, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages resulting from his actual
incapacity. With respect to the damage to his business the court ruled that the p
rofits of an established business may be considered in calculating the measure o
f damages for an interruption of it.
Kinds of Actual Damages
Integrated Packaging Corp. vs. CA
GR No. 115117 (June 8, 2000)

Facts: Petitioner, Integrated Packaging, and private respondent, Fil-Anchor Pape

r Co., Inc., entered into a contract whereby private respondent would deliver 34
50 reams of printing paper on specified schedules to be paid within a maximum pe
riod of ninety days. Private respondent delivered 1097 out of 3450 reams to peti
tioner, but the latter failed to pay the amount due causing private respondent t
o file a collection suit against petitioner. In its counterclaim petitioner cont
ends that by reason of respondents failure to deliver the 3450 reams as agreed u
pon, it was unable to complete its printing obligation with Philacor resulting t
o actual damages and unrealized expected profits. Issue: Whether private respond
ent is liable for petitioners breach of contract with Philacor. Held: Private res
pondent was justified in suspending its deliveries when petitioner failed to pay
within ninety days from receipt of the goods as agreed upon. Neither may privat
e respondent be held liable for the breach of contract committed by petitioner a
gainst Philacor when respondent was not a party thereto. Indemnification for dam
ages includes loss suffered or actual damages (damnum emergens) and profits whic
h the obligee failed to obtain or compensatory damages (lucrum cessans); however
, it is necessary to prove actual amount of loss. The court ruled that it was er
roneous to conclude that petitioner would have earned a profit of P 790, 324.30
since these were based on speculation and were hypothetical. Neither is petition
er entitled to moral damages in the absence of bad faith, or gross negligence am
ounting to bad faith.
Attorneys fees
Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73886 (January 31, 1989)
Facts: On June 18, 1983, herein petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial
court for the confirmation of his attorneys fees. According to him, there was a
n oral agreement between him and the late Dr.Casasola with regard to his attorne
ys fees, which agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asunc
ion Vda. De Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garc
ia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant to said agreement, t
he attorneys fees would be computed as follows: A. In case of recovery of the P
120,000.00 surety bond, the attorneys fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Qu
irante) shall be P30,000.00. B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in ex
cess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally between the Heirs of I
. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz. The trial court granted
the motion for confirmation in an order dated March 20, 1984, despite an opposi
tion thereto. It also denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of conf
irmation in its second order dated May 25, 1984. The Court of Appeals set aside
the two orders and made the previous restraining order permanent. Issue: Whether
or not Petitioner Quirante is allowed to recover his attorneys fees even if the
case has not yet been decided?

Held: What is being claimed here as attorneys fees by petitioners is, however,
different from attorneys fees as an item of damages provided for under Article
2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not
of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who
may enforce the judgment for attorneys fees by execution.
14
Here, the petitioners claims are based on an alleged contract for professional
services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
Since the main case from which the petitioners claims for their fees may arise
has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and th
e amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity
in the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an i
ncident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the c
lient. Thus, it was ruled that:
... an attorneys fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has b
een decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The
issue over attorneys fee only arises when something has been recovered from whi
ch the fee is to be paid.
15
As regards to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorneys fees by s
ome of the heirs of the deceased. We are of the considered view that the orderly
administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by th
e court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same contingencies in
determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorneys fe
es by both petitioners herein. The court below will be in a better position, aft
er the entire case shall have been adjudicated, inclusive of any liability of PH
ILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs of Dr.Casasola in the awa
rd, to determine with evidentiary support such matters like the basis for the en
titlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz and as to whether the agreement a
llegedly entered into with the late Dr.Casasola would be binding on all his heir
s, as contended by petitioner Quirante. We, therefore, take exception to and rej
ect that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the al
leged confirmation to attorneys fees should not adversely affect the non-signat
ories thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the
Casasola family, hence the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a hol
ding may be pre-emptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented
for consideration by the trial court. WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation
, the decision of the respondent court subject of the present recourse is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Interest
Crismina Garments, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No.128721 (March 9, 1999) Facts: Petitioner (Crismina Garments) contracted
the services of the respondent (DWilmar Garments) for sewing 20,762 pairs of deni
ms. The total of which amounted to 76,410. Petitioner failed to pay the aforesai
d amount. As a result, Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the c
ollection of payment. Trial Court ruled in favor of the respondent and ordered t
he petitioner to pay the sum of 76,140 with interest at 12% per annum. CA affirm
ed the trial Courts ruling. Hence, a Petition for review was filed. Petitioner s
ubmits that the interest rate should be 6% pursuant to Art. 2209 of the Civil Co
de. On the other hand private respondent maintains that the interest rate should
be 12% per annum in accordance with Central bank Act, since the money sought to
be recovered by her is in the form of forbearance. Issue: Whether or not it is
proper to impose interest at the rate of 12% per annum for an obligation that do
es not involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of t

he parties. Held: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for
a piece of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of
six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of t
he demand could be established with certainty when the complaint was filed, the
six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the said complai
nt. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is s
atisfied, the interest should be reckoned at twelve percent (12%) per year. Priv
ate respondent maintains that the twelve percent (12%) interest should be impose
d, because the obligation arose from a forbearance of money. This is erroneous.
In eastern Shipping, the Court observed that forbearance in the context of the usu
ry law is a contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during a giv
en period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt
then due and payable. Using this standard, the obligation in this case was obvio
usly not a forbearance of money, goods or credit.
Mitigation of Liability
Cerrano vs. Tan Chuco
38 Phil 392 (August 1, 1918) Facts: Tan Chuco, who was then the owner of casco N
o. 1033, rented it to Vicencio Cerrano at a monthly rental of P70. Tan Chuco not
ified Vicencio Cerrano that in the following month it would be necessary to send
the casco to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano then informed Tan Chuco that he would
like to rent the casco again after repairs had been completed. Tan Chuco indica
ted that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it, by whic
h Cerrano acceded to the demand. About one week before the end of the repair per
iod, Tan Chuco sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Santos, the man who had be
en employed by Cerrano, upon hearing of the said sale went to the office of Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. and asked for employment in the same capacity. Cerrano, claimin
g that he was entitled to the possession of the casco under his contract with Ta
n Chuco, regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. induced Santos to refuse
to take orders from the new owners. As a result Siy Cong Bieng & Co. were oblig
ed to bring an action of replevin against Santos for the recovery of the possess
ion of their casco. Upon this judgment was entered for the delivery of casco to
Siy Cong Bieng& Co. and for damages. Cerrano, paid the judgment in favor of Siy
Cong Bieng& Co. in the replevin suit, for which he had become liable under the t
erms of the delivery bond. Issue: Whether Tan Chuco is liable for damages for br
each of contract. Ruling: Yes. Under the terms of his contract Tan Chuco was bou
nd to deliver the casco to Cerrano for one month from the date upon which the re
pairs were ended, but was under no obligation to renew the contract at the end o
f the month. By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. he broke his contract
with Cerrano and is responsible for the damages caused by his failure to give Ce
rrano possession of the casco for the term of one month. The Court is of the opi
nion that Cerrano is entitled to recover damages for the breach of contract, the
profit

his failure to give Cerrano possession of the casco for the term of one month. T
he Court is of the opinion that Cerrano is entitled to recover damages for the b
reach of contract, the profit by which he would have been able to make had the c
ontract been performed. Article 1106 of the Civil Code establishes the rule that
prospective profits may be recovered as damages, while article 1107 of the same
Code provides that the damages recoverable for the breach of obligations not or
iginating in fraud (dolo) are those which were or might have been foreseen at th
e time the contract was entered into. Applying these principles to the facts in
this case, we think that it is unquestionable that defendant must be deemed to h
ave foreseen at the time he made contract that in the event of his failure perfo
rm it, the plaintiff would be damaged by the loss of the profit he might reasona
bly have expected to derive from its use.
Moral Damages
Kierulf vs. CA
G.R. No. 99301 (March 13, 1997) Facts: The Pantranco bus was traveling along EDS
A from Congressional Avenue towards Clover Leaf, Balintawak. The driver lost con
trol of the bus along the way, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly
over the center island occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the
bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi. Damages to bo
th vehicles occured and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his pass
enger Lucila Kierulf, both of whom were treated at the Quezon City General Hospi
tal. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA. Despi
te the impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed a
gainst a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing
equipment. As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries. The injur
ies sustained by Lucila required major surgeries like "tracheotomy, open reducti
on, mandibular fracture, intermaxillary repair of multiple laceration" and prolo
nged treatment by specialists. Legaspi also suffered injuries.The front portion
of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf, was smashed to pieces. The cost o
f repair was estimated at P107,583.50. Pantranco in its petition alleged that it
was driven by Jose Malanum. While cruising along EDSA, a used engine differenti
al accidentally and suddenly dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus. Said
differential hit the under chassis of the bus, throwing Malanum off his seat an
d making him lose control of said bus. The bus swerved to the left, hit the cent
er island, and bumped the pickup of the spouses. The plaintiffs alleged that the
moral damages awarded by Respondent Court are "clearly and woefully not enough.
" The established guideline in awarding moral damages takes into consideration s
everal factors, some of which are the social and financial standing of the injur
ed parties and their wounded moral feelings and personal pride. The Kierulf spou
ses add that the Respondent Court should have considered another factor: the los
s of their conjugal fellowship and the impairment or destruction of their sexual
life and that the moral damages awarded in favor of Lucila should be increased
to P1,000,000.00, not only for Lucila but also for her husband Victor who also s
uffered "psychologically." Pantranco rebuts that Article 2219 of the Civil Code
provides that only the person suffering the injury may claim moral damages. Addi
tionally, no evidence was adduced to show that the consortium had indeed been im
paired and the Court cannot presume that marital relations disappeared with the
accident Issue: How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are victims of vehi
cular accidents entitled to? Held: The Supreme Court ruled in this case that the
Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common law view first enunciated in
the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not recover for the loss o
f her husbands services by the act of a third party. Rodriguez ruled that when
a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving lov
e, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has
suffered a direct and real personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequenti
al rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separa
te and distinct from that of the injured person. Whether Rodriguez may be cited
as authority to support the award of moral damages to Victor and/or LucilaKierul
f for "loss of consortium," however, cannot be properly considered in this case.

