[G.R. No. 160261.

November 10, 2003]

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA
MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO,
INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents, J AIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160262. November 10, 2003]
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA
RAZON-ABAD, petitioners, ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL
AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-
intervention, WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO,respondent-in-
intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
[G.R. No. 160263. November 10, 2003]
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.
CAGAMPANG, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioners-in-
intervention, vs. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160277. November 10, 2003]
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,
HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREON-
JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,
GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL
DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS
COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO,
RENE VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH
SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ,
RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT
REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL
ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON,
MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO
ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA,
JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO,
JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS
LOPEZ, respondents, JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-
intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
[G.R. No. 160292. November 10, 2003]
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.
CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents, JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160295. November 10, 2003]
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,respondents, JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO
Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
[G.R. No. 160310. November 10, 2003]
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,
MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,
EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO
NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO
MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON
A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE
ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR.,
JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE
ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners, WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET
AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 160318. November 10, 2003]
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs. HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160342. November 10, 2003]
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND
ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING
PROFESSION, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160343. November 10, 2003]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,respondents.
[G.R. No. 160360. November 10, 2003]
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160365. November 10, 2003]
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.
PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS,
LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA
G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF
OF OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA
AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF
JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
[G.R. No. 160370. November 10, 2003]
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160376. November 10, 2003]
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs. HON. FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION
OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160392. November 10, 2003]
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160397. November 10, 2003]
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR.,petitioner.
[G.R. No. 160403. November 10, 2003]
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN
DRILON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 160405. November 10, 2003]
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION
OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY
RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,
PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
[CELLA, INC.], MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO
FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU
CHAPTER, petitioners, vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO-MORALES, J .:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how
passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the
determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,
scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the
Constitution itself provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nations history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional,
at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous
sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the
Constitution, and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has
resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was
brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court
is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each
of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power is
wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate
functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to
achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater interest
and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court,
the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session
days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines,
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial,
and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry
out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the
12
th
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment
Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules
[1]
approved by the 11
th
Congress. The relevant distinctions between
these two Congresses House Impeachment Rules are shown in the following
tabulation:

11
TH
CONGRESS RULES 12
TH
CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT



Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment.
Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment
filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a
verified complaint or resolution
of impeachment filed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.



RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION
OF IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 16.
I mpeachment
Proceedings Deemed
I nitiated. In cases where
a Member of the House
files a verified complaint
of impeachment or a
citizen files a verified
complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House
through a resolution of
endorsement against an
impeachable
officer,impeachment
proceedings against such
official aredeemed
initiated on the day the
Committee on Justice finds
that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against
such official,as the case
may be, is sufficient in
substance, or on the date
the House votes to
overturn or affirm the
finding of the said
Committee that the
verified complaint and/or
resolution, as the case may
be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third
(1/3) of the Members of the
House,impeachment
proceedings are deemed
initiated at the time of the
filing of such verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment with the
Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST
IMPEACHMENT

Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall
be initiated against the same
official more than once within
the period of one (1) year.



Section 17. Bar Against
I nitiation Of Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period
of one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the
original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a
Resolution,
[2]
sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which
directed the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
[3]

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an
impeachment complaint
[4]
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
[5]
of this Court for culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high
crimes.
[6]
The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,
[7]
and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
[8]
in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice

ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was sufficient in form,
[9]
but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.
[10]
To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint
[11]
was filed with
the Secretary General of the House
[12]
by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded
on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by
a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third (1/3)
of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
[13]

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article
XI of the Constitution that [n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year.
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he himself was a victim of the capricious
and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12
th
Congress,
[14]
posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been
violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the
House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and
Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2)
this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing respondents House of
Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of
the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it
off the records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently
enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a
writ perpetually prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing
any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for
the issuance of a writ perpetually prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of Impeachment
against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the
same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad
Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public
interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the
impeachment trial on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court
has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the
cases of Chavez v. PCGG
[15]
andChavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,
[16]
prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for
an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment
complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and
Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as a class suit and
pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and
void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from
taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment
complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act
on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a
citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their
petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen
and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer,
pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and
Permanent Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging
that it is mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the
Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16
and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House
Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional and that the House of
Representatives be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et.
al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class
suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citingOposa v. Factoran
[17]
which was filed in
behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the
fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ prohibiting
the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment
to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges
in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the
time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were absolutely without
any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the
Articles of Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief
Justice to disburse the (JDF).
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L.
Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the
subject matter of their petition forCertiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a
constitutional issue which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students, pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second
impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does
not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in
his petition To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action
and Jurisdiction that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings
thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens
and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null
and void and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be
prohibited from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,
[18]
prayed for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction
to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the
Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for
the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null
and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,
petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by
the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second impeachment
complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,
[19]
and as
reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be
forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28,
2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court
rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court
directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b)
require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the
Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5,
2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae.
[20]
In addition, this Court called on petitioners and respondents to
maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in
their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions
moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives
through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of
special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has
no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government
under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante
Cautela)
[21]
and Comment, praying that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction
of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment
cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be
recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution.
[22]

