ARTICLE # (bold)

CASE TITLE (Bold)

NUMBER AND DATE
PONENTE
FACTS: (BULLET FORM)
ISSUE: SHOULD BE BASED ON THE ARTICLE NUMBER
HELD: PLEASE ANSWER YES OR NO FIRST THEN STATE WHAT THE COURT SAID
RATIO: BASIS FOR THE DECISION
1. Enrotech Industrial Technologies Inc V Cuizon 521 SCRA 584 (2007)
2. People V Yabut 76 SCRA 624 (1977)
3. Andrew vs Ramsay & Co (1903)*please take note of this case. Pakitignan nalang sa book. I
might have overlooked the SCRA number kaya wala. Pasensya na ang dami kasi
4. American Rubber Co. vs Collector of Internal Revenue 64 SCRA 569 1975
5. Pearson* vs Caltex 7 N.C. 324 cant find this case
6. Chua Ngo vs Universal Trading Co. Inc. 87 Phil 331 1950
7. Lim vs CA 254 SCRA 170 1996
8. Pittsburgh Plte Glass Co. vs The Director of Patents 56 SCRA 243 1974
9. Veloso vs CA 260 SCRA 593 1996
10. Goquiolay vs Sycip 108 Phil 984 1960 and 9 SCRA 603 1963
11. Vicente vs Geraldez 52 SCRA 210 1973
12. BA Finance Corp vs CA 211 SCRA 112 1992


Art. 1897. The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts,
unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party
sufficient notice of his powers.
G.R. No. 167552 April 23, 2007
EUROTECH INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC. vs. EDWIN CUIZON and ERWIN CUIZON,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importation and distribution of various European
industrial equipment for customers here in the Philippines. It has as one of its customers Impact
Systems Sales ("Impact Systems") which is a sole proprietorship owned by respondent ERWIN
Cuizon (ERWIN) andt EDWIN is the sales manager of Impact Systems
From January to April 1995, petitioner sold to Impact Systems various products allegedly
amounting to P91,338.00. Subsequently, respondents sought to buy from petitioner one unit of
sludge pump valued at P250,000.00 with respondents making a down payment of P50,000.00.
When the sludge pump arrived from the United Kingdom, petitioner refused to deliver the
same to respondents without their having fully settled their indebtedness to petitioner.
On 28 June 1995, respondent EDWIN and Alberto de Jesus, general manager of petitioner,
executed a Deed of Assignment of receivables in favor of petitioner.
Cuizons, despite the existence of the Deed of Assignment, proceeded to collect from Toledo
Power Company the amount of P365,135.29. Eurotech made several demands upon Cuizons to
pay their obligations. As a result, Cuizons were able to make partial payments to Eurotech.
Cuizons total obligations stood at P295,000.00 excluding interests and attorneys fees.
Edwin Cuizon alleged that he is not a real party in interest in this case. According to him, he
was acting as mere agent of his principal, which was the Impact Systems, in his transaction
with Eurotech and the latter was very much aware of this fact.
ISSUE: Edwin exceeded his authority when he signed the Deed of Assignment thereby binding
himself personally to pay the obligations to Eurotech
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. In a contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another with the latters consent. The underlying principle of the
contract of agency is to accomplish results by using the services of others to do a great variety of
things like selling, buying, manufacturing, and transporting. Its purpose is to extend the personality
of the principal or the party for whom another acts and from whom he or she derives the authority
to act. It is said that the basis of agency is representation, that is, the agent acts for and on behalf of
the principal on matters within the scope of his authority and said acts have the same legal effect as
if they were personally executed by the principal. By this legal fiction, the actual or real absence of
the principal is converted into his legal or juridical presence qui facit per alium facit per se.
Article 1897 reinforces the familiar doctrine that an agent, who acts as such, is not personally liable
to the party with whom he contracts. The same provision, however, presents two instances when
an agent becomes personally liable to a third person. The first is when he expressly binds himself
to the obligation and the second is when he exceeds his authority. In the last instance, the agent
can be held liable if he does not give the third party sufficient notice of his powers. We hold that
respondent EDWIN does not fall within any of the exceptions contained in this provision.
The Deed of Assignment clearly states that respondent EDWIN signed thereon as the sales manager
of Impact Systems. As discussed elsewhere, the position of manager is unique in that it presupposes
the grant of broad powers with which to conduct the business of the principal, thus:
The powers of an agent are particularly broad in the case of one acting as a general agent or
manager; such a position presupposes a degree of confidence reposed and investiture with liberal
powers for the exercise of judgment and discretion in transactions and concerns which are
incidental or appurtenant to the business entrusted to his care and management. In the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, a managing agent may enter into any contracts that he deems
reasonably necessary or requisite for the protection of the interests of his principal entrusted to
his management.




