International Crisis Group: The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

THE PHILIPPINES: COUNTER-INSURGENCY VS.
COUNTER-TERRORISM IN MINDANAO
Asia Report N°152 – 14 May 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1
II. ISLANDS, FACTIONS AND ALLIANCES ................................................................ 3
III. AHJAG: A MECHANISM THAT WORKED .......................................................... 10
IV. BALIKATAN AND OPLAN ULTIMATUM............................................................. 12
A. EARLY SUCCESSES ..............................................................................................................12
B. BREAKDOWN ......................................................................................................................14
C. THE APRIL WAR .................................................................................................................15
V. COLLUSION AND COOPERATION ....................................................................... 16
A. THE AL-BARKA INCIDENT: JUNE 2007................................................................................17
B. THE IPIL INCIDENT: FEBRUARY 2008 ..................................................................................18
C. THE MANY DEATHS OF DULMATIN ......................................................................................18
D. THE GEOGRAPHICAL REACH OF TERRORISM IN MINDANAO ................................................19
VI. THE U.S. ROLE ........................................................................................................... 20
A. COUNTER-TERRORISM OR COUNTER-INSURGENCY? ............................................................20
B. FROM BASILAN TO JOLO .....................................................................................................21
VII. BRINGING POLITICS BACK IN.............................................................................. 23
VIII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 25
APPENDICES
A. MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES .........................................................................................................27
B. MAP OF MINDANAO .................................................................................................................28
C. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................29
D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...........................................................................30
E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ..................................................................31
F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES .......................................................................................33
Asia Report N°152 14 May 2008

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
U.S.-backed security operations in the southern Phil- jihadi allies, they are casting the net too widely and
ippines are making progress but are also confusing creating unnecessary enemies.
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency with dan-
gerous implications for conflict in the region. The Mass-based insurgencies like the MILF and MNLF
“Mindanao Model” – using classic counter-insurgency rely on supportive populations. By extension, small
techniques to achieve counter-terror goals – has been numbers of terrorists rely on sympathetic insurgents.
directed against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and has Counter-terrorism’s central task in a setting like that
helped force its fighters out of their traditional strong- in the Philippines is to isolate jihadis from their insur-
hold on Basilan. But it runs the risk of pushing them gent hosts – not divide insurgents from the popula-
into the arms of the broader insurgencies in Min- tion. Recent gains against the ASG came only after
danao, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the MILF expelled key jihadis from mainland Min-
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The U.S. danao in 2005. Yet AHJAG, the mechanism that made
and the Philippines need to revive mechanisms to this possible, is not getting the attention it deserves.
keep these conflicts apart and refocus energies on
peace processes with these groups. That imperative AHJAG was crafted as part of an ongoing govern-
has become particularly acute since the Malaysian ment-MILF peace process. For more than two years,
government announced withdrawal, beginning on 10 it prevented conflict escalation as the search for ter-
May, from the International Monitoring Team (IMT) rorists intensified in MILF strongholds in western
that has helped keep a lid on conflict since 2004. If Mindanao and led to a few cases of the MILF’s disci-
renewed attention to a peace agreement is not forth- plining extremists in its own ranks. It helped force the
coming by the time the IMT mandate ends in August, ASG’s core group, including Kadaffy Janjalani and
hostilities could quickly resume. Abu Solaiman, to Sulu, where they were killed.
A policy tool of proven value is at hand. Called the This has come at a heavy price in Sulu, where no
Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), it was designed equivalent ceasefire machinery exists to separate ji-
to facilitate coordination between the Philippines gov- hadis from the dominant local guerrilla force, the Moro
ernment and the MILF to share intelligence on terror- National Liberation Front (MNLF). Instead, heavy-
ists and avoid accidental clashes while government handed offensives against ASG and its foreign jihadi
forces pursued them. Allowed to lapse in June 2007, allies have repeatedly spilled over into MNLF com-
it was formally renewed in November but not fully munities, driving some insurgents into closer coopera-
revived. It should be, as a counter-terror and conflict tion with the terrorists, instead of with government.
management mechanism that worked, and a similar
arrangement should be developed with the MNLF. Ceasefire mechanisms like AHJAG depend on sub-
The problem is that it will only work if there is pro- stantive progress toward a comprehensive peace pact,
gress on the political front – that is, in peace nego- but negotiations with the MILF remain deadlocked.
tiations – so that insurgents see concrete benefits from While the Arroyo administration is distracted by tur-
their cooperation with the government. moil in Manila, and Washington focuses on economic
and military approaches to an essentially political
As part of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, problem in the Philippines south, AHJAG has been
U.S. forces are strengthening the Philippines military allowed to wither. As an innovative means of depriv-
and using civic action to drive a wedge between re- ing transnational extremists of refuge and regenera-
bels and the Muslim populace. But if their goal is to tion while building confidence with insurgents and
defeat the ASG and its foreign, mainly Indonesian, strengthening moderates among them, this mechanism
needs to be strengthened and expanded.
The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-terrorism in Mindanao
Crisis Group Asia Report N°152, 14 May 2008 Page ii
RECOMMENDATIONS in the event a peace agreement is signed, to

clarify its membership, in the first instance by
To the Philippines Government: providing a list of expelled members to prevent
post-facto alibis;
1. Facilitate insurgent cooperation against terrorists
by addressing substantive political grievances, in- c) formalise government-MNLF ceasefire mecha-
cluding by committing immediately to: nisms, map MNLF camps and communities in
Sulu and upgrade the gentlemen’s agreement
a) resume exploratory talks with the MILF on the that facilitated Oplan Ultimatum’s early success
basis of the right to self-determination of the to formal ceasefire and intelligence-sharing
Bangsamoro people, with the goal of a formal mechanisms; and
agreement on ancestral domain by June 2008 d) guarantee in return through a restored interna-
and formal talks on a final agreement to start by tional Joint Monitoring Committee that clearly
July; and demarcated MNLF camps and communities
b) resume Organisation of the Islamic Conference will not be attacked.
(OIC) tripartite talks to review implementation
of the 1996 Jakarta peace agreement with the To the U.S. Government:
MNLF, without further delay, and with Nur
Misuari’s participation, as sought by the MNLF. 3. Review official military doctrine with emphasis on
clarifying the distinction between insurgents and
2. Initiate discussion with both MILF and MNLF on terrorists, and in the specific Philippines case en-
reestablishing counter-terrorist cooperation along courage insurgent cooperation against terrorists by
the following lines: supporting AHJAG and similar mechanisms.
a) appoint senior, full-time AHJAG chairs and 4. Use all the resources at its disposal to encourage
staff, ensure full and prompt funding and create the Philippines government and the MILF to final-
teams for Basilan and Sulu; ise a formal peace agreement.
b) encourage the MILF, as a step toward the de-
Jakarta/Brussels, 14 May 2008
mobilisation and reintegration of its members
Asia Report N°152 14 May 2008

I. INTRODUCTION action “to demonstrate momentum in the war on ter-

ror, deploy troops in a country where they are wel-
come, show the flag in Southeast Asia and find an en-
The success of a classic counter-insurgency formula emy that can be quickly beaten”.2 There was some
against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) may prove truth to this, but as the deployment increased from
short-lived unless the Philippines government and its 660 troops to more than 1,200 under Exercise Balika-
American backers recognise the importance of a key tan 02-1, it took on broader objectives: to boost the
factor in the ASG’s decline: government coordination professionalism of the Philippines armed forces and
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to win hearts and minds in ASG strongholds through
share intelligence on terrorists and avoid accidental building roads, bridges and schools and providing
clashes while pursuing them.1 humanitarian services.3 A program that began as a
counter-terrorism operation has become heralded as
The mechanism that made this possible was the Ad the “Mindanao Model” of successful counter-
Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), designed to iden- insurgency, with global policy implications.4
tify and root out criminals and terrorists in a way that
would protect the peace process. Agreed on in 2002 The gains made through the combination of military
and made operational in early 2005, it was allowed to force and community assistance are real in terms of
atrophy from mid-2007 and has not been fully re- decimation of ASG ranks and capacity and dwindling
vived, although both sides agreed on a year’s exten- popular support in its base on Basilan, off the coast of
sion in November 2007. Even if it becomes opera- Mindanao. But the ASG should be seen as more a ter-
tional again, the MILF’s willingness to provide infor- rorist network with some guerrilla capacity than an
mation will depend on significant progress in the insurgency like the MILF or MNLF. Members of that
peace talks, at a time when the Arroyo government, network, including some two dozen foreign jihadis,
beset by scandals, may be reluctant to take the bold
steps needed. No equivalent to AHJAG exists with
the smaller Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 2
even as operations on Sulu are having the unintended Nicholas D. Kristof, “The Wrong War”, The New York
Times, 19 February 2002.
consequence of pushing it closer to the ASG. Unless 3
Balikatan means “shoulder to shoulder” in Tagalog. Balika-
one is quickly established, the ASG could regain tan 02-1 was different from earlier Balikatan programs which,
some of its lost ground. beginning in 1981, were simply joint training exercises. These
annual exercises continue to this day.
Gains against the ASG have come from extension to 4
Glowing accounts of the “Basilan Model” (used interchange-
Mindanao of the Philippines branch of Operation En- ably with “Mindanao Model” and “Philippines Model”) in-
during Freedom, the U.S. “global war on terror”. Sol- clude the entire September 2004 issue of Special Warfare, the
diers from the U.S. Special Operations Command, authorised official quarterly of the John F. Kennedy Special
Pacific (SOCPAC) were sent to “advise and assist” Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Gregory Wil-
the Philippines military’s fight against the ASG. The son, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-
impetus was to rescue three U.S. hostages the ASG Philippines and The Indirect Approach”, Military Review, vol.
86, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 2006), pp. 2-12 (publication of the U.S.
seized from a Palawan beach resort, but the deploy-
Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas);
ment was criticised as a politically motivated overre- William Eckert, “Defeating the Idea: Unconventional Warfare
in the Southern Philippines”, Special Warfare, vol. 19, no. 6
(Nov.-Dec. 2006), pp. 16-22; and David P. Fridovich and Fred
1
For earlier Crisis Group reporting on the Philippines, see T. Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Opera-
Crisis Group Asia Reports N°80, Southern Philippines Back- tions Forces Indirect Approach”, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 44
grounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, 13 July 2004; (2007), pp. 24-27 (published by the Institute for National Stra-
and N°110, Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Is- tegic Studies of the National Defense University for the Chair-
lamic Converts, 19 December 2005. man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
Crisis Group Asia Report N°152, 14 May 2008 Page 2
rely on allies embedded in these broader insurgencies. Jolo, in January 2008 during a military hunt for ASG
The crux of counter-terrorism in the Philippines is to operatives also might have been avoided had there
separate terrorists from insurgents. been a similar mechanism with the MNLF that could
have provided the armed forces with information on
In the Philippines context, the distinction between the the whereabouts on the wanted men, thus avoiding an
two can be roughly defined by four characteristics: unnecessary attack on a village where in fact no op-
eratives were present .
chosen targets of violence;
negotiable goals; The number of terrorists in the Philippines is small
relative to the mass-based insurgencies in which they
possession of political infrastructure; and take cover. But the ASG and its allies remain danger-
control of population and territory. ous because of their potential to drag the latter back
into war. Denying terrorists sanctuary among insur-
Terrorists deliberately and systematically target civil- gents should be a key counter-terrorism goal, and an
ians in pursuit of non-negotiable goals, and score rela- effective AHJAG, working in the context of a broader
tively low on the other two indices – reflecting their peace process, could help achieve it.
lack of legitimacy. Insurgent movements with nego-
tiable demands, political infrastructure, popular con- This report takes a detailed look at the impact of secu-
stituencies and territorial control are less likely to de- rity operations in Sulu that ended the careers of some
pend on terrorist tactics and are more readily held to of the Philippines’ most notorious terrorists, but also
account for their actions, especially when engaged in tipped the strategic island of Jolo back into war. It ex-
peace processes. The MNLF and MILF fall closer to amines the role of AHJAG and other counter-terrorism
the “insurgent” end of the spectrum. They focus over- measures and how they have been affected by U.S.-
whelmingly on military targets but contain relatively backed military operations. It is based on extensive in-
marginal terrorist networks, which can be isolated by terviews in Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan and Manila in
working with the groups’ moderate majorities. ASG 2007 and 2008.
falls at the other end. It has worked closely with a small
group of South East Asian jihadis to plan and carry
out some of the worst acts of terrorism in the region, but
its members can also fight like the MILF or MNLF –
particularly when they join forces with allies on their
own turf.
Employing mechanisms like AHJAG to isolate ASG

and its terrorist allies from their insurgent hosts does
not mean engaging terrorists in the peace process. It
means using the peace process to build confidence
with insurgents who are open to a comprehensive ne-
gotiated settlement, while identifying, with their help,
extremists among them who have a very different
agenda. For more than two years, AHJAG helped pre-
vent conflict from escalating in the MILF’s heartland,
as Philippines forces searched for terrorists; it prompted
the MILF’s leadership to discipline its own extremists
who were harbouring jihadis; and it forced ASG’s core
group into Sulu, where key figures, including Kadaffy
Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, were hunted down.
On 10 July 2007, three weeks after the two sides failed

