Tojo's Diary

Hideki Tojo's Prison Diary
Published here for the first time in English is the postwar prison
"diary" of Japanese General and Premier Hideki Tojo.
After an outstanding army career and service as War
Minister, Tojo served as Prime Minister from October 1941 to
July 1944-perhaps the most critical period in his country's
history. A few weeks after Japan's surrender in August 1945,
Tojo was arrested by American occupation forces and then put
on trial for alleged war crimes. By all accounts, he conducted
himself with dignity and composure during the proceedings.
After being sentenced to death, he was executed in December
1948.
Written while in prison, this "diary" consists of several essays,
a reconstructed daily log of the critical period of the 1941 Pearl
Harbor attack, and answers to anticipated prosecution
questions.
Composed in part as an aid in trial proceedings, and in part as
an explanation for posterity, this memoirljustification by a
central figure of twentieth century history is a valuable historical
document. Unknown to the world for more than forty years,
these papers were first published in 1991 by historian Sanae
Sato in the August and September issues of the Japanese
monthly magazine Hoseki.
This translation was jointly prepared by General Hideo Miki,
retired professor of Japan's National Defense Academy, and
Henry Symington, an American specialist of Japanese economic
and social affairs. This material has been very slightly edited,
and clarifying information has been added in brackets.
* * * * *
I. Events Leading to the
First Greater East Asian Outbreak
I
mmediately before the beginning of the Great East Asian
war [which commenced on December 7, 19411, Japan was
still engaged in the unfortunate Sino-Japanese War, which had
already gone on for more than four years. Throughout that
period, Japan had made honest efforts to keep the destruction
of war from spreading and, based on the belief that all nations
32 THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW
of the world should find their places, had followed a policy
designed to restore an expeditious peace between Japan and
China. Japan was ensuring the stability of East Asia while con-
tributing to world peace. Nevertheless, China was unfor-
tunately unable to understand Japan's real position, and it is
greatly to be regretted that the Sino-Japanese War became one
of long duration.
Clearly, this Sino-Japanese War of more than four years was
a considerable burden on Japan's national power and an
obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. From the
point of the view of the nation's power, it was obvious that
while we were fighting the Sino-Japanese war, every effort
was to be made to avoid adding to our enemies and opening
additional fronts. Naturally, this was the view of those who
then held positions of responsibility.
In the past, the theory had been: Advance towards the north
while defending the south, or advance to the south while
defending the north. However, as the Sino-Japanese War drag-
ged on, the only objectives that bore consideration were: 1) a
swift peace between Japan and China; 2) the maintenance of
international peace; and 3) the restoration of national power.
It was for this reason that Japan: 1) attempted to establish
peace with China through negotiations, sometimes through
American mediation; 2) strengthened the Russo-Japanese
Neutrality Treaty [April 19411 in the hope of avoiding war
with the Soviet Union; and 3) tried as much as possible to use
diplomatic means to respond to signs that relations with the
United States were worsening, even though in so doing it was
necessary for Japan to endure things that were unendurable.
Despite Japan's desires and efforts, unfortunate differences
in the ways that Japan, England, the United States, and China
understood circumstances, together with misunderstandings
of attitudes, made it impossible for the parties to agree. Up un-
til the very end, these were important reasons for the outbreak
of war, and from Japan's point of view, this is a matter of great
regret.
Thus, England and the United States supported the Chungk-
ing [Chinese] government [of Chiang Kai-Shek] in every way,
obstructed the peace between Japan and China that Japan
desired, and thwarted Japan's efforts towards East Asian
stability. During this period, in July 1939, the United States
suddenly gave notice of the abrogation of the treaty of com-
3 3
Prime Minister Hideki Tojo
merce [signed in 1911, its termination restricted the importa-
tion of essential raw materials] thereby threatening the ex-
istence of the Japanese people. At present, looking back coolly
upon the past, I think that both nations have much to reflect
upon.
1. Both China and Japan should have emptied their hearts of
ill-will, calmly explained their true positions to each other, and
reflecting deeply on the fact that they were the corner stones
of stability in East Asia, should have more bravely followed
the path of direct peace negotiations.
34
THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW
2. Likewise, in dealing with the China problem, the British
and American side, which had particularly strong interests in
China, should have based its judgments about the origins of
the problem on direct observation of the actual circumstances
at the time. Moreover, both sides should have considered the
point of view and survival of the one billion people of East
Asia, who were awakening to world development. Rather
than be trapped in the narrow-minded maintenance of old
power structures, it was necessary that both sides deliberate
together, work harmoniously, and take a broader view of
mutual prosperity, cooperation, and the establishment of
stability in East Asia.
Note 1. As for the China Incident [the alleged attack by
Chinese troops at the Marco Polo bridge near Peking on July 7 ,
1937, which triggered the Sino-Japanese War] and the pro-
blem of whether or not it was possible for Japanese forces to
withdraw from China, before concluding for formalist reasons
that this was a simple invasion, it is necessary to consider the
deeper origins: the exclusion and insult of Japan throughout
the entire Chinese region, boycotts of Japanese goods, the in-
fringement of rights and revenues, and violence against resi-
dent Japanese. The [Western] powers have had similar ex-
periences with China, such as the exclusion of foreigners in
1899 and the anti-Christian Boxer Rebellion [1899-19011.
Note 2. All peoples are created by God and have the same
rights and freedoms to survive on earth together according to
law. It goes without saying that when survival is threatened,
struggles erupt between peoples, and unfortunate wars be-
tween nations result. Furthermore, in the period when they
awoke to world development, the one billion people of East
Asia had greater demands to make with respect to their sur-
vival because of economic development and unusual in-
creases in population. I believe that it is in East Asia where
these demands must be met.
Of course, the peoples of East Asia have a natural obligation
to be grateful for the sacrifice and efforts of the European
powers and America in leading the peoples of East Asia to
their present circumstances, and they should respect the ex-
isting rights and privileges of those powers. The stability of
East Asia can be hoped for only if both sides understand and
appreciate the other's position and have the magnanimity to
adjust to circumstances. Moreover, this is part of the obliga-
Hideki Tojo's Prison Diary 3 5
tion towards East Asia that the great powers have as part of
their fundamental responsibility for ensuring world peace.
3. With respect to the above and considering the case of
Japan, recourse to arms has a profound relation to national
policy and bears the following considerations: before resorting
to military action, it should be strongly deterred at the ap-
propriate time by diplomatic means if necessary. Unnecessary
escalation is to be prevented by diplomatic power, and all ef-
forts should be made to keep operations from interfering with
policy.
(Explanation 1) On this matter, in the Japanese system [of
the 1930s and 1940~1 there are many aspects that relate to the
independence of the high command. Actions of the high com-
mand are not, as in other nations, included in the national
government, but are outside and independent of the nation's
constitutional government, and it is natural that they should
brook no interference. Consequently, these matters are dif-
ferent from those on which the Interior Minister assists the
Emperor. In actions relating to the high command, the Chiefs
of Staff of the Imperial General Headquarters, that is to say,
the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations,
have a responsibility that is separate from that of the cabinet,
and they take independent responsibility for the assistance
they provide the Emperor. According to our current system,
in matters pertaining to both sides, this is the role of the Army
and Navy ministers.
Consequently, once operations have begun, they are largely
conducted according to the independent will of the high com-
mand. Frequently, the national government finds that it has
no choice but to make the best of things or simply submit in
silence. In time of war, especially, these conditions become
even more extreme because the Imperial General Head-
quarters has primary control over conduct of the war, and its
word carries much weight.
Even military ministers have no more than a certain amount
of control. It is customary that they have the right and the
power to participate, from a political and military point of
view, in the planning of actual operations.
It is obvious that in purely military matters, it is absolutely
necessary that operations be energetically executed, and that
military objectives be achieved quickly without any political
restrictions. However, unanticipated ill results may ensue
when there are delicate policy considerations or when there is
an important diplomatic connection. This is to be expected in
contemporary warfare because it is often the case that the suc-
cess or failure of operations is instantly reflected in world con-
ditions.
It is for this reason that relations between the national
government and the [military] high command must be har-
monized from time to time. This is something to be much
reflected upon in the future. In fact, past cabinets have set up
regular meetings with the high command and tried to har-
monize relations, but such bodies had no formal respon-
sibilities (under the current constitution, each minister
counsels and assists the Emperor individually, so organiza-
tions of this kind cannot be set up). Furthermore, they were
not actually involved in the conduct of operations so their ef-
fect was not great. In later years, they were formalized as
Meetings of Chief Executives [Liaison Conference], but that
probably did not make much difference. This is suggested by
the fact that although at that time the Prime Minister attended
meetings at the Imperial General Headquarters, it is my
recollection that he was not to be involved in the conduct of
operations.
(Explanation 2) From around the time of the February 26 in-
cident of 1936 [when an insurgent group of army officers at-
tempted a coup in Tokyo], there appeared in the military
trends towards subordinate policy-making (subordinates
would ignore the wishes of their superiors) and staff-level con-
trol of government (staff officers would seize control, ignoring
the ministers and director-generals). These trends were par-
ticularly apparent in the army. In that manner, there was a
tendency for decisions, entirely contrary to national policy or
to top military policy, to be made according to the limited
understanding of lower-ranking men, and this, without the
knowledge of their superiors. This, too, hindered the smooth
operation of national government.
Half of the reason for this was shortcomings in the instruc-
tion on staff officer attitude at the War College and deteriora-
tion within the military of the psychological and formal feeling
of subordination and assistance to superiors. There remains,
however, the fact that there had been a loss of ardor and en-
thusiasm in the spirit of command at the higher levels. There
was an absence of strong leadership and initiative, and a
Hideki Tojo's Prison Diary 37
Tojo with his family
tendency to think that given the choice, the best course of ac-
tion was to do nothing.
After I became Army Minister [in July 19401, His Majesty
[the Emperor] told me what he had said to the Army Minister
at that time, General Terauchi, immediately after the February
26 incident, namely, that His Majesty was very worried about
these matters. After becoming minister, I tried to make im-
provements. As it happened, at the time troops were dispatch-
ed to French Indochina, misbehavior of that kind was
detected and those involved - from top to bottom- were firm-
ly disciplined. Later, I worked from time to time to counter
those tendencies, but left office before improvements were
complete.
As is the case with civilian bureaucrats, the reasons for the
abuses committed by lower-ranking bureaucrats are different,
but they are the source of the sclerotic manner in which Japan
executes policy.
(Explanation 3) For a long time, we have heard about
military factions. Also, we have heard for a long time that the
armed forces were high-handed, and recently this idea has
3 8 THE JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL REVIEW
been particularly widespread. There were many things in the
past about which the military should reappraise its own
behavior.
Nevertheless, there is something that must be said about
military factions. [A reference to the so-called "Control" and
"Imperial Way" factions within the Japanese military.]
Today, it is an error to think that there are factions in the
military. A soldier holds his rank for life, but his authority
begins only when his position is conferred upon him by the
Emperor. With this authority comes the right to influence the
high command or, according to his position, the execution of
government policy. However, as soon as a man leaves the ser-
vice, even if he had been a general, his authority ceases and he
no longer has the power even to adjust the rank of a second
lieutenant. If such power were to continue, that would mean
the creation within the military of an individual faction, and it
would be impermissible. This has always been the case in
Japan, and explains why there are no factions in the military.
