ADJUSTING ROMANIAN VALUES TO

EUROPEAN STANDARDS
Values define Europe, not borders.
Jos Manuel Barroso
Abstract: the main assertion of this paper is that a proper
integration into EU structures requires a process of adusting
national !alues to European standards, that is ideal"t#pe $in the
%eberian sense& European !alues. Unfortunatel#, recent sur!e#s
ha!e sho%ed that 'omania is characteri(ed b# !alue
incompatibilities in !ital fields such as democrac#, rule of la% or
tolerance. After identif#ing the deep causes of this phenomenon
as due to a)iological uncertaint#, a common feature both for the
communist regime and the post"communist transition, the
%riter suggests that a suitable solution %ould be to increase the
le!els of social capital in the 'omanian societ# b# fighting
corruption and promoting !oluntar# action.
*e# terms: !alues, democrac#, rule of la%, tolerance, a)iological
uncertaint#, communism, post"communist transition, social
capital, corruption, !oluntar# action.
+ntroduction. The European Union is
sometimes mistakenly identified as only a
geographic entity or a common market,
established to spur intra-European economic
integration. While the EU is certainly both of
these, it is in reality much more, since its
inception in the 195s on through today the EU
has been a community based on the shared
!alues that guide "ember #tates and their
citi$ens as they li!e, %ork and interact %ith
each other, %ith their neighbours and %ith the
%ider %orld. &t is because of this state of facts
that countries %ho %ish to 'oin the club not
only ha!e to meet political, economic or social
criteria as imposed from abo!e, but they also
ha!e to reali$e that the most salient priority is
to internali$e these shared !alues %hich
underpin the European pro'ect.
,etangling the !alue concept.
(efining the concept of !alue has al%ays been
contro!ersial. )ne of the causes responsible for
this difficulty is made up of the different
meanings the term holds in !arious disciplines.
&n aesthetics or philosophy for e*ample, the
concept has a normati!e connotation, !alues
thus representing the basis on %hich the
distinction bet%een good and %rong or
beautiful and ugly is made.
&n the field of social sciences, %hich deal %ith
the study of !alues as one of their main
preoccupation, a consensus on ho% to define
them has not been reached yet. #till, both
psychologists and sociologists agree upon the
fact that !alues are elusi!e to define and
therefore difficult to operate %ith. (espite this
initial agreement though, there is a lack of
consensus bet%een the t%o categories, as
psychologists tend to see !alues as a %ay of
&oana +ung-,d'usting -omanian .alues to European #tandards
selecti!e orientation in connection %ith
indi!idual moti!ations, needs and attitudes,
%hereas sociologists tend to link !alues %ith
social norms, habits and ideologies.
/enerally speaking and from a normati!e
perspecti!e, !alues can be identified as general
criteria that make us orientate, lines bet%een
%hat is and is not socially permitted or
desirable. )ne of the definitions %hich en'oy a
large acceptance among sociologists belongs to
0luckhohn, %ho sees !alues as an e*plicit or
implicit concept, distincti!e for an indi!idual or
characteristic for a group, regarding %hat is
desirable and influencing the selection bet%een
a!ailable %ays and means of action 1.oicu,
.oicu, 223. &n connection %ith this
definition, the author also defines the term of
!alue orientation, as a generalised and %ell-
organi$ed outlook regarding the en!ironment
and the place of the indi!idual inside of it, but
also the relations of the indi!idual %ith the
others members of the society and the social
rules it encompasses.
,mong the most important characteristics
attached to the !alue concept is the fact that
they cannot be obser!ed directly, but rather as
included in beha!iour, decisions and attitudes.
To put it differently, they are not %ays or
means of action, but principles that underlie and
guide actions, and thus the difficulty to 4uantify
them. )ne step further, -okeach considers that
!alues do not e*ist independently, but
organised in %hat he calls a system of !alues, a
dynamic hierarchy influenced by culture,
society or personal e*perience 1.oicu, .oicu,
223.