G.R. No. L-42847 April 29, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CECILIA QUE YABUT and HON. JESUS DE VEGA, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II.
G.R. No. L-42902 April 29, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GEMINIANO YABUT, JR.
MARTIN, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Yabut accused of estafa by means of false pretenses: Yabut, as treasurer of the
Yabut Transit Line located and doing business in Caloocan City, prepared issued and make
out Check, drawn against the Merchants Banking Corporation, payable to Freeway Tires
Supply, in payment of articles and merchandise, and upon presentation of the said checks to
the bank, the checks were dishonored and inspite of repeated demands by the owner of the
Freeway Tires Supply to deposit the necessary funds to cover the checks within the
reglementary period enjoined by law, failed and refused to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of Alicia P. Andan, owner and operator of the Freeway Tires Supply
Instead of entering a plea, Yabut filed a motion to quash, contending that the acts charged
do not constitute the offense as there is no allegation that the postdated checks were issued
and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the
merchandise, the crime of estafa not being indictable ,when checks are postdated or issued
in payment of pre-existing obligation; and the venue was improperly laid in Malolos,
Bulacan, because the postdated checks were issued and delivered to, and received by, the
complainants messenger Modesto Yambao in the City of Caloocan, where she (respondent
Que Yabut) holds office.
The trial court Quashed the information as prayed for and peoples motion for
reconsideration was denied, the same course happened with the other case hence the two
petitions
ISSUE: WON there is a contract of agency between Modesto Yambao and Alicia Adan
Held/RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO, although the perfection of a contract of agency may take an implied form, the existence of
an agency relationship is never presumed. The relationship of principal and agent cannot be
inferred from mere family relationship; for the relation to exist, there must be consent by both
parties. The law makes no presumption of agency; it must exist as a fact.
Modesto Yambao's receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Que Yabut or Geminiano Yabut Jr. in
Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respodent Judges, be licitly taken as
delivery of the checks to the complainant Alicia P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there.
He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as "payee" or "indorse". And there appears
to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of
the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal
that Yambao is but her "messenger" or "part-time employee."
8
There was no special fiduciary
relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of
both parties is essential, the principal consent of both parties is essential, the principal
consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so to
act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has
the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent.
This is more imperative when it is considered that the transaction dealt with involves checks,
which are not legal tender, and the creditor may validly refuse the same as payment of
obligation.

