Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of
Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of
Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. VETINO REYES and
ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Cayanga, Zuniga and Angel for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

I. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; MAY CONSIDER PETITION FOR REVIEW ON
CERTIORARI ON ALLEGED USURPATION OF FRANCHISE AS QUO WARRANTO. On the
issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of the Philippines, a question
was raised during the hearing on 10 November 1994 as to whether intervention in G.R.
No. 115044 was the proper remedy for the national government to take in questioning
the existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a separate
action for quo warranto under Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was the proper
remedy. We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC agreed to the
suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all substantive issues raised by the
parties in these cases. Moreover, this Court can consider the petition filed in G. R. No.
117263 as one for quo warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the Court
under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution.
II. ID.; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; MAY BE ALLOWED EVEN AFTER TRIAL. On the propriety
of intervention by the Republic, however, it will be recalled that this Court in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA. 238) allowed intervention even beyond the period
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said case that a
denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of
injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value
and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation,
should intervenors' claim be proven to be true." Consequently, in the light of the
foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the Republic (in contra distinction to the City
of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening
in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the
exercise of its governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general
welfare.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ALL LAWS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL
OR UNLESS OTHERWISE RULED BY THE SUPREME COURT; CASE AT BAR. The time-
honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and
constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII,
Section 3 of the Constitution states: "Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive
still exercised legislative powers).
IV. ID.; SUPREME COURT; ONLY THE COURT SITTING EN BANC HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE
A LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the
continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No.
771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said
case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as
unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section
4(2) of the Constitution.
V. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; ESTOPPEL; STATE CANNOT BE ESTOPPED BY THE MISTAKES OR
ERRORS OF ITS OFFICIALS OR AGENTS. And on the question of whether or not the
government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-
settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any,
of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90).
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATURE; CONGRESS DID NOT DELEGATE TO THE CITY OF
MANILA THE POWER "TO FRANCHISE" WAGERS OR BETTING INCLUDING THE JAI-ALAI;
CASE AT BAR. It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC
to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely, the Charter of the City of
Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise."
Rep. Act No. 409 empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to
"tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting" and to "grant exclusive rights to
establishments," while Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow
and permit" 'AD to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila. It is clear from the
foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise"
wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise."
What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to
wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore
means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or
betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to
something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED
by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license,
permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments,
including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive
Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation
of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
VII. ID.; ID.; FRANCHISE; CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH THE ISSUANCE OF A LICENSE OR
PERMIT FROM THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO OPERATE A JAI-ALAI. In relation,
therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate
the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor
to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
VIII. ID.; LAWS PRESUMED VALID, CONSTITUTIONAL AND IN HARMONY WITH OTHER LAWS;
ORDINANCE NO. 7065 OF THE CITY OF MANILA REFERS TO THE REGULATORY POWERS
OF THE BOARD ON THE OPERATION OF JAI-ALAI OF ENTITIES GRANTED CONGRESSIONAL
FRANCHISE. Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which
was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated
legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section
18 shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature. The regulatory nature of
these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under
Section 18 but also in this Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56). In Vera, this Court
declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine
whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation law Act No. 4221)
would or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an
undue delegation of legislative power. From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to
conclude that, if ADC's arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare
Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila unconstitutional for the power it would
delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter the absolute and
unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or
inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in
the City of Manila. We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws
must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the
relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be
taken together and it should then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal
Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954
should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a necessity for the
operation of jai-alais.
IX. POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER, CONSTRUED. The police power has been described
as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient
doctrine salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law.)
In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through
Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus: "The police power of the State . . . is a power
coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling
necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.
Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the
onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go
beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not
arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual."
X. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION; EXAMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE MOTIVATION IS GENERALLY
PROHIBITED. ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD No. 771. Clearly,
however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit
a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810.
The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971], per Black, J.) There is, in the first place, absolute
lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD
No. 771. In the second place,as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the
expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even
laudable.
XI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATURE; GAMBLING FRANCHISE; GRANT OR DENIAL
THEREOF CANNOT BE SUBJECT OF NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE; REASON. On the
alleged violation of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, it should be
remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is,
more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the
government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police
power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for
the public welfare.
XII. ID.; ID.; ID.; REVOCATIONS THEREOF BY PD 771 DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. There was no violation by PD No. 771
of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local
governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the
equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for
as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai
franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for
alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early
as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago.
XIII. ID.; ID.; ID.; PD 771; REQUIREMENT OF A LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE IN THE OPERATION OF
JAI-ALAI, NOT A "RIDER." Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and
the requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are "riders" to the two
(2) laws and are violative of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall
be expressed in the title, as argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this
Court ruled that the requirement under the Constitution that all laws should embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title is sufficiently met if the title is
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for
the accomplishing of the objective.
XIV. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION TO AN
ENTITY WITHOUT ANY LEGAL RIGHT THERETO CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary restraining order (later
converted to a writ of preliminary injunction) and the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, we hold and rule there was. Section 3, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial
notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the
reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Since PD
No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled
otherwise by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs
issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
XV. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; MOTION CAN BE FILED ONLY BEFORE OR
DURING TRIAL. As to the first issue, I submit that unless we either amend the rule on
intervention or suspend it, the motion to intervene must be denied. Under Section 2,
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, such motion may be allowed only before or during a trial.
This provision was taken from Section 1, Rule 13 of the old Rules of Court with the
modification that the phrase "at any period of a trial" in the latter was changed to
"before or during a trial. The phrase "at any period of a trial" in Section 1, Rule 13 of the
old Rules of Court has been construed to mean the period for the presentation of
evidence by both parties. And the phrase "before or during the trial" in Section 2, Rule
12 of the present Rules of Court "simply means anytime before the rendition of the final
judgment." Accordingly, intervention could not be allowed after the trial had been
concluded or after the trial and decision of the original case.
XVI. ID.; ID.; ID.; ANCILLARY AND SUPPLEMENTAL TO AN EXISTING LITIGATION.
Fundamentally then, intervention is never an independent action but is ancillary and
supplemental to an existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct nor unnecessarily
delay the placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an
original party, yet having a certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity
to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such right or interest.