Victors claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued befo
re Respondent Court, is not supported by the evidence on record. His wife might
have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence thereo
f, his right to marital consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that m
atter, Lucila) had failed to make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the
Rodriguez spouse. Again, we emphasize that this claim is factual in origin and m
ust find basis not only in the evidence presented but also in the findings of th
e Respondent Court. For lack of factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon b
y this Court at this time. The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be
considered in awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the ac
cident show that no "rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supe
rcilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful reference" was given
her. The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be con
sidered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuou
s conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social and financial st
anding. Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petition
er Lucila for her physical sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety a
nd wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and rib
s. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and
treatments. Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. Sh
e felt that she has not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to under
go a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleeples
s nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident. In this light and
considering further the length of time spent in prosecuting the complaint and t
his appeal, we find the sum of P400,000.00 as moral damages for Petitioner Lucil
a to be fair and just under the circumstances.
Proof and Proximate Cause
Miranda-Ribaya vs. Carbonell
G.R. No. L-49390 January 28, 1980 Facts: Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged
sometime in 1968 in the pawnshop business and in the buying and selling of jewel
ry. Prior to April 23, 1968 one of her agents, Mrs. Josefina Roco-Robles, inform
ed her that a millionaire logger by the name of Marino Bautista was interested t
o buy big diamond stones. Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by her agent, Mrs. Robles drop
ped by the house of Mr. and Mrs. Marino Bautista on April 23, 1968 at La Salle S
treet, Greenhills Mandaluyong, Rizal. Mrs. Ribaya was convinced that the Bautist
as were millionaires as represented by her agent. On that occasion both Mr. and
Mrs. Bautista were present together with Gloria Duque, the secretary of Mr. Baut
ista, and the couples daughter, Teresita. Mrs. Ribaya sold to the Bautistas 10
pieces of jewelry for the price of P222,000.00 (originally priced at P224,000.00
). Mr. Bautista acknowledged the receipt of the jewelry as well as the agreed pu
rchase price by signing the receipt and Mrs. Ribaya in turn was paid in the form
of the two (2) Equitable Banking Corporation checks Nos. 10767485-A for P112,00
0.00 (Annex B of the complaint) and No. 10755100-A for P110,000.00, both checks
postdated June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya then executed a voucher evidencing said pay
ment

Mrs. Ribaya, accompanied by Miss Narcisa Gosioco, went back the next day to requ
est Bautista to break up the Equitable Banking Corporation Check No. 10755100-A
for P110,000.00 into separate check inasmuch as part of the jewelry sold to Baut
ista the previous day belonged to Mrs. Gosioco. Bautista accommodated them with
four (4) Bank of Amerca checks DD-8112 for P14,000.00, DD-8113 for P34,000.00, D
D- 8114 for P12,000.90 and DD-9115 for P50,000.00 P110,000.00, all postdated Jun
e 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya delivered Account Nos. 8113 and 8114 to Miss. Gosioco an
d kept for herself checks Nos. 8115 and 8112. On the same day, she also sold to
the Bautistas 4 pieces worth P94,000.00. Bautista issued Bank of America Checks
Nos. DD-8106 forP12,000.00, DD-8111 for P12,000.00, DD-8110 for P35,000.00, and
DD-8107 for P35,000.00, all post dated June 23, 1968. As some of the owners of t
he jewelry sold to the defendants by Ribaya on April 23, 1968 and April 24, 1968
wanted to get back their jewelry, Mrs. Ribaya on May 15, 1968 went back to the
house of the Bautistas accompanied by Gloria Duque bringing with her 3 pieces of
jewelry in exchange for some pieces previously sold to defendant Bautista. She
left the jewelry with Bautista but instead of exchanging the jewelry Bautista is
sued to Mrs. Ribaya another Bank of America check No. DD-8130 for P45,000.00 pos
tdated July 17, 1968. Ribaya tried to contact Bautista when the checks matured,
but were unable to do so. She deposited the checks to her account but they were
dishonored by the bank for the reason that the accounts of the defendant were cl
osed.
Suspecting that the Bautistas might have pawned the pieces of jewelry purchased
from her, she went to the pawnshop section of the Manila Police Department and d
iscovered that most of the jewelry she had sold to the defendants were pledged t
o various pawnshops in Manila. Mrs. Ribaya confronted Marino Bautista, who assur
ed her that he would pay her their obligation. After failing to comply, Mrs. Rib
aya demanded from Bautista the surrender of the pawnshop tickets covering the pl
edge of the jewelry he obtained from her. She was able to redeem part of the jew
elry she delivered to the Bautistas. It was computed that Bautistas obligations
amounted to P125,460.79. The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the Bauti
stas to pay petitioners the sum of P125,460.79 with interest and 25% thereof for
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation. The claim for moral and exemplary d
amages was denied on the ground that the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs [was
] insufficient to warrant its grant. ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to moral an
d exemplary damages? HELD: Yes. In Francisco vs. Government Service Insurance Sy
stem, the Court had sustained the trial courts appealed decision denying the th
erein prevailing plaintiffs claim for moral and exemplary damages "not only on
account of the plaintiffs failure to take the witness stand and testify to her
social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc., but primarily because a bre
ach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does
not warrant the award of moral damages. Here, the facts and circumstances are to
tally different. In that case, therein plaintiff failed to take the witness stan
d and defendants breach of contract was held to be not malicious and fraudulent
. In the present case, petitioner took the witness stand and established by unco
ntradicted testimony that due to respondents deceitful and malevolent acts of d
efraudation, she had suffered "extreme" anguish and "could not sleep for three m
onths," since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her personal je
welries and borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the jewelries wrongfu
lly gotten by respondents from her. The evidence of record shows the magnitude o
f respondents wanton, fraudulent and malevolent acts of defraudation. Petitione
rs testimonial evidence to the effect that she suffered "extremely" and that fo
r three months she could not sleep was a clear demonstration of her physical suf
fering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and similar injury, resulting from re
spondents malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to moral damages
. Petitioners having established the more damages, are entitled in addition ther
eto, to exemplary damages. The wantonness and malevolence through which responde
nts defrauded petitioners, deceitfully incurring and then evading settlement of
their just liability certainly justifies the award of exemplary damages by way o
f example and correction for the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to

the commission of similar misdeeds by others, even if the transaction were view
ed as a breach of civil contract.
Del Rosario vs. CA
G.R. No. 118325 (January 29, 1997) Facts: In selling to the public roofing mater
ials known as "Banawe" shingles, Metal Forming Corporation (MFC) made representa
tions on the durability of the product and the sturdiness of its installation, c
haracterizing the shingles as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAW
E METAL TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due
to the strong hook action on its overlaps". It prompted the Del Rosarios to buy
the "Banawe" shingles and have them installed at their residence. Two months af
ter installation, portions of the roof of the Del Rosarios were blown away by th
e typhoon "Ruping", and the same acted in parts (instead of as a single unit) wh
en strong winds blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off. The Del
Rosarios filed a complaint on November 21, 1990, charging MFC with a violation
of Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising, Misla
beling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc." After due proceedings
, the DTI rendered judgment sentencing MFC to pay an "administrative fine of P10
,000.00". MFC however declined to concede liability for the other damages claime
d by the Del Rosario Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home.
The spouses sought to recover from MFC, damages resulting from the events just n
arrated, contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house,
injury was also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall
paper, wood parquet flooring and furniture. They reckoned their actual damages a
t P1,008,003.00 and prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the sum of P
3,000,000,00, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and attorneys f
ees in the sum of P1,000,000.00. MFC moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
cause of action, alleging that it had no contractual relationship with the Del R
osarios since the contract for the purchase and installation of the roofing, upo
n which the latters claims were based, was actually entered into between it and
another person, Jesus M. Puno (an engineer identified as the Del Rosarios cont
ractor). Judgment was rendered in favor of the Del Rosarios. Issue: Are the Spou
ses entitled to moral damages? Held: Yes. It is indisputable that (1) the tiles
were delivered to the Del Rosarios and used in fabricating the roof of their hom
e, and (2) that it was the employees and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the sh
ingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the Del Rosarios home, and (b
) undertook and completed the installation thereof. These they did in bad faith,
using inferior materials and assembling them in a manner contrary to MFCs expr
ess representations in its brochures and advertisements circulated and broadcast
to the general public which representations had, in the first place, induced th
e Del Rosarios to choose the metal tiles in question for their roofing. In fine,
since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed the express warran
ty made by it to the general public in connection with the "Banawe" tiles brough
t to and set up in the house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty,
and thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity of the individual who
actually dealt with MFC and asked the latter to make such delivery and installa
tion is of little moment. That MFC did in truth act with bad faith, in flagrant
breach of its express warranties made to the general public and in wanton disreg
ard of the rights of the Del Rosarios who relied on those warranties, is adequat
ely demonstrated by the recorded proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award
of moral damages "in breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulentl
y or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psycholo
gical and mental trauma actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them
of moral damages is warranted. In Makabili v. Court of Appeals, the court held
that:
It is essential. . . . in the award of damages that the claimant must have satis
factorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the dama
ges and its causal connection to defendants acts. This is so because moral dama
ges though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award de
signed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a

penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.] and are
allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San Miguel Brewer
y, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968])
Raagas vs. Traya

Raagas vs. Traya

G.R. No. L-20081, February 27, 1968 Facts: Spouses Melquiades Raagas and Adela L
audiano Raagas filed on April 1, 1960, a complaint with the Court of First Insta
nce of Leyte against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido Canciller, alleging
in essence that on or about April 9, 1958, while the latter was "recklessly" dr
iving a truck owned by his co-defendants, along the public highway in MacArthur,
Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the plaintiffs three-year old son Regino caus
ing his instantaneous death. The plaintiffs ask for actual damages in the sum of
P10,000, moral, nominal and corrective damages in a sum to be determined by the
court, P1,000 as attorneys fees, P1,000 for expenses of litigation, plus costs
. Defendants specifically denied that Canciller was "driving recklessly" at the
time of the mishap, and assert that the truck "was fully loaded and was running
at a very low speed and on the right side of the road"; that it was the child wh
o "rushed from an unseen position and bumped the truck so that he was hit by the
left rear tire of the said truck and died", and consequently the defendants are
not to blame for the accident which was "entirely attributable to an unforeseen
event" or due to the fault of the child and negligence of his parents; that the
defendant-spouses have exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of their driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946 only after a thorough study
of his background as a truck driver; and that each time they allowed him to driv
e it was only after a check of his physical condition and the mechanical fitness
of the truck assigned to him. On June 24 it rendered a judgment on the pleading
s, condemning the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs t
he sum of P10,000 for the death of their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 fo
r moral damages, P1,000 actual damages, P1,000 for attorneys fees, and the cost
s." On May 4 the plaintiffs moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the cla
im that the defendants answer not only "failed to tender an issue" but as well
"admitted material allegations" of the complaint. The court reasoned that the de
nial in the answer of the charge of reckless driving "did not affect the plainti
ffs positive allegation in their complaint that the truck . . . did not have a
current year registration plate . . . for the year 1958 when the accident occurr
ed that "this failure . . . has the effect of admitting hypothetically that they
operated ... the said truck without proper license . . . when the accident occu
rred," and that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a pe
rson driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation (article 2185, new Civil Code)." The court
went on to conclude that under the circumstances a judgment on the pleadings wa
s "irremediably proper and fitting."
Issue: Did the court act correctly in rendering judgment on the pleadings? Held:
No. The plaintiffs claim for actual, moral, nominal and corrective damages, wa
s controverted by the averment in the answer to the effect that the defendants "
have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that the dea
th of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the fault of
the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has the effect of te
ndering a valid issue. The court has previously held that we held even if the al
legations regarding the amount of damages in the complaint are not specifically
denied in the answer, such damages are not deemed admitted. It has also declared
in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that a court cann
ot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the fact and amount of d
amages, but must depend on actual proof that damage had been suffered and on evi
dence of the actual amount. Moreover, in Malonzo vs. Galang et. al., L-13851, Ju
ly 27, 1960, the court reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not ne
cessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, "it is, nevertheless, essent
ial that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis of
the damage and its causal relation to defendants acts." There is a need of a f
ull-blown trial on the merits.
Enervida vs. Dela Torre

G.R. No. L-38037 (January 28, 1974)