Article 1881:The agent must act within the scope of his authority. He may do such acts as may
be conducive to the accomplishment of the purpose of the agency.
Andrew vs Ramsay & Co (1903)
The plaintiff asked the defendant estate agents to find a purchaser for his property at a
price of 2,500 and if one such was found the agents fee would be 50.
A purchaser, one Clutterbuck, at 2,100 was found. He paid the agents 100 by way of
deposit.
The agents paid the principal 50 and, with the principals consent, retained 50 as their
commission.
But it then transpired that the agents had had a side deal with Clutterbuck whereby he
paid them 20.
In the first action the principal claimed and recovered the 20 as a secret profit made by
the agent in breach his duty of good faith.
In the second action the principal claimed the return of the 50.
Held: The action succeeded. Where an agent takes a commission secret from his principal, the
principal may refuse to pay or recover any commission under the main agency contract. The
action for and recovery of the secret commission had not operated as a ratification of the sale.
Even though he had had the benefit of the agents services.
Lord Alverstone CJ said: It is said that the defendants ought not to be called upon to hand over
the 50 to the plaintiff because the plaintiff has had the benefit of their services. The principle
of Salomons v. Pender (1865) 3 H&C 639 seems to me to govern the case, and it is, in my
opinion, amply sufficient to do so. In that case it was held that an agent who was himself
interested in a contract to purchase property of his principal was not entitled to any commission
from the principal. The principle there laid down is that, when a person who purports to act as
an agent is not in a position to say to his principal, I have been acting as your agent, and I
have done my duty by you, he is not entitled to recover any commission from that principal. .
. It seems to me that this case is only an instance of an agent who has acted improperly being
unable to recover his commission from his principal. It is impossible to say what the result might
have been if the agent in this case had acted honestly. It is clear that the purchaser was willing
to give 20 more than the price which the plaintiff received, and it may well be that he would
have given more than that. It is impossible to gauge in any way what the plaintiff has lost by the
improper conduct of the defendants. I think, therefore, that the interest of the agents here was
adverse to that of the principal. A principal is entitled to have an honest agent, and it is only
the honest agent who is entitled to any commission. In my opinion, if an agent directly or
indirectly colludes with the other side, and so acts in opposition to the interest of his principal,
he is not entitled to any commission. That is, I think, supported both by authority and on
principle; but if, as is suggested, there is no authority directly bearing on the question, I think
that the sooner such an authority is made the better.
Wills J said: The 50 in question was paid by the purchaser to the defendants as agents for the
plaintiff as part of the 100 deposit on the purchase, and the defendants were allowed by the
plaintiff to retain 50 in the belief that they had earned that sum as commission. If the money
had all been paid over, and the defendants had had to sue the plaintiff for commission, it seems
to me perfectly clear that they could not recover it. They would have no chance whatever of
succeeding in such an action, and I think that they ought not to stand in any better position
because the plaintiff, believing that they had acted properly, had allowed them to retain the
50. The case ought to be the same whether the commission has already been paid or whether
the agent has to sue for it.

G.R. No. L-25965 June 30, 1975
AMERICAN RUBBER COMPANY (Now American Rubber Corporation) vs
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE (Now the Commissioner of Internal Revenue) and the
COURT OF TAX APPEALS
ESGUERRA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, is
engaged in the business of producing logs and lumber for sale. It acquired its logs from
its forest concession in Basilan City duly licensed by the Bureau of Forestry.
The lumber pieces belonging to petitioner which were deposited at petitioner's dock at
Isabela, Basilan, were sold thru contracts executed by SCLCO with different buyers in
Manila and the contracts recited among others that said lumber was "the timber of
American Rubber Company".
SCLCO issued in behalf of petitioner sales invoices to said buyers. Petitioner reimbursed
SCLCO for transportation, handling and other expenses advanced by the latter. After
SCLCO had shipped to Manila buyers the lumber marked "ARCO", bills of lading were
issued in favor of SCLCO as shipper and consignee. In some bills of lading, petitioner
appears as shipper and SCLCO as consignee
After delivery of the lumber sold by SCLCO in behalf of petitioner, SCLCO sent to
petitioner's Manila office liquidation statements of said lumber shipped to Manila which
papers consisted of statements of lumber costs, bank deposit slips, bills of lading and
lumber sales contracts. SCLCO in making the sales, charged and collected a 5%
commission which was deducted from the gross sales. Likewise it deducted freight,
unloading and trucking charges from the proceeds of sale and the balance was
deposited by SCLCO with petitioner's bank account at the National City Bank of New
York. SCLCO provided itself with the privilege tax receipt and paid percentage taxes as
commercial brokers during the period in question.
ISSUE: WON SCLCO is an agent of ARCO
HELD/RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES, though in the letter of agreement signed by the petitioner and SCLCO it is clear that there is no
contract of agency existed between the two, as a general rule the essence of a contract determines
what law should apply to the relation between the parties and not what the parties prefer to call that
relationship. However, only the acts of the contracting parties, subsequent to and in connection with
the execution of the contract, must be considered for the purpose of interpreting the same.
With regard to one particular transaction between SCLCO and ARCO involving lumber, no sales invoice
was issued but instead tally sheets were prepared. When queried why, Mr. de Leon miserably failed to
offer an explanation except for his usual and trite excuse that "he did not know the reason for such
procedure and that he was a mere subordinate and could not question Dr. Strong's wishes." The reason,
the court believe, why petitioner did not issue sales invoices is the fact that SCLCO acted only as agent of
petitioner as shown by the aforementioned circumstances surrounding the transactions between the
petitioner and SCLCO.