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b)
require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5,
2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is
concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in
fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue
was presented before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as
an impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of
Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a Petition for Leave to
Intervene in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quoResolution issued by this Court on October
28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this
Court in a constitutional deadlock and praying for the dismissal of all the
petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention.
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No.
160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. also filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene
in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentels
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadras Petition in Intervention were
admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and
Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal
issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to
wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can
invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this
Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) Houses exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senates sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues
arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this
Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and
novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the essential pre-
requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled;
and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
J udicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power
of judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment
complaint.
This Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of
the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon
by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission
[23]
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions,
unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article
VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel
discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances,
and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions
and limitations upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage,
the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions
embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of
its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided
for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act
of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as
its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
[24]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this moderating power to determine
the proper allocation of powers of the different branches of government and
to direct the course of government along constitutional channels is inherent
in all courts
[25]
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is
the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.
[26]

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has been
set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half
centuries. To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v.
Madison
[27]
that the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief
Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws
of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the
constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions,
that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument.
[28]
(Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant
in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.
[29]
And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,
[30]
the executive and legislative branches of our government in fact
effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
[31]
judicial review is indeed
an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers
are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow
from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each
other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and
balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.
[32]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, x x x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and
enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among
the three great departments of government through the definition and
maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them.
[33]
To
him, [j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or
instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation.
[34]

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse
of discretion by any branch or instrumentalities of government, the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the so-called
expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court, the nature of and rationale for
which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto
Concepcion:
x x x
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the
role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by the
circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then had
no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of
martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not
a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
[35]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this
Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-
settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,
[36]
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando,
declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We
do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are
the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
[37]
(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary
[38]
in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a
Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption,
and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason
which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision
and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that
purpose.
[39]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
[40]
where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task
in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the
purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may
also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided
mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
[41]
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,
[42]
this Court, through Chief
Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated
a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without
considering that it could also affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they
permitted, if not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent of
its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other
provisions of that great document.
[43]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
[44]
this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of
the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but
that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into
view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and
one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor
of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.
[45]
(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort
to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of
the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the
resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as
said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing
the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but
they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less
of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.
[46]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement
and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel
argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from
the coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial
character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
[47]

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senates sole
power to try impeachment cases
[48]
(1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senates power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.
[49]

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment
proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American
authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United
States.
[50]
Thus, they contend that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the
framers decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments
and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create
a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.
[51]
Respondents likewise point
to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial
power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents and intervenors reliance upon American jurisprudence, the
American Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support
the proposition that the Senates sole power to try and decide impeachment
cases, as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial
review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment
process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily
confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling
within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as
Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,
[52]
[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs.
[53]
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since
diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, [w]e have cut the umbilical
cord.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power
but also aduty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any government
branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation,
[54]
our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives
the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
[55]
provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4)
and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and
the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that whenever possible, the Court should
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full
well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride.
[56]

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in
the language of Baker v. Carr,
[57]
judicially discoverable standards for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power
of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez
[58]
and Alejandrino v. Quezon,
[59]
cited by
respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment power is
beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern
the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to
perform non-ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of
judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr.,
[60]
this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction
of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation
of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,
[61]
in seeking to nullify an act
of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it
held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. InBondoc v. Pineda,
[62]
this Court declared null and void a resolution
of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal
for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,
[63]
it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of
the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,
[64]
it held that the act of the
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,
[65]
it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. InAngara v. Electoral Commission,
[66]
it
ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges
of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as
a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another.
[67]
Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts power of
judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject
to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
standing to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner,
the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through
their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.
[68]
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[69]

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends
that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has
sustained and will sustain direct personal injury.Amicus curiae former Justice
Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest
[70]
and transcendental importance,
[71]
and that procedural matters are
subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the
laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.
[72]
Amicus
curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights
by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for
ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts
will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest
and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure
[73]
while
the latter has constitutional underpinnings.
[74]
In view of the arguments set forth
regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato
[75]
to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it
from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted
by authorities thus: It is important to note . . . that standing because of its
constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions
relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to
sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain
parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of
the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are
brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually
sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
x x x
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is the party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails
of the suit.
[76]
(Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a
class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were
supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been given
standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.
[77]
In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right,
[78]
the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
[79]
Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
[80]

