G.R. No. 155800. March 10, 2006.

*
LEONILO ANTONIO, petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES,
respondent.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled principle of civil procedure that
the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony
which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.It is a settled principle of
civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility
of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because
the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while
giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. The Court
is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the
veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Annulment; Psychological
Incapacity; The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity
of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has
long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.Article
36 of the Family Code states that [a] marriage contracted by any party who,
at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. The concept
of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our
body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a
ground for the dissolution of a marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence has recognized that
psychological incapacity is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume.The notion that psychological incapacity pertains
to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere
inability to comply with
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
them, was further affirmed in the Molina case. Therein, the Court, through
then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that [t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption thereto. Jurisprudence since then has
recognized that psychological incapacity is a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as
the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.Article 36 of
the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in
promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as
the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand
or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement provided in the
Molina case for the Solicitor General to issue a certification stating his
reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition for annulment of
marriage has been dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.Molina had provided for
an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. This requirement
however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code
mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attor-
355
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 355
Antonio vs. Reyes
ney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated
or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering
the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration
of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the
trial court is extant from the records of this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The root causes of respondents
psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified and
proven by experts as perennially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories and
inventing personalities and situations, of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment and family background, among others.The root
cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts,
and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint
alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal
behavior of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations, of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income,
educational attainment, and family background, among others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court had already held
in Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) that personal examination of
the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.The Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000), that personal examination of the subject by
the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as
sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged
heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of
facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners
factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
356
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.It
should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as
false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly,
they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory
of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations
of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and
reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital
bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations
attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality
cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The psychological incapacity must be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.The final point
of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this
score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the
appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition
was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement that psychological
incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion.The
requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined
without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not
accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection,
there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos,
especially those presently on appellate review, where presuma-
357
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 357
Antonio vs. Reyes
bly the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen
the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as
in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually
incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Tomas M. Guno for petitioner.
Roberto L. Mendoza for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to
the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational
as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty
spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
and
Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24
October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo
N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and
void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial
court.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate
Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo; See Rollo, pp. 67-84.
2 Rollo, p. 86.
3 Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina
Guevara-Salonga.
358
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
(1)
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26
years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their
first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel
4
at the
Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December
1990.
6
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly
died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time
their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.
8
As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the
people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things,
9
to wit:
She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an
illegitimate son,
10
and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as
the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from
other sources after their marriage.
11
_______________
4 Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Pias,
Metro Manila.
5 Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
6 Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7 Records, pp. 1-5.
8 Id., at pp. 1-2.
9 Id., at pp. 2-3. See also Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
10 Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11 Supra note 8.
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 359
Antonio vs. Reyes
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David,
attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident
occurred.
12
She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician,
Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
13
She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated
with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a
single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a
luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her
honor and even presented an invitation to that effect
14
but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of
said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.
15
She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez,
and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming
to be from Blackgold and touting her as the number one
moneymaker in the commercial industry worth P2 million.
16
Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one
who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the
truth in one of their quarrels.
17
He likewise realized that Babes
Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination
when he discovered they were not known in or connected with
Blackgold.
18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus,
she altered her payslip to make it appear that she
_______________
12 Rollo, pp. 69, 92.
13 Id., at pp.70, 92.
14 Id., at p. 95.
15 Supra note 13.
16 Id., at pp. 70, 92.
17 TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.
18 Id., at pp. 12-13. See also Records, p. 91.
360
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public
market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
(7)
(1)
furniture dealer.
19
She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and
ended up borrowing money from other people on false
pretexts.
20
She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent
of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When
he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from
her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but
since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991.
21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede
(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a
clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It
undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and
respect.
22
They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was
also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.
23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the
_______________
19 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
20 Id.; Records, p. 3.
21 Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
22 Id., at pp. 71-72, 92-93.
23 Id.
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 361
Antonio vs. Reyes
allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.
24
She presented her version, thus:
She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because
she was afraid of losing her husband.
25
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her
because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching
her back and ogling her from head to foot.
26
She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had
been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two
(2) years.