As for whether or not the military has been high-handed, it
is not as though there are no reasons for thinking this is so.
This is something that requires self-examination.
However, I think it possible that much of the public
criticism about high-handedness arose from the power of ex-
ecution born of the commandlobedience relationship and
strength that come from the military's organization, especially
from the importance placed on timing that arises from the re-
quirements of war. I believe that this is what produced the
consequences of Explanations 1 and 2 noted above, that is to
say, those things that must be acknowledged as high-
handedness and reflected upon as such.
4. Later, as operations against China followed natural opera-
tional exigencies, the front was gradually expanded towards
the south. In order to put a quick end to the Sino-Japanese
War, it was necessary first to strike a mortal blow against the
Chungking forces [of Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek]. For
this reason, it was necessary to strengthen the blockade of the
Southeast China coast and to establish a large, new operations
route deep into the South.
5. At about that time, in order for Japan to sustain its own
people, and because of the necessity of maintaining internal
production, and in order to prosecute the Sino-Japanese War,
we were faced with the necessity of obtaining such things as
rice and oil from the southern islands, including French and
Dutch Indochina. Particularly at the time when the United
States broke off commercial relations with Japan, and the
routes that depended on the United States were cut, the sur-
vival of Japan was closely connected to whether or not
peaceful commerce would be possible with these southern
areas. Consequently, Japan despatched ambassadors and con-
ducted negotiations with these areas, but since they already
had hostile feelings, nothing could be smoothly established.
Furthermore, it had been clearly established by intelligence
that French Indochina was an important, hidden supply route
for [the Chinese forces headquartered in] Chungking. Conse-
quently, it was necessary to cut this off, as part of the
strengthening of our China operations. At the time, given the
conditions in Europe, France was a friendly nation with a du-
ty to cooperate with Japan. Therefore, the peaceful occupation
of Indochina (September 1940) was carried out with the
understanding of France. Thus, given the uncertainties in the
southern Pacific, and the necessity of putting a quick end to
the Sino-Japanese War and establishing the cooperative rela-
tions necessary for the survival of both nations, a portion of
our military was gradually transferred to southern French In-
dochina.
However, the British-American side called this a threat to
their own territories, and in July 1941, together with Holland,
ordered the freezing of assets and, in effect, commenced an
economic blockade.
This was a grave threat to the existence of Japan. In addition
to this, the British-American side concentrated troops in
Hawaii, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaya, and reinforc-
ed their defenses. In this way, economic pressure was increas-
ed just as the circle around Japan was tightened, and condi-
tions arose that severely threatened the existence of Japan.
(Note) The reasons for the occupation of French Indochina
are as explained above, and in outline they were as follows:
(1) To cut the enemy's supply lines, to make it easier to
launch aerial attacks, and to finalize the defenses of French In-
dochina. This was done on the basis of a mutual defense pact.
(2) Because commercial relations were smooth, trade was
facilitated and relations of mutual benefit were established.
The reasons for the occupation of southern French In-
dochina were essentially the same. However, conditions in the
Pacific had worsened, and the need to end the Sino-Japanese
War was felt more keenly than ever, and the conditions outlin-
ed above were more severe.
One of the reasons that Japan prepared for a passive na-
tional defense was the worsening conditions in the Pacific,
but this was not the main reason.
6. Since conditions were deteriorating, it was necessary to
resolve them quickly. It was proposed that the Prime Minister
of the time [Konoe Fumimaro] meet directly with the Presi-
dent [of the United States] so that both could express their feel-
ings and debate the general problems of the Pacific that had
arisen between the two nations, so as to resolve these
dangerous circumstances by political means. However, even
though the United States agreed to this proposal in theory,
they claimed that since it was an important matter, they
preferred that such a meeting take place after differences of
opinion had been resolved. Ultimately there was no such
meeting, which was very unfortunate. The Japanese govern-
ment had thought that a meeting would take place, and actual-
ly selected an entourage and prepared a ship.
7. The hope for a peaceful solution by means of a summit
meeting thus disappeared, but Japan, wishing to reach a solu-
tion through diplomatic means, made several later proposals
in response to the American position. However, the United
States held firm to its initial position and would concede
nothing.
8. Around November 20th [1941], conditions were on the
verge of deteriorating even further. In order to avoid a rupture
of diplomatic relations, the government resisted strong
pressures from the high command and made a proposal con-
taining a number of concessions. As I recall, the proposals
were the following:
(1) Neither nation will send military forces to the southern
Pacific or to any part of South East Asia other than French In-
dochina. (2) Should peace be established between Japan and
China or in the Pacific region, all Japanese troops in French
Indochina will be withdrawn. (3) If this agreement is conclud-
ed, all Japanese troops in southern French Indochina will be
rotated to the north. (4) Commercial relations will be restored
to their former state, Assurances will be given so that
necessary materials can be obtained.
9. The United States did not agree to these proposals. Fur-
thermore, it took back what it had previously said about acting
as an intermediary in Sino-Japanese peace-making and refus-
ed to perform this service.
In any case, if one looks at the circumstances immediately
before the outbreak of the Great East Asian War from a
Japanese point of view, one notes that the China Incident had
continued for more than four years without solution. Efforts
had been made to resolve the situation by negotiations be-
tween Japan and the United States, but this had failed. Further-
more, in accordance with the requirements of operations, the
theater of action of the Sino-Japanese War had moved ever
more deeply towards the Southwest and international rela-
tions continued to deteriorate.
During this period, Japan's peaceful commercial relations
were successively obstructed, primarily by the American rup-
ture of commercial relations, and this was a grave threat to the
survival of Japan. In particular, the economic blockade by the
various powers, led by the United States, inflicted a mortal
blow to the survival of Japan.
In connection with these multiple economic pressures, the
ABCD [American-British-Chinese-Dutch] encirclement of
Japan only drew tighter, and defenses in Hawaii, the Philip-
pines, Singapore and Malaya were strengthened. The main
American naval forces were shifted to the Pacific region and
an American admiral made a strong declaration to the effect
that if war were to break out between Japan and the United
States, the Japanese navy could be sunk in a matter of weeks.
Further, the British Prime Minister [Churchill] strongly
declared his nation's intention to join the fight on the side of
the United States within 24 hours should war break out be-
tween Japan and the United States. Japan therefore faced con-
siderable military threats as well.
Japan attempted to circumvent these dangerous cir-
cumstances by diplomatic negotiation, and though Japan
heaped concession upon concession, in the hope of finding a
solution through mutual compromise, there was no progress
because the United States would not retreat from its original
position. Finally, in the end, the United States repeated
demands that, under the circumstances, Japan could not ac-
cept: complete withdrawal of troops from China, repudiation
of the Nanking government [formed under Japanese auspices
and headed by Wang Ching-Wei, previously an important
42
Chinese Nationalist leader], withdrawal from the Tripartite
Pact [signed by Germany, Italy and Japan on September 27,
19401. At this point, Japan lost all hope of reaching a resolu-
tion through diplomatic negotiation.
Since events had progressed as they had, it became clear
that to continue in this manner was to lead the nation to
disaster. With options thus foreclosed, in order to protect and
defend the nation and clear the obstacles that stood in its path,
a decisive appeal to arms was made.
(Explanation) War was decided upon at the Imperial Con-
ference on December 1, 1941, and the shift to real operations
was made at this point. However, even during the prepara-
tions for action, we laid our plans in such a manner that
should there be progress through diplomatic negotiation, we
would be well prepared to cancel operations at the latest mo-
ment that communication technology would have permitted.
11. Concerning the Three Final Problems
in Japanese-American Negotiations
1. The demand that Japanese troops be withdrawn completely
from China.
The causes of the China Incident were the exclusion and in-
sult of Japan throughout China, the exclusion of Japanese
goods, the persecution of Japanese residents in China, and the
illegal violation of Japanese righ.ts. As Japan had declared on
such occasions, it was thought that the stability of East Asia
depended on the close, mutual assistance and cooperation be-
tween China and Japan. That Japanese troops were stationed
in China at the time was the result of unfortunate incidents
and not something that Japan had originally desired. Conse-
quently, there would have been no objection to the total
withdrawal of troops should the causes be eliminated, and
even with respect to the New China-Japan Treaty [March 30,
19401, discussions were pursued in this fashion. However, this
required the elimination of those causes and would have been
possible only on the basis of a guarantee to that effect.
To withdraw troops without having obtained such
guarantees would be only to repeat what had happened before
(the troop withdrawal of 1932 after the Shanghai Incident),
and would have caused unhappiness not only to Japan and
China but would not have permitted the anticipation of stabili-
ty in East Asia. On the British-American side the causes were
4 3
seen entirely to be a Japanese policy of invasion, and little
thought was given to actual circumstances. The Japanese
policy, as was made clear at the time, was a non-expansionist
policy, and it was not carried out as a matter of national intent.
Looking back on that period from the present, there is some
cause for self-examination. Even though the Sino-Japanese
war was called a non-expansionist policy, it is clear that over a
long period events expanded to a wide area. However, this
was not the will of the nation but a result of the exigencies of
operations, combined with the inability of a weak government
to prevent it. The reasons for the latter lie in Japan's internal
systems and traditions.
Whether the fundamental cause was China's illegal activities
or Japan's invasion may be something of a chicken-and-egg
question. The reason was the failure of both Japan and China
to understand each other and the inability of America and the
European powers to sympathize, without prejudice, with the
peoples of East Asia.
2. Repudiation of the Nanking government.
The establishment of a national [Chinese] government [bas-
ed in Nanking] with Wang Ching-wei as Premier was primari-
ly a domestic question for the Republic of China. Of course, it
must be conceded that it was born of the stimulus of Japanese
operations, but this is only a secondary reason and not the real
reason. As opposed to the Chungking government, which con-
tinued to exclude, insult and make war on Japan, the Wang
Ching-wei government made overall peace its objective, and
attempted to establish permanent peace in East Asia by means
of Sino-Japanese mutual assistance. Therefore it was natural
that Japan recognize this government and feel friendly
towards it.
(Note) When a new government is formed in any country, it
is normal to recognize if it is in harmony with one's own
governmemt, and to show it good intentions. The [Western]
powers have done the same in the course of the current war.
However, to repudiate a government less than one year after
having recognized it would cause the world to doubt a nation's
faith, and therefore it could not be done.
The Nanking government essentially wished for overall
peace in China. Consequently, it was thought that when
overall peace had been achieved, questions about it would be
resolved as a domestic matter. For that, it was necessary that
44
peace be concluded between Japan and China through ter-
mination of the Sino-Japanese War. However, even with
Japanese assistance, prospects were uncertain, so it was im-
possible to resolve questions about the Nanking government.
3. The problem of repudiating the Tripartite Pact
The Americans demanded that, "the governments of both
parties agree not to interpret any agreements concluded with
third countries in a way that contradicts the purpose of this
agreement, which is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific
region." This clearly required that Japan breach the Tripartite
Pact and that, consequently, was the same as requiring that
Japan renounce the alliance.