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
[81]
This Court opts to grant standing to
most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to
the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.
[82]
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing
to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.
[83]

While an association has legal personality to represent its
members,
[84]
especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests,
[85]
the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does
not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is shared by
other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.
[86]
It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing
and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned
[87]
to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,
[88]
for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable
or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all
members of the class whether or not they were before the court.
[89]
Where it
clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown
by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court,
G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however,
their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R.
No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or
other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being
raised.
[90]
Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues
raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.
[91]
Such liberality does not, however, mean
that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such
interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus
have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter
in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the
courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the
law authorizing intervention.
[92]

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadras
case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262.
Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same
standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has
been interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking
their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that they will suffer if this insidious
scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful, this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires
of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation the
respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs
with Senate President Drilons. He alleges that submitting to this Courts
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of
the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly,
Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he
being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed.
For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier
stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Sorianos motion to intervene, the same must be
denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the
standing requirement for bringing taxpayers suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,
[93]
to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public
moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is
being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against
abuses of legislative power, or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
[94]
(Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that
the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in
public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere
interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,
[95]
this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held
that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture.
[96]
Only then may the courts pass on
the validity of what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing
of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance
with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12
th
Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been
carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged unconstitutional
act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v.
Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a
decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality
anyway. He thus recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of
Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to
encourage signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their
signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when
the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the
same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles
are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their
constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The deans position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint
since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article
XI of the Constitution
[97]
and, therefore, petitioners would continue to suffer their
injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either
or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact
that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise,
as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted
Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a
body which is bereft of power to grant it.
J usticiability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,
[98]
Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term political question, viz:
[T]he term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris
Secundum, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality,
of a particular measure.
[99]
(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without
any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance
of cases which involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid
behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its
power of judicial review.
[100]
In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction
whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies.
[101]
Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary
[102]
which raised the issue of whether the
1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine
to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Courts power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God, and
is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
bodys indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on
the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience
during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but
the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was marred considerably by
the circumstance that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political
questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it. The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not
a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar
are familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission
who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme
Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not
mistaken. Martial law was announced on September 22, although the proclamation
was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that
the administration had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only
because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who
succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of
the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and
by September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that upon the proclamation of
martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them,
were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner
Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14
months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President around
December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which
suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial law decree which
prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public
concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of the
Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may
use a word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum,
however, the draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling
effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult the
people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to
be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its scheduled
beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on Elections, but of
what was then designated as citizens assemblies or barangays. Thus the barangays
came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed
answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the
answers given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the
holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard before
the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the Court a proclamation of
the President declaring that the new Constitution was already in force because the
overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored the
Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded
to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and
the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been
ratified by the people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null
and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a
political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
x x x
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the
vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the
Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any
referendum in their respective places of residence, much less did they participate in
the alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the
members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference
between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the
defense that the issue was a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the
case. This is not the only major case in which the plea of political question was
set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was
clearly justiciable.
x x x
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced
the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual
controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by
a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that his wife was
unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: We can tell your wife
what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we cannot
force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are
some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human dignity.
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another
important function. The powers of government are generally considered divided
into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one
is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of that
supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and
offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that
such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an
initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.
[103]
(Italics in the original;
emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice
Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term judicial power but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as
may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify
political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression judicial power?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but
where there is a question as to whether the government had authority or had
abused its authority to the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction,
that is not a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the
Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political
question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion,
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do
away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial
power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, judicial power includes and the
reason being that the definition that we might make may not cover all possible
areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political
questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.
[104]
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty,
a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called
the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with truly
political questions. From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) truly political questions and (2) those
which are not truly political questions.
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other
hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review
questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP
College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction
over questions which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,
[105]
this Court, speaking through Madame Justice
Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens
the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions,
would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
[106]
x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
[107]
through Justice Teodoro
Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform
under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, (t)he political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases.
[108]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,
[109]
speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under
the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question.
[110]
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker
v. Carr
[111]
attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
[112]
(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are
not separate and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the
presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the others are also
present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American
concept of judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional
issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-
justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there
are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard to the present
controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section
3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally
mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by
the 12
th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article
XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of
this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such
an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
[113]

