Federal Reserve System: Vol. 79 Wednesday, No. 14 January 22, 2014

Vol.
79 Wednesday,
No. 14 January 22, 2014
Part II
Federal Reserve System
12 CFR Part 234
Financial Market Utilities; Proposed Rule
VerDate Mar<15>2010 16:15 Jan 21, 2014 Jkt 232001 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4717 Sfmt 4717 E:\FR\FM\22JAP2.SGM 22JAP2
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
3666 Federal Register / Vol. 79, No. 14/ Wednesday, January 22, 2014/ Proposed Rules
1
The Dodd-Frank Act, Public Law 111203, 124
Stat. 1376, was signed into law on July 21, 2010.
2
For these purposes, section 803(9) of the Dodd-
Frank Act defines systemically important and
systemic importance as a situation in which the
failure of or disruption to the functioning of an
FMU could create, or increase, the risk of
significant liquidity or credit problems spreading
among financial institutions or markets and thereby
threaten the stability of the financial system of the
United States. 12 U.S.C. 5462(9).
3
Currently, two of the eight FMUs that have been
designated by the Council are subject to the risk-
management standards promulgated by the Board
under section 805(a)(1)(A)The Clearing House
Payments Company, L.L.C., on the basis of its role
as operator of the Clearing House Interbank
Payments System, and CLS Bank International.
4
The Acts definition of Supervisory Agency is
codified at 12 U.S.C. 5462(8).
5
12 CFR part 234.
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 234
[Regulation HH; Docket No. R1477]
RIN AD7100 AE09
Financial Market Utilities
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
SUMMARY: Under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act or Act), the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (Board) is required to
prescribe risk-management standards
governing the operations related to the
payment, clearing, and settlement
activities of certain financial market
utilities that are designated as
systemically important (designated
FMUs) by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (Council). The Board
is proposing to amend the risk-
management standards currently in the
Boards Regulation HH by replacing the
current risk-management standards with
a common set of risk-management
standards applicable to all types of
designated FMUs. These new risk-
management standards are based on the
Principles for Financial Market
Infrastructures (PFMI), which were
developed by the Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems
(CPSS) and the Technical Committee of
the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and
published in April 2012.
DATES: Comments on this notice of
proposed rulemaking must be received
by March 31, 2014.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. R1477 and
RIN No. 7100 AE09, by any of the
following methods:
Agency Web site: http://
www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
Email: regs.comments@
federalreserve.gov. Include the docket
number in the subject line of message.
Facsimile: (202) 4523819 or (202)
4523102.
Mail: Robert deV. Frierson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20551.
All public comments are available
from the Boards Web site at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/
foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as submitted,
unless modified for technical reasons.
Accordingly, your comments will not be
edited to remove any identifying or
contact information. Public comments
may also be viewed electronically or in
paper form in Room MP500 of the
Boards Martin Building (20th and C
Streets NW.) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.
on weekdays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jennifer A. Lucier, Deputy Associate
Director (202) 8727581, Kathy C.
Wang, Senior Financial Services
Analyst (202) 8724991, or Emily A.
Caron, Senior Financial Services
Analyst (202) 4525261, Division of
Reserve Bank Operations and Payment
Systems; Christopher W. Clubb, Special
Counsel (202) 4523904 or Kara L.
Handzlik, Counsel (202) 4523852,
Legal Division; for users of
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
(TDD) only, contact (202) 2634869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
A. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act
Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act,
titled the Payment, Clearing, and
Settlement Supervision Act of 2010,
was enacted to mitigate systemic risk in
the financial system and to promote
financial stability, in part, through an
enhanced supervisory framework for
designated FMUs.
1
Section 803(6) of the
Act defines an FMU as a person that
manages or operates a multilateral
system for the purposes of transferring,
clearing, or settling payments,
securities, or other financial
transactions among financial
institutions or between financial
institutions and the person. Pursuant
to section 804 of the Act, the Council is
required to designate those FMUs that
the Council determines are, or are likely
to become, systemically important.
2

Such a designation by the Council
makes an FMU subject to the
supervisory framework set out in Title
VIII of the Act.
The supervisory framework
established under Title VIII includes
risk-management standards for
designated FMUs that take into
consideration relevant international
standards and existing prudential
requirements. Section 805(a)(1)(A) of
the Act requires the Board to prescribe
risk-management standards governing
the operations related to the payment,
clearing, and settlement activities of
certain designated FMUs.
3
In addition,
section 805(a)(2) of the Act grants the
U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) the authority to prescribe
regulations containing risk-management
standards for a designated FMU that is,
respectively, a derivatives clearing
organization (DCO) registered under
section 5b of the Commodity Exchange
Act or a clearing agency registered
under section 17A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
As set out in section 805(b) of the Act,
the applicable risk-management
standards must (1) promote robust risk
management, (2) promote safety and
soundness, (3) reduce systemic risks,
and (4) support the stability of the
broader financial system. Further, under
section 805(c), the risk-management
standards may address areas such as (1)
risk-management policies and
procedures, (2) margin and collateral
requirements, (3) participant or
counterparty default policies, (4) the
ability to complete timely clearing and
settlement of financial transactions, (5)
capital and financial resource
requirements for designated FMUs, and
(6) other areas that are necessary to
achieve the objectives and principles for
risk-management standards in section
805(b). Designated FMUs are required to
conduct their operations in compliance
with the applicable risk-management
standards. Compliance is examined by
the federal agency that has primary
jurisdiction over a designated FMU
under federal banking, securities, or
commodity futures laws (the
Supervisory Agency).
4

B. Risk-Management Standards for
Designated Financial Market Utilities
On July 30, 2012, the Board adopted
Regulation HH to implement, among
other things, the statutory provisions
under section 805(a)(1)(A) of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
5
Regulation HH established
two sets of risk-management standards
for certain designated FMUs: One set of
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
6
At the time of the rulemaking, the Board
acknowledged that most designated FMUs that
operate as central securities depositories or central
counterparties would be subject to the risk-
management standards promulgated by the CFTC or
SEC. The Board, however, adopted standards for
designated FMUs that operate as central securities
depositories, central counterparties, or both, to
address the event that a designated FMU operates
as one of the two types of FMUs and is not required
to register as derivatives clearing organization or a
clearing agency with the CFTC or SEC, respectively.
7
12 CFR 234.1.
8
The relevant international standards were the
2001 Committee on Payment and Settlement
Systems (CPSS) report on the Core Principles for
Systemically Important Payment Systems, the 2001
CPSS and the Technical Committee of the
International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) report on the
Recommendations for Securities Settlement
Systems, and the 2004 CPSSIOSCO report on the
Recommendations for Central Counterparties. The
Board previously incorporated these international
standards into its PSR policy.
9
The PFMI also establishes minimum
requirements for trade repositories, which have
emerged internationally as an important category of
financial market infrastructure. The term financial
market utility as defined in Title VIII of the Dodd-
Frank Act excludes trade repositories.
10
The PFMI reflects broad market input from
FMUs, their participants, authorities, and others. A
consultative version of the PFMI was published in
March 2011. CPSS and IOSCO received 120
comment letters on the consultative version. All
designated FMUs, as well as many of their major
participants, provided comments on the
consultative report.
11
The FSB is an international forum that was
established to develop and promote the
implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory,
and other financial sector policies. The FSB
includes the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the
Board, and the SEC. For the FSBs Key Standards
for Sound Financial Systems, see http://
www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_
standards.htm.
12
See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), interim rules on Capital Requirements for
Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties, July
2012, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs227.pdf and
BCBS, Capital Treatment of Bank Exposures to
Central Counterparties, consultative document,
June 2013 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs253.pdf.
13
See, G20 Declaration on Strengthening the
Financial System (April 2009), http://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-
g20/Documents/
London%20April%202009%20Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_
Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf.
14
For an overview of how the PFMI is being
implemented by different authorities around the
world, see CPSSIOSCO, Implementation
Monitoring of PFMIsLevel 1 Assessment Report,
August 2013.
risk-management standards for
designated FMUs that operate a
payment system ( 234.3(a)) and another
set for designated FMUs that operate a
central securities depository or a central
counterparty ( 234.4(a)).
6
The
Regulation HH standards do not apply
to designated FMUs for which the CFTC
or the SEC is the Supervisory Agency.
7

In adopting Regulation HH, the Board
considered relevant international
standards as well as the Boards Federal
Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk
(PSR policy).
8

As noted in the preamble to the final
rule for Regulation HH, the CPSS and
IOSCO finalized the PFMI in April
2012. The Board also noted in the
preamble that it anticipated reviewing
the PFMI, consulting with other
appropriate agencies and the Council,
and seeking public comment on the
adoption of revised standards for
designated FMUs based on the PFMI.
The PFMI updated, harmonized,
strengthened, and replaced the previous
international risk-management
standards for payment systems that are
systemically important, central
securities depositories, securities
settlement systems, and central
counterparties.
9
The PFMI addresses
areas such as legal risk, governance,
credit and liquidity risks, operational
risk, and general business risk.
10
It sets
forth 24 principles, each with (1) a
headline standard that frames the
overall risk-management objective of the
principle, (2) a list of key considerations
that elaborate on the headline standard,
and (3) accompanying explanatory notes
that discuss the objective and rationale
of the principle and provide additional
guidance on how the principle may be
implemented.
The Board believes that the risk-
management standards in Regulation
HH should be revised in consideration
of the PFMI. The PFMI establishes an
important framework for promoting
sound risk management in payment,
clearing, and settlement systems and
financial stability more broadly. The
report reflects more than a decade of
experience with international risk-
management standards for these types of
systems, important lessons learned from
the financial crisis, and other relevant
policy work by the international
standard-setting bodies. As described in
more detail below, risk-management
standards based on the PFMI may
improve upon the standards currently in
Regulation HH and will further promote
the objectives of the risk-management
standards for designated FMUs set out
in section 805(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
In addition, the PFMI is widely
recognized as the most relevant set of
international risk-management
standards for payment, clearing, and
settlement systems. The Financial
Stability Board (FSB), which includes
U.S. authorities, has endorsed the PFMI
and has replaced the previous sets of
risk-management standards with the
PFMI in its Key Standards for Sound
Financial Systems.
11
In addition, the
Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision considers the application of
the PFMI as an important factor in
determining capital charges for bank
exposures to central counterparties
related to over-the-counter derivatives,
exchange-trade derivatives, and
securities financing transactions.
12

The Board believes that the
implementation of risk-management
standards based on the PFMI by the
relevant payment, clearing, and
settlement systems and their regulators,
both domestically and internationally,
can help promote the safety and
efficiency of these systems and financial
stability more broadly. Implementation
also supports the initiatives of the
Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors (G20) and the
FSB to strengthen core financial
infrastructures and markets around the
world.
13
Widespread implementation
also reduces potential conflicts among
domestic and foreign authorities
regarding prudential requirements for
FMUs, and provides a more consistent
framework among relevant domestic
and foreign authorities for assessing the
risks and risk management of FMUs
with cross-market, cross-border, or
cross-currency operations. Since April
2012, many central banks and market
regulators have taken steps to
incorporate the PFMI into their
respective legal and regulatory
frameworks that apply to systemically
important financial market
infrastructures.
14

II. Explanation of Proposed Rules
The Board proposes to amend
Regulation HH by replacing the existing
risk-management standards with a set of
standards based on the PFMI and
making conforming changes to the
definitions. In developing the proposal,
the Board has considered the PFMI as
the relevant international standards
applicable to payment, clearing, and
settlement systems. In implementing the
proposed revisions to Regulation HH,
the Board anticipates using the PFMI as
a reference as it establishes its
supervisory planning and analysis tools
for each designated FMU for which it is
the Supervisory Agency.
The Board requests comment on all
aspects of the proposed rules. In
addition, the Board requests comment
on specific questions set out with
respect to certain of the risk-
management standards as discussed
below. Where possible, commenters
should provide both quantitative data
and detailed analysis in their comments,
particularly with respect to suggested
alternatives to the proposed standards.
Commenters should also explain the
rationale for their suggestions.
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
A. Proposed 234.2Definitions
The Board proposes to amend
Regulation HH 234.2 by revising three
definitions, adding six definitions, and
deleting one definition. These proposed
amendments constitute conforming
changes or provide clarity with respect
to the proposed revisions to the risk-
management standards.
Central counterparty. The Board
proposes to revise the definition of
central counterparty to describe more
accurately the nature of the relationship
between the central counterparty and
the original counterparties with respect
to a particular trade. The existing
definition, an entity that interposes
itself between the counterparties to
trades, acting as the buyer to every seller
and the seller to every buyer, is being
revised to read, an entity that
interposes itself between the
counterparties to contracts traded in one
or more financial markets, becoming the
buyer to every seller and the seller to
every buyer.
Designated financial market utility.
The Board proposes to revise the
definition of designated financial
market utility for clarity regarding
designation rescission. The existing
definition, a financial market utility
that the [Council] has designated under
section 804 of the Dodd-Frank Act is
being revised to read, a financial
market utility that is currently
designated by the [Council] under
section 804 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Under section 804(b) of the Act, a
designated FMU may have its
designation rescinded if the Council
determines the designated FMU no
longer meets the standards for systemic
importance. The proposed revision is
intended to clarify that Regulation HH
applies only to FMUs with designations
that are currently effective. If the
Council rescinds a designation of an
FMU, the FMU is no longer subject to
the provisions of Title VIII of the Act or
any rules or orders prescribed under
Title VIII, including the risk-
management standards set out in
Regulation HH.
Central securities depository. The
Board proposes to revise the definition
of central securities depository. The
existing definition, an entity that holds
securities in custody to enable securities
transactions to be processed by means of
book entries or an entity that enables
securities to be transferred and settled
by book entry either free of or against
payment, is being revised to read, an
entity that provides securities accounts
and central safekeeping services. This
revision reflects a narrower set of
functions that a central securities
depository can provide and better
distinguishes this type of FMU from a
securities settlement system, which
will be covered by a new term as
described below.
Securities settlement system. The
Board proposes to add the term
securities settlement system, which
means an entity that enables securities
to be transferred by book entry and
allows transfers of securities free of or
against payment. The term securities
settlement system was previously
embedded in the Regulation HH
definition for central securities
depository because a central securities
depository typically also performs the
securities settlement function. The
Board proposes this separation of the
two functionscentral securities
depositories and securities settlement
systemsin order to accommodate any
systems in which the central securities
depository does not also operate a
securities settlement system.
Nonetheless, the Board recognizes that
one entity can perform both functions
and satisfy both definitions.
Backtest and stress test. The Board
proposes to add the terms backtest as
used in proposed 234.3(a)(6) (Margin)
and stress test as used in proposed
234.3(a)(4) (Credit risk) and proposed
234.3(a)(7) (Liquidity risk). Under the
proposal, backtest is defined as the
ex post comparison of realized
outcomes with margin model forecasts
to analyze and monitor model
performance and overall margin
coverage. Stress test is defined as
the estimation of credit or liquidity
exposures that would result from the
realization of potential stress scenarios,
such as extreme price changes, multiple
defaults, and changes in other valuation
inputs and assumptions. These
proposed definitions provide further
clarity to designated FMUs with regard
to compliance with the above standards.
Recovery and wind-down. The Board
proposes to add the terms recovery
and wind-down, used in proposed
234.3(a)(3) (Framework for the
comprehensive management of risks)
and 234.3(a)(15) (General business
risk). Under the proposal, recovery is
defined as the actions of a designated
financial market utility consistent with
its rules, procedures, and other ex ante
contractual arrangements, to address
any uncovered credit loss, liquidity
shortfall, capital inadequacy, or
business, operational or other structural
weakness, including the replenishment
of any depleted prefunded financial
resources and liquidity arrangements, as
necessary to maintain the designated
financial market utilitys viability as a
going concern. The proposed
definition of recovery is for purposes
of proposed 234.3(a)(3) and (15) only
and not in the context of business
continuity management under proposed
234.3(a)(17). The Board proposes to
define wind-down as the actions of
a designated financial market utility to
effect the permanent cessation, sale, or
transfer of one or more of its critical
operations or services.
Links. The Board proposes to add the
term link as used in proposed
234.3(a)(20) (Links to other financial
market utilities). For the purposes of
234.3(a)(20), link is defined as a set
of contractual and operational
arrangements between two or more
central counterparties, central securities
depositories, or securities settlement
systems that connect them directly or
indirectly, such as for the purposes of
participating in settlement, cross
margining, or expanding their services
to additional instruments and
participants.
Payment system. The Board proposes
to remove the definition of payment
system from Regulation HH because
the term is neither used in the proposed
rule nor used in any other section of
Regulation HH. The term payment
system is currently included in
Regulation HH because there is list of
risk-management standards for payment
systems in 234.3 that is separate from
the list of standards for central
securities depositories and central
counterparties in 234.4. Under the
proposed rule, there would be only one
list of standards for all types of
designated FMUs, so the separate term
is no longer necessary.
The Board specifically requests
comment on whether the proposed
definitions are clear and sufficiently
detailed and whether additional
definitions are needed to implement the
proposed rules.
B. Proposed 234.3Standards for
Designated Financial Market Utilities
As noted above, the Board proposes to
replace the two current sets of standards
under 234.3(a) and 234.4(a) with one
set of standards for all types of
designated FMUs under revised
234.3(a). In certain cases where
proposed standards would only apply to
a particular type of designated FMU, the
type of designated FMU is specified in
the proposed standard.
The Board believes the proposed
revisions, which reflect the new
international standards in the PFMI,
improve the current risk-management
standards under Regulation HH and
further the objectives in section 805(b)
of the Dodd-Frank Act. Additionally, in
considering the PFMI, the proposed
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
15
The Board may have additional statutory
authority over a particular designated FMU that is
subject to Regulation HH, which would allow the
Board to apply other requirements or conditions on
the FMU in those contexts. For example, the Board
may set conditions on an FMUs membership in the
Federal Reserve System under the Federal Reserve
Act.
revisions reflect the most recent and
relevant views on comprehensive risk
management by FMUs. Furthermore,
adopting a common set of standards
across all types of designated FMUs will
help remove any confusion that can be
caused by perceived inconsistencies in
the wording in two similar sets of
requirements set out in the same
regulation.
The Board, however, recognizes that
certain proposed revisions represent
new or heightened requirements relative
to the baseline requirements established
under the current set of risk-
management standards. The Board also
understands the need to weigh the risk-
reduction benefits of and any burden
that may be imposed by a particular
rulemaking. Among other things, the
Board has compared the proposed
standards with the baseline standards
under current Regulation HH to identify
and analyze potential incremental
burden, and is considering establishing
different effective dates for certain
proposed standards that may require
additional time for a designated FMU to
implement.
Comparison to baseline requirements
under current Regulation HH.
Consistent with current Regulation HH
and the Boards longstanding approach
in its supervision and oversight of
FMUs, the proposed standards generally
employ a flexible, principles-based
approach to permit a designated FMU to
employ a cost-effective method for
compliance, so long as the method
chosen achieves the risk-mitigation
goals of the standard. In addition, the
standards are intended to permit the
risk-management goals to be pursued in
light of evolving market conditions,
technology, and risk-management
techniques and systems. In several
cases, however, the Board proposes
explicit minimum requirements,
including minimum frequencies for
testing requirements and methods of
calculating a minimum level of financial
resources, which are drawn from PFMI
key considerations and explanatory
notes. The Board selected explicit
minimum requirements that the Board
believes a designated FMU must be able
to meet in order to achieve the overall
objective of a particular standard.
Although some of these additions
constitute new or heightened
requirements relative to the current
requirements in Regulation HH, many of
the additions represent the Boards
existing supervisory practice with
respect to designated FMUs for which
the Board is the Supervisory Agency.
In comparing the proposed revised
risk-management standards to the
current standards in Regulation HH, the
Board has identified three broad types
of revisions: (1) Those that essentially
carry over a current standard under
Regulation HH; (2) those that establish
a standard that is new to Regulation HH,
but represent an expectation that is a
prudential objective of the Boards
current supervisory process or a specific
Board-imposed requirement for a
particular designated FMU; and (3)
those that establish a standard that is
new or heightened to both Regulation
HH as well as either the current
supervisory process or a specific Board-
imposed requirement for a particular
designated FMU.
15
The Board
recognizes that the incremental burden
associated with each type of proposed
revision may vary by designated FMU.
A majority of the proposed revisions
to 234.3(a) are similar in content and
application to existing Regulation HH
standards. In these cases, differences
between the current standard and the
proposed standard generally result from
conforming edits to harmonize the
originally separate standards into one
set of standards. These proposed
standards include proposed 234.3(a)(1)
on legal basis, proposed 234.3(a)(4)(i)
on credit risk, proposed 234.3(a)(8) on
settlement finality, proposed
234.3(a)(9) on money settlements, and
proposed 234.3(a)(18) on access and
participation requirements. The Board
does not anticipate that minor
differences in wording of the rule text
will impose any significant incremental
burden on designated FMUs that are
already in compliance with Regulation
HH.
With respect to some other proposed
revisions to 234.3(a), although they
establish a standard or parts thereof that
is new to Regulation HH, the designated
FMU may already meet the standard
through the Boards current supervisory
process or as a part of a specific Board-
imposed requirement. These proposed
revisions include paragraphs (a)(3)(i)
and (ii) on the comprehensive
management of risks, (a)(4)(ii) on credit
risk, and (a)(7)(i)(v) on liquidity risk.
There may be minimal costs associated
with demonstrating compliance with
the proposed revision and incorporating
it into any formal compliance
documentation. The Board, however,
does not anticipate this type of revision
to impose significant burden.
Other proposed revisions to 234.3(a)
establish a standard or parts thereof that
is new or heightened to both Regulation
HH and the current supervisory process.
These proposed revisions, depending on
the designated FMU, may include
proposed 234.3(a)(3)(iii) on plans for
recovery or orderly wind-down,
proposed 234.3(a)(15)(i) and (ii) on
maintaining sufficient liquid net assets
funded by equity and a viable capital
plan, and proposed 234.3(a)(19) on
tiered participation arrangements,
which the Board recognizes may impose
costs on designated FMUs to
implement. The costs can be viewed as
a designated FMUs incremental
expenses in establishing and
maintaining the systems and procedures
necessary to meet the standards over
and above the risk-management
measures it has currently in place to
comply with the current Regulation HH
standards or would have otherwise
adopted for business reasons. If these
costs are passed on to a designated
FMUs participants, they can take the
form of higher transaction costs and
margin or collateral costs. These costs
should be weighed against the societal
benefit of stability in the financial
system and the economy more broadly.
These new standards are meant to
help achieve the financial stability and
systemic risk-reduction objectives of
Title VIII of the Act. As such, the key
benefits of these proposed standards are
in minimizing the probability of
recurrent financial crises and avoiding
events in which firm-level distress leads
to a market-wide disruption or even an
economic recession. Such benefits are
difficult to quantify, because it would
require the computation of the
probability of a crisis with and without
regulatory change. Such computations
generally cannot produce credible
figures. To the extent possible, the
Board provides instead its qualitative
reasons for proposing requirements that
may impose an incremental cost,
including its explanation of the
importance of these requirements to risk
management and systemic-risk
reduction. The Board provides this
explanation in the discussion for each
standard below.
Effective and compliance dates. The
Board recognizes that certain new or
heightened requirements may require
more time for designated FMUs to
implement and achieve compliance.
Any delay in implementation, however,
must be balanced against the risks
presented to the financial system during
the period that a designated FMU is not
required to comply with an applicable
risk-management standard. As
discussed below, the Board therefore is
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
16
For similar corresponding standards under
current Regulation HH, see 234.3(a)(1) for
payment systems and 234.4(a)(1) for central
securities depositories and central counterparties.
17
considering different compliance dates
to provide sufficient lead time for
certain new or heightened requirements.
The Board is proposing that the
requirements proposed in 234.3(a)
become effective and require
compliance 30 days from the date the
final rule is published in the Federal
Register, with the exception of
establishing plans for recovery or
orderly wind-down, set forth in
proposed 234.3(a)(3)(iii); addressing
uncovered credit losses, set forth in
proposed 234.3(a)(4)(vi); addressing
liquidity shortfalls, set forth in proposed
234.3(a)(7)(viii); maintaining sufficient
liquid net assets funded by equity and
a viable capital plan, set forth in
proposed 234.3(a)(15)(i) and (ii);
managing risks arising in tiered
participation arrangements, set forth in
proposed 234.3(a)(19); and providing
comprehensive public disclosure, set
forth in proposed 234.3(a)(23)(iv). The
Board is proposing that compliance
with these proposed requirements be
required six months from publication of
the final rule.
The Board believes the revised risk-
management standards as proposed,
including any that may impose
incremental burden to designated
FMUs, achieve an appropriate balance
between reducing systemic risk through
enhanced risk management of
designated FMUs and minimizing
incremental burden associated with
implementing any new or heightened
requirements. With respect to the set of
the risk-management standards set out
in the proposed rule, the Board is
specifically requesting comment on the
following questions:
Q.0.1. Are the proposed standards
reasonable risk-mitigation tools?
Q.0.2. Is six months from
publication of the final rules
appropriate for designated FMUs to
comply with the proposed requirements
identified above (that is, proposed
234.3(a)(3)(iii), (a)(4)(vi), (a)(7)(viii),
(a)(15)(i) and (ii), (a)(19), and
(a)(23)(iv))? Should the Board propose
alternative compliance dates for these or
any other proposed requirements?
Q.0.3. What are the costs that are
imposed by the proposed standards?
Are there ways to meet the proposed
standards other than those identified as
examples in the discussion on each
standard below?
Q.0.4. What are other benefits that
are achieved by the proposed standards?
1. Legal Basis
Proposed 234.3(a)(1) requires the
designated FMU to have a well-founded,
clear, transparent, and enforceable legal
basis for each material aspect of its
activities in all relevant jurisdictions.
16