to renew AHJAG’s mandate, a clash between Philip-
pines marines and MILF fighters on Basilan was fol-
lowed by the beheading of ten marines. The MILF
claimed that government forces failed to coordinate
with it, as the marines, searching for a kidnapped Ital-
ian priest, entered MILF territory in Al-Barka, Basi-
lan. This was exactly the kind of confrontation AHJAG
was designed to avoid. On a lesser scale, the killing of
seven civilians and an off-duty soldier in Maimbung,
II. ISLANDS, FACTIONS AND opened the door to Jemaah Islamiyah, the regional ji-
ALLIANCES hadi organisation responsible for the 2002 Bali bomb-
ings, which began training in Mindanao in 1994,
building on connections established in Afghanistan in
There is not just one conflict in the southern Philip- the late 1980s.
pines, but several. Islamic identity, kinship, shared
Ex-MNLF militants opposed to Misuari, meanwhile,
training and combat experience and a common enemy
formed the nucleus of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) provide
from 1991, initially on Basilan island and nearby Zam-
a basis for uncertain coalitions among geographically,
boanga City but soon spreading to Sulu. The founder
ethnically and ideologically disparate groups.
of the ASG, Abdurajak Janjalani, died in 1998 and
Today’s tangled web of rebel factions grew out of the was succeeded by his brother, Kadaffy Janjalani, who
MNLF, which launched a campaign for the independ- was killed in a battle on Jolo with Philippines marines
ence of the thirteen Bangsa Moro (Muslim) tribes af- in October 2006. The new overall amir (supreme
ter Ferdinand Marcos imposed martial law in 1972. leader) of ASG is now believed to be Ustadz Yasir
Led by Nur Misuari, an ethnic Sama from Sulu, the Isagan, a religious scholar and like the MNLF’s Ha-
MNLF drew adherents from the Tausug-dominated bier Malik, a University of Medina alumnus.
Sulu archipelago and the Mindanao mainland, where
Intertwined with the three groups are about two dozen
the Maguindanaon and Maranao are the largest Mus-
foreign jihadis. Half are believed to be under MILF
lim ethnic groups.
protection in a JI camp known as Jabal Quba 3 in
A failed peace agreement signed in Tripoli, Libya in Maguindanao; the rest, led by Indonesian national
1976 led Misuari’s head of foreign affairs, Salamat Umar Patek, are working with the ASG. The latter
Hashim, to break away the next year to form his own group includes some JI members, including Patek him-
faction – renamed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front self and his better known but less important colleague,
(MILF) in 1984. Salamat was Maguindanaon and took Joko Pitono alias Dulmatin, who frequently has been
much of the MNLF’s central Mindanao following with reported dead only to turn up several weeks later. The
him. Emphasising Islam over Misuari’s secular ethno- unit, however, is a mixture of non-Filipino South East
nationalism, Salamat’s MILF rode a rising tide of Asians from at least three groups (JI, KOMPAK and
militancy through the 1990s. A “final” MNLF peace Darul Islam) and Philippines Muslims from ASG,
agreement in 1996, signed in Jakarta and brokered by MILF and the Rajah Solaiman Movement, a group of
the Indonesian government on behalf of the Organisa- converted or born-again Muslims.6 It appears to be
tion of the Islamic Conference (OIC), co-opted most completely independent of the JI leadership and has
of Misuari’s remaining followers into accepting a ter- only sporadic communication with the group in Jabal
ritorial unit called the Autonomous Region of Muslim Quba. Its Indonesian links are more with KOMPAK,
Mindanao (ARMM).5 In Sulu, however, some MNLF but it is now more accurately seen as an ASG offshoot.
members continued to fight under Ustadz Habier Malik,
Over the last decade, these groups have interacted and
a Saudi-trained religious scholar, and other local
realigned in a way that makes any effort to address
commanders. Misuari himself remained under house
one in isolation from the others nearly impossible.
arrest in Manila until 28 April 2008.
Except in Misuari’s base in Sulu, the MILF is now the A. THE MILF
dominant insurgent group in the Muslim south, fight-
ing and negotiating through three major cycles of con-
flict (1997, 2000 and 2003) in an effort to win greater The largest group of rebels continues to pursue peace
autonomy. Despite Salamat’s focus on Islam, it also is talks with the Philippines government, while being
overwhelmingly an ethno-nationalist insurgency, fight- unable or unwilling to control commanders who work
ing for self-government of the Bangsamoro people, not with the ASG or foreign jihadis. A 1997 “Agreement
against unbelievers and persecutors of Muslims for General Cessation of Hostilities” became the base-
worldwide. But Salamat’s international Islamist ties line for all subsequent negotiations. The implement-
ing guidelines established government and MILF Co-
ordinating Committees for the Cessation of Hostilities
5 (CCCH), with six members on each side. These com-
The ARMM, formed in 1990, initially comprised the Mus-
mittees remain the principal ceasefire monitoring
lim-majority provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi. It was extended in 2001 to include Basilan
province (other than its capital, Isabela City). The partition of
6
Maguindanao in 2007 created a sixth province in ARMM, For more detail on the Rajah Solaiman Movement, see Crisis
Shariff Kabunsuan. Group Report, Philippines Terrorism, op. cit.
mechanism.7 Negotiations collapsed in 2000 after the more detail below, have been floated to get around the
Estrada government launched an attack on MILF head- stalemate, the talks remain stalled. Despite the im-
quarters; they resumed, with Malaysia facilitating, in passe, the MILF’s moderate head, Al-Haj Murad
2001, but after five years of slow but incremental pro- Ebrahim, who succeeded Salamat Hashim after the
gress, they ground to a halt in late 2006 over the key latter’s death in 2003, reinforced his commitment to the
issue of Muslim “ancestral domain”, including the ter- peace process at an “expanded” MILF central com-
ritory to be included in the new autonomous region. mittee meeting (8-11 March 2008) in Butig, Lanao
Nevertheless, what the sides called “clarificatory” and del Sur, on the Mindanao mainland.
“technical” meetings took place in December 2006,
August, September and October 2007 and January 2008. Frustrated at the slow pace of the talks, Malaysia,
their facilitator since 2001 and leader of an Interna-
On 24 October 2007, both sides announced with great tional Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao since
fanfare in a joint statement that the peace process “is 2004, announced in April 2008 that it would begin
firmly back on track toward the holding of the Formal withdrawing its ceasefire monitors on 10 May. The
Talks before the end of the year”.8 However, in mid- 59-strong IMT has played a key role, supporting the
December, just before a memorandum of agreement CCCH and civil society Local Monitoring Teams
was to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, the MILF decided (LMTs) in dampening down recurrent skirmishes be-
not to participate, saying the government had intro- tween government and MILF forces. Without interna-
duced “new and extraneous elements” that violated tional support, these mechanisms may not be able to
the consensus. From the beginning, there had been an withstand a drift toward renewed conflict.11
agreement that the government would not raise the
Philippines constitution, which in the MILF’s view In the meantime, MILF extremists continue to collude
reflects non-Moro interests, and the MILF would not with JI, its freelance jihadi offshoots and ASG, de-
raise independence. But in the government’s draft spite attempts by the leadership to curtail such ties.
agreement, the inclusion of new territories in the Fighters from South East Asia and the Middle East
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity was to be “subject to had been welcome at the MILF’s sprawling Camp
constitutional processes” – meaning there would have Abu Bakar in Maguindanao since the early 1990s.
to be a plebiscite in the communities to be added to The biggest contingent was from Jemaah Islamiyah,
the existing ARMM, many of which have mixed which in 1994 began setting up a military academy,
Muslim, Christian and indigenous populations.9 Camp Hudaibiyah, to replace its Afghanistan facili-
ties.12 In 1998, the camp became the headquarters of
The MILF argued the constitution is premised on a JI’s territorial sub-division in the Philippines, Waka-
unitary state that does not permit genuine power shar- lah Hudaibiyah, part of the regional unit called Man-
ing, and a plebisicite would be Manila’s escape clause, tiqi III, which also covered Sulawesi and East Kali-
allowing the government to renege on treaty obliga- mantan in Indonesia and Sabah in Malaysia.
tions, as it had after the 1996 treaty with the MNLF.10
Other conflicts around the world, such as Bougain- After the Philippines armed forces overran Camp Abu
ville in Papua New Guinea and southern Sudan, had Bakar in 2000, JI moved its training site to Jabal
been settled through extra-constitutional means, they Quba on Mt. Cararao, also in Maguindanao, where in
argued. Although at least two proposals, discussed in early 2007 a small group of trainees was receiving
regular monthly payments from the JI leadership in
central Java. That funding was disrupted but probably
7 not stopped by the arrest of JI leaders, including Abu
Crisis Group Report, Southern Philippines Backgrounder,
op. cit., p. 6.
Dujana, in Indonesia in March and June 2007.13 This
8
“No sked yet for GRP, MILF talks resumption”, Mindanews,
8 January 2008.
9 11
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines (1987), Arti- Until 10 May 2008, Malaysia provided 41 IMT personnel,
cle X, Section 10: “No province, city, municipality or baran- Brunei ten, Libya seven and Japan one. All are likely to
gay [village or precinct] may be created, divided, merged, withdraw by September 2008. The IMT is credited with re-
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except … ducing the number of armed clashes from 559 in 2003 to just
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebi- seven in 2007. See Abhoud Syed M. Lingga, “Malaysia’s
scite in the political units directly affected”. Pull-Out from the International Monitoring Team: Implica-
10
“MILF offered federal state in 2005, rejects it”, Luwaran, tions [for] Peace and the Peace Process in Mindanao”, Insti-
29 December 2007. (Luwaran.com is the official MILF web- tute of Bangsamoro Studies, May 2008.
12
site.) Crisis Group interview, MILF panel member, Cotabato Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jemaah Islamiyah (Jakarta, 2005),
City, 30 June 2007. See also “Government formally asks for pp. 139-168.
13
new extension on territory”, Luwaran, 7 October 2006, which Interrogation deposition of Arif Syaifuddin alias Tsaqof ali-
prominently features opinion within MILF opposed to the as Firdaus alias Wito, 15 August 2007, in case dossier of Ai-
peace process. nul Bahri alias Yusron Mahmudi alias Abu Dujana alias Abu
group of “structural” JI members, obedient to the chain a host of other prominent jihadis have passed through
of command, is believed to be under the protection of SKP, including top Abu Sayyaf commanders and some
the MILF, likely in exchange for a commitment to lie low of the most-wanted Indonesians and Malaysians.18
as long as there is chance of progress in the peace talks.
The accounts of Istiada and Mohamed Baehaqi, ar-
Even as Al-Haj Murad consolidates control over the rested in February 2008, implicate other MILF com-
MILF, there is ample evidence that some of his commanders, including Ameril Umbra, also known as
manders are collaborating with the ASG and the Commander Kato, a powerful warlord whose terror
group around Umar Patek. Istiada binti Haja Oemar ties are well documented; Ustadz Baguinda Alih of
Sovie, Dulmatin’s wife, who was arrested in October the 105th command in Mamasapano, Maguindanao;
2006, confirmed reports that her husband had found and Commander Satar of Pantukan, Compostela Val-
refuge with the MILF. After entering the Philippines ley province. They also both refer to a man named
in August 2003, she met him and his brother-in-law, Zabidi Abdul alias Bedz, a senior MILF commander
Hari Kuncoro alias Bahar, in an MILF camp known who is the alleged chief of a group calling itself “al-
as SKP,14 in the Liguasan Marsh region where four of Khobar” and responsible for a series of bus bombings
the MILF’s thirteen base commands converge.15 in 2007 and possibly a string of fourteen transmission
tower bombings in Lanao in early 2008.19 Bedz is also
The SKP camp commander – and perhaps the MILF’s said to be a member of the MILF’s Special Opera-
most important link with foreign jihadis – is Mugasid tions Group, which in the past has worked with JI on
Delna alias Abu Badrin, a classmate of Umar Patek in major bombing operations. It is now believed to have
Afghanistan.16 Also known as H. Solaiman, he is de- some twenty members; its relationship to the MILF
scribed simultaneously as a member of the 108th Base leadership is unclear.
Command and a “renegade”.17 In addition to Dulmatin,
Despite the evidence, however, MILF leaders consis-
tently deny terrorist ties, saying the movement has re-
Musa alias Sorim alias Sobirin alias Pak Guru alias Dedy peatedly denounced violence against non-combatants
alias Mahsun bin Tamli Tamami, September 2007. and has no contact with JI, and that the government
14
“After Custodial Debriefing Report on Istiada Bte. Hja uses accusations of sheltering terrorists as an excuse
Oemar Sovie”, 5 October 2006. SKP is short for Salipada K. to attack it.20
Pendatun, a municipality on the Maguindanao-Sultan Kuda-
rat provincial border.
15
The four are Ameril Umbra’s (Commander Kato’s) 105th,
the 106th, 108th and 109th. A reorganisation over the last
18
few years has established four MILF fronts in Mindanao Among the ASG leaders accommodated there were Ka-
(Northminfront, Southminfront, Westminfront and Eastmin- daffy Janjalani, Jainel Antel Sali and Isnilon Hapilon. One of
front. The old 101st and 106th base commands under two Malaysians who have been frequent visitors is Zulkifli
Gordon Syafullah and Samir Hashim have been restored to bin Hir alias Marwan, formerly of the JI-affiliated Kumpulan
their former status as the General Headquarters Division and Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) and believed responsible for
National Guard Division, independent of the regional fronts. some of the most serious bombings on Mindanao in 2007. At
16
Mugasid is variously spelled Mogasid, Mokasip and Mu- least six Indonesians have stayed there at different times as
kasip. His collaboration with Patek’s group is confirmed in well as a Singaporean named “Manobo”, also known as
the testimonies of several other Indonesians who trained or Muawiyah and Mohamad Ali. Crisis Group interview, senior
were arrested in Mindanao. Patek and Mugasid were in the investigator, Manila, 10 July 2007. See also testimonies of
same intake at the JI military academy in Sada, Pakistan, on Istiada and Baehaqi.
19
the Afghan border, in 1991. Other members of that class Bedz is implicated with Elmer Abram in the 12 December
were Bali bombers Imam Samudra, Ali Imron and Sarjiyo 2004 General Santos bombing, which targeted the public
alias Sawad, as well as KOMPAK leader and financier Aris market’s pork section to avoid Muslim casualties. The attack
Munandar. After the academy was forced to disband in 1992, killed fifteen (including one Muslim woman) and wounded
Mugasid moved to Torkham, Afghanistan with a group of JI 80. See Regional Trial Court, Region 11, Branch 22, General
members that included Patek, as well as Abu Dujana and Santos City, criminal case no. 18368 for multiple murder
Zarkasih, the JI leaders arrested in June 2007. His nom de with multiple frustrated murder, 31 March 2005. Abram
guerre, Abu Badrin, means “father of two Badrs” because, alias Elmer Emran, reportedly born to Indonesian parents in
when he left for training on the Afghan border, he had two the Philippines, is also implicated in the joint JI-ASG-RSM
young children, a girl named Badriyah and a boy named Valentine’s Day bombings of 2005. He was arrested in
Badruddin. When Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, one of JI’s most Manado in late 2006.For a report on the transmission tower
senior operatives, was shot dead at a checkpoint outside Co- bombings, see Froilan Gallardo, “Extortion group behind
tabato City in October 2003, Mugasid reportedly was riding bombings”, Sun Star, 29 January 2008.
20
the lead motorcycle in his convoy. See, for example, “The Issue of Terrorism” in Salah Jubair,
17
“Organisation Structure of Mindanao Command BIAF The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Proc-
MILF”, undated, 2007, a chart used by the IMT. BIAF stands for ess, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (Manila, 2007), pp. 54-
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, the MILF armed wing. 62. “Salah Jubair” is the pseudonym of a top MILF negotiator.
B. THE MNLF terms, and rival candidates for Manila’s imprimatur as