Facts: Petitioner, Roque Enervida, filed a complaint against the defendant-spous
es de la Torre, praying that the deed of sale executed on December 3, 1957 by hi
s deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida, over a parcel of land covered by a Homestea
d Patent be declared null and void for having been executed within the prohibite
d period of five years, in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Pub
lic Land Law) and that he be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being
the legitimate son and sole heir of his deceased father. The defendants filed t
heir answer, stating that the plaintiff has no cause of action against them as h
is father, Ciriaco Enervida, is still living, the petitioner is not only son of
Ciriaco Enervida as he has also four other living children and that the sale of
the property in question did not take place within the prohibited period provide
d for in Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the sale having taken place on Nove
mber 20, 1957, although ratified and acknowledged on December 3, 1957, before a
Notary Public. During the pre-trial conference, petitioner admitted that his fat
her is still living and that he has four other living brothers and sisters who w
ere not joined as party-plaintiffs. He also admitted that the sale of the land i
n question actually took place on November 20, 1957, but was formalized only on
December 3, 1957. He likewise admitted that the homestead patent was issued on N
ovember 17, 1952 to his father, which was beyond the prohibited period of 5 year
s. The CFI ruled that petitioner has no cause of action and was prompted with ma
lice and bad faith in taking his action to court by alleging false statement in
his complaint. The court dismissed the case and ordered the petitioner to pay th
e defendants P2000 as actual moral and exemplary damages and pay also the attorn
eys fees. On appeal to Court of Appeals, it certified the case to the Supreme Cou
rt for it involved purely question of law. Issue: Whether or not it is proper to
award the defendant an actual moral and exemplary damages when plaintiff filed
unfounded civil case. Held: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that with regard to the
award of TWO THOUSAND PESOS "in concept of actual, moral and exemplary damages .
..", the same is not proper for it would ran counter to the decision of this Cou
rt in Deogracias Malonzo vs Gregoria Galang where it was ruled:
It will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are general
ly recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art
. 2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages, may
be recovered (Art. 2219). A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery o
f attorneys fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations dif
fer in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in Art
. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorneys fees, but is not included
in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages. It is true that Art
. 2219 also provides that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to t
hose enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended" a clearly unfounded civi
l action or proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases wherein moral damage
s may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art. 2219, as it
did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in Art. 2219. Besi
des, Art. 2219 Specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing physical injuries",
as an instance when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all othe
r quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Fig
ueras, 96 Phil. 321), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art
. 309, par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on
the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
Furthermore, while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral d
amages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of t
he court (Art. 2216), it is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfact
orily prove the existence of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its
causal relation to defendants acts. This is so because moral damages, though i
ncapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to co
mpensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer (Algara vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 294). The trial court and the Court

of Appeals both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that respondent we
re sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of moral damages,
hence they made no definite finding as to what the supposed moral damages suffe
red consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral damages a penalty, which t
hey are not, rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered, which they a
re intended to be. Moral damages, in other words, are not corrective or exemplar
y damages.
People vs. Bugayong
G.R. No. 126518 (December 2, 1998)

Facts: Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan got married on May 14, 1978. Out of th
is marital union they begot 3 children: Albert, Honeylet and Arlene. They separa
ted in 1983. Albert and Arlene stayed with their mother Leticia while Honeylet s
tayed with her grandmother Anita Yu. Leticia cohabited with the accused Rodelio
Bugayong and had one child, Catherine Bugayong. On October 15, 1994 Bugayong had
Arlene hold his penis inside the room he shared with Leticia. At that time, Cat
herine Bugayong, who was 6 years old was also inside the same room and her fathe
r, the accused was letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened to maim Arlene if she
did not hold his penis. When the penis was already hard and stiff, he placed it
inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out from the penis. Cather
ine saw this incident. On the basis of a medico-legal examination conducted by t
he NBI, and testimonies, Bugayong was convicted. Upon appeal, among other issued
involving the defects of the information, he questions the award of PhP50,000.0
0 in damages ex-delicto in favor of the offended party: Issue: Does the award da
mages by the trial court have basis? Held: The court affirmed his conviction. Th
e trial court correctly awarded P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, an amount which
is automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence
other than the fact of the commission of rape. Consistent with recent jurisprud
ence, appellant should also be ordered to pay the victim the additional amount o
f P50,000 as moral damages. In People v. Prades, the Court resolved that "moral
damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in
such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice."
Francisco vs. GSIS
7 SCRA 577 (March 30, 1963) Facts: Trinidad Francisco, in consideration of a loa
n in the amount of P400,000.00, mortgaged in favor of the GSIS a parcel of land
with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound, located at Baesa, Qu
ezon City, payable within ten (10) years in monthly installments and with intere
st of 7%per annum compounded monthly. Because of her failure to comply with the
mortgaged, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage. GSIS itself was the bu
yer of the property in theforeclosure sale. On 20 February 1959, the Trinidads fa
ther, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the general manager of the GS
IS offering a compromise that P30,000 which GSIS owes him be credited to Trinida
ds unpaid monthly installments and that GSIS would take over the administration o
f the mortgaged property and collect all monthly installments amounting to about
P5,000 of more than 31 lots and houses until the debt is fully covered. This wa
s approved by GSIS through Andal. Remittances were made, totaling P698,726.10 se
nt by Trinidad to GSIS through Andal, all of which were received and duly receip
ted for. However, GSIS sent 3 letters, all of which were signed by Andal, asking
Trinidad for a proposal for the payment of her indebtedness, since according to
GSIS the one-year period for redemption had expired. Atty. Francisco protested
against the GSIS request for proposal of payment because of the existence of the
agreed offer dated 20 February 1959. However, GSIS countered stating that the te
legram should be disregarded in view of its failure to express the contents of t
he board resolution due to the error of its minor employees in couching the corr
ect wording of the telegram which provides that approval of the compromise is sub
ject to the condition that Mr. Vicente J. Francisco shall pay all expenses incur
red by the GSIS in the foreclosure of the mortgage. GSIS moved for the consolidat
ed the title to the compound in its name, and gave notice thereof to the plainti
ff and to each occupant of the compound. Hence, the plaintiff instituted the pre
sent suit, for specific performance and damages. After trial, the court below fo
und the following:
(a) Declaring null and void the consolidation in the name of the defendant, Gove
rnment Service Insurance System, of the title of the VIC-MARI Compound; said tit
le shall be restored to the plaintiff; and all payments made by the plaintiff, a
fter her offer had been accepted by the defendant, must be credited as amortizat
ions on her loan; and (b) Ordering the defendant to abide by the terms of the co
ntract created by plaintiffs offer and its unconditional acceptance, with cost
s against the defendant.

Both parties appealed. GSIS appealed the decision of declaring null and void the
consolidation of the lots, while Trinidad appealed because the trial court did
not award the P535,000.00 damages and attorneys fees she claimed. Issue: Is the
lower court correct in not awarding damages to plaintiff? Held: YES. The court
a quo correctly refused to award such actual or compensatory damages because it
could not determine with reasonable certainty the difference between the offered
price and the actual value of the property, for lack of competent evidence. Wit
hout proof we cannot assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the plaint
iff, that the practice of lending institutions in the country is to give out as
loan 60% of the actual value of the collateral. There was no error also denying
moral damages, not only on account of the plaintiffs failure to take the witnes
s stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety, etc.,
as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of contract like that of d
efendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant the award of moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code. There is also no basis for awardi
ng exemplary damages either, because this species of damages is only allowed in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of which
have been allowed in this case. As to attorneys fees, we agree with the trial
courts stand that, in view of the absence of gross and evident bad faith in def
endants refusal to satisfy the plaintiffs claim, and there being none of the o
ther grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence preclude
s a recovery. The award of attorneys fees is essentially discretionary in the t
rial court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown.
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals
309 SCRA 141 (June 25, 1999)

Facts: On 07 October 1987, Expertravel& Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic

corporation engaged in the travel agency business, issued to private respondent
Ricardo Lo four roundtrip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel accom
modations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had fa
iled to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since
the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recover
y of the amount claimed plus damages. Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, th
at his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid. The outstanding acc
ount was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de
Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. Th
e payment was evidenced by a Monte de Piedad Check for P42,175.20 for which Ms.
de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920 in favor of Expertravel for
the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo,
etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987. The
trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo w
as valid awarding moral damages, attorneys fees and cost of the suit in favor of
Lo. Hence, this petition. Issue: Can moral damages be recovered in a clearly unf
ounded suit? Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or quasi-delict that di
d not result to physical injury to the offended party? Held: NO. Although the in
stitution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justificatio
n for an award of attorneys fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably b
een held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the
rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to l
itigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a
civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by an
yone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason
for the award of moral damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages
must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuc
cessful plaintiff. NO. An award of moral damages would require certain condition
s to be met; to wit: (1) First, there must be an injury, whether physical, menta
l or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be
a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act o
r omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by th
e claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cas
es stated in Article 2219.Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual
or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted
in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wa
nton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of
breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injurie
s. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Co
de, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results f
rom a breach of carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act o
r omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of int
entional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as
aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damage
s could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, l
ascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal
arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise
to a claim for moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Articl
e 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expres
sly enumerated by the law.
Unfounded suits
Editha and Glicerio Mijares vs. CA and Metro Drug, Inc.
G.R. No. 113558 (April 18, 1997) Facts: Petitioners Editha Mijares and Glicerio
T. Mijares owners of Aklan Drug had been buying pharmaceutical products from pri
vate respondent Metro Drug since 1976. Editha Mijares, aside from being the oper
ator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng Maynila Consumers Coop
erative, a concessionaire of a small area right inside the hospital compound whe
re it operated a drugstore. The Ospital ng Maynila Cooperative also had some tra

nsactions with Metro Drug as supplier of pharmaceutical products. Subsequently,

the Cooperative was dissolved and stopped its operations in October 1986. On Nov
ember 1, 1986, a Contract of Lease was entered into between the City of Manila a
s lessor and Solomon Silverio, Jr. as lessee. Silverio, Jr. as the new lessee, p
ut up a drugstore on the same area occupied by the Cooperative. On November 26,
1986, Metro Drug delivered pharmaceutical products to the said store thru Diosco
ro Lamenta, its salesman/collector. More deliveries of pharmaceutical products w
ere made in the same place by Metro Drug, the total value of which amounted to P
32,034.42. In partial payment of these receivables, a check was drawn by Silveri
o, Jr. under the account name Farmacia delos Remedios amounting to P14,180.46. T
he check however was subsequently dishonored due to insufficient funds. Metro Dr
ug filed a telegram addressed to Aklan Drug demanding full payment of outstandin
g account for P27,938.06. Lamenta tried to collect from Editha Mijares for the d
isputed claim, but Editha referred him to Mr. Silverio as the new operator and c
oncessionaire of the drugstore. She informed him verbally that they have no more
business inside the Ospital ng Maynila as the cooperative drugstore has already
stopped operations. Despite said verbal notice, the demand telegram addressed t
o Aklan Drug was still sent to Editha Mijares. On Lamentas follow-up of said te
legram, Editha again directed Lamenta to see Solomon Silverio, the new owner of
the drugstore. Thereafter, Metro Drug filed before the Regional Trial Court of M
anila a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners Editha Mijares and Glic
erio T. Mijares. Petitioners in their "Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim," den
ied Metro Drugs allegations and interposed a counterclaim for malicious prosecu
tion and prayed for moral damages, attorneys fees and expenses of suit. The RTC c
oncluded that the Mijareses were not the owners of said drugstore when the deliv
eries were made and the absence of any privity of relations between the parties
at the time of the deliveries precludes any cause of action in favor of Metro Dr
ug against the Mijareses. Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Metr
o Drug to pay the petitioners P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorn
eys fees and the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals however reversed the decis
ion of the RTC. Issue: Whether the award of moral damages in favor of the Mijare
ses was proper. Held: No. The Mijareses have failed to show that Metro Drug was
motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. In China Ba
nking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held that: x x x Malicious prosecutio
n, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements, to w
it: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there must be proof t
hat the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a per
son, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false an
d baseless (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). H
ence, mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosec
ution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a pe
nalty on the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. C
ourt of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1
986]). Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot be rec
overed from a person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith, or
without malice or bad faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159
SCRA 433 [1988]; R & B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129
SCRA 736 [1984]). If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is dam
num absque injuria (Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCR
A 5 [1989]). For the same reasons, the award for attorneys fees and expenses of
litigation must likewise be deleted.