A designated FMUs legal basis consists
of its rules, procedures, and contracts as
well as the legal framework (that is,
applicable laws and regulations) under
which it operates. The legal basis
defines, or provides the foundation for
relevant parties to define, the rights and
obligations of the designated FMU, its
participants, and other relevant
stakeholders (such as customers of
participants, custodian banks,
settlement banks, and service
providers). Most risk-management tools
rely on assumptions regarding the
manner and time at which these rights
and obligations arise through the
designated FMUs operations. Sound
and effective risk management,
therefore, is dependent on the
enforceability of these rights and
obligations. If the legal basis for a
designated FMUs activities and
operations is inadequate or uncertain,
the designated FMU, its participants,
and their customers may face
unexpected or unmanageable credit or
liquidity risks, which may also create or
amplify systemic risks.
While the Board acknowledges that an
FMU cannot control or dictate its
governing laws or regulations, a
designated FMU must take steps to
manage its legal risk within this
environment, such as by conducting
legal due diligence to ensure that its
rules, procedures, and contractual
provisions are consistent with and
enforceable under the legal framework
in each applicable jurisdiction. In
particular, these rules, procedures, and
contracts should be clear regarding
material aspects of the designated
FMUs activities, such as settlement
finality, netting arrangements, and
default procedures. If a designated FMU
operates across multiple jurisdictions, it
must confirm the legal basis for all
material aspects of its activities in all
relevant jurisdictions to mitigate legal
risks.
A designated FMU must be able to
articulate, in a clear and understandable
manner, its compliance with applicable
laws and regulations and the
enforceability of its rules, procedures, or
contracts under those law and
regulations. When appropriate, a
designated FMU may need to obtain
well-reasoned and independent legal
opinions or analyses on the material
aspects of its activities. Further, when
evaluating the enforceability of its rules
and procedures, a designated FMU may
need to consider different scenarios,
such as implementation of its plans for
recovery or orderly wind-down, the
insolvency or resolution of a
participant, and the potential for
conflict-of-laws issues, and must take
steps to mitigate any identified legal
risks.
2. Governance
Proposed 234.3(a)(2) sets out the
requirements that apply to a designated
FMUs governance arrangements.
17

Governance is the set of relationships
among the designated FMUs
stakeholders, including its owners,
board of directors (or an equivalent
body), management, participants, and
other relevant parties (such as
customers of participants, other
interdependent FMUs, and the broader
market). Governance arrangements
define the structure under which the
designated FMUs board of directors and
management operate.
Sound governance is essential to
achieving comprehensive and effective
risk management at a designated FMU.
The way in which a designated FMUs
governance arrangements are structured,
including the definition of its lines of
authority, responsibility, and
accountability, affects the fundamental
decisionmaking within the designated
FMU, including decisionmaking
involving risk management.
Furthermore, governance arrangements
that promote sound risk-management
decisions and practices, in turn, help
provide a basis for compliance with the
other risk-management standards in
Regulation HH. For these reasons,
effective, accountable, and transparent
governance arrangements are critical to
the effective risk management of a
designated FMU.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(2)(i), a
designated FMU must establish and
document clear and transparent
governance arrangements. Clarity and
transparency in a designated FMUs
governance arrangements promote
accountability by providing relevant
stakeholders with the information
necessary to understand how decisions
are made and what the chosen course of
action is intended to accomplish. Key
components of an FMUs governance
arrangements that must be clear and
transparent include the (a) role and
composition of the board and any board
committees, (b) senior management
structure, (c) reporting lines between
management and the board, (d)
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
18
For these purposes, affiliate means a
company that controls, or is controlled by, or is
under common control with the designated FMU.
Control of a company means (a) ownership, control,
or holding with power to vote 20 percent or more
of a class of voting securities of the company; or (b)
consolidation of the company for financial report
purposes.
19
The Board recognizes that the language on the
composition of the board of directors under
Principle 2 of the PFMI is phrased differently.
Principle 2 states that the board of directors
typically requires the inclusion of non-executive
board member(s). The Board believes the intended
effect of having non-executive board members (that
is, the ability to make objective decisions), is better
achieved when they represent the majority on the
board of directors.
ownership structure, (e) internal
governance policy, (f) design of risk-
management and internal controls, (g)
procedures for the appointment of board
members and senior management, and
(h) processes for ensuring performance
accountability.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(2)(ii) and
(iii), a designated FMU must develop
governance arrangements that promote
the safety and efficiency of its
operations and support the stability of
the broader financial system and other
relevant public interest considerations.
The stability of the financial system is
an important public interest
consideration for all designated FMUs.
Certain designated FMUs may have
other relevant public interest
considerations, such as fostering fair
and efficient markets, market
transparency, and investor protection.
The Board can provide guidance as
needed, through ongoing dialogue
during the supervisory process, to assist
a designated FMU in identifying other
public interests that are relevant to its
operations.
Further, proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iii)
requires a designated FMU to develop
governance arrangements that support
the legitimate interests of relevant
stakeholders. These stakeholders
include the owners of the FMU,
participants of the FMU, and
participants customers. Although the
mechanisms for involving stakeholders
may depend on the type of stakeholder
and the particular designated FMU, in
general, the involvement of relevant
stakeholders in the designated FMUs
governance processes, particularly in
the determination of the FMUs risk
tolerance, the formal objective-setting
process, the design of its risk-
management framework, and the
strategic decisionmaking process may
enhance the effectiveness of the FMUs
overall risk management.
In addition, proposed
234.3(a)(2)(iv)(A) and (B) require the
designated FMU to define the structure
under which its board and management
operate by setting out their
responsibilities and defining how they
will interact. Proposed
234.3(a)(2)(iv)(A) requires a designated
FMU to ensure that its governance
arrangements provide clear and direct
lines of responsibility and
accountability, and proposed
234.3(a)(2)(iv)(B) requires that the
board of directors and senior
management have roles and
responsibilities that are clearly
specified. These elements must be clear,
because the board of directors and
senior management are ultimately
responsible for managing a designated
FMUs business and operations.
Proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(C) and (D)
address the composition of the board of
directors. Proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(C)
requires that the designated FMUs
governance arrangements be designed to
ensure its board consists of suitable
individuals with appropriate skills to
fulfill its multiple roles identified under
proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(B). For
example, such arrangements may
include a process to identify and
regularly review the desired set of skills
and experience for the board as a whole
and for individual board members. Such
arrangements may also include
processes and procedures for recruiting
board members. Proposed
234.3(a)(2)(iv)(D) requires that the
board include a majority of individuals
who are not executives, officers, or
employees of the designated FMU or an
affiliate of the designated FMU; such
individuals may offer different
perspectives and can help strengthen
the boards decisionmaking process.
18 19

Proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(E) requires
the board to establish policies and
procedures to identify, address, and
manage board member conflicts of
interest and to review the performance
of the board as a whole and of the
individual members on a regular basis.
Proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(F) requires
the board to establish a clear,
documented risk-management
framework that includes the designated
FMUs risk-tolerance policy, assigns
responsibilities and accountability for
risk decisions, and addresses
decisionmaking in crises and
emergencies.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(G),
governance arrangements must be
designed to ensure that the designated
FMUs senior management has the
appropriate experience, skills, and
integrity necessary to discharge
operational and risk-management
responsibilities. For example, the
arrangements may include a process to
identify and regularly review the
desired set of skills and experience for
the individual senior management
positions. With respect to ensuring the
integrity of senior management, a
designated FMU may establish rules of
conduct, provide ethics guides and
training, and conduct background
checks.
Proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(H) and (I)
address the important role that the risk-
management and internal audit
functions serve in a designated FMU. A
designated FMU must have governance
arrangements designed to ensure that its
risk-management and internal audit
functions have sufficient authority,
resources, independence, and access to
the board of directors to achieve risk-
management objectives. In addition, the
reporting lines for risk management
must be clear and separate from those
for other operations of the designated
FMU and there must be an additional
direct reporting line to a non-executive
director on the board via a chief risk
officer (or equivalent). Further, the risk-
management and internal audit
functions must each be overseen by a
committee, although not necessarily the
same committee, of the board of
directors. The committee responsible for
advising the board with respect to the
designated FMUs risk management or
for overseeing the audit function must
be chaired by a sufficiently
knowledgeable individual who is
independent of the designated FMUs
senior management and be composed of
a majority of members who are non-
executive members.
Finally, proposed 234.3(a)(2)(iv)(J)
requires that the designated FMUs
governance arrangements be designed to
ensure that major decisions of the board
of directors are clearly disclosed to
relevant stakeholders, including the
designated FMUs owners, participants,
and participants customers, and, where
there is a broad market impact, the
public. Major decisions include those
that would affect the nature or overall
level of risk that the designated FMU
presents to the relevant stakeholders.
Information should be disclosed to the
extent that it would not risk prejudicing
the security and integrity of the FMU or
its participants or divulge commercially
sensitive information, such as trade
secrets or other intellectual property.
With respect to proposed
234.3(a)(2), the Board requests
comment on the following specific
questions:
Q.2.1 Should the Board specify in
the rule text other relevant public
interest considerations for a specific
type of or even for a particular
designated FMU?
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
20
See CPSSIOSCO Recovery of Financial Market
Infrastructures consultative report at http://
www.bis.org/publ/cpss109.pdf. See also Financial
Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions report
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_111104cc.pdf, and the Boards
Regulation QQ (joint rule with the FDIC) for a
similar requirement for resolution plans with
respect to nonbank financial companies supervised
by the Board and bank holding companies with
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more. http://
www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/
reglisting.htm#QQ.
Q.2.2 Should the Board set a specific
minimum percentage of individuals on
the board of directors that may not be
executives, officers, or employees of the
designated FMU or an affiliate of the
designated FMU? Alternatively, should
the standard set any requirements for
the participation of outside directors
(that is, directors who are not
participants in or management of the
designated FMU)?
Q.2.3 Should the Board require
specifically that the chairman of the
board of directors be (a) an individual
who is not an executive, officer, or
employee of the designated FMU or an
affiliate of the designated FMU or (b) a
different individual than the designated
FMUs chief executive officer?
Q.2.4 Should there be a requirement
for the regular reviews of the
performance of the board of directors
and its individual board members to
include periodic independent
assessments?
Q.2.5 Should the designated FMUs
board of directors be required to have a
committee of the board of directors that
only has audit responsibilities to which
the audit function reports and a risk
committee of the board of directors that
only has risk-management
responsibilities to which the risk-
management function reports?
Alternatively, should the designated
FMUs audit and risk-management
functions be required to report directly
to the entire board of directors?
Q.2.6 What additional guidance
should the Board provide to a
designated FMUs board of directors in
order to identify a major decision that
must be disclosed to relevant
stakeholders under the rule?
3. Framework for the Comprehensive
Management of Risks
designated FMU to have a sound risk-
management framework for
comprehensively managing legal, credit,
liquidity, operational, general business,
custody, investment, and other risks
that arise in or are borne by the
designated FMU. A comprehensive risk-
management framework is a set of
objectives, policies, procedures, and
systems that supports the designated
FMU in identifying risks, determining a
risk-tolerance level, and managing risks.
The framework provides an overall
mechanism for the designated FMU to
address the manner in which the risks,
addressed individually by the other
proposed standards, relate to and
interact with each other. For example,
attempts to reduce or limit one type of
risk could lead to the concentration or
creation of different risks, and, although
some risks do not appear to be
significant in isolation, they can become
material when combined with others.
Therefore, robust risk management
involves taking an integrated and
comprehensive approach to risk in order
to understand and manage effectively
this interplay among individual risks.
Proposed 234.3(a)(3)(i) requires a
designated FMU to have risk-
management policies, procedures, and
systems that enable it to identify,
measure, monitor, and manage risk.
These policies, procedures, and systems
must address the full range of risks and,
in particular, interactions among these
risks that can arise in or are borne by the
designated FMU, including those posed
by other entities as a result of
interdependencies. Proposed
234.3(a)(3)(ii) requires a designated
FMU to have risk-management policies,
procedures, and systems that enable the
designated FMU to identify, measure,
monitor, and manage the material risks
that it poses to other entities as the
result of interdependencies. Such
entities include other FMUs, settlement
banks, liquidity providers, and services
providers. Policies, procedures, and
systems must also be designed for a
dynamic environment, which includes
taking into account the possibility of
various economic and financial shocks
that may affect the risks presented to or
arising in the designated FMU. The
entire risk-management framework,
including the assumptions used and the
component frameworks established for
individual risks, must be reviewed and
updated periodically to reflect changes
in market conditions or the designated
FMUs operations.
Even with comprehensive risk
management, however, a designated
FMU may face extreme scenarios that
require extraordinary actions by the
FMU so that it can continue to provide
its critical operations and services as a
going concern. The designated FMUs
management of these extreme events
requires comprehensive, thoughtful
planning to avoid disrupting the
markets it serves. Therefore, proposed
234.3(a)(3)(iii) requires a designated
FMU to develop and maintain recovery
or orderly wind-down plans that
identify the designated FMUs critical
operations and services related to
payment, clearing, or settlement;
scenarios that may potentially prevent it
from being able to provide its critical
operations and services as a going
concern, including scenarios involving
uncovered credit losses (as described in
proposed 234.3(a)(4)(vi)(A)),
uncovered liquidity shortfalls (as
described in proposed
234.3(a)(7)(viii)), and general business
losses (as described in proposed
234.3(a)(15)); and criteria that could
trigger the implementation of the
recovery or orderly wind-down plans.
Proposed 234.3(a)(3)(iii) further
requires the recovery or orderly wind-
down plans to include rules,
procedures, policies, and any other tools
the designated FMU would use in a
recovery or wind-down to address the
scenarios identified by the designated
FMU; procedures to ensure timely
implementation of the plans in the
scenarios identified by the designated
FMU; and procedures for informing the
Board, as soon as practicable, if the
designated FMU is considering
initiating the recovery or orderly wind-
down plan.
Effective plans not only address the
specific actions or measures a
designated FMU would take during a
recovery or orderly wind-down, but also
the ex ante determination of key
individuals who are responsible for the
plan (including responsibilities for
overseeing the development,
maintenance, and implementation of the
plans), the incentives that the plan
creates for the designated FMUs
participants and the participants
customers, and identification of key
areas of the designated FMU that may
affect (for example, organization
structure, interconnectedness and
interdependencies of existing processes
or resources) or be affected by (for
example, funding, liquidity, or capital
needs and resources available) the
strategies planned.
20
As mentioned in
the discussion on legal basis in
proposed 234.3(a)(1), one way for the
designated FMU to ensure the
soundness of its recovery and orderly
wind-down strategies is to include in its
plans an analysis of the legal
implications and risks involved. The
plans should be reviewed and tested, for
example by carrying out periodic
simulation and scenario exercises, at
least annually or following material
changes to the designated FMUs
operations or risk profile, and the
designated FMU should update these
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
21
current Regulation HH, see 234.3(a)(3) and (5) for
payment systems, 234.4(a)(15) for central
securities depositories, and 234.4(a)(16) and (18)
for central counterparties. The current standards
bundle the management of credit and liquidity
risks. Separating credit risk and liquidity risk
recognizes that there are different tools that could
be used to identify, monitor, and manage these two
distinct risks.
22
Current exposure is the larger of zero or the
market value (replacement cost) of a transaction or
portfolio of transactions within a netting set with
a counterparty that would be lost upon the default
of the counterparty. Potential future exposure is the
maximum exposure estimated to occur at a future
point in time at a high level of statistical
confidence.
23
Proposed 234.3(a)(5) provides additional
requirements relating to collateral.
24
In a case in which a designated FMU operates
a payment system or a securities settlement system,
financial resources would include collateral and
other equivalent financial resources, as described in
proposed 234.3(a)(5) on collateral. In the case
where a designated FMU operates as a central
counterparty, financial resources would include
margin and other prefunded financial resources, as
described in proposed 234.3(a)(5) and (6) on
collateral and margin, respectively.
25
Proposed 234.3(a)(4)(iv) prohibits a
designated FMU that is a central counterparty from
counting assessment powers for additional default
or guaranty fund contributions (i.e., default or
guaranty fund contributions that are not prefunded)
in its calculation of financial resources available to
meet the total financial resource requirement to
cover its credit exposures.
plans as needed following the
completion of each test and review.
Proposed 234.3(a)(3)(iii) is a new
requirement and may impose a cost on
a designated FMU with respect to the
analysis, development, and
maintenance of plans for recovery or
orderly wind-down. The proposed rule,
however, is intended to help a
designated FMU respond to extreme
scenarios on a timely basis and may
help the designated FMU develop early
indicators for these types of scenarios so
they can be avoided. Ex ante
identification of, and planning for,
scenarios that could lead to failure, as
well as dissemination of such
information to participants, also can
increase market certainty. Ultimately,
this requirement is intended to prevent
a disorderly wind-down of a designated
FMU and the resulting liquidity or
credit problems to other financial
institutions or markets.
questions:
Q.3.1 Should an annual or longer
minimum frequency be established for
the proposed periodic review of the
designated FMUs comprehensive risk-
management framework? Commenters
should discuss the anticipated costs or
benefits of any suggested minimum
frequency. Alternatively, should
individual minimum frequencies be
established for each particular
designated FMU, given the design or
type of designated FMU?
4. Credit Risk
Proposed 234.3(a)(4) requires a
designated FMU to measure, monitor,
and manage effectively its credit risk to
its participants and those arising from
its payment, clearing, and settlement
processes. Credit risk arises when a
counterparty such as a participant,
settlement bank, custodian, or other
FMU, is unable to meet fully its
financial obligations when due or at any
time in the future.
21
A default by one or
more of a designated FMUs participants
could prevent the designated FMU from
meeting financial obligations to its other
participants, consequently causing the
other participants to fail to meet their
other financial obligations when due.
The failure of a designated FMU to
manage appropriately its credit risks,
therefore, has the potential to increase
systemic risk throughout the broader
financial system and thus threaten
financial stability. To mitigate the risk
of such a systemic impact, a designated
FMU must manage its credit exposures
to its participants and the credit risks
arising from its payment, clearing, and
settlement processes.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(4), a
designated FMU must establish a
comprehensive framework to manage its
credit exposures to its participants and
any other exposures arising from its
processes. This framework should allow
the designated FMU to identify sources
of credit risk, measure and monitor its
credit exposures, and use appropriate
risk-management tools to control the
risks generated by such exposures.
Credit exposure can be separated into
two measurable components: Current
exposure and potential future
exposure.
22
Current exposure is
relatively straightforward to measure
and monitor, while potential future
exposure typically requires modeling
and estimation. For example, a
designated FMU that operates a
payment system would face current
exposure when it extends intraday
credit to its participants and potential
future exposure if the value of any
collateral that participants provide to
secure the intraday credit falls below
the amount of the credit extended.
23