new ARMM governor began manoeuvring against
The MNLF is an often forgotten element in the terror- him. In April 2001 they announced an Executive
insurgency relationship. A “final” peace agreement Council of Fifteen (EC-15) had assumed control of
signed with the government of President Fidel Ramos the MNLF – and it was promptly recognised by the
in 1996 seemed to end its rebellion. But the so-called government.
Jakarta agreement did not require the disarmament of
its armed wing, the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA), and To ensure his continued authority over BMA forces in
only 7,500 of an estimated 45,000 fighters were inte- Sulu, Misuari formed the Jabal Uhud Islamic Task
grated into the armed forces and police.21 While most Force, circumventing the MNLF chief of staff, Yusop
MNLF veterans on mainland Mindanao melted back Jikiri – then a member of the EC-15 and Manila’s
into civil society, or realigned themselves with the choice to become governor of Sulu. Misuari loyalist
MILF, those in the Sulu archipelago retained their Habier Malik became Task Force commander, and the
separate identity as an armed force. On Jolo and Basi- MNLF’s de facto headquarters shifted to Malik’s
lan, their ethno-linguistic and kinship ties with the camp in Bitanag, Panamao on Jolo.23 Misuari’s mes-
ASG eventually drew them back into the conflict. sage to the MNLF was unmistakable: do not betray
your leader’s command for the material rewards of
On 23 April 2000, the ASG seized a group of tourists political office. 24
in a raid on the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan,
just south of Sulu. This was followed a year later by Following the ransoming of most of the Sipadan hos-
another high-profile abduction of tourists from Dos tages, the administration of President Joseph Estrada,
Palmas beach resort on Palawan. The abductions led fresh from its victory over the MILF at Camp
to the escalation of the military campaign against the Abubakar in July 2000, launched a major offensive,
ASG in Sulu and created a dilemma for the MNLF: Oplan Sultan, on Jolo on 16 September 2000. Civil-
remain scattered in civilian communities across Sulu, ians endured the most brutal campaign since Ferdi-
or consolidate forces in clearly demarcated camps. nand Marcos’s martial law, as swathes of the munici-
The first would allow fighters to defend kith and kin palities of Patikul, Talipao and Maimbung were
against military depredations but risk their being virtually depopulated in the search for ASG.25 The
caught up in anti-ASG sweeps. The second would MNLF lodged official complaints through a Joint
create a clear line between ASG and MNLF but leave Monitoring Committee – which deployed Indonesian
civilians defenceless. BMA fighters in camps could military observers during phase one of the Jakarta
also be tempting targets for both sides. The ASG agreement – but for more than a year did not strike
could try to pull the MNLF back into combat, and back at the AFP.26
some elements of the military could see any insurgent
base as a threat.
Resolving that dilemma was further complicated by City) and Marawi City to the region; new ARMM officials
MNLF chairman Nur Misuari’s waning authority, as were elected on 26 November 2001.
23
his first term as regional governor, a position he se- The MNLF’s base of operations until that point had been in
cured as an informal corollary to the 1996 agreement, Timbangan, Indanan, under the influence of Jikiri and another
came to an end. In February 2001, the Philippines Misuari rival, Alvarez Isnaji.
24
In the battle outside Mecca in 625 CE to which Malik’s task
Congress finally passed legislation implementing the
force and main camp owe their name, Muslim archers disre-
second phase of the agreement, involving new elec- garded the Prophet’s orders not to abandon their post atop Ja-
tions and an expanded ARMM.22 Misuari opposed the bal (Mt.) Uhud, when they caught sight of pagan women tak-
ing the field to tend their dead and wounded. Instead, the
Muslims stormed down the hill in pursuit of spoils – and were
21
“Report on the Implementation of the 1996 Final Peace slaughtered. See Muhammad Muhsin Khan, The Translation
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari (New Delhi, 1984), vol.
Philippines [GRP] and the Moro National Liberation Front v, p. 258, for the definitive hadith (sayings of the Prophet) in
[MNLF]”, Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace circulation in Sulu, and the Holy Koran, 3:121, 3:155 and
Process (OPAPP), Manila, 2004, p. 52. The figure of 45,000 3:166.
25
was bloated by friends and relatives seeking benefits from the Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, March 2003. For details, see
settlement, but thousands of armed men did remain unab- “The Hidden War: Report on the Sulu Fact-Finding and
sorbed. Medical Mission, April 18-23, 2002”, Alliance for the Ad-
22
Alexander P. Aguirre, “The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement: vancement of People’s Rights (Karapatan), 2002. Martial law
Revisited June 2001”, Autonomy and Peace Review, vol. 2, lasted from 1972 to 1986 in Muslim Mindanao.
26
no. 3 (Oct.-Dec. 2006), p. 48. The legislation, Republic Act See, for example, “Deliberate Raid on MNLF Supporters
9054, amended RA 6734 (1989) creating ARMM, and led to a and Civilians in Parang, Sulu Province”, MNLF-JMC, 8 July
plebiscite on 14 August 2001 adding Basilan (less Isabela 2001. In this case, it is alleged that an MNLF village official’s
That changed after an assault on a camp under Malik’s villages of Patikul – the movement’s spiritual home –
command in Tiis, Talipao, on 19 October 2001. Seven to avoid being identified as ASG in what has essen-
MNLF men were killed, including several sons of lo- tially become a free-fire zone. Misauri reassigned Ta-
cal commanders Ustadz Mahmud and Unding Amang. hil Sali – the MNLF vice-chairman on Sulu and son
The latter, brother of MNLF Sulu State Congress of legendary commander Usman Sali – from Patikul
chairman Dawud Amang, called for retaliation against to Camp Marang in order to distance him from ASG
the AFP’s Camp Bautista. Exactly a month later, leader Radullan Sahiron, his relative.30 Yet, informal
Misuari supporters stormed 104th Army Brigade ceasefire mechanisms in Sulu have proven too weak
headquarters in Jolo, killing eighteen soldiers, includ- to withstand the drift toward MNLF-ASG coalescence.
ing a colonel. The AFP bombarded the home of
Misuari’s in-laws the same day, and he fled to Malay- C. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP
sia.27
The ASG is not an insurgency in the same sense as the
The MNLF on Jolo has inhabited a no-man’s-land ever MILF or MNLF, or even a clearly delineated organisa-
since. Rather than acknowledge the breakdown of the tion. It is best understood as a network of networks, an
Jakarta agreement, the government maintains the pre- alliance of smaller groups around individual charismatic
tence that unintegrated BMA fighters are a fringe leaders who compete and cooperate to maximise their
“renegade” group and a law-and-order issue. After reputation for violence. The greater the violence, the
Malaysia deported him in January 2002, Misuari re- bigger the pay-off, in terms of higher ransom payments
mained in detention until April 2008. Manila mean- and foreign funding. Contrary to some assumptions, the
while deals with co-opted rival leaders who command ASG was not an Islamist insurgency that “degenerated”
no significant armed following and are not recognised into criminality following the death of its founder, Abu-
by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), rajak Janjalani, in 1998. Kidnapping and extortion were
the peace process broker. part of its modus operandi from the outset and its re-
ligio-political motivations did not disappear with Jan-
An OIC representative visited Jolo in May 2006 and jalani’s death.
called for renewed “tripartite” consultations (govern-
ment-MNLF-OIC) in Jeddah over the 1996 agree- Janjalani founded ASG in 1991. He was then a char-
ment. Manila repeatedly reneged on the meeting, only ismatic young preacher in the mosques and madrasas
carrying through in November 2007 after in effect of Zamboanga and Basilan. While training in Libya in
barring Misuari from taking part.28 The Jeddah meet- the mid-1980s, he had opposed Nur Misuari’s entry
ing established five Joint Working Groups (on Sharia into peace talks and insisted that the sole objective of
law, education, political representation, a regional se- the Muslim struggle was an Islamic state – not auton-
curity force and the economy and natural resources) omy, not independence, not revolution.31 ASG’s origi-
to review the agreement’s implementation. Further nal name, indeed, was Al-Harakat al-Islamiyah, Arabic
meetings were held in Manila and Istanbul in January for “Islamic movement”. In 1990 he had met Osama
and February 2008. bin Laden’s brother-in-law, Muhammad Jamal Khalifa,
then heading the Philippines office of the Interna-
Despite his prolonged incarceration, Misuari has tional Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO). Khalifa
urged supporters to cooperate with Balikatan and re- began directing funds his way and eventually drew
sist the tendency for ASG and MNLF fighters to close him into an al-Qaeda cell in the Philippines that in-
ranks in the face of the Philippines military’s pressure cluded Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 World Trade Center
and strong kinship ties.29 MNLF forces, and most of bomber, and Yousef’s uncle, 9/11 mastermind Khalid
the population, have completely abandoned interior Sheikh Mohammad. This cell plotted spectacular acts
of terrorism from Manila while providing training to
Abdurajak’s Zamboanga- and Basilan-based follow-
relative was shot dead after a clan enemy purposely misin- ers. Their numbers swelled while Misuari talked peace.
formed the AFP as to Abu Sayyaf’s presence. Similar reasons
have been given for a February 2008 massacre in Ipil, Maim- The outside world paid little note as the ASG made
bung, Jolo (see below). Basilan increasingly ungovernable. Its seizure of for-
27
Crisis Group interview, Nur Misuari, Santa Rosa, Laguna,
31 March 2003.
28
The government insisted that Misuari obtain a “sovereign
30
guarantee” from Saudi Arabia that he would not seek political Radullan Sahiron’s cousin was Usman’s first wife and Ta-
sanctuary there. There is no question of the Saudis providing hil’s mother, Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, July 2003 and
such a guarantee. June 2007.
29 31
Al Jacinto, “Misuari to MNLF Followers: Don’t Disrupt Abdurajak Janjalani, “Jihad: The Misunderstood Doctrine”
RP-US Military Exercises in Sulu”, Manila Times, 9 February (undated sound recording, c.1992).
2006.
eign hostages from Sipadan and Dos Palmas in 2000- centred on Igasan’s Libyan and Syrian training back-
2001 came as if from the blue. Joint bombing opera- ground, it is his education at the Islamic University of
tions involving JI, ASG, and extremists within MILF Medina in Saudi Arabia that makes him one of the
began well before the first Bali bombing and could most qualified religious authority figures in Sulu.35
have provided early clues to the regional jihadi nexus
but were not taken seriously as instances of interna- He was also among the defenders of Abu Sayyaf’s
tional terrorism. From early 2002, the ASG extended base camp, Al-Medina, in the ASG’s first major con-
its operational reach into the nation’s capital, using frontation with the AFP.36 When marines assaulted
militant converts to Islam.32 Organised as the Rajah the camp, in Kapayawan village outside Isabela, Basi-
Solaiman Movement (RSM), and trained and com- lan province on 3 May 1993, the fledgling group that
manded by ASG and JI, converts struck at Manila’s had begun with just five rifles was able to muster 60
transport infrastructure in February 2004 and Febru- fighting men. It took the marines more than a week to
ary 2005, taking more than 120 lives. These attacks subdue ASG resistance and seize the base.37
anticipated parallel developments elsewhere (Madrid,
London). Time and again since the early 1990s, ter- The battle of Al-Medina was a turning point in ASG’s
rorists in the Philippines have been ahead of the global evolution. Its loss drove Abdurajak Janjalani to seal
curve but have been subjected to little informed an alliance with MNLF commanders on Jolo disgrun-
analysis. tled by the resumption of peace talks with the gov-
ernment. Foremost among these was Radullan Sahi-
The ASG has been the principal target of U.S. inter- ron, zone two commander in Patikul, who spurned
vention since Balikatan operations began in early Misuari’s entreaties to join the peace process in 1992
2002. After those operations drove the group’s core and pledged to “continue his sacrifices in the jun-
leadership from Basilan into MILF territory on the gle”.38 He later married Abdurajak’s widow. Many other
Mindanao mainland, sympathetic MILF commanders
protected the leaders and their foreign allies. AHJAG
played a key role in getting them expelled, with MILF
help, in late 2005 to Jolo, where pursuit by the U.S.-
backed Philippines armed forces then shifted in 2006. September 2006 and June 2007. See also Jim Gomez, “Un-
Top leaders like Kadaffy Janjalani have been killed known militant may be new Abu Sayyaf chief”, The Wash-
there, but survivors have been driven into cooperation ington Post, 3 March 2007; and Jaime Laude, “Scholar is new
Abu Sayyaf leader”, Philippine Star, 28 June 2007, p. 12.
with the MNLF. 35
According to one account, Igasan was among the leader-
ship contenders in 1999, outranking Kadaffy as musrif (top
The dangers of this development could be compounded graduate) of the second batch at Darul Imam Shafie, a reli-
by the emergence of new ASG leadership with the gious and military training academy established by al-Qaeda.
capacity to exploit both local and international alli- Arlyn dela Cruz, “New Abu chief Igasan is Tausog, ‘very
ances. 33 In 2006, following six years’ absence in the spiritual’”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 July 2007. For de-
Middle East, Ustadz Yasir Igasan alias Tuan Ya re- tails on Darul Imam Shafie, see Crisis Group Report, South-
portedly returned to Sulu to take up the mantle as ern Philippines Backgrounder, op. cit., p. 22.
36
ASG’s spiritual leader.34 While media speculation has The “front buyer” for the land used to set up the Al-
Medina camp was Ustadz Husein Manatad, Kadaffy’s fa-
ther-in-law and a teacher in the Shuhada al-Islam madrasa in
the Tabuk neighbourhood of Isabela. He was also the head of
32
Christians working with ASG who have “reverted” to Is- IIRO’s Halaqat ul-Koran program in Basilan. See “Debrief-
lam in the belief that it preceded Christianity in the Philip- ing Report, Noor Mohamad Umug”, Philippine National Po-
pines are often affiliated with the RSM, see Crisis Group lice, 18 December 2002. The area was familiar to Abdurajak,
Report, Philippines Terrorism, op. cit. who was born in nearby Lunot village, Crisis Group inter-
33
In this respect, Kadaffy Janjalani’s passing may be as sig- view, Basilan, January 2008.
37
nificant a point in ASG’s evolution as the death in 1998 of Nilo Barandino, “List of Victims of Abduction, Kidnap-
his elder brother and ASG founder, Abdurajak. The first ping and Violent Death for the Year 1993”, unpublished
leadership transition saw a dramatic escalation in violence on document made available to Crisis Group. “Revelations of
Basilan. Contenders jostled for advantage, and a wave of Noor Mohamad Umug”, Philippine National Police, un-
kidnapping spectaculars in 2000-2001 won the group new dated, 2002; Arlyn dela Cruz, “New Abu chief”, op. cit. Ac-
wealth and notoriety, plunging the Sulu archipelago into a cording to Umug, a ranking ASG operative and Darul Imam
crisis from which it has never recovered. Many observers Shafie graduate, the group began with two M-16s, two
view those events as marking a decisive break with ASG’s World War II-era M-1 Garands and a single .30 calibre ma-
original religio-political motivations – the “degeneration” chinegun. Two kidnap victims – a Spanish priest and a four-
into common criminality. year-old boy – were liberated as a result of the attack on
34
Yasir’s presence on Jolo was brought to Crisis Group’s Camp Al-Medina.
38
attention on 29 September 2006; he was reportedly chosen as Crisis Group interview, Shakiruddin Bahjin, Jolo, 12 June
new amir in early June 2007, Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, 2007.
such marriages have taken place, knitting ASG tightly vance logistics team arrived on Jolo for the 2006
into the fabric of Sulu society and the MNLF.39 Balikatan “exercises”, the local police intelligence
chief was shot dead inside Camp Asturias, the provin-
But Yasir Isagan also rose to prominence at a time cial police headquarters. A week later, a bar outside
when al-Qaeda influence in the Philippines was at its Camp Bautista was bombed, killing at least three; a
height. In the early 1990s, he reportedly managed more powerful bomb wrecked a downtown store on
IIRO’s largest program in the country, Koran-reading 27 March, killing five.43 And in the six months before
classes for children (Halaqat ul-Koran), with 6,500 the military offensive known as Oplan Ultimatum be-
students and a multi-million dollar budget.40 Igasan’s gan in August 2006, about 70 victims fell to motorcy-
longstanding ties to Saudi sponsors may recharge the cle assassinations and kidnap-murders by the ASG’s
flow of foreign funds, while his religious training “Urban Terrorist Group” (UTG), also in Jolo town.44
provides the basis for wider local alliances.41
It is unclear whether the foreign jihadi presence has
The ASG network continues to work closely with for- influenced ASG’s diversifying tactics.45 Umar Patek
eign jihadis. Its early partnership in 2001 was with JI, and Dulmatin were on the team that prepared the first
reportedly at the initiative of the then head of JI’s regional Bali bombs and are believed to have imparted their
sub-division (wakalah) head in Jabal Quba, but it is skills in explosives to their ASG colleagues. They and
the relationship with freelance jihadis that has as- Marwan have been in occasional communication by
sumed greater significance over the last three or four telephone and internet with associates in Indonesia.
years after the wakalah structure was disrupted by ar- But UTG’s kidnapping of Christians remains an es-
rests. tablished tactic, although recent victims have more
often been wealthy townspeople than the villagers
Umar Patek, Dulmatin and a few other other foreign
jihadis from KOMPAK and Darul Islam accompanied
ASG leaders when they were forced back to Jolo in
September 2005; others, including Dulmatin’s brother-
in-law and Malaysian JI member Zulkifli bin Hir alias 43
“Special Report on Bomb Explosion at the Notre Dame
Marwan, stayed with MILF contacts in Maguindanao Multi-Purpose Cooperative Inc.”, Philippine National Police
but were in regular communication by phone.42 The (PNP), Camp Asturias, Jolo, 29 March 2006; and “Blast Vic-
arrival of the ASG contingent in Jolo quickly reig- tims,” Integrated Provincial Health Office, Jolo, 20 February
nited conflict there in November 2005, and a new 2006, and “Manmade Disaster,” 31 March 2006.
44
wave of violence swept through Jolo town, the capi- UTG, also known as Abu Sofian and the Freedom Squad,
tal, from February 2006. On the same day a U.S. ad- exemplifies the mixed motives typical of ASG joint ven-
tures. Its commander was Joselito “Sofian” Nasari, son of a
retired army major, driven underground by an abusive rela-
tive in military intelligence. Deeply religious, of mixed eth-
39
Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, June 2007. The second of nic background, and just nineteen years old, Sofian was tor-
Janjalani’s sisters married into the Jalmaani clan, which has tured and pressured to infiltrate the group of ASG leader “Dr
produced the group’s longstanding foreign liaison in Saudi Abu” Pula. Instead, he joined it. He was killed in an intelli-
Arabia, Haji Hasan Jalmaani, and a respected former MNLF gence operation in Zamboanga City on 23 November 2006,
fighter, Julasbi Jalmaani, based in Tanum, Patikul. Other mar- and the group seems to have dissolved in early 2007. Crisis
riage alliances binding ASG commanders include the fami- Group interviews, Jolo, September 2006 and June 2007. Ur-
lies of “Doctor Abu Pula” Gumbahali and Albader Parad. ban violence in Jolo is comprehensively catalogued by the
40
Halaqat ul-Koran’s budget more than doubled annually local vicariate’s Justice and Peace desk; see its “Peace
between 1989 and 1991, from about $500,000 to $2.5 mil- Watch 2006”. UTG operations extended to Zamboanga City,
lion, out of IIRO’s official total country spending of $2.9 where they spiked in October 2006, with twelve shootings in
million in 1989, $3.7 million in 1990 and $6 million in 1991. the last week of the month. Bong Garcia, “Officials tag Say-
Given that each student cost 14 Saudi riyals a month ($3.75), yaf hit men as behind Zambo killings”, Manila Times, 1 No-
there was ample room for diverting funds. See “International vember 2006.
45
Islamic Relief Organization”, undated, c. 1992, pp. 7, 16. On In Indonesia, in late 2005 at the time of the second Bali
Igasan’s role, see Taharudin Piang Ampatuan, “Abu Say- bombs, Noordin Mohamed Top’s followers were circulating
yaf’s New Leader: Yasser Igasan the Religious Scholar”, Indonesian translations of al-Qaeda online material stressing
RSIS Commentaries 71/2007, 9 July 2007. the need to engage in urban guerrilla warfare, including kid-
41
Crisis Group sources on Jolo indicated, however, that napping and targeted assassinations, but they apparently had
Igasan’s stringent control over the use of funds was already no capacity to carry it out. Internet communication was
causing friction and would be an obstacle to his assuming clearly taking place between the Patek group and its associ-
overall leadership. Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, June 2007. ates in Indonesia; Patek was a regular contributor in 2004-
42
Testimony of Baehaqi. Two KOMPAK recruits are thought 2005 to a website run by KOMPAK, www.muharridh.com,
to have entered the Philippines from Sabah around June now closed. In 2005-2006, Marwan was also in contact with
2005. See Crisis Group Report, Philippines Terrorism, op. his brother-in-law detained in Cipinang Prison in Jakarta,
cit., p. 15; also, Crisis Group interview, Manila, 10 July 2007. according to others detained there.
(and foreigners) typical in the past.46 Intended primar- III. AHJAG: A MECHANISM THAT
ily to raise funds, these attacks also increase religious WORKED
tensions and, if undertaken on a wider scale, might pro-
voke renewed polarisation between Christians (mostly
settlers from outside Jolo) and Muslims. Whether the AHJAG, renewed in November 2007 but still mori-
ASG and foreign jihadis acquire the capacity to do bund, offers a model for preventing such coalescence
this depends on their relationship with the MNLF and of terrorists and insurgents. On mainland Mindanao, it
MILF. helped prise ASG and foreign jihadis away from the
MILF, leading to their flight to Sulu. A similar mecha-
nism is needed there as the fugitives disappear into
MNLF territory. Isolating a carefully defined terrorist
enemy from insurgents is the only way to remove the
threat without inflaming wider hostilities.
The problem of “lawlessness” in insurgent enclaves

was first addressed in May 2002, when the Philip-
pines government and MILF negotiating panels
agreed to the “isolation and interdiction” of all crimi-
nal syndicates, kidnap-for-ransom groups and lost
commands “suspected of hiding in MILF areas [and]
communities”.47 The mechanism for this endeavour
was an Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), for-
mally established only in January 2005.48
AHJAG’s baptism of fire came quickly. Following