European standards. 5esides the field
of psychology or sociology, it has become
ob!ious that !alues are highly topical in the
conte*t of European integration too. The
beginning of the ne% century has seen the
Union submerged in an omnipresent debate of
unprecedented intensity on its underlying
!alues and the need for the "ember #tates and
accession countries to internali$e these !alues
both at societal and indi!idual le!el. ,t least
four factors can be cited for bringing discussion
of !alues to a head6 the drafting of the 7harter
of 8undamental -ights in 2, the so-called
,ustrian crisis of the same year, the general
turmoil in international politics follo%ing
#eptember 11 and, finally, the European
7on!ention9s drafting of the European Union9s
ne% constitutional treaty.
Truth is that in order to speak about a European
identity or its legal dimension, the European
citi$enship, one cannot resort to concepts like
race, language or religion, but to more latent
realities such as guiding principles, attitudes or
beliefs. &t has been emphasi$ed that "ember
#tates %ill not be able to find a common ground
on a functional le!el as long as they do not
agree on their ideas about Europe. 5ack in the
1959s, "onnet used to say that building the
European pro'ect meant not only forming a
coalition of states, but uniting people. :alf a
decade later, more and more EU high-officials
emphasi$e in their speeches the fact that the
European Union must be seen as a community
based on shared !alues 1see, for e*ample, dr.
;oe 5org9s speech, European .alues, deli!ered
at the #(" &nternational 7onference <The
7ommon :eritage of Europe=, "alta, 1> "ay
253. ,ll in all, !alues are the noblest mean
%e posses to tackling the non-material issue of
community belonging.

(espite this ho%e!er, the notion of European
!alues remains foggy, as it is used %ith
different meanings in different conte*ts.
Toggenburg argues that the discussion
circulating around this issue is usually based on
one of the three different preconceptions of
%hat constitutes European !alues 1Toggenburg,
2>6?-113. 8irstly, European !alues are often
referred to as political principles underlying the
European 7ommunities 1founding !alues3.
#econdly, the term arises regularly in the debate
on <European identity= and, in this conte*t, one
refers to !arious ideological stances as
European !alues 1European ideas3. These
European ideas try to sketch a hidden
ideological agenda or a common cultural
&oana +ung-,d'usting -omanian .alues to European #tandards
backbone for Europe and its integration
process.
Thirdly, the term labels the legal acquis
communautaire surrounding concepts such as
respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, liberty, democracy or rule of la%.
#ince "aastricht, these common principles
ha!e been enshrined in the treaties, namely in
,rticle @ EU. The latter circle of !alues is
no%adays the most prominent reference to
!alues in the treaty. :o%e!er, in this internal
dimension, the treaty does not speak of !alues,
but of principles, the notion of !alues being so
far reser!ed to the realm of the Union9s e*ternal
relations. &t must be mentioned here that it is to
the !alues attached to this category that & am
going to make references further on. ,ll of
these !alues shall be considered as ideal-type
ones, in the %eberian understanding of the
term, as it is not this article9s aim to make
empirical comparisons 14ualitati!e or
4uantitati!e3 bet%een the different le!els of
adherence to these !alues in different European
countries.
'omanian realities. ,s an acceding
country, -omania has undertaken the task to
comply %ith economic, political and social EU
criteria. &t is a %ell kno%n fact, and the 25
7omprehensi!e "onitoring -eport sho%s it,
that our country has made important progress in
edifying a suitable legal and institutional
frame%ork for EU integration6 -omania, it is
said in the -eport, continues to fulfill the
political criteria for membership. )!erall, it has
reached a satisfactory le!el of compliance %ith
EU re4uirements. &n addition, it has taken
significant steps to address some of the issues
%ithin the political criteria %hich %ere
highlighted in the 2> report as re4uiring
further impro!ements, such as the reform and
independence of the 'udiciary, ensuring greater
media freedom, ne% legislation on property
restitution, an o!erall impro!ement of the
situation of minorities and child protection.