XVII. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANT THEREOF LEFT TO SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION. The grant of an
intervention is left to the discretion of the court. (Paragraph [b] Section 2, Rule 12 of the
Rules of Court)
XVIII. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE DENIED IF THE INTERVENOR'S RIGHT MAY BE FULLY PROTECTED IN
SEPARATE PROCEEDINGS. It is thus clear that, by its very nature, intervention
presupposes an existing litigation or a pending case, and by the opening paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, it may be properly filed only before or during
the trial of the said case. Even if it is filed before or during the trial, it should be denied if
it will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and
if the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
XIX. ID.; ID.; ID.; SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED WHERE DECISION HAD BEEN EXECUTED; CASE
AT BAR. It is not disputed that the motion to intervene was filed only on 16
September 1994, or on the fifteenth (15th) day after the First Division had promulgated
the decision, and after petitioner Mayor Alfredo Lim complied with or voluntarily
satisfied the judgment. The latter act brought to a definite end or effectively terminated
G.R. No. 115044. Consequently, intervention herein is impermissible under the rules. To
grant it would be a capricious exercise of discretion. The decision of this Court
in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals cannot be used to sanction such capriciousness
for such decision cannot be expanded further to justify a new doctrine on intervention.
In the first place, the motions to intervene in the said case were filed before the
rendition by this Court of its decision therein. In the second place, there were unusual
and peculiar circumstances in the said case which this Court took into account. Of
paramount importance was the fact that the prospective intervenors were
indispensable parties. Considering then that the intervention in the case at bar was
commenced only after the decision had been executed, a suspension of the Rules to
accommodate the motion for intervention and the intervention itself would be
arbitrary. The Government is not without any other recourse to protect any right or
interest which the decision might have impaired.
XX. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION TO INTERVENE AND INTERVENTION PROPER MAY NOT BE TREATED
AS A PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO WHERE THERE IS A PROPER FORUM WHERE
VALIDITY OF A FRANCHISE MAY BE CHALLENGED. May the motion to intervene and
intervention proper be, nevertheless, treated as a petition for quo warranto? The
majority opinion answers it in the affirmative because all the essential requisites for a
petition for quo warranto are present in said pleadings. I am almost tempted to agree
with that opinion if not for the fact that there is pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila Civil Case No. 94-71656 which is a petition for prohibition, mandamus,
injunction, and damages filed by the Associated Development Corporation against
Executive Secretary Guingona and then Games and Amusement Board (GAB) Chairman
Sumulong. That is the more appropriate forum where the Government and petitioner
Guingona may challenge the validity of ADC's franchise. Its filing was provoked by the
withdrawal by the GAB of the provisional authority it granted to ADC in view of the 13
September 1994 directive of Executive Secretary Guingona in forming the GAB of
sufficient bases to hold in abeyance the operation of the jai-alai until the legal questions
stated therein are properly resolved. Said legal questions go into the validity of the
franchise issued to ADC. Consequently, it is to be logically presumed that for its
affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. 94-71656 the Government would raise the same
issues raised in the intervention in G.R. No. 117263. Accordingly, I vote to deny the
motion for intervention in G.R. No. 115044.
XXI. ID.; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION; CANNOT LEGALLY ALLOW WAGERING AND BETTING ON THE RESULTS OF
JAI-ALAI. However, I vote to partially grant the petition in G.R. No. 117263 insofar as
wagering or betting on the results of jai-alai is concerned. The temporary restraining
order and the preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge cannot
legally and validly allow such wagering and betting. It was precisely for this reason that I
earlier voted to grant a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 115044 and G.R. No.
117263 to restrain wagering or betting. I wish to reiterate here what I stated in my
supplemental concurring opinion in G.R. No. 115044. P.D. No. 483, enacted on 13 June
1974, penalizes betting, game fixing or point shaving and machinations in sports
contests, including jai-alai. Both P.D. No. 483 and P.D. No. 1602 were promulgated in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 483,
which was not repealed by P.D. No. 1602 since the former is not inconsistent with the
latter in that respect, betting in jai-alai is illegal unless allowed by law. There was such a
law, P.D. No. 810, which authorized the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.
However, as stated in the ponencia, P.D. No. 810 was repealed by E.O. No. 169 issued by
then President Corazon C. Aquino. I am not aware of any other law which authorizes
betting jai-alai. It follows then that while the private respondent may operate the jai-
alai fronton and conduct jai-alai games, it can do so solely as a sports contest. Betting
on the results thereof, whether within or off-fronton, is illegal and the City of Manila
cannot, under the present state of the law, license such betting. The dismissal of the
petition in this case sustaining the challenged orders of the trial court does not legalize
betting, for this Court is not the legislature under our system of government.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition in G.R. No. 117263 and to set aside the
questioned temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction but only to the extent that they allow wagering or betting on the results of
jai-alai.

KAPUNAN, J., separate opinion:
XXII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; CITY OF MANILA; MANILA MUNICIPAL
BOARD; WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ISSUE FRANCHISE. While the grant of authority
under the Ordinance was made pursuant to R.A. 409, the City Charter of Manila, the
authority granted could best be viewed as a grant of a license or a permit, not a
franchise. Nowhere is it pretended that Ordinance 7065 is a franchise enacted pursuant
to the legislative powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila under Section
18(jj) thereof. The absence of authority of the Manila Municipal Board to issue a
franchise, notwithstanding its legislative powers, is furthermore evident in the above-
cited Charter provision regulating gambling and other gambling establishments which
enumerates the following powers: (jj) To tax. license, permit and regulate wagers or
betting by the public on boxing . . . cockpits, jai-alai . . . as well as grant exclusive rights
to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.
XXIII. ID.; ID.; ID.; ORDINANCE NO. 7065, NOT IN CONFLICT WITH P.D. 771. I find no
incompatibility therefore, between P.D. 771, which revoked all authority by local
governments to issue franchises for gambling and gaming establishments on one hand,
and the municipal ordinance of the City of Manila, granting a permit or license to
operate subject to compliance with the provisions found therein, on the other hand, a
legislative franchise may be required by the government as a condition for certain
gambling operations. After obtaining such franchise, the franchisee may establish
operations in any city or municipality allowed under the terms of the legislative
franchise, subject to local licensing requirements. While the City of Manila granted a
permit to operate under Ordinance No. 7065, this permit or authority was at best only a
local permit to operate and could be exercised by the ADC only after it shall have
obtained a legislative franchise.