Kadaffy Janjalani’s flight to mainland Mindanao in
mid-2003, U.S. electronic and aerial surveillance led
to a series of air strikes in MILF-controlled areas of
southern Maguindanao province, from November
2004 to April 2005. These were followed by a major
AFP ground operation, Oplan Tornado, from July to
October 2005. The MILF did not retaliate, and escala-
tion to full-scale hostilities, as occurred in 2000 and
2003, was avoided.49 Instead, key ASG leaders and
their foreign jihadi confederates were forced back to
Sulu, with MILF assistance.50
47
“Joint Communiqué between the Government of the Re-
public of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front”, Cyberjaya, Malaysia, 6 May 2002, paras. 1, 3. “Lost
commands” refers to units led by allegedly renegade com-
manders, but it has not always been clear how removed they
really were from central MILF control. For the full text of
the joint communiqué, see Crisis Group Report, Southern
Philippines Backgrounder, op. cit., Appendix D, p. 33.
48
“Updates on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks”, OPAPP, 28
February 2007, p. 3. AHJAG’s operationalisation was finally
approved by the two parties’ negotiating panels in Kuala
Lumpur on 21 December 2004 and implemented at the 24th
joint meeting of the Coordinating Committees on the Cessa-
tion of Hostilities (CCCH), to which AHJAG reports, on 12-
46
This reflects ASG’s territorial shift from Basilan – with its 13 January 2005, in Davao City.
49
Christian enclaves in rural Lantawan (Matarling) and Su- Hostilities in 2000 displaced approximately one million
misip (Tumahubong, Manggal, Sinangkapan), as well as Isa- civilians; about 400,000 were displaced in 2003.
50
bela and Lamitan – to Jolo, where the tiny Christian minority The first air strike, on 19 November 2004, came close to
is exclusively urban. Survivors usually flee the province the mark, injuring a top JI graduate of the Abubakar camp
rather than attempt to seek justice. system, Rahmat Abdulrahim, who went on to manage the
The AHJAG concept rests on intelligence sharing. At after about a month’s cantonment, and minor clashes
the third joint AHJAG meeting in Davao City on 23 ensued.53
April 2005, the government presented a list of 53 per-
sons of priority interest, including 32 foreign jihadis, Even if AHJAG did not result in the terrorists’ cap-
it believed were hiding in MILF territory. Two ture, the new arrangement did prevent potentially dis-
months later, according to a well-placed source, Al- astrous conflict escalation in the MILF’s central Min-
Haj Murad sent a personal letter to Kadaffy, ordering danao heartland; prompted the first demonstration of
him to leave within 72 hours. At the end of this pe- Murad’s willingness to control extremists in his own
riod, the MILF gave the government the “exact loca- fold; and forced key ASG and jihadi targets back into
tion” of Kadaffy’s group.51 The willingness of the their corner on Jolo. These were significant achieve-
MILF to expel the ASG leader was unprecedented; its ments for an untested mechanism – undoubtedly
readiness to provide information on the whereabouts aided by the generally positive mood of the wider
of ASG was even more significant. peace process at the time. Yet, for several reasons,
AHJAG has received no credit for the counter-
Armed with this intelligence, U.S.-trained Light Re- terrorism victories it later made possible in Sulu.
action Company troops formed the spearhead of
Oplan Tornado, which was to begin with a night op- Collaboration with terrorists is a sensitive issue. To
eration on 30 June 2005. But the troops reached the acknowledge the breaking of a terrorist link is to ad-
target area six hours late, and a protracted chase be- mit its existence in the first place. As noted, the MILF
gan, leading to several encounters with MILF forces. refuses to acknowledge that its commanders harbour
Three weeks into the operation, new ground was bro- terrorists. Media and civil society organisations sup-
ken with a Philippines government (GRP)-MILF porting other aspects of the peace process tend to deny
agreement to reposition 280 MILF fighters in safe ar- the problem exists or suggest that counter-terrorism
eas in Talayan and Datu Saudi Ampatuan towns in measures are “nothing but a smokescreen for the as-
Maguindanao.52 Intelligence personnel inspected the sertion of hegemonic U.S. interests”.54AHJAG’s own
men as they crossed the highway to ensure no wanted reports emphasise cooperation against common crimi-
individuals had smuggled themselves into the ranks, nality, reflecting a formal mandate that does not even
and the pursuit continued. mention terrorism.55
Tensions on both sides threatened the success of this There are other factors as well, however. Not every-
unprecedented joint counter-terrorist drive. The gov- one believes AHJAG was the key reason for the ex-
ernment was under pressure from the International pulsion of ASG and its allies in 2005. A Philippines
Monitoring Team (IMT), a Malaysian-led peacekeep-
ing force deployed in October 2004, to halt the opera-
tion altogether, while the MILF leadership around 53
On 1 September 2005, men under Ustadz Abdul Wahid
Murad faced recalcitrant field commanders who Tundok, operations officer of the MILF’s 105th Base Com-
viewed the jihadis as allies and sought to aid their es- mand, confronted police special action forces and army
cape. Complaining that they were unable to harvest troops in Gawang village, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, preventing
their crops as Oplan Tornado dragged on, fighters be- a raid on a suspected safehouse. Following IMT, ceasefire
gan returning to the MILF’s camps Omar and al-Badr officials’ and AHJAG intervention, the opposed forces were
separated, and Tundok accompanied monitors to the safe-
house, but the suspects had fled, leaving food and radio
equipment behind. According to a senior ceasefire official
present at the scene, 105th base commanders “tried to ar-
range an escape by the JI and ASG, shuttling them out by
motorbike”. The jihadis’ weapons were smuggled out in a
multiple Valentine’s Day bombings three months later. See separate vehicle, but then confiscated by the MILF. Jan-
Crisis Group Report, Philippines Terrorism, op. cit. A sub- jalani, Dulmatin and their companions fled back to Sulu
sequent air strike was recorded by the Abu Sayyaf on their shortly afterwards. Crisis Group interview, senior officer in-
first known jihadi DVD, captured in an October 2005 raid in volved in the operation, Manila, June 2007. A total of eight
Zamboanga City. It shows the ASG’s riverside encampment ASG/JI were reported killed in the course of Oplan Tornado.
54
being bombed and strafed, while the main group observes Kit Collier, “Terrorism and the Internationalisation of the
from a safe distance; a mujahid is shown with a serious leg Southern Philippines Conflict: Towards a More Balanced
wound resulting from the attack. “Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah”, Perspective”, unpublished conference paper, 2004.
55
Al-Harakatul Islamiyyah Productions, 2005. During its first two years to January 2007, AHJAG reports
51
Crisis Group interview, Manila, June 2007. Murad is said facilitating the rescue of 27 kidnap victims. The expulsion of
to have taken umbrage at Janjalani after he called Murad a Kadaffy and Dulmatin’s group from mainland Mindanao is
kafir (unbeliever). not mentioned, but the recovery of a stolen cow in Lanao del
52
“Joint Monitoring and Assistance Center, GRP-MILF Sur is. “Updates on the GRP-MILF Peace Talks”, OPAPP,
CCCH/AHJAG Press Statement”, 22 July 2005. 12 January 2007, pp. 3-4.
official made the implausible argument that after se- IV. BALIKATAN AND OPLAN
curity forces tracked down and shot Fathur Rahman ULTIMATUM
al-Ghozi, ASG and its foreign allies became con-
vinced that MILF commanders had betrayed them.
Fearful of further betrayals, they fled to Jolo on their Oplan Ultimatum, a nine-month offensive in Sulu by
own.56 The flight to Jolo, however, took place two a ten-battalion Philippines joint services task force,
years after al-Ghozi was shot. Other officials sug- was directed against an estimated 500 ASG and a small
gested that AHJAG in fact had not worked, because number of “High Value Target” foreigners – principal
the MILF continued to turn a blind eye to the activi- among them Dulmatin and Umar Patek. Supported by
ties of commanders like Mugasid. a U.S. military contingent of about 200, the offensive,
which began in August 2006, built on gains won since
But its achievements were real,57 and strengthening a
Balikatan 02-1, a joint U.S.-Philippines “military ex-
proven mechanism should be an obvious policy choice.
ercise” conducted on Basilan between January and
The five-month hiatus between the June 2007 expira-
July 2002. Those manoeuvres had driven the ASG’s
tion of AHJAG’s mandate and its renewal at the 14
core leadership out of Basilan, established a tenuous
November 2007 exploratory meeting in Kuala Lum-
peace on the island and upgraded local infrastructure
pur, however, was costly, as many of its personnel
and AFP skills, especially intelligence fusion and in-
had moved on to new assignments, including its gov-
teroperability of weapons, tactics and communica-
ernment chairman Major General Ben Dolorfino, now
tions systems. Balikatan has since become a paradigm
Marine Commandant, based in Manila.58
of successful counter-insurgency, with global policy
It is in the context of a complex set of intertwined or- implications.
ganisations and a demonstrably successful counter-
terrorism mechanism that the flaws of Balikatan and A. EARLY SUCCESSES
Oplan Ultimatum must be understood.
The new offensive was spurred by information de-
rived from the capture some weeks earlier of a Ma-
laysian-born Philippines Muslim, Binsali Kiram, also
known as Binsali Omar, as he attempted to re-enter
Sabah in the company of two Malaysian Darul Islam
(DI) operatives.59 Binsali had extensive knowledge of
the whereabouts of the wanted jihadis in Sulu, in
which the Malaysians showed little interest. Improv-
ing Malaysian cooperation with the Philippine National
Police (PNP), however, allowed a senior PNP investi-
gator to interview Binsali and brief the AFP Southern
Command (Southcom) chief, Major General Gabriel
Habacon, on the actionable intelligence, and a plan of
attack was prepared for midnight of 31 July 2006.60
59
Darul Islam (DI) was the name given to several Islamic in-
surgencies in Indonesia, including in West Java, Aceh and
South Sulawesi, that united briefly before their defeat by the
Indonesian army in the early 1960s. They regrouped in the
1970s and gradually adopted a more radical ideology. Sev-
eral members, including Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, now known as
a JI leader, fled to Malaysia in 1985 and recruited both Ma-
laysian and Singaporean nationals. Most of these recruits
joined a breakaway faction of DI that in 1993 became Je-
56
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 4 April 2008. maah Islamiyah, but others opted to stay in DI. These in-
57
See further below. cluded many members of the South Sulawesi DI who fled to
58
Crisis Group interview, Brig. Gen. Reynaldo Sealana, Sabah after their leader was killed in 1965; they were later
chairman, GRP-CCCH, Cotabato City, 24 January 2008. joined by DI members from elsewhere, returning from train-
Gen. Sealana indicated to Crisis Group that most inquiries ing in Afghanistan.
60
reaching the CCCH concern AHJAG business. Crisis Group interview, Manila, 10 July 2007.
U.S. groundwork over the previous year had been ex- sq. km “no fire zone,” and there were no serious “mis-
tensive. A military “needs assessment” team arrived encounters” between AFP and MNLF forces.62
on Jolo in May 2005, and Bayanihan (“Community
Spirit”) exercises began on the island in September. Operational successes against the ASG during the
In February 2006, Jolo hosted about 250 of the 5,000 first four months of Oplan Ultimatum went hand-in-
U.S. troops taking part in wider “Balikatan 2006” hand with close MNLF cooperation and were note-
manoeuvres. When Balikatan 2006 ended in early worthy for the limited civilian displacement. An esti-
March, U.S. forces stayed on in Jolo, building deep- mated 3,000 villagers were dislocated in August 2006,
water wells, roads and schools and conducting medi- compared with up to 70,000 in February 2005 clashes
cal civic action programs (Medcaps) to build local and 12,000 in November 2005.63 The decisive factor
goodwill and turn the population against ASG. enabling more discriminate AFP tactics may have
been as much clear demarcation of MNLF forces as
The August offensive was also preceded by a “gen- U.S. training, equipment and intelligence.
tlemen’s agreement” with the MNLF that reaffirmed
its 1996 peace pact signed in Jakarta and established The initial fighting was largely contained to the Mount
an informal Ad Hoc Coordinating Group (AHCG) and Kagay and Mount Taran areas to the immediate south
Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). A verbal agreement west of Camp Marang. Early on the first morning, two
was struck between the MNLF and the Philippines Philippines special operations platoons engaged ASG
government in the village of Bitanag, Jolo on 20 May fighters under Radullan Sahiron in Kagay village, In-
2006. It was modelled on the elaborate ceasefire danan, killing Radullan’s son, Ismin Sahiron alias
mechanisms crafted with the MILF but absent from Young Hunter. Foreign jihadis took part in that battle,
the Jakarta agreement. This “gentlemen’s agreement” according to information that recently has emerged
came into play on the afternoon of 31 July, as AFP from an Indonesian participant, Mohamed Baehaqi,
and MNLF representatives haggled over conditions almost certainly including Umar Patek, Dulmatin and
for the forthcoming attack on the ASG. the Singaporean, Manobo. The group withdrew to a
camp in Bai Bitu.64 Six more encounters ensued over
Representing Southcom was its deputy commander for the following week in the same area.65
operations, General Dolorfino, also head of AHJAG,
with extensive experience coordinating counter-ter- In the third week, the action shifted north east. Unable
rorist action with the MILF on mainland Mindanao. to draw Ajibun’s men into the fray, the ASG made a
Opposite him sat Khaid Ajibun, chairman of the Sulu break for Radullan’s home turf – the rugged and