designated FMU also must maintain
sufficient financial resources to cover its
credit exposure to each participant fully
with a high degree of confidence.
24
The
Board acknowledges that a designated
FMU cannot be completely certain that
it is covering its credit exposure to each
participant fully, because measuring
potential future exposure likely requires
modeling and estimation. Therefore,
although the designated FMUs current
exposures must be covered fully, its
potential future exposures must be
covered fully with a high degree of
confidence. In the case of a designated
FMU that operates as a central
counterparty, high degree of
confidence means establishing initial
margin requirements that, at a
minimum, meet a single-tailed
confidence level of at least 99 percent of
the estimated distribution of future
exposure.
Additional prefunded financial
resources. Proposed 234.3(a)(4)(i) and
(ii) require a designated FMU that
operates as a central counterparty to
maintain additional prefunded financial
resources to cover a portion of the
residual risk (or tail risk) of disruptions
that could occur in extreme but
plausible market conditions, which
could cause a central counterpartys
losses to exceed the margin posted if a
participant defaulted.
25
Specifically,
proposed 234.3(a)(4)(i) requires a
designated FMU that operates as a
central counterparty to maintain
additional prefunded resources
sufficient to cover its credit exposure
under a wide range of significantly
different stress scenarios, including the
default of the participant and its
affiliates that would potentially cause
the largest aggregate credit exposure net
of any applicable margin to the central
counterparty in extreme but plausible
market conditions (a Cover One
requirement).
Alternatively, under proposed
234.3(a)(4)(ii), the central counterparty
may instead be directed by the Board to
maintain additional prefunded financial
resources that are sufficient to cover its
credit exposure under a wide range of
significantly different stress scenarios,
including the default of the two
participants and their affiliates that
would potentially cause the largest
aggregate credit exposure net of any
applicable margin to the central
counterparty in extreme but plausible
market conditions (a Cover Two
requirement). Under the proposal, the
Board may require a central
counterparty to meet the Cover Two
requirement when that central
counterparty is involved in activities
with a more-complex risk profile (such
as clearing products with discrete jump-
to-default risks or that are highly
correlated with potential participant
defaults) or is determined by another
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
26
This validation must include validation of
models the designated FMU uses to comply with
the collateral provisions under proposed
234.3(a)(5) and to determine initial margin under
proposed 234.3(a)(6). It should also include
validation of models the designated FMU uses to
size its total financial resources and to conduct any
other material risk-management functions.
jurisdiction to be systemically important
in that jurisdiction.
Stress testing. Stress testing is a
critical component of a designated
FMUs financial risk-management
framework. Under proposed
234.3(a)(4)(iii), a designated FMU that
is a central counterparty must determine
the amount and regularly test the
sufficiency of its total financial
resources in the event of a participant
default or multiple participant defaults
in extreme but plausible market
conditions through stress testing. Under
the proposal, a designated FMU must,
(A) on a daily basis, conduct a stress test
of its total financial resources using
standard and predetermined stress
scenarios, parameters, and assumptions;
(B) on at least a monthly basis, and more
frequently when the products cleared or
markets served experience high
volatility or become less liquid, or when
the size or concentration of positions
held by the central counterpartys
participants increases significantly,
conduct a comprehensive and thorough
analysis of the existing stress scenarios,
models, and underlying parameters and
assumptions such that the designated
FMU meets its required level of default
protection in light of current and
evolving market conditions; and (C)
have clear procedures to report the
results of its stress tests to
decisionmakers at the central
counterparty and use these results to
evaluate the adequacy of and adjust, if
necessary, its total financial resources.
Stress testing helps ensure that the
designated FMU has sufficient total
financial resources under current and
evolving market conditions. When
conducting stress tests, a designated
FMU should use a wide range of
significantly different stress scenarios in
terms of both defaulters positions and
possible price changes in liquidation
periods, including, at a minimum,
relevant peak historic price volatilities,
shifts in other market factors, such as
price determinants and yield curves,
multiple defaults over various time
horizons, simultaneous pressures in
funding and asset markets, and a range
of forward-looking stress scenarios in a
variety of extreme but plausible market
conditions. The results of these stress
tests inform the decisionmakers such as
the board of directors or the appropriate
committee of the board within the
organization, who must use the results
to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust
its total financial resources. Clearly
established and documented procedures
allow for these results to be reported to
the appropriate parties for prompt
action and contribute to the overall
effectiveness of using stress testing as a
risk-management tool.
Model validation. Under proposed
234.3(a)(4)(v), a designated FMU must
validate its risk-management models
used to determine the sufficiency of its
total financial resources at least
annually.
26
A validation should be
comprehensive, addressing the
justification of the approach and
assumptions underlying the model, the
calibration of critical parameters and
other model settings, and the reliability
of the model and programming. Model
validation can either be undertaken by
outside experts or by internal staff with
the necessary expertise. In either case,
the validator must be a qualified person
who does not perform functions
associated with the model (except as
part of the annual model validation),
does not report to such a person, and
does not have a financial interest in
whether the model is determined to be
valid.
Proposed 234.3(a)(4)(iii) through (v)
contain two new requirements to
Regulation HH related to the frequency
of stress testing conducted by
designated FMUs that are central
counterparties and to model validation
by all designated FMUs that face credit
risk. Broadly, stress testing and
validation of credit risk management
models are consistent with past Board
supervisory practice. The proposed rule,
however, establishes minimum
frequencies for such stress testing and
model validation. The daily and
monthly stress testing requirements
help to promote robust management of
credit risk by increasing the availability
of stress testing data available to a
central counterparty to assess its
financial resources and the performance
of its models. The annual model
validation requirement also promotes
robust credit risk management by
ensuring the designated FMUs risk-
management models continue to reflect
current economic and financial
conditions, in part by allowing the FMU
to both uncover and track any
limitations to its models.
Rules and procedures to address
uncovered credit losses. In certain
extreme circumstances, the post-
liquidation value of the collateral and
other financial resources held by a
designated FMU to fulfill its credit-risk
requirement may not be sufficient to
cover fully realized credit losses. A
designated FMU must make plans for
responding to such a shortfall. Proposed
234.3(a)(4)(vi) requires the designated
FMU to establish rules and procedures
that explicitly address how potentially
uncovered credit losses would be
allocated, including how the designated
FMU would repay any funds it may
borrow from liquidity providers. This
proposed provision represents an
enhancement of existing expectations.
The proposed rule also requires the
designated FMU to establish rules and
procedures that explicitly describe how
the designated FMU plans to replenish
any financial resources it may use
during a stress event, including a
participant default, so that it may
continue to operate in a safe and sound
manner. This proposed provision
represents a new requirement.
Proposed 234.3(a)(4)(vi) contains an
enhanced requirement that designated
FMUs have rules and procedures that
explicitly address how potentially
uncovered credit losses would be
allocated, including repayment of any
funds a designated FMU might borrow
from liquidity providers, and a new
requirement that designated FMUs have
rules and procedures that address the
FMUs process to replenish any
financial resources that the FMU might
employ in a stress event. This requires
a designated FMU to plan for and be
transparent with respect to its
procedures for extreme credit events. It
is also a critical step in the designated
FMUs process for developing its
recovery or orderly wind-down plans, as
described in proposed 234.3(a)(3)(iii).
The process of planning for extreme
events such as uncovered credit losses
helps prepare the designated FMU for
managing these events, thereby reducing
the likelihood that the designated FMU
will fail to settle its obligations.
Planning for replenishment of financial
resources increases the likelihood that
the designated FMU will be able to
continue to operate after an extreme
credit event occurs. The transparency of
the designated FMUs rules and
procedures will also help participants
plan and prepare for such an event.
question:
Q.4.1 In considering whether to
apply a Cover Two requirement for a
central counterparty, should the Board
consider factors other than whether the
central counterparty is involved in
activities with a more-complex risk
profile and whether the central
counterparty is determined by another
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
27
securities depositories, and 234.4(a)(17) for central
counterparties.
28
The proposed standard replaces and builds on
234.4(a)(17) under current Regulation HH.
in that jurisdiction? Should the
approach used to make the
determination by another jurisdiction
that a designated FMU is systemically
important in that jurisdiction be similar
to the approach used by the Council in
order for the determination to be a factor
in the Boards consideration of whether
to impose a Cover Two requirement?
5. Collateral
designated FMU that uses collateral to
manage its or its participants credit
exposure to accept collateral with low
credit, liquidity, and market risks and
set and enforce appropriately
conservative haircuts and concentration
limits, in order to achieve a high degree
of confidence in the adequacy of the
value of the collateral in the event of
liquidation and that the collateral can be
used in a timely manner.
27