Essentially, the reason for concluding the Tripartite Pact
was the fact that as a result of the Washington Conference [on
naval armaments, in 19221, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had
been annulled, and world circumstances were such that Japan
had withdrawn from the League of Nations [announced in
1933, effective in 19351 because the League would not
recognize Japan's claims. In order to end its isolation, alliance
was sought with Germany and Italy, which found themselves
in much the same circumstances. Furthermore, it was ex-
pected that German power could be used to help in a solution
to the China problem. However, if Japan were to accede to an
American demand of this kind, it would indicate to the world
the untrustworthiness of Japan. In the past, Japan fulfilled the
terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and at the request of
Britain, advanced all the way into the Mediterranean. As is
clear from the fact that today, the souls of those fallen
[Japanese] soldiers are still on the island of Malta, I believe the
world will recognize that Japan is faithful to alliances. [A
Japanese destroyer was sunk during the First World War
while on escort duty in the Mediterranean, in fulfillment of
Japan's obligations to England under the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance.] Therefore, Japan could hardly take, for purposes of
momentary gain, measures that would cause it permanently to
lose the faith of the world.
111. Circumstances Around the Time
Of the Resignation of the Third Konoe Cabinet
1. My recollection is that it was at a time when, in accor-
dance with the Imperial Policy Execution Outline adopted at
the Imperial Conference of September 6, 1941, the point had
been reached when troops were moved into Southern French
Indochina, and the situation had become tense. It was
something that had been determined as necessary in order to
carry out national policy and, as I recall, we were to be
prepared both for war and for peace.
2. The US-Japan summit that Prime Minister Konoe had
hoped for was rejected by the American side and did not take
place. [The summit proposal was made on August 8.1
There was a difference of opinion between Foreign Minister
Toyoda and myself at a cabinet meeting around the 14th or
15th of October. I recall that the points of disagreement were
as follows:
(1) My opinion was that, as could be seen from a review of
the US-Japan negotiations, Japan had striven for a solution by
means of repeated concessions but the United States had
stuck firmly to its initial positions and would make no conces-
sions.
(2) US approval could not be obtained for a diplomatic solu-
tion by means of the US-Japan summit that the Prime Minister
had hoped for. Furthermore, military and economic pressures
were being stepped up day by day.
Therefore, if one were to consider that there was virtually
no possibility of success through the US-Japan negotiations,
the military and economic pressures would only force Japan
into further crisis if time were allowed to pass in vain. It was
my position that we must recognize that it was impossible to
meet Japan's objectives as decided at the Imperial Conference,
and that the time had come to make war on the United States
(at the Imperial Conference [of September 61 the start of opera-
tions had been set for mid-October). At the time, the high com-
mand of the army advocated this (starting operations in mid-
October).
3. As opposed to this, the Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister took the position that the obstacle to the negotiations
was the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and that if
concessions were made on this point, an agreement might not
be impossible. As for troop withdrawal, that was a matter of
great interest to the army, which was then conducting opera-
tions. There were no objections to withdrawal as such.
However, the reasons for the China Incident [the alleged at-
tack by Chinese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking
on July 7, 19371 had been the insults to Japan, and the anti-
Japanese and illegal acts that had occurred in various parts of
China. Therefore, if there was not to be a guarantee that those
causes would be eliminated, the result would simply be a
repetition of the same incidents. Furthermore, a withdrawal
that did not achieve its purpose would demoralize the
Japanese army to no avail, and it was feared that it would con-
firm the American claim that the China Incident was provok-
ed by a Japanese invasion. This was something to which the
army could not agree.
At the time, both the high command and the army in the
field were firm on this from top to bottom; a withdrawal
without guarantees was unthinkable.
Thus, because of this difference of opinion, the cabinet
resigned en masse. I might add that I had nothing whatsoever
to do with Prime Minister Konoe's memorandum to the throne
on the resignation of his cabinet.
4. On October 18, 1941, I suddenly received a mandate from
His Majesty to form a new cabinet. This was completely unex-
pected, and when I was summoned to the Imperial Palace I
thought I would be questioned on the army's point of view. I
took with me documents related only to this.
(I) With respect to the formation of a cabinet, I received an
Imperial mandate to return to blank paper [that is, with a free
hand to direct national policy] and to make no missteps in
policy. Therefore,considering that the national leadership
responsibilities of the Prime Minister and Army Minister are
different from each other, I was unswayed by the usual claims
of the army. Though there were demands that negotiations be
cut off and war begun, I was unmoved by them, arguing that
so long as there was the slightest hope of a negotiated
breakthrough, efforts should be continued.
Since there was no desire on the part of the high command
for a troop withdrawal from China, it was determined to seek
a breakthrough in negotiations on the importanat matter that
had caused a worsening of conditions, namely, the movement
of Japanese troops into French Indochina. Even about this,
there was considerable unhappiness in the high command.
IV. Various Problems To Which
The Pearl Harbor Attack is Central
It is natural that I should bear entire responsibility for the
war in general, and, needless to say, I am prepared to do so.
Consequently, now that the war has been lost, it is presumably
necessary that I be judged so that the circumstances of the
time can be clarified and the future peace of the world be
assured. Therefore, with respect to my trial, it is my intention
to speak frankly, according to my recollection, even though
when the vanquished stands before the victor, who has over
him the power of life and death, he may be apt to toady and
flatter. I mean to pay considerable attention to this in my ac-
tions, and say to the end that what is true is true and what is
false is false. To shade one's words in flattery to the point of
untruthfulness would falsify the trial and do incalculable harm
to the nation, and great care must be taken to avoid this.
As it happens, what has been called the speech of Fleet Ad-
miral Nagano [Chief of the Naval Staffl with respect to the
Pearl Harbor attack, was publicized on October 27th. Upon
reading it, errors can be found in important matters, and I
shall here write the true facts for the benefit of future genera-
tions.
1. At the Imperial Conference on December 1, it was decid-
ed to make war against England and the United States. How
the procedures for the commencement of hostilities were to be
carried out was deliberated upon at the Liaison Conference [a
joint meeting of civilian and military personnel] where the
agenda of the Imperial Conference was discussed. It was
decided to proceed according to international treaty and con-
firm the propriety of those actions while at the same time
avoiding a too-early disclosure of our operations. Ambassador
Nomura was to deliver a note by hand to the US State Depart-
ment an hour and a half ahead of time, and the text, as well as
the time of domestic notification [within Japan] were to be the
responsibilities of the high command and of the foreign
ministry. Therefore, I have thought to this day that the
notification that Japan was breaking off diplomatic relations
and was shifting to the unfettered conduct of its affairs [by
declaring war] should have been under the responsibility of
the Foreign Minister, communicated without fail. Of course, if
there was failure in this matter, I have no argument with the
view that, as Prime Minister, the responsibility is mine.
The draft of the final rupture of diplomatic relations was
written under the responsibility of the Foreign Minister of the
time, and its contents were not reported to the Cabinet.
2. The Imperial Rescript on war, as can be seen from its first
page, is directed primarily to the Japanese people. In order
that this be made public as soon as possible after the com-
mencement of war, approval from the Privy Council was ob-
tained on the morning of the 9th.
Though this was a domestic matter, if these procedures had
been followed in advance, it might have resulted in a too-early
disclosure of operations.
In any case, the way the Imperial Rescript was handled was
not'by any means intended as a means of concealing the attack
on Pearl Harbor. On this matter, according to Fleet Admiral
Nagano, it was understood that the declaration of war was to
be made before the start of the Pearl Harbor attack, before
three in the morning, but this is a grave mistake. That is
something that the government would not have known about.
Three in the morning would mean getting Privy Seal approval
in the middle of the night on Sunday, and the government
would not have agreed to something so out of keeping with
Japanese custom. Fleet Admiral Nagano has probably confus-
ed this with the final official note [to the Americans]. It is most
unbecoming that the Fleet Admiral should give the world an
impression that is not only mistaken but suggests that Japan
deliberately delayed the declaration of war.
When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack
should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing
from Heaven. It was clear that a great American fleet had been
concentrated in Pearl Harbor, and we supposed that the state
of alert would be very high. At the same time, since we were
approaching with a great fleet of our own, there were grave
doubts as to success. It is intolerable to think that on that occa-
sion the government did something incorrect, and we had ab-
solutely no intention of doing so.
V. The Manchurian Incident
And International Relations
1. After the first Great European War [of 1914-19181, our
country made, as the basis of its foreign policy, the support of
international understanding and the development of good
relations with the powers.
2. At that time, in China, internal disorders had continued
ever since the establishment of the Republic of China [in
1,9121. Regional war lords proliferated and the internal
disorders due to the struggle between the northern and
southern governments did not cease. Even after the beginning
of the Showa era [I9261 and the establishment of the Na-
tionalist government in Nanking with Chiang Kai-shek as
Premier, its power was not sufficient to ensure an orderly na-
tion.
3. After the Nine Power Treaty [of 19221 was concluded [at
the Washington Conference], American East Asian policy
became more vigorous, and at the same time the Communist
movement gained strength on the Chinese mainland. Interna-
tional relations, especially concerning Manchuria and
Mongolia, became more complex and tense.
4. Despite this situation, the Nationalist government as well
as the [Chinese] war lords were taken in by the East Asian
policies of such countries as Britain and the United States, and
they did not understand our own spirit of justice and friend-
ship. Furthermore, seeing that public opinion in our country
was confused, that the political situation was unstable, and
that our foreign policy appeared also to be unstable, they in-
sulted our nation, took policies opposed to Japan, and con-
tinued on a national scale with their resistance to Japan, with
such efforts as the boycott of Japanese products.
5. Especially in Manchuria, where our special privileges had
been secured, such war lords as Chang Tso-lin, who held real
power in the region, failed to understand the true significance
of the Russo-Japanese War, and lost their understanding and
gratitude of what our country had done on the continent on
behalf of the stability of East Asia. They called for the recovery
of Port Arthur and Dairen, violated our interests, and took an
arrogant attitude. After Chang Tso-lin died [in 1928, in an ex-
plosion attributed to Japanese plotters] and the era of his son,
Chang Hsueh-ling began, outrageous circumstances only
worsened.
(1) Plans were undertaken, with American finance, to build
a new railroad that would encircle our South Manchurian
Railway.
(2) Farmers from the Korean peninsula were persecuted and
attempts were made to expel them. Treaties were spurned,
and our interests were destroyed. Further, our nation's ex-
istence was threatened, and there were continuous plots to
disturb the peace of East Asia. Our government was patient,
sometimes negotiating, sometimes trying to set up
agreements. In return, China showed no sincerity whatsoever,
and thus arose a mountain of unsolved problems, both great
and small.
5 0
6. On the night of September 18, 1931, Chinese [?I troops oc-
cupying Mukden blew up the South Manchuria Railway, and
that became the Manchurian Incident.
On March l st , 1932, [the state of] Manchukuo was establish-
ed [in northern China], and this fact was proclaimed both
domestically and to the world. That proclamation meant that a
peaceful and happy world was to be built by means of the rule
of virtue, that peoples would cooperate and contribute to the
peace of the East.
On September 15, 1932, its independence was approved,
and the Protocol between Japan and Manchukuo was signed.
