Plaintiffs Unopposed Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

OFFICER PAMELA LEE, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
-vs- )
)
MIKE PENCE, in his official capacity ) Cause No: 1:14-cv-406-RLY-TAB
as Governor of the State of Indiana, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

PLAINTIFFS UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs, Officer Pamela Lee, Candace Batten-Lee, Officer Teresa Welborn,
Elizabeth J. Piette, Battalion Chief Ruth Morrison, Martha Leverett, Sergeant Karen
Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz and J.S.V., T.S.V. and T.R.V.
("Children"), by their parents and next Friends, Sergeant Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz and
Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz, by counsel, respectfully request that they be granted to
leave to file an amended complaint. In support of their motion, plaintiffs state as follows:
1. Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to address the following:
a. Paragraph 10: The amendment simply adds Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz;
b. Paragraph 17: This is now changed to accurately reflect where
Chief Morrison and Martha Leverett were actually married;
c. Paragraphs 37 and 38: As noted by the defendants, there were two
Case 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-TAB Document 48 Filed 06/05/14 Page 1 of 3 PageID #: 555
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paragraphs 37 and two paragraphs 38. The amended now identifies each of the four
paragraphs as identified by the defendants in their answer, i.e., paragraphs 37[a], 37[b],
38[a] and 38[b];
d. Count III: The amended complaint no longer contains allegations
regarding a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
2. This amendment is being sought so as to make certain the record is
accurate should this matter be further adjudicated beyond this Court.
3. The proposed changes are not substantive except for the abandonment of
Count III and none of the changes prejudice the defendants.
4. Counsel for defendants has no objection to this amendment.

WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs respectfully request that they be granted leave to file
the amended complaint which is attached hereto.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/Karen Celestino-Horseman
Karen Celestino-Horseman
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C.
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220

Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: (317) 632-5633
Fax: (317) 630-1040
E-mail: [email protected]
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a copy of the foregoing Uncontested Motion
for Additional Pages was filed electronically on June 4, 2014. Notice of this filing will be
sent to the following counsel by operation of the Courts electronic filing system. Parties
and counsel may access this filing through the Courts System.
Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
302 W. Washington St., IGCS 5th Floor
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2770
Email: [email protected]

/s/Karen Celestino-Horseman
Karen Celestino-Horseman
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C.
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220

Tel: (317) 632-5633
Fax: (317) 630-1040

1

)
Plaintiffs, )
)
-vs- )
)
)
Defendants. )

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiffs Officer Pamela Lee, Candace Batten-Lee, Officer Teresa
Welborn, Elizabeth Piette, Batallion Chief Ruth Morrison, Martha
Leverett, Sergeant Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz,
J.S.V., T.S.V. and T.R.V. by their Parents and Next Friends, Sergeant
Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz, by counsel,
hereby allege as follows:
INTRODUCTION
1.Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 to
challenge the constitutionality under the United States Constitution of
Indiana Code 31-11-1-1 and its voiding of their marriages to persons of
the same sex, despite plaintiffs' marriages having been lawfully entered
Case 1:14-cv-00406-RLY-TAB Document 48-1 Filed 06/05/14 Page 1 of 17 PageID #: 558

2
into under the laws of a state other than Indiana. Said challenge to
Indiana Code 31-11-1-1 is both facial and as applied to plaintiffs.
Indiana Code 31-1 1-1-1 provides as follows:
(a) Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a
female.
(b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in
Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is
solemnized.
2. Indiana law provides that "[t]he validity of the marriage, being
governed by the law of the place of its celebration, must be recognized
in Indiana as a matter of comity." Gunter v. Dealer's Transport Company,
120 Ind. App. 409; 91 N.E.2d 377, 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950).
3. But under comity principles, Indiana is not required to
recognize a marriage solemnized in another state if the marriage violates
Indiana's public policy. Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) (while marriage between first cousins under the age of 65 is
void in Indiana, marriage will be recognized by Indiana if the first cousins
marry in a state where such marriages are recognized, as there is no
Indiana statute that articulates a public policy against the marriage of
first cousins).
4. Under Indiana law, the only out-of-state marriages for which
there is a public policy voiding the marriage upon returning to Indiana