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six
grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and
betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of
the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers
could find no better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public
trust and other high crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor.
[114]
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-
justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,
[115]
this Court
held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional
question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is
raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some
other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.
[116]
[Emphasis
and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,
[117]
where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act
No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case
or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself.
[118]
[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by
the related cannon of adjudication that the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied.
[119]

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it
directly resulted from a Resolution
[120]
calling for a legislative inquiry into the
JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.
[121]

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of
the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Courts opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative
inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts
of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact
that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition
which would not be adversely affected by the Courts ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate
Blue Ribbon Commttee,
[122]
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that
the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected,
including the right to due process and the right not be compelled to testify against
ones self.
[123]

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al.,
introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment complaint
was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3
(4), Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same
did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned section
in that the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment was not filed by
at least one-third of all the Members of the House. With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution
are alleged to have verified the same merely as a Resolution of
Endorsement. Intervenors point to the Verification of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x
[124]

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution
requires in order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically
become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin
forthwith, is that the verified complaint be filed, not merely endorsed, by at
least one-third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the second impeachment
complaint should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of
the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there
should be 76 or more representatives whosigned and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories
to a resolution of impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution
of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from at least one Member whenever a
citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the
provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate against
its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among
this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R.
No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for invalidating the second
impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the basis for
deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught
the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary
for the determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said
intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latters arguments and issues as their
own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by this Courts decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked
as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether
Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by
the 12
th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
J udicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power
to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that
the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the
impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment.
[125]
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature
has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses because
Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option
before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not
legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
[126]
Otherwise, this Court
would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-
bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
[127]
In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn
duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious,
would be a dereliction of duty.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system
of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because
no other office has the authority to do so.
[128]
On the occasion that this Court
had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon
the matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
[129]
After all, by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the judiciary]
their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of
their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in
[his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease any person, interest
or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the
temptations lurking in [his] office.
[130]

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had
already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.
[131]
In
that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a
Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from
the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of
them were interested parties to said case as respondents therein. This would
have reduced the Tribunals membership to only its three Justices-Members
whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the
matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of
which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by
no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the
Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that
would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be
at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual
situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of
the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,
[132]
it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of
them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as
established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his
judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise
the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial
power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no
alternative but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices.
[133]
(Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court
when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,
[134]
this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the
seven pillars of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US
Supreme Court Justice Brandeis inAshwander v. TVA
[135]
as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions is legitimate
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly
suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it. . . . It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case
can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the
other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only
the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a
question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of
this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who
lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested
only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v.
Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made
by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing pillars of limitation of judicial review, summarized
in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of
the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the
statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court
in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
[136]

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that judicial review of impeachments might
also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
[J]udiciary. They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or
conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario that it would be
confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home and
abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.
[137]
Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging
that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would
result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and
faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly
stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a
constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their
constitutional duties just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a
crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to
act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not
regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of
the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical effects but also political
consequences. Those political consequences may follow even where the Court fails to
grant the petitioners prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a
decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows.
[138]

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary
[139]
where this Court was split and
in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to
sustain respondents claims,
[140]
the pre-existing constitutional order was
disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law
regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the
coordinate branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner
and not do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the
laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental
law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by
the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:
[141]

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public
officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the
duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of
men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
[142]

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution,
contending that the term initiate does not mean to file; that Section 3 (1) is
clear in that it is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which
has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate
could not possibly mean to file because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article
XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to
wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House
of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by
any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the
House. Respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as
the House of Representatives, acting as the collectivebody, has yet to act on
it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
initiate. Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate
Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of initiate as to file, as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during
the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner
Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on the instant
petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
initiating included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates
any doubt that indeed the word initiate as it twice appears in Article XI (3)
and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action
on it.
Initiate of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries
do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Websters Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means to perform
or facilitate the first action, which jibes with Justice Regalados position, and
that of Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts
consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the
articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or
the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives
Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is deemed initiated when the
Justice Committee votes in favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a
contrary vote of the Committee. Note that the Rule does not say impeachment
proceedings are initiated but rather are deemed initiated. The language is
recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to
postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is
looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the
substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals
and, I think, these would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution
on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of
this body. This is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa. For the
information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in the
impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker
committee action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of
the approval of the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just
make of record my thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on
the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment
is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it
appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite
examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon
wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was the body who
approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves or
disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style
could help in rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about
this. I have been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the
U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of
Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval
of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only
in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of
the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that
on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: to
initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the
word resolution the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter
i in impeachment and replace the word by with OF, so that the whole section
will now read: A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF
the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall
be recorded.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles
of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of Impeachment are
mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified compliant of one-
third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam President, that
my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the
uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President.
[143]
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.
[144]