Ae!ertheless, in the field of latent realities, the
-omanian population seems to be one step
behind regarding the process of ad'usting
national !alues to European standards. &n its
25 7ommunication #trategy, the (elegation
of the European 7ommission in -omania
emphasi$es that its main mission is to promote
the European !alues through different
instruments and to different target groups. )ne
of its most recent acti!ities has consisted of
conducting a sur!ey entitled <-omanian and
European !alues6 the same or notB= The sur!ey
has sho%ed important discrepancies bet%een
national and European !alues in three
fundamental fields6 democracy, rule of la% and
tolerance. These aspects are crucial both for the
7openhagen criteria and the implementation of
the acquis communautaire.
&n the field of democratic achie!ements, an
o!er%helming ma'ority 1CDE3 belie!es that the
common people cannot by any means influence
political decisionsF furthermore, more then a
half 155E3 see no ad!antage in ha!ing a
multitude of political parties and a %orrying
third 1D>E3 considers that a strong leader is far
more efficient than la%s and reforms. )!erall,
there is a lack of trust in the participation
process, %eak !alori$ation for political
pluralism and a tendency to%ards strong
leaders.
"o!ing to 'ustice and the rule of la%, C5E
percent of the -omanians belie!e there is no
chance of fair treatment in the 'udicial system
unless one has connections, @2E agree that in
order to get a promotion one needs to commit
illegalities, and 5CE subscribe to the pessimist
sentence that it is impossible to eliminate
bribery and the influence of politics o!er
'ustice. What these results sho% is a perception
of a highly eroded system, mainly by
corruption, both at a high and grass-root le!el.
+ast, but not least, the picture also looks dim in
the tolerance field, %here there ha!e been
encountered strong negati!e feelings to%ards
ethnic groups and e!en *enophobia. ,lmost
t%o thirds 1@2E3 of the ones inter!ie%ed
&oana +ung-,d'usting -omanian .alues to European #tandards
strongly suggest that ethnic minorities should
be forced to learn the -omanian language. >2E
say that there are more gypsies committing
illegalities than -omanians and that the
:ungarians from -omania are more attached to
:ungary than -omania 1@CE3.
Addressing the root causes. The
legitimate 4uestion after looking at these rather
discouraging results %ould be6 %here do these
incompatibilities %ith Western !alues come
fromB , !ast number of sociologists ha!e
linked this issue to the legacies of the
communist regimes and post-communist
transition, both features of 7entral and Eastern
European regimes.
7ommunism did teach its citi$ens lessons in the
decade of its rule. &t did not create the model
<socialist men= it set out to create, nor did it
create the homogeneity that %as its goal. &t did
create a population that %as highly educated
and mobili$ed %ith a sense of <rightful po%er=.
&n doing this, it created citi$ens %ith !alues,
e*pectations and beha!ior patterns 4uite
different from those of their Western neighbors
and e!en other states 1for e*ample states in
+atin ,merica and #outh-Europe3 that ha!e
gone from being authoritarian to being
democratic.
The ans%er to the abo!e 4uestion therefore lies
in the remains of communist-era institutions, in
the problematic economic transformation
process %ith %hich these societies are dealing,
but also in the characteristics of the population
that communism crafted, that is the less
4uantifiable and more sub'ecti!e realm of social
attitudes, learned beha!ior and patterns of
interaction and e*pectation. Aone of these are
the same as those that underlay and underlie the
birth and sur!i!al of democracies else%here.
Their significance and impact not only color the
nature of political reconstruction in present-day
Eastern Europe, but %ill also ha!e a long-term
effect on the nature of the region9s polities and
societies.
#tarting %ith the educational legacies, it must
be mentioned that all of the population of
Eastern Europe, -omania included, is highly
educated, %ith literacy !irtually uni!ersal, and
also higher and technical education more
%idespread that in most Western European
countries. ,t the !ery least, Western theories of
de!elopment and political participation %ould
indicate that highly educated populations are
likely to be more politically conscious and
participatory than those %ith lo%er educational
le!els. Education in communist regimes carried
out messages more politically pregnant than the
standard messages of Western-based education.
What %as con!eyed, deliberately or
inad!ertently, in this education %as far different
from the messages in standard educational
programs else%here. -ather than focusing
primarily on literacy and technical education,
communist societies tried to use their
educational societies to remake their people. &t
created a mobili$ed, if disillusioned population
di!ided into groups %ith special skills and
interests.