Collateralizing credit exposures protects
an FMU against potential losses in the
event of a participant default because
the FMU can liquidate the defaulting
participants collateral to cover the
losses. A designated FMU requiring its
participants to post collateral may also
encourage these participants to manage
the risks that they may pose to the FMU
and other participants to avoid losing
their collateral.
Collateral with low credit, liquidity,
and market risks protects the FMU
during stressed market conditions,
when both a default may become more
likely and collateral quality may
deteriorate. A designated FMU must
generally limit the assets it routinely
accepts as collateral to those with low
credit, liquidity, and market risks, such
as currency and government securities
issued by the United States, or other
highly marketable collateral, including
high quality, liquid, general obligations
of another sovereign nation, in order to
be confident of the collaterals value and
the FMUs ability to access and use that
collateral in the event of a participant
default, especially during stressed
market conditions.
A designated FMU applies haircuts to
collateral it collects in order to protect
itself from losses resulting from declines
in the market value of the asset posted
in the event that the collateral taker
needs to liquidate that collateral.
Haircuts represent a risk control
measure and are estimated to be the
possible percentage decrease in
liquidation value from the current
market value until the designated FMU
can liquidate the collateral. A precursor
to ensuring the haircuts applied are
appropriate, therefore, includes
assigning an accurate current value to
the collateral accepted, which depends
on prudent practices for valuation,
including marking collateral to market
on a daily basis.
Proposed 234.3(a)(5)(i) through (iii)
establish requirements related to a
designated FMUs collateral practices
and specifically, on haircut procedures.
designated FMU that accepts collateral
to establish prudent valuation practices
and develop haircuts that are tested
regularly and take into account stressed
market conditions. Further, proposed
234.3(a)(5)(ii) requires the designated
FMU to establish stable and
conservative haircuts that reflect
relevant periods of stressed market
conditions to reduce the need for
procyclical adjustments. In a stressed
market, a designated FMU may require
the posting of additional collateral both
because of the decline of asset prices
and because of an increase in haircut
levels. Such actions could exacerbate
market stress and contribute to driving
asset prices down further and result in
additional collateral requirements. This
cycle could exert further downward
pressure on asset prices. Calibrating
haircuts to incorporate stressed market
conditions is, therefore, essential to help
mitigate the need for a designated FMU
either to require large amounts of
additional collateral, or to significantly
increase the size of the haircut to
address declining asset prices. Proposed
234.3(a)(5)(iii) requires a designated
FMU to validate annually its haircut
procedures, as part of its risk-
management model validation under
proposed 234.3(a)(4)(v).
Proposed 234.3(a)(5)(iv) requires a
designated FMU to avoid concentrated
holdings of certain assets where it could
significantly impair the ability to
liquidate such assets quickly without
significant adverse price effects. One
way of avoiding concentrated holdings
is through the establishment of
concentration limits that restrict
participants ability to provide more
than a specified amount or percentage of
a specific asset as collateral. Imposing
concentration charges on participants
that maintain holdings beyond this limit
may help the designated FMU create
disincentives for such concentrations.
Whether concentration limits are
needed will depend, in part, on the
assets accepted as collateral.
Proposed 234.3(a)(5)(v) requires that
a designated FMU use a collateral
management system that is well-
designed and operationally flexible.
Among other things, the collateral
management system must accommodate
changes in the ongoing monitoring and
management of collateral. It should also
allow for the timely valuation of
collateral and execution of any
collateral or margin calls. The
designated FMU should allocate
sufficient resources to its collateral
management system to ensure an
appropriate level of operational
performance, efficiency, and
effectiveness.
6. Margin
central counterparty to cover its credit
exposures to its participants for all
products by establishing a risk-based
margin system.
28
Margin is the collateral
that a central counterparty collects in
order to help manage and mitigate the
credit exposures posed by its
participants open positions. It is one of
the core tools a central counterparty
uses to manage its credit exposures.
Margin systems typically differentiate
between initial margin, which covers
potential future exposure over the
appropriate close-out period in the
event of a default, and variation margin,
which a central counterparty collects
and pays out to reflect changes in
current exposures resulting from
realized changes in market prices.
Collecting sufficient margin protects
the central counterparty and its non-
defaulting participants against potential
losses in the event of a participant
default because the central counterparty
can apply the defaulting participants
margin to cover the defaulters
obligations and any resulting losses. To
promote robust risk management,
therefore, a designated FMU that
operates as a central counterparty must
establish a margin system that is risk-
based and reviewed regularly to ensure
sufficient margin is collected. When
designing and establishing an effective
margin system, a designated FMU
should consider the underlying concept
and methodology; the attributes of each
product, portfolio, and market the
designated FMU serves; the availability
and use of price data; the calculation of
variation and initial margin; the
operational capacity to make margin
calls; and appropriate parameters and
assumptions. The Board proposes the
following provisions to address these
aspects of margin systems.
central counterparty is required to
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
establish a risk-based margin system
that is conceptually and
methodologically sound for the risks
and particular attributes of each
product, portfolio, and markets it serves,
as demonstrated by documented and
empirical evidence supporting the
margin models design choices, methods
used, variables selected, theoretical
bases, key assumptions, and limitations.
These elements are important for
demonstrating the quality of the model,
including showing whether judgment
exercised in its design and construction
is well-informed and carefully
considered. Under proposed
234.3(a)(6)(ii), the margin levels
applied by the central counterparty
must be commensurate with the risks
including taking into account the
complexity of the underlying
instruments.
Proposed 234.3(a)(6)(iii) and (iv)
establish requirements related to a
central counterpartys price data for
purposes of its margin system. First, a
central counterpartys margin system
must be based on a reliable source of
timely price data for the central
counterparty to cover sufficiently its
credit exposures to its participants. A
central counterparty must use high-
quality price data from continuous,
transparent, and liquid markets where
available. When such high-quality price
data is unavailable, a central
counterparty must acquire pricing data
from other sources. A central
counterparty should evaluate
developing its own pricing process and
obtaining third-party pricing services. In
either case, the designated FMU must
continually evaluate the datas
reliability and accuracy.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(6)(v), a
central counterpartys margin system
must mark participant positions to
market and collect variation margin at
least daily and have the operational
capacity to make intraday margin calls
and payouts, both scheduled and
unscheduled, to participants. A central
counterparty must collect variation
margin at least daily (and, when
appropriate, intraday) to prevent the
accumulation of current exposures and
mitigate potential future exposures.
Proposed 234.3(a)(6)(vi), a central
counterpartys system must also be able
to generate initial margin requirements
sufficient to cover potential changes in
the value of future exposure to each
participants position during the
interval between the last variation
margin collection and the close out of
positions following a participant
default. In particular, the margin system
must (A) ensure that initial margin
meets an established single-tailed
confidence level of at least 99 percent
with respect to the estimated
distribution of future exposure; and (B)
use a conservative estimate of the time
horizons for the effective hedging or
close out of the particular types of
products cleared by the central
counterparty, including in stressed
market conditions.
A key assumption of effective margin
models is the close-out period, which is
an estimate of how long it would take
the designated FMU to liquidate or
completely hedge the market risk of one
or more participants portfolios. For
purposes of the proposed rule, an
appropriate close-out period
conservatively reflects market liquidity
under stressed market conditions for
each product that the central
counterparty clears. A central
counterparty must document the close-
out periods and related analysis for each
product type that it clears.
A designated FMUs margin model is
also dependent on a number of other
model parameters and assumptions,
which may include the selection of an
appropriate sample period of historical
data to use in establishing its initial
margin model for each product that it
clears. For these purposes, an
appropriate sample period is long
enough to provide an accurate
representation of historical price
movements, while also being sensitive
to recent price and volatility levels.
Additionally, an effective margin system
eliminates the potential for specific
wrong-way risk, which occurs when the
default of a participant is highly
correlated with a decrease in value of
the participants cleared portfolio. An
example of specific wrong-way risk is
when a participant sells single-name
credit-default swap protection on debt
issued in its own name or on the names
of any affiliates.
A central counterparty must also seek
to avoid application of its margin
arrangement in a manner that could
exacerbate or cause financial instability.
For example, in a period of rising credit
risk, if the central counterparty requires
initial margin in excess of the amount
determined by the margin model, it may
add to the market stress and volatility.
In general, margin requirements should
be, to the extent possible, designed to be
forward-looking, stable, and
conservative that are specifically
designed to limit the need for
destabilizing, procyclical changes. To
support this objective, a central
counterparty could consider increasing
the size of its prefunded default
arrangements to limit the need and
likelihood of large or unexpected
margin calls in times of market stress.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(6)(vii), the
designated FMU must monitor on an
ongoing basis and regularly review, test,
and verify its margin system.
Specifically, the designated FMU must
conduct daily backtests and monthly
sensitivity analyses, performed more
frequently during stressed market
conditions or significant fluctuations in
participant positions. Further, the
central counterparty must also provide
for annual validation of its margin
models and related parameters and
assumptions, as part of its risk-
proposed 234.3(a)(4)(v).
The Board expects backtests to
incorporate only the portions of the
margin model that are reflected in the
available historical data. For example, a
central counterparty might add an
additional concentration charge to
reflect the difficulty in unwinding a
large position, but because historical
price data may not incorporate large
concentrated positions, the charge
should not be included in the
backtesting analysis. Separate analyses
would need to be conducted to
determine the adequacy of
concentration charges. For systems
whose initial margin covers multiple
days, the worst observed price move
within the period should be used in
backtesting. Backtesting, however, only
evaluates the performance of the margin
model on the historical sample chosen,
it does not guarantee that a model will
perform well going forward.
Sensitivity analyses study how
variability in the output of the margin
model can be influenced by the
variability and other aspects of its
inputs. It tests the robustness of the
margin model and potentially uncovers
errors or limits of the model. Sensitivity
analysis should incorporate a wide
range of input parameters and, where
feasible, vary assumptions to reflect
various possible market conditions,
including the most-volatile periods that
have been experienced by the markets
served and extreme changes in the
correlations between prices and other
factors.
Effective backtesting and sensitivity
analysis may use both historical data
from realized stressed market conditions
and hypothetical data for unrealized
stressed market conditions. Further, the
Board expects the sensitivity analysis to
be performed on both actual and
simulated positions and portfolios. The
analysis would help a central
counterparty understand how the level
of margin coverage might be affected by
highly stressed market conditions.
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
29
securities depositories, and 234.4(a)(18) for central
counterparties. The current standards bundle the
management of credit and liquidity risks.
Separating credit risk and liquidity risk recognizes
that there are different tools that could be used to
identify, monitor, and manage these two distinct
risks.
30
The Board recognizes that the language on
qualifying liquid resources under Principle 7 of
PFMI is phrased differently. Principle 7 requires
qualifying liquid resources to be, among other
things, highly marketable collateral held in custody
and investments that are readily available and
convertible into cash with prearranged and highly
reliable funding arrangements. For many years, the
Board has expected FMUs under its authority to
maintain cash or committed arrangements for
converting non-cash assets into cash to meet the
minimum liquidity resource requirement. The
Board believes that, in order for arrangements to be
highly reliable, they must be prearranged and
committed. The legal enforceability of committed
arrangements helps to ensure obligations are
fulfilled even in extreme but plausible market
conditions. Supplemental resources beyond
amounts needed to meet proposed the minimum
liquid source requirement in 234.3(a)(7) may not
need to be obtained on a committed basis.
Sensitivity analysis can also be used to
determine the impact of varying
important model parameters, such as
the sample period, the close-out period,
and a confidence interval.
Proposed 234.3(a)(6) includes three
enhanced requirements relative to the
current corresponding standard under
Regulation HH. First, the proposal
increases frequency of backtesting from
quarterly to daily. Second, the proposed
provision includes an express
requirement to perform sensitivity
analysis. Third, the proposal increases
the frequency of the analysis from
quarterly to at least monthly. The Board
believes these enhanced requirements
will help to ensure that the designated
FMU has sufficient financial resources
to cover its credit exposures to its
participants with a high degree of
confidence in current and stressed
market conditions. Effective
management of credit risk will allow the
designated FMU to continue operating
normally during periods of market stress
and prevent the spread of credit losses
to its participants, the market it serves,
and the financial system more broadly.
7. Liquidity Risk
designated FMU to effectively measure,
monitor, and manage the liquidity risk
that arises in or is borne by the
designated FMU.
29
Liquidity risk is
intended to be a broad concept covering
different designs for payment and
settlement arrangements. Liquidity risk
arises in a designated FMU when it, its
participants, or other entities (such as
settlement banks, nostro agents, and
liquidity providers) cannot settle their
payment obligations when due as part of
the clearing or settlement process. It is
important for a designated FMU to
manage carefully its liquidity risk so
that it can meet its payment obligations
and complete settlement when due. If
the designated FMU has insufficient
liquid resources to meet its payment
obligations and complete settlement
when due, the other participants may
not receive funds they are relying upon
to meet their own obligations. As a
consequence, the liquidity shortfalls
and pressure could be transmitted to
these participants and quickly give rise
to broad liquidity dislocations and
systemic risk.
designated FMU must have effective
operational and analytical tools to
identify, measure, and monitor its
settlement and funding flows on an
ongoing and timely basis, including its
use of intraday liquidity. Effective
measuring and monitoring of liquidity
risk involves understanding and
assessing the value and concentration of
a designated FMUs daily settlement
and funding flows through its
settlement banks, nostro agents, and
other intermediaries. Further, a
designated FMU must be able to
monitor on a daily basis the level of any
liquid assets that it holds and determine
the value of liquid assets that is
available for use. If a designated FMU
maintains committed funding
arrangements, it must similarly identify,
measure, and monitor its liquidity risk
from the liquidity providers of the
arrangements.
Sufficient liquid resources. Under
proposed 234.3(a)(7)(ii), a designated
FMU must maintain sufficient liquid
resources in all relevant currencies to
effect same-day and, as applicable,
intraday and multiday settlement of
payment obligations with a high degree
of confidence under a wide range of
significantly different potential stress
scenarios. These scenarios must include
the default of the participant and its
affiliates that would generate the largest
aggregate liquidity obligation for the
designated FMU in extreme but
plausible market conditions. A
central counterparty and that is subject
to proposed 234.3(a)(4)(ii) should
consider scenarios that include the
default of the two participants and their
affiliates that would generate the largest
aggregate liquidity obligation for the
designated FMU in extreme but
plausible market conditions.
For purposes of meeting this liquid
resource requirement, proposed
234.3(a)(7)(iii) requires the designated
FMU to maintain these liquid resources
in cash in each relevant currency at the
central bank of issue or at creditworthy
commercial banks, or in assets that are
readily available and convertible into
cash through committed arrangements
without material adverse change
conditions. These committed
arrangements include, but are not
limited to, collateralized lines of credit,
foreign exchange swaps, and repurchase
agreements. Proposed 234.3(a)(7)(iii)
requires these arrangements to be
committed in order to ensure that the
resources are highly reliable even in
extreme but plausible market
conditions.
30

Proposed 234.3(a)(7)(iv) and (v)
require a designated FMU to evaluate
and confirm, at least annually, whether
each provider of the committed
arrangements as described in proposed
234.3(a)(7)(iii) has sufficient
information to understand and manage
that providers associated liquidity
risks, and that the provider has the
capacity to perform as required under
this commitment. Effective liquidity risk
management involves ensuring that the
designated FMU is operationally ready
to handle liquidity pressures caused by
participants or other entities financial
or operational problems. For example,
the designated FMU should have the
operational capacity to reroute
payments on a timely basis in case
problems arise with a correspondent
bank. A designated FMU therefore must
conduct rigorous due diligence to
ensure that each of its liquidity
providers has the understanding and
capacity to perform as expected. As part
of rigorous due diligence, a designated
FMU also must test at least annually its
procedures and operational capacity for
accessing each type of liquid resource
required under this standard. A
designated FMU may also employ other
risk-management tools to manage its or
its participants liquidity risk, which
can vary depending on the source of
liquidity risk (such as a participant
default, the late-day submission of
payments or other transactions, or the
use of a service provider or a linked
FMU).
Stress testing of liquid resources.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(7)(vi), a
designated FMU must determine the
amount and regularly test the
sufficiency of its potential liquidity
needs and the value of its liquid
resources by, (A) on a daily basis,
conducting a stress test of its liquid
resources using standard and
predetermined stress scenarios,
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
31
parameters, and assumptions; (B) on at
least a monthly basis, and more
frequently when products cleared or
markets served experience high
held by the designated FMUs
participants increases significantly,
conducting a comprehensive and
thorough analysis of the existing stress-
testing scenarios, models, and
underlying parameters and assumptions
such that the designated FMU meets its
identified level of liquidity needs and
resources in light of current and
evolving market conditions; and (C)
having clear procedures to report the
results of its stress tests to
decisionmakers at the designated FMU
and using these results to evaluate the
sufficiency of and to adjust its liquidity
risk-management framework.
In conducting stress testing, the
designated FMU must consider a wide
range of significantly different potential
scenarios. These scenarios include
relevant peak historic price volatilities,
shifts in other market factors such as
price determinants and yield curves,
multiple defaults over various time
horizons, simultaneous pressures in
funding and asset markets, and a
spectrum of forward-looking stress
scenarios in a variety of extreme but
plausible market conditions. Scenarios
also include disruptions to the design
and operation of the designated FMU,
including disruptions caused by all
entities that might present material
liquidity risks to the FMU, and where
appropriate, cover a multiday period. A
designated FMU also must consider any
strong inter-linkages or similar
exposures among its participants, as
well as the multiple roles that
participants may play with respect to
risk management of the designated
FMU. Also, liquidity stress test
scenarios must consider the probability
of multiple failures and the contagion
effect among its participants that such
failures may cause.
Model validation. Under proposed
234.3(a)(7)(vii), a designated FMU
must validate any models used in its
liquidity risk-management at least
annually. The validation should be
comprehensive, addressing the
justification of the approach and
assumptions underlying the model, the
calibration of critical parameters and
other model settings, and the reliability
of the model and programming. Model
validation can either be undertaken by
outside experts or by using internal staff
with the necessary expertise. In either
case, the validator must be a qualified
person who does not perform functions
part of the annual model valuation),
valid. An annual validation of the
model is important to provide a high
degree of confidence that the designated
FMU is using an appropriate liquidity
risk-management framework to
determine the amount and test the
sufficiency of the designated FMUs
liquid resources.
Rules and procedures to address
shortfalls. In certain extreme
circumstances, a designated FMU may
not have sufficient liquid resources to
cover its obligations. A designated FMU
must analyze the possibility of these
circumstances and plan for steps it
would take in response to such a
liquidity shortfall. Under proposed
234.3(a)(7)(viii), a designated FMU
must establish explicit rules and
procedures that address potential
liquidity shortfalls that would not be
covered by the designated FMUs liquid
resources and avoid unwinding,
revoking, or delaying the same-day
settlement of payment obligations,
including in the event of one or more
participant defaults. Proposed
234.3(a)(7)(viii) also requires a
designated FMU to describe in its rules
and procedures its process to replenish
any liquid resources that the designated
FMU may employ during a stress event,
including a participant default, so that
it can continue to operate in a safe and
sound manner.
The proposed standard contains two
new requirements for designated FMUs.
First, proposed 234.3(a)(7)(vi) and (vii)
with respect to liquidity stress testing
and model validation are new. These
requirements are necessary to ensure
that the appropriate data regarding
liquidity flows and potential liquidity
pressures is available to the designated
FMU. Increased availability of data will
allow an FMU to identify and respond
more quickly to liquidity pressures and
prevent them from disrupting the
operations of the FMU and possibly
spreading to the FMUs participants and
the financial markets more broadly.
Second, proposed 234.3(a)(7)(viii)
includes a new requirement above the
existing standards that requires rules
and procedures that explicitly address
unforeseen and potentially uncovered
liquidity shortfalls and that describe the
designated FMUs process to replenish
any liquid resources it may employ
during a stress event. The process of
planning for uncovered liquidity
shortfalls helps prepare the FMU to
manage such an event, thereby reducing
the likelihood that the FMU and its
participants will fail to meet payment
and settlement obligations as expected.
The process of preparing for
replenishment of resources increases the
likelihood that an FMU will be able to
continue to operate after an extreme
liquidity event occurs and continue to
provide its critical operations and
services to the markets it serves. The
transparency of the FMUs rules and
procedures will also help the FMUs
participants plan and prepare for such
an event.
question:
Q.7.1 Should the Board establish a
requirement for designated FMUs that
are subject to the Cover Two credit
exposure requirement under proposed
234.3(a)(4)(ii) to also undertake an
analysis at least once a year to evaluate
the feasibility of maintaining sufficient
liquid resources for the default of the
two participants and their affiliates that
would generate the largest aggregate
liquidity obligation for the designated
FMUs in extreme but plausible market
conditions?
8. Settlement Finality
designated FMU to provide clear and
certain final settlement intraday or in
real time, as appropriate, and at a
minimum, by the end of the value
date.
31
The proposed rule addresses
settlement risk, which is the risk that
settlement will not take place as
expected. For these purposes, final
settlement is the moment when the
transfer of an asset or financial
instrument or discharge of an obligation
by a designated FMU or its participants
becomes legally irrevocable and
unconditional. Final settlement by the
end of the value date (that is, the day
on which the payment, transfer
instruction, or other obligation is due
and the associated funds and securities
are typically available to the receiving
participant) is important because
deferring settlement can create credit
and liquidity risks for the FMU and its
participants. The potential for these
additional risks to arise increases the
likelihood that a deferred or revocable
settlement at a single designated FMU
can cause systemic risk and threaten the
stability of the broader financial system.
Clear and certain final settlement by the
end of the value date is therefore
necessary for robust risk management
and helps to promote the safety and
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
32
Ensuring the consistency and enforceability of
a designated FMUs settlement finality rules
consistent with relevant laws and regulations is a
component of the broader requirement to have a
well-founded and enforceable legal basis for each
material aspect of the designated FMUs activities
under proposed 234.3(a)(1).
33
payment systems, 234.4(a)(5) for central securities
depositories and central counterparties.
34
The proposed standard replaces 234.4(a)(13)
under current Regulation HH.
soundness of the designated FMU,
reduce systemic risk, and support the
stability of the broader financial system.
Under the proposed rule, a designated
FMUs payment, clearing, and
settlement processes must provide final
settlement no later than the end of the
value date. Where appropriate, a
designated FMU must provide intraday
or real-time settlement to reduce
settlement risk. Intraday or real-time
finality may be appropriate, for
example, for payments operations,
settlement of back-to-back transactions,
intraday margin calls by central
counterparties, or safe and efficient
cross-border links between central
securities depositories that perform
settlement functions. The proposed rule
also requires a designated FMU to
clearly define in its rules and
procedures a cutoff point, after which
settled payments, transfer instructions,
or other settlement instructions may not
be revoked by a participant. A clearly
defined cutoff point contributes to the
overall certainty that a payment will be
settled and helps participants manage
their liquidity risks.
32