It is thus clear that the framers intended initiation to start with the filing of
the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained
that the obvious reason in deleting the phrase to initiate impeachment
proceedings as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was
to settle and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint, and the
vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedingswhich was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of
the Constitution.
[145]

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view
as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, that the word initiate as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means
to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action
to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that
the word initiate, appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment.
x x x
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, impeachment case and impeachment proceeding.
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is
to initiate. The object in the first sentence is impeachment case. The
object in the second sentence is impeachment proceeding. Following the
principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term cases must be distinguished
from the term proceedings. An impeachment case is the legal controversy
that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides
that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to
the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has exclusive power to initiate
all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a
decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a proceeding must be
followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be initiated. To
initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the
other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of
several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member
of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member
of the House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or
uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the
House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the
Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the
members. If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint,
Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at
this point that the House initiates an impeachment case. It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or
she is successfully charged with an impeachment case before the Senate as
impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The impeachment proceeding is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that
is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding,
namely the trial. Neither is the impeachment proceeding initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,
because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the
House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified
complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is
the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that A vote of at
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate
impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on
the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
[146]
Thus the line was
deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year, it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his
explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common understanding of
the meaning of to initiate which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they
understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary
words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and
not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can
initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment, This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating impeachment cases with
impeachment proceeding.
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt
that the term to initiate refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of
the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules,
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the
House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement
before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of
the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the
rules give the term initiate a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of
Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino
[147]
wherein this Court stated that
their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the
Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Courts
our deliberations stand on a different footing from the properly recorded
utterances of debates and proceedings. Further citing said case, he states
that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to
actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators
may know more about the real meaning because of the latters balanced
perspectives and disinterestedness.
[148]

Justice Gutierrezs statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide
and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these
proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied
on the personal opinions now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and
proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8)
of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power
to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument is
premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate
its rules. This assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section. Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited
by the phrase to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Hence,
these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI
clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House
of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The
Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to
either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the
Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,
[149]
this Court held that it is within the province of
either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of
what constituted disorderly behavior of its members. However, in Paceta v.
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,
[150]
Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis
in United States v. Smith,
[151]
declared that where the construction to be given
to a rule affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,
[152]
quoting United States
v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
[153]
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the
same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed
that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire
into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of
power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against the
interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules of procedure by
legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to
view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first
defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It
held:
x x x
The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the
rules of its proceedings. It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had,
prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall
be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the
names of the members voting, and be counted and announced in determining the
presence of a quorum to do business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is
as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own
motion resort to for determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the
Speaker or clerk may of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters
for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. I t may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within
these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject
to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined
by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any
constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method
had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining
Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
[154]

x x x
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will cover
up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts x x x to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and
1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any
foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of
state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political
question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government.
[155]

x x x
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere
power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the
Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the
Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and
the legislators being elected by the people.
[156]

x x x
The provision defining judicial power as including the duty of the courts of justice. . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission
to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x
x
x x x
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government
committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this
Court from passivity to activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift
in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this
solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new
constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters
of our power to review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise
this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel
provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign
jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons of our own history should
provide us the light and not the experience of foreigners.
[157]
(Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant
petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the
Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives rely on Nixon v.
US
[158]
as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As
already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that the
House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. It adds
nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this sole power is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning
does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes
several provisions articulating how that exclusive power is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed
initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the
verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by
the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of
Article XI as they give the term initiate a meaning different from filing.
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to
the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the
controversy over the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two
weeks have proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle
to articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view
on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for
or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets armed
with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various
sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and
denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy
in the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any
perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told,
urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint
against the subject respondent public official. When the present petitions
were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for
non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of lack of
jurisdiction, non-justiciability, and judicial self-restraint aimed at halting the
Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already
explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions
for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review
over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the construction or
interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in
here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with the
clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face
thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Courts jurisdiction,
no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head
on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy,
is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all
the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison detre of the judiciary is
to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own
powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and
ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice,
the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a
brethren. That the members interests in ruling on said issue is as much at
stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has
long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting
legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or
actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected
by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever
imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to
wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking
magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branchs official
act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules
on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in
specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at
bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one
of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential
to the laws moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and
obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the
law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody
else. The law is solicitous of every individuals rights irrespective of his station
in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put
to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution
in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in
government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to
have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important
that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover
that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of
Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House
of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section
3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.