1

Case Digest in Local Government Code (Part II)

1. Vicente De La Cruz vs. Edgardo Paras
G.R. No. L-42571-72
July 25, 1983

Fernando, CJ:

FACTS:
De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of
1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out
their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to
promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade,
the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD:
The SC ruled against Paras. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot
prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All
that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to
grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction.
That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs
subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their
establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business.

If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would
pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the
term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained
by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.


2. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 94759 January 21, 1991

2

GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:
Technology Developers Inc. is engaged in manufacturing and exporting charcoal briquette. On February
16, 1989, they received a letter from respondent Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz, ordering the full cessation
of the operation of the petitioners plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter also requested the company
to show to the office of the mayor some documents, including the Building permit, mayors permit, and
Region III-Pollution of Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. Since the company
failed to comply in bringing the required documents, respondent Acting Mayor, without notice, caused
the padlock of companys plant premises, effectively causing stoppage of its operation. Technology
Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injuction
against respondents, alleging that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. The lower
court ruled against the company. The CA affirmed the lower courts ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is within the power of the Mayor to order the closure of private business operation
within his territory?

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge
investment in this dollar-earning industry but it must be stressed however, that concomitant with the
need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the
pollution of the environment.

3. CHUA HUAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-53851 July 9, 1991

DAVIDE, JR., J.

FACTS:
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested Manila City Engineer and Building Official Manuel del Rosario to
condemn the dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. The said
official issued notices of condemnation to petitioners based on Inspection Reports showing that the
buildings suffered from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The condemnation orders stated
that the subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition and therefore
condemned, subject to the confirmation of the Mayor as required by Section 276 of
the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the notice was not an order to
demolish as the findings of the City Engineer are still subject to the approval of the Mayor. The Mayor
confirmed the condemnation orders.

More than 3 months after the issuance of the condemnation order, petitioners protested against the
notices of condemnation on the ground that the buildings are still in good physical condition and are
structurally sound.

Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition, with
PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.

The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to comment. Respondents prayed that the petition
be dismissed claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila
3

falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276 of
its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances 1600); and (2) the power to condemn and
remove buildings and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila
to promote public safety.

ISSUE:
WON the power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Official;

HELD:
The Court held in the affirmative. The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of Manila
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer, who is at the same time the
Building Officials. The Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila and the National Building Code,
also provide the authority of the Building Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings. Respondent
City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation
and demolition orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or deny the condemnation
orders as provided in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.

4. HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 92389
September 11, 1991

PARAS, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner passed a resolution to confirm and/or ratify the ongoing burial assistance program initiated
by the office of the mayor, of extending financial assistance of five hundred pesos (500.00) to a
bereaved family, funds to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal
treasury. This resolution was re-enacted again by a subsequent resolution.

The dispute arose when respondent issued an order disapproving the disbursement of the City's funds
pursuance to the said resolution.

The COA argued that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to
be attained under the assailed Resolutions, and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati."

Also COA alleged that the resolution violate the prohibition that government funds must be disbursed
for public purpose.

Moreover, COA alleged that there was violation of the equal protection clause, since classifying pauper
residents would be an invalid classification since there is not substantial distinctions form the other
residents of Makati.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the resolutions are within the power of the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Makati.

HELD:
4

The Court held in the affirmative. Municipal corporations are clothed with authority to "enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the
health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote
the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein."

As to the first defense of COA- it does not hold water since COA tries to re-define the scope of police
power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati."

It has been ruled by the court that police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been,
purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding
to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and,
in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It
covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is
broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the
people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the
preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt
to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

As to the second defense of COA- COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is
not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general welfare, social
justice, as well as human dignity and respect for human rights.

The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been
an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

As to the third defense of COA- there is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying
paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive
varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare
of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

Note: This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise.

Note further:
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation
may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
5

repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from
express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and
as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose
of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and
statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the
things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. The so-called
inferred police powers of such corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in
express terms, the inference of their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal
corporation and the additional fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its
creation by exercising such powers. Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies,
must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental
functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. Thus, not only does the State
effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does also.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they
are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary
and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein."

5. TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
207 SCRA 157
G.R. No. 40243
11 Mar 1992

FACTS:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of
Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then
appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental
fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the
people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said
warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to
respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No.
13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in
the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of
houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends
that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and
void?

HELD:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article
694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac
in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a
valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
6

trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The
purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the
primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.

6. RTC JUDGE CAMILO E. TAMIN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE MEDINA and FORTUNATA ROSELLON, respondents.
G.R. No. 97477 May 8, 1992

ABATEMENT OF PUBLIC NUISANCE

FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of
respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga
del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the
mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should
vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously
until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is
allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction
could not continue because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under
Article 694 of the Civil Code?

Held:
Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that Art. 694. A nuisance
is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: hinders
or impairs the use of the property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of
the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.

Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:
1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance
2. Civil action
3. Abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file
a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR.
Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance
before summarily abate a public nuisance.

Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would
have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent.

7. Greater Balanga Development Corporation
vs.
Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)
G.R. No. 83987 December 27, 1994

FACTS:
7

The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 261-B-6-A-3 located behind the public market in the Municipality
of Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of Greater Balanga Development, Corp.,
owned and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the
name of Aurora Banzon Camacho, which was later subdivided into certain lots, some of which were sold,
others donated. Five buyers of the lot filed a civil case against Camacho for partition and delivery of titles.

Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by the Office of the Mayor of Balanga but failed
to mention the existence of the civil case for partition and delivery of titles. The permit was granted the
privilege of a real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator. However, the Sangguniang Bayan
(SB) passed Resolution No. 12 s-88, annulling the Mayor's permit issued to Petitioner, on the ground that
the issue as to the ownership of the lot caused anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the
stallholders and traders in the lot, and advising the Mayor to revoke the permit to operate a public
market. The Mayor then revoked the permit through EO No. 1 s-88.

Petitioner filed this petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction or
restraining order and to reinstate the Mayor's permit and to curtail the municipality's collection of
market and entrance fees from the lot occupants. He alleges that: 1) it didn't violate any law, thus, there's
no reason for revocation of the permit; 2) Respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation;
3) the collection of market fees is illegal.

On the other hand, Respondents assert that the Mayor as the local chief executive has the power to
issue, deny or revoke permits. They claim that the revocation was due to the violation by Petitioner of
Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it: 1) made false statement in the application form,
failing to disclose that the lot was subject to adverse claims for which a civil case was filed; 2) failed to
apply for 2 separate permits for the 2 lines of business (real estate and public market).

ISSUE:
W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

HELD:
NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed in strictissimi juris and any doubt or
ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is
premised on a violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation to be
justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2)
deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed.

In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the applicant to state the type of business,
profession, occupation, privileges applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is
only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified
because Petitioner did not make any false statement therein.

Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second
paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more
businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that
separate permits are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the
number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the Balanga Public
Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public market on the area. Until
8

expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the
landowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.

Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to
municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued may
be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the
stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid
ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.

Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due
process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the
order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover,
Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which
only an owner can do.

8. ALFREDO TANO, et. al.
vs.
HON. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, et. al.
G.R. No. 110249 August 21, 1997

FACTS:
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality
of:(1) Ordinance No. 15-92 entitled:
"AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVEFISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA
CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1,1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"(2) Office Order No. 23, requiring any person engaged or intending
to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the
articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayors and authorizing and directing
to check or conduct necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out
from Puerto Princesa and,
(3) Resolution No. 33, Ordinance No. 2 entitled: "A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THECATCHING, GATHERI
N, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINECORAL DWELLING AQUATIC
ORGANISMS The petitioners contend that the said Ordinances deprived them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation
of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution and that the Mayor
had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit. They also claim that it
took away their right to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as the Airline Shippers
Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering
"into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a
successful conclusion Public respondents Governor Socrates
and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2,
Series of 1993, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government's power under the general welfare
clause; they likewise maintained that there was no violation of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinances in question are unconstitutional

HELD:
9

NO. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
thepowers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause),
andunder Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve
theexercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.

Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted,those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for itsefficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare.Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, amongother things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliantscientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain
peace and order, and preserve thecomfort and convenience of their inhabitants. (emphasis supplied).It
is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) toestablish a
"closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of fiveyears; and
(2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan
from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities.

9. JOSE D. SANGALANG, et. al.
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 71169
December 22, 1988

FACTS:
The Mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to opening of several streets to the
general public, after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter St. was voluntarily
opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force-opened the gates of
said street for public use. The area ceased to be purely residential. Action for damages was brought
against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to maintain the purely residential
status of the area. Other similarly situated also filed their respective cases. All were dismissed in the
trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract between homeowners and Ayala Corporation violated in opening
the Jupiter street for public use?

HELD:
No. There was no contract to speak of in the case, hence nothing was violated.

Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation, to build a [f]ence
along Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing
obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a
contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a
legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise
other than for the supposed non-impairment guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the
more compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or
arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed.

10

10. FRANCISCO U. DACANAY
vs.
MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., et. al.
G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992

FACTS:
An ordinance was issued designated certain city and municipal streets, roads, and other public
areas for sites of public markets. Pursuant to this, licenses were issued to market stall owners to put
up their stalls in certain streets. Thereafter, the OIC mayor of Caloocan has caused the demolition of
the stalls, which was upheld by the trial court, saying that the public streets are part of the
public dominion and is not open to the commerce of man. Then there come about a change in
administration of the city. The next mayor did not continue the demolition of the stalls. Using the
trial courts decision, here now comes petitioner asking for the demolition of the stalls.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a public street may be subject to commerce of man?

HELD:
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside
the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease
or other contract.
The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The
interests of the few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community.

11. Macasiano vs. Diokno
211 SCRA 464
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992

FACTS:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,
Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the establishment of a flea market thereon. This
was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2 and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority
on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract agreement whereby
the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or vending areas in the
aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government
of Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along
G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag ordering the destruction of
the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the
assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order against Palanyag.

ISSUE:
11

WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing the lease & use
of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

HELD:
No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads used for
public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of
the local government devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control
of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority to control/regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.

Sec. 10, Chapter II of the LGC should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles
already established by law.

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from
public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended/necessary for public
use/service. Once withdrawn, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the LGU concerned
and only then can said LGU use the property as an object of an ordinary contract. Roads and streets
available to the public and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. The LGU has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it
to private persons.

Also, the disputed ordinance cannot be validly implemented because it cant be considered approved
by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance with the conditions it imposed for the
approval of said ordinance.

The powers of an LGU are not absolute, but subject to the limitations laid down by the Constitution and
laws such as the Civil Code. Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance
the public health, safety & convenience, maintain peace & order and promiote the general prosperity
of the inhanbitants pf the local units.

As in the Dacanay case, the general public have the right to demand the demolition of the illegally
constructed stalls in public roads & streets. The officials of the respondent municipality have the
corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific
public purpose.

The ordinance is void and illegal for lack of basis in authority in laws applicable during its time.

12. MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.
GR 135962
March 27, 2000

FACTS:
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its
private road, Neptune Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day,
respondent was apprised that the perimeter separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would
be demolished. Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the
issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting
the demolition of the perimeter wall.

12

ISSUE:
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state
endowed with police power.

HELD:
A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a
political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants
of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality] and its
inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the [LGU's corporate powers]
provided under the Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to
enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of government since it
is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not
an elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet
member.