9. Money Settlements
designated FMU to address the
settlement risk that arises when it
conducts its money settlements.
33
A
designated FMU conducts money
settlements for a variety of purposes,
such as the settlement of various
financial instruments or contracts,
funding and defunding activities, and
the distribution and collection of margin
payments. Money settlements may be
conducted in one or more currencies. In
general, a designated FMU can conduct
settlements in central bank money or in
commercial bank money. Central bank
money is a liability of a central bank, in
the form of deposits held at the central
bank that can be used for money
settlement purposes. Commercial bank
money is a liability of a commercial
bank in the form of deposits held at the
commercial bank.
A designated FMU and its
participants may face credit and
liquidity risks from money settlements.
Credit risk may arise when a settlement
bank has the potential to default on its
obligations. Liquidity risk may arise if,
after a payment obligation has been
settled, participants or the designated
FMU are unable to transfer readily their
assets at the settlement bank to obtain
other liquid assets, such as claims on a
central bank. These potential credit and
liquidity risks that arise from the money
settlement process increase the chances
that a single designated FMU would
create systemic risk, which may
threaten the stability of the broader
financial system. To promote risk
management, therefore, a designated
FMU should manage and mitigate, to
the greatest extent practicable, the risks
that arise in conducting money
settlements.
FMU must conduct its money
settlements in central bank money,
where available and practical, in order
to mitigate the credit and liquidity risks
that arise from money settlements.
Central bank money, however, may not
always be available for use. For
example, a designated FMU or its
participants may not have direct access
to relevant central bank accounts and
payment services. In addition, in some
cases, settlement in central bank money
may not always be practical. For
example, an FMU that has access to the
relevant central bank accounts and
services may find that a central banks
payment services may not operate or
provide the necessary finality at the
times when it needs to conduct money
settlements. In such cases, a designated
FMU may conduct money settlements at
a commercial bank or on its own books
and would need to minimize and
strictly control the credit and liquidity
risks arising from the money settlement
arrangement used.
Proposed 234.3(a)(9)(i) through (iii)
apply specifically to designated FMUs
that conduct money settlements at a
commercial bank. Under proposed
234.3(a)(9)(i), such a designated FMU
must establish and monitor adherence
to criteria based on high standards for
its settlement banks that take account of,
among other things, the commercial
banks applicable regulatory and
supervisory frameworks,
creditworthiness, capitalization, access
to liquidity, and operational reliability.
Further steps to limit credit and
liquidity exposures include using
multiple commercial settlement banks
to diversify the risk of a commercial
settlement bank failure. Under proposed
234.3(a)(9)(ii), a designated FMU using
multiple commercial settlement banks
must monitor and manage the
concentration of credit and liquidity
exposures to its commercial settlement
banks and assess its potential losses and
liquidity exposures as well as those of
its participants in the event that the
commercial settlement bank with the
largest share of activity were to fail.
Finally, under proposed
234.3(a)(9)(iii), a designated FMU
must ensure that its legal agreements
with its settlement banks state clearly
when transfers on the books of
individual settlement banks are
expected to occur, that transfers are
final when funds are credited to the
recipients account, and that funds
credited to the recipient are available
immediately for withdrawal.
10. Physical Deliveries
central counterparty, securities
settlement system, or central securities
depository to clearly state its obligations
with respect to the delivery of physical
instruments or commodities and
identify, monitor, and manage the risks
associated with such physical
deliveries.
34
A designated FMU may
settle transactions using physical
delivery, which is the delivery of an
asset, such as a financial instrument or
a commodity, in physical form. Physical
instruments include securities,
commercial paper, and other debt
instruments that are issued in paper
form. Commodities include tangible
assets. Settlement risk arises in both the
storage and delivery of the underlying
instrument or commodity because of, for
example, risk of theft, loss,
counterfeiting, or deterioration.
Settlement risk associated with credit,
liquidity, or other risks involving money
settlements in U.S. or foreign currencies
are addressed broadly in the other
proposed standards.
FMU that provides physical settlement
must have rules that clearly state its
obligations with respect to physical
deliveries. Clear rules on physical
deliveries enable the designated FMU
and its participants to take the
appropriate steps to mitigate the risks
posed by such physical deliveries. For
example, clear rules would include
definitions for acceptable physical
instruments or commodities,
permissible alternative delivery
locations or assets (if any), rules for
warehouse operations, and the timing of
delivery, where relevant. The
designated FMU must also identify,
monitor, and manage the risks
associated with the storage and delivery
of physical instruments and
commodities. The designated FMU must
ensure that its record of physical assets
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
35
The proposed standard replaces and builds on
234.4(a)(14) under current Regulation HH.
36
under current Regulation HH for central securities
depositories and central counterparties and extends
the requirement explicitly by regulation to payment
systems.
37
reflects accurately the assets in its
possession. It would be prudent for a
designated FMU to have appropriate
employment policies and procedures for
personnel that handle physical assets,
including proper background checks
and training. Additional risk-
management methods a designated FMU
may consider include insurance
coverage and random storage facility
audits.
11. Central Securities Depositories
central securities depository to
minimize and manage the unique risks
associated with its function and
design.
35
A central securities depository
provides securities accounts, central
safekeeping, and asset services; helps to
ensure the integrity of securities issues;
and usually operates a securities
settlement system to transfer securities.
As a result, a central securities
depository may present custody risk to
their participants. Custody risk is the
risk of loss on assets held in custody in
the event of the central securities
depositorys insolvency, negligence,
fraud, poor administration, or
inadequate recordkeeping. For example,
safekeeping and transferring securities
in physical form can pose risk of loss or
destruction of the securities due to such
causes as fire, flood, or theft of the
security.
Under the proposed rule, a central
securities depository must have
appropriate rules and procedures to
help ensure the integrity of securities
issues. The preservation of the rights of
issuers and holders of securities is
essential for the orderly functioning of
a securities market. Failure by the
central securities depository to protect
customers assets from loss or
destruction, to safeguard the rights of
securities issuers or holders, or to keep
accurate records of a securities issuance
can have severe effects on the
confidence of the participants in the
safety and soundness of the central
securities depository and on the safety
and stability of the markets for these
securities. To protect the integrity of the
securities issue, the rules and
procedures must provide for
reconciliation of the securities issues
that it maintains at least daily, and
ensure that the total number of
securities recorded in the central
securities depository for a particular
issue is equal to the amount of securities
of that issue held on the central
securities depositorys books. One
important way for a designated FMU to
avoid credit risk and reduce the
potential for the unauthorized creation
of securities is to have the rules and
procedures that prohibit overdrafts and
debit balances in securities accounts.
Further, the central securities
depository must minimize and manage
the risks associated with the safekeeping
and transfer of securities. With respect
to safekeeping, the central securities
depository must employ a system that
ensures the segregation of assets
belonging to the central securities
depository from those belonging to its
participants. In addition, the central
securities depository must segregate
participants securities from those of
other participants. With respect to the
transfer of securities, although a central
securities depository may transfer
securities held in physical form via
physical delivery, it can reduce the risks
associated with such form of delivery by
immobilizing the securities and
providing electronic transfer via a book-
entry system. It can further eliminate
the risks associated with holding
securities in physical form through
dematerialization. Therefore, a central
securities depository must maintain
securities in immobilized or
dematerialized form so that they can be
transferred via book entry to the greatest
extent possible.
12. Exchange-of-Value Settlement
Systems
The settlement of a financial
transaction by a designated FMU may
involve the settlement of two linked
transactions, such as the delivery of
securities against payment of cash (i.e.,
DvP), delivery of securities against
delivery of other securities (i.e., DvD), or
the delivery of a payment in one
currency against delivery of a payment
in another currency (i.e., PvP).
Substantial credit losses and liquidity
pressures may result from the failure to
complete the settlement of both sides of
the linked obligations. Accordingly,
under proposed 234.3(a)(12), a
designated FMU that settles transactions
that involve the settlement of two linked
obligations, such as a transfer of
securities against payment or the
exchange of one currency for another,
must condition the final settlement of
one obligation upon the final settlement
of the other.
36
In this context, the
designated FMU eliminates principal
risk, which is the risk that a
counterparty will lose the full value
involved in a transaction when one leg
of the obligation is settled, but the other
is not (for example, the securities are
delivered but no cash payment is
received). The appropriate mechanisms
to achieve such final settlement to
eliminate principal risk are DvP, DvD,
or PvP settlement. These mechanisms
can settle obligations on either a gross
basis or on a net basis and the
obligations need not be settled
simultaneously. However, the
mechanism must ensure that the
settlement of one obligation is final if
and only if the settlement of the
corresponding obligation is final.
13. Participant-Default Rules and
Procedures
designated FMU to have effective and
clearly defined participant-default rules
and procedures that are designed to
ensure that the designated FMU can
take timely action to contain losses and
liquidity pressures and continue to meet
its obligations.
37
If participant defaults
are handled ineffectively, losses and
liquidity pressures can lead to the
failure of the designated FMU and can
spread to the designated FMUs other
participants and to the markets it serves.
Participant-default rules and
procedures must describe the
circumstances, both financial and
operational, that constitute a participant
default and that would trigger the
established default procedures. Other
key aspects to be considered in
designing the rules and procedures
include the actions that a designated
FMU can take when a default is
declared; the extent to which such
actions are automatic or discretionary;
potential changes to the normal
settlement practices to ensure timely
settlement should these changes be
necessary in extreme circumstances; the
management of transactions at different
stages of processing; the expected
treatment of proprietary and customer
transactions and accounts; the probable
sequencing of actions; the roles,
obligations, and responsibilities of the
various parties, including non-
defaulting participants; and the
existence of other mechanisms that may
be activated to contain the impact of a
default.
The proposed rule requires that a
designated FMUs rules and procedures
regarding participant defaults enable it
to take timely action to contain losses
and liquidity pressures resulting from a
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
default. Its rules must clearly describe
the use and sequence of use of the
financial resources at its disposal and
the obligations of the non-defaulting
participants to replenish the financial
resources used during a default. Further,
the public disclosure of key aspects of
the designated FMUs participant
default rules and procedures will help
to provide predictability regarding the
measures that the designated FMU will
take during a default (see also proposed
234.3(a)(23)).
The proposed rule also requires a
designated FMU to test and review its
default procedures, including any close-
out procedures, at least annually or
following any material changes to the
rules and procedures. These tests and
reviews are most effective when they
involve the designated FMUs
participants and other stakeholders
because the objective of the testing is to
ensure that the parties affected by a
default understand and are able to carry
out their responsibilities as expected
during a default event.
14. Segregation and Portability
central counterparty to have rules and
procedures that enable the segregation
and portability of positions of a
participants customers and the
collateral provided to the designated
FMU with respect to those positions.
Segregation refers to a method of
holding or accounting for a participants
customer collateral and contractual
positions separately from those of the
participant in order to protect the
customers collateral from becoming
part of the participants estate in
insolvency. Portability refers to the
operational aspects of the transfer of
contractual positions, funds, or
securities from one party to another.
It is important for a central
counterparty to have segregation and
portability arrangements, or alternate
means, that protect the assets of a
participants customers in the event of
that participants default or insolvency.
Effective segregation arrangements also
provide for clear and reliable
identification of the participants
customers positions and related
collateral. Effective portability
arrangements lessen the need for closing
out positions, even during times of
market stress. Portability thus reduces
the costs and potential market
disruption associated with closing out
positions and reduces the possible
impact on customers ability to continue
to obtain access to central clearing.
Effective segregation and portability
not only depends on the operational
capabilities of the designated FMU, but
also on the applicable legal framework.
A cash-market central counterparty, for
example, may operate in a legal regime
that offers the same degree of protection
for a participants customers as the
segregation and portability approaches
under proposed 234.3(a)(14). In such
cases, the Board will take into
consideration a central counterpartys
assessment of whether the applicable
legal or regulatory framework achieves
the same degree of protection and
efficiency for customers that would
otherwise be achieved by segregation
and portability arrangements at the
central counterparty level described in
the proposed standard. The Board
believes segregation and portability
arrangements may differ depending on
the design of a central counterparty and
would work with any applicable
designated FMU through the
supervisory process to determine how
best to set specific requirements.
Proposed 234.3(a)(14) is a new
standard with respect to Regulation HH.
These arrangements help to minimize
credit and liquidity risks to participants
customers, reduce the potential for
systemic risk that could result from
credit and liquidity exposures on a
defaulting participants customers, and
thereby support the stability of the
broader financial system.
15. General Business Risk
designated FMU to identify, monitor,
and manage its general business risk,
which is the risk of losses that may arise
from its administration and operation as
a business enterprise that are neither
related to participant default nor
separately covered by financial
resources maintained for credit or
liquidity risk under proposed
234.3(a)(4) and (7). General business
risk includes any potential impairment
of the designated FMUs financial
position as a consequence of a decline
in its revenues or an increase in its
expenses, where such expenses exceed
revenues and result in a loss that must
be charged against capital. Such
impairment can be caused by a variety
of business factors, including a poor
business strategy, ineffective operations,
negative cash flows, and unexpected
and excessively large operating
expenses. General business risks may
also arise from other risks, such as legal
risk (in the case of legal actions
challenging the designated FMUs
custody arrangements or other business
activities), investment risk affecting the
designated FMUs resources, and
operational risk (in the case of fraud,
theft, or loss). Losses associated with
general business risk may result in an
extraordinary one-time loss or recurring
losses.
General business risk may threaten
the designated FMUs ability to
continue to operate as a going concern.
The abrupt or disorderly failure of a
designated FMU would cause
significant uncertainty and confusion in
the markets it serves. In such a scenario,
the designated FMUs participants may
be unable to clear or settle their
financial transactions as expected.
FMU must identify, monitor, and
manage its general business risk, in part
by identifying and assessing its sources
of general business risk and their
potential impact on its operations and
services. For example, a designated
FMU must conduct scenario analysis to
examine how specific adverse business
scenarios would affect it. The
designated FMU must also conduct
sensitivity analysis to test how a
particular source of business risk, such
as the loss of a key customer, may affect
its financial standing (for example, its
cash flows, liquidity, and capital
positions). A designated FMU also must
have internal processes, controls, and
information systems to measure and
monitor on an ongoing basis the general
business risks that it identifies.
designated FMU to maintain, at a
minimum, sufficient liquid net assets
funded by equity to cover the greater of:
(1) The cost to implement its recovery
or orderly wind-down plan to address
general business losses and (2) six
months of current operating expenses.
This requirement is intended to ensure
that the designated FMU has both the
liquidity and the capital to absorb
unexpected losses, permitting it to
weather adverse conditions, and
promote public confidence in the
designated FMUs ability to continue
operations and services as a going
concern. Should it become necessary for
a designated FMU to wind down its
operations and services to its
participants, the liquid resources and
capital it holds may also help to fund
the wind-down so that it can be
conducted in an orderly manner.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(15)(i),
liquid net assets funded by equity are
composed of two components,
unencumbered liquid financial assets
and equity, both of which must be
sufficient to cover the greater of (1) the
cost to implement the recovery or
orderly wind-down plan and (2) six
months of operating expenses, as
described above. Proposed
234.3(a)(15)(i)(A) requires the
designated FMU to hold liquid financial
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
38
If the designated FMU does not hold cash or
cash equivalents, the assets held should be
sufficiently liquid so that they can be liquidated to
match the cash outflows projected under the
recovery or wind-down plans.
39
depositories and central counterparties and extends
the requirement explicitly by regulation to payment
systems.
assets, such as cash and highly liquid
securities, sufficient to cover the greater
of the two calculated costs described
above.
38
The liquid financial assets
must also be unencumbered by creditor
claims or liens. In addition, proposed
234.3(a)(15)(i)(B) requires the
designated FMU to hold equity in the
form of common stock, disclosed
reserves, and other retained earnings,
that is at all times greater than or equal
to the amount of unencumbered liquid
financial assets held under paragraph
(A).
For cases in which a designated FMU
is subject to international risk-based
capital standards or other relevant
Board-imposed capital requirements,
the Board, at its discretion, may allow
a designated FMU to use the equity held
for this purpose towards the designated
FMUs equity requirement in proposed
234.3(a)(15)(i)(B) to avoid duplicate
capital requirements. Further, the
Board, at its discretion, may allow a
designated FMU that is part of a larger
legal entity with multiple business lines
that do not each have a separate balance
sheet to meet the requirement by using
and equity held at the legal entity level.
Calculating recovery or orderly wind-
down costs. Costs to implement the
recovery or orderly wind-down plan are
those direct, support, and overhead
costs that the designated FMU would
incur in a recovery or wind-down
scenario. In determining these costs, the
designated FMU should first consider
reasonable scenarios where general
business losses could cause it to need to
recover or wind down. The appropriate
scenarios will depend on the designated
FMUs organizational structure and
market environment. The designated
FMU should then determine the
appropriate time period for a recovery
or orderly wind-down when faced with
these scenarios and calculate the costs
that would be incurred. A designated
FMU should also include in its analysis
the possibility that the designated FMU
may have to wind-down after an initial
attempt to recover. In calculating its
recovery or orderly wind-down costs,
the designated FMU should consider
additional, extraordinary costs related to
a recovery or wind-down, such as
additional legal expenses and costs
associated with retaining staff (such as
retention bonuses). The designated FMU
may also remove from its calculation
those normal business operating
expenses that would not be incurred in
a recovery or wind-down scenario, such
as certain marketing costs.
Calculating six months of current
operating expenses. At a minimum, a
designated FMU must hold six months
of current operating expenses. This is a
minimum requirement for all designated
FMUs, irrespective of their
organizational and ownership structure,
as well as charter type, that creates a
level playing field among different types
of FMUs. When calculating its current
operating expenses, the designated FMU
is expected to consider its normal
business operating expenses. These
expenses are those that are typically
categorized as either cost of sales or
selling, general, and administrative
expenses on the designated FMUs
income statement. Therefore, these costs
may exclude, among other items,
depreciation and amortization expenses,
taxes, and interest on debt.
Further, proposed 234.3(a)(15)(ii)
requires a designated FMU to develop
and maintain a viable capital plan for
raising additional equity before its
equity falls below the amount required.
In developing this plan, the designated
FMU should consider its ownership
structure and any insured business
risks. Given the contingent nature of
insurance, a designated FMU should use
conservative assumptions when taking
insurance into account for its capital
plan, and these resources may not be
taken into account when assessing the
designated FMUs capital adequacy. A
designated FMUs capital plan must be
approved by the board of directors and
updated at least annually.
Proposed 234.3(a)(15) is a new
standard in Regulation HH. The
proposed standard reflects existing
Board supervisory expectations for a
financial institution to manage
appropriately its general business risk,
including through the use of financial
and internal controls. The proposed
capital requirement to maintain liquid
net assets funded by equity equal to at
least six months of current operating
expenses is also generally consistent
with past and current Board supervisory
practice. Before the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Board required certain
FMUs under its jurisdiction to hold
sufficient resources to ensure a recovery
or orderly wind-down of critical
operations and services. In determining
the appropriate level of capital for an
FMU, the Board considered three
factors: (1) Initial capital should be
sufficient to absorb any projected start-
up operating losses and limited business
losses in its early operation; (2) capital
should be sufficient to cover costs of
continued operations during an orderly
wind-down; and (3) capital should be
sufficient at all times to meet any
minimum regulatory requirements.
Therefore, although the proposed
standard is new to Regulation HH, its
objectives are consistent with the
prudential objectives of the Boards
supervisory process that existed prior to
the Act. The Board recognizes that the
incremental burden may vary by
designated FMU.
questions:
Q.15.1 Should the Board set a
minimum amount of liquid net assets
funded by equity that is different from
the six-month minimum international
standard, such as three or nine months
of current operating expenses? Should
the Board set the requirement based on
the risk profile of the designated FMU?
If so, what factors should the Board
consider and what would be the effects
of such an approach?
Q.15.2 Should the Board require a
designated FMU that is part of a larger
legal entity to take into account, when
calculating the cost to implement its