XXIV. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; APPEAL; RULE OF AVOIDANCE, APPLIED IN CASE AT BENCH.
Both P.D. 771 and Ordinance 7065 can stand alongside each other if one looks at the
authority granted by the charter of the City of Manila together with Ordinance No. 7065
merely as an authority to "allow" and "permit" the operation of jai-alai
facilities within the City of Manila. While the constitutional issue was raised by the
respondent corporation in the case at bench, I see no valid reason why we should jump
into the fray of constitutional adjudication in this case, or on every other opportunity
where a constitutional issue is raised by parties before us. It is a settled rule of
avoidance, judiciously framed by the United States Supreme Court in Ashwander v. TVA
that where a controversy may be settled on a platform other than one involving
constitutional adjudication, the court should exercise becoming modesty and avoid the
constitutional question.
XXV. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; POLICE POWER; REGULATIONS OF GAMBLING OPERATIONS,
EMBRACED THEREIN. The State has every legitimate right, under the police power, to
regulate gambling operations by requiring legislative franchises for such operations.
Gambling, in all its forms, unless specifically authorized by law and carefully regulated
pursuant to such law, is generally proscribed as offensive to the public morals and the
public good. In maintaining a "state policy" on various forms of gambling, the political
branches of government are best equipped to regulate and control such activities and
therefore assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. Parenthetically,
gambling, in all its forms, is generally immoral.
XXVI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATURE; FRANCHISE; AMENDMENT, ALTERATION OR
REVOCATION THEREOF DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION AND IMPAIRMENT
OF CONTRACTS CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION; EXERCISE THEREOF CONSTITUTES
POLICE POWER. The disturbing implications of a grant of a "franchise," in perpetuity,
to the ADC militates against its posture that the government's insistence that the ADC
first obtain a legislative franchise violates the equal protection and impairment of
contracts clauses of the Constitution. By their very nature, franchises are subject to
amendment, alteration or revocation by the State whenever appropriate. Under the
exercise of its police power, the State, through its requirement for permits, licenses and
franchises to operate, undertakes to regulate what would otherwise be an illegal activity
punished by existing penal laws. The police power to establish all manner of regulation
of otherwise illicit, immoral and illegal activities is full, virtually illimitable and plenary.
XXVII. POLITICAL LAW; STATE; POLICE POWER; DEFINED. In Edu v. Ericta we defined the
police power as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." In its exercise, the State
may impose appropriate impositions or restraints upon liberty or property in order to
foster the common good. Such imposition or restraint neither violates the impairment
of contracts nor the equal protection clauses of the Constitution if the purpose is
ultimately the public good.
XXVIII. ID.; ID.; ID.; FRANCHISE AND LICENSING REGULATIONS ON GAMBLING, EXTENSION OF
EXERCISE THEREOF. Restraints on property are not examined with the same
microscopic scrutiny as restrictions on liberty. Such restraints, sometimes bordering on
outright violations of the impairments of contract principle have been made by this
Court for the general welfare of the people. Justice Holmes in Noble State Bank
v. Haskel once expansively described the police power as "extending to all public
needs." Franchise and licensing regulations aimed at protecting the public from the
pernicious effects of gambling are extensions of the police power addressed to a
legitimate public need.
XXIX. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; MOTION FOR INTERVENTION DURING APPEAL; CONSIDERED
ONE FOR QUO WARRANTO WHERE BOTH PARTIES AGREED TO THE RESOLUTION OF ALL
ISSUES RAISED. On the question of the propriety of the Republic of the Philippines'
intervention late in the proceedings in G.R. No. 117263, the ADC counsel's agreeing to
have all the issues raised by the parties in the case at bench paves the way for us to
consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as one for quo warranto.
QUIASON, J., dissenting opinion:
XXX. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; ALLOWED ONLY BEFORE OR DURING TRIAL.
Intervention as contemplated by Section 9, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court is a
proceeding whereby a third person is permitted by the court "before or during a trial" to
make himself a party by joining plaintiff or uniting with defendant or taking a position
adverse to both of them (Gutierrez v. Villegas, 5 SCRA 313 [1962]). The term "trial" is
used in its restrictive sense and means the period for the introduction of evidence by
both parties (Bool v. Mendoza, 92 Phil. 892 [1953]; Provincial Government of Sorsogon
v. Stamatelaky, 65 Phil. 206 [1937]). The period of trial terminates when the period of
judgment begins (El Hogar Filipino v. Philippine National Bank, 64 Phil. 582 [1937]).
XXXI. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COMPULSORY. Intervention as an action is not compulsory. As
deduced from the permissive word "may" in the Rule, the availment of the remedy is
discretionary on the courts (Garcia v. David, 67 Phil. 279 [1939]). An important factor
taken into consideration by the courts in exercising their discretion is whether the
intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding (Peyer v. Martinez,
88 Phil. 72 [1951]).
XXXII. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AVAILABLE WHERE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY. The
case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 238 (1979), can not serve as
authority in support of the Republic's intervention at this late stage. While said case
involved an intervention for the first time in the Supreme Court, the motion to be
allowed to intervene was filed before the appeal could be decided on the merits. The
intervention allowed in Republic v.Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 9673, Resolution, March 3,
1992, was also made before the decision on the merits by this Court. In contrast, the
intervention of the Republic was sought after this Court had decided the petition in G.R.
No. 115044 and petitioners had complied with and satisfied the judgment. While the
intervention in Director of Lands was in a case that was timely appealed from the
Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals and from the Court of Appeals to the
Supreme Court, the intervention of the Republic was in a case that had become final
and executory more than five years prior to the filing of the motion to intervene. As of
September 16, 1994, therefore, when the Republic moved to intervene, there was no
longer any pending litigation between the parties in G.R. No. 115044. Intervention is an
auxiliary and supplemental remedy to an existing, not a settled litigation (cf. Clareza v.