PART 2
Hideki Tojo's Log
Dec. 1 [I9411
0900 - 1000 [hours] Extraordinary cabinet meeting (decision to
go to war with US. , Britain, Holland)
1130 - Imperial appointment ceremony [a ceremony in which
the Emperor directly appoints someone to a position-not
mentioned who was appointed to what] (discussion with Lord
Kido [Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal] about the Imperial Con-
ference)
1400 - Imperial Conference (with various officials as well as
the participants of the Liaison Conference) Subject: Opening
of war with U.S., Britain, Holland (EX 588) Minister explana-
tion (EX2955, DD1892, Record 252-2P) In attendance: Sum-
marized and abbreviated
1630 - Discussion with Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal about the
Imperial Rescript on War [the official war proclamation].
Evening - Official Conference with Foreign Minister
Official signature as Prime Minister
Dec. 2
1. From 1000 throughout the morning - cabinet meeting
2. 1330 - private meeting with His Majesty (Hatta to be named
Minister of Railroads, Ino to be named Minister of
Agriculture)
3. 1500 - Imperial installation ceremony for Hatta and Ino.
Dec. 3
1. From 1000 Liaison Conference, throughout the morning, at
the palace. Afternoon - funeral of Princess Kaya
5 1
Dec. 4
1. Morning - Privy Council - Foreign Minister Togo, private
2. From 1400 Liaison Conference
3. 1600 - Foreign Minister Togo, private meeting with his ma-
jesty
Deliberations at the Liaison Conference of Dec. 4:
1. How to handle Manchukuo with respect to the opening of
hostilities
2. How to handle Holland
3. The final notice to the United States
The text was to be the responsibility of the Foreign Minister.
It was agreed that notice was to be given before the start of
operations, and details were to be worked out between the
Foreign Minister, the Army Chief of Staff,and the Chief of
Naval Operations.
Dec. 5 (Fri.) Sunny
Official visit to Imperial War College. Luncheon with
Emperor at the Imperial Army Headquarters
1630 - Report to Emperor on what was to be brought up in
Cabinet meeting. Discussion with the Lord Keeper Privy Seal
about the Imperial Rescript on War (Article 6).
Dec. 6 (Sat.) Cloudy, later sunny
1000 - Liaison Conference at the Palace
1130 - Discussion with Lord Kido, Keeper of the Privy Seal,
about Imperial Rescript on War
1500 - 1750 Liaison Conference 1) On negotiations with Ger-
many 2) On instructions on when to begin negotiations with
Thailand 3) On when to deliver the notice to the United States.
Deliver by hand on the 7th at 3 a.m. (Japan time) 4) How to
deal with the Nationalist government with respect to the open-
ing of hostilities 5) Decision about the Imperial Rescript on
War 6) Planning for the events of Dec. 8.
Dec. 7 (Sun.) Sunny
1100 - Consultation with Emperor. Discussion with Secretary
of the Cabinet Hoshino, and Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy
Seal, about commencement of hostilities against US, Britain,
and Holland.
Dec. 8 (Mon.) Sunny
0100 - Visit from Foreign Minister Togo
5 2
0430 - Report came of the success of the Pearl Harbor attack
0600 - Broadcast about entry into war
0715 - Cabinet meeting
0730 - Meeting of the Privy Council, Consultation with
Emperor
1000 - End of Privy council Meeting. Cabinet meeting (East
wing of palace, Room 1)
1140 - Presentation of the Imperial Rescript on War
1200 - Broadcast of the Imperial Rescript on War
1300 - Central cooperation meeting of the Imperial Rule
Assistance Association
1400 - Army and Navy are given written orders addressed to
them directly by the Emperor. Addresses [by Tojo] to the Ar-
my Ministry and the Interior Ministry. Paid reverence at Meiji
Shrine and Yasukuni Shrine [to Japanese war dead]
1730 - Taped broadcast
1800 - Liaison Conference
The Imperial Conference of December First
Outline of explanations made by Prime Minister Tojo
1. Acting in accordance with the decisions arrived at during
the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, the army and navy worked
to complete their preparations while, at the same time, the
government made every effort to adjust diplomatic relations
with the United States. However, the latter effort resulted in
failure and it is clear that Japan's claims cannot be met by
diplomatic means.
2. We have entered a state that can no longer be tolerated,
neither from the point of view of our nation's power nor from
an operational point of view. At the same time operational
demands can no longer brook delays.
3. At this point, in order to resolve the current crisis, and in
order to effect the self-preservation and self-defense of the na-
tion, Japan has no choice but to make war upon the US, Bri-
tain, and Holland.
4. The China Incident has already continued for more than
four years, and henceforth we are about to enter another great
war. I deeply regret that His Highness' heart be inflicted with
such a concern.
5 3
5. The morale of the officers and men of the army and navy
is very high, the spirit of the nation is firm, and the people are
prepared to act as one. With a spirit willing to face death, I
have no doubt that they will triumph over every difficulty.
6. I seek your [the Emperor's] consideration of these matters.
Explanation by the Foreign Minister ((Shigenori Togo))
1. Explanation of the progress of US-Japan negotiations.
Although over a period of seven months our nation has of-
fered many compromises, they have held to their original posi-
tion and will concede nothing.
2. The Japan policy of the United States hinders the
establishment of a new order in East Asia-which has been
our unwavering policy from the beginning.
3. If we were to accede to American demands, our interna-
tional stature would sink even lower than it was before the
Manchurian Incident, and our existence might be imperiled.
4. Even if we continue negotiations further, there is virtually
no possibility of our claims being met.
Explanation by the Chief of Naval Operations, representing
the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy.
1. We have continued to prepare for operations. As soon as
the order to commence operations should be given, we are
prepared swiftly to commence operations according to plan.
2. The US, Britain, and Holland have strengthened their
preparations for war, but I am convinced that operations can
be carried out according to plans that are already established.
3. With respect to the Soviet Union, our diplomacy is coup-
led with a state of high alert, but at present this does not appear
to be a matter of great concern.
4. The martial spirit is high in both officers and men, and the
spirit burns within them to serve the nation even unto death.
Should orders come, they are eager to do their duty bravely.
Explanation by Interior Minister Tojo
Concerning such things as changes in public opinion, the
state of domestic control, the protection of foreigners and
foreign diplomats, and special security forces. Efforts will be
made so that the various policies for handling emergencies
can be carried out without mishap.
Explanation by the Finance Minister
1. So long as the necessary materials, facilities, and skilled
54
labor are available, our nation can be financially self-
sufficient.
2. Even if Japan issues military or other currency with
which to secure labor and materials overseas, it will be dif-
ficult to maintain the value of such currency. We will attempt
to establish a policy of local self sufficiency [for Japanese
troops stationed abroad] and we will limit the despatch of
materials overseas to the least amount necessary to maintain
local security and to meet the needs of local labor. We must
not be overly concerned about such things as a deterioration
in the value of local currency, and the turmoil in the local
economy that would result.
Explanation by the Agriculture Minister
We must establish measures to bolster self-sufficiency in
food stuffs, and develop a coordinated food policy for Japan,
Manchuria, and China. We must make plans for an increase in
livestock production and fish catches. If thoroughly carried
out, these policies can probably ensure the minimum
necessary food supp!y for the people for an extended period.
Main points of questions by Chairman of the Privy Council
Hara.
1. Will the current strengthening of the enemy's military
preparations be an obstacle to our operations?
(Answer) Chief of Naval Operations: The United States has its
forces in a proportion of four in the Atlantic and six in the
Pacific. However, it is the British who are currently
maneuvering [in a way to threaten us], though they will have
no effect on our operations.
2. What tendency is seen in Thailand? What will we do if
Thailand opposes us?
(Answer) Prime Minister: That will be dealt with just before
occupation. At present, things could go either way; Thailand
is wavering. Japan would wish that they do as we ask while
there is still peace. Just before we start operations we intend to
approach them and have our demands met. If we must resort
to force, we will attempt to keep it to a minimum.
3. What measures will be taken in the case of aerial bom-
bardment of the home islands?
[no reply written]
Chairman Hara's final views
1. The American attitude is one that Japan can no longer
tolerate and further negotiation is pointless. War cannot be
avoided.
2. There are no doubts about early victory, but in the case of
a long war, the support of the people's will is necessary.
3. A long war cannot be avoided, but it is necessary that
resolution be reached as quickly as possible. Therefore we
must now begin thinking about how things are to be conclud-
ed.
4. Decisions About the Formalities of Opening Hostilities.
Notice of the Breaking Off of Negotiations.
(1) Neither the date and time of the opening of hostilities nor
the related formalities were discussed at the Imperial Con-
ference on Dec. 1.
(2) After the Imperial Conference on Dec. 1, at the Liaison
Conference on Dec. 4, the following agreements were reached:
1. Foreign Minister Togo's proposal for the final notice was
approved.
2. It would be notice to the effect that on Dec. 8th (Japan
time) Japan was breaking off diplomatic negotiations and con-
sidered itself free to take unhampered action.
3. The above notification would take place in Washington.
4. The above notification would take place before attacking.
5. The time of delivery of the notice would be decided by
consultation between the Foreign Minister and the Army and
Navy Chiefs of Staff.
The diplomatic handling of the final notice would be the
responsibility of the Foreign Ministry.
Note: According to Yamamoto's testimony [Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, Commander of the Combined Fleet]:
1. The final notice would be drafted by the Foreign Ministry
based on what had been discussed at the Liaison Conference.
Corrections to be made, based on discussions with army and
navy personnel, and text to be proposed at the Dec. 4 Liaison
Conference. Copies to be distributed to all in attendance. Final
approval was secured.
2. The participants in the Liaison Conference firmly believ-
ed that the last part clearly indicated the breaking of
diplomatic relations and the opening of hostilities.
The outline of the final notice was reported by the Foreign
Ministry to the cabinet meeting on Dec. 5, and was approved
by all present.
Note: According to Yamamoto's testimony, the decision
about the formalities of commencing hostilities, that is to say,
the decision to give notice in Washington that negotiations
were being broken off, was made at a Liaison Conference on
Dec. 2nd. The facts are correct, but there was no Liaison Con-
ference on Dec. 2nd. It is my recollection that it was on Dec. 4.
[According to General Miki, Tojo is referring here to
Kumaichi Yamamoto, who was head of the US desk at the
Foreign Ministry during the third Konoe cabinet.]
On the Ultimatum to the United States
1. The final notice [the fourteen-part final Japanese reply to
Secretary of State Hull's proposals of November 261 that was
ordered to be delivered by hand to the United States govern-
ment at 1:00 p.m. on Dec. 7, 1941 [Washington, DC, time] is as
described in testimony (No. 1245) of this trial.
2. It was believed that in this notice the Japanese govern-
ment was breaking off diplomatic negotiations and had deter-
mined to make war.
3. The research as to whether this notice was in accordance
with international law was undertaken with sufficient care by
the Foreign Ministry, especially in the Treaty Section, and the
Liaison Conference put its faith in that study.
4. I do not accept the prosecution's claim that the text of the
notice does not correspond to what the Hague treaty, in article
three, calls a declaration of war with reasons included [a
reference to the 1907 Hague Convention on the commence-
ment of hostilities]
5. If one reads the 2400 characters of the entire document,
particularly in light of circumstances at the time, it criticizes
the American attitude, and makes it clear that Japan had no
choice but to take military action. Therefore:
(1) World peace must be built upon reality and an under-
standing of the other's position, and can be achieved only by
finding means that are acceptable. It is not conducive to
negotiations for one country to ignore reality and force its
own self-righteousness upon another country.