State Revolutionary Committee, with overall command sparsely populated municipality of Patikul – taking
of MNLF forces in Sulu province. The venue was many of the foreign jihadis with them. According to
Ajibun’s Camp Khalid bin Walid, better known as Dolorfino, the MNLF called to inform him of a large
Camp Marang, in the hamlet of Marang, Buansa vil- Abu Sayyaf group on the move, attempting to break
lage, on the slopes of Mount Tumantangis, overlook- out of the AFP cordon.66
ing the provincial capital of Jolo and just 5km from it.
Marines and scout rangers closed in on the ASG core
The delicacy of the situation lay in the extreme prox- group in a series of intensifying battles between 18
imity of the operation’s targets to Ajibun’s camp. As and 28 August 2006. Shortly before dawn on 4 Sep-
Dolorfino negotiated with the MNLF commander, he tember, marines came upon a small group of men at
received updates on enemy movements from a U.S. prayer in the village of Tugas, Patikul. Six marines
surveillance plane circling overhead. It placed Abu died and nineteen were wounded in the fierce ex-
Sayyaf forces within 500 metres of Dolorfino’s posi- change that followed, as the group was reinforced from
tion.61 As the agreement was being translated into
Tausug, the predominant language in Sulu, AFP artil-
lery and air strikes suddenly erupted, throwing the scene 62
Events reconstructed from Crisis Group interviews, Jolo,
into chaos. Ajibun’s men rushed to defend the camp June 2007, and a sound recording of the opening moments of
perimeter to cries of “Allahu Akbar!” and “Our Mus- the offensive made inside Camp Marang.
63
lim brothers are under attack!” However, the ceasefire Tabang Mindanaw (Mindanao Aid), “Developing a Cul-
pact held. Ajibun’s men were confined to an agreed 6 ture of Peace for Sulu”, unpublished report, 2006, pp. 1, 57.
64
Testimony of Moh. Baehaqi, 22 February 2008.
65
“Southcom Oplan 03-06 (Ultimatum), 01 August-09 Mar
2007”, Armed Forces of the Philippines, pp. 1-2. Elsewhere
on the island, there was only minor harassment of the 51st In-
fantry Battalion (IB) headquarters 20km to the east in Talipao.
66
Dolorfino passed the message on to the 3rd Marine Brigade
61
Crisis Group interview, Maj. Gen. Ben Dolorfino, Manila, commander, Brig. Gen. Juancho Sabban, warning him that the
25 June 2007. group would be crossing the main provincial road.
the surrounding woods. Only on 19 January 2007 did talities resulted.70 Surviving villagers told a different
FBI (U.S.) forensic analysis confirm that Kadaffy story.
Janjalani, the ASG’s supreme leader (amir), was
among the dead. Siliya Usman, whose husband Kaddam, an MNLF
commander, and adult son Taib were among at least
In February 2008, an account of the battle surfaced eight local residents killed, claimed the military at-
from Mohamed Baehaqi, the Indonesian KOMPAK tacked her community without provocation, killing
member captured in Mindanao. He said that before it three on the spot. Taib and Kaddam fled, flagging
began, ASG forces had divided into two parts, with down a passenger jeep bound for Jolo town, 25km
Kadaffy leading one and Umar Patek the other. They distant. The vehicle ran a marine checkpoint, which
had been marching the whole night and were so tired fired on it, killing the driver, his son, Taib, Kaddam
that they neglected to secure their perimeters and and another passenger.71
were attacked. One of Radullan Sahiron’s men tried
to persuade Kadaffy to withdraw, but he thought he Local leaders explained to Crisis Group that the
could exploit the weakness of the government forces, Tandu Batu villagers were involved in a clan feud
since so many had been wounded. In the battle that (rido) and had been startled by the sudden appearance
followed, Kadaffy was fatally hit in the neck. The of armed men over a rise near the Usmans’ house. It
ASG then withdrew, and a small group of top ASG is unclear who opened fire first, but the origins of the
leaders gathered to bury him, with one man recording tragedy lie in the ambiguous status of armed MNLF
the event on a video camera. Baehaqi, who appears to communities in Jolo’s volatile environment. One
have been the only foreigner present, said they all month earlier, a military raid on another MNLF com-
kissed Kadaffy’s forehead as he was laid in the grave.67 munity on Daungdong Island, south of Jolo, caused a
pregnant woman to miscarry. And a month after
By the time Kadaffy’s death was confirmed, Oplan Tandu Batu, inexperienced scout rangers ambushed
Ultimatum had achieved another victory. Jainal Antel two boys returning home late in the evening in Tag-
Sali alias Abu Solaiman, the ASG’s high-profile mas- bak, Indanan, on the fringes of Camp Marang. Four-
termind, was shot dead by Philippines army special teen-year-old Hakim Hamsijani Abbilul, a nephew of
forces near the summit of Bud Dajo, in Talipao, on 16 Khaid Ajibun, died, as did one soldier, apparently
January 2007. Coming in such rapid succession, its from friendly fire.72
top two commanders’ deaths provoked premature
obituaries for the group.68 But just as the AFP pre- Mounting tensions became manifest on 2 February
pared for the campaign’s conclusion, its gains began 2007, when government negotiators were detained in
to slip through its fingers, as the “gentlemen’s agree- the MNLF’s second major camp on Jolo – Jabal Uhud
ment” with the MNLF broke down. – by its commander, Ustadz Habier Malik. The gov-
ernment party, led by General Dolorfino, was there to
negotiate a settlement of the Tandu Batu incident.
B. BREAKDOWN They agreed on a payment of 50,000 pesos ($1,100)
per victim as “financial assistance”, with a deduction
In a complaint to the OIC, which brokered the Jakarta for the dead marines, and for both sides to return cap-
and Bitanag agreements, the MNLF described an in- tured weapons.73 But then Ramon Santos, undersecre-
cident that occurred just two days after Abu So- tary with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the
laiman’s death as the start of military operations
against it.69 Elements of the 3rd Marine Brigade were
on patrol in the hamlet of Tandu Batu, Timpook, 70
Southcom Oplan, op. cit., p. 7.
Patikul, on 18 January 2007, when, according to their 71
“Partial Report Re: Killing in Patikul, Sulu on January 18,
after battle report, they encountered 50 to 60 ASG 2007”, Commission on Human Rights, Zamboanga City, 22
under Albader Parad. Nine “enemy” and five AFP fa- January 2007.
72
Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, June 2007. The Tagbak in-
cident was officially recorded as an encounter with “more or
less 30 ASG”. And just 48 hours after Tandu Batu, Albader
67
Testimony of Moh. Baehaqi, 22 February 2008. Parad reportedly led an ambush in Saldang, Parang town –
68
For example, Alcuin Papa, “Esperon: Final battles vs Abus on the opposite side of Jolo Island. While not inconceivable,
at hand”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 January 2007, citing this does stretch the credibility of the official account further.
AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. Albader usually operates in Parang and Indanan. See South-
69
“Follow-up Report by the Secretary General on the Out- com Oplan, op. cit., p. 7.
73
break of Hostilities between the GRP and the MNLF in the The settlement followed the traditional Tausug formula of
Province of Sulu in Southern Philippines”, Organisation of “blood money” payments in clan feuds. Since this only ap-
the Islamic Conference, OIC/ICFM-34/MM/SGREP. (GRP. plies between Muslims, the term “financial assistance” was
MNLF), undated, p. 3. used instead.
Peace Process (OPAPP), told Malik that the planned “there is a need to put up a [formal] coordinating
OIC meeting in Jeddah had been postponed, and committee between the MNLF and AFP to prevent
Malik “became agitated”.74 hostilities. There is a truce, and we signed a peace
agreement with the rebels, but sporadic clashes still
Dolorfino recalled being led to the watchtower in the occur”.80 His warnings were in vain.
centre of the camp and confined. “So the meeting has
been postponed”, Malik said, “but we cannot post-
pone the misencounters – I am losing face with my C. THE APRIL WAR
men! You are here risking your life, but the policy-
makers do not value your work”! The government By March 2007, the AFP estimated it had killed 79
party, twenty in all, was not permitted to leave Jabal ASG and captured 28 in 61 incidents over the course
Uhud until a definite date was set for the OIC tripar- of Oplan Ultimatum. This was achieved at the price of
tite meeting, due to review implementation of the Ja- 28 AFP dead and 123 wounded. Remaining ASG
karta agreement, but repeatedly delayed.75 strength was put at 432 men with 284 firearms. By
these conventional counter-insurgency metrics, the
For two days, Jolo teetered on the brink of war. Some extended operation had reduced ASG manpower by
military hawks invoked the massacre of General 20 percent.81
Teodulfo Bautista and 35 of his men after he agreed
to talk to MNLF Commander Usman Sali 30 years In addition to killing the group’s top two leaders, the
earlier.76 But Dolorfino insisted that he was never in AFP was closing in on the foreign jihadis. On 3 Octo-
real danger: “We weren’t hostages. My twelve secu- ber 2006, Dulmatin’s wife, Istiada, was captured in a
rity men weren’t disarmed, some were allowed to safe house in Patikul, just a kilometre from the site of
travel to town, and we had our mobile phones”.77 Kadaffy’s last battle a month before. Another Indone-
sian with the Patek group, Abu Samur alias Gufran,
On 4 February, Manila guaranteed that tripartite talks died together with five ASG, including Jundam Ja-
would proceed in July, and Dolorfino’s party was free malul alias Black Killer, in a maritime encounter off
to go. But the pace of mistaken engagements in- Panglima Sugala, Tawi-Tawi (60km south west of
creased. Five days after Ajibun’s nephew was shot, a Jolo) on 6 January 2007. And on 9 April, the AFP
scout ranger platoon fought about “40 ASG believed claimed to have narrowly missed Dulmatin, Patek and
to be under Radullan Sahiron and Doctor Abu” 2.5km prominent ASG commander Isnilon Hapilon in a pre-
further up the slopes of Mount Tumantangis78 – the dawn raid in Kanlibot, Talipao.82
heart of Ajibun’s territory. The scout ranger com-
mander was reported as saying, “the Abu Sayyaf ran Two days later, the tottering truce with the MNLF
to the MNLF area; it looks like the Abu Sayyaf were collapsed. ASG led by Radullan Sahiron were moni-
joined by the MNLF”.79 Dolorfino cautioned that tored near a satellite camp of Khaid Ajibun’s, under
“somebody is trying to get the AFP to attack the the command of Bitting Jalaidi. Working through the
MNLF and start a confrontation again”, adding, Ad Hoc Coordination Group and Peace Monitoring
Group, the Philippines army commander and his
MNLF counterpart pressured Ajibun to evacuate his
74
forces and allow military operations to proceed. Five
Crisis Group interview, Maj. Gen. Ben Dolorfino, Manila, of Ajibun’s sub-commanders agreed to withdraw,83
25 June 2007.
75 and 70 MNLF fighters from Bitting’s camp in Tali-
The OIC-GRP-MNLF meeting was originally scheduled
for July 2006 after a fact-finding mission to Jolo led by the
bang were taken by military trucks to Langpas, In-
OIC special envoy, Ambassador Sayed Kassem al-Masri, in danan – site of another MNLF camp, Amilhamja.
May, Crisis Group interview, Maj. Gen. Ben Dolorfino, Ma-
nila, 25 June 2007. However, Ajibun himself, and his lieutenant, Tahil
76
The 10 October 1977 massacre in Patikul is still com- Sali, were reluctant to abandon Camp Marang, which
memorated in the name of the AFP headquarters in Jolo, lies 3km from Talibang, “quite far from where the
Camp Bautista. Tausug celebrate Usman Sali, vice mayor of
Patikul when the war began in November 1972, as a leading
hero of the MNLF struggle. His exploits are recounted in the
80
popular ballad “Kissa kan Usman Sali” (Mock’s Records, “Hundreds flee, 6 killed, 13 hurt in Jolo clash”,
Tawau, Sabah). GMANews (TV), 26 February 2007.
77 81
Crisis Group interview, Maj. Gen. Ben Dolorfino, Manila, Southcom Oplan, op. cit., p. 1, and “ASG (AHAI)
25 June 2007. Strength and Firearms”, op. cit., pp. 1,-2.
78 82
Southcom Oplan, op. cit., p. 7. Joel Guinto, “Abu Sayyaf leader, JI bomber elude arrest in
79
Julie Alipala and Joel Guinto, “6 Abu rebels slain, 13 sol- Sulu”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 9 April 2007.
83
diers hurt in Sulu”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26 February They were Bitting Jalaidi, Nandi Udih, Hassan, Bahid and
2007. Ajijul.
ASG members were”, as Bitting pointed out.84 Ajibun under Albader Parad took advantage of the chaos by
also mistrusted AFP motives. After having being told abducting seven civilians and demanding ransom from
that operations around Camp Marang would only last provincial governor Ben Loong. Several days later,
a few days at the start of Oplan Ultimatum, he had their heads were dumped at army bases in Parang and
remained surrounded even after fighting shifted to Indanan.88
Patikul, with his men unable to carry arms in areas
through which they previously moved freely. While difficult to quantify, much of the civilian
goodwill so painstakingly cultivated through the civil-
Ajibun phoned MNLF chairman Nur Misuari, under military operations component of Balikatan was clearly
house arrest in Manila, for advice, and was told not to lost in the mass evacuations. The armed forces’ own
vacate the camp. AFP operations began anyway, and tactical intelligence estimates are unambiguous. With
Ajibun’s men were drawn into the fighting. It is un- the followers of at least seven MNLF commanders
clear if there were any ASG casualties, but two sol- driven into the arms of the Abu Sayyaf, the number of
diers and two MNLF men were killed in a six-hour enemy combatants on Jolo instantly jumped from 432
skirmish. A ceasefire monitor based on Jolo told Cri- to 609 – more than 40 per cent – while the group’s
sis Group: “If the withdrawal had been coordinated armed strength rose from 284 to 458 – an increase of
properly, it could have been done. This splitting up of over 60 per cent.89
the MNLF is what made a mess of it. The partial
evacuation gave a signal to the military to begin op-
erations – but it shouldn’t have been rushed”.85 If all
MNLF forces had stayed in place, or if all had moved
out, conflict could have been avoided. Instead, a dom-
ino effect took hold across Jolo.
In an MNLF command conference on 7 April 2007,