Rosales, 2 SCRA 455 [1961]). An intervention was disallowed in a case which has become
final an executory (Trazo v. Manila Pencil Co., 77 SCRA 181 [1977]).
XXXIII. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERVENOR SHOULD NOT JUST SIT IDLY AND WATCH THE PASSING SCENE
BEFORE HE SEEKS JUDICIAL RELIEF. An intervenor should not be permitted to just sit
idly and watch the passing scene as an uninterested overlooker before he wakes up to
seek judicial relief (Pacursa v. Del Rosario, 24 SCRA 125 [1968]). The Office of the
President was aware of the plans of ADC to start operation as early as 1988. On May 5,
1988, ADC informed said Office of its intention to operate under Ordinance No. 7065.
The said Office perfunctorily referred the letter of ADC to the Manila mayor, implying
that the matter was not the concern of the National Government.
XXXIV. ID.; SUPREME COURT; MAY RELAX THE STRICT APPLICATION OF RULES OF PROCEDURE.
Be that as it may, the Court may consider the motion to intervene, motion for
reconsideration-in-intervention, supplemental motion for reconsideration-in-
intervention and second supplemental motion-in-intervention as a petition for quo
warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court. In the liberal construction of the
Rules in order to attain substantial justice, the Court has treated petitions filed under
one Rule as petitions filed under the more appropriate Rule (Davao Fruits Corporation v.
Associated Labor Union, 225 SCRA 562 [1993]).
XXXV. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; QUO WARRANTO; A PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT
TO THE USE OF A FRANCHISE. In quo warranto, the government can require a
corporation to show cause by what right it exercises a privilege, which ordinarily can not
legally be exercised except by virtue of a grant from the state. It is a proceeding to
determine the right to the use of a franchise or exercise of an office and to oust the
holder from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded (Castro v. Del Rosario, 19
SCRA 196 [1967]).
XXXVI. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEAL BY IMPLICATION, NOT FAVORED. Republic Act
No. 954 did not expressly repeal Section 18(jj). In such a case, if there is any repeal of
the prior law by the later law, it can only be by implication. Such kind of repeals is not
favored. There is even a presumption against repeal by implication (The Philippine
American Management Co. Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees
Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]).
XXXVII. ID.; A SUBSEQUENT LAW CAN NOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPEALING A PRIOR LAW IN THE
ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS REPEAL. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent
law can not be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency
and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old law (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters
Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]).
XXXVIII. ID.; SPECIAL LAW CAN NOT BE REPEALED BY A GENERAL LAW. But more importantly,
the rule in legal hermeneutics is that a special law, like the Charter of the City of Manila,
is not deemed repealed by a general law, like R.A. No. 954 (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 487 [1992]).
XXXIX. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; GRANT OF FRANCHISE UNDER A
DELEGATED AUTHORITY, BINDS THE PUBLIC AND CONSIDERED AN ACT OF THE STATE;
ORDINANCE NO. 7065, CONSIDERED A "LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE." In a way also,
Ordinance No. 7065 can be considered a "legislative franchise" within the purview of
R.A. No. 954, having been enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
pursuant to the powers delegated to it by the legislature. A grant, under a delegated
authority, binds the public and is considered the act of the state. "The franchise
[granted by the delegate] is a legislative grant, whether made directly by the legislature
itself or by any one of its properly constituted instrumentalities" (36 Am Jr 2d. 734).
XL. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRESIDENT; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 771; SECTION 3
THEREOF AS IT IS APPLIED TO ORDINANCE NO. 7065 SUFFERS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INFIRMITIES AND TRANSGRESSES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS; EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE, VIOLATED. Insofar as it is applied to Ordinance No. 7065, Section 3 of P.D.
No. 771 suffers from constitutional infirmities and transgresses several constitutional
provisions. Said Section 3 provides: "All existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments are hereby revoked and may be renewed only in accordance with this
Decree." Section 3 violated the equal protection clause (Section 1 of Article IV) of the
1973 Constitution, which provided: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Less than two months after the promulgation of P.D. No. 771,
President Marcos issued P.D. No. 810, granting the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement
Corporation (PJAC) a franchise to operate jai-alai within the Greater Manila Area. It is
obvious that P.D. No. 771 was decreed to cancel the franchise of ADC so that the same
could be given to another entity under P.D. No. 810. A facially neutral statute (P.D. No.
771) may become discriminatory by the enactment of another statute (P.D. No. 810)
which allocates to a favored individual benefits withdrawn under the first statute
(Ordinance No. 7065), and when there is no valid basis for classification of the first and
the second grantees. The only basis for distinction we can think of is that the second
grantee was Benjamin Romualdez, a brother-in-law of President Marcos.
XLI. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, ABRIDGED. Section 3 violated the due process
clause of the Constitution, both in its procedural and substantive aspects. The right to
due process is guaranteed by the same Section 1 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
Ordinance No. 7065, like any franchise, is a valuable property by itself. The concept of
"property" protected by the due process clause has been expanded to include economic
interests and investments. The rudiments of fair play under the "procedural due
process" doctrine require that ADC should at least have been given an opportunity to be
heard in its behalf before its franchise was cancelled, more so when the same franchise
was given to another company. Under the "substantive due process" doctrine, a law
may be voided when it does not relate to a legitimate end and when it unreasonably
infringes on contractual and property rights. The doctrine as enunciated in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. (1897) can be easily stated, thus: the government has to employ
means (legislation) which bear some reasonable relation to a legitimate end (Nowak,
Rotunda and Young, Constitutional Law 436, 443 [2d ed]). When President Marcos
issued P.D. No. 771, he did not have public interest in mind; otherwise, he would have
simply outlawed jai-alai as something pernicious to the public. Rather, all what he
wanted to accomplish was to monopolize the grant of jai-alai franchises. The motivation
behind its issuance notwithstanding, there can be no constitutional objection to P.D. No.
771 insofar as it removed the power to grant jai-alai franchises from the local
governments. We said so in Basco v. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991). The constitutional
objection arises, however, when P.D. No. 771 cancelled all the existing franchises. We
search in vain to find any reasonable relation between Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 and any
legitimate ends of government intended to be achieved by its issuance. Besides, the
grant of a franchise to PJAC exposed P.D. No. 771 as an exercise of arbitrary power to
divest ADC of its property rights.