(2) It can only be said that the United States, seduced by its
own doctrines and selfishness, was planning to expand the
war.
5 7
(3) Although it avoided handling its international relations
by means of force, the United States government advanced its
harsh claims by applying economic pressure, together with
the British government and others. This kind of pressure can,
at times, be even more inhumane than military pressure and
should be avoided as a means of handling international rela-
tions.
(4) In every instance, what the US government demanded of
Japan ignored reality in China and attempted to subvert the
position of Japan, which was the stabilizing force in East Asia.
These demands by the American government prove that it had
abandoned its position of ceasing to aid Chiang Kai-shek, and
that its intention was to hinder the reestablishment not only of
peace between Japan and China but in all of East Asia.
The above makes it clear that Japan had lost all hope in fur-
ther negotiation, and was forced to extreme measures as a
matter of pure self defense.
(5) Furthermore, at the end [of the final note] it states: 'The
Japanese government has finally lost its hope of adjusting in-
ternational relations and, together with the government of the
United States, establishing and supporting peace in the
Pacific. It is therefore with much regret that we notify the
United States government that having taken into considera-
tion the attitude of the United State government, we see no
prospect for a solution by means of continued negotiation."
The above is a notice of a break in diplomatic relations and,
moreover, given the strained circumstances of the time, we
understood it to be notice of Japan's intent to make war.[On
the evening of December 6, 1941, President Roosevelt himself
read this and commented: "This means war".]
Note: 1. Yamamoto, in his testimony, says, "The members of
the Liaison Conference firmly believed that the last words
make clear the intention to break off diplomatic relations and
make war."
Various Problems to which the Pearl Harbor Attack is Central
pojo's notes of likely trial questions, and draft replies]
1. Why did Japan start the useless Great East Asian War?
Answer: Leaving aside the more distant causes, the direct
reasons were as follows: Japan's military and economic sur-
vival was threatened by a group of nations led by Britain and
the United States. Attempts were made to reach a solution by
5 8
negotiation between Japan and the United States, but that
route was eventually foreclosed, so for reasons of self-
preservation and self-defense, war was decided on.
2. On what day did Japan decide to make war?
Answer: It was decided on the basis of conclusions reached
at the Imperial Conference of Dec. 1.
3. As for the Imperial Conference of Dec. 1, was it not the
case that war was to be made against the United States, Bri-
tain and Holland because the negotiations with America bas-
ed on the Imperial Policy Execution Outline adopted on Nov.
5 had come to nothing [a reference to the final Japanese pro-
posal for a peaceful settlement].
Answer: That is correct.
4. In that case, Japan decided on war, not for reasons of self
preservation, but because the US-Japan negotiations had fail-
ed. Is that not so?
Answer: No. Naturally, there were various kinds of pro-
blems included in the US-Japan negotiations. However, the
main thing was to relieve the threat to Japan's existence. War
was decided on because relief could not be obtained.
5. Nevertheless, according to the decision of the Imperial
Conference of Nov. 5, 1941, "In order to break out of the pre-
sent crisis and to achieve self-preservation and self-defense,
and in order to establish a new order in Greater East Asia, war
against the United States, Britain, and Holland is decided
upon and the following measures are to be taken." Does this
not show that the establishment of a greater East Asian order
was the main objective of the US-Japan negotiations?
Answer: That is correct. At the time, the establishment of
the new order in greater East Asia was one objective.
6. If that is the case, then was not the main reason for the
decision to go to war the rejection of Japan's claims about the
establishment of a new order in greater East Asia?
Answer: No. The establishment of a new order in greater
East Asia was one of the objectives of the US-Japan negotia-
tions, but if this had been the only objective there would still
have been prospects for a peaceful solution. In fact, during the
course of the US-Japan negotiations, in this area Japan con-
sidered the American claims and made many concessions in
the hope of reaching a solution. However, during this period,
economic and military pressure from the British-American
side grew ever stronger, and it became clear that Japan's ex-
istence was endangered. The decision to go to war was made
for that reason. Thus, the main reason for the decision to make
war was self-preservation and self-defense.
7. According to the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5,1941, "At
this time, it is decided to make war on Britain, the united
States, and Holland, and the following measures are to be
taken." Does this not mean that the decision to make war on
Britain, the United States, and Holland was made, not on Dec.
l st , but by decision of the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5?
Answer: No. At the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, it was
decided that war against Britain, the United States and
Holland would be unavoidable if no solution could be reached
by diplomatic negotiation. On Dec. lst, war was decided upon
as a consequence of the failure of diplomatic negotiations.
8. [sic] Had not Japan already decided at the Imperial Con-
ference of Nov. 5, 1941 to make war? Did it not send Am-
bassador Kurusu to America in order to camouflage the deci-
sion to make war and to carry out operations, rather than in
any hope of achieving a diplomatic solution?
Answer: No. Japan's position at the Imperial Conference of
Nov. 5, 1941 was that the decision to make war would be
unavoidable if the diplomatic negotiations did not reach a
solution. We sincerely hoped that the US-Japan negotiations
would achieve a breakthrough.
At that Imperial Conference we did the following:
1) Decided to propose further concessions at the US-Japan
negotiations. 2) As can be clearly seen from the decision that
the deployment of force would be canceled if negotiations suc-
ceeded by 0000 hours of Dec. 1, this was by no means a policy
of camouflage. Japan does not engage in camouflage foreign
relations as part of a policy to gain power. Moreover, at an im-
portant meeting held in the presence of the Emperor,
something like this would never have been permitted against
his wishes.
9. That can be understood to some degree, but did you not
make proposals in the US-Japan negotiations that you knew
the United States could not accept, and thus anticipating the
failure of the diplomatic negotiations, did you not deceive Am-
bassadors Nomura and Kurusu? Has not Ambassador Nomura
himself said, "I had not even imagined an attack on Hawaii'?
Answer: No. What had been decided at the Imperial Con-
ference of Nov. 5, 1941, was the limits of the concessions that
Japan was then able to make. On the American side, from the
very beginning there had not been the slightest softening of
60
demands. It is a fact that only the Japanese side had made con-
cessions. Moreover, in my policy speech, as Prime Minister,
to the 77th Diet session on Nov. 17, 1941, I spoke clearly of
what we expected from diplomatic negotiations. At the same
time, Foreign Minister Togo stated plainly, "Naturally, should
it come to a matter in which a great nation were to lose its
authority, a strong position must be taken to reject this, and
we look forward to negotiations with sufficient determination
on this point." The full text was broadcast overseas at the time,
intentions were made clear to the world, and the full text was
printed in American newspapers. Consequently, at that stage
American officials should have understood Japan's resolve.
If, at that point, the American side had accepted Japanese
concessions and the US-Japan negotiations had reached a
solution, deployment of force and preparations for same
would have promptly been canceled, in accordance with the
decision of the Nov. 5th Imperial Conference. To know this is
to know that there was no camouflage policy. That Am-
bassador Nomura did not expect an attack on Hawaii is a fact.
That sort of attack is top secret from an operational point of
view, and in order for it not to be disclosed, it was not even
revealed to the general cabinet members who participated in
the Imperial Conference.
10. When were operational preparations started for war
against the United States, Britain, and Holland?
Answer: That would be a matter for the Imperial General
Headquarters and I do not know the details, but both the army
and navy started operational preparations on the basis of deci-
sions taken at the Nov. 5,1941 Imperial Conference.
However, this was undertaken on condition that if there were
a compromise in the diplomatic negotiations by 0000 hours,
Dec. I, 1941, everything could be halted immediately.
11. Is it correct to assume that the orders with regard to the
opening of hostilities in the war against the United States, Bri-
tain, and Holland were issued immediately after the Imperial
Conference of Nov. 5, 1941?
Answer: No. Immediately after the Imperial Conference of
Nov. 5, 1941, orders were given for joint operational prepara-
tions by the army and navy, and they would not have been
orders to start operations. At this Imperial Conference it was
decided only to start preparing for operations.
12. In that case, what were the specifics of those prepara-
tions?
Answer: That would be a matter for the Imperial General
Headquarters and not within the area about which I can
responsibly speak. About the navy, in particular, I am poorly
informed.
13. Tell us what you knew as Army Minister.
Answer: As I recall, the principal matters were as follows.
However, they were undertaken principally under the authori-
ty of the Army Chief of Staff.
Nov. 6, 1941 - General Headquarters of the Southern Army.
Appointment of Marshall Terauchi as Supreme Commander
of the Southern Army. Marshall Terauchi ordered to prepare
to occupy vital areas to the south.
Nov. 15, 1941 -Decision on an outline for an operations
plan against Britain and U.S.
14. Did you know about the "Imperial Policy Execution
Outline" that was adopted at the Imperial Conference of Sept.
6, 1941?
Answer: I don't recall the details but I have a general
knowledge of it.
15. About its general outline:
Based on Japan's resolve to wage war against the United
States, Britain, and Holland for reasons of self-preservation
and self-defense, war preparations were to be largely complete
by the latter part of October. Also, as mentioned before, if, by
the first part of October, Japan's requirements were still not
met by diplomatic negotiation, Japan was resolved to wage
war on the United States, Britain, and Holland. This is to say
that preparations for war against the US, Britain, and Holland,
that is to say, for the Great East Asian War, were not decided
on at the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, 1941, but had already
been decided on at the Imperial Conference of Sept. 6, had
they not?
Answer: Yes. As pointed out in the main text, under the
strained circumstances of the time, for its own self-
preservation and self-defense, Japan was to make every at-
tempt at diplomacy. However, if Japan's requirements could
not be met, we had resolved to prepare for war, and were
resolved to wage war against the US, Britain, and Holland.
Thus, our war preparations had two postures: both war and
peace.
16. The war preparations based on the decisions of the Im-
perial Conference of Sept. 6,1941,were reconfirmed at the Im-
perial Conference of Nov. 5, were they not?
62
Answer: No. They were not reconfirmed. The war prepara-
tions of the Sept. 6 Imperial Conference were based on the
possibility of war with the US, Britain, and Holland, and were
preparations in a broad sense. Specific preparations had not
yet begun. In the meantime, the third Konoe cabinet had fallen
and the Tojo cabinet had taken its place. Under instruction of
the Emperor, all decisions up to the point were returned to a
state of blank paper, and the current conditions were reap-
praised by the Liaison Conference. It was on a new founda-
tion that operations planning was decided on at the Nov. 5th
Imperial Conference.
17. Even if that were the case, it was canceled only in the
mind, and in reality war preparations had been continued
since Sept. 6, and consequently they were only reconfirmed
on Nov. 5 were they not?
Answer: No. It was not only in the mind. It was based on the
results of a reappraisal, and in reality, the preparations that
began Sept. 6 were canceled. To be specific, this is clear from
the fact that such specific operational preparations as the ap-
pointment of the Supreme Commander of the Southern Army
and the conclusion of the outline for operational plans against
the US and Britain took place after the Imperial Conference of
Nov. 5th.
18. Do you know about the "Imperial Policy Execution
Outline to Follow Changing Circumstances" that was
established at the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941?
Answer: I don't remember the details but I know the general
outline.