Ustadz Habier Malik had assured Ajibun that he
would retaliate if Camp Marang came under AFP at-
tack. Accordingly, on the night of 13 April, Malik’s
forces mortared the headquarters of the 11th Marine
Battalion in Seit Lake, Panamao, killing a civilian.
The next morning they attacked a marine patrol base
7km to the east, in Tayungan, and the army special
forces headquarters 16km to the west, in Talipao.
Two marines died and eight were wounded. Malik
declared that he had had enough of misencounters.
“We have been cooperating with you”, he told a gov-
ernment negotiator, “but our men are becoming col-
lateral damage”.86
The marines responded by overrunning Camp Jabal

Uhud on 15 April, and the army took a third MNLF
camp in Tiis, Talipao. The fighting was the fiercest
since February 2005, with gun battles erupting in
Kalingalan Kaluang and Parang, towns at opposite
ends of the island, as well as around the seized MNLF
camps. More than 40,000 villagers were displaced in
the first few days and 67,000 by the end of May 2007
– more than 12 per cent of Jolo’s population.87 ASG
84
Julie Alipala and Christine Avendano, “MNLF commander
declares ‘holy war’ on gov’t”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16
April 2007; and Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, June 2007.
85
Crisis Group interview, Jolo, 12 June 2007.
86
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 25 June 2007.
87 88
“Status of Internally Displaced Persons as of May 30 Joel Guinto, “Abu Sayyaf beheads seven captives in
2007”, Office of the Provincial Governor, Sulu. Jolo’s popu- Sulu”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 19 April 2007.
89
lation in 2007 was 546,800, out of 753,446 in Sulu province. “ASG (AHAI) Strength and Firearms”, op. cit.
V. COLLUSION AND COOPERATION On 19-20 June, notorious terrorists Omar and Iting
Sailani were gunned down in Baywas, Sumisip town,
on Basilan, the home village of local MILF com-
The seizure of the MNLF’s principal bases on Jolo mander Amir Mingkong, who has a long history of
recalls the MILF experience on mainland Mindanao collusion with the ASG. News reports credited a ma-
from 2000 to 2003. Relatively disciplined and hierar- rine unit with the kills, but according to the marine
chically accountable guerrilla formations have again commander on Basilan, it was Mingkong himself who
been dispersed into an anarchic environment, where delivered the coup de grace. This was more likely
there are many possibilities – and even imperatives – motivated by a personal dispute than a conscious em-
for them to deepen collusion with terrorists. brace of the peace process but was an encouraging
development, nonetheless.92
In counter-insurgency terms, capturing guerrilla strong-
holds may be seen as a victory. But from a counter-
terrorism perspective, anything that drives main-
A. THE AL-BARKA INCIDENT: JUNE 2007
stream guerrillas and extremist jihadis closer together
is a defeat. On Mindanao, the AFP’s occupation of Across the Moro Gulf on the Zamboanga peninsula,
the MILF’s Camp Abubakar, from July 2000, did im- however, a dangerous situation was evolving that
pede the JI training facilities – though this was not would have serious consequences for Basilan. On 10
presented as an objective at the time.90 But smaller June 2007, Fr. Giancarlo Bossi, an Italian priest, was
groups of freelance foreign jihadis have continued to kidnapped from his parish in Payao, Zamboanga
seek partnerships with militants inside, as well as out- Sibugay province. MILF forces helping in the search
side, the MILF and MNLF. for Bossi stood down at the end of the month, ex-
pressing concern that a mistaken encounter might oc-
The most dangerous of these liaisons came about as a cur in the absence of a clear AHJAG mandate, since it
direct result of Balikatan’s “success” in Basilan. As had expired on 21 June.93 Ten days later, those fears
described above, driving the ASG core group onto the were realised in Al-Barka.
mainland had the unintended effect of cementing its
alliance with radical MILF commanders. Defusing Basilan’s unique volatility arises from the fact that the
this combination was the basis for recent achieve- small island is home to all three main separatist rebel-
ments against the ASG. Though the story remains un- lions – MNLF, MILF and ASG. Clans are often in-
told in the official account, it holds important lessons volved in all three networks, as well as local electoral
for Sulu and for many situations where terrorists are politics, where access to high-powered firearms is at a
embedded in popular insurgencies. premium. Acting on information that Fr. Bossi had been
sighted in Al-Barka municipality, Philippines marines
Where distinguishing between insurgents and terror- set out on patrol on the morning of 10 July 2007.
ists is possible, encouraging the first to cooperate against
the second, rather than collude with them, must be a Two days earlier, Basilan marine commander Col.
central pillar of counter-terrorism programs. More- Ramiro Alivio told Crisis Group that unusually large
over, in the longer term, such cooperation helps build formations of armed men – several hundred strong –
mutual trust necessary for a durable peace agreement. had been making their presence felt in the area for
Quiet MILF cooperation against ASG and foreign ji- some months. Rather than attempting to distinguish
hadis continued until shortly after the expiry of AH- their component members, which could have involved
JAG’s mandate on 21 June 2007. An ASG plan to re- a complicated “paper trail” with the ceasefire commit-
infiltrate mainland Mindanao, due to intensifying pres- tee, Alivio chose to regard them as undifferentiated
sure from Oplan Ultimatum on Jolo, was frustrated in “lawless elements”. As his men turned back for base
November 2006. Bashir Takasan, an MILF member camp with no sign of Bossi, a truck bogged down in
working with AHJAG from Davao Oriental, where the mud, and, following standard operating procedure,
the jihadis had hoped to land, “died in the line of duty marines fanned out around the vehicle to secure the
preventing their re-entry”.91
92
Crisis Group interview, Col. Ramiro Alivio, commanding
officer, 1st Marine Brigade, Basilan, 8 July 2007. See also,
90
Despite detailed documentation by Crisis Group and oth- “2 Sayyaf gunmen killed in Basilan clashes”, Daily Tribune,
ers, the MILF has never acknowledged the systematic nature 22 June 2007, p. 3, and “2 Sayyaf men killed in Basilan”,
of the JI program in Camp Abubakar between 1994 and Philippine Star, 22 June 2007, p. 2.
93
2001. For more detail, see Crisis Group Report, Southern Christine Avendano, Julie Alipala and Edwin Fernandez,
Philippines Backgrounder, op. cit. “MILF troops pull out from search for Bossi”, Philippine
91
Crisis Group interview, Manila, June 2007. Daily Inquirer, 4 July 2007, pp. 1, 17.
perimeter. The site – in Guinanta village – is the loca- and nine; one was a pregnant woman, one was a vil-
tion of two of the MILF’s three brigade commands in lage councilman, and three were local men aged nine-
Basilan. Unknown to the marines, MILF forces were teen, 24 and 37.
closely observing their movements. As the marines
came within metres of the guerrillas’ high ground, “It was a legitimate encounter”, Maj. Gen. Ruben
gunfire erupted. Rafael was quoted in the Philippines press as saying.
“As far as we are concerned, troops clashed with the
A CCCH official described what ensued as a “pinta- Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah”.96 His statement
kasi” (a fight in which everyone joins in). Once com- was refuted by the regional director of the national
bat began, armed men from surrounding neighbour- Commission on Human Rights, who also documented
hoods, including ASG fighters, joined against the attacks and looting of village houses by the govern-
marines in the hope of sharing in the spoils – captured ment troops and recommended that criminal charges
equipment, arms or ammunition – or of avenging past be filed against the attackers. A team of prosecutors
wrongs. Followers of local politicians were embit- from the justice department was sent to investigate on
tered by the marines’ rigid enforcement of the previ- 26 March.97
ous May’s election gun ban. Fourteen marines died, ten
of whom were decapitated and otherwise mutilated. The apparent misinformation about ASG presence in
Triggered by a lack of coordination between AFP and the village was reportedly linked to a rido (traditional
MILF, the Al-Barka incident demonstrated the power clan feud) in which an informant for the military saw
of a momentary tactical alliance across organisational an opportunity to get the army to attack his rivals. It
boundaries. An MNLF commander from Basilan noted: resembled incidents previously contained by interna-
“MILF’s three brigades [about 500 men] will become tional ceasefire monitors on Jolo, but for which vic-
3,000 men if ‘loose arms’ on the island are consoli- tims now have little recourse.98 The local knowledge
dated by the failure of the peace talks”.94 of ex-MNLF army integrees like Ibnul Wahid is po-
tentially an enormous resource in the conflict with the
ASG but is prone to misuse in petty local vendettas.
B. THE IPIL INCIDENT: FEBRUARY 2008 Ideally, it should be mediated through a rigorous in-
telligence-sharing mechanism like AHJAG.
A mechanism like AHJAG with the MNLF might
have helped avert an incident like the AFP’s reported
killing of seven civilians and an off-duty soldier in C. THE MANY DEATHS OF DULMATIN
Ipil village, Maimbung, Jolo on 4 February 2008.
Claiming they had intelligence that ASG, led by Abu Two weeks after the Ipil incident, the military an-
Pula (“Dr Abu”) and foreign jihadis were in the area, nounced, as it had several times before, that Dulmatin
a unit of the regional military Task Force Comet was dead. It said a source, Alfa Moha alias Bin, had
stormed the village. Two soldiers were killed. Accord- led it to a grave in Lubbok, Panglima Sugala, Tawi-
ing to the Sulu governor (confirmed to Crisis Group Tawi, where a battle between ASG and AFP forces
by official sources in Manila who did not wish to be had taken place on 31 January 2008. An AFP naval
identified), they died from friendly fire between the unit had been looking for the killers of Fr. Reynaldo
army’s Light Reaction Company and the navy’s Spe- Roda, a Catholic priest shot on Tabawan Island,
cial Warfare Group, both of which are part of the task Tawi-Tawi, on 15 January in what appears to have
force. been a botched kidnapping.99 Wahab Upao, an ASG
member whom the military suspected of involvement
The army’s version was that one of the victims, Ibnul in that murder, was killed in the 31 January attack,
Wahid, a former MNLF rebel turned AFP soldier, and Dulmatin was allegedly wounded.100
who was reportedly on leave, was a suspected ASG
member and killed the two Task Force members be-
fore he died.95 Wahid’s wife said he was tied up and
executed with a shot to the back of the head. Of the
seven civilians killed, two were children aged four 96
Alipala, “Sulu gov: Military ‘massacred’ villagers”, op. cit.
97
“DOJ sets prove of Maimbung killings”, Manila Times, 27
March 2006.
94 98
Crisis Group interviews, Basilan, July 2007 and January Such as the 2001 Parang incident and the Tandu Batu in-
2008, and Cotabato City, January 2008. cident of 2006.
95 99
Julie Alipala, “Sulu ‘massacre’ survivor claims seeing U.S. “Oblate priest killed in Tawi-tawi”, Mindanews, 15 Janu-
soldiers”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 7 February 2008; and ary 2008.
100
Julie Alipala, “Sulu gov: Military ‘massacred’ villagers”, “FBI takes DNA sample from suspected Dulmatin body”,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5 February 2008. Mindanews, 20 February 2008.
But while results of DNA tests on the body found in involved, together with an MILF commander, Abdul
Tawi-Tawi have not yet been announced, doubts are Basit Usman, and likely Dulmatin’s brother-in-law
growing that the body was Dulmatin’s – particularly Hari Kuncoro as well.102 Exactly three months later, a
after reports began to surface in Indonesia that the fu- second string of bombings struck General Santos
gitive had made new contact with jihadis there. The City, Cotabato City and Kidapawan, killing another
question is why Philippines authorities apparently six bystanders; on 8 May 2007, eight more died in
were wrong yet again. One explanation is money: ea- Tacurong. The same group may have been involved in
gerness to claim the cash reward may be leading to these as well.
overly hasty pronouncements. Dulmatin has a $10
million bounty on his head from the U.S. “Rewards On 18 May 2007, 8 June, 15 June, 7 July, 18 July, 3
for Justice” program, which is credited with the down- August, and 18 September, buses were bombed in
fall of some of ASG’s most wanted figures. But the Cotabato, Matalam, Bansalan, Koronadal and Tacu-
program has led some military informants to equate rong, killing at least nineteen and injuring dozens.103
amount of bounty with the importance of the individ- As noted above, these were said to be the work of
ual concerned. Jabidi Abdul alias Bedz and the al-Khobar group.104
As with the degeneration thesis with regard to the ASG,
Dulmatin is now seen internationally as the top terror- however, distinctions between “political” and “crimi-
ist in the Philippines, in part because the reward for nal” violence can be exaggerated. The bus bombings
his capture is the highest. But Umar Patek, who only are widely written off as an extortion racket unrelated
merits a $1 million reward, is in fact the top com- to the conflict.105 Even if this proves the case, the dif-
mander among the foreigners, with technical expertise fusion of bombing technology into the criminal un-
at least equal to and probably greater than Dulmatin’s. derworld is a destabilising consequence of jihadi ac-
A senior Philippines police officer was critical of the tivity in the Philippines.106 More generally, Indone-
bounties in more general terms, suggesting they were sian jihadis have long used armed robberies of non-
leading to undue focus on individuals at the expense
of more carefully thought-through strategies.101
102
On 19 February, the same day the alleged body of Baehaqi told Philippines investigators that he received an
Dulmatin was recovered, the military announced the SMS from Marwan saying “It has exploded, Allah Akbar!”
capture on the Mindanao mainland, in Davao Orien- He said Marwan was in Mamasapano, Maguindanao at the
tal, of Indonesian JI member Mohamed Baehaqi. He time and that he believed him to be working with Abdul
Basit Usman.
was in fact KOMPAK, not JI, and he reported to 103
For an overview of IED (improvised explosive device)-
Patek. The fact that he was arrested not on Jolo, nor type bombings in the Philippines – which have killed more
even in western Mindanao in the MILF heartland, but than 400 and injured over 1,400 since the resurgence of con-
had moved through both to the other side of the is- flict in the south in 2000 – see “Lives Destroyed: Attacks
land, suggests the complexity of jihadi alliances and Against Civilians in the Philippines”, Human Rights Watch,
the need to look beyond the big-name targets. July 2007.
104
Significantly, Bedz is believed to have trained with
Ahmad Faisal bin Imam Sarjian alias Zulkifli, former head
D. THE GEOGRAPHICAL REACH OF of JI’s Wakalah Hudiabiyah. Zulkifli was arrested in Sabah,
TERRORISM IN MINDANAO Malaysia in December 2003, as he was returning to Indone-
sia to assume the leadership of Mantiqi III. He was returned
to the Philippines in 2006 to face trial for involvement in
Unlike Indonesia, where no serious bombings have multiple bombings. To Crisis Group’s knowledge, the trial
occurred since 2005, jihadis continue their attacks in has never taken place.
105
the Philippines. The geographic spread of those attacks Edith Regalado, “Bombers targeting family of bus
is instructive, because it demonstrates that members owner”, Philippine Star, 18 June 2007, pp. 1, 11. Davao City
of all three rebel factions are involved – and foreign mayor Rodrigo Duterte blamed the bus bombings on “dis-
jihadis may be providing a vital link among them. gruntled employees”.
106
One week after the capture of Dulmatin’s wife in Oc- One extraordinary example is a subcommander of the
tober 2006, coordinated explosions in three towns MILF’s 104th Base – renowned for its mercenary inclina-
tions. Known only as Commander Kayob, he is believed to
across central Mindanao (Makilala, Tacurong and Co-
have guided Kadaffy Janjalani’s group during its mainland
tabato City) killed six and wounded 36. Zulkifli bin sojourn, taking custody of its weapons when it returned to
Hir alias Marwan, the Malaysian national who has Sulu. Yet Kayob has also allegedly freelanced as a “special
been in Mindanao since 2000, was almost certainly operations” agent for the region’s traditional Muslim politi-
cal kingpin,Datu Andal Ampatuan, disrupting elections in
May 2007 by firing M-79 rifle grenades at a municipal hall
outside Cotabato City. Crisis Group interviews, Zamboanga
101
Crisis Group interview, Manila, 26 March 2008. City, 28 September 2006, Cotabato City, 1 July 2007.
Muslims, called fa’i, as a religiously sanctioned way VI. THE U.S. ROLE
of raising money for jihad and have offered common
criminals a way of atoning for past acts by using their
skills in the service of war. Curtailing ties between jihadis and mainstream insur-
gents is at the heart of effective counter-terrorism in
Other devices, including a second bomb in Makilala the Philippines – but is also the missing element of
and a car bomb rigged with ten mortars and 4kg of nails U.S. operations there. Washington’s doctrine is ex-
near the Surallah public market, did not detonate.107 pressed in a triangular “counter-insurgency model”
Bombs in Kidapawan on 5 October and 22 November focusing on “three critical relationships” – between
2007 and in General Santos on 30 January 2008 killed government and population, population and insur-
at least six more civilians. It is probably not coinciden- gents, and insurgents and government.109 Relation-
tal that these target locations radiate out from the ships among dissident groups are absent from the
MILF’s SKP camp like the spokes of a wheel. model – yet breaking these links is critical. Just as
counter-insurgency aims to divide guerrillas from
Marwan’s role has been underestimated. Between Sep-
populace, counter-terrorism should aim, where possi-
tember 2005 and November 2006, he appears to have
ble, to separate terrorists from the insurgents they rely
stayed on the Mindanao mainland with his MILF as-
on for sanctuary. But the terms “insurgent” and “ter-
sociates, while Patek’s group and Kadaffy joined
rorist” are used interchangeably, without analytical
forces in Jolo. He kept in touch with his colleagues in
distinction, in official accounts of Operation Enduring
Jakarta and also had contact with Zulkifli alias Danny
Freedom-Philippines, the U.S. extension of the post-
Ofresio, the former head of the JI wakalah, detained
9/11 “war on terror” to Mindanao.110
in Manila, and with his colleagues in Jolo who were
involved in other bombings, including the March
2006 explosion at the Notre Dame Cooperative Cen- A. COUNTER-TERRORISM OR COUNTER-
tre in Jolo. (Baehaqi claims to have witnessed the as- INSURGENCY?
sembling of the mortar used, in which Kadaffy and
Tariq, a Muslim “revert”, were involved.)108 In addi-
tion to staying in touch, Marwan and Patek appear to Collapsing terrorists and insurgents in the Philippines
have relied on the same source of funding. into a single category is as dangerous as conflating
insurgents with their support base – the military tac-
In November 2006, Patek ordered Baehaqi to leave tics that often follow reinforce bonds rather than break
Jolo. Baehaqi went to Davao, where he joined up with them. U.S. operations resemble counter-insurgency
two Muslims, perhaps linked to the Rajah Solaiman more than counter-terrorism, which risks encouraging
Movement, whom he had first met in Jolo. In April dissident alliances, instead of dissolving them.
2007, he had a rendezvous with Marwan and Hari
Kuncoro somewhere between the borders of Ma-
masapaao, Manguindanao and Shariff Aguak town.
109
Baehaqi seems to have stayed in the area, working Cherilyn A. Walley, “Civil Affairs: A Weapon of Peace on
with the mainland branch of Patek’s group. Sometime Basilan Island”, Special Warfare, vol. 17, no. 1 (Sept. 2004),
shortly before he was arrested in February 2008, p. 35. An embellished version of counter-insurgency, the Dia-
Marwan gave him three bomb trigger mechanisms, mond Model, incorporates “international actors” who relate
which were still in his possession when he was to government and insurgents in the “external” environment.
110
caught. Baehaqi claimed he was waiting for instruc- Key objectives of the War on Terror (“a counter-
insurgency operation on a global scale”) are to “deny sanctu-
tions from Patek on where and how to use them. ary to terrorists and insurgents” and, in the Philippines, to
“separate the insurgency from the population” (or, on the
The division of labour between Patek on Jolo and same page, “separate the population from and destroy terror-
Marwan in Maguindanao and Davao suggests this ist organisations”). See David S. Maxwell, “Operation En-
group may have been pursuing its own jihadi ends, during Freedom-Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?”,
independent of the MILF and Abu Sayyaf while Military Review, vol. 84, no. 3 (May-June 2004), p. 20, em-
working with both. Pursuing Abu Sayyaf alone will phasis added. C.H. Briscoe and Dennis Downey, “Multiple
just push the air in the terrorist balloon to a new loca- Insurgent Groups Complicate Philippine Security”, Special
tion, as occurred after Oplan Tornado in 2005. Warfare, vol. 17, no. 1 (Sept. 2004), pp. 12-14, describe ASG
as a “third major insurgent faction”, alongside the MNLF
(which has conducted “terrorist attacks” and a “bombing
campaign”) and MILF (responsible for “terrorist activities”).
And, according to Cherilyn A. Walley, “Special Forces
107
“Two bombs hit buses in South, 9 dead, 5 hurt”, Daily Training Exercises Continue Balikatan Mission”, ibid, p. 43,
Tribune, 16 June 2007, p. 3. U.S. training aims “to combat insurgency in the southern
108
On reverts, see fn. 32 above. Philippines”.
The U.S. Defense Department’s 2006 “Quadrennial By “putting the AFP in the lead”, according to mili-
Defense Review” asserts: “Increasingly, in many tary analysts, the indirect approach “enhanced gov-
states of the developing world, terrorist networks pose ernment legitimacy at the grassroots” and “drove a
a greater threat than external threats”. Failed states wedge” between the population and Abu Sayyaf.
and ungoverned spaces in which extremists operate or With the ASG “isolated from local support networks”,
shelter are viewed as a principal challenge in the an AFP rejuvenated with U.S. resources expelled the
“Long War” against terrorism – best met by an “indi- group from the island, allowing civilian professionals
rect approach, building up and working with and to return, and development agencies to begin address-
through partners”.111 In a strategic climate dominated ing “root causes” of unrest. This was the epitome of a
by Iraq, the Pentagon is rediscovering counter- “successful [counter-insurgency] operation”.116
insurgency, issuing its first new field manual on the
subject in decades, and looking to the Basilan experi- In a rare, critical assessment, Colonel David Maxwell,
ence as a model.112 But its extension to Jolo highlights who led the first U.S. battalion to deploy in Operation
a crucial gap in this model. Enduring Freedom-Philippines and commanded U.S.
forces in the south in 2007, faulted the operation’s fail-
Operating Enduring Freedom-Philippines has become ure to address the relationship between ASG, MILF
a paradigm of the “indirect approach”. During the and JI. He admitted this allowed the ASG to find ref-
first half of 2002, 160 U.S. special forces deployed to uge in “MILF-controlled areas”. But for Maxwell –
Basilan in a dozen twelve-man A-teams attached to one of the few U.S. military practitioners to acknowl-
Philippines battalions, supported by three B-teams at edge the MILF peace process – its mechanisms did
AFP brigade level.113 A-teams conducted field sur- not offer a way out of that conundrum. Rather, the
veys on local needs and accompanied Philippines talks “created de facto ASG sanctuaries”. The deci-
daylight patrols. With additional security provided by sion not to “directly attack the alliance of the three
U.S. marines, navy engineers improved island infra- terrorist groups” and to “concentrate solely on the
structure, and thousands of residents received free ASG”, he concluded, was a “strategic error”. Maxwell
medical care – all hand-in-hand with Philippines per- believed a “broad, combined campaign” should have
sonnel.114 When Balikatan 02-1’s mandate expired in covered the enemy’s entire area of manoeuvre, with
July 2002, civic action and military training continued U.S. combat forces targeting the “terrorist” MILF as
under the Bayanihan (Community Spirit) program, well as ASG and JI.117 Nothing would have been
treating thousands more patients and improving the more likely to fuse the three groups into an alliance.
capability of at least ten AFP infantry battalions.115
B. FROM BASILAN TO JOLO
111 Conflation did not prove fatal on Basilan in 2002. The

“Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, U.S. Department
of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Pol- MNLF had largely demobilised on the island, and the
icy, Washington DC, 6 February 2006, pp. 21, 24. MILF did not regard it as a significant theatre at the
112
“Counterinsurgency”, U.S. Department of the Army, time. Neither group wanted to risk confrontation with
Field Manual No. 3-24, Washington DC, 16 June 2006; and U.S. forces. JI’s Wakalah Hudaibiyah was also fo-
Stanley A. Weiss, “After Iraq, a New U.S. Military Model”, cused on the mainland, where the Americans suffered
International Herald Tribune, 27 December 2006.
113 their only combat casualty.118 The freelance jihadi
Kit Collier, “U.S. Lifts Presence in Southern Philippines”,
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, June 2002, pp. 46-47. Bri- presence was still insignificant. Six years on, Jolo
gade-level ODBs (Operations Detachment Bravo) desig- presents a more complex challenge.
nated Alaska, Texas and Florida covered the north west,
south west and eastern sectors of the island; A-teams were In Jolo, the cradle of Muslim separatism in the Phil-
named for cities like Dallas (ODA-125 in Maluso Heights, ippines, attempts to “separate the insurgency from the
attached to the Philippines 5th Marine Battalion in the Texas population” are bound to fail. The population is the
Area of Operations). insurgency. The vast majority of Tausug residents,
114
“Exercise-Related Construction” included 24 wells, six-
teen school buildings, five clinics, two hospital buildings,
two piers, two bridges and a municipal water system. An air-
116
field and 80km of circumference road were refurbished and Wilson, op. cit., p. 8.
117
9,466 Medcaps patients treated on Basilan and 10,385 in Maxwell, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Wilson, op. cit., p. 9, also
Zamboanga City. “Civil Military Operations: Balikatan to takes note of the peace process only to the extent that ASG
Bayanihan and the Road Ahead”, U.S. Joint Special Opera- used it “for cover”.
118
tions Task Force-Philippines, 2003. Sergeant First Class Mark W. Jackson was killed in a
115
C.H. Briscoe, “Reflections and Observations on ARSOF bombing not far from the gate of Camp Arturo Enrile, the
Operations during Balikatan 02-1”, Special Warfare, vol. 17, AFP’s special forces headquarters in Zamboanga City, on 2
no. 1 (Sept. 2004), p. 55. October 2002.
especially outside the capital town, view the AFP as Errors of this kind reflect a paucity of accurate intelli-
an army of occupation. Under these conditions, the gence. Despite the Quadrennial Review’s call for a
effect of the indirect approach is reversed: rather than polyglot force and “long-term assignments in key stra-
enhancing government legitimacy, close association tegic regions”, Americans on Jolo speak no Tausug
between Philippines and U.S. troops taints the Ameri- and are quickly rotated out. Over-reliance on “heri-
cans at the grassroots. Should conflict with the MNLF tage speakers” of (Christian) Philippines languages,
continue to escalate, this guilt by association will mainly Tagalog, means greater rapport is established
eclipse the goodwill purchased through civic action. with the AFP than with local residents, and valuable
informal intelligence-gathering opportunities are lost.123
About 180 U.S. troops are stationed on the island at Tuan Yang, the misidentified suspect, expressed a
any given time, supported by another 170 at the Joint view heard repeatedly by Crisis Group on Jolo: “We
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF- used to admire the Americans….Now people are
P)-Forward base, at AFP Western Mindanao Com- looking at them differently because they always ac-
mand headquarters in Zamboanga City.119 Attached to company the Filipino troops”.124 Popular suspicions
Philippines brigades and battalions as “liaison coordi- of U.S. involvement in the Ipil incident underscore
nation elements”, special forces advisers are spread this risk.
across the island in almost a dozen locations. Their
primary counter-terrorism role is to provide real-time Civic action creates other problems. About 50 medi-
battlefield intelligence to the AFP, driving precision cal civic action programs were conducted on Jolo in
operations against the ASG. 2006, usually following road repair to facilitate access
and gather intelligence. Nineteen school construction
The 2006 “Quadrennial Defense Review” calls for “a and renovation projects, ten wells, five community
more culturally aware, linguistically capable force”, centres and five water distribution centres were also
able to “operate clandestinely” and “sustain a persis- undertaken during the year.125 Despite widespread ap-
tent but low visibility presence”.120 But civic action preciation for the short-term benefits of the U.S. pres-
and information operations on Jolo, of which the cen- ence, residents question its top-down, militarised ap-
trepiece is the “Rewards for Justice” program, have proach and apparent favouritism. Villages with powerful
not shown great sophistication.121 local patrons receive multiple visits, while others are
bypassed. Healthy villagers flock to the programs ex-
The suspected new ASG leader Yasir Igasan is a case pecting “dole-outs”, such as free paracetamol, while
in point. On 9 June 2007, U.S. special forces distrib- fundamental public health needs go unmet. “We are
uted booklets during civic operations in Samak, Tali- not involved in identifying areas for treatment”, Jolo
pao, bearing images of seventeen wanted terrorists. health professionals remarked, “but the politicians
Alongside a photograph of Umar Patek was another love it”.126
labelled “Ali Igasan a.k.a. Abdulla Tuan Ya Yasir
Igasan”. The picture was actually of Ustadz Yahiya The lack of community consultation in planning civic
Sarahadil “Tuan Yang” Abdullah, an innocent and action, and its non-participatory approach, deprive it
well-regarded religious scholar. Not only is Tuan of sustainable long-term impact – which is not even
Yang, at 45, a decade older than the wanted man, good counter-insurgency. Bureaucratic and force pro-
Tuan Ya, but he also has a fair complexion and aqui- tection issues that also handicapped Balikatan 02-1
line features, while Igasan is said to be dark, rotund are partly to blame – an aversion to dealing directly
and pockmarked.122
hiya Abdullah, and acquaintances of Yahiya and Yasir, Jolo,

11 June 2007. See also “Muslim religious leaders hit har-
119
Crisis Group interview, Col. David Maxwell, commander, assment, seek dialogue”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 June
JSTOF-P, Zamboanga City, 8 July 2007. Twenty more 2007.
123
Americans operate in Tawi-Tawi; around 60 out of Cotabato Quadrennial Defence Review Report, op. cit., p. 15, indi-
City; and twelve in Manila. JSOTF-P replaced Joint Task cates that 479 members of the armed forces had been re-
Force 510, overseeing Balikatan 02-1, in August 2002. cruited to the heritage speakers program in 2006, with just
Westmincom and Eastmincom (in Davao City) were created 133 “currently deployed” worldwide.
124
out of Southcom in August 2006. Crisis Group interview, Jolo, 15 June 2007.
120 125
“Quadrennial Defense Review Report”, op. cit, pp. 11, 15. Eckert, op. cit., p. 21. These are known as Encaps – engi-
121
C.H. Briscoe, “Wanted Dead or Alive: Psychological Op- neering civic action programs.
126
erations During Balikatan 02-1”, Special Warfare, vol. 17, For example, Bato-bato, Indanan, a secure village fa-
no. 1 (Sept. 2004), pp. 26-29, also credits the program with voured by a powerful politician, was “saturated” by five
the rescue of U.S. hostage Gracia Burnham. Medcaps. Villages allied to his rivals received low priority,
122
“Rewards for Justice Recognition Handbook”, U.S. De- as did more remote areas, especially in island municipalities.
partment of Justice, 2007; and Crisis Group interviews, Ya- Crisis Group interviews, Jolo, 5 July 2007.
with the population and to the slightest risk of U.S. VII. BRINGING POLITICS BACK IN
casualties in a “non-combat” situation.127 These deeply
rooted tendencies in the U.S. way of war are accentu-
ated by the indirect approach, which eschews overtly As U.S. investment in military and economic aid
political involvement in the affairs of a sovereign grows, political commitment to the peace process has
partner. Manila, eager to depoliticise Muslim resis- diminished. The sudden resignation of the Philippines
tance, embraces a counter-insurgency model based on government’s peace panel head, Silvestre Afable, on
military and socio-economic initiatives alone. But 15 June 2007 coincided with the expiration of AH-
counter-terrorism’s missing prong is irreducibly po- JAG’s mandate (21 June) as well as the end of a four-
litical. year U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) presence in the
country (30 June). All three developments flowed
from Washington’s and Manila’s neglect of the politi-
cal dimension of Muslim insurgency. In Manila, con-
servatives are ascendant, as the Arroyo administration
fights scandal after scandal. The government’s perils
ultimately derive from state failure in the south, which
is driving a cycle of destabilisation between centre
and periphery.
The high water mark in the MILF talks came on 7

February 2006, when both sides endorsed 29 “con-
sensus points” on ancestral domain at the panels’
tenth exploratory meeting; formal agreement on this
last agenda item was anticipated the next month and a
comprehensive peace pact by year’s end.128 But on 24
February, an abortive coup in Manila triggered a week-
long state of emergency. The administration, under
growing conservative influence since the “Hello Garci”
scandal prompted mass resignation of the cabinet’s
reform faction,129 bunkered down.
The military mutiny, like “Hello Garci”, was rooted in

allegations of cheating in the May 2004 elections in
parts of Muslim Mindanao which were beyond nor-
mal scrutiny because of chronic disorder and warlord-
ism.130 Relentless opposition pressure over the scan-
dal reinforced Arroyo’s dependency on Muslim allies
in those anarchic enclaves, led by the Ampatuan clan
– whose dubious captive votes sparked the crisis. Im-
peachment and coup attempts strengthened cabinet
hardliners, who shared Muslim traditionalists’ mis-
trust of the MILF and Afable’s concessions. The elev-
128
Carolyn O. Arguillas, “GRP, MILF agree to sign compre-
hensive peace pact before year end”, Mindanews, 7 February
2006. For background on the peace process to this stage, see
Crisis Group Reports, Philippines Terrorism, op. cit., pp. 15-
16; and Southern Philippines Backgrounder, op. cit., pp. 5-8.
129
The scandal, named for a wiretapped presidential conver-
sation with an election commissioner, cast doubt on Ar-
royo’s narrow 2004 election win. Arroyo’s chief peace proc-
ess adviser, Teresita Deles, joined the so-called “Hyatt Ten”
cabinet members resigning in protest at the revelations on 8
July 2005.
130
“Failed Enterprise”, Newsbreak (Manila), 3 November
127
Robert D. Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with 2006. The marine officers who led the conspiracy cited their
the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to direct involvement in electoral fraud in Muslim Mindanao as
Iraq and Beyond (New York, 2005), pp. 147-53, 177-178. spurring the revolt.
enth round of talks, postponed due to the instability in A post-election cabinet reshuffle tightened the con-
Manila, ended on 21 March with the sides now servatives’ grip, and three key officials – National Se-
“heaven and earth” apart.131 A twelfth round on 2-4 curity Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Justice Secretary
May, centred on the territorial delineation of the pro- Raul Gonzalez and Interior Secretary Ronaldo Puno –
posed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), failed to intensified their opposition to Afable’s strategy.
end the impasse. Heady optimism before the putsch Afable’s position became untenable, as his negotiat-
gave way to an admission that there would be no ing mandate was in effect withdrawn, while pressure
agreement in 2006.132 Manila’s insistence on a consti- mounted to bring conservative allies like the Ampatu-
tutionally required plebisicite in the villages and mu- ans on board, which was properly the president’s re-
nicipalities that it agreed to add to the ARMM was sponsibility, not his.136 Manila compounded the “set-
the chief hurdle. back” of his resignation by immediately appointing a
replacement without cabinet rank – which the MILF
Following the failed thirteenth round on 6-7 Septem- interpreted as a “deliberate downgrading” of the
ber 2006, Afable tried an innovative end run around peace process.137
the charter issue by introducing a “Right to Self-
Determination” framework. As a “generally accepted Many believe that the conservatives are actively try-
principle of international law”, the collective right of ing to obstruct an agreement. A former U.S. official
peoples to freely determine their political status is close to the Manila political elite said:
constitutionally incorporated in Philippines domestic
law.133 On 9 November, Afable suggested in a letter While there are many AFP officers who under-
channelled through the Malaysians that the self- stand the distinction between the MILF and ASG,
determination provision might offer a way around the key senior security officials tend to see Moro de-
sensitive sovereignty issue. The MILF took this as ac- mands for self-determination as threatening their
ceptance of its longstanding demand for a referendum influence or interests. They therefore support the
and sought clarification at a “question and answer” C[ounter-]T[errorism] effort as a means to prevent
session in Kuala Lumpur. Its negotiators, however, a peace settlement (and necessary sharing of po-
neither accepted nor rejected the proposal, requesting litical and economic power) with the MILF or the
more detail.134 conscientious implementation of the 1996 MNLF
agreement.138
A new round of talks was scheduled for 1-2 May
2007 but was abruptly cancelled as the administration The MILF’s chief negotiator, Mohagher Iqbal, be-
braced for mid-term elections that potentially would lieves only the U.S. can influence Manila to make an
determine its ability to withstand another impeach- acceptable political offer. On 21 June 2007, the day
ment drive. The crucial deciding votes for Senate AHJAG’s mandate expired, American officials met
candidates came from the same Muslim rotten bor- with the MILF to coordinate new aid projects. These
oughs as in 2004, threatening a new wave of turmoil were welcome, Iqbal said, “but not at the expense of
in Manila.135 the political aspect”. Aid donors, he added, appear not
to understand that:
Self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is not a

socio-economic problem – it’s a political problem,
131
“GRP-MILF talks open in KL”, Luwaran, 3 May 2006. to be resolved politically, through a negotiated set-
132
Edwin Fernandez and Michael F. Sarcauga, “MILF exec tlement. They are trying to kill the problem softly,
sees 2006 bad year for pact”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 based on the premise that poverty is the problem.
June 2006.
133 It’s not.139
See United Nations International Covenant on Economic
Social and Cultural Rights (1966), Article 1, and Philippines
Constitution, Article II, Section 2.
Another MILF panel member told Crisis Group: “None
134
Crisis Group interview, Mohagher Iqbal, MILF Central of this is new – we’ve seen it all before, in Marcos’s
Committee, Sultan Kudarat, Shariff Kabunsuan, 2 July 2007, time. There’s no terminal point, no closure – they [Ma-
and “MILF: Peace talks will not take place this year”, Lu- nila] prefer to ‘manage’ the problem. We are warning
waran, 9 December 2006. For the MILF, the difference be-
tween a plebiscite and a referendum is that only Moros
136
would vote in the latter. Crisis Group interview, Cotabato City, 28 June 2007.
135 137
This time the scandal revolved around another election “Gov’t chief peace negotiator quits; rebels say it’s set-
commissioner, Lintang Bedol, who “misplaced” crucial cer- back”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 17 June 2007, p. A 15; Dar-
tificates of canvass from Muslim constituencies. Since Sep- win T. Wee, “Change in peace panel head setback to process
tember 2007, Arroyo’s administration has been further dis- – MILF”, Business World (Manila), 18 June 2007, p. 12.
138
tracted by a bribery scandal arising out of a broadband Communication to Crisis Group, 25 April 2008.
139
network contract won by the Chinese firm ZTE. Crisis Group interview, Mohagher Iqbal, 2 July 2007.
[MILF leader] Murad: economic packages that take leaders into service as go-betweens, enticing holdouts
the form of counter-insurgency won’t work”.140 down from the hills. AFP units heighten tensions
around MNLF communities by arriving unannounced
The U.S. country team seems deaf to these voices. to demand such mediation, equating refusal with
Focusing exclusively on the strategy of civic action sympathy for ASG. “There should be a third group to
and military cooperation, Ambassador Kristie Kenney negotiate between the MNLF and the military – not
recommended ending USIP’s Philippines Facilitation the military itself”, argued a rebel based at Camp
Project, which had fostered the peace process since Amilhamja. “There is too much mistrust, and peace
2003. Its termination did not lead, as some hoped, to a agreements cannot implement themselves”.144 In its
more direct U.S. role in the talks. Rather, the socio- determination to divide mainstream insurgents, Ma-
economic approach was reinforced in September nila risks uniting them with terrorists.
2007, with a five-year, $190 million U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) grant “focused
on developing the business and economy of Min-
danao”.141 Visits to MILF headquarters by the U.S.
deputy chief of mission, Paul Jones, in November
2007 and Ambassador Kenney on 19 February 2008
appear to have focused on economic incentives as
well. While the aid is welcome in an area where all
social indicators are around the nation’s lowest, it is
not a substitute for a political settlement.
MNLF leaders from Sulu also look to the U.S. to

counter what Ustadz Murshi Ibrahim, the front’s sec-
retary general, calls the “depoliticisation and localisa-
tion” of its struggle. “Where in the world are revolu-
tionaries negotiating for development?” asked the
MNLF’s head of foreign affairs, Ustadz Abdulbaki
Abubakar. “Socio-economic development should fol-
low the political aspect – what use is it if they [Ma-
nila] control everything?” The MNLF seeks the return
of international Joint Monitoring Committee observ-
ers while the Jakarta agreement is reassessed. But
Manila fends off OIC involvement by insisting that
security operations in Sulu are a “law enforcement
campaign and … [a] purely domestic concern”.142
The government aims to weaken both the MILF and