XLII. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE BILL TO EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT. Section 3 also
violated Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provided: "Every bill
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." The title of
P.D. No. 771 reads as follows: "REVOKING ALL POWERS AND AUTHORITY OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TO GRANT FRANCHISE, LICENSE OR PERMIT AND REGULATE WAGERS OR
BETTING BY THE PUBLIC ON HORSE AND DOG RACES, JAI-ALAI OR BASQUE PELOTA, AND
OTHER FORMS OF GAMING." The title of P.D. No. 771 refers only to the revocation of
the power of local governments to grant jai-alai franchises. It does not embrace nor
even intimate the revocation of existing franchises.
XLIII. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPAIRED OBLIGATIONS OF CONTRACTS. Lastly, Section 3 impaired
the obligation of contracts prohibited by Section 11 of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution. As authorized by Section 18(jj), Ordinance No. 7065 grants ADC a permit
"to establish, maintain and operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila, under the following
terms and conditions and such other terms and conditions as he [the Mayor] may
prescribe for good reasons of general interest." Section 11 of Article IV of the 1973
Constitution provided: "No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties,
necessarily impairs the contract itself (U.S. v. Conde, 42 Phil. 766 [1922]; Clemens v.
Nolting, 42 Phil. 702 [1922]). A franchise constitutes a contract between the grantor and
the grantee. Once granted, it may not be invoked unless there are valid reasons for
doing so (Papa v. Santiago, 105 Phil. 253 [1959]). A franchise is not revocable at the will
of the grantor after contractual or property rights thereunder have become vested in
the grantee, in the absence of any provision therefor in the grant or in the general law
(Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U.S. 544). Ordinance No. 7065 is not
merely a personal privilege that can be withdrawn at any time. It is a franchise that is
protected by the Constitution.
XLIV. ID.; LEGISLATURE; FRANCHISE DIFFERENTIATED FROM PRIVILEGE. The distinction
between the two is that a privilege is bestowed out of pure beneficence on the part of
the government. There is no obligation or burden impose on the grantee except maybe
to pay the ordinary license and permit fees. In a franchise, there are certain obligations
assumed by the grantee which make up the valuable consideration for the contract.
That is why the grantee is first required to signify his acceptance of the terms and
conditions of the grant. Once the grantee accepts the terms and conditions thereof, the
grant becomes a binding contract between the grantor and the grantee. Another test
used to distinguish a franchise from a privilege is the big investment risked by the
grantee. In Papa v. Santiago,supra, we held that this factor should be considered in
favor of the grantee. A franchise in which money has been expended assumes the
character of a vested right (Brazosport Savings and Loan Association v. American Savings
and Loan Association, 161 Tex. 543, 342 S.W. 2d. 747).
XLV. ID.; POLICE POWER; POWER TO REGULATE FRANCHISE DOES NOT INCLUDE POWER TO
CANCEL. That a franchise is subject to regulation by the state by virtue of its police
power is conceded. What is not acceptable is the Republic's proposition that the power
to regulate and supervise includes the power to cancel the franchise altogether.
XLVI. ID.; PRESIDENT; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 135; 200 METER RADIUS FROM GOVERNMENT
BUILDINGS, PUBLIC PLAZA AND OTHER SIMILAR PLACES NO LONGER APPLICABLE TO
PELOTA FRONTONS. The Republic questioned the siting of the ADC's fronton as
violative of E.O. No. 135 of President Quirino. Under said executive issuance, no pelota
fronton can be maintained and operated "within a radius of 200 lineal meters from any
city hall or municipal building, provincial capital building, national capital building, public
plaza or park, public school, church, hospital, athletic stadium, or any institution of
learning or charity." However, the operative law on the siting of jai-alai establishments
is no longer E.O. No. 135 of President Quirino but R.A. No. 938 as amended by R.A. No.
1224. Under said law only night clubs, cabarets, pavilions, or other similar places are
covered by the 200-lineal meter radius. In the case of all other places of amusements
except cockpits, the proscribed radial distance has been reduced to 50 meters. With
respect to cockpits, the determination of the radial distance is left to the discretion of
the municipal council or city board (Sec. 1).
XLVII. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; ABSENCE OF PERIOD OF CONTRACT;
REMEDIES AVAILABLE. The Republic also questions the lack of the period of the grant
under Ordinance No. 7065, thus making it indeterminate (G.R. No. 117263). The
ordinance leaves it to the Mayor of the City of Manila to lay down other terms and
conditions of the grant in addition to those specified therein. It is up to the parties to
agree on the life or term of the grant. In case the parties fail to reach an agreement on
the term, the same can be fixed by the courts under Article 1197 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
XLVIII. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; CALENDAR; ASSIGNMENT OF CASES NEED NOT ALWAYS BE
BY RAFFLE. Section 7 of Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court does not require that
the assignment of cases to the different branches of a trial court should always be by
raffle. The Rule talks of assignment "whether by raffle or otherwise." What it requires is
the giving of written notice to counsel or the parties "so that they may be present
therein if they so desire."
XLIX. ID.; ID.; CALENDAR; SPECIAL RAFFLE; REQUISITES. However, there may be cases
necessitating the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent irreparable injury
on the petitioner. To await the regular raffle before the court can act on the motion for
temporary restraining order may render the case moot and academic. Hence,
Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 was issued by this Court allowing a
special raffle. Said Circular provides: "8.3. Special raffles should not be permitted except
on verified application of the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional
remedy and only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless a special raffle is
conducted irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall
be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala station."
L. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY; APPLIED IN ASSIGNMENT OF CASES. In a case where a
verified application for special raffle is filed, the notice to the adverse parties may be
dispensed with but the raffle has to "be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-
sala station." The Republic does not claim that Administrative Circular No. 1 has been
violated in the assignment of the case to respondent Judge. The presumption of
regularity of official acts therefore prevails.
LI. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION; PURPOSE. The purpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction, whether preventive or mandatory, is merely to prevent a threatened wrong
and to protect the property or rights involved from further injury, until the issues can be
determined after the hearing on the merits (Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 73 L.