G.R. No. L-2870 September 19, 1950
CHUA NGO vs. UNIVERSAL TRADING CO., INC.
BENGZON, J.:
Facts:
Chua Ngo ordered 300 boxes of Sunkist oranges from Universal Trading Company Inc to be
gotten from the United States
The latter ordered the said boxes from Gabuardi Company of San Francisco and in due course,
the goods were shipped from that port to Manila
Only 120 boxes were delivered to Chua Ngo and the 180 were lost in transit
Plaintiff is now asking for reimbursement of the price paid for the lost boxes.
ISSUE: WON A CONTRACT OF AGENCY EXIST BETWEEN CHUA NGO AND UTC
WON UNIVERSAL TRADING CO., INC IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT FOR THE LOST GOODS
HELD/RATIO:DECIDENDI:
NO, the court held that the circumstances of record sufficiently indicate a sale. First, no commission
was paid. Second, Exhibit 1 says that "if balance is not paid within 48 hours of notification,
merchandise may be resold by the Universal Trading Company and the deposit forfeited." "Resold"
implies the goods had been sold to Chua Ngo. And forfeiture of the deposit is incompatible with a
contract of agency. Third, immediately after executing Exhibit 1 wherein oranges were quoted at $6.30
per box, Universal Trading placed an order for purchase of the same with Gabuardi Company at $6 per
box. If Universal Trading Gabuardi Company was agent of Chua Ngo, it could not properly do that.
Inasmuch as good faith is to be presumed, we must hold that Universal Trading acted thus because it
was not acting as agent of Chua Ngo, but as independent purchaser from Gabuardi Company. Fourth,
the defendant charged the plaintiff the sum of P218.87 for 3 percent sales tax, thereby implying that
their transaction was a sale. Fifth, if the purchase of the oranges had been made on behalf of Chua Ngo,
all claims for losses thereof against the insurance company and against the shipping company should
have been assigned to Chua Ngo. Instead, the defendant has been pressing such claims for itself.
The appealed judgment for plaintiff in the sum of P3,882.60 is affirmed.
In Lim v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 170 (1996), it was held that as a general rule, an agency to sell
on commission basis does not belong to any of the contracts covered by Articles 1357 and 1358 of the
Civil Code requiring them to be in a particular form, and not one enumerated under the Statutes of
Frauds in Article 1403. Hence, unlike a sale contract which must comply with the Statute of Frauds for
enforceability, a contract of agency to sell is valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered
into.


G.R. No. 102784. February 28, 1996
ROSA LIM vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
Facts:
That on or about the 8th day of October 1987, in Quezon City, Philippines said accused got and
received in trust from said complainant one (1) ring 3.35 solo worth P169,000.00, Philippine
Currency, with the obligation to sell the same on commission basis and to turn over the
proceeds of the sale to said complainant or to return said jewelry if unsold.
The said accused once in possession thereof and far from complying with her obligation despite
repeated demands therefor, misapplied, misappropriated and converted the same to her own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount
aforementioned and in such other amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil
Code
The accused contends that the contract between her and the complainant was not a contract of
agency. The real agreement between her and the private respondent was a sale on credit with
Mrs. Suarez as the owner-seller and petitioner as the buyer, as indicated by the fact that
petitioner did not sign on the blank space provided for the signature of the person receiving the
jewelry but at the upper portion thereof immediately below the description of the items taken.
ISSUE: WON THE CONTRACT BETWEEN LIM AND SUAREZ IS A SALE ON CREDIT
HELD/RATIO DECIDENDI:
NO, the receipt marked as Exhibit A which establishes a contract of agency to sell on commission basis
between Vicky Suarez and Rosa Lim which states that if I could not sell, I shall return all the jewelry
within the period mentioned above; if I would be able to sell, I shall immediately deliver and account
the whole proceeds of sale thereof to the owner of the jewelries at his/her residence; my
compensation or commission shall be the over-price on the value of each jewelry quoted above. I am
prohibited to sell any jewelry on credit or by installment; deposit, give for safekeeping; lend, pledge or
give as security or guaranty under any circumstance or manner, any jewelry to other person or
persons. The court finds that this fact does not have the effect of altering the terms of the transaction
from a contract of agency to sell on commission basis to a contract of sale. Neither does it indicate
absence or vitiation of consent thereto on the part of Rosa Lim which would make the contract void or
voidable. The moment she affixed her signature thereon, petitioner became bound by all the terms
stipulated in the receipt. She, thus, opened herself to all the legal obligations that may arise from their
breach.
CONTRACT OF AGENCY; NO FORMALITIES REQUIRED. - There are some provisions of the law which
require certain formalities for particular contracts. The first is when the form is required for the validity
of the contract; the second is when it is required to make the contract effective as against the third
parties such as those mentioned in Articles 1357 and 1358; and the third is when the form is required
for the purppose of proving the existence of the contract, such as those provided in the Statute of
Frauds in Article 1403. A contract of agency to sell on commission basis does not belong to any of these
three categories, hence, it is valid and enforceable in whatever form it may be entered into.
Thus, the court denied Lims petition and the decision of the lower court affirmed.