recovery or orderly wind-down plans,
recovery or wind-down scenarios in
which other business lines in the legal
entity or the legal entity itself may also
face an adverse business environment?
To prepare for such scenarios, should
the designated FMU include in its
calculation of recovery or wind-down
costs more than its normal business
share of any shared support and
overhead costs?
Q.15.3 For designated FMUs that are
part of a larger legal entity, the Board
considered the alternative of requiring
the designated FMU to hold liquid net
assets funded by equity that are specific
to the FMU itself to meet the
requirement, but believes that it would
likely be difficult to implement in
practice. Are there any reasonable
methodologies for determining which of
the liquid net assets and equity held at
the legal entity level belong to a
particular business line?
16. Custody and Investment Risks
designated FMU to minimize and
manage the custody and investment
risks associated with its own and its
participants assets.
39
Custody risk is the
risk of loss on assets held in custody in
the event of a custodians (or
subcustodians) insolvency, negligence,
fraud, poor administration, or
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
40
The proposed standard is also consistent with the
requirements in the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council (FFIEC) IT Handbook, Board
Supervision and Regulation (SR) Letter 039 on the
Interagency Paper on Sound Practices for the
Resilience of the U.S. Financial System, SR Letter
0718 on Pandemic Planning, and SR Letter 0523
on Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for
Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and
Customer Notice.
inadequate recordkeeping. Investment
risk is the risk of loss faced by an FMU
when it invests its own or its
participants assets. Situations that
create custody and investment risks may
prevent a designated FMU from having
prompt access to its own assets or its
participants assets at the expected
value when needed. Problems with
access could result in financial losses
incurred by the FMU, participants, and
other parties and damage the designated
FMUs reputation or perceived
reliability.
designated FMU to safeguard its own
and its participants assets and
minimize the risk of loss on and delay
in access to these assets by holding its
own and its participants assets at
supervised and regulated entities that
have robust accounting practices,
safekeeping procedures, and internal
controls that fully protect the assets. A
designated FMU must also evaluate and
consider the full scope of its
relationship with and exposures to its
custodian banks. For example, a
custodian bank may also be a
participant in the designated FMU, as
well as the designated FMUs settlement
bank or liquidity provider.
Understanding these different
relationships is necessary to avoid
excessive concentration or exposure to
an individual financial institution.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(16)(ii), if a
designated FMU invests its own and its
participants assets, it is required to
invest the assets in instruments with
minimal credit, market, and liquidity
risks, such as investments that are
secured by, or are claims on, high-
quality obligors and investments that
allow for quick liquidation with little, if
any, adverse price effect. A designated
FMU must use an investment strategy
that is consistent with its overall risk-
management strategy and fully
disclosed to its participants. The
alignment of investment and risk-
management strategies and the
disclosure of the investment strategies
can help ensure that investment choices
do not allow the pursuit of profit to
compromise the designated FMUs
financial soundness and liquidity
management. A designated FMU must
also consider its overall credit risk
exposures to individual obligors,
including relationships with the obligor
that create additional exposures, such as
when the obligor is also a participant or
an affiliate of a participant in the
designated FMU.
17. Operational Risk
designated FMU to manage its
operational risk by establishing a robust
operational risk-management framework
that is approved by the board of
directors.
40
Operational risk is the risk
that deficiencies in information systems,
internal processes, and personnel or
disruptions from external events will
result in the deterioration or breakdown
of services provided by an FMU.
Vulnerabilities to and threats against the
designated FMUs physical security or
information security, including cyber
security, also present operational risk.
FMU must establish a framework to
manage its operational risk. Proposed
234.3(a)(17)(i) requires the designated
FMU to identify the plausible sources of
operational risk, both internal and
external, and mitigate their impact
through the use of appropriate systems,
policies, procedures, and controls that
are reviewed, audited, and tested
periodically, as well as after major
changes that could affect the source or
level of operational risk that is present
in the designated FMU. In addition,
proposed 234.3(a)(17)(ii) requires the
and manage the risks its operations
might pose to other FMUs.
Proposed 234.3(a)(17)(iii) requires the
designated FMU to have policies and
systems that are designed to achieve
clearly defined objectives to ensure a
high degree of security and operational
reliability. Proposed 234.3(a)(17)(iv)
requires the designated FMU to have
systems that have adequate, scalable
capacity to handle increasing stress
volumes and achieve the designated
FMUs service-level objectives.
Proposed 234.3(a)(17)(v) requires the
designated FMU to have comprehensive
physical, information, and cyber
security policies, procedures, and
controls that address potential and
evolving vulnerabilities and threats.
Proposed 234.3(a)(17)(vi) and (vii)
address the designated FMUs business
continuity management. The designated
FMU must have business continuity
management that aims for rapid
recovery and timely resumption of
critical operations and fulfillment of the
designated FMUs obligations, under a
range of scenarios, including a wide-
scale or major disruption. Specifically, a
designated FMU must have a business
continuity plan that incorporates the
use of a secondary site located at a
sufficient geographical distance from
the primary site to have a distinct risk
profile, such that, for example the sites
are not located in the same hurricane
zone or on the same fault line. Further,
the business continuity plan must be
designed to ensure that critical
information technology systems can
recover and resume operations within
two hours after the disruptive events
and to enable the designated FMU to
complete settlement by the end of the
day of the disruption, even in case of
extreme circumstances. Further, the
business continuity plan must be tested
at least annually and more frequently
where appropriate.
Sources of operational risk change
over time and with advancements in
technology. Although the operational
risk standard has historically been
applied through the lens of a disruption
that causes physical damage to
infrastructure or equipment (that is,
physical threats or attacks), the Board
believes, in general, that a designated
FMU should take into account
cyberattacks and threats when
establishing its business continuity
plans. The PFMI also makes explicit
references to cyberattacks, which
suggests that the traditional view on
operational risk has evolved
internationally. Cyberattacks can reach
far beyond the geographical distance
that any physical attack can reach.
While cyberattacks may present
different challenges than physical
attacks, the need for rapid recovery and
timely resumption in response to
cyberattacks is equally necessary.
The Board recognizes, however, that
there is ongoing work and discussion
domestically and internationally on
developing operational risk-
management standards and planning for
business continuity with respect to
cyber security and responses to
cyberattacks. Further, certain standards
or responses originally intended to
address physical attacks may not be
appropriate for certain types of
cyberattacks. For example, the proposed
two-hour recovery time objective (a
longstanding industry objective and
Board requirement) may present
challenges in the near term for extreme
cyberattacks that could corrupt data or
software from not just the designated
FMUs primary site but also its
geographically distance backup site(s).
The Board anticipates addressing with
designated FMUs through the
supervisory process reasonable
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
41
approaches to cyberattacks in the
context of the evolving risk and
technological environment.
The requirement to consider
cyberattack scenarios in a designated
FMUs business continuity planning
may, in some respects, constitute a
heightened requirement. In an
environment where cyberattacks have
become increasingly sophisticated and
far-reaching, a designated FMU must
plan for recovery and resumption of
operations in these scenarios. The
inability of a designated FMU to
respond in a timely manner to
cyberattacks could compromise the
integrity of the financial markets. In
addition, planning for such scenarios
also would be in accordance with
national policies aimed at improving the
cybersecurity posture of U.S. critical
infrastructures. The Board recognizes
that there may be additional costs
associated with development of
business continuity plans and
establishment of any systems and
controls to accommodate different
scenarios of cyberattacks.
questions related to cyberattacks:
Q.17.1 What types of changes to a
designated FMUs current systems,
policies, procedures, and controls will
be necessary to reasonably ensure that
its critical information technology
systems can recover and resume
operations no later than two hours
following disruptive events caused by
cyberattacks?
Q.17.2 What are reasonable
estimates of the costs and other
challenges associated with these
changes?
18. Access and Participation
Requirements
designated FMU to have objective, risk-
based, and publicly disclosed criteria
for participation, which permit fair and
open access.
41
Access refers to the
ability to use a designated FMUs
services by direct participants and,
where relevant, indirect participants
and service providers. These
participation requirements should not
be subjective or overly restrictive
because fair and open access to a
designated FMU helps support the
stability of the financial system. Fair
and open access may help avoid the
concentration of financial activity (and
therefore risk) into a few large
participants. Broad participation in a
designated FMU can also increase the
effectiveness of multilateral netting
arrangements, facilitate crisis
management by applying a consistent
set of rules and procedures (for
example, default management and loss
mutualization), encourage competition
among participants, promote efficiency,
and improve overall market
transparency.
Unlimited access to an FMU,
however, can pose a wide variety of
risks to the FMU. A designated FMU
can control these risks by setting
reasonable risk-based participation
requirements to ensure that participants
have the requisite operational capacity,
financial resources, legal powers, and
risk-management expertise to prevent
unacceptable risk exposure for the
designated FMU and its other
participants. Therefore, balancing fair
and open access with reasonable risk-
based participation requirements can
promote robust risk management,
promote the safety and soundness of the
designated FMU, reduce systemic risk,
and support the stability of the broader
financial system.
designated FMU is required to control
the risks to which it is exposed from its
participants by setting objective, risk-
based, and publicly disclosed
requirements for participants in its
services, including designing the criteria
to ensure that participants meet
appropriate operational, financial, and
legal requirements that allow them to
meet their obligations to the FMU or
other participants on a timely basis.
Although a designated FMU may use
risk-based measures in determining
access, the requirements should be
objective and should not unnecessarily
discriminate against particular classes of
participants or introduce competitive
distortions. Participation requirements
must be justified in terms of the safety
and efficiency of the designated FMU
and the markets it serves, and tailored
to and commensurate with the
designated FMUs specific risks.
Overall, risk-based, as well as other
participation requirements, should aim
to have the least restrictive impact on
access needed to achieve their
objectives.
designated FMU must monitor
compliance with its access and
participation criteria on an ongoing
basis. Further, it must have the
authority to impose more-stringent
requirements and other risk controls on
a participant in situations where the
designated FMU determines that the
participant poses heightened risk to the
FMU. The proposed rule allows the
designated FMU to require participants
to report any developments that may
affect their ability to comply with the
designated FMUs requirements. If a
participants creditworthiness declines,
the designated FMU can then require
the participant to provide additional
collateral or reduce the participants
credit limit. Under proposed
234.3(a)(18)(ii), the designated FMU
must clearly define and publicly
disclose its procedures for facilitating
the suspension and orderly exit of a
participant that fails to meet the
designated FMUs access and
participation criteria.
19. Tiered Participation Arrangements
and manage the material risks to the
designated FMU arising from tiered
participation arrangements. Tiered
participation arrangements occur when
other firms (indirect participants) rely
on the services provided by direct
participants to use the designated
FMUs central payment, clearing, or
settlement facilities. Indirect
participants are not bound by the rules
of the designated FMU, but their
transactions are cleared or settled
through the FMU by way of a direct
participant that has a contractual
relationship with the FMU. As a result,
the transactions of indirect participants
may pose credit, liquidity, operational,
and other risks to the FMU. If these risks
are not managed effectively by the direct
participants of the FMU or the FMU
itself, these risks can affect the safety
and soundness of the FMU and pose
systemic risk to other market
participants and FMUs.
FMU is required to identify the types of
risk that could arise from tiered
participation arrangements and monitor
concentrations of such risk. If a
designated FMU is exposed to material
financial or operational risk from tiered
participation arrangements, the FMU
should seek to manage and limit the
risk. The Board recognizes that there are
limits to the extent to which a
designated FMU can influence direct
participants commercial relationships
with their customers. Nonetheless, the
FMU should not ignore risks that can
significantly affect its operations. A
designated FMU may have access to
information on transactions undertaken
on behalf of indirect participants that
would allow it to evaluate and take
steps to manage any risks posed by the
indirect participants. For example, a
designated FMU can set expectations in
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
42
depositories and central counterparties. Links to
payment systems are addressed in proposed
234.3(a)(9) and are not covered under this
standard.
43
its membership agreements with its
direct participants regarding
information on transactions undertaken
on behalf of their customers in order to
evaluate the proportion of customer
business relative to the direct
participants proprietary business. A
regular review of the risks to which the
designated FMU may be exposed as a
result of tiered participation
arrangements may also be beneficial to
determining whether any mitigating
actions are necessary.
In order to determine whether it faces
material risks arising from tiered
participation, a designated FMU could
gather basic information on indirect
participants in order to identify (a) the
proportion of activity that direct
participants conduct on behalf of
indirect participants, (b) direct
participants that act on behalf of a
material number of indirect
participants, (c) indirect participants
with significant volumes or values of
transactions in the system, and (d)
indirect participants whose transaction
volumes or values are large relative to
those of the direct participants through
which they access the FMU. A
designated FMUs analysis would also
benefit from identifying material
dependencies between direct and
indirect participants that might affect
the FMU. For example, the FMU could
determine whether a large proportion of
the transactions processed by the
designated FMU originates from indirect
participants and, as a result, creates a
material dependency on the operational
or financial performance of a few direct
participants.
Proposed 234.3(a)(19) is a new rule
and may impose an additional cost or
burden on designated FMUs. The Board
believes this requirement is necessary
because the dependencies and risk
exposures inherent in tiered
participation arrangements can present
risks to the designated FMU and its
smooth functioning and the broader
financial markets. If a designated FMU
has few direct participants, but many
indirect participants, the disruption to
the services of one or more of these few
direct participants could present risk to
the smooth functioning of the market
the designated FMU serves. In addition,
if the value of an indirect participants
transactions is large relative to the direct
participants ability to manage risks, the
direct participants default risk may be
greater.
questions:
Q.19.1 What, if any, risks do tiered
participation arrangements pose to a
payment system? How would a payment
system assess these risks?
Q.19.2 What types of information
would be helpful to assess the risks
posed by indirect participants to a
designated FMU? Is it feasible for a
payment system to collect this
information?
Q.19.3 How, if at all, should the
Board define the threshold for
identifying indirect participants
responsible for a significant proportion
of transactions processed by the
designated FMU?
Q.19.4 How, if at all, should the
Board define the threshold for
identifying indirect participants whose
transaction volumes or values are large
relative to the capacity of the direct
participants through which the indirect
participants access the designated FMU?
Q.19.5 How often should a
designated FMU review the potential
risks from tiered participation
arrangements?
20. Links to Other Financial Market
Utilities
central counterparty, securities
depository and that establishes a link
with one or more of these types of FMU
to identify, monitor, and manage link-
related risks.
42
FMU links, as defined in
proposed 234.2(f), can reduce
transaction costs and increase market
efficiency, but they may also serve as an
avenue for contagion of market stress
between FMUs and markets. Links can
expose a designated FMU to legal risk,
where the laws and rules governing the
linked FMUs differ; operational risk,
where operational failures in one FMU
may have implications for other linked
FMUs; and financial risk, where the
failure or default of a participant in one
FMU may impact a linked FMU. Any of
these risks individually or in
combination could pose systemic risk
and threaten the stability of the broader
financial system. Therefore, a
designated FMU should manage and
mitigate to the greatest extent
practicable the risks that arise from its
link arrangements.
FMU that establishes a link is required
to identify, monitor, and manage the
risks related to the link, which may
include legal, operational, credit, and
liquidity risks. The identification,
monitoring, and management of link-
related risks begin before the designated
FMU enters into the arrangement in
order to identify, monitor, and manage
all potential sources of risk arising from
the link arrangement. A link must have
a well-founded legal basis in all relevant
jurisdictions. Further, a designated FMU
must measure, monitor, and manage the
credit and liquidity risks arising from a
link to another FMU. Credit extensions
between linked FMUs must be covered
fully with a high degree of confidence
with high-quality collateral. In
particular, a designated FMU that
operates as a central counterparty in a
link arrangement with another central
counterparty must cover, at least on a
daily basis, its current and potential
future exposures to the linked central
counterparty and its participants, if any,
without reducing the designated FMUs
ability to fulfill its obligations to its own
participants. A designated FMU that
establishes a link with another FMU
must also ensure that the arrangement
provides a high level of protection for
the rights of its participants.
Furthermore, a designated FMU that
establishes multiple links must ensure
that the risks generated in one link do
not affect the soundness of the other
links and linked FMUs. Links must be
designed so that the designated FMU
can comply with the other standards
proposed in this regulation.
21. Efficiency and Effectiveness
designated FMU to be efficient and
effective in meeting the requirements of
its participants and the markets it
serves.
43
Efficiency generally
encompasses what an FMU chooses to
do, how it does it, and the resources
required by the designated FMU to
perform its functions. Effectiveness
refers to whether the designated FMU is
meeting its goals and objectives, which
include the requirements of its
participants and the markets it serves. A
designated FMU that is designed or
managed inefficiently or ineffectively
may ultimately distort financial activity
and market structure, increasing not
only the credit, liquidity, and other risks
of the FMUs participants, but also the
risks of their customers and other end
users.
There is an inherent tradeoff between
safety (that is, risk management) and
efficiency (that is, direct and indirect
costs) in the design and management of
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
44
For example, this standard is consistent with
the existing supervisory expectations for
systemically important central securities
depositories and central counterparties in section
C.2.a.xvi of part I of the PSR policy.
45
a designated FMU. A designated FMUs
design; operating structure; scope of
activities; and use of technology can
influence its efficiency and can
ultimately provide incentives for market
participants to use, or not use, the
designated FMUs services. In certain
cases, inefficiently designed systems
may increase operational costs to the
point at which it would be cost
prohibitive for participants to use the
designated FMU. As a result, the
inefficiency could drive market
participants toward less-safe
alternatives, such as bilateral clearing or
settlement on the books of the
participants. In such cases, risks to the
market participants increase as they
seek less-safe opportunities to lower
direct costs; this behavior may
reintroduce risk into the market that the
designated FMU was intended to
mitigate. Therefore, designated FMUs
should be efficient and effective in their
design and operations.
designated FMU must be efficient and
effective with regard to (A) its clearing
and settlement arrangement (for
example, gross, net, or hybrid
settlement; real time or batch
processing; and novation or guarantee
scheme); (B) risk-management policies,
procedures, and systems; (C) scope of
products cleared or settled; and (D) the
use of technology and communication
procedures. To help maintain system
efficiency, the designated FMUs system
design must be sufficiently flexible to
respond to changing demand and new
technologies.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(21)(ii), a
designated FMU must have clearly
defined goals and objectives that are
measureable and achievable, such as
minimum service levels (for example,
the time it takes to process a
transaction), risk-management
expectations (for example, the level of
financial resources it should hold), and
business priorities (for example, the
development of new services). Under
proposed 234.3(a)(21)(iii), a designated
FMU must have policies and procedures
for the regular review of its efficiency
and effectiveness. To be effective, a
designated FMU must reliably meet its
obligations in a timely manner,
including service and security
requirements, and achieve the public
policy goals of safety and efficiency for
participants and the markets it serves.
22. Communication Procedures and
Standards
designated FMU to use, or at a
minimum accommodate, relevant
internationally accepted communication
procedures and standards in order to
facilitate efficient payment, clearing,
and settlement. The use of
procedures and standards can reduce
the number of errors, avoid information
losses, and reduce transaction and
processing costs, which helps reduce
operational risk faced by a designated
FMU, its participants, and the broader
markets. Further, lower transaction
costs associated with the use or
accommodation of internationally
accepted communication procedures
and standards can promote participation
in the designated FMU by a broad set of
financial institutions in various
locations. Therefore, the use or
accommodation of internationally
and standards supports robust risk
management, promotes the safety and
soundness of designated FMUs, and
supports the stability of the broader
financial system.
FMU must use or accommodate
procedures, messaging standards, and
reference data standards that provide a
common set of rules across systems for
exchanging messages and allow a broad
set of systems and institutions in
various locations to communicate
efficiently and effectively. A designated
FMU, alternatively or additionally, may
communicate with other systems by
supporting systems that translate or
convert internationally accepted
procedures and standards into those
used by the designated FMU.
Proposed 234.3(a)(22), although new
to Regulation HH as an explicit
requirement, codifies the Boards
existing supervisory requirements for
the payment, clearing, or settlement
systems under its authority.
44