27
She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an
executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)
commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of
Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She
told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she
was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to
the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a
luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine
Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
28
She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by
her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez
Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United
States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
29
She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband
but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic
matter if she was the one asking for chocolates
_______________
24 Id., at p. 93.
25 Id., at pp. 74, 94.
26 Id.
27 Id., at pp. 73, 93.
28 Id.
29 Id.
362
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.
30
She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported
almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.
31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child
prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were
mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological
incapacity on her part.
32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr.
Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological
condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his
assistant,
33
together with the screening procedures and the
Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself
conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated
that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and
poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence
of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the
evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who
administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not
reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.
35
_______________
30 Id., at pp. 74, 94.
31 Id., at pp. 73, 94.
32 Id., at pp. 77-78.
33 Miss Francianina Sanches.
34 Rollo, p. 94.
35 Id., at pp. 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.
363
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 363
Antonio vs. Reyes
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and
held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher
occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others
had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
36
The trial court thus declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of
the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the
parties.
37
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals,
the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only
respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.
38
Subsequently, the
decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by
the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the
Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment.
While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest
with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of
the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals
40
governing the appli-
_______________
36 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37 Id., at pp. 97-98.
38 Id., at pp. 99-100.
39 Id., at pp. 101-103.
40 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
364
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
cation and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been
satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner
elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence
conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced
by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of
petitioner.
41
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions
of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony
which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.
42
The Court is likewise
guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity
of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court
concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the
psychological incapacity of respondent.
43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner
as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the
state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards
set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts
1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
44
(also known as the
Molina case
45
), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the
_______________
41 Rollo, p. 95.
42 Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126; 250
SCRA 523, 542 (1995), citing Serrano v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43 Rollo, p. 82.
44 Supra note 40.
45 The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O.
Molina. Id.
365
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 365
Antonio vs. Reyes
Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.
46
Since Molina
was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
47
In
fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case,
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
48
wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article
36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception
that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow,
insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.
49
Yet what Molina and the
succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while
undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity,
still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances.
Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36,
even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
_______________
46 Rollo, p. 78.
47 There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court
order declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are Sy
v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 760; 330 SCRA 550 (2000), and Buenaventura v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 & 127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261.
However, in Sy, the Court found that the marriage was void ab initio due to the
lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage was solemnized, and thus
declined to pass upon the question of psychological incapacity. In Buenaventura,
since the parties chose not to challenge the trial courts conclusion of
psychological incapacity and instead raised questions on the award of damages
and support, the Court did not review the finding of psychological incapacity.
48 334 Phil. 294; 266 SCRA 324 (1997).
49 It does not escape this Courts attention that many lower courts do grant
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are not
elevated for review to the Supreme Court.
366
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that [a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
50
The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground
for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage
persons who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage.
51
Marriages with such persons were ordained as
void,
52
in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons
already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a
ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,
53
but a marriage
where either party was of unsound mind at the time of its celebration
was cited as an annullable marriage under the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted
under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.
55
Upon
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a
party of unsound mind was classified under Article 85 of the
_______________
50 See FAMILY CODE, Art. 36.
51 Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher,
The Civil Code of Spain with Philippine Notes and References 45 (Fifth Ed., 1947).
The original text of Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: No pueden
contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su
razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio.
52 See SPANISH CIVIL CODE. (1889) Art. 101.
53 Act No. 2710 (1917).
54 See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c).
55 See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 367
Antonio vs. Reyes
Civil Code as a voidable marriage.
56
The mental capacity, or lack thereof,
of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio.
57
Similarly, among the marriages classified as
voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a
party of unsound mind.
58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of
consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of
the essential requisites of a contract.
59
The initial common consensus on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it
did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice
of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling
such rights and obligations.
60
Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990
edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect
the consent to the marriage.
61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36
as phrased by the Family Code committee. To-
_______________
56 Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband or wife. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 85 (3).
57 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 80.
58 Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See
note 56.
59 See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33; 240 SCRA 20, 30 (1995).
See also A. Sempio Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines 37
(1988). A contrary view though was expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a
member of the Family Code commission. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, Ibid.
61 I A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and
Jurisprudence 274-275 (1990 ed.).
368
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
lentino opined that psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the
marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of
the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of
the marriage only.