For the same reasons, the award for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation m
ust likewise be deleted.
De la Pena vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 81827 (March 28, 1994)
Facts: Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24 hectare parcel of land in Davao Del No
rte for which he filed a Homestead Application. At the same time, a certain Pote
nciano Nazaret likewise filed an application for the same lot. Reducto later tra
nsferred his possessory right over the 6 hectares of the lot to petitioner Panta
leon de la Pena. After it was ascertained in a field verification that de la Pen
a had a better right to acquire the portion claimed by him being its actual occu
pant and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed de la Pena to apply for the
portion himself within sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose his prefer
ential right thereto." However, no such application was filed. Meanwhile, Ciriac
o transferred his rights over another 1 hectare portion of the lot to Michael Do
ble who in turn sold his rights to Ricardo Tan (private respondents father). When
a survey of the lot was conducted, it was found out that the lands occupied by
de la Pena was bigger by hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from
Ciriaco and the land sold to Dobles (later acquired by Tan) was very much smaller
than what he actually bought. Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the
area acquired by Doble, it was de la Pea who cultivated the same without objectio
n from Doble. However, when Ricardo Tan acquired the lot, he built a fence to re
claim the portion, but de la Pena kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boun
dary dispute. On April 1977, de la Pena then filed a complaint for forcible entr
y against Tan. The MTC which ruled in favor of de la Pena concluded that de la P
ena had prior possession of the land. The decision was affirmed by the CFI. On J
uly 1977, during the pendency of the forcible entry case, de la Pena instituted
the present action for reconveyance with damages against Tan with the RTC. De la
Pena alleged that Tan fraudulently registered the hectare portion which was act
ually cultivated by the former. The trial court ruled in favor of the Tan since
the disputed hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for by de
la Pena. De la Pena was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith. His
prayer for damages was likewise denied. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the lower court, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the award for att
orneys fees, moral damages and expenses of litigation against the petitioner ar
e proper. Held: It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to
the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in anothers name. I
n the case at bench, de la Pena does not claim to be the owner of the disputed p
ortion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire owners
hip thereof by virtue of his actual occupation since January 1947. However, de l
a Penas possession is not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienab
le public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive posse
ssion for at least thirty (30) years. It must be noted that the dispute regardin
g the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent and OCT could be iss
ued to private respondent in 1975. As early as 1956, the controversy already beg
an between de la Pena and Tans father. Hence,petitioners possession falls shor
t of the required period. Not being the owner, de la Pena cannot maintain the pr
esent suit.
An award for attorneys fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action la
ter declared to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prej
udice to the other party is improper. The right to litigate is so precious that
penalty should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
J Marketing vs. Sia
285 SCRA 580 (January 29, 1998) Facts: J Marketing, herein petitioner, a company
engaged in the business of appliances and motorcycles, received on April 24, 19
83 from Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) a brand new Kawasaki motorcycle, color Blue, Mo
de HD-11 (1985) with Engine No. G7E-04848 and Chassis No.KG-805535. Upon receipt
, petitioners representative placed motorcycle in the bodega of YKS Bldg.. Howeve
r, petitioner found out that the motorcycle unit was missing in the bodega and t

he loss immediately reported to the police authorities specifically to the Headq

uarters Constabulary Highway Patrol District. Petitioner upon tracing found the
motorcycle in possession of FelicidadSia Jr., herein respondent, who bought a mo
torcycle from one Renato Pelande, Jr. Petitioners representative went to the hous
e of the private respondent and examined the chassis and motor numbers of the mo
torcycle and found out that the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle in p
rivate respondents possession have been tampered to jibe with the chassis and mot
or numbers of the motorcycle unit previously purchased by Renato Pelande, Jr. fr
om petitioner. When petitioners representative confronted private respondent at t
he Constabulary Highway Patrol Group office anent the questionable motorcycle, p
rivate respondent refused to return the said motorcycle to petitioner and instea
d told petitioners representative to file a case in court. Hence, petitioner file
d a complaint for replevin with damages against private respondent Felicidad C.
Sia, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 8. Private res
pondent filed a third party complaint against Renato Pelande Jr., Said third par
ty complaint was declared in default. After trial, the lower court rendered a de
cision dismissing petitioners complaint but awarded damages and attorneys fees to
private respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the court a quo.H
ence this petition. Issue: Whether the award of damages and attorneys fee is prop
er? Held: NO. A persons right to litigate should not be penalized by holding him
liable for damages, especially when he believes he has a rightful claim against
another although found to be erroneous. In the case at bar, petitioner filed for
replevin case against private respondent because of the latters own challenge th
at if he has a right over the motorcycle petitioner should file a case in court.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the institution of the replevin suit was tain
ted with gross or evident bad faith or was done to maliciously to harass, embarr
ass, annoy or ridicule private respondent. Moreover, the adverse result of an ac
tion dismissal of petitioners complaint does not per se make an act unlawful and
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. It is not a sound public poli
cy to place a premium on the right to litigate. No damages can be charged on tho
se who may exercise such precious right in good faith, even if done erroneously.
Further, the award of exemplary damages has no factual basis. It is a requisite
that the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or
malevolent manner - circumstances which are absent in this case. In addition, ex
emplary damages cannot be awarded as the requisite element of compensatory damag
es was not present. As to the attorneys fees, an adverse decision does not ipso f
acto justify the award thereof to the winning party. Petitioner honestly thought
that they had a good cause of action, so notwithstanding the dismissal of their
case, no attorneys fees can be granted to private respondent. Considering that t
he latter claims to be the owner of the motorcycle, petitioner was compelled to
sue him. When the former necessarily became a party defendant no attorneys fees and
litigation expenses can automatically be recovered even if he should win, it is
not the fact of winning alone that entitles recovery of such items but rather t
he attendance of special circumstances - the enumerated exceptions in Article 22
08 of the New Civil Code. There being no bad faith reflected in petitioners persi
stence in pursuing its case, other than an erroneous conviction of the righteous
ness of its cause, attorneys fees cannot be recovered as cost.
Cometa vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 141855 (February 6, 2001) Facts: Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc
. (SITI) extended loans in various amounts to Guevent Industrial Development Cor
p., (GIDC). However, GIDC failed to pay on the dates the

Facts: Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI) extended loans in various
amounts to Guevent Industrial Development Corp., (GIDC). However, GIDC failed to
pay on the dates the loans became due. For this reason, GIDC agreed to mortgage
several parcels of land to SITI. When GIDC again defaulted, SITI foreclosed the
mortgages and it acquired the properties as the highest bidder. Thereafter, GID
C filed a case alleging that there were irregularities in the foreclosure of the
mortgages. The case was eventually settled through a compromise agreement. A di
spute later arose concerning the interpretation of the said agreement, as Honeyc
omb Builders, Inc. (HBI) offered to purchase from GIDC the lot covered by the ag
reement and the latter agreed but SITI as mortgagee refused to give its consent
to the sale. The trial court directed SITI to accept the offer of HBI. On appeal
, the Court of Appeals affirmed the same Meanwhile, respondent HBI applied to th
e Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for a permit to develop the prop
erty in question. Its application was granted, on account of which respondent HB
I built a condominium on the property. When respondent HBI applied for a license
to sell the condominium units it was required by the HLURB to submit an Affidav
it of Undertaking which in effect stated that the mortgagee (SITI) of the said p
roperty to be developed agrees to release the mortgage on the said property as s
oon as the full purchase price of the same is paid by the buyer. Respondent HBI
submitted the required affidavit purportedly executed by Cometa as president of
SITI (mortgagee). Petitioner Cometa denied that he ever executed the affidavit.
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) found Cometas signature to be forger
y on the basis of which a complaint for falsification of public document was fil
ed against HBI president Guevara. However, the Rizal Provincial Prosecutors Off
ice found no probable cause against Guevara and accordingly dismissed the compla
int. On appeal, Secretary Drilon reversed the decision of the prosecutor and ord
ered it to file information against Guevara. The trial court dismissed the crimi
nal case. Thereafter, Guevara and HBI file a complaint for malicious prosecution
against Cometa and SITI. Issue: Whether or not the case for malicious prosecuti
on states a cause of action. Held: A complaint for malicious prosecution sates a
cause of action if it alleges that (1) the defendant was himself the prosecutor
or that at leas he instigated the prosecution; (2) the prosecution finally term
inated in the plaintiffs acquittal; (3) that in bringing the action the prosecu
tor acted without probable cause; and (4) that the prosecutor was actuated by ma
lice, i.e. by improper and sinister motives. The mere allegation in a complaint
for malicious prosecution that an information was filed after preliminary invest
igation and that a warrant of arrest was there after issued does not by itself n
egate allegations in the same complaint that the prosecution was malicious. All
criminal prosecutions are by direction and control of the public prosecutor. To
sustain petitioners stand that an allegation in a complaint for malicious prose
cution that the information in the criminal case was filed after appropriate pre
liminary investigation negates a contrary allegation that the filing of the case
was malicious would result in the dismissal of every action for malicious prose
cution.
Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc vs. NLRC
299 SCRA 608 (December 3, 1998) Facts: In August 1992, private respondent Osdana
was recruited by petitioner for employment with the latters principal, Gulf Cate
ring Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the origi
nal employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as Food Server for a period of
thirty-six (36) months with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi Rials. Osdana
claims she was required by petitioner to pay a total of P11,950.00 in placement
fees and other charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise asked
to undergo a medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests Syste
m, a duly accredited clinic for overseas workers, which found her to be Fit of Em
ployment. Petitioner asked Osdana to sign another Contractor. Employee Agreement wh
ich provided that she would be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months wit
h a salary of two hundred eighty US dollars ($280). It was this employment agree
ment which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration(POE
A). Osdana left for Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. She was

assigned to the College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and,

contrary to the terms and conditions of the employment contract, was made to wa
sh dishes, cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial work and other tasks w
hich were unrelated to her job designation as waitress. She was made to work a g
ruelling twelve-hour shift, without overtime pay. Osdana suffered from numbness
and pain in her arms. The pain was such that she had to be confined at a housing
facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22, 1993, during which period, she was n
ot paid her salaries. Osdana was allowed to resume work, this time as Food Serve
r and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, where she worked seven days a week
from August 22 to October 5, 1993. Again, she was not compensated. Then, from Oc
tober 6 to October 23, 1993, Osdana was again confined for no apparent reason. D
uring this period, she was still not paid her salary. On October 24, 1993, she w
as re-assigned to the Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other menial task
s. Osdana worked long hours and under harsh conditions. She was diagnosed as hav
ing Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition precipitated by activities req
uiring repeated flexion, pronation, and supination of the wrist and characterized
by excruciating pain and numbness in the arms. Osdana underwent two surgical ope
rations. Between these operations, she was not given any work assignments even i
f she was willing and able to do lightwork in accordance with her doctors advice.
Again, Osdana was not paid any compensation for the period between February to
April 22, 1994. Osdana was discharged from the hospital on April 25,1994. The me
dical report stated that she had very good improvement of the symptoms and she wa
s discharged on the second day of the operation. Four days later, however, she wa
s dismissed from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any
separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not a
llowed to work. Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of pe
titioner, but to no avail. She was thus constrained to file a complaint before t
he POEA. ISSUES: Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion for the
following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if there was no factual o
r legal basis for the award; and (b) holding petitioner solely liable for her cl
aims despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with its principal
, GCC. HELD: The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the NLRC were based mai
nly on the facts and allegations in Osdanas position paper and supporting documen
ts. We find these sufficient to constitute substantial evidence to support the q
uestioned decisions. Generally, findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies lik
e the NLRC are accorded great respect and, at times, even finality if supported
by substantial evidence. This Court, therefore, upholds the finding of herein pu
blic respondents that the facts and the evidence on record adduced by Osdana and
taken in relation to the answer of petitioner show that indeed there was breach
of the employment contract and illegal dismissal committed by petitioners princi
pal. Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination by reas
on of disease or illness, viz:
Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination An employer may terminate the serv
ices of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whos
e continued employment is prohibited bylaw or prejudicial to his health as well
as the health of his co-employees: x x x
Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the L
abor Code provides: Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal Where the employee
suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or pre
judicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall
not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months with proper medical treatment. If the
disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not termi
nate the employee but shall ask the employeeto take a leave. The employer shall
reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration
of his normal health.

Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the manner by which Osdana was
terminated was clearly in violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules
and regulations. Osdanas continued employment despite her illness was not prohib
ited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-empl
oyees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that
she had very good improvement of the symptoms. Besides, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome is n
ot a contagious disease. Petitioner has not presented any medical certificate or
similar document from a competent public health authority in support of its cla
ims. If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her emp
loyer could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent
public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for
illegal dismissal. The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 o
f the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unil
ateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of t
he employees illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor
. As regards the monetary award of salaries for the unexpired portion of the emp
loyment contract, unpaid salaries and salary differential granted by public resp
ondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the same for being contrary to law, eviden
ce and existing jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes grave abuse of
discretion. Although this contention is without merit, the award for salaries f
or the unexpired portion of the contract must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5,
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized c
ause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full rei
mbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for t
hree (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
While it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was only
for a period of twelvemonths, Osdanas actual stint with the foreign principal la
sted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, th
at the employer renewed her employment contract for another year. Thus, the awar
d for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x
4 months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the
labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC. As for the award for unpaid salaries an
d differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months unpaid salaries an
d one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed o
ut by Osdana, the no work, no pay rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in
this case. In the first place,the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to
August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29,1994, was due to her illnes
s which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993,Osda
na actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Ban
i Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, fro
m October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given
any work for no reason at all. With respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is
the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee
was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, o
r was done in amanner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewi
se, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner. Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse of disc
retion on the part of public respondents for holding it solely liable for the cl
aims of Osdana despite the fact that its liability with the principal is joint a
nd several. Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be not
ed that contrary to petitioners interpretation, the decision of the labor arbiter
which was affirmed by the NLRC did not really. Petitioner was the only one held
liable for Osdanas monetary claims because it was the only respondent named in t
he complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its princ
ipal included as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did
not acquire jurisdiction over the foreign principal.

People of the Philippines vs. Pirame

G.R. No. 121998 (March 9, 2000)
Facts: Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame were both convicted by the trial c
ourt for murder, the eye-witness Cipriano Supero saw them killing one Pedro Torr
enueva by hitting him with iron pipe while being held by the accused Florencio P
irame. The trial court ordered to indemnify the surviving spouse of the deceased
victim Pedro Torrenueva in the amount of P50,000.00 each and the amount of P23,
214.00 representing burial and incidental expenses and P50,000 representing mora
l and exemplary damages and in all instances without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. Pirame appealed the trial courts decision denying his partici
pation in the crime and alleging that the evidence against him was weak to begin
with as the eye-witness testimony was unbelievable, improbable and unreliable, a
s he claims that Superos testimony were inconsistent and that he only volunteered
to testify two months after the crime. And so the case was elevated to the Supr
eme Court. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred regarding the conviction
and awarding of damages Held: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial
court. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not
impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating t
he principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants. Slight co
ntradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the sincerity of the witness and p
rove that his testimony is not rehearsed. They are safeguards against memorized
perjury. As to the delay, it was a result of the fear that was instilled upon hi
m upon seeing the killing with his own eyes. Regarding the amount of the damages
awarded, the order to pay the widow of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P23,214.00 as actual damages, as well as the costs was AFFIRMED, but the aw
ard of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages was DELETED, there being no leg
al and factual basis. The award of P50,000.00 from each accused as moral and exe
mplary damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify
on any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of
her husbands death. The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attendi
ng the crime likewise disqualified the award of exemplary damages. The attendanc
e of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime, though alleged in the
information, is not supported by the evidence, as there is no showing as to whe
n appellant and his co-accused determined to kill the victim. Likewise, abuse of
superior strength, being absorbed by treachery, cannot be considered as an aggr
avating circumstance in this case.
Arcona vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 134784 (December 9, 2002)
Facts: In the evening of June 27, 1986, Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines wer
e walking along the national highway at Barangay Labog, Brookes Point, Palawan, o
n their way home after coming from a birthday party. When they were near the hou
se of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a loud thud. He turned around saw Napoleon slu
mp to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamb
oo, causing him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate premises except Carlos A
rcona, the petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the house of Cesar
Umapas to ask for help. Petitioner voluntarily surrendered. In his defense, peti
tioner alleged that in the evening of June 27, 1986, he was walking alone when h
e met Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines. Without any provocation, Napoleon su
ddenly drew his bolo and swung the bolo at him twice but missed him. He then dre
w out his knife and stabbed Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo Talanquines rushing to
wards him, he grabbed a piece of bamboo from the newly constructed culvert and h
it the former on the left arm. Talanquines ran away. Petitioner also left the pr
emises and went home. On the way, he met his brother, Benito, and together they
proceeded to their house. After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convict
ing Carlos of Homicide and acquitting Benito Arcona and ordered that the former
pay the amount of 30,000 pesos for the death of Napoleon Ong and 10,000 pesos mo

ral damages. For the charge of Slight Physical Injuries Benito Arcona was found
guilty and Carlos was acquitted. On appeal, the Court affirmed the decision of t
he lower court but increased the civil indemnity to the heirs of Napoleon Ong to
50,000 pesos. Petitioner Carlos Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y
Moban were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder in separate informations. T
he charges arose from the death of Napoleon Ong after he was attacked and stabbe
d by Carlos and Benito Arcona y Moban. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeal
s was correct in increasing the civil indemnity due to the heirs of Napoleon Ong
.

Held: Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct in increasing the amount of civil in
demnity to P50,000.00, in line with existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder,
homicide, parricide and rape, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is aut
omatically granted to the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, with
out need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.
On the other hand, the award of moral damages in the sum of P 10,000.00 must be
increased to P50,000.00. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent
death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pa
in and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing.
Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the dec
eased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and suppor
t, but often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been don
e to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of
any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional suffering.
Factors in determining amount
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116181 (April 17, 1996) Facts: Carmelo H. Flores (Flores) purchased fro
m petitioner at its Manila Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2) managers checks worth P
500,000.00 each. A receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner. Subsequ
ently, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino unit of petition
er. Petitioner refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it a
greed to encash one (1) of the checks. However, it deferred the payment of the o
ther check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five (5) manager
s checks of P100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash one of t
he five checks until after it is cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Havi
ng no other option, Flores agreed to such an arrangement. However, upon his retu
rn to Manila, he made representations to PNB through its Malate Branch so that t
he check may be encashed but to no avail. Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to
his counsel informing the latter of the aforementioned events. A Formal Demand w
as made by private respondents counsel but petitioner persisted in its refusal
to honor the check. Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with the Regi
onal Trial Court which ruled in his favor ordering PNB, among others, to pay the
amount of the checks dishonored plus moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.0
0 pesos. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not th
e award of P1,000,000.00 moral damages in addition to actual claim of inordinate
ly disproportionate and unconscionable Held: YES. We concur with the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the award of moral damages, howe
ver the amount of P1,000,000.00 for moral damages in addition to Flores actual
claim of P100,000.00 is "inordinately disproportionate and unconscionable." The
following factors were taken into consideration: First, Flores contention that
he lost the opportunity to purchase a house and lot in Baguio City due to petiti
oners gross negligence is based solely on his own testimony and a mere general
statement at that. The broker he named during his cross-examination, Mr. Nick Bu
endia was not even presented to confirm the aforementioned allegation. Second, t
he award of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is obviously not propor
tionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00 sustained by Flores. The moral damag
es awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered. Moral damages
though incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an award desig
ned to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a pe
nalty on the wrongdoer. It is not intended to enrich a complainant at the expens
e of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he
has undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed
at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering inflicted.
Gregorio Fule vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112212 (March 2, 1998) Facts: Gregorio Fule, a corporate secretary of R

ural Bank of Alaminos and also a jeweler on the side, acquired a 10-hectare prop
erty in Tanay, Rizal. The property used to be under the name of Fr. Antonio Jaco
be. Fr. Jacobe had mortgaged it earlier to the Rural Bank of Alaminos to secure
a loan, but the mortgage was later foreclosed and the property was offered for p
ublic auction. Fule, as corporate secretary of the bank, asked Remelia Dichoso a
nd Oliva Mendoza to look for a buyer who might be interested in the Tanay proper
ty. The two found a buyer in private respondent Dr. Ninevetch Cruz. At the same
time, it so happened that Fule had shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cu
t diamond earrings owned by Dr. Cruz. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter
of the jewelry and the property ensued. However, it was later on found out that
no barter was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption had not yet expir
ed. To get over this legal impediment, Fule executed a deed of redemption on beh
alf of Fr. Jacobe, the latter purportedly sold the property to Fule. One day, Fu
le arrived at Atty. Belarminos (private petitioners lawyer) residence with Dichoso
and Mendoza to execute a deed of absolute sale. Fule issued a certification sta
ting that the actual consideration of the sale was Php200,000.00 and not Php80,0
00.00 as indicated in the deed. Since the earrings were appraised at only Php160
,000.00, the remaining Php40,000.00 was to be paid later in cash. This was done
apparently to minimize the capital gains tax which Fule would have to shoulder.
Fule later headed for the bank to meet Cruz and pick up the earrings. There, Dr.
Cruz and the bank cashier then opened the safety deposit box. Dr. Cruz retrieve
d a transparent plastic or cellophane bag with the jewelry inside and handed the
same to Fule. The latter took the jewelry from the bag, went near the electric
light at the banks lobby, held the jewelry against the light and examined it for
ten to fifteen minutes. After a while, Dr. Cruz asked, Okay na ba iyan? Petitioner
expressed his satisfaction by nodding his head. When asked if the jewelry was o
k, Fule nodded to express his satisfaction. Fule paid the agents $300 and some p
ieces of jewelry. On the evening of the same day, Fule arrived at the residence
of Atty. Belarmino complaining that the jewelry given to him, as proven by a tes
ter, was fake. Fule then accused Dichoso and Mendoza of deceiving him which they
, however, denied. They countered that Fule could not have been fooled because h
e had vast experience with jewelry. Nevertheless, Fule took back the $300 and th
e jewelry he paid them. Fule filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court a
gainst Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino praying, among other things, that the contract
of sale over the Tanay property be declared null and void on the ground of fraud
and deceit. The lower court issued a temporary restraining order directing the
Register of Deeds of Rizal to refrain from acting on the pertinent documents inv
olved in the transaction. However, the same court lifted its previous order and
denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. After trial, the lower c
ourt rendered its decision in favor of Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino. In awarding da
mages to the defendants, the lower court found that Fule acted in bad faith. The
court awarded Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino moral damages and exemplary damages. Th
e court also granted both P25,000.00 each as attorneys fees and litigation expens
es. A petition with the Court of Appeals yielded the same result, hence this pet
ition. Issue: Whether or not the appellate court erred in awarding damages. Held
: No. In the instant case, the trial court awarded damages analogous to maliciou
s prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons: The ma
lice with which Fule filed the case is apparent. As an experienced jeweler who t
horoughly examined the earrings himself and went so far as to sketch them earlie
r, it is illogical that he would fail to exert extra effort to check its genuine
ness at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to accord with
what

them earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to exert extra effort to check
its genuineness at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to a
ccord with what an ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation. A
s an experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewd enough to bloat the prope
rtys price from Php25,000.00 to Php75,000.00 only a few days after he had purchas
ed it for a far lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the diamond e
arrings price. Also, it took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before complaining
that the earrings were counterfeita period in which anything could have happened
while Fule was in possession of the jewelry. Given this, it would appear that th
e cause of action in the instant case was contrived by Fule himself in hopes of
obtaining a favorable outcome in his complaint to take the real jewelry, return
a fake, and get back the property. This is plain and simple, unjust enrichment.
All that considered the damages prayed for were reasonably proportionate to the
sufferings Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino underwent. Petitioner filed a malicious and
unfounded case all the while dragging down private respondents, whose reputatio
ns had been soiled by Fules coming to court with unclean hands. Because of the fa
lsity, malice and baseless nature of the complaint, Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino we
re compelled to litigate and are thus also entitled to the awarding of attorneys
fees under Article 2208.
Philippine Airlines vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120262 (July 17, 1997) Facts: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City
, boarded a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was suppos
ed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City However, due to typhoon Osang,
the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. To accommodate the needs of
its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance and, the next d
ay for their expected stay of two days in Cebu. Pantejo requested instead that h
e be billeted in a hotel at PALs expense because he did not have cash with him
at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was forced to seek and a
ccept the generosity of a co-passenger. when the flight for Surigao was resumed,
respondent Pantejo came to know that the hotel expenses of his co-passengers, w
ere reimbursed by PAL. At this point, respondent Pantejo informed Oscar Jereza,
PALs Manager for Departure Services at Mactan Airport and who was in charge of
cancelled flights, that he was going to sue the airline for discriminating again
st him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay respondent Pantejo P300.00 w
hich, due to the ordeal and anguish he had undergone, the latter decline. The Re
gional Trial Court of Surigao City, rendered judgment in the action for damages
filed by Pantejo against Philippine Airlines, Inc., ordering the latter to pay P
antejo among others, P150,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, respondent court a
ffirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of the award of
attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Issue: WON the award of P 150,000.00 as
moral damages was proper. Held: Yes. Moral damages are emphatically not intende
d to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only t
o allow the former to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendants culpable a
ction and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering inflicted. However, s
ubstantial damages do not translate into excessive damages. Under the peculiar c
ircumstances of this case, the awards for actual, moral and exemplary damages gr
anted in the judgment of respondent court, for the reasons meticulously analyzed
and thoroughly explained in its decision, are just and equitable.
Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024 (February 7, 1996)
Facts: Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving along Aurora Blvd. when she realized s
he had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights,
and opened the cars trunk. She was at the left side of the rear of her car. While
she was talking to a man who will help her fix the tire, she was suddenly bumpe
d by a car driven by defendant Richard Li which was registered in the name of Al
exander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact, Valenzuela was thrown against th

e windshield of Lis car and fell onto the ground. The cars windshield on the other
hand, was also destroyed,. Valenzuelas left leg was severed up to the middle o
f her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. Sh
e was confined in the hospital for 20 days and was eventually fitted with an art
ificial leg. She then filed a claim for damages against Li.

Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a
speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to th
e right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped Valenzuelas ca
r. He claimed to not have seen the car due to its midnight blue color. He argued
that there was no parking light or an early warning device, and that the area w
as poorly lighted. Li and Alexander Commercial, Inc. counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that Valenzuela was the one who was reckless or negligent. The RTC fou
nd Li and Alexander Commercial, Inc. solidarily liable. CA absolved Alexander Co
mmercial, Inc. Issue: Whether nor not the damages should be mitigated due to the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela for parking along Aurora Blvd, which happ
ens to be a no parking zone. Held: Contributory negligence is a conduct on the p
art of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffe
red, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his o
wn protection. The "emergency rule," on the other hand, as adopted by this Court
in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, is where an individual who suddenly finds himself
in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider th
e best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may a
ppear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negli
gence. While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thoug
ht or the opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the
conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclus
ively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, b
ut by the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle sudden
ly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at
a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to o
ther motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a
parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no on
e to help her. As a result of the accident, Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amp
utation of her left lower extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee
. Because of this, Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory fu
nctions of her left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic
technology. Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li)
, she will be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to th
e shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing. The damage done to her wou
ld not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and
adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo throu
gh the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require correspond
ing adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it ha
s been documented, are painful. The foregoing discussion does not even scratch t
he surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly spec
ulative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which go
es with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic d
evice, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of
functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory fun
ctions are forever lost. The resultant

advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the m

otor functions of the lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The re
sultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain a
re inestimable. As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discret
ion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial
court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -physical a
nd psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly negligent dr
iving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
Aurelio Sumaplong vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123404 (February 26, 1997) Facts: Sumalpong shot Ramos after the former
slapped Ramoss wife. Before the incident, the accused called upon the spouses an
d inquired if they knew the person who stoned his house. During the conversation
, Sumalpong accused Ramos of throwing stones at his house. Because of this, Leod
arda, the wife of Ramos, remarked that Sumalpong should first confirm the inform
ation he received before accusing anyone. after hearing Leonardas remark, Sumalpo
ng shot her at the back of her head (though apparently, Leonarda was not harmed)
. Ramos rushed towards Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed. They wres
tled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos ear, causing its mutilation. The tria
l court conviicted Sumalpong of attempted homicide. It awarded Ramos P 16,800.00
for the loss of his crops due to his failure to attend to his farm due to the i
njuries inflicted upon him by Sumalpong. The court also awarded Ramos P2,000.00
for hospitalization expenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral damages. On appeal,
the CA affirmed Sumalpongs conviction. It however removed the award for loss of c
rops and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages to P10,000.00, and aw
arded nominal damages in the same amount. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner i
s guilty and liable for damages. Ruling: In view of the foregoing, this Court ca
nnot but concur with the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding the pet
itioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Anent the award of
damages, however, this Court upholds the Court of Appeals ruling on the matter.
Eliminating the award of actual or compensatory damages in the form of hospital
ization expenses and loss of income, the Court of Appeals cited the failure of t
he complainant to offer any proof of the same. To justify a grant of actual or c
ompensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certai
nty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the in
jured party, the actual amount of loss. Anent the increase in the amount of mora
l damages awarded, suffice it to state that the nature of the injuries and the d
egree of physical suffering endured by the complainant warrants the same. The tr
agic incident caused a mutilation of complainants left ear and a permanent scar
on his right forearm. These injuries have left indelible marks on the complaina
nts body and will serve as a constant reminder of this traumatic experience. Th
e Court finds the award of nominal and moral damages both in the amount of P10,0
00.00 justified under the circumstances.

Lopez vs. Pan-American World Airways

G.R. No. L-22415 (March 30, 1966)
Facts: Sen. Fernando Lopez, his wife, son-in-law, and his daughter made reservat
ions, through their agency, for first class accommodations in the Tokyo San Fran
cisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AMs San Francisco head office confirmed their reser
vations. Subsaquently, first class tickets were issued, with the total fare havi
ng been previously paid. As scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arri
ved in Tokyo, they contacted PAN-AMs Tokyo office regarding their accommodation
s. PAN-AMs Tokyo office informed them that the first class seats were all alrea
dy booked and that they could not take the flight unless they took the tourist c
lass. Due to pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained to take PAN-A

Ms flight as tourist passengers. Sen. Lopez filed a suit for damages alleging b
reach of contracts done in bad faith by PAN-AM out of racial prejudice against O
rientals. He asked for actual and moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney
s fees plus costs. PAN-AM asserted that its failure to provide first class acco
mmodations to Sen. Lopez and his family was due to honest error of its employees
. Issue: Whether or not the award for moral damages and exemplary damages could
be increased. Held: The Court ruled in favor of Sen. Lopez and his family and in
creased the amounts of moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are recoverabl
e in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith
(Art. 2220). While exemplary or corrective damages may be imposed by way of exam
ple or correction for the public good in breach of contracts where the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner (Art.
2229, 2232). Written contracts for an attorneys services, on the other hand, sh
all control the amount to be paid unless found by the court to be unconscionable
or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, ROC). Factors in determining amount for mor
al damages: The amount of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by
adequately considering the official, political, social, and financial standing o
f the offended parties on one hand, and the business and financial position of t
he offender on the other. The present rate of exchange and the terms at which th
e amount of damages awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been
considered. MORAL DAMAGES As a proximate result of PAN-AMs breach in bad faith o
f its contracts, Sen. Lopez and his family suffered social humiliation, wounded
feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to trave
l as tourist passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, co
ntrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the contractual undertaking. Se
n. Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore. International carriers like defe
ndant know the prestige of such an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper
Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the nations treaty-ratifying body. He w
as also former Vice-President of the Philippines. Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of t
he Senator, shared his prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition, she
suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip; her reason for going to th
e US was actually for medical check-up and relaxation. The fact that the seating
spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in first class will suffice
to show that she indeed

actually for medical check-up and relaxation. The fact that the seating spaces i
n the tourist class are quite narrower than in first class will suffice to show
that she indeed experienced physical suffering during the trip. Mr. and Mrs. Alf
redo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as immediate members of the family of Sen
. Lopez. Even if they initially wanted to change their seat reservations from fi
rst class to tourist class, they eventually paid for first class seats. Hence, t
hey also suffered social humiliation.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount

as to effectively deter similar breach of contracts in the future by defendant o
r other airlines.
Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Spouses Chua
G.R. No. 111584 (September 17, 2001)
Facts: Salvador Chua was originally a depositor of Pacific Banking Corporation.
He was offered by the manager of Producers Bank of the Philippines to transfer h
is account with them. The manager assured Chua that if he was to transfer his ac
count the latter would enjoy longer loan terms and lower interest rates. Chua la
ter on decided to transfer his account to Producers Bank. There, he maintained s
ubstantial savings and current deposits with the banks Bacolod branch. He also ob
tained various loans, one of which amounted to P 2,000,000.00 which was secured
by a real estate mortgage. Later on, unfortunate events started to happen to Chu
a as a client of Producers Bank. The amount which he deposited into his savings
account was never credited. It was discovered that the branch manager absconded
with the money of the banks depositors. The bank also dishonored the checks drawn
by Chua on the ground of insufficient funds despite the fact that there was a b
alance deposit sufficient to cover the amount of the checks. These events prompt
ed Chua and his wife to request for copies of their ledgers covering their savin
gs and current accounts. However, the bank refused to grant their request. Due t
o the banks refusal, the couple instituted an action for damages against the ba
nk. The bank, on the other hand, filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage which covered Chuas previous loan. As a result, spous
es Chuas filed a complaint for injunction and damages, alleging that the petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure was without basis and was instituted maliciously
in order to harass them. The trial court and the appellate court ruled in favor
of Spouses Chua, hence awarding damages. Issue: Are Spouses Chua entitled to mor
al, exemplary, and actual damages? Held: The Court held that Spouses Chua are en
titled to moral and exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages may be awarde
d without proof of pecuniary loss. In awarding both, the court shall take into a
ccount the circumstances surrounding the case and assess damages according to it
s discretion. The dishonor of Chuas checks and the foreclosure case initiated by
the bank against Chua adversely affected his credit standing, as well as his bus
iness dealings. Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, entitles Spouses Chua
to moral damages. Obviously, the banks wrongful acts caused serious anxiety, e
mbarrassment, and humiliation to Chua. The acts of the bank (the malicious and u
nwarranted application for extrajudicial foreclosure done by the bank to harass,
embarrass, annoy, and ridicule Chua, as well as the banks failure to credit th
e deposit of Chua which constituted gross negligence in the performance of the b
anks contractual obligation) were accompanied by bad faith and done in wanton, fr
audulent and malevolent manner warranting the award of exemplary damages in favo
r of Chua, in accordance with Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Of course, a plain
tiff need not prove the actual extent of exemplary damages, for its determinatio
n is addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon proof of the plaintiff
s entitlement to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages (Article 2234, Civil
Code). Anent the award of actual damages, the injured party must prove his case
in order to recover. When the existence of a loss is established, absolute certa
inty as to its amount is not required. The benefit to be derived from a contract

which one of the parties has absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to so

me extent, a matter of speculation, but the injured party is not to be denied fo
r that reason alone. He must produce the best evidence of which his case is susc
eptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been damaged by
the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated bu
t for the defendants wrongful act, he is entitled to recover (Cerreno vs. Tan C
huco, 28 Phil. 312 [1914] quoted in Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 63 SCRA 431 [1975]). Applying the foregoing test to the instant case,
the Court finds the evidence of Chua insufficient to be considered within the pu
rview of "best evidence." The bare assertion of Salvador Chua that he lost an av
erage of P18,000.00 per month is inadequate if not speculative and should be adm
itted with extreme caution since it is not supported by independent evidence. Ch
ua could have presented evidence as reports on the average actual profits earned
by their gasoline business, their financial statements, and other evidence of p
rofitability which could aid the court in arriving with reasonable certainty at
the amount of profits which private respondents failed to earn. Thus there can b
e no award of exemplary damages.