Ed. 972, 49 S. Ct. 256; Gobbi v. Dilao, 58 Or. 14, 111 p. 49, 113, p. 57). What is intended
to be preserved is the status quo ante litem motam or the last actual, peaceable,
noncontested status (Annotation, 15 ALR 2d 237).
LII. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP AND ITS MODIFICATIONS; RIGHT TO CONDUCT A
BUSINESS OR TO PURSUE ONE'S BUSINESS OR TRADE, A PROPERTY RIGHT WHICH
EQUITY WILL PROTECT BY INJUNCTION. The right to conduct a business or to pursue
one's business or trade without wrongful interference by others is a property right
which equity will, in proper cases, protect by injunction, provided of course, that such
occupation or vocation is legal and not prohibited by law (Rance v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 410 P. 2d. 859).
LIII. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WITH JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ISSUES NOT SETTLED
BY THE TRIAL COURT. Respondent Judge Reyes did not pre-empt this Court in
deciding the basic issues raised in G.R. No. 115044 when it assumed jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 94-71656 and issued the orders questioned in G.R. No. 117263. The orders
of Judge Reyes are provisional in nature and do not touch on the merits of the case. The
issues raised in Civil Case No. 94-71656 are the validity of the Directive and
Memorandum, which were issued after the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 115044.
The respondents in the civil case before the trial court are not even parties in G.R. No.
115044.
PUNO, J., dissenting opinion:
LIV. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATURE; BILL; TITLE OF LAW, VALUABLE INTRINSIC AID IN
DETERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 954 DOES NOT REQUIRE A
LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE TO OPERATE JAI-ALAI. I find as completely baseless
petitioners' submission that R.A. No. 954 requires a legislative franchise to operate a jai-
alai, in effect, revoking the power of the City of Manila to issue permits for the same
purpose as granted by its Charter. A 20-20 visual reading of R.A. No. 954 will not yield
the suggested interpretation by petitioners. The title of R.A. No. 954 will immediately
reveal that the law was enacted to achieve a special purpose. It states: "An Act To
Prohibit Certain Activities In Connection With Horse Races And Basque Pelota Games
(Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation." The prohibited activities related
to jai-alai games are specified in Sections 4 to 6, viz: The title of R.A. No. 954 does not
show that it seeks to limit the operation of jai-alai only to entities with franchise given
by Congress. What the title trumpets as the sole subject of the law is the criminalization
of certain practices relating to jai-alai games. The title of a law is a valuable intrinsic aid
in determining legislative intent. The Explanatory Note of House Bill 3204, the precursor
of R.A. No. 954, also reveals that the intent of the law is only to criminalize the practice
of illegal bookies and game-fixing in jai-alai. It states: "This bill seeks to prohibit certain
anomalous practice of 'bookies' in connection with the holding of horse races or 'basque
pelota' games. . . .
LV. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPLANATORY NOTE GIVES A RELIABLE KEYHOLE ON SCOPE AND COVERAGE
OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 954. As said Explanatory Note is expressive of the purpose of
the bill, it gives a reliable keyhole on the scope and coverage of R.A. No. 954. Nothing
from the Explanatory Note remotely suggests any intent of the law to revoke the power
of the City of Manila to issue permits to operate jai-alai games within its territorial
jurisdiction.
LVI. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE DEBATE, GOOD SOURCE TO DETERMINE INTENT OF THE LAW.
The Debates in Congress likewise reject the reading of R.A. No. 954 by petitioners,
thus: Again, legislative debate is a good source to determine the intent of a law.
LVII. ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 954; ABSENCE OF REPEALING PROVISION, MANIFEST.
To top it all, the text of R.A. No. 954 itself does not intimate that it is repealing any
existing law, especially Section 18(jj) of R.A. No. 409, otherwise known as the Charter of
Manila. Indeed, R.A. No. 954 has no repealing provision. The reason is obvious it
simply prohibited certain practices in jai-alai then still unregulated by the laws of the
land. It did not regulate aspects of jai-alai already regulated by existing laws, like the
matter of whether it is the national government alone that should issue franchises to
operate jai-alai games.
LVIII. ID.; ID.; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER TO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BINDS THE
FORMER; PERMIT ISSUED BY THE CITY OF MANILA EQUIVALENT TO FRANCHISE ISSUED
BY CONGRESS. The passage of P.D. No. 771, also negates petitioners' insistence that
for ADC to continue operating, it must show it has a franchise from Congress, not just a
permit from the City of Manila. The suggested dichotomy between a legislative
franchise and city permit does not impress. If the City of Manila is empowered to license
the ADC it is because the power was delegated to it by Congress. The acts of the City of
Manila in the exercise of its delegated power bind Congress as well. Stated otherwise,
the permit given by the City to ADC is not any whit legally inferior to a regular franchise.
Through the years, the permit given by the City endows the grantee complete right to
operate. Not once, except in these cases, has the national government questioned the
completeness of this right. For this reason, P.D. No. 771 has to revoke all existing
franchises and permits without making any distinction. It treated permits in the same
class as franchises.
LIX. ID.; POLICE POWER; DEFINED. It was the legendary Chief Justice Marshall who first
used the phrase police power in 1824. Early attempts to fix the metes and bounds of
police power were unsuccessful. For of all the inherent powers of the State, police
power is indubitably the most pervasive, the most insistent and the least limitable.
Rooted on the Latin maxims, salus populi suprema est lex (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not
to injure the property of others), it was not without reason for Justice Holmes to stress
that its reach extends "to all the great public needs." A similar sentiment was echoed by
our own Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams who defined police power as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare."
