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Sr. No Area Sif Service Description: Sifs Requiring Transient Analysis

This document lists 10 items requiring transient analysis for an oil processing system and utilities flare. It describes initiating causes such as overpressurization of upstream pipework due to various valve errors or failures during shutdowns. Worst case scenarios could include multiple fatalities from gas releases and fires. The items include pressure monitoring on flowlines, isolation valves on slug catchers, gas flow paths between flares and compressors, and operator errors in valve operation during riser depressurization.

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Nurali Panjwani
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
105 views6 pages

Sr. No Area Sif Service Description: Sifs Requiring Transient Analysis

This document lists 10 items requiring transient analysis for an oil processing system and utilities flare. It describes initiating causes such as overpressurization of upstream pipework due to various valve errors or failures during shutdowns. Worst case scenarios could include multiple fatalities from gas releases and fires. The items include pressure monitoring on flowlines, isolation valves on slug catchers, gas flow paths between flares and compressors, and operator errors in valve operation during riser depressurization.

Uploaded by

Nurali Panjwani
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as XLSX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Sr.

No Area SIF Service Description


1 Oil Processing PAHH202008 Northern Flow line Riser Top Pressure
2 Oil Processing PAHH202022 Northern Flow line Riser Top Pressure
3
Oil Processing ZSL200015
LP Comp South Eastern FLOWLINE PIG LAUNCHER /
RECEIVER
4
Oil Processing ZSL200023 & ZSL200021
MANIFOLD INLET VALVE TO SLUGCATCHER 1 and 2
South Eastern FLOWLINE
5
Oil Processing ZSL202023 & ZSL202021
MANIFOLD INLET VALVE TO SLUGCATCHER 1 and 2
NORTHERN FLOWLINE
6
Oil Processing ZSL202015
NORTHERN FLOWLINE PIG LAUNCHER /
RECEIVER
7 Oil Processing ZSL203015
LP Comp South Western FLOWLINE PIG LAUNCHER /
RECEIVER
8
Oil Processing ZSL203023 & ZSL203021
MANIFOLD INLET VALVE TO SLUGCATCHER 1 and 2
South Western FLOWLINE
9
Utilities Flare PAHH520021 LP FLARE
SIFs requiring transient analysis
10
Utilities Flare PAHH510031 HP FLARE
Loop Response Time
(Sec) Event
25
17
28
28
28
28
28
4
Overpressurisation of upstream pipework and LP Flare KO Drum (V-
52001), leading to escalation of the initiating incident. The Hazop
team has identified tube rupture on fuel gas heater resulting in gas
ingress into heating medium circulating loop and being relieved by
heating medium expansion drum PSVs 816010A/B. This would
result in a major gas release and fire as a result of rupture of LP
header.
SIFs requiring transient analysis
Packed flowline and riser to maximum well shut in pressure.
Operator opening XXV202015 with flowline lined up to Slug
Catcher (V21001) leading to a transient flowrate from the riser
that can exceed Slug catcher PSV capacity and potential
overpressurisation to 3 to 3.5 times design pressure and rupture
of Slug Catcher. LOPC and potential for VCE causing 3 to 10
fatalities.
Slug Catcher (V-21001/2) overpressurisation due to operator error
in depressurising South Western riser top following shut-down
Slug Catcher (V-21001/2) overpressurisation due to operator error
in depressurising South Eastern riser top following shut-down
Slug Catcher (V-21001/2) overpressurisation due to operator error
in depressurising Northern riser top following shut-down
4 No flow of gas to LP Compressor (C-30001). Overpressurisation of
upstream pipe work and HP Flare KO Drum (V-51001). This would
result in a gas release potentially from several locations and fire.
Worst case would be gas release from the sea water caissons due
to reverse rupture of Compressor Cooler bursting discs leading to
multiple fatalities.
Intiating Cause
Route from LP Flare Drum V-52001 to LP Flare tip closed, e.g. due
to mechanical interlock SP 1260 defeated or mal-functioning.
(There are other Ics too)
SIFs requiring transient analysis
Planned shutdown of Northern flowline coupled with failure of the
operator to isolate Northern RBGL leading to packed flowline and
riser to maximum of 180 barg. Subsequently operator error in
opening XXV202015 during riser top depressurisation operation
with PV202002 not closed and MOV202001 not closed.
Planned shut-down of South Western flowline coupled with failure
of the operator to isolate all South Western production wells(s)
leading to packed flowline and riser to maximum well shut-in
pressure. Subsequently operator error in opening XXV203015
during riser top depressurisation operation with PV203002 not
closed and MOV203001 not closed.
Planned shut-down of South Eastern flowline coupled with failure
of the operator to isolate all South Eastern production wells(s)
leading to packed flowline and riser to maximum well shut-in
pressure. Subsequently operator error in opening XXV200015
during riser top depressurisation operation with PV200002 not
closed and MOV200001 not closed.
Planned shut-down of Northern flowline coupled with failure of the
operator to isolate all Northern production wells(s) leading to
packed flowline and riser to maximum well shut-in pressure.
Subsequently operator error in opening XXV202015 during riser top
depressurisation operation with PV202002 not closed and
MOV202001 not closed.
6. Route from HP Flare to LP compression closed (e.g. due to
HV510024 or HV510112 or HV510166 closed,
Or
PV510040 closed due to control loop error
Or
NRV HV510113 sticks closed.
Or
XV510041 fails closed).
Applies to mode when HP Flare gas recovery is in use, with fast
opening valve XXV510032 closed.

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