Who may recover?

Strebel vs Figueras
96 PHIL 321 (December 29, 1954) Facts: Emilio Strebel seeks to recover damages a
gainst Figueras (acting Secretary of Labor), Jose (Dir. of labor) and Ruperto (A
sst. City Fiscal of Manila) alleging as ground, three causes of action: 1. 2. 3.
That out of spite against him and his family, defendants used their political i
nfluence in attempting to build a drainage through a gasoline station operated b
y a partnership, to which Strebel is a partner. That defendants, by making use o
f their official and political connections, was able to induce the Secretary of
Justice to transfer one Dr. Hernandez from being an officer of the Bureau of Imm
igration to that of the Bureau of Prisons. Strebel claims that Dr. Hernandez is
his son-in-law, being the husband of his (Strebels) step-daughter. Defendants cau
sed the laborers of Strebels gasoline station to file false cases against him for
violation of a Commonwealth Act prohibiting compulsion of vwork beyond eight (8
) hours. While the case was dismissed, Defendants issued a press conference ques
tioning the dismissal besmirching his reputation nonetheless.
Issue: Is plaintiff entitled to damages? Held: No, on all causes of action. As t
o the first cause of action, the Supreme Court ruled that the drainage project h
as not begun, therefore, no damage was suffered by plaintiff. As to the third ca
use of action, the court ruled that since no information has been filed by the F
iscal, the charge of malicious prosecution cannot prosper. While plaintiff also
maintains that at any case, defendants are liable under their misconduct via tor
tuous act, the old civil code, which was the law in effect at the time of the co
mmission of the crime, moral damages may not be recovered in cases of crime or t
ort unless it results from physical injuries. NOTE: FOCUS on this-- As to the seco
nd cause of action, Strebel claims that by reason of the malicious transfer of D
r. Hernandez to the Office of the Bureau of Prisons, he has

NOTE: FOCUS on this-- As to the second cause of action, Strebel claims that by r
eason of the malicious transfer of Dr. Hernandez to the Office of the Bureau of
Prisons, he has suffered moral and mental suffering and therefore entitled to mo
ral damages. As to the alleged press conference, no mention of the case number o
f a specific person was made, hence, there could be no damage suffered. The Supr
eme Court elucidates "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffer
ing resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered
the bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy fo
r anothers suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So t
he anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal per
il from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration It furthered by saying
that damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as resul
t of willful act, unless such act was directed toward person or property or pers
on seeking recovery. The rule on this point, as stated in the American Jurisprude
nce, is: "In law mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or
suffering as arises from an injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguis
hed from that form of mental suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or
sorrow for anothers suffering or which arises from a contemplation of wrongs c
ommitted on the person of another. Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wif
e cannot recover for mental suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the othe
rs suffering." It should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Her
nandez. The latters wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage.
Hence Dr. Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a rela
tive by affinity of said plaintiff.
ABS-CBN vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128690 (January 29, 1999) Facts: In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a F
ilm Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS-CBN an exclusive right to exhibit
some Viva films. ABS-CBN shall have the right of first refusal to the next twen
ty-four (24) Viva films for TV telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon b
y the parties hereto, provided, however, that such right shall be exercised by A
BS-CBN from the actual offer in writing. Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, of
fered ABS-CBN, through its vice-president Charo Santos-Concio, a list of three(3
) film packages (36 title) from which ABS-CBN may exercise its right of first re
fusal. ABS-CBN, however "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from the list) "we
can purchase" and therefore did not accept said list. Subsequently, Del Rosario
approached ABS-CBNs Ms. Concio, with a list consisting of 52 original movie tit
les (i.e. not yet aired on television) including the 14 titles subject of the pr
esent case, as well as 104 reruns (previously aired on television) from which AB
S-CBN may choose another 52 titles, as a total of 156 titles, proposing to sell
to ABS-CBN airing rights over this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs. Del R
osario and ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III, met at the Tamarind Grill
Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package proposal of Viva. Mr. Lopez te
stified that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN was granted ex
clusive film rights to fourteen (14) films for a total consideration of P36 mill
ion; that he allegedly put this agreement as to the price and number of films in
a "napkin and signed it and gave it to Mr. Del Rosario. On the other hand, De
l Rosario denied having made any agreement with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva film
s; denied the existence of a napkin in which Lopez wrote something; and insisted
that what he and Lopez discussed at the lunch meeting was Vivas film package o
ffer of 104 films (52 originals and 52 re-runs) for a total price of P60 million
. Mr. Lopez promising to make a counter proposal which came in the form of a pro
posal contract. Thereafter, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano Gozon discussed the ter
ms and conditions of Vivas offer to sell the 104 films, after the rejection of
the same package by ABS-CBN. On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received t
hrough his secretary, a handwritten note from Ms. Concio, which reads: "Heres t
he draft of the contract. I hope you find everything in order," to which was att
ached a draft exhibition agreement a counter-proposal covering 53 films, 52 of w
hich came from the list sent by defendant Del Rosario and one film was added by
Ms. Concio, for a consideration of P35 million. The said counter proposal was ho

wever rejected by Vivas Board of Directors on the evening of the same day, Apri
l 7, 1992, as Viva would not sell anything less than the package of 104 films fo
r P60 million pesos and such rejection was relayed to Ms. Concio. After the reje
ction of ABS-CBN and following several negotiations and meetings defendant Del R
osario and Vivas President Teresita Cruz, in consideration of P60 million, sign
ed a letter of agreement granting RBS the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produc
ed and/or acquired films including the fourteen (14) films subject of the presen
t case. Thereafter, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific perfor
mance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restra
ining order against private respondents Republic Broadcasting Corporation, Viva
Production and Del Rosario. RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and
against ABS-CBN, ordering the latter to pay, among others, P5 million as and by
way of moral damages. On appeal, respondent court found reasonable basis for th
e award of moral damages holding that RBSs reputation was debased by the filing
of the complaint and denied VIVA and Del Rosarios appeal because it was "RBS a
nd not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS-CB
N."
Issue: Whether or not ABS-CBN is entitled to the award of moral damages. Held: N
o. As to moral damages, RBSs claim for moral damages could possibly fall only u
nder item (10) of Article 2219, thereof which reads: (10) Acts and actions referr
ed to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35. Moral damages are in th
e category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suf
fered. and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to e
nrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate then
moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the li
mits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportion
ate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award o
f exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured obje
ctivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption
on the part of the trial court. The award of moral damages cannot be granted in
favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence
only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cann
ot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be e
xperienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Maner
o and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if
it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation" is
an obiter dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, s
ince RBS is a corporation.
65
National Power v. Philipp Brothers
G.R. No 126204 (November 20, 2001)
Facts: The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for th
e supply and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas C
oal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as one of the bidders
. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBROs bid was accepted. NAPOCORs a
cceptance was conveyed in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by PHI
BRO on July 15, 1987. On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR that industr
ial disputes might soon plague Australia, the shipments point of origin, which
could seriously hamper PHIBROs ability to supply the needed coal. From July 23
to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, p
articularly informing the latter that the ship owners therein are not willing to
load cargo unless a "strike-free" clause is incorporated in the charter party o
r the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal, PHIBRO prop
osed to NAPOCOR that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free" clause. NA
POCOR refused. Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once more advertised for t

he delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in thi
s subsequent bidding.

On November 24, 1987, NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBROs application for pre-qualifica

tion to bid for not meeting the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIB
RO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported failure to s
atisfy NAPOCORs demand for damages due to the delay in the delivery of the firs
t coal shipment. This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages with applica
tion for injunction against NAPOCOR. In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOC
ORs act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent b
iddings was tainted with malice and bad faith and prayed for actual, moral and e
xemplary damages and attorneys fees. Trial court rendered a decision in favor o
f PHIBRO, ordering NAPOCOR among others, to pay PHIBRO actual, moral, exemplary
damages and costs. Issue: Whether or not PHIBRO is entitled to the award of mora
l damages. Held: No. Moral damages are not, as a general rule, granted to a corp
oration. While it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moral damage
s, it cannot cause mental anguish to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natu
ral person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an individual
has, and besides, it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental
anguish. In LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that "Moral dam
ages are granted in recompense for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, s
erious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social hum
iliation, and similar injury. A corporation, being an artificial person and havi
ng existence only in legal contemplation, has no feelings, no emotions, no sense
s; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental
suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows f
rom real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life all of which cannot be suffered by re
spondent bank as an artificial person."
Nominal Damages
Ventanilla vs. Gregorio Centeno
G.R. No. 14333 (January 28, 1961) Facts: Ventanilla instituted this action to re
cover damages against his lawyer, Atty. Centeno for neglecting to perfect within
the reglementary period his appeal from an adverse judgment rendered by the CFI
of Manila. Trial courts facts showed that the required appeal bond was not filed
by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the record on appeal was admitted for filing is
the best evidence that Atty. Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The
record on appeal was disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal
bond had been filed by the plaintiff. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of
Ventanilla ordered Centeno to pay Ventanilla the sum of P200 as nominal damages
and the costs. Ventanilla appealed to the Court of Appeals and claimed that the
trial court erred, among others, in ordering Centeno to pay only the sum of P20
0, and not P2,000 as nominal damages. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erre
d in the amount of the award of nominal damages. Held: No. Relative to the suffi
ciency of the sum of P200 as nominal damages awarded by the trial court to the a
ppellant, article 2221 of the new Civil Code provides: Nominal damages are adjudi
cated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of i
ndemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The assessment of nominal
damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances
of the case. Considering the circumstances, as found by the trial court, and the
degree of negligence committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not depositing on
time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the extension period
granted by the court, which brought about the refusal by the trial court to all
ow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the trial court to the ap
pellant as nominal damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless, considering that nom
inal damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindicatio
n or recognition of a right violated or invaded; and that even if the appeal in
civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was not an assurance that the a
ppellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed in his complaint,
the amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to recover as nominal damages is exces
sive. After weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount awarded to the
appellant for nominal damages should not be disturbed.