Designated FMUs subject to the Boards
authority already use, or at minimum
accommodate, the relevant
internationally accepted
communications procedures.
23. Disclosure of Rules, Key Procedures,
and Market Data
designated FMU to disclose relevant
information about its operations and
risk management to its participants and
to the public.
45
Such transparency
allows a designated FMUs participants,
relevant authorities, and the broader
public to understand better the activities
and structure of the designated FMU, its
risk profile, and its risk-management
practices and to compare such
characteristics across similar types of
FMUs. Disclosure of relevant
information by a designated FMU can
thus support sound decisionmaking by
these stakeholders. Participants can use
this information to assess and manage
more effectively any risks posed to them
by the designated FMU. Relevant
authorities can use this information to
better assess the designated FMUs
observance of the risk-management
standards, help identify possible risks,
and inform their cooperative or
coordination efforts with the Board.
Relevant authorities can include those
supervising the participants of the
designated FMU. These authorities can
use the information disclosed by the
FMU to better assess the risks posed to
the financial institutions they supervise.
Disclosure to the public helps potential
participants make informed decisions
on whether to become members of the
designated FMU and promotes
confidence in the markets served by the
FMU. Thus, transparency by a
designated FMU promotes robust risk
management, reduces systemic risk, and
supports the stability of the broader
financial system.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(23)(i) and
(ii), a designated FMU must have clear
and comprehensive rules and
procedures and disclose publicly all
rules and key procedures, including key
aspects of its default rules and
procedures. An FMUs rules and
procedures are typically the foundation
of the FMU and provide the basis for
participants and potential participants
understanding of the risks they incur by
participating in the FMU. Rules and
procedures should include clear
descriptions of the systems design and
operations as well as the participants
and the FMUs rights and obligations. In
addition to disclosing all relevant rules
and key procedures, the FMU should
have a clear and fully disclosed process
for proposing and implementing
changes to its rules and procedures and
for informing participants and relevant
authorities of these changes.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(23)(iii), the
designated FMU must provide sufficient
information to enable participants to
have an accurate understanding of the
risks, fees, and other material costs they
incur by participating in the designated
FMU. An FMU should provide all
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
documentation, training, and
information necessary to facilitate
participants understanding of the rules
and procedures and the risk they face
from participating in the FMU. For
example, an FMU should disclose to
each individual participant the stress
test scenarios used, the individual
participants stress-test results, aggregate
stress-test results, and other data to help
each participant understand and
manage the potential financial risks
stemming from its participation in the
FMU. An FMU should also disclose to
its participants the key highlights of its
business continuity arrangements,
without revealing information that can
create vulnerabilities for the FMU or
undermine its safety and soundness.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(23)(iv), the
designated FMU must provide a
comprehensive public disclosure on its
legal, governance, risk management, and
operating framework. The public
disclosure must include (A) an
executive summary, (B) a summary of
major changes since the last update of
the disclosure, (C) general background
information on the designated FMU, (D)
a narrative for each standard that
summarizes the designated FMUs
approach to complying with the
standard, and (E) a list of publicly
available resources that provide further
information on the designated FMU.
The general background information
required under proposed
234.3(a)(23)(iv)(C) must include (I) the
designated FMUs function and the
markets it serves, (II) basic data and
performance statistics on its services
and operations, such as basic volume
and value statistics by product type,
average aggregate intraday exposures to
its participants, and statistics on the
designated FMUs operational
reliability, and (III) a description of the
designated FMUs general organization,
legal and regulatory framework, and
system design and operations. Data
provided should be accompanied by
robust explanatory documentation that
enables readers to understand and
interpret the data correctly.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(23)(iv)(D),
the designated FMUs disclosure
framework must include a standard-by-
standard summary narrative. This
section must provide a narrative for
each applicable principle with sufficient
detail and context to enable a reader to
understand the FMUs approach to
observing the principle. A designated
FMU may look to the guiding questions
in the CPSSIOSCO Principles for
Financial Market Infrastructures:
Disclosure Framework and Assessment
Methodology as background to
understand the level and type of detail
that the Board expects to be included in
the disclosure. Further, cross-references
to publicly available documents should
be included, where relevant, to
supplement the narrative.
Under proposed 234.3(a)(23)(v), a
designated FMU must update the public
disclosure under (iv) of this part every
two years, or more frequently following
changes to its system or the
environment in which it operates,
which would significantly change the
accuracy of the statements provided the
public disclosure.
The proposed standard contains two
requirements that may be new for at
least one designated FMU subject to
Regulation HH. The proposed standard
makes more explicit that a designated
FMU should disclose relevant rules and
key procedures and provide a
comprehensive disclosure to the public.
The Board does not expect that
disclosure of rules and key procedures
will impose a significant burden on
designated FMUs because they already
have these rules available; the cost of
posting them on their Web sites should
be minimal. An FMUs initial
comprehensive disclosure may be more
costly to produce, but the Board expects
that a designated FMU will leverage,
where possible, the narratives from the
self-assessment against the previous sets
of international standards that it
currently prepares under the PSR
policy. Further, future updates to the
comprehensive disclosure should
impose a minimal burden unless there
are significant changes to the designated
FMUs governance, operations, or risk-
management framework.
The Board believes that such
transparency is essential to promoting
robust risk management, reducing
systemic risk, and enhancing financial
stability because it allows the public,
including market participants, to
understand an FMUs operations and
better predict its actions in a crisis.
This, in turn, allows participants to
manage any risks posed to them from
the FMUs actions and thereby limit
systemic risk and enhance financial
stability.
question:
Q.23.1 Should the Board require
information about fees and discount
policies to be part of the designated
FMUs public disclosure framework?
Why should the Board not require
disclosure of fees and discount policies?
III. Administrative Law Matters
A. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
Congress enacted the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et
seq.) to address concerns related to the
effects of agency rules on small entities,
and the Board is sensitive to the impact
its rules may impose on small entities.
The RFA requires agencies either to
provide an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis with a proposed rule or to
certify that the proposed rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
In accordance with section 3(a) of the
RFA, the Board has reviewed the
proposed regulation. In this case, the
proposed rule would apply to FMUs
that are designated by the Council under
Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act as
systemically important to the U.S.
financial system. In July 2012, the
Council designated eight FMUs as
systemically important. Based on
current information, none of the
designated FMUs are small entities
for purposes of the RFA, and so, the
proposed rule likely would not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities (5
U.S.C. 605(b)). The following Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis,
however, has been prepared in
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 603, based on
current information. The Board will, if
necessary, conduct a final regulatory
flexibility analysis after consideration of
comments received during the public
comment period. The Board requests
public comment on all aspects of this
analysis.
1. Statement of the need for,
objectives of, and legal basis for, the
proposed rule. The Board is proposing
these revisions to Regulation HH to
implement certain provisions of Title
VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act. Section
805(a)(1)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act
requires the Board to prescribe risk-
management standards governing the
operations related to the payment,
clearing, and settlement activities of
certain designated FMUs. In prescribing
the risk-management standards, section
805(a)(1) of the Act requires the Board
to take into consideration, among other
things, the relevant international
standards. As noted above, the CPSS
and IOSCO finalized the PFMI in April
2012. The Board believes that the PFMI
is now widely recognized as the most
relevant set of international risk-
management standards for payment,
clearing, and settlement systems and the
risk-management standards in
Regulation HH should be updated in
consideration of the PFMI. As described
above, risk-management standards
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
based on the PFMI may improve upon
the standards currently in Regulation
HH and will further promote the
objectives of the risk-management
standards for designated FMUs set out
in section 805(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Board believes that the
implementation of risk-management
standards based on the PFMI by the
relevant payment, clearing, and
settlement systems and their regulators,
both domestically and internationally,
can help promote the safety and
efficiency of these systems and financial
stability more broadly. Widespread
implementation also reduces potential
conflicts among domestic and foreign
authorities regarding prudential
requirements for FMUs, and provides a
more consistent framework among
relevant domestic and foreign
authorities for assessing the risks and
risk management of FMUs with cross-
market, cross-border, or cross-currency
operations.
2. Small entities affected by the
proposed rule. Pursuant to regulations
issued by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) (13 CFR 121.201),
a small entity includes an
establishment engaged in (i) financial
transaction processing, reserve and
liquidity services, and/or clearinghouse
services with an average annual revenue
of $35.5 million or less (NAICS code
522320); (ii) securities and/or
commodity exchange activities with an
average annual revenue of $35.5 million
or less (NAICS code 523210); and (iii)
trust, fiduciary, and/or custody
activities with an average annual
revenue of $35.5 million or less (NAICS
code 523991). Based on current
information, the Board does not believe
that any of the FMUs that have been
designated by the Council, and in
particular the two designated FMUs for
which the Board is the Supervisory
Agency under Title VIII of the Dodd-
Frank Act, would be small entities
pursuant to the SBA regulation.
3. Projected reporting, recordkeeping,
and other compliance requirements.
The proposed rule imposes certain
reporting and recordkeeping
requirements for a designated FMU,
such as proposed 234.3(a)(3) that
requires a designated FMU to have
policies and procedures to identify,
measure, monitor, and manage relevant
risk and to develop recovery or orderly
wind-down plans. The proposed rule
also contains a number of compliance
requirements that the designated FMU
must meet, such as the designated FMU
having a well-founded, clear,
transparent, and enforceable legal basis
for each material aspect of its activities
in all relevant jurisdictions (proposed
234.3(a)(1)). In addition, the proposed
rule contains requirements for the
maintenance of sufficient financial
resources to address its credit risk
(proposed 234.3(a)(4)), liquidity risk
(proposed 234.3(a)(7)), and general
business risk (proposed 234.3(a)(15)).
Professionals that the designated FMU
needs to employ to comply with these
standards may include experts skilled in
the legal, risk management, finance,
payments operations, and accounting
areas.
4. Identification of duplicative,
overlapping, or conflicting Federal
rules. The Board does not believe that
any Federal rules conflict with these
proposed revisions to Regulation HH.
5. Significant alternatives to the
proposed rule. The Board is not aware
of any significant alternatives to the
proposed rule that accomplish the
stated objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act
and that minimize any significant
economic impact of the proposed rule
on small entities. As noted above, the
PFMI is now widely recognized as the
most relevant set of international risk-
management standards for payment,
clearing, and settlement systems. The
Board is proposing to revise the risk-
management standards in Regulation
HH in consideration of the current
international standards. FMUs that are
designated as systemically important by
the Council and present similar risk
profiles should be held to consistent
standards, including compliance and
reporting requirements, regardless of
size, because they can present similar
risk to the U.S. financial system. In
addition, except as noted above, the
proposed standards generally employ a
flexible, principles-based approach to
permit a designated FMU to employ a
cost-effective method for compliance, so
long as the method chosen achieves the
risk-mitigation goals of the standard.
Where necessary or appropriate, the
proposed rule includes specific testing
frequencies or other requirements. The
Board included such detail in each
proposed standard as it deemed
necessary to provide the designated
FMUs with sufficient guidance for
compliance with the standard.
B. Competitive Impact Analysis
As a matter of policy, the Board
subjects all operational and legal
changes that could have a substantial
effect on payment system participants to
a competitive impact analysis, even if
competitive effects are not apparent on
the face of the proposal. Pursuant to this
policy, the Board assesses whether
proposed changes would have a direct
and material adverse effect on the
ability of other service providers to
compete effectively with the Federal
Reserve in providing similar services
and whether any such adverse effect
was due to legal differences or due to
a dominant market position deriving
from such legal differences. If, as a
result of this analysis, the Board
identifies an adverse effect on the ability
to compete, the Board then assesses
whether the associated benefitssuch
as improvements to payment system
efficiency or integritycan be achieved
while minimizing the adverse effect on
competition.
Designated FMUs are subject to the
supervisory framework established
under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act.
This proposed rule promulgates revised
Regulation HH risk-management
standards for certain designated FMUs
as required by Title VIII. At least one
currently designated FMU that is subject
to Regulation HH competes with a
similar service provided by the Reserve
Banks. Under the Federal Reserve Act,
the Board has general supervisory
authority over the Reserve Banks,
including the Reserve Banks provision
of payment and settlement services
(Federal Reserve priced services).
This general supervisory authority is
much more extensive in scope than the
authority provided under Title VIII over
designated FMUs. In practice, Board
oversight of the Reserve Banks goes well
beyond the typical supervisory
framework for private-sector entities,
including the framework provided by
Title VIII.
The Board is committed to applying
risk-management standards to the
Reserve Banks Fedwire Funds Service
and Fedwire Securities Service that are
at least as stringent as the applicable
Regulation HH standards applied to
designated FMUs that provide similar
services. In a separate, related Federal
Register notice, the Board proposes to
revise concurrently part I of its PSR
policy, which applies to the Federal
Reserve priced services, in
consideration of the PFMI. The
proposed revisions to the risk-
management and transparency
expectations in part I of the PSR policy
are consistent with those proposed for
Regulation HH. Therefore, the Board
does not believe the proposed rule
promulgating risk-management
standards for designated FMUs under
Title VIII will have any direct and
material adverse effect on the ability of
other service providers to compete with
the Reserve Banks.
C. Paperwork Reduction Act Analysis
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506;
5 CFR part 1320, Appendix A.1), the
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
Board reviewed the proposed rule under
the authority delegated to the Board by
the Office of Management and Budget.
For purposes of calculating burden
under the Paperwork Reduction Act, a
collection of information involves 10
or more respondents. Any collection of
information addressed to all or a
substantial majority of an industry is
presumed to involve 10 or more
respondents (5 CFR 1320.3(c),
1320.3(c)(4)(ii)). The Board estimates
there are fewer than 10 respondents and
these respondents do not represent all
or a substantial majority of the
participants in payment, clearing, and
settlement systems. Therefore, no
collections of information pursuant to
the Paperwork Reduction Act are
contained in the proposed rule.
IV. Text of Proposed Rule
List of Subjects in 12 CFR 234
Banks, Banking, Credit, Electronic
funds transfers, Financial market
utilities, Securities.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Board proposes to amend
12 CFR, Chapter II as set forth below.
PART 234DESIGNATED FINANCIAL
MARKET UTILITIES (REGULATION HH)
1. The authority citation for part 234
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 5461 et seq.
2. Revise 234.2 as follows:
234.2 Definitions.
(a) Backtest means the ex post
comparison of realized outcomes with
margin model forecasts to analyze and
monitor model performance and overall
margin coverage.
(b) Central counterparty means an
entity that interposes itself between
counterparties to contracts traded in one
or more financial markets, becoming the
buyer to every seller and the seller to
every buyer.
(c) Central securities depository
means an entity that provides securities
accounts and central safekeeping
services.
(d) Designated financial market utility
means a financial market utility that is
currently designated by the Financial
Stability Oversight Council under
section 804 of the Dodd-Frank Act (12
U.S.C. 5463).
(e) Financial market utility has the
same meaning as the term is defined in
section 803(6) of the Dodd-Frank Act
(12 U.S.C. 5462(6)).
(f) Link means, for purposes of
234.3(a)(20), a set of contractual and
operational arrangements between two
or more central counterparties, central
securities depositories, or securities
settlement systems that connect them
directly or indirectly, such as for the
purposes of participating in settlement,
cross margining, or expanding their
services to additional instruments and
participants.
(g) Recovery means, for purposes of
234.3(a)(3) and 234.3(a)(15), the
actions of a designated financial market
utility, consistent with its rules,
procedures, and other ex ante
contractual arrangements, to address
any uncovered credit loss, liquidity
shortfall, capital inadequacy, or
business, operational, or other structural
weakness, including the replenishment
of any depleted prefunded financial
resources and liquidity arrangements, as
necessary to maintain the designated
financial market utilitys viability as a
going concern.
(h) Securities settlement system
means an entity that enables securities
to be transferred and settled by book
entry and allows transfers of securities
free of or against payment.
(i) Stress test means the estimation of
credit or liquidity exposures that would
result from the realization of potential
stress scenarios, such as extreme price
changes, multiple defaults, and changes
in other valuation inputs and
assumptions.
(j) Supervisory Agency has the same
meaning as the term is defined in
section 803(8) of the Dodd-Frank Act
(12 U.S.C. 5462(8)).
(k) Wind-down means the actions of a
designated financial market utility to
effect the permanent cessation, sale, or
transfer of one or more of its critical
operations or services.
3. In 234.3, revise paragraph (a) to
read as follows:
234.3 Standards for designated financial
market utilities.
(a) A designated financial market
utility must implement rules,
procedures, or operations designed to
ensure that it meets or exceeds the
following risk-management standards
with respect to its payment, clearing,
and settlement activities.
(1) Legal basis. The designated
financial market utility has a well-
founded, clear, transparent, and
enforceable legal basis for each material
aspect of its activities in all relevant
jurisdictions.
(2) Governance. The designated
financial market utility has governance
arrangements that
(i) Are clear, transparent, and
documented;
(ii) Promote the safety and efficiency
of the designated financial market
utility;
(iii) Support the stability of the
broader financial system, other relevant
public interest considerations such as
fostering fair and efficient markets, and
the legitimate interests of relevant
stakeholders, including the designated
financial market utilitys owners,
participants, and participants
customers; and
(iv) Are designed to ensure
(A) Lines of responsibility and
accountability are clear and direct;
(B) The roles and responsibilities of
the board of directors and senior
management are clearly specified;
(C) The board of directors consists of
suitable individuals having appropriate
skills to fulfill its multiple roles;
(D) The board of directors includes a
majority of individuals who are not
executives, officers, or employees of the
designated financial market utility or an
affiliate of the designated financial
market utility;
(E) The board of directors establishes
policies and procedures to identify,
address, and manage potential conflicts
of interest of board members and to
review its performance and the
performance of individual board
members on a regular basis;
(F) The board of directors establishes
a clear, documented risk-management
framework that includes the designated
financial market utilitys risk-tolerance
policy, assigns responsibilities and
accountability for risk decisions, and
addresses decisionmaking in crises and
emergencies;
(G) Senior management has the
appropriate experience, skills, and
integrity necessary to discharge
operational and risk-management
responsibilities;
(H) The risk-management function has
sufficient authority, resources, and
independence from other operations of
the designated financial market utility,
and has a direct reporting line to and is
overseen by a committee of the board of
directors;
(I) The internal audit function has
sufficient authority, resources, and
independence from management, and
has a direct reporting line to and is
overseen by a committee of the board of
directors; and
(J) Major decisions of the board of
directors are clearly disclosed to
relevant stakeholders, including the
designated financial market utilitys
owners, participants, and participants
customers, and, where there is a broad
market impact, the public.
(3) Framework for the comprehensive
management of risks. The designated
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
financial market utility has a sound risk-
management framework for
comprehensively managing legal, credit,
liquidity, operational, general business,
custody, investment, and other risks
that arise in or are borne by the
designated financial market utility. This
framework is subject to periodic review
and includes
(i) Risk-management policies,
identify, measure, monitor, and manage
the risks that arise in or are borne by the
designated financial market utility,
including those posed by other entities
as a result of interdependencies;
(ii) Risk-management policies,
identify, measure, monitor, and manage
the material risks that it poses to other
entities, such as other financial market
utilities, settlement banks, liquidity
providers, or service providers, as a
result of interdependencies; and
(iii) Plans for the designated financial
market utilitys recovery or orderly
wind-down that
(A) Identify the designated financial
market utilitys critical operations and
services related to payment, clearing,
and settlement;
(B) Identify scenarios that may
potentially prevent it from being able to
provide its critical operations and
services as a going concern, including
uncovered credit losses (as described in
paragraph (a)(4)(vi)(A) of this section),
uncovered liquidity shortfalls (as
described in paragraph (a)(7)(viii)(A) of