LX. ID.; ID.; TEST TO DETERMINE VALIDITY OF POLICE MEASURE. But while the State is
bestowed near boundless authority to promote public welfare, stillthe exercise of police
power cannot be allowed to run riot in a republic ruled by reason. Thus, our courts have
laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure as follows: (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, requires
its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper
reflexion will reveal that the test reiterates the essence of our constitutional guarantees
of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
LXI. ID.; PRESIDENT; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 771; SECTION 3 THEREOF REVOKING "ALL"
EXISTING FRANCHISE AND PERMITS, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Truth, has its own time of
sprouting out. The truth behind the revocation of ADC's franchise revealed itself when
former President Marcos transferred ADC's franchise to the Philippine Jai-Alai and
Amusements Corporation then under the control of his brother-in-law, Mr. Alfredo
"Bejo" Romualdez. The favored treatment was extended hardly two (2) months after the
revocation of ADC's franchise and it left Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusements Corporation
the sole jai-alai operator in the Philippines. The Court is not informed of any distinction
of PJAC that will justify its different treatment. The evidence is thus clear and the
conclusion is irresistible that Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 was designed with a malignant
eye against ADC. In light of the established facts in field, section 3 of P.D. No. 771 must
be struck down as constitutionally infirmed. Despite its cosmetics, Section 3 cannot be
unblushingly foisted as a measure that will promote the public welfare. There is no way
to treat the self-interest of a favored entity as identical with the general interest of the
Filipino people. It will also be repulsive to reason to entertain the thesis that the
revocation of the franchise of ADC is reasonably necessary to enable the State to
grapple to the ground the evil of jai-alai as a form of gambling. Petitioners have not
demonstrated that government lacks alternative options to succeed in its effort except
to cancel the lone franchise of ADC. Well to stress, it is not the lofty aim of P.D. No. 771
to completely eradicate jai-alai games; it merely seeks to control its multiplication by
restoring the monopoly of the national government in the dispensation of franchises.
Prescinding from these premises, I share the scholarly view of Mr. Justice Quiason that
Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 771 offends the Constitution which demands faithful compliance with
the requirements of substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and non-
impairment of contracts.
LXII. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. But while I wholeheartedly
subscribe to the many impeccable theses of Mr. Justice Quiason, it is with regret that I
cannot join his submittal that Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 771 violates procedural due process. We
are dealing with the plenary power of the legislature to make and amend laws. Congress
has previously delegated to the City of Manila the power to grant permits to operate jai-
alai within its territorial jurisdiction and ADC was given its permit thru Ordinance No.
7065. ADC's permit could have been validly revoked by law if it were demonstrated that
its revocation was called for by the public good and is not capricious. In ascertaining the
public good for the purpose of enacting a remedial law, it is not indispensable, albeit
sometimes desirable, to give notice and hearing to an affected party. The data the
legislature seeks when engaged in lawmaking does not focus on the liability of a person
or entity which would require fair hearing of the latter's side. In fine, the legislature
while making laws is not involved in establishing evidence that will convict, but in
unearthing neutral data that will direct its discretion in determining the general good.
LXIII. ID.; JUDICIARY; SUPREME COURT; WITH EXPANDED JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION OF ANY BRANCH OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT. I
also support the stance of Mr. Justice Quiason which resisted the stance that the Court
should close its eyes to allegations that Section 3 of P.D. No. 771 was conceived and
effected to give naked preference to a favored entity due to pedigree. I reiterate the
view that Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution expanding the jurisdiction of this
Court to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part, of any branch or agency of
government is not a pointless postulate. Without the grant of this new power, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to pierce through the pretentious purposes of P.D. No.
771. P.D. No. 771 has no right to a reverential treatment for it is not a real law as it is
not the product of an authentic deliberative legislature. Rather, it is the dictate of a
public official who then had a monopoly of executive and legislative powers. As it was
not infrequently done at that time, the whereas clauses of laws were used to
camouflage a private purpose by the invocation of public welfare. The tragedy is that
the bogus invocation of public welfare succeeded partly due to the indefensible
deference given to official acts of government. The new Constitution now calls for a
heightened judicial scrutiny of official acts. For this purpose, it has extirpated even the
colonial roots of our impotence. It is time to respond to this call with neither a pause
nor a half-pause.

D E C I S I O N
PADILLA, J p:

These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve simple issues. If these
issues have apparently become complicated, it is not by reason of their nature because of the
events and dramatis personae involved.
The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on
01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack
of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the
questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of
Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue
the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development
Corporation (ADC).
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing Mayor Lim to explain why he should not
be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March
1994.
c. order dated 20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing
Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated
Development Corporation (ADC).
The order dated 28 March 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for
execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila
Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under
Manila Ordinance No. 7065.
On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a
directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R.
Sumulong, Jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued, to
withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-
alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved:
1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by
local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional.
2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to
issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether
the franchise granted is valid considering that the franchise has no duration,
and appears to be granted in perpetuity.
3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to
Associated Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of
executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from local
governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to regulate
Jai-Alai.
On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC)
filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
against petitioner Guingona and then GAB chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-
71656, seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority that had earlier
been granted to ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through presiding Judge
Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from withdrawing
ADC's provisional authority. This temporary restraining order was converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction upon ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00.
Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Games and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion
for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the Court En Banc" and later a
"Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to
Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention".
In an En Banc Resolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court referred G.R. No.
115044 to the Court En Banc and required the respondents therein to comment on the
aforementioned motions.
Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on 19 October 1994 issued another order, this time,
granting ADC a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Guingona and GAB to compel
them to issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate jai-alai.
Guingona, as executive secretary, and Dominador Cepeda, Jr. as the new GAB
chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263 assailing the abovementioned orders of
respondent Judge Vetino Reyes.
On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted petitioner's motion
for leave to file supplemental petition and to admit attached supplemental petition with
urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court further required respondents to file their
comment on the petition and supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order.
The Court likewise set the case and all incidents thereof for hearing on 10 November 1994.
At the hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved were formulated
by the Court as follows:
1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of
the proceedings is proper;
2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether or not the Associated
Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain
and operate the jai-alai;
3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned temporary restraining
order (later writ of preliminary injunction); and
4. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.
On the issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of the Philippines,
a question was raised during the hearing on 10 November 1994 as to whether intervention in
G.R. No. 115044 was the proper remedy for the national government to take in questioning
the existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a separate action
for quo warranto under Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy.
We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC agreed to the
suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all substantive issues raised by the parties in
these cases. Moreover, this Court can consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as one
for quo warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5(1),
Article VIII of the Constitution.
On the propriety of intervention by the Republic, however, it will be recalled that
this Court in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 238) allowed intervention even
beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in
said case that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act
of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and
in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors' claim be proven to be true."