Robes-Francisco Realty and Development Corp. vs.CFI

G.R. No. L-41093 (October 30, 1978) Facts: On May 1962, private respondent Milla
n bought a lot from petitioner corporation Robes-Francisco Realty and Developmen
t Corporation (Robes-Francisco for brevity). Millan paid the installments in ful
l on December 22, 1971, but it was only on March 2, 1973 that a Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed in her favor. Notwithstanding the lapse of almost three (3) y
ears since she made her last payment, Robes-Francisco still failed to convey the
corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT) to Millan. Due to this, Milla
n was compelled to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Robes-Francisco in 1974. One of the prayers in the complaint include the paymen
t of damages, corrective and actual in the sum of P15,000.00. The trial court ru
led in favor of Millan and ordered Robes-Francisco to pay her nominal damages in
the amount of P20,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and cost
s. Robes-Francisco now questions the award for nominal damages of P20,000.00 and
attorneys fees of P5,000.00 which are allegedly excessive and unjustified. Issue
: Whether or not the trial court was correct in awarding nominal damages? Held:
The trial court did not err in awarding nominal damages. However, the circumstan
ces of the case warrant a reduction of the amount granted to Millan. There can b
e no dispute that Robes-Francisco was guilty of delay, amounting to nonperforman
ce of its obligation, in issuing the TCT to Millan who had fully paid her instal
lments. Article 1170 of the Civil Code expressly provides that those who in the
performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and th
ose who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Howe
ver, Millan submitted her case without presenting evidence on the actual damages
suffered by her as a result of the non-performance of Robes-Franciscos obligatio
n under the deed of sale. NONETHELESS, the facts show that the right of the vend
ee to acquire title over the lot was violated by Robes-Francisco. This entitles
her at the very least to nominal damages. Nominal damages are not intended for i
ndemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a righ
t violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the
amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left
to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case. In t
he situation before Us, We are of the view that the amount of P20,000.00 is exce
ssive. The admitted fact that Robes-Francisco failed to furnish Millan the TCT b
ecause said lot was mortgaged to GSIS does not in itself show that there was bad
faith. Bad faith cannot be presumed. Millans contention that the P20,000.00 awar
d may be considered in the nature of exemplary damages cannot be upheld because
in case of breach of contract, exemplary damages may be awarded if the guilty pa
rty acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

People vs Gopio
G.R. No. 133925 (November 29, 2000) Facts: Agustin Gopio was accused of committi
ng statutory rape on Ma. Princess Millano y, San Diego, an 11 year-old girl, aga
inst her will. The incident was said to have taken place while the Brgy. San Pas
cual, Obando Bulacan, was celebrating its town fiesta. The victim allegedly went
to Gopios store to buy cooking oil around 10:00 am but instead was taken to the
bedroom where she was raped. The victim kept silent about the incident for fear
of Gopio and of what her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim was asham
ed and worried that her friends would spread the news regarding her unfortunate
experience. On two other occasions, also in 1995, the victim related that she wa
s again raped by Gopio but remained silent about it. It was only when the victim
was examined Municipal Health Clinic for complaints of pain in her navel that h
er mother, Luzviminda, discovered that her daughter was no longer a virgin. Upon
inquiry, Princess admitted that Gopio had raped her. The trial court convicted
Gopio guilty of statutory rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusio
n perpetua. The court further ruled that Gopio is liable to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the amount of P3,727.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00, as moral

damages, and to pay the costs of the suit. Issues: (1) Whether Gopio is liable
of statutory rape and (2) whether Gopio is liable to pay the heirs of the victim
actual and moral damages Held: (1) The Court affirmed the ruling of the trial c
ourt convicting the accused of statutory rape. The testimony of the victim was c
lear and categorical, positively identifying the accused as the perpetrator of t
he crime. (2) However, with respect to the award of actual damages, the court ru
led that the award of actual damages in the amount of P 3727.00 was deleted in t
he absence of proof as required in Article 2199.

To be entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof

constituting evidence of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing the
expenses incurred on account of the rape incident. Among the evidence presented
by the mother to establish a claim for actual damages, only the laboratory fee i
n the amount of P350.00 was duly receipted, the rest were merely a doctors prescr
iption and a handwritten list of expenses. Nevertheless, the court ruled that un
der Article 2221 of the Civil Code, the complainants were entitled to nominal da
mages. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recog
nized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffer
ed by him. As has been held, whenever there has been a violation of an ascertaine
d legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are shown, the award
of nominal damages is proper. The victims family evidently incurred expenses due t
o the crime committed and the victim also suffered pains in her navel. Hence, th
e court awarded them P2,000 for nominal damages and increased the moral damages
from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Dr. Armovit, et al. vs. CA and Northwest Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 88561 (April 20, 1990) Facts: Dr. Herman Armovit, a Filipino physician
residing in the United States, along with his family, came home to the Philippin
es for a Christmas visit. They purchased three round plane tickets from Northwes
t Airlines, and was confirmed as OK by a Northwest Airlines ticket sales agent. The
Armovits even reconfirmed their date of departure through their representative
Ernesto Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets at the Northwest
Airlines Roxas Boulevard office. For their return flight, the Armovits arrived i
n the airport at 9:15 in the morning for their 10:30 AM flight, only to be rudel
y informed that they cannot be accommodated because the 10:30 AM flight was erro
neous and that the 9:15 AM flight was already taking off. The family was bumped
off at the Manila International Airport. Dr. Armovit complained that as a result
of the bump off he was not able to keep his appointments with his patients and th
at the family suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and ni
ght until they were informed that seats were available for them the following da
y. The trial court awarded the Armovits actual, moral, exemplary and nominal dam
ages; but on appeal the Court of Appeals deleted the award of moral and nominal
damages. Issue:

Whether the Armovits are entitled to moral and exemplary damages arising from th
e breach of the contract of carriage
Held: The deletion of the moral damages on the ground that petitioners did not t
ake the witness stand to testify on "their social humiliation, wounded feelings
and anxiety, and that the breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent" wa
s improper. Northwest Airlines was found guilty of gross negligence in the issua
nce of the tickets with the erroneous entry of date of departure and its failure
to change the same when the Armovits had reconfirmed their flight. The gross ne
gligence of the airline amounted to malice and bad faith and tainted the breach
of air transportation contract. There was sufficient indicia of malice and bad f
aith on the part of the airline when it issued the tickets, failed to correct th
e dates and rudely informed the Armovits that they were not to be accommodated.
The petitioners are evidently entitled to moral damages. Their failure to testif
y is of no moment since it was explained the assassination of Senator Benigno Aq
uino, Jr. resulting to turmoil in the country refrained the Armovits from coming
back to testify; nevertheless, Atty. Raymundo Armovit who was with the complain
ants at the time of the incident, took the witness stand. By the same token to p
rovide an example for the public good, an award of exemplary damages is also pro
per. Nevertheless, the deletion of the nominal damages by the appellate court is
well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal damages cannot co
-exist with actual or compensatory damages.

Temperate Damages
People vs. Singh
G.R. No. 129782 June 29, 2001)
(
Facts: Dilbang Singh, the private compalinant in the frustrated murder case, rec
alled that while he was cleaning his motorbike in front of his appartment, Dalvi
r, Balwinder, Gurmok, Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip --all surnamed Si
ngh-- Johander Singh Dhillon, and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul re
marks in their native language and demanded Surinder Singh to come out of the ap
artment. When Surinder Singh came out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to st
ab him but Surinder was able to move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions to h
old Surinder Singh and thereafter, Dial and Johinder each held the arms of Surin
der, while Kuldip pushed Surinder. Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder on the rig
ht side of his stomach, causing the latter to fall. Dial Singh said that Surinde
r failed to give money and if others will also refuse, the same fate will happen
to them. As Surinder Singh tried to get up, Malkit and Jarnail started hitting
him with lead pipes, while Johinder and Dial punched and kicked him. Amarjit, wh
o was holding a gun, warned everyone not to help Surinder or else he will shoot.
While all these things were going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to
stop them but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on his back. Gurmok likewise stabbed
him with a bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side. After th
at, the ten (10) accused Indians left. Thereafter, Dilbag Singh and Surinder Sin
gh, were brought to the hospital. Surinder was pronounced dead on arrival. Issue
: Whether or not the court a quo erred in awarding excessive damages against acc
used-appellants. Held: In the criminal case for frustrated murder, the trial cou
rt awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representin
g his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00 as attorneys fees. Fo
r his hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to support sa
id claim amounted only to P370.50. Hence, Dilbag Singh is entitled only to the s
aid amount. The award of attorneys fees is hereby deleted. Nonetheless, private c
omplaint is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for the suffer
ing he endured from appellants felonious acts. In the criminal case for murder, o
nly the following expenses were proven to recover actual damages: funeral expens
es and air ticket/freight of the cadaver. The amounts for hospitalization expens
es are deleted since it is not supported by evidence. Attorneys fees and the comp
ensation for loss of earning capacity, are likewise deleted for lack of basis. H
owever, the trial courts award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 m
oral damages are affirmed. Awards for loss of earning capacity partake of damage
s which must be proven not only by credible and satisfactory evidence, but also
by unbiased proof. The testimony of Balwinder Singh Gill, first cousin of the de
ceased, on the alleged income of the deceased, is not enough. The best evidence
to substantiate income earned by foreigners while in the Philippines is the paym
ent of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent such proof, bare allega
tion is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the definite proof of pecun
iary loss cannot be offered, and the fact of loss has been established, appellan
ts shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages.
People of the Philippines vs. Edison Plazo
G.R. No. 120547 (January 29, 2001)

G.R. No. 120547 (January 29, 2001)

Facts: Leonor Fabula went out of her house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur to
buy sugar at a nearby store. When she reached the store, she saw appellant boxi
ng her son Romeo Fabula and banging his head on the post of the store, while ask
ing him why he told the police about his brother and the location of appellants
house. When Leonor sought to intervene, appellant got angry at her. She became
afraid and asked for help but nobody went near them. Romeo freed himself from th
e hold of appellant and ran away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo known
locally as "gatab." Leonor shouted at appellant to stop but the latter did not
heed her pleas. Appellant caught up with Romeo and stabbed him at the back causi
ng Romeo to fall on the ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo in the upper a
nd lower chest area. Leonor continued shouting for help and eventually someone c
ame to help. However, when she saw her son no longer moving, she told the people
not to touch or move him because she was going to the Poblacion of Tigaon to ge
t a policeman. When Patrolmen Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the sc
ene of the crime, they saw the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded o
n his chest and the detached handle of the bolo on the ground near his body. On
June 10, 1991, appellant was charged with the crime of murder After trial, the t
rial court rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder
and ordered Plazo to indemnify the heirs of the late Fabula for the latters de
ath the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); the sum of Fifteen Thousand Se
ven Hundred Twelve Pesos (P15,712.00) as actual damages; and the sum of Ten Thou
sand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages. Issue: Whether or not the lower court
erred in the award of actual damages. Held: The trial court correctly awarded th
e amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of actual damages in the
amount of P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare assertions of the mother of t
he victim. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are support
ed by receipts. In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be awarded. Howeve
r, in lieu of actual damages, TEMPERATE DAMAGES under Art. 2224 of the Civil Cod
e may be recovered where it has been shown that the victims family suffered som
e pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. We find
the award of P15,000.00 as temperate damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot b
e awarded in the absence of any evidence to support its award.
PNB vs. CA
G.R. No. 108630 (April 2, 1996)
Facts: private respondent Loreto Tan is the owner of the land which has been exp
ropriated by the government. After the proceedings, Tan requested the release to
him of the expropriation price of P32, 480.00. The trial court ordered the PNB
to release the same to Tan as deposited in it by the government. Petitioners Asst
.branch manager, Juan Tagamolilia, issued managers check for the said amount and
delivered it to Sonia Gonzaga without Tans knowledge. As a consequence, Tan dema
nded the payment from PNB which refused on the ground that they had already paid
the same based on the SPA allegedly executed in her favour by Tan. Tan therefor
e executed an affidavit contending that he had never executed such SPA nor autho
rized Gonzaga to receive it. PNB, on the other hand, failed to produce the SPA a
s directed by the court. The TC ruled against the PNB. CA affirmed the same but
deleted the award of P5, 000.00 for exemplary damages and P5, 000.00 for attorne
ys fees. Issues: (1) Whether or not an SPA existed. (2) Whether or not the award
of attorneys fees and exemplary damages is proper. Held: (1) No. Under the best e
videnced rule, only the original document is the best evidence of the fact as to
whether the creditor authorized a third person to receive the payment from the
debtor and in the absence of such document, the debtors argument regarding due pa
yment must fail.

In this case, since PNB failed to prove the SPA as an evidence, its contention t

hat they paid petitioner must fail. (2) The award of attorneys fees is proper und
er Art. 2208 of the CC since Tan is forced to litigate to protect his rights, bu
t the award of exemplary damages is properly deleted. Under Art. 2232 of the CC,
exemplary damages may be awarded if a part acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckl
ess, oppressive or malevolent manner.
However, they cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court has yet to dec
ide whether or not they should be adjudicated. In the case at bar, while there i
s a clear breach of petitioners obligation to pay private respondents, there is
no evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive manner
. Furthermore, there is no award to compensatory damages which is a prerequisite
before exemplary damages may be awarded.

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