"o!ing to industriali$ation legacies, the
populations of Eastern Europe are highly
industriali$ed populations that shifted from a
rural social base to an industrial one in the great
industriali$ation dri!e of the 195s. , state-
controlled economy that employed !irtually
e!ery %orking person brought %ith it a
heightened sense of the relationship bet%een
politics and economics6 economic difficulties
%ere not seen as the fault of a firm or its
management, but as the fault of state. &n this
light, too, indi!iduals lost the sense of personal
responsibility that industriali$ation usually
creates. &nstead of indi!idual gains or losses
being seen as a result of indi!iduals9 %ork or
failures, such gains or losses came to be seen as
the product of the go!ernment9s bad policy or
poor management.
8urther on, the critical distinction that
communism taught people %as the distinction
bet%een <them= and <us=, a distinction that is
played out on all le!els. )n the most personal
le!el, the use of secret police created a situation
&oana +ung-,d'usting -omanian .alues to European #tandards
in %hich indi!iduals9 initial reaction to each
other %as distrust. )n a national le!el, the split
bet%een <them= and <us= took on far greater
significance. The political elite %as percei!ed
as imposed by the outside. The relati!e
secreti!eness and insularity of the leaders9
li!es, and the re!elations of their pri!ileged
positions, set them apart from the population.
8rom the perspecti!e of those at the bottom of
the hierarchy, it seemed that the po%er %ielded
by <them= made it impossible for the <us= to be
responsible or to act. This perception %as
magnified by the sense that <they= %ere not 'ust
an untouchable elite but a system imposed from
the outside, by the #o!iet Union. This
perception also allo%ed people to a!oid taking
responsibility for their society and its problems
by using <them= as a scapegoat.
,ccompanying this <them-!ersus-us=
dichotomy has been a learned cynicism about
politics. 8or all the claims that East Europeans
states %ere %orkers9 states in %hich the
%orking class built their countries, the citi$enry
learned early on that its !oice mattered little.
.oting %as something to be done because it
%as re4uired, not something done to affect
politics. With this cynicism came disrespect for
the la%. 8ear bred obedience, not support or
respect. #ur!i!al as a successful factory
manager, a citi$en %ith a %ell-stocked larder,
or someone %ho had to make things happen,
re4uired %orking around and bending the la%.
To sum up, the decision-taking process has
been characteri$ed by opacity, the decisions
being taken by a hand of people and behind
closed doors, or e!en imposed from the outside
1the #o!iet Union3F this discouraged ci!ic
participation, mainly by decreasing the le!els of
indi!idual responsibility. )n the other hand, for
the 7ommunist rulers, the la% %as not
something that regulated them and so %orking
around and bending the la% soon became
common practice. 7oupled %ith economic
shortages, the disrespect for the la% led to the
edification of a parallel society, go!erned by
informal ties, corruption and illegalities. +ast,
but not least the freedom of e*pression %as
buried under broken feedback mediated by
ideology and restrained by censorship.
(ue to these communist de!elopments, the
-omanian society has become characteri$ed by
a*iological uncertainty 1.oicu, 216>D3, a lo%
le!el of prediction regarding the social
en!ironment. , lo% le!el of a*iological
uncertainty 1%hich is e4ui!alent to a high
a*iological certainty3 presupposes the capacity
of indi!iduals to correctly forecast the actions
of the other indi!iduals from a society due to
the kno%ledge of the decision-taking process
and the %ay of acting. This kind of kno%ledge
is only possible %hen the indi!iduals are
similar as regards their !alue orientations
andGor %ay of action. ,n increased le!el of
a*iological uncertainty e!entually leads to
!alue uncertainty and hampers the process of
dynamic !alue change.
Unfortunately, some of the practices from the
7ommunist regime ha!e been perpetrated
during the period of post-communist transition.