3
are those marriages between persons of the same sex and marriages
entered into out of state so as to evade the prohibition of marrying while
mentally incompetent, drunk or on drugs. See, I.C. 31-1 1-8-6.
5. Indiana's law restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples
publicly stigmatizes persons in a same-sex marriage and sends a hideous
message to their children by implying that persons entering into same-
sex marriages are equivalent to marriages entered into by the mentally
incompetent, the drunk or the drugged.
6. Indianas refusal to recognize same-sex marriage
solemnized in another state denies plaintiffs a dignity and status of
immense import. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2692
(2013). Moreover, they are stigmatized and relegated to a second-class
status by having their respective marriages declared void by Indiana,
which suggests that their relationships are unworthy of recognition. Id.
at 2694.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 1331 and 1343 because this suit raises federal questions
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiffs seek both injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2201.
8. Venue is proper in the Indianapolis Division of the
Southern District of Indiana under 28 U.S.C. 139 1(b) because

4
defendants reside or have their principal offices in this district.
PARTIES
9. Defendant Mike Pence is the Governor of the State of
Indiana. In his official capacity, he is the chief executive officer of
Indiana and is, pursuant to Article V, Section 16 of the Indiana
Constitution, responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of Indiana,
including I. C. 31-11-1-1, the law that excludes same-sex couples
from having their out-of-state marriage recognized in Indiana. Governor
Pence is a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and was acting
under color of state law at all times relevant to this complaint.
10. Defendants Brian Abbott, Chris Atkins, Ken Cochran,
Steve Daniels, Jodi Golden, Michael Pinkham, Kyle Rosebrough and
Bret Swanson are members of the Board of Trustees of the Indiana Public
Retirement System (INPRS) who administer the 1977 Police Officers
and Firefighters Pension and Disability Fund (Pension Fund) in which
Officers Lee and Welborn, Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz and Chief
Morrison are participants. Defendant Steve Russo is the executive
director of the INPRS. All of these defendants are persons within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and were acting under color of state law
at all times relevant to this complaint.
11. All defendants named herein are sued in their official
capacities. Each of the defendants, and those subject to their

5
supervision, direction, and control, intentionally performed, participated
in, aided and/or abetted in some manner the acts alleged herein,
proximately caused the harm alleged herein, and will continue to injure
plaintiffs irreparably if not enjoined from enforcing I. C. 31-11-1-1.
12. On October 25, 2013, plaintiffs Pamela Lee and Candace
Batten- Lee were lawfully married in California, a state that issues
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Officer Lee, a military veteran,
has served as a police officer for 22 years, serving the last 19 years with
the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department.
13. On or about January 27, 2014, Officer Lee made
application for the designation of plaintiff Candace Batten-Lee as her
spouse and primary beneficiary. The Pension Fund has declined to
recognize Ms. Batten-Lee as the spouse of Officer Lee because it claims it
is prohibited from doing so under I.C. 31-11-1-1.
14. On December 13, 2013, plaintiffs Teresa Welborn and
Elizabeth J. Piette were lawfully married in Hawaii, a state that issues
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. For more than 25 years, Officer
Welborn has served as an officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan
Police Department.
16. On or about February 20, 2014, Officer Welborn made
application for the designation of plaintiff Elizabeth Piette as her spouse
and primary beneficiary. The Pension Fund has declined to recognize

6
Ms. Piette as the spouse of Officer Welborn because it claims it was
prohibited from doing so under I.C. 31-11-1-1.
17. On September 11, 2013, Chief Morrison and Martha Leverett
were married in Montgomery County, Maryland, a state that issues
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Chief Morrison served in the
Indianapolis Fire Department for over 27 years before retiring as
battalion chief on December 23, 2013.
18. On or about September 18, 2013, Chief Morrison submitted
her application for retirement benefits and affirmed under oath that her
marital status is that of married and that plaintiff Leverett is her
lawful spouse. Chief Morrison was informed by the INPRS that Leverett
would not be recognized as Chief Morrisons spouse because of I. C.
31-11-1-1.
19. On October 25, 2013, Plaintiffs Karen Vaughn-Kajmowicz
and Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz were lawfully married in Iowa, a state that
issues marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz, has served as a police officer for 18 years with the Evansville
Police Department, most recently working in the Narcotics Division.
Plaintiffs Sergeant VaughnKajmowicz and Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz are
the parents of J. S. V., T. S. V. and T. R. V., each of whom is under the
age of seven years. In or around October 2013, Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz made application for the designation of plaintiff Tammy