62
At the same time, Tolentino noted [it] would be
different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential
marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to
the marriage.
63
These concerns though were answered, beginning with
Santos v. Court of Appeals,
64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug,
acknowledged that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than
a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to
understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina
66
case. Therein, the
Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that
[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto.
67
Jurisprudence since
_______________
62 Id.
63 Id., at p. 274.
64 Supra note 60.
65 Id., at p. 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, [t]here is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to marriage. Id.
66 Supra note 40.
67 Id., at p. 677.
369
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 369
Antonio vs. Reyes
then has recognized that psychological incapacity is a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological
incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central
phase reading psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage.
69
At the same time, it has been
consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its
application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis.
Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although
not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
71
_______________
68 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851; 343 SCRA 755, 765 (2000).
69 It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently
rejected by the Family Code Commission, stated that among those void ab initio
marriages are those contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made
manifest after the celebration. See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at p.
30; p. 40.
70 Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108;
citing A. Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at p. 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at p. 36; p. 31; Republic v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 40, at p. 677; p. 212.
71 G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
370
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.
72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity
may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even
canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the
deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the
Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina
has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides
courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear
legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article
36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is
need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern
the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos
then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the
interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code
_______________
72 Id., at p. 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997),
Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 371
Antonio vs. Reyes
committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,
73
and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the
Catholic Church but still existent under civil law.
74
It would be
disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court
has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling
or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
75
Still, it must be
emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence
in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have
been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and
subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely
persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting
psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal
guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2,
Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that [t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly,
it
_______________
73 See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at pp. 32-39; p. 31.
74 See Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at p. 36.
75 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at p. 678; p. 212.
76 Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the
psychological incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the
fact that he did not engage in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10)
month marital cohabitation, remains a binding precedent, even though it was
decided shortly before the Molina case.
372
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
developmen[t], and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the
family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects
of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,
based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject
of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres
to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls
on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that
protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present
through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and
the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it
may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a
constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if
circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the
only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a
petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages
contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should
be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage.
Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation
of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is
a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages
373
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 373
Antonio vs. Reyes
ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article
36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and
family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons
independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply
with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present
petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized
in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The
Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and
1)
2)
3)
the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in
full:
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations
374
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or
prior thereto.
4)
5)
6)
7)
Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children
and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 375
Antonio vs. Reyes
Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to
harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to
reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be
given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on
evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed
civilly void.
77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor
General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition.
78
This requirement however was dispensed with
following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages.
79
Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that
the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,
collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous
opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any
event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is
extant from the records of this case.
_______________
77 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at pp. 676-680; pp. 209-213.
78 Id., at p. 680; p. 213.
79 See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441
SCRA 422, 435.
376
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding
on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the
primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute
the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and
personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication
sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article
36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in
Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine
Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her
alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from
the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of
respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event,
both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough.
Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.
80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of
nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with
a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be
considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is
impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or
Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or sup-
_______________
80 Rollo, p. 82.
377
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 377
Antonio vs. Reyes
pressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological
incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of
collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently
proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The
initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating
ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations, of writing
letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual
occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,
among others.
81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further
linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of
psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.
Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of
at least two (2) major hospitals,
82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to
me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly
wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of
which is the persistent,constant and repeated lying of the
respondent; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
_______________
81 Records, pp. 2-3.
82 University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr.
Abcede likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association.
TSN, February 23, 1994, p. 6.
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
Q Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of
the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic
obligations of her marriage?
A Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards
another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person,
and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,
relationship is based on communication between individuals and what
we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then
when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to
tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is
going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it
undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect.
Q Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the
respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is
the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has
been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the
activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the
petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the
transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,
which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her
husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the
extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel
jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but
everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological.
If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an
affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the
husband is having an
379
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 379
Antonio vs. Reyes
affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that
paranoid jealousy.
Q Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the
marriage?
A Yes, Maam.
83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological
capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent is [a] pathological
liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself.
84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological
incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of
respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner.
While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court
had already held in Marcos v. Marcos
85
that personal examination of the
subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared
psychologically incapacitated.