In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the national
government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely
questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which
is a gambling operation) in favor of ADC. As will be more extensively discussed later, the
national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to
ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No.
954, approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter
approved 7 September 1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a
municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues
that even assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise
was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential Decree No. 771, issued on 20 August
1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all
forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments.
On the other hand, ADCs position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted
by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under its charter, Republic Act No.
409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel for
ADC contends that this Court should really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to
determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid franchise.
It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if this Court
were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our
view, become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy, in view of ADCs
insistence that it was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate
the jai-alai.
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed
valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article
XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:
"Sec. 3.All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been
repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the
executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044,
for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot
have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has
that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.


And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from
contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot
be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the
republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No.
115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or
proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect public
morals and promote the general welfare.

Anent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de
Manila, a statement of the pertinent laws is in order.
1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949.
Section 18 thereof provides:
"Section 18.Legislative Powers. The Municipal Board shall have the
following legislative powers:
(jj)To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on
boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jai-
alai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or athletic contests, as well as
grant exclusive rights to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding
any existing law to the contrary."
2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the
authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board
(GAB).
3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to
Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For
Its Violation". The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:
"Sec. 4.No person, or group of persons other than the operator or
maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota
games (Jai-Alai), shall offer, to take or arrange bets on any basque pelota
game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or
system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event." (Emphasis
supplied).
"Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative
franchise to conduct basque pelota games shall offer, take, or
arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a
totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any
basque pelota game or event outside the place, enclosure, or fronton
where the basque pelota game is held." (Emphasis supplied).
4. On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless
passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And
Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-
Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes."
5. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President
Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To
Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse
And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling", in Section 3
thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
6. On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The
Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A Franchise To Operate, Construct And
Maintain A Fronton For Basque Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In The Greater Manila Area,"
was promulgated.
7. On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII, Section 6, of
the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent legislative powers until the first Congress was
convened, issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and
cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed
the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is
argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises
issued by Congress.
On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act No. 409 (Manila Chapter) gives
legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954
does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then
Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of
Republic Act No. 409 and consequently it was within the power of the City of Manila to allow
ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.

On this point, the government counter-argues that the term "legislative powers" is
used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to distinguish the powers under Section 18 of the law from
the other powers of the Municipal Board, but that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act
No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely by Congress.
Further, the government argues that Executive Order No. 392 dated 01 January
1951 transferred even the power to regulate Jai-Alai from the local governments to the
Games and Amusements Board (GAB), a national government agency.
It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support
its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act
No. 409) and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409
empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or
betting" and to "grant exclusive rights to establishments", while Ordinance No. 7065
authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow and permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the
City of Manila.
It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila
the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such
power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with
respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore
means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting
activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something
meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national
government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers
or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and
transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that
the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the
regulatory function is vested in the GAB.
In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from
Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if its has a license or permit from
the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila.
It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes
gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited
by law, unless another law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain
forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by
special law are the horse races authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling
casinos authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869.
While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the
results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense
punishable under Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a letter
or special law had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law.
Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was
enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative
powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that
these powers are basically regulatory in nature. The regulatory nature of these powers finds
support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under Section 18 but also in this
Courts ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56).
In Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the
discretion to determine whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation
Law Act No. 4221) would or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional
for being an undue delegation of legislative power.
From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADCs arguments
were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of
Manila unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila
would give the latter the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code
provisions on gambling inapplicable or inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to
operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila.
We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws must be
presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the relevant provisions
of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should
then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be
regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer
to congressional franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai.
We need not, however, again belabor this issue further since the task at hand
which will ultimately, and with finality, decide the issues in this case is to determine whether
PD No. 771 validly revoked ADC's franchise to operate the jai-alai, assuming (without
conceding) that it indeed possessed such franchise under Ordinance No. 7065.
ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, the
government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the
State.
The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers
of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39
Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:
"The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It
may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely
attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean
security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right
of the individual."
In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the
"whereas clause" as follows:
"WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our
law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social
ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country;
"WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government
to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance
of the social and economic development program under the new society;
"WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting
by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling
there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise
from local government to the National Government."
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote
public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the objectives of national
productivity and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and
hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government
must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this
Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:
"In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has
consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve
the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government." (Emphasis supplied)
Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line between right and privilege in
American constitutional law has no relevance in the context of these cases since the
reference there is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere economic
activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be
permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questions primarily for the lawmaking
authority to determine, talking into account national and local interests. Here, it is the police
power of the State that is paramount.
ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD No. 771. Clearly, however, this
Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group
which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of
legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d
438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADCs
allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as
already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD
No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.

It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national
government can subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of
the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a
franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus,
the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures,
speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-
crony to operate the jai-alai), she did not scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all
franchises to operate jai-alais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the
government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not
local governments) to consider and approve.
On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple
contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are
within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the
police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for
the public welfare.
In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that:
"A franchise started out as a 'royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's
prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject.' This definition was given
by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since . .
. Today, a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign
power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to
regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its
administrative agencies."
There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because
jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise
to a franchise for the operation of a public utility, such as public transportation company, is to
trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege.
As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the
provisions of PD No. 771. And yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions,
i.e., to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises.
Thus, all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the
national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications
and requirements.
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the
decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception.
ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one
affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled
out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek
redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as
early as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago.
Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the requirement of a
legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are "riders" to the two (2) laws and are violative
of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, as
argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this Court ruled that the requirement
under the constitution that all laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the objective.

On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ
of preliminary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, we hold and rule
there was.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance
of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should
have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 Rule 129 of the
Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the
reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Since PD No.
771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by
the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and
consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to intervene in G.R. No.
115044.
2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional.
3. declaring that respondent Associated Development corporation (ADC)
does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and
conduct the jai-alai under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree
No. 771.
4. setting aside the writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino Reyes in Civil
Case No. 94-71656.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. and Kapunan, JJ., file separate opinions.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., join the dissents of Justices Quiason and Puno.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part for personal reasons.
Vitug, J., took no part; not ready to vote at this time on all issues.
Francisco, J., took no part. Conflict of interest.