19. [sic] In order to execute the decision items it clearly says,
"completion of preparations for war against Britain and
America," and "do not shirk from war with Britain and
America." Judging from this, had not plans for the Great East
Asian War already been considered by July 2, 1941?
Answer: This Imperial Conference was held to set national
policy after the beginning of hostilities between Germany and
the Soviet Union. [Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June
22, 1941.1 Its main thrusts were to maintain the policy of
establishing the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and
to determine a southern policy as well as a posture to adopt
towards northern problems so as to solve the China Incident
and establish a foundation for self-preservation and self-
defense. With respect to executing a southern policy with
regard to French Indochina and Thailand, these were con-
tingency defensive preparations against the possibility that we
might face military resistance from Britain or America. These
were not preparations for the Great East Asian War, which
came later.
20. Earlier you said that the resolve to make war on Britain
and America was a result of military and economic threats
from the British-American side that endangered the existence
of Japan, and was for self-preservation and self-defense, but
when did those threats begin to be felt?
Answer: In answer to that question, let me first say three
things.
First, Japan, China and Manchuria are at the center of a north-
ern threat from Soviet power in the Siberian area, British
power directed eastward from India, Burma, and Malaya, and
American power directed northward from the Pacific. Thus,
they were at the center of these three great forces and were in
circumstances in which, as independent nations, they had to
engage in self-preservation and self-defense.
Second, in that environment, from July of 1937, Japan had
been at war with China- a China complicated by the various
powers' rights and privileges. Japan's opponent, the Chungk-
ing government, was receiving support from powerful Britain
and America, and was continuing the war.
Third, after the first great European war, the United States
raised its tariffs and strengthened the Pan American Union.
Britain tightened its grip on the British economic bloc, the
Soviet Union went into isolation, and Japan's trade was ex-
cluded all around the world. Then, when war broke out in
Europe in 1939, one of its effects was that Japan's peaceful
trade was restricted to the United States and the southern
countries, and this trade was vital to the support of Japan's ex-
istence.
21. When did Japan begin to feel menaced by the British-
American side?
Answer: In early 1940 there was a threat to Japan in the [US]
naval policy proposal. On July 25, 1940, oil and scrap metal
were put on a permit-only basis. In Aug. 1940, there was the
establishment of a regular Joint Committee with Canada. In
Sept. 1940, there was a representative meeting in Britain of
Africa, Hong Kong, Malaya, Palestine and Britain about
maintenance of the situation in French Indochina. On Jan. 15,
1941, a Conference on Joint Pacific Defense was held in
Washington for U.S., Britain, and Holland. In Feb. 1941, there
were measures to reinforce military bases in East Asia,
Alaska, and the Pacific, followed by a concentration of forces
in Malaya, Burma, and on the Thai border in order to disturb
conversations between Japan and Thailand. On March 11,
1941, the Lend-Lease Act was passed.
22. Wasn't that because war preparations had been com-
pleted and the decision had been made to go to war? History
shows that among the reasons for war there are always
misunderstandings and miscalculations. Wasn't it because
there were important misunderstandings between Japan and
the United States?
Answer: The US-Japan negotiations were a series of
misunderstandings right from the start. However, the Hull
note could not possibly have been a simple misunderstanding.
[This is a reference to Secretary of State Hull's stiff response to
the Japanese proposals of November 25, 1941, which he
issued on the following day.]
Outline of the Disagreements with
Chief of Counsel Keenan's Opening Address
[Joseph Keenan was the Chief Prosecutor at the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East]
Part I: On General Issue
(1) Differences from the Japanese point of view about the wish
for world peace and security.
1. The ultimate purpose of the trial is said to be "to con-
tribute significantly to the future peace and security of the
world." The purpose of the indictments is "do justice
properly." It is arbitrarily concluded that Japan "declared war
on civilization." Consequently, "by means of the rights and
powers granted," "in order to prevent future wars," it is claim-
ed that "a firm struggle has been begun to protect the world
from the destruction and obliteration of civilization." It is also
added that "it is not for such petty reasons as retribution or
revenge."
2. I have no objections to the wish for world peace and
security and that all peoples be spared war. However, this can-
not be expected merely because [a nation] arbitrarily defines
"civilization" and assumes the posture of the world's
policeman. The fundamental causes of war must be studied,
and they must first be removed.
3. If the victorious nations unilaterally and arbitrarily
decide that their way of thinking is the best, and force it on
other nations and peoples, it will instead be a reason for future
conflicts and wars. The circumstances after the First Great
European War and today's world situation after the end of the
Second World War are eloquent testimony to this.
4. A correct conclusion about Japan's behavior cannot be ar-
rived at without understanding that the semi-colonized status
of East Asia, which had its roots in the distant past, was
always a reason for the troubles of East Asia, and that the con-
ditions of war that Japan encountered had these special cir-
cumstances as their origin.
5. When a nation risks its fate by making war, there are
always profound reasons for it. There is no nation in the world
that likes war, and no people that likes war.
(2) Errors in comments about civilization and international
justice.
Japan's point of view:
1. I deny that Japan "declared war on civilization."
2. To advocate a New Order was to seek freedom and
respect for peoples without prejudice, and to seek a stable
basis for the existence all peoples, equally, and free of threats.
Thus, it was to seek true civilization and true justice for all the
peoples of the world, and to view this as the destruction of per-
sonal freedom and respect is to be assailed by the hatred and
emotion of war, and to make hasty judgments.
3. I would like to point out their [my accusers'] inhumane
and uncivilized actions in East Asia ever since the Middle
Ages.
4. In the shadow of the prosperity of Europe and America,
the colored peoples of East Asia and Africa have been sacrific-
ed and forced into a state of semi-colonization. I would point
out that the cultural advance of these people has been sup-
pressed in the past and continues to be suppressed in the pre-
sent by policies designed to keep them in ignorance.
5. I would point out that Japan's proposal at the Versailles
Peace Conference on the principle of racial equality was re-
jected by delegates such as those from Britain and the United
States.
6. Of two through five above, which is civilization? Which is
international justice? Justice has nothing to do with victor na-
tions and vanquished nations, but must be a moral standard
66
that all the world's peoples can agree to. To seek this and to
achieve it - that is true civilization.
7. In order to understand this, all nations must hate war, for-
sake emotion, reflect upon their pasts, and think calmly.
(3) The principle of no retroaction is being needlessly trampled
under foot.
1. The illegality of trampling on the principle of no retroac-
tion.
2. The illegality of trying to explain that illegal action in the
name of civilization.
3. The danger posed to the maintenance of future peace by
affirming this. Its myopic and incoherent character.
(4) Denial of conspiracy
1. It is an absurdity to define "conspiracy," which had as its
purpose "domestic plots," in such a way as to include the
deliberations held as part of an independent nation's political
system (including cabinet meetings, Imperial Conferences,
Imperial General Headquarters, Liaison Conferences).
2. In Japan there was no secret association that conspired,
or plotted to wage war. One must be dreaming to think that
there was an association in Japan like the Nazis in Germany,
and any thinking based on such an assumption is a delusion.
3. On the true nature of the changes in Japan's governments
and the system of deciding on war.
4. It is absurd to ignore the treaty-making rights and powers
of an independent nation and to conclude that the Tripartite
Pact [of September 19401 with Germany and Italy was a con-
spiracy.
5. Japan had no consistent war policy.
6. I would like to know how it was that many different
defendants, of different ages, active at different times, in dif-
ferent jobs, and in different locations could possibly have
entered into a conspiracy.
7. The independence of the high command refutes the ex-
istence of a conspiracy.
8. That there were differences of opinion among the defen-
dants is evidence that there were arguments among the defen-
dants. I point out the frail foundation for the view that "expan-
sion of Japanese power in every direction" constitutes a crime
of conspiracy.
9. The army's land-based programs were opposed to the
navy's sea-based programs, and this, too, is proof that there
was no plot.
(5) The appropriateness of the right of self-defense. Denial that
Japan waged aggressive war.
1. The appropriateness, in international relations, of the
right of self-defense is a right of an independent nation.
2. American claims to the right of self-defense and claims to
the right of self-defense made prior to the outbreak of the
Great East Asia War. (Claims made with respect to the Euro-
pean War and its related actions. Also, an interpretation of the
American claims to self-defense focusing on the Tripartite
Pact, made during the US-Japan negotiations.)
3. It was natural that given the special circumstances of East
Asia, there would be frequent occurrences of self-defense act-
ivity.
4. I point out the self-righteous interpretation of
"aggression."
(6) Manchukuo and the other nations that were established in
East Asia were legitimate.
1. Indicate the evidence that they were established accor-
ding to the wills of their peoples. (Contrast with war-time
governments in exile that were not on their native soil.)
2. I deny any violation of the Nine Power Treaty [concluded
in 1922 to guarantee China's territorial integrity].
3. Japan's friendly internal guidance during the develop-
mental stage of the nation of Manchukuo did not deny its
sovereignty.
4. The fact that ten or so nations recognized it. In particular,
at the time of the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality
Treaty in 1941, the Soviet Union affirmed the existence of
Manchukuo, promised to respect its territory and refrain from
aggression, and exchanged consuls.
5. Point out that pride was taken in political and economic
help and intervention.
6. In their fundamental thinking, troop operations on the
one hand, and the establishment and development of an in-
dependent nation on the other, are different elements. It is not
correct to confuse the two and mistakenly conclude that there
was aggression or subjugation.
(7) The maintenance of international law and custom. I believe
that in East Asia, human relations, customs, and habits are dif-
ferent from those in the West.
1. It is natural to respect and to abide by international law
and custom, but this must apply to victors as well as to the
vanquished.
2. On the Japanese national character and its respect for
humanity.
3. How this applies to East Asia, where human relations,
customs, habits and standards of living are different.
4. The true meaning of not having ratified the treaty on
prisoners of war [Geneva Conventions of 19291, and the fact
that we applied the treaty.
5. That it is unreasonable to equate the casualties of a war,
started with the intention of exercising self-defense, with
murder.
Part I1 - SPECIFIC ITEMS
(The main purpose being to prove that Japan's actions
were not aggressive war but the exercise of the right of self-
defense.)
Outline of My Impressions of the Chief of
Counsel's Address
Did Japan really declare war on civilization?
(1) War is something that destroys the civilized life of
peoples, so there can be no question that it is something that a
nation must do everything to avoid. For this reason, in normal
times, causes that could lead to war are suppressed before
they lead to crisis or conflict, and early solutions that prevent
the eruption of conflict are necessary-so long as they are ar-
rived at in the spirit of constant mutual compromise. This is
particularly important for great nations. Moreover, not only
does war result in great sacrifice and cost to both the oppo-
nent and to one's own people, if an error is made and war is
lost, it can result in miserable conditions in which the nation
can be destroyed. Since this is well known, there is no such
thing on the face of the earth as a nation that loves war, or
what one might call a war-loving nation or war-loving people.
Moreover, for one who is in a position of national leader-
ship, it is natural that, faced with the heavy responsibility he
bears towards nation and people, such a resolve should be
thought over very seriously. Especially, when a small, weak
nation plunges into war with a great nation, that act in itself
explains, without one word, the reason why war is necessary.
When a great nation uses its power to force its will upon a
small, peaceful nation, and tries to prevent its normal develop-
ment and, moreover, threatens that nation's existence in order
to achieve these aims, can that be conceived of as civilized
conduct?