86
We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions.
Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of
respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since
the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises,
there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity
drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial
court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in
this wise:
_______________
83 TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
84 TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
85 397 Phil. 840; 343 SCRA 755 (2000).
86 Id., at p. 850; p. 764.
380
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that
propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her
state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in
a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give
meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and
constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As
concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is
abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.
87
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have
clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.
She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark
about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the
latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a
little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his
wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not
adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage.
More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to
distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners
witnesses and the
_______________
87 Rollo, pp. 95-96.
381
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 381
Antonio vs. Reyes
trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling
lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them,
were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish
between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the
legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the
corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One
unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any
legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent
allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited
her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced.
Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain
in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even
comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best.
Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability
to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage
cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code
which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party
was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that
no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage. It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the
misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article
45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not
allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations
382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.
Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As
noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological
liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.
88
Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a
Conclusion
89
dated 30 March 1995, citing the lack of due discretion
on the part of respondent.
90
Such decree of
_______________
88 As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by
petitioner with the canonical declarations attached as annexes.
89 Id., at pp. 97-98.
90 The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of
invalidity on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. On
appeal, however, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified the
judgment by holding that lack of due discretion applied to respondent but there
was no suffi
383
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 383
Antonio vs. Reyes
nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,
91
and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
92
In fact, respondents
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause
93
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent
from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage
vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by
law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made
the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that
were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications
of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the
integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an
adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from
eliciting a judicially bind-
_______________
cient evidence to prove lack of due discretion on the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
91 Rollo, pp. 99-100.
92 Id., at pp. 101-103.
93 A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect that
the respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express consent of this
Tribunal, in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as well as
for the protection of the intended spouse.; Rollo, p. 97.
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
ing matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case
however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part
of the Petitioner.
94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not
only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify
the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case.
They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the
trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court
instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate
court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this
matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual
findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts,
that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina
that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it
did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that
Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially
separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.
However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she
continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.
From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is
incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that
respondents psychosis is quite grave, and
_______________
94 Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.
95 Rollo, p. 82.
385
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 385
Antonio vs. Reyes
a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had
petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as
incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts
taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the
trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement
was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the
Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in
January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the
Family Code committee,
96
then the opinion of canonical scholars,
97
before
arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.
98
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed
during the deliberations that psychological incapacity is incurable,
99
and
the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.
100
However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological
incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteris-
_______________
96 Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at pp. 30-36; pp. 26-31.
97 Id., at pp. 37-39; pp. 31-33.
98 Id., at pp. 39-40; p. 34.
99 Id., at p. 33; p. 27.
100 Id., at p. 39; p. 33.
386
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
tic of psychological incapacity.
101
_______________
101 It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including,
and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase psy-chological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumas Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting
from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudsons Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law
on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to
have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of
the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not
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VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 387
Antonio vs. Reyes
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial
court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether
respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos
did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological
incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least,
there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and
the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a
medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in
1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the
reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102
the Court countered an
argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the
observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of
a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.
103
Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations.
The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily
cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was
no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents
psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there
was no
_______________
necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. Santos v.
Court of Appeals, Id., at pp. 39-41; pp. 34-35.
102 G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103 Id., at p. 593.
388
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Antonio vs. Reyes
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question
was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep
reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before
Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would
not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold
in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial
court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the
interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It
would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or
clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no
impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was
tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the
evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the
petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the
Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an
integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced
that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree
that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of
action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial
court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it
does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is
possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love
with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on
respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage.
389
VOL. 484, MARCH 10, 2006 389
Antonio vs. Reyes
Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC
dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio and Carpio-Morales, JJ.,
concur.
Petition granted, decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void
reinstated.
Notes.The guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitatedwhat is important is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition, for indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
(Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 [2000])
A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting
personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. (Choa vs.
Choa, 392 SCRA 641 [2002])
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (1) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. (Carating-Siayngo vs.
Siayngo, 441 SCRA 422 [2004])
o0o
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Meaning of Psychological Incapacity as Ground for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage More Elaborated
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