G.R. No. L-22773 March 29, 1974
PITTSBURG PLATE GLASS COMPANY vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS and CHUA TUA HIAN AND
COMPANY
CASTRO, J.
Facts:
Petition for review of two resolutions of the Director of Patents in Inter Partes Case 283,
dismissing the opposition of the Pittsburg Plate Glass Company (hereinafter referred to as the
petitioner) to the registration of a trademark applied for by Chua Tua Hian Company
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent).
On November 5, 1962, the law firm of Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili filed with the Philippine
Patent Office a petition for extension of 30 days from November 8, 1962 within which to file in
behalf of the petitioner a notice of opposition to the respondent's application for registration of
"Solex Bluepane" as trademark for its glass products. The plea was made pursuant to a
cablegram from Langner, Parry, Card and Langner International Patent and Trademark Agents,
USA, asking that the respondent's application be opposed. A copy of the cablegram was
attached to the request. The extension was granted.
On December 7, 1962 an unverified notice of opposition to the trademark application was filed
by Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili, pursuant to Rule 187(c) of the Rules of Practice before the
Patent Office which authorizes the filing of such a notice provided it is verified by the opposer
within 60 days thereafter. On the same day, the same counsel filed a duly authenticated power
of attorney executed by the petitioner on November 12, 1962 in favor of the former for the
prosecution of its opposition.
On February 5, 1963 the petitioner's verified opposition to the respondent's application was
filed.
On October 14, 1963 the Director of Patents, acting upon a motion of the respondent, issued a
resolution dismissing the petitioner's opposition on the ground that on November 5, 1962 when
the petitioner's counsel asked for an extension of time to file a notice of opposition, the said
counsel was not yet authorized by the petitioner to file the said pleading as the aforementioned
power of attorney was executed only on November 12, 1962.
ISSUE: WON THE LAW FIRM OF LICHAUCO, PICAZO AND AGCAOILI WAS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE PHILIPPINE PATENT OFFICE ON NOVEMBER 5, 1962 WHEN THE FORMER
PLEADED FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO REGISTER THE PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO THE
RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION.
HELD/RATIO DECIDENDI:
YES, the court held that the said law firm was so properly authorized by the petitioner. It should be
noted that the petitioner does not deny, as in fact it asserted in writing, that the said law firm was
authorized to represent it by virtue of the powers it had vested upon Langner, et al., a correspondent of
Lichauco, Picazo and Agcaoili, to handle all foreign trademark matters affecting the petitioner. It bears
emphasis that the relationship between counsel and client is strictly a personal one. It is a relationship
the creation of which courts and administrative tribunals cannot but recognize on the faith of the
client's word, especially when no substantial prejudice is thereby caused to any third party.
The Director of Patents is directed to proceed with the determination of the application and the
opposition thereto with costs against Chua Tua Hian & Company.