This period of time added economic insecurity
to the communist legacy, insecurity that has led
to changes in !alue hierarchy, gi!ing priority to
the satisfaction of basic needs. This %as added
to the malfunction of institutions and
corruption, %hich created a lack of trust of the
population, thus endangering the strength of the
democracy and creating a !icious circle almost
impossible to break 1Hamfir, 2D3.
-ac.ling the issue. &f %e put a*iological
uncertainty at the heart of the -omanian !alue
deficit, then reducing it %ould definitely help
increasing con!ergence in !alues %ith the EU,
and one mean to achie!e this %ould be by
addressing the concept of social capital. ,
highly popular concept %hich has emerged in
the social sciences during the last ten years,
social capital has become a synonym for
positi!e influence of informal norms and
institutions, the generator of de!elopment and
political stability. &n recent years, the
importance of social capital has been
empirically confirmed in the transitional
&oana +ung-,d'usting -omanian .alues to European #tandards
conte*t as %ell, both in terms of linking the
trust in institutions and ci!ic participation %ith
economic gro%th and pointing out the deficit of
ci!ility and ci!ic participation in the post-
communist societies.
5y social capital %e define a cluster of specific
characteristics of social life, norms and customs
that support cooperation and solidarity in the
society 18ukuyama, 23. &t is usually referred
to as a three-dimensional notion, made of
generali$ed trust 1le!el of initial readiness to
cooperate %ith unkno%n indi!iduals3, ci!ic
participation and trust in institutions 1Iutnam,
199D3.
#tudies ha!e sho%n that increasing the le!els of
social capital is the generator of economic
de!elopment and political stability, processes
that reduce a*iological uncertainty and foster
dynamic !alues changes 1"arginean,
Irecupetu, Irecupetu6 213. "y main
suggestion that follo%s this line of reasoning as
regards policy recommendations is that t%o of
the most popular measures of increasing the
le!els of social capital consist of fighting
corruption and promoting !oluntary action.
The perception of corruption is the strongest
predictor in the case of trust in institutions, in
other %ords those %ho belie!e in the
omnipresence of corruption are less likely to
ha!e confidence in important societal
institutions 15adescu, 2D3. The logic behind
this is ob!ious6 ho% to maintain trust %here
norms can be breached regularly and %ithout
sanctionsB Therefore, the first policy
recommendation is to halt the spread of
cynicism and opportunism, particularly among
youth. &n order to achie!e this, it is necessary to
step up the %ork of the e*isting institutions and
to increase their actions9 !isibility in the media
1-imac, #tulhofer, 256D223. ,dding to this,
anti-corruption campaign must be systematic, in
that it should start in one sector and then mo!e
to others 1spillo!er effect3 in order to attain the
highly sought rule of la%.
The second policy recommendation is to
encourage !oluntary action, as this has a direct
and positi!e impact on the le!els of generali$ed
trust and ci!ic participation, coupled %ith the
impro!ement of tolerance and democracy. )n
one hand, !oluntary associations are a mean of
e*pressing ci!ic participation and assure a
better representation of the citi$ens, thus being
beneficial for democratic de!elopments. )n the
other hand, the range of acti!ities de!eloped
under the frame%ork of !oluntary associations
increase cooperation skills and a high sense of
responsibility, teaching people %in-%in
solutions, %hich breeds generali$ed trust and
therefore reduces intolerance to%ards the other.
/onclusion. ,s sho%ed abo!e, -omania
still suffers form a !alue deficit in connection
%ith EU !alues, a deficit that is in connection
%ith the communist legacy, be it educational,
social or political, and this deficit has been
further perpetrated during the transition period.
The European Union, through its (elegation of
the European 7ommission in -omania as its
main spokesperson, has underlined numerous
times the salient need of reducing this deficit in
order to speak about a healthy and complete
integration of -omania into EU structures.
:o%e!er, it should be strongly emphasi$ed that
the desire for !alue change must not be
moti!ated by political correctness, or the need
to present oursel!es more fa!orably to those
%hose club %e %ant to enter, but by efforts to
impro!e -omanian reality by subscribing to the
uni!ersal !alues that the European Union stands
for.
&oana +ung-,d'usting -omanian .alues to European #tandards
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