According to the address by the chief of counsel, Japan
declared war on civilization, but the responsibility for declar-
ing war lies rather, as explained above, with the Anglo-
American side, which forced Japan into war. Japan fought in
order to ensure its own survival and also to establish the pro-
per survival of the people of East Asia. In other words, it
sought true civilization for mankind. This truth is not to be
judged hastily as the sorrowful lamentations of a vanquished
country, for it is the truth of mankind. (A weak and gentle
lamb- or nation- is born, and lives by eating grass. It has
never even thought of eating the flesh of lions or tigers. Lions
and tigers do eat the flesh of lambs and [what the chief of
counsel is arguing] is like claiming that it is the natural fate of
the lamb to be eaten by lions and tigers, and that this is
civilization and justice.)
(2) If one examines the Chief of Counsel's address it is
similar to denying to an independent nation the right to a war
of self-defense.
Avoiding any discussion of the reasonableness of a war of
self-defense, it is unilaterally declared that Japan's behavior
was aggressive war, and this is the point of departure. It is not
necessary to say a great deal about the fact that according to
international law, a war of self-defense can be reasonable, As
is clear from the diplomatic documents that preceded the con-
clusion of the No-War Treaty [the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
19281, before adhering to this treaty, Japan reserved this very
point. This is also clear from the explanation that then-US
Secretary of State Kellogg gave to an American conference on
international law. If an independent nation faces an external
threat to its existence and is endangered, it has the right to
remove that threat. Many misunderstandings arise from not
doing a theoretical study of the fact that Japan based its
behavior on this right, and from summarily and arbitrarily
concluding that what Japan did was a violation of interna-
tional law. Moreover, the fact that Japan's military self-defense
activity was frequent is dismissed as nothing more than a com-
mon Japanese tactic, but no thought is given to the cir-
cumstances of East Asia that gave rise to frequent self-defense
activity. Further, a war of self-defense is proper under interna-
tional law, it is a free action, and it is a right that an indepen-
dent nation has under international law. Therefore it does not
come under the constraints of the Hague Convention with
respect to the initiation of war, and it is therefore not a viola-
tion of law if the final notice does not necessarily follow the
form that it sets forth. For these reasons, it is a great error
deliberately to ignore the circumstances and declare that
Japan's initiation of war on Dec. 8, 1941 was an attack without
warning and therefore a treaty violation, and therefore
murder.
(3) When I listen to the discussions about conspiracy, I get
the impression that in order to find some basis for the charge,
materials have been collected and an attempt has been made
to make something out of them.
The assumption is that Japan had established the Great East
Asian War as a goal, and had already planned and plotted it
for many years. I do not get the impression that evidence was
first gathered and that a judgment was then made on the basis
of the evidence.
Nothing is said about the international facts of the Anglo-
American legal pressure applied after the First Great Euro-
pean War [the First World War], Japan's political cir-
cumstances are ignored, and no thought is given to the efforts
made to establish peace in East Asia. Moreover, there is no ex-
planation as to how a conspiracy could be possible among a
large number of defendants, whose ages differ greatly, and
whose active periods, jobs, and workplaces are all different.
Furthermore, it is a great error to say that the first step
towards aggression was for an independent nation to establish
school instruction as a way of nurturing citizen spirit. Japan
suffered greatly in the Russo-Japanese war [1904-19051.
Because China was weak, Japan assumed the burden in place
of China, and earned treaty-based rights by risking its very ex-
istence as a nation. As a consequence, Manchukuo become a
flourishing territory, and Japan was trying to develop. To say
that this was the second step towards aggression is another
great error.
(4) An independent nation has the right to hold to an ideal.
Despite this, the Anglo-American side sets up its own ideal
about the establishment of world peace as the only correct
view. It summarily determines that Japan's ideals- the New
East Asian Order and the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere - are supranational thinking, and builds its arguments
on that basis. Moreover, it fails to distinguish measures that
were taken to realize that ideal and bring common benefits to
the related nations, from measures taken to win the war and
that were in effect only during the war. Thus mixed together,
both are criticized.
(5) Whether or not the laws and conventions of warfare
were violated will be examined later in this trial. However,
Japan is one of the civilized nations, and as part of its national
character it would have attempted to abide by laws and con-
ventions. These would be incidental acts undertaken by peo-
ple on the battlefield (and obviously if they occurred, they are
not be forgiven or justified). It is charged that this sort of
behavior was an indispensable part of Japanese military activi-
ty and it is concluded that it was simply one of the Japanese
methods of war. However, compared to what was done to
Japan- the indiscriminate bombing of defenseless cities and
the calculated, gigantic massacre achieved by use of the
atomic bomb- our actions were natural measures for main-
taining civilization and our sin is light.
(6) Manchukuo, the Nanking government, and such
[Japanese sponsored] nations [Chinese] as the Philippines and
Burma were recognized by as many as ten or more nations, in-
cluding Japan. They were established according to interna-
tional law, by the will of the people, and within national ter-
ritories. Just because they were not recognized by the enemy
during the war, they are now being called puppet govern-
ments. It is true that as a result of that war they were
destroyed, but it is a fact that they were not puppet govern-
ments but nations recognized by a number of other nations.
(7) Did the Tripartite Pact really plan world conquest? The
real purpose of the Tripartite Pact was explained in the text of
the treaty itself and was as follows:
1. That each country, in whatever it does in order to gain its
place, should first of all work for permanent peace,
2. That a new order was to be sought in Europe and in
Greater East Asia for the common existence and prosperity of
peoples. It was promised that this would be supported through
mutual association and cooperation.
3. Further, cooperation was not to be denied nations,
anywhere in the world, that were making similar efforts.
There would be an attempt to fulfill the ultimate hope of the
three nations with respect to world peace. In other words, im-
perialist policies were to be avoided, with a goal of co-
existence and mutual prosperity rather than subjugation. It is
natural for independent nations to wish for such things. For a
disadvantaged nation, and for one to which pressures were
being applied, this was nothing more than to seek the natural
path of mankind, to advance along the path towards civiliza-
tion. To think of this as world conquest is a grave mistake. Fur-
thermore, it is natural that the Anti-Comintern Pact, as stated
in the text, would have entirely different purposes. As for
whether there were secret agreements of some kind, I never
heard of such a thing.
(8) Leaving aside the question of whether it is appropriate to
discuss the Russo-Japanese War during this trial, it was very
much with the help of Britain and the United States that the
war was carried out and was successful. At the time, the
Japanese people felt grateful to those two nations.
1) Japan never planned to wage a war for the purposes of ag-
gression. Japan always tried to establish its independence and
self-preservation and self-defense, and tried to counter the in-
stability and turmoil that resulted from European and
American aggression in East Asia. Japan tried to stabilize East
Asia and believed that this was a contribution to world peace.
2) Contrary to the reasons for prosecution that are set out in
many pages, the events from 1928 to 1945 -such things as the
Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and the Great East
Asian War- were not carried out on the basis of a coherent,
common plan. Each had its own causes based on the interna-
tional situation of the time, and each is a separate matter.
3) The "construction of a New East Asian Order" that was
planned at the time of the China Incident, and the "construc-
tion of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" that was
planned at the time of the Great East Asian War were not for
the purpose of gaining a sphere of military, political, and
economic domination for Japan. The purpose was to relieve
East Asia from the fetters and exploitation of the past several
centuries of aggression and exploitation by the great powers
of Europe and America. Each nation of East Asia was to
respect the mutual autonomy of the others, cooperate
economically, engage in mutual defense, seek the fruits of co-
existence and co-prosperity, and seek peace in East Asia.
There was not the slightest attempt at aggression or exploita-
tion. Instead, it was defense in the name of ensuring the sur-
vival of East Asian nations and peoples. Furthermore, war
was not waged in order to achieve the goals of "construction of
a New East Asian Order." The attempt was made to achieve its
goals by harmonizing it with the China Incident, which had
occurred for other reasons. The same can be said for the con-
struction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,
which was undertaken in connection with the Great East
Asian War, which in turn occurred for separate reasons of its
own.
4) Contrary to what is written in indictment 5, Japan did not
join the Tripartite Pact in an attempt to secure military,
political, and economic domination over the whole world. In-
stead,
1. Ever since the Washington Conference [Nov. 1922-Feb.
19231, Japan had fallen into a state of international isolation,
and it sought allies. It sought world peace, and the
maintenance of a balance of world power.
2. Efforts were made to prevent the European War from
spreading to East Asia.
3. It was hoped that Germany's power would be of
assistance in resolving the issue that was then of greatest con-
cern to Japan, namely, the China Incident.
4. It was hoped that it would be of assistance in "construc-
tion of a New East Asian Order."
Furthermore, contrary to what is written in indictment 5,
there was no effort made to establish a particular position of
domination in East Asia. It was a mutual recognition of
Japan's leadership position, of Japan's capabilities of the time,
of the fact that it was in a position to take the initiative with the
various nations of East Asia. There was no attempt to sub-
jugate the nations of East Asia. This is clear from the wording
of the treaty.
It was not, as written in indictment 5, an attempt to rule the
world. It was the hope for a world in which every nation could
achieve its own place. Moreover it is not the case that Japan,
Germany, and Italy plunged into the Second World War ac-
cording to plan. Each fell into a state of war in accordance
with the circumstances of the time.
(5) The Manchurian Incident has deep roots. Japan had won
special rights as a result of the great sufferings of the Russo-
Japanese War. China launched a planned, systematic, illegal
program of exclusion, insult, boycott of Japanese products,
and persecution and violence against 1-112 million imperial
subjects, including Koreans and legally-resident Japanese. The
Mukden Incident was simply the spark that set things off.
Contrary to what is written in indictment 2, it was not
something that happened with the calculated objective of
"establishing a separate nation under Japanese and Chinese
rule." At the time the incident began, the policy was to keep
the trouble from spreading. That it did spread was a result of
the natural exercise of an independent nation's respon-
sibilities in protecting 1-112 million imperial subjects--
Japanese and Koreans - who were suffering from a deteriora-
tion of public order.
Furthermore, the establishment of Manchukuo was con-
ceived of by the people of Manchukuo themselves. Man-
chukuo itself was the reason for the existence of the state of
Manchukuo. Finally, for anyone who does not disregard the
history of its origins and its geography, it is obvious that Man-
chukuo would depend on Japan and have a destiny that was
pro-Japanese.
(6) The China Incident did not occur as set forth in indict-
ment 3. It was a result of the fact that China had persisted, in a
planned and systematic way, in excluding and insulting
Japan, boycotting Japanese goods, persecuting resident
Japanese, and committing massacres and violence. Its purpose
was not, as set forth in indictment 3, "the direct or indirect
establishment of one or more nations under the rule of Japan
so that Japan could dominate China militarily, politically, and
economically." On the contrary, Japan hoped for the unity of
China. Further, even after the incident began, reflecting on the
reasons for the incident, Japan hoped for the "construction of
a New East Asian Order" so as to bring about permanent
stability in East Asia.
The purpose was not for Japan to gain military, political and
economic control of China. It was an effort to seek the true
liberation of co-existence and co-prosperity that comes from
neighborly relations, economic cooperation, and common
defense.