In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the
opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

13. Moday vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 107916
February 20, 1997

Municipal Corporation Eminent Domain Disapproval by SP of SB Resolution

FACTS:
Moday is a landowner in Bunawan, Agusan del Sur. In 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bunawan passed
a resolution authorizing the mayor to initiate an expropriation case against a 1 hectare portion of
Modays land. Purpose of which is to erect a gymnasium and other public buildings. The mayor
approved the resolution and the resolution was transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which
disapproved the said resolution ruling that the expropriation is not necessary because there are other
lots owned by Bunawan that can be used for such purpose. The mayor pushed through with the
expropriation nonetheless.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution
which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?

HELD:
13

Yes. Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant case, is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is governments right to appropriate,
in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. Inherently
possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation. The
only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance, or order
invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is beyond the powers conferred upon the council
or president making the same. This was not the case in the case at bar as the SP merely stated that
there are other available lands for the purpose sought, the SP did not even bother to declare the SB
resolution as invalid. Hence, the expropriation case is valid.

14. PROVINCE OF CAM SUR vs. CA
222 SCRA 137
GR 103125
May 17, 1993

FACTS:
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed a
Resolution authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural
crops and a housing project for provincial government employees Pursuant to the Resolution, the
Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed two separate cases for expropriation against
Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur.

The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for
their property. In an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer in the
event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.

The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions
were denied in the order dated February 26, 1990.

In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be
dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26,
1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that
an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to
issue a writ of injunction.

Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated that
under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by
the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent
domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must
first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of
petitioners for use as a housing project.

14

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of the amended
motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after
the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land.

ISSUE:
WON the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of
the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.

HELD:
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first
applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of
these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.

Resolution No. 219, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local
Government Code, which provides:

"A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or
purpose."

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government units must first secure
the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is
no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of
agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
closest provision of law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law.

Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall determine whether the use
of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an expression of legislative
policy.

Ratio:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of private respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings;
and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural
use.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial court,
denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
15


15. Municipality of Meycauayan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR L-72126
29 January 1988

Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur

FACTS:
In 1975, the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation (PPMC) filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a
width of 26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by TCTs 215165 and 37879. The fencing of
said property was allegedly to enable the storage of PMC's heavy equipment and various finished
products such as large diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge
components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost
housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R.
Legaspi, passed Resolution 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent's parcel of land covered by TCT 37879. An opposition to the resolution was filed by the
PPMC with the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a special committee of four
members to investigate the matter. On 10 March 1976, the Special Committee recommended that the
Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because there was no
genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use
as a public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed Resolution 238,
Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan. The PPMC, then, reiterated to the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the
permit to fence the aforesaid parcels of land. On 21 October 1983, however, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution 21, Series of 1983, for the
purpose of expropriating anew PPMC's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid
resolution on 25 January 1984. Thereafter, the Municipality of Meycauayan, on 14 February 1984, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine
National Bank, the trial court on 1 March 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the municipality.
On 27 August 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property as lawful and
appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to
ascertain the just compensation for the property. PPMC went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on
petition for review. On 10 January 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by PPMC, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The
appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as a public road
as there were several other roads for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the
proposed public road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also opined
that the land is more ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy equipment and finished
products. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, the municipality went to the Supreme Court
on petition for review on certiorari on 25 October 1985.

ISSUE:
Whether there is genuine necessity to expropriate PPMCs property for the purpose of a connecting
road, in light of other appropriate lots for the purpose.

HELD:
There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation. What is questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor. The
16

foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
public good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the
power to require into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is a genuine necessity therefor. The government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken. With due recognition then of the power of Congress to designate the
particular property to be taken and how much Constitutional Law II, 2005 thereof may be condemned
in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a judicial question whether in the exercise of
such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
protection clause will not allow. The Special Committee's Report, dated 10 March 1976, stated that
"there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid
property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandizing Corporation for use as a public road. Considering
that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as the
lot in question and lying idle, unlike the lot sought to be expropriated which was found by the
Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced
together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does not appear to be
very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the
Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be fully and
better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without
causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to
expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a wider public road to
attain decongestion of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought
to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not suffice to improve and
decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area." There is absolutely no showing in
the petition why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not
been the subject of the municipalities's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for
another connecting road.