MNLF by drawing out the diplomatic process, anaes-
thetising rebel supporters with aid and selectively
criminalising commanders who fail to cooperate. By
filing murder charges against Habier Malik for the
April 2007 fighting – but not Khaid Ajibun – Manila
is attempting to drive a wedge into Sulu’s insur-
gency.143 This also involves pressing local MNLF
140
Crisis Group interview, Cotabato City, 30 June 2007.
141
Crisis Group discussions, Manila, 19 June 2007, and
Edwin Fernandez and Jeoffrey Maitem, “ARMM to get bulk
of US$190-M grant”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 22 Septem-
ber 2007.
142
Crisis Group interviews, Murshi Ibrahim and Abdulbaki
Abubakar, Manila, 10 July 2007; and “Follow-up Report”,
OIC, op. cit., p. 3.
143
See Regional Trial Court of Sulu, Branch 3, Jolo, crimi-
nal case nos. (05-07)1436-3 for murder, (05-07), 1437-3 for
frustrated murder and (05-07), 1442-3 for attempted murder,
144
3 May 2007. Crisis Group interview, Jolo, 15 June 2007.
VIII. CONCLUSION population at large. To attempt the latter is to fall into

the trap of identifying the counter-terrorist cause with
domestic counter-insurgency. This makes enemies of
The “Mindanao Model” of using counter-insurgency potential allies, reinforces insurgent-jihadi bonds, and
methods to fight terrorism has partially succeeded in may even lend jihadis popular legitimacy otherwise
separating the ASG from its support base on Basilan. reserved for mainstream insurgents. It makes the in-
High-profile visits to Sulu by Ambassador Kenney ternational community’s stake in counter-terrorism
and U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Thomas Keating hostage to domestic civil wars in ways that can make
have turned a spotlight on the twin prongs of military the latter even more intractable.
and economic aid, credited with the demise of top
Abu Sayyaf leaders. But the ASG is not the only Properly understood, counter-terrorism and domestic
source of terrorism. Extremists within the MILF con- conflict resolution are mutually reinforcing. The MILF
tinue to use terror tactics and provide refuge to the model, demonstrated during Oplan Tornado, expelled
same jihadis working with the ASG, while ASG local and foreign jihadis from the front’s midst,
members and their jihadi allies pushed out to Jolo strengthening its moderates and boosting mutual con-
have found support in MNLF strongholds in a way fidence in the peace process at the same time. Be-
that could reignite conflict there. cause no equivalent mechanisms were built into the
relationship between the Philippines government and
The MILF peace process may provide a template for the MNLF, however, the fugitives found sanctuary in
those conflicts in which relatively distinct jihadis find Sulu. As joint U.S.-Philippines security operations
sanctuary among popular insurgents. Military strate- continue, there is an urgent need to replace failed in-
gists who compare the war on terror to a global formal arrangements in Sulu with robust ceasefire and
counter-insurgency campaign must understand the intelligence-sharing structures.
two-tiered nature of this nexus. Terrorists operating
across borders against a global enemy do resemble Such mechanisms cannot stand alone. They depend
classic insurgents, except the sea they swim in is not a on a positive negotiating climate and forward momen-
sympathetic population – it is domestic rebellion. It is tum toward a substantive peace treaty. Without regu-
these domestic rebels who rely on popular support to lar meetings between peace panels, performance can-
manoeuvre; extremist jihadis embed themselves among not be reviewed, nor mandates renewed. Without
them. And unlike the foreign jihadis, the ASG and the progress on substance, insurgents have little incentive
Moro extremists who harbour them, mainstream MILF to cooperate. To the extent governments treat negotia-
and MNLF rebels are amenable to a negotiated politi- tion as a stalling tactic, hoping to weaken and divide
cal settlement. insurgents, so too will insurgents use talks as a shield,
striking, then retreating behind ceasefire machinery.
Counter-terrorism’s proper goal in the Philippines is
to separate jihadis from insurgents – not to separate Jakarta/Brussels, 14 May 2008
insurgents and jihadis, conflated together, from the
APPENDIX A
MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES
Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

APPENDIX B
MAP OF MINDANAO
The shading area is just to draw attention to the key areas discussed on the report.
This map was produced by the International Crisis Group
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX C – GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AHCG Ad Hoc Coordinating Group (GRP-MNLF)
AHJAG Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (GRP-MILF)
ARMM Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group
BIAF Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (MILF)
BJE Bangsa Moro Juridical Entity (MILF)
BMA Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF)
CCCH Coordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (GRP-MILF)
EC-15 Executive Council of Fifteen (MNLF)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GRP Government of the Republic of the Philippines
IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization
IO Information operations
IMT International Monitoring Team (Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, Japan)
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
JMC Joint Monitoring Committee (Indonesia-GRP-MNLF)
JSOTF-P Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (U.S.)
LRC Light Reaction Company (AFP)
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
OEF-P Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OPAPP Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (GRP)
PMG Peace Monitoring Group (GRP-MNLF)
PNP Philippine National Police
QDR Quadrennial Defence Review
RSM Rajah Solaiman Movement
SKP Salipada K. Pendatun (municipality and MILF camp)
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USIP United States Institute of Peace
UTG Urban Terrorist Group (ASG)
WIA Wounded in action
APPENDIX D
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire,
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
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through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan,
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Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines,
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Teams of political analysts are located within or close by and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia
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the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest of
recommendations targeted at key international decision- the Andean region and Haiti.
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analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of
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makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal
former European Commissioner for External Relations Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of
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Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January Development, United Kingdom Economic and Social Research
2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Council, U.S. Agency for International Development.
Evans.
Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie
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advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, William &
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organisation currently operates eleven regional offices Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. &
(in Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart
Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and
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currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential May 2008
conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
APPENDIX E
CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2005
CENTRAL ASIA North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship, Asia

Briefing N°71, 4 December 2007 (also available in Russian)
The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture, South Korea’s Election: What to Expect from President Lee,
Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian) Asia Briefing N°73, 21 December 2007
Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May
2005 (also available in Russian) SOUTH ASIA
Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May
2005 (also available in Russian) Nepal’s Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia
Report N°91, 9 February 2005
Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December
2005 (also available in Russian) Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing
N°35, 23 February 2005
Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16
February 2006 (also available in Russian) Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35,
24 February 2005
Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report
N°113, 10 April 2006 Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94,
24 March 2005
Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118,
16 August 2006 (also available in Russian) The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18
April 2005
Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54,
6 November 2006 Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005
Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues,
(also available in Russian) Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005
Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia
2007 Report N°101, 21 July 2005
Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005
(also available in Russian) Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan¸
Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia Briefing N°67, Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005
22 August 2007 Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia
Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Report N°104, 27 October 2005 (also available in Nepali)
Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008 Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing
Kyrgyzstan: The Challenge of Judicial Reform, Asia Report N°43, 22 November 2005
N°150, 10 April 2008 Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists,
Asia Report N°106, 28 November 2005
NORTH EAST ASIA Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role,
Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005
North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?,
Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006
Russian) Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing
Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report N°46, 15 March 2006
Nº100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean) Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing
China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 N°49, 19 April 2006
September 2005 Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10
North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108, May 2006 (also available in Nepali)
15 December 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian) Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia
China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report Report N°116, 15 May 2006
N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean) India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia
After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006
Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report
Korean and Russian) N°119, 14 September 2006
Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006
Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available in Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia
Korean and Russian) Report N°123, 2 November 2006
North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, 13 Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report
November 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian) N°124, 28 November 2006
After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report
or Confrontation?, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007 (also N°125, 11 December 2006
available in Korean and Russian) Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126,
15 December 2006
Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29 Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006
January 2007 Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border,
Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006
2007 (also available in Nepali) Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114,
Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Report N°130, 29 March 2007 Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117,
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report N°131, 2 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
April 2007 Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing
Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, Asia Report N°132, N°53, 5 September 2006
18 May 2007 (also available in Nepali) Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October
Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, Asia Report 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
N°134, 29 May 2007 Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement
Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°135, 14 June (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006
2007 Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing
Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 N°58, 8 December 2006
(also available in Nepali) Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127,
Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, Asia Report 24 January 2007
N°137, 31 July 2007 Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report
Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report N°138, 30 August N°129, 15 March 2007 (also available in Thai)
2007 Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 22
Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September March 2007
2007 (also available in Nepali) Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing
Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Briefing N°63, 3 May 2007
N°69, 22 October 2007 Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in
Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Maluku, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007
Consensus, Asia Report N°141, 7 November 2007 Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections, Asia Briefing N°65,
Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°70, 12 June 2007
12 November 2007 Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia
Nepal: Peace Postponed, Asia Briefing N°72, 18 December 2007 Briefing N°66, 19 July 2007 (also available in Indonesian)
(also available in Nepali) Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, Asia Report N°139, 4
After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, Asia October 2007 (also available in Indonesian)
Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008 Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia
Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, Asia Report Report N°140, 23 October 2007 (also available in Thai)
N°145, 6 February 2008 “Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report N°142,
Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage, Asia Report 19 November 2007
N°146, 20 February 2008 Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report N°143, 17
Nepal’s Election and Beyond, Asia Report N°149, 2 April 2008 January 2008 (also available in Tetum)
Restoring Democracy in Bangladesh, Asia Report N°151 28 Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing N°75, 22
April 2008 January 2008
Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report N°144,
SOUTH EAST ASIA 31 January 2008
Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia
Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005 (also Report N°147, 28 February 2008
available in Indonesian) Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, Asia Report N°148, 31
Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa March 2008
Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005
Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98, OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
18 May 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005 For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:
Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from • Africa
Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also • Asia
available in Indonesian) • Europe
Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report N°105, • Latin America and Caribbean
18 November 2005 (also available in Thai)
• Middle East and North Africa
Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005 • Thematic Issues
(also available in Indonesian)
• CrisisWatch
Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org
Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005
Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing
N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
APPENDIX F
CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs Kim Campbell

Christopher Patten Former Prime Minister of Canada
Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Gover- Naresh Chandra
nor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Ox- Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S.
ford University
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Thomas Pickering Former President of Mozambique
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan,
El Salvador and Nigeria Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
President & CEO Wesley Clark

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia Pat Cox
Former President of European Parliament
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Executive Committee
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secre-
Joschka Fischer
tary General of the ANC Former Foreign Minister of Germany
Maria Livanos Cattaui* Leslie H. Gelb

Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Yoichi Funabashi Carla Hills

Editor-in-Chief & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative
Frank Giustra Lena Hjelm-Wallén

Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister,
Sweden
Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. Congressman
Swanee Hunt
Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Alter-
George Soros natives Fund; former Ambassador U.S. to Austria
Chairman, Open Society Institute
Anwar Ibrahim
Pär Stenbäck Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
Former Foreign Minister of Finland
Asma Jahangir
*Vice-Chair
UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief;
Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Adnan Abu-Odeh Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein Former U.S. Senator
and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN James V. Kimsey
Kenneth Adelman Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Wim Kok
Disarmament Agency Former Prime Minister of Netherlands
Ersin Arioglu Ricardo Lagos
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi Former President of Chile; President, Club of Madrid
Group
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Ayo Obe
Lakhdar Brahimi
Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy,
Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian Nigeria
Foreign Minister
Christine Ockrent
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Journalist and author, France
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President
Victor Pinchuk Douglas Schoen

Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.
Samantha Power Thorvald Stoltenberg
Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Former Foreign Minister of Norway
University
Ernesto Zedillo
Fidel V. Ramos Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study
Former President of Philippines of Globalization
Ghassan Salamé
Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL
Crisis Group's President’s Council is a distinguished group of major individual and corporate donors providing essential
support, time and expertise to Crisis Group in delivering its core mission.
Khalid Alireza Frank Holmes Ian Telfer
Canaccord Adams Limited Iara Lee & George Gund III Guy Ullens de Schooten
Bob Cross Foundation Neil Woodyer
Equinox Partners Ford Nicholson Don Xia
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises significant individual and corporate donors who contribute their
advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser Harry Bookey and Charlotte & Fred PT Newmont Pacific
(Co-Chair) Pamela Bass-Bookey Hubbell Nusantara (Robert
Humberson)
Elliott Kulick John Chapman Chester Khaled Juffali
(Co-Chair) Michael Riordan
Chevron George Kellner
Marc Abramowitz Tilleke & Gibbins
Citigroup Amed Khan
Hamza al Kholi Vale
Richard Cooper Shiv Vikram Khemka
Anglo American PLC VIVATrust
Credit Suisse Scott Lawlor
APCO Worldwide Inc. Stanley Weiss
Neil & Sandy DeFeo StatoilHydro ASA Yasuyo Yamazaki
Ed Bachrach
John Ehara McKinsey & Company Yapi Merkezi
Patrick Benzie
Frontier Strategy Group Harriet Mouchly-Weiss Construction and
Stanley Bergman & Industry Inc.
Edward Bergman Seth Ginns Najib Mikati
Shinji Yazaki
BHP Billiton Alan Griffiths Donald Pels
Sunny Yoon
SENIOR ADVISERS
Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who
maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.
Martti Ahtisaari Stanley Fischer George J. Mitchell William Taylor
(Chairman Emeritus) Malcolm Fraser (Chairman Emeritus) Leo Tindemans
Diego Arria Bronislaw Geremek Surin Pitsuwan Ed van Thijn
Paddy Ashdown I.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Shirley Williams
Zainab Bangura Max Jakobson George Robertson Grigory Yavlinski
Christoph Bertram Todung Mulya Lubis Michel Rocard Uta Zapf
Jorge Castañeda Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe
Alain Destexhe Barbara McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun
Marika Fahlen Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim

International Crisis Group: The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

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International Crisis Group: The Philippines: Counter-Insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao

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THE PHILIPPINES: COUNTER-INSURGENCY VS.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i

THE PHILIPPINES: COUNTER-INSURGENCY VS.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS in the event a peace agreement is signed, to

THE PHILIPPINES: COUNTER-INSURGENCY VS.

I. INTRODUCTION action “to demonstrate momentum in the war on ter-

Employing mechanisms like AHJAG to isolate ASG

On 10 July 2007, three weeks after the two sides failed

B. THE MNLF terms, and rival candidates for Manila’s imprimatur as

The problem of “lawlessness” in insurgent enclaves

AHJAG’s baptism of fire came quickly. Following

In an MNLF command conference on 7 April 2007,

The marines responded by overrunning Camp Jabal

111 Conflation did not prove fatal on Basilan in 2002. The

hiya Abdullah, and acquaintances of Yahiya and Yasir, Jolo,

The high water mark in the MILF talks came on 7

The military mutiny, like “Hello Garci”, was rooted in

Self-governance of the Bangsamoro people is not a

MNLF leaders from Sulu also look to the U.S. to

The government aims to weaken both the MILF and

VIII. CONCLUSION population at large. To attempt the latter is to fall into

MAP OF THE PHILIPPINES

Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

APPENDIX C – GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2005

CENTRAL ASIA North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship, Asia

CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs Kim Campbell

President & CEO Wesley Clark

Maria Livanos Cattaui* Leslie H. Gelb

Yoichi Funabashi Carla Hills

Frank Giustra Lena Hjelm-Wallén

Victor Pinchuk Douglas Schoen

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

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