this section), and general business
losses (as described in paragraph (a)(15)
of this section);
(C) Identify criteria that could trigger
the implementation of the recovery or
orderly wind-down plans;
(D) Include rules, procedures,
policies, and any other tools the
designated financial market utility
would use in a recovery or wind-down
to address the scenarios identified
under paragraph (a)(3)(ii)(B) of this
section;
(E) Include procedures to ensure
timely implementation of recovery or
orderly wind-down plans in the
scenarios identified under paragraph
(a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section; and
(F) Include procedures for informing
the Board, as soon as practicable, if the
designated financial market utility is
considering initiating the recovery or
orderly wind-down plan.
(4) Credit risk. The designated
financial market utility effectively
measures, monitors, and manages its
credit exposures to participants and
those arising from its payment, clearing,
and settlement processes. In this regard,
the designated financial market utility
maintains sufficient financial resources
to cover its credit exposure to each
participant fully with a high degree of
confidence. In addition, the designated
financial market utility
(i) If it operates as a central
counterparty, maintains additional
prefunded financial resources that are
sufficient to cover its credit exposure
under a wide range of significantly
different stress scenarios that includes
the default of the participant and its
affiliates that would potentially cause
the largest aggregate credit exposure to
in extreme but plausible market
conditions;
(ii) If it operates as a central
counterparty, may be directed by the
Board to maintain additional prefunded
financial resources that are sufficient to
cover its credit exposure under a wide
range of significantly different stress
scenarios that includes the default of the
two participants and their affiliates that
would potentially cause the largest
aggregate credit exposure to the
designated financial market utility in
extreme but plausible market
conditions, if it
(A) Is involved in activities with a
more-complex risk profile, such as
clearing financial instruments
characterized by discrete jump-to-
default price changes or that are highly
correlated with potential participant
defaults, or
(B) Has been determined by another
in that jurisdiction;
(iii) If it operates as a central
counterparty, determines the amount
and regularly tests the sufficiency of the
total financial resources available to
meet the requirements of this paragraph
by
(A) On a daily basis, conducting a
stress test of its total financial resources
using standard and predetermined stress
(B) On at least a monthly basis, and
more frequently when the products
cleared or markets served experience
high volatility or become less liquid, or
when the size or concentration of
positions held by the central
counterpartys participants increases
significantly, conducting a
comprehensive and thorough analysis of
the existing stress scenarios, models,
and underlying parameters and
financial market utility meets its
required level of default protection in
light of current and evolving market
conditions; and
(C) Having clear procedures to report
the results of its stress tests to
decisionmakers at the central
counterparty and using these results to
evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its
total financial resources;
(iv) If it operates as a central
counterparty, excludes assessments for
additional default or guaranty fund
contributions (i.e., default or guaranty
fund contributions that are not
prefunded) in its calculation of financial
resources available to meet the total
financial resource requirement under
this paragraph;
(v) At least annually, provides for a
validation of the designated financial
market utilitys risk-management
models used to determine the
sufficiency of its total financial
resources that
(A) Includes the designated financial
market utilitys models used to comply
with the collateral provisions under
paragraph (a)(5) of this section and
models used to determine initial margin
under paragraph (a)(6) of this section;
and
(B) Is performed by a qualified person
who does not perform functions
valid; and
(vi) Establishes rules and procedures
that explicitly
(A) Address allocation of credit losses
may face if its collateral and other
financial resources are insufficient to
fully cover its credit exposures,
including the repayment of any funds a
designated financial market utility may
borrow from liquidity providers; and
(B) Describe the designated financial
market utilitys process to replenish any
financial resources that the designated
financial market utility may employ
participant default.
(5) Collateral. If it requires collateral
to manage its or its participants credit
exposure, the designated financial
market utility accepts collateral with
low credit, liquidity, and market risks
and sets and enforces conservative
haircuts and concentration limits, in
order to ensure the value of the
collateral in the event of liquidation and
that the collateral can be used in a
timely manner. In this regard, the
(i) Establishes prudent valuation
practices and develops haircuts that are
tested regularly and take into account
stressed market conditions;
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
(ii) Establishes haircuts that are
calibrated to include relevant periods of
stressed market conditions to reduce the
need for procyclical adjustments;
(iii) Provides for annual validation of
its haircut procedures, as part of its risk-
paragraph (a)(4)(vi) of this section;
(iv) Avoids concentrated holdings of
any particular type of asset where the
concentration could significantly impair
the ability to liquidate such assets
quickly without significant adverse
price effects;
(v) Uses a collateral management
system that is well-designed and
operationally flexible such that it,
among other things,
(A) Accommodates changes in the
ongoing monitoring and management of
collateral; and
(B) Allows for the timely valuation of
collateral and execution of any
collateral or margin calls.
(6) Margin. If it operates as a central
counterparty, the designated financial
market utility covers its credit
exposures to its participants for all
products by establishing a risk-based
margin system that
(i) Is conceptually and
methodologically sound for the risks
as demonstrated by documented and
empirical evidence supporting design
choices, methods used, variables
selected, theoretical bases, key
assumptions, and limitations;
(ii) Establishes margin levels
commensurate with the risks and
particular attributes of each product,
portfolio, and markets it serves;
(iii) Has a reliable source of timely
price data;
(iv) Has procedures and sound
valuation models for addressing
circumstances in which pricing data are
not readily available or reliable;
(v) Marks participant positions to
market and collects variation margin at
least daily and has the operational
capacity to make intraday margin calls
and payments, both scheduled and
unscheduled, to participants;
(vi) Generates initial margin
requirements sufficient to cover
potential changes in the value of each
participants position during the
interval between the last margin
collection and the close out of positions
following a participant default by
(A) Ensuring that initial margin meets
an established single-tailed confidence
level of at least 99 percent with respect
to the estimated distribution of future
exposure; and
(B) Using a conservative estimate of
the time horizons for the effective
hedging or close out of the particular
types of products cleared, including in
stressed market conditions; and
(vii) Is monitored on an ongoing basis
and regularly reviewed, tested, and
verified through
(A) Daily backtests;
(B) Monthly sensitivity analyses,
performed more frequently during
stressed market conditions or significant
fluctuations in participant positions,
with this analysis taking into account a
wide range of parameters and
assumptions that reflect possible market
conditions that captures a variety of
historical and hypothetical conditions,
including the most volatile periods that
have been experienced by the markets
serves; and
(C) Annual model validations of the
margin models and related parameters
and assumptions, as part of its risk-
paragraph (a)(4)(v) of this section.
(7) Liquidity risk. The designated
financial market utility effectively
measures, monitors, and manages the
liquidity risk that arises in or is borne
by the designated financial market
utility. In this regard, the designated
(i) Has effective operational and
analytical tools to identify, measure,
and monitor its settlement and funding
flows on an ongoing and timely basis,
including its use of intraday liquidity;
(ii) Maintains sufficient liquid
resources in all relevant currencies to
effect same-day and, where applicable,
intraday and multiday settlement of
payment obligations with a high degree
of confidence under a wide range of
significantly different potential stress
scenarios that includes the default of the
participant and its affiliates that would
generate the largest aggregate liquidity
obligation for the designated financial
market utility in extreme but plausible
market conditions;
(iii) Holds, for purposes of meeting
the minimum liquid resource
requirement under paragraph (a)(7)(ii) of
this section, cash in each relevant
currency at the central bank of issue or
creditworthy commercial banks or
assets that are readily available and
convertible into cash, through
committed arrangements without
material adverse change conditions such
as
(A) collateralized lines of credit;
(B) foreign exchange swaps; and
(C) repurchase agreements;
(iv) Evaluates and confirms, at least
annually, whether each provider of the
committed arrangements as described in
paragraph (a)(7)(iii) of this section has
sufficient information to understand
and manage that providers associated
liquidity risks, and that the provider has
the capacity to perform as required
under this commitment;
(v) Maintains and tests its procedures
and operational capacity for accessing
each type of liquid resource required
under this paragraph at least annually;
(vi) Determines the amount and
regularly tests the sufficiency of the
liquid resources necessary to meet the
minimum liquid resource requirement
under this paragraph by
(A) On a daily basis, conducting a
stress test of its liquid resources using
standard and predetermined stress
(B) On at least a monthly basis, and
more frequently when products cleared
or markets served experience high
held by the designated financial market
utilitys participants increases
significantly, conducting a
comprehensive and thorough analysis of
the existing stress scenarios, models,
and underlying parameters and
financial market utility meets its
identified liquidity needs and resources
in light of current and evolving market
conditions; and
(C) Having clear procedures to report
the results of its stress tests to
decisionmakers at the designated
financial market utility and using these
results to evaluate the adequacy of and
make adjustments to its liquidity risk-
management framework;
(vii) At least annually, provides for a
validation of its liquidity risk-
management model by a qualified
person who does not perform functions
valid; and
(viii) Establishes rules and procedures
that explicitly
(A) Address potential liquidity
shortfalls that would not be covered by
the designated financial market utilitys
liquid resources and avoid unwinding,
revoking, or delaying the same-day
settlement of payment obligations; and
(B) Describe the designated financial
market utilitys process to replenish any
liquid resources that it may employ
participant default.
(8) Settlement finality. The designated
financial market utility provides clear
and certain final settlement intraday or
in real time as appropriate, and at a
minimum, by the end of the value date.
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
The designated financial market utility
clearly defines the point at which
settlement is final and the point after
which unsettled payments, transfer
instructions, or other settlement
instructions may not be revoked by a
participant.
(9) Money settlements. The designated
financial market utility conducts its
money settlements in central bank
money where practical and available. If
central bank money is not used, the
minimizes and strictly controls the
credit and liquidity risks arising from
conducting its money settlements in
commercial bank money, including
settlement on its own books. If it
conducts its money settlements at a
commercial bank, the designated
(i) Establishes and monitors
adherence to criteria based on high
standards for its settlement banks that
take account of, among other things,
their applicable regulatory and
supervisory frameworks,
creditworthiness, capitalization, access
to liquidity, and operational reliability;
(ii) Monitors and manages the
concentration of credit and liquidity
exposures to its commercial settlement
banks; and
(iii) Ensures that its legal agreements
with its settlement banks state clearly
(A) When transfers on the books of
individual settlement banks are
expected to occur;
(B) That transfers are final when
funds are credited to the recipients
account; and
(C) That the funds credited to the
recipient are available immediately for
retransfer or withdrawal.
(10) Physical deliveries. A designated
financial market utility that operates as
a central counterparty, securities
depository clearly states its obligations
with respect to the delivery of physical
instruments or commodities and
identifies, monitors, and manages the
risks associated with such physical
deliveries.
(11) Central securities depositories. A
designated financial market utility that
operates as a central securities
depository has appropriate rules and
procedures to help ensure the integrity
of securities issues and minimizes and
manages the risks associated with the
safekeeping and transfer of securities. In
this regard, the designated financial
market utility maintains securities in an
immobilized or dematerialized form for
their transfer by book entry.
(12) Exchange-of-value settlement
systems. If it settles transactions that
involve the settlement of two linked
obligations, such as a transfer of
securities against payment or the
exchange of one currency for another,
eliminates principal risk by
conditioning the final settlement of one
obligation upon the final settlement of
the other.
(13) Participant-default rules and
procedures. The designated financial
market utility has effective and clearly
defined rules and procedures to manage
a participant default that are designed to
ensure that the designated financial
market utility can take timely action to
contain losses and liquidity pressures so
that it can continue to meet its
obligations. In this regard, the
designated financial market utility tests
and reviews its default procedures,
including any close-out procedures, at
least annually or following material
changes to these rules and procedures.
(14) Segregation and portability. A
designated financial market utility that
operates as a central counterparty has
rules and procedures that enable the
segregation and portability of positions
of a participants customers and the
collateral provided to the designated
financial market utility with respect to
those positions.
(15) General business risk. The
identifies, monitors, and manages its
general business risk, which is the risk
of losses that may arise from its
administration and operation as a
business enterprise (including losses
from execution of business strategy,
negative cash flows, or unexpected and
excessively large operating expenses)
that are neither related to participant
default nor separately covered by
financial resources maintained for credit
or liquidity risk. In this regard, in
addition to holding financial resources
required to manage credit risk
(paragraph (a)(4) of this section) and
liquidity risk (paragraph (a)(7) of this
section), the designated financial market
utility
(i) Maintains liquid net assets funded
by equity that are at all times sufficient
to ensure a recovery or orderly wind-
down of critical operations and services
such that it
(A) Holds unencumbered liquid
financial assets, such as cash or highly
liquid securities, that are sufficient to
cover the greater of
(1) The cost to implement the
recovery or wind down plan to address
general business losses as required
under 234.3(a)(3)(iii) and
(2) Six months of current operating
expenses or as otherwise determined by
the Board; and
(B) Holds equity, such as common
stock, disclosed reserves, and other
retained earnings, that is at all times
greater than or equal to the amount of
that are required to be held under
paragraph (a)(15)(i)(A) of this section;
and
(ii) Maintains a viable plan, approved
by the board of directors and updated at
least annually, for raising additional
equity before the designated financial
market utilitys equity falls below the
amount required under paragraph
(a)(15)(i) of this section.
(16) Custody and investment risks.
The designated financial market
utility
(i) Safeguards its own and its
participants assets and minimizes the
risk of loss on and delay in access to
these assets by
(A) Holding its own and its
participants assets at supervised and
regulated entities that have accounting
practices, safekeeping procedures, and
internal controls that fully protect these
assets; and
(B) Evaluating its exposures to its
custodian banks, taking into account the
full scope of its relationships with each;
and
(ii) Invests its own and its
participants assets
(A) In instruments with minimal
credit, market, and liquidity risks, such
as investments that are secured by, or
are claims on, high-quality obligors and
investments that allow for timely
liquidation with little, if any, adverse
price effect; and
(B) Using an investment strategy that
is consistent with its overall risk-
management strategy and fully
disclosed to its participants.
(17) Operational risk. The designated
financial market utility manages its
operational risks by establishing a
robust operational risk-management
framework that is approved by the board
of directors. In this regard, the
(i) Identifies the plausible sources of
operational risk, both internal and
external, and mitigates their impact
through the use of appropriate systems,
policies, procedures, and controls that
are reviewed, audited, and tested
periodically and after major changes;
(ii) Identifies, monitors, and manages
the risks its operations might pose to
other financial market utilities;
(iii) Has policies and systems that are
designed to achieve clearly defined
objectives to ensure a high degree of
security and operational reliability;
(iv) Has systems that have adequate,
scalable capacity to handle increasing
stress volumes and achieve the
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2
service-level objectives;
(v) Has comprehensive physical,
information, and cyber security policies,
procedures, and controls that address
potential and evolving vulnerabilities
and threats;
(vi) Has business continuity
management that provides for rapid
recovery and timely resumption of
critical operations and fulfillment of its
obligations, including in the event of a
wide-scale disruption or a major
disruption; and
(vii) Has a business continuity plan
that
(A) Incorporates the use of a
secondary site that is located at a
sufficient geographical distance from
the primary site to have a distinct risk
profile;
(B) Is designed to ensure that critical
information technology systems can
recover and resume operations no later
than two hours following disruptive
events;
(C) Is designed to enable it to
complete settlement by the end of the
day of the disruption, even in case of
extreme circumstances; and
(D) Is tested at least annually.
(18) Access and participation
requirements. The designated financial
market utility has objective, risk-based,
and publicly disclosed criteria for
participation, which permit fair and
open access. The designated financial
market utility
(i) Monitors compliance with its
participation requirements on an
ongoing basis and has the authority to
impose more-stringent restrictions or
other risk controls on a participant in
situations where the designated FMU
determines the participant poses
heightened risk to the designated FMU;
and
(ii) Has clearly defined and publicly
disclosed procedures for facilitating the
suspension and orderly exit of a
participant that fails to meet the
participation requirements.
(19) Tiered participation
arrangements. The designated financial
market utility identifies, monitors, and
manages the material risks to the
arising from arrangements in which
firms that are not members in the
designated financial market utility rely
on the services provided by direct
participants to access the designated
financial market utilitys payment,
clearing, or settlement facilities.
(20) Links to other financial market
utilities. If it operates as a central
counterparty, securities settlement
system, or central securities depository
and establishes a link with one or more
of these types of financial market
utilities, the designated financial market
utility identifies, monitors, and manages
risks related to this link. In this regard,
each central counterparty in a link
arrangement with another central
counterparty covers, at least on a daily
basis, its current and potential future
exposures to the linked central
counterparty and its participants, if any,
without reducing the central
counterpartys ability to fulfill its
obligations to its own participants.
(21) Efficiency and effectiveness. The
(i) Is efficient and effective in meeting
the requirements of its participants and
the markets it serves, in particular, with
regard to its
(A) Clearing and settlement
arrangement;
(B) Risk-management policies,
procedures, and systems;
(C) Scope of products cleared and
settled; and
(D) Use of technology and
communication procedures;
(ii) Has clearly defined goals and
objectives that are measurable and
achievable, such as minimum service
levels, risk-management expectations,
and business priorities; and
(iii) Has policies and procedures for
the regular review of its efficiency and
effectiveness.
(22) Communication procedures and
standards. The designated financial
market utility uses, or at a minimum
accommodates, relevant internationally
and standards in order to facilitate
efficient payment, clearing, and
settlement.
(23) Disclosure of rules, key
procedures, and market data. The
(i) Has clear and comprehensive rules
and procedures;
(ii) Publicly discloses all rules and
key procedures, including key aspects of
its default rules and procedures;
(iii) Provides sufficient information to
enable participants to have an accurate
understanding of the risks, fees, and
other material costs they incur by
participating in the designated financial
market utility;
(iv) Provides a comprehensive public
disclosure of its legal, governance, risk
management, and operating framework,
that includes
(A) Executive summary. An executive
summary of the key points from
paragraphs (a)(23)(iv)(B) through (D) of
this section;
(B) Summary of major changes since
the last update of the disclosure. A
summary of the major changes since the
last update of paragraph (a)(23)(iv) (C),
(D), or (E) of this section;
(C) General background on the
designated financial market utility. A
description of
(1) The designated financial market
utilitys function and the markets it
serves,
(2) Basic data and performance
statistics on its services and operations,
such as basic volume and value
statistics by product type, average
aggregate intraday exposures to its
participants, and statistics on the
operational reliability, and
(3) The designated financial market
utilitys general organization, legal and
regulatory framework, and system
design and operations;
(D) Standard-by-standard summary
narrative. A comprehensive narrative
disclosure for each applicable standard
set forth in this paragraph (a) with
sufficient detail and context to enable a
reader to understand the designated
financial market utilitys approach to
controlling the risks and addressing the
requirements in each standard; and
(E) List of publicly available
resources. A list of publicly available
resources, including those referenced in
the disclosure, that may help a reader
understand how the designated
financial market utility controls its risks
and addresses the requirements set forth
in this paragraph (a); and
(v) Updates the public disclosure
under paragraph (a)(23)(iv) of this
section every two years, or more
frequently following changes to its
system or the environment in which it
operates that would significantly change
the accuracy of the statements provided
under paragraph (a)(23)(iv) of this
section.
* * * * *
234.4 [Removed]
4. Remove 234.4.
234.5 [Redesignated as 234.4]
5. Redesignate 234.5 as 234.4.
234.5 [Added and Reserved]
6. A new 234.5 is added and
reserved.
234.6 [Removed and Reserved]
7. Remove and reserve 234.6.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, January 10, 2014.
Robert deV. Frierson,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 201400682 Filed 12114; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
e
m
c
d
o
n
a
l
d

o
n

D
S
K
6
7
Q
T
V
N
1
P
R
O
D

w
i
t
h

P
R
O
P
O
S
A
L
S
2

Federal Reserve System: Vol. 79 Wednesday, No. 14 January 22, 2014

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Federal Reserve System: Vol. 79 Wednesday, No. 14 January 22, 2014

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Federal Reserve System: Vol. 79 Wednesday, No. 14 January 22, 2014

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Vol.

You might also like