7
Vaughn-Kajmowicz as her spouse and primary beneficiary. The Pension
Fund has declined to recognize Ms. Vaughn-Kajmowicz as the spouse of
Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz because it claims it is prohibited from doing
so under I.C. 31-11-1-1.
COUNT I
Indianas Refusal to Recognize Plaintiffs Marriages
Violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

20. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the allegations of
paragraphs 1- 20.
21. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that no State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
22. By refusing to recognize plaintiffs same-sex marriages that
were lawful in the jurisdictions where those marriages were solemnized,
defendants are depriving them of the numerous legal protections that
are available to opposite sex couples under Indiana law by virtue of
marriage.
23. Indianas refusal to recognize same-sex marriages validly
performed in other states infringes on protections offered by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and treats plaintiffs
differently because they married persons of the same sex instead of the
opposite sex.
25. Officer Wellborn and Battalion Chief Morrison are vested

8
members and beneficiaries of the Pension Fund.
26. Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Officer Welborn and Officer Lee
are active duty police officers who would be covered by the provisions of
the Pension Fund if they are killed in the line of duty.
27. Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Officer Welborn and Officer Lee
are active duty police officers who would be covered by the provisions of
the Pension Fund if they were to die while on active duty.
28. Under the Pension Fund, if a police officer dies in the line of
duty, then the "surviving spouse is entitled to a monthly benefit during the
spouse's lifetime." I.C. 36-8-8-14.1. It is not necessary that the
police officer be vested in the Pension Fund to be covered by this
provision.
29. Defendants recognize the spouses of police officers
married to persons of the opposite sex and enter those spouses as spouses
in the officers records maintained by the Pension Fund. If such officers
die in the line of duty, their opposite-sex spouse is entitled to be paid a
monthly benefit during the spouse's lifetime.
30. Because of I. C. 31-11-1-1, defendants have refused to enter
the same-sex spouses of Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Officer Welborn
and Officer Lee as designated surviving spouse beneficiaries in the
officers' records, making their spouses ineligible to claim this benefit if
Sergeant VaughnKajmowicz, Officer Lee or Officer Welborn should die in

9
the line of duty.
31. Under the Pension Fund, if a police officer is married to a
person of the opposite sex and dies in the line of duty, the Pension Fund
will pay that officer's spouse a lump sum, tax free, of $150,000.00. See
I.C. 36-8-8-20(c).
32. Because of I. C. 31-11-1-1, defendants have refused to
designate the spouses of Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Officer Lee and
Officer Welborn as designated spouse beneficiaries in the officers'
records as maintained by the Pension Fund, making their spouses
ineligible to claim the lump sum payment should Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz, Officer Lee or Officer Welborn die in the line of duty.
33. Under the Pension Fund, if a police officer is married to a
person of the opposite sex and dies while on active duty, the Pension
fund will pay that officer's surviving spouse a monthly benefit. See I.C.
36-8-8-13.8(c).
34. Because of I. C. 31-11-1-1, defendants have refused to
designate the spouses of Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz, Officer Lee and
Officer Welborn as designated spouse beneficiaries, making them
ineligible to claim the monthly benefit should Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz, Officer Lee or Officer Welborn die while on active duty.
35. Should Sergeant Vaughn-Kajmowicz die while on active
duty, her dependent children will receive the monthly benefit but as the

10
surviving mother of the children will not receive a benefit, the total of
the family's monthly benefit will be significantly less than a similarly
situated family where the officer's spouse was of the opposite sex.
36. Under the Pension Fund, if a retired firefighter dies while
receiving retirement, the "surviving spouse is entitled to a monthly
benefit." I.C. 36-8- 8-13.8. If a retired firefighter is married to a person
of the opposite sex, the Pension Fund will pay the spouse of that retired
firefighter a monthly benefit.
37[a]. Because of I. C. 31-11-1-1, defendants have refused to
designate the spouse of retired Chief Morrison as a spouse beneficiary
thereby making her ineligible to claim the monthly benefit should she be
predeceased by Chief Morrison.
37[b]. Without certain knowledge of what benefits will be made
available to their surviving spouse, plaintiffs cannot do necessary
financial and estate planning. If plaintiffs wish to provide for the same
level of benefits provided by the pension fund to surviving spouses who
are the opposite sex of the deceased officer or firefighter, they must pay an
additional amount to private investment plans, a financial burden not
imposed upon same opposite-sex couples.
38[a]. In the case of the children, J. S. V., T. S. V. and T. R. V., while
the children will qualify for a monthly benefit, their stay-at-home mother,
Tammy Vaughn-Kajmowicz, will not receive a benefit. Thus, her burden to