(7) Contrary to what is claimed in indictment 4, Japan did
not, for an extended period beginning in 1928, try to establish
military, political, and economic dominance over broad areas
of East Asia, Asia, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the adja-
cent nations and islands. Instead, it sought to liberate East
7 5
Asia from several centuries of aggression, control, and ex-
ploitation by the great powers of Europe and America. Its
wish was for every nation of East Asia mutually to respect the
autonomy of others, to build friendly relations, to cooperate
economically, to maintain a common defense, to seek the
fruits of co-existence and co-prosperity, and establish peace in
East Asia. Japan had not the slightest aggressive or ex-
ploitative intent. Instead, it wished to defend and ensure the
survival of every East Asian nation and people. This is not to
say that others were to be excluded.
Moreover, war was not waged in order to achieve the goals
of the construction of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere. The reasons for war lay elsewhere. It was during a
war that had occurred for other reasons, but in accordance
with those circumstances, that an attempt was made to
achieve the construction of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere.
It was ordered [by the ''war crimes" tribunal] that virtually all
enemy [American] documents of the following kind be
withheld: those that might substantiate the Japanese claim that
this was a war of self-defense or that there had been anti-
Japanese economic pressure. (Such documents might have in-
cluded the report of the Pearl Harbor Attack Investigation
Committee [Joint Congressional Committee on the ?earl Har-
bor Attack] and other US State Department documents.)
Pressures of this kind were so flagrantly unfair that the
American lawyers assigned to the defense finally made a re-
quest: 'We seek instruction from the Court as to whether
evidence that Japan's war was in self-defense will be
accepted." The court, touched in a vital spot, gave a vague
answer.
The question of military pressure will probably be handled
in the same way. I will note with interest what happens.
Pressures like this are fine. I hope that there is more and
stronger pressure. It only demonstrates to the world how un-
fair this trial is. It is amusing. (Impressions of Aug. 6).
On the Causes of the War
(1) I will ask about the reasons why Japan started the Pacific
war.
Answer: There is much that I would like to say about the
deeper causes, but I will save that for later. The immediate
cause was the Anglo-American side's extreme military and
76
economic threats that put Japan's existence in crisis. Japan
tolerated this, and though it had little hope of success, sought
resolution through US-Japan negotiations. However, in the
end, the United States made difficult, unbearable demands,
and the route to a solution through negotiation finally came to
nothing. Japan was forced into a situation that could permit no
further delay. Thus, as an independent nation, for reasons of
self-preservation and self-defense, Japan bravely determined
to wage war.
(2) However, the decision of the Imperial Conference of
Dec. 1, 1941, says, "the American plan based on the Imperial
Policy Execution Outline formulated on Nov. 5 not having
come to fruition, war will be waged with the United States,
Britain, and Holland." From this it appears that Japan went to
war, not out of self-preservation and self-defense, but because
the US-Japan negotiations failed to reach a conclusion.
Answer: Included in the US-Japan negotiations were
various matters in addition to the demands that the threats
against Japan be eased. The US and British economic and
military threats were continued in parallel with the negotia-
tions. I think that if there had been no such threats, the US-
Japan negotiations would have continued, and even though
there were problems, they could have been resolved by mutual
compromise, and the Pacific War could have been avoided.
However, these threats were only strengthened with the
passage of time, and by August or September of 1941, Japan
had already been pressed to the brink of the crisis. Hope lay
only in the slim chance of a breakthrough in the US-Japan
negotiations.
The decision at the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, 1941,
was taken in these circumstances. The specific conditions
with respect to the US-Japan negotiations that arose from this
decision were that concessions were to be made on the other
political issues, and our demands were to be concentrated on
one thing: the easing of the threats to Japan's self-preservation
and self-defense. However, in reply to that last proposal, the
United States made difficult proposals that were clearly unac-
ceptable to Japan. The possibility of breakthrough through US-
Japan negotiations disappeared. Therefore, as explained
above, the decision was reached, as an independent nation, to
wage a war of self-preservation and self-defense so as to
escape from these very real threats. The breakdown in the
negotiations itself was not the reason for war.
Tojo reading
in his
prison
cell.
Your Excellency, it may be appropriate at this point to quote
from the speech you made at the Imperial Conference. It says:
1) An attempt was made on the basis of the decision of Nov.
5 to adjust relations with the United States, but the United
States did not make a single concession.
2) In fact, they sought unconditional and complete
[Japanese] troop withdrawal [from China] under the joint
supervision of the United States, Britain, Holland and China;
the repudiation of the Nanking government; and the renuncia-
tion of the Tripartite Pact.
3) The United States, Britain, Holland, and China stepped
up their economic and military pressure.
The decision of Nov. 5 sought the end of economic pressure
(in particular, the unfreezing of funds, and the free acquisition
of oil and other materials). The second draft mentions these
things clearly.
78
-Kiyose [Chief defense counsel for Tojo]
(3) From the mass of evidence produced so far, it can be con-
cluded that Japan considered the construction of a New Order
for Greater East Asia an important political objective. Since
the construction of a New Order for Greater East Asia was the
primary objective of the US-Japan negotiation and was also
the reason for starting the war, this talk of US and British
threats is nothing more than an excuse, is it not?
Answer: No. As explained above, the cause of the war was
the threats from the US-British side. This is not an excuse.
The construction of a New Order for Greater East Asia was
certainly, ever since the China incident, an important
Japanese policy, and it was the main point of the US-Japan
negotiations. However, Japan hoped for a realization of this
policy on a peaceful basis of understanding by both nations.
The US-Japan negotiations were one of the means to bring this
about. In fact, on this issue, during the US-Japan negotiations,
Japan considered the American side's claims and tried to
reach a solution by making concession after concession. Con-
sequently, if this had been the only issue, there would have
been no necessity to decide on war with the United States.
(4) If, as you say, the cause of the Pacific War was military
and economic pressure from the American and British side
that forced Japan into a crisis over its very existence, why
were the US-Japan negotiations not concentrated on solving
this one question?
Answer: The US-Japan negotiations changed over time. In
April 1941, when the negotiations began, Japan had political
objectives including the following:
1) The reestablishment of peace in East Asia by means of a
resolution of the China Incident. 2) The maintenance of peace
in the Pacific, which was beset by crises. 3) Prevention, in ac-
cordance with the Tripartite Pact, of the spread of the Great
European War to East Asia. 4) Establishment of an economy
of self-supply and self-sufficiency in the face of US and British
economic pressure.
We concluded that the US side also hoped to keep peace in
East Asia. It was thought that the satisfactory solution of these
issues would be the foundation of a recovery in relations be-
tween Japan and the Unitedstates, and this was made the basis
of US.-Japan negotiations. At that time, the economic and
military pressure against Japan had not yet reached its peak.
In July 1941, the economic blockade of Japan-of which the
freezing of assets by the US, Britain, and Holland was the
main element - along with military pressure brought Japan
face to face with death. Consequently, at this period, the main
issue of the negotiations was the relief and elimination of
threats. This is clear from the Japanese side's proposal of
November 0 [November 71 based on the second draft based on
the decision of the Imperial Conference of Nov. 5, 1941.
(5) You say that the cause of the war was economic and
military threats from the United States and Britain against the
existence of Japan, but what do you mean? Please give us a
summary.
Answer: As has already been demonstrated, after the First
Great European War, and after the Manchurian Incident, the
United States adopted a policy of high tariffs, Britain built up
an imperial economic bloc, and Japan's trade was excluded
from one part of the world after another.
Further, at the end of July 1939, the United States suddenly
applied economic pressure, principally by rescinding its trade
and commerce treaty with Japan. This, together with the
outrageous act of economic blockade by means of the freezing
of Japanese assets by the United States, Britain, and Holland,
was a mortal threat to Japan, whose economic activities
depended on foreign trade. This kind of economic blockade by
nations with which Japan was not in a state of war was felt as
an enemy act that was little different from war. From a
military point of view, the US-British side openly increased its
support of the Chungking forces, thus causing the war to con-
tinue. Moreover, the United States, Britain, and Holland, in
concert with the Chungking government, concentrated troops
in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and Dutch Indochina, and
strengthened their military preparations by such means as in-
creasing airbase facilities. A great American fleet was
assembled in Hawaii and readied so as to be able to start
operations at a moment's notice. Such were the threats that
faced Japan. Moreover, at the same time, according to reports,
on October 3, 1941, British and American leaders met in
Manila to discuss operations. Further, on October 9, a U.S.
military delegation was received at a meeting in Hong Kong,
at which support for China and the continued resistance of
Chungking were discussed. Likewise, a certain American ad-
miral (note: commander of the Pacific fleet, [Husband E.] Kim-
mel) threatened Japan with his famous statement to the effect
that if there were war with Japan, the entire Japanese fleet
could probably be sunk in a few weeks. Further, on Nov. 10,
1941, the British Prime Minister, at a luncheon for the installa-
tion of the [lord] mayor of London, said that if there were war
between Japan and the United States, Britain was prepared to
declare war on Japan within 24 hours. This was taken to mean
that Britain and the United States were in complete accord on
the subject of war with Japan, and that this resolve was inten-
tionally being revealed.
Even if the threats from Britain and the United States were
real, were they not provoked by Japan's southern advance into
French Indochina and the consequent threat to British and
American territory?
Answer: No. Japan's southern advance was to:
1. Cut off the life line to the Chungking forces that ran
through French Indochina and Burma- this, with the inten-
tion of resolving the China Incident.
2. Establish economic self-sufficiency so as to escape from
Anglo-American economic pressure.
If, on the American and British side, there had been no sup-
port for Chungking or encouragement of continued
resistance, this would not have been necessary. Moreover, if
there had been no American and British economic pressure,
and Japan had been able to continue in its economic
dependency on peaceful foreign commerce, there would have
been no need to advance to the south. It was natural that Japan
should try to improve friendly relations with French In-
dochina and Thailand while peace lasted; these were nations
with which Japan had broad connections.
When you touch on this point, the Chief of Counsel is likely
to refer to the decisions of the July 6 Imperial Conference, par-
ticularly "French Indochina and Thailand policy items" and
"matters related to furthering the southern policy," and to
cross examine you on these matters. Please be prepared.
The summary of item two of the decisions made on July 2
reads, "For its self-preservation and self-defense, Japan will
continue the diplomatic negotiations necessary with respect
to the southern territories, and will promote various other
policies." Furthermore, according to this section-"for this
reason preparations for war with the United States and Bri-
tain are to be advanced, and first, policy items with regard to
French Indochina and Thailand, as well as the matter of pro-
moting the southern policy7'- various policies with respect to
French Indochina and Thailand were to be carried out and the
conditions for southern advance were to be strengthened. It
says, "in order to achieve this goal, Japan should not shirk
from war with the United States and Britain." The policy items
with regard to French Indochina and Thailand were decisions
of the Liaison Conference of Feb. 1, 1941, and it says, "for the
self-pres.ervation and self-defense of Japan, military, political,
and economic union that is close and inseparable is to be
established with French Indochina and Thailand."
Furthermore, with respect to the promotion of the southern
policy, at what is thought to be about the time of the April 17
Liaison Conference decision, (1) Military, political, and
economic relations that are close and inseparable are to be
established with French Indochina and Thailand. (2) Close
economic relations are to be established with Dutch In-
dochina. (3) Proper commercial relations will be maintained
with the remaining southern