11
care for her children as the surviving spouse of Sergeant Vaughn-
Kajmowicz will be more costly and difficult than the financial burden of
an opposite-sex spouse of a deceased police officer with children.
38[b]. Additionally, by refusing to recognize the plaintiffs' lawful
marriages from other states, Indiana law as administered and enforced
by defendants deprives same-sex married couples of numerous legal
protections that are available to opposite-sex married couples by virtue
of marriage. By way of example:
a. A widow or widower of an opposite-sex spouse is entitled to 50%
to 100% of his or her deceased spouses estate if the spouse
died intestate. I. C. 29-1-2-1(b). Because of I. C. 31-11-1-
1, same- sex surviving spouses in this situation receive
nothing.
b. If an opposite-sex spouse becomes incapacitated, her spouse
may be ordered by a court to support that spouse during the
period of incapacity. I. C. 31-15-7-2. Because of I. C. 31-
11-1-1, plaintiffs are not afforded this protection by Indiana
law.
c. Because of I. C. 31-11-1-1, Indianas divorce laws do not apply
to same-sex spouses.
d. Because of I. C. 31-11-1-1, Indiana requires same-sex
couples who file federal returns with a married filing status

12
to file their Indiana income tax returns with a filing status of
single, thus requiring plaintiffs to complete a sample federal
return entering information as if they are each single, as a basis
for their Indiana return, at additional cost and
inconvenience.
39. Same-sex married couples are excluded from these and
many other legal protections and obligations provided for opposite-sex
married couples under Indiana law. For example, the publication "More
than Just a Couple - A Compendium of the Rights and Responsibilities
of Civil Marriage in the Indiana Code" was compiled by the LGBT project
at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law and identifies 614
different provisions in the Indiana Code that "are legally and
linguistically tied to civil marriage, family and spousal relationships."
http://www.indianaequalityaction.org/wordpress/wp/content/uploads/
2012/11/More-Than-Just-a-Couple.pdf (Last viewed on Mar. 4, 2014).
Because plaintiffs are married to persons of the same sex, they
cannot avail themselves of any of the protections, rights or responsibilities
that Indiana imposes upon persons who are married to someone of the
opposite sex.
40. By refusing to recognize the plaintiffs' lawful, out-of-
state marriages, Indiana, acting through the defendants and pursuant to
I. C. 31- 11-1-1, disadvantages, harms and stigmatizes plaintiffs solely

13
because their spouses are of the same sex instead of the opposite sex.
41. Because defendants refuse to recognize the plaintiffs' lawful
out-of- state marriages by virtue of I. C. 31-11-1-1, their children are
harmed and stigmatized by the treatment of their family because it is
headed by two persons of the same sex versus a family headed by a
man and a woman.
42. I. C. 31-1 1-1-1 tells the plaintiffs and their children that their
marriages -- and their families -- are not valued in the same manner as
opposite-sex marriages or single-parent families.
43. By refusing to recognize the plaintiffs' lawful out-of-state
marriages, defendants, acting pursuant to I. C. 31-11-1-1, deny plaintiffs
significant legal protections, benefits and a dignity and status of enormous
import. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
44. By refusing to recognize plaintiffs marriages validly
entered into elsewhere, defendants, acting under color of I. C. 31-11-1-
1, deprive plaintiffs of the rights secured by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
COUNT II
Indianas Refusal to Recognize Plaintiffs Marriages
Violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution

paragraphs 1- 44.
46. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

14
guarantees to all citizens due process of law.
47. Marriage is a fundamental right. Choices regarding marriage,
like choices about other aspects of family life, are a central part of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
48. Plaintiffs, once they have been validly married in a state
which authorizes same-sex marriage, have a fundamental right to remain
married and a fundamental right to have their marriage recognized.
49. Plaintiffs, as persons in valid, lawful marriages have a
liberty interest in their marital status that is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of where they
choose to live in the United States as a married couple.
50. Plaintiffs, as persons in valid, lawful marriages have a
protected property interest in maintaining their lawful marital status
and the comprehensive protections and mutual obligations that
marriage provides.
51. Plaintiffs also have a fundamental right to preserve their
lawful marital status as they choose to travel in and out of Indiana.
52. Ind. Code 31-1 1-1-1 denies the plaintiffs their
fundamental right to have their lawful marriages recognized and their
fundamental right to remain married by voiding, without any
semblance of due process, the marriages they validly entered into in
jurisdictions other than Indiana and thus denies them the myriad

15
benefits, privileges and rights of marriage available under Indiana law.
53. The voiding by defendants acting pursuant to I. C. 31-1 1-1-
1 of plaintiffs' marriages lawfully entered into in jurisdictions other than
Indiana denies the plaintiffs substantive due process by infringing upon
their fundamental rights to have their lawful marriages recognized and
to remain married and thus denies them the myriad benefits, privileges
and rights of marriage available under Indiana law.
54. Defendants refusal to recognize plaintiffs respective
marriages entered into in other jurisdictions where those marriages are
valid and lawful, and its voiding of those marriages by operation of law,
violates the Due Process Clause.
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
28 U.S.C. 2201 and 2202;
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 57 and 65

paragraphs 1- 54.
56. This case presents an actual controversy because
defendants present and ongoing denial of equal treatment to plaintiffs;
the infringement of plaintiffs' fundamental rights; and the denial of due
process to plaintiffs; and, an infringement of plaintiffs rights promised
by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, subjects them to serious and
immediate harms, including ongoing emotional distress and stigma,
warranting the issuance of a judgment declaring that I. C. 33-11-1-1

16
violates the Due Process Clause and/or the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
57. A favorable decision enjoining defendants from further
constitutional violations, and mandating them to recognize plaintiffs'
marriages, would redress and prevent the irreparable injuries to plaintiffs
which they have identified, and for which they have no adequate remedy
at law or in equity.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:
a. Enter a declaratory judgment that Ind. Code 31-1 1-1-1 on
its face and as applied to plaintiffs violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
b. Enter a declaratory judgment that Ind. Code 31-1 1-1-1 on
its face and as applied to plaintiffs violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution;
c. Enter a declaratory judgment that Ind. Code 31-1 1-1-1
on its face and as applied to plaintiffs violates the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution;
d. Enter a permanent injunction directing defendants to
recognize plaintiffs marriages as valid and lawful within the State of
Indiana and to administer the Pension Fund so as to provide the same
benefits for all married couples, regardless of whether the couples are of

17
the opposite sex or the same sex;
e. Award plaintiffs the costs of suit, including reasonable
attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988; and
f. Enter all further relief to which plaintiffs may be justly
entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Karen Celestino-Horseman /s/ William R. Groth
Karen Celestino-Horseman William R. Groth
Of Counsel, Austin & Jones, P.C. Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth
One N. Pennsylvania St., Ste. 220 & Towe, LLP
Indianapolis, IN 46204 429 E. Vermont St., Ste. 200
Tel: (317) 632-5633 Indianapolis, IN 46202
Fax: (317) 630-1040 Tel: (317) 353-9363
E-mail: [email protected] Fax: (317) 351-7232

/s/ Mark W. Sniderman /s/ Kathleen M. Sweeney
Mark W. Sniderman Kathleen M. Sweeney
Sniderman Nguyen, LLP Sweeney Law Group, LLC
47 S. Meridian St., Ste. 400 141 E. Washington St., Ste. 225
Indianapolis, IN 46204 Indianapolis, IN 46204
Tel: (317) 361-4700 Tel: (317) 491-1050
Fax: (317) 464-5111 Fax: (317) 491-1043
E-mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected]

/s/ Robert A. Katz* /s/ Kelly R. Eskew
Robert A. Katz Kelly R. Eskew
Indiana University 6459 Central Avenue
McKinney School of Law Indianapolis, IN 46220
530 W. New York St., Room 349 Email: [email protected]
*Pro Hac Vice Admission Requested

)
Plaintiffs, )
)
-vs- )
)
)
Defendants. )

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS UNOPPOSED MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs move the Court for file leave to file an amended complaint. This motion is
uncontested. After being duly advised, the Court GRANTS said Motion.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Plaintiffs are granted leave to file an amended complaint.
All defendants shall be held to have been served with the amended complaint as of the date of
entry of this order.

So Ordered:

Tim A. Baker
United States Magistrate Judge
Southern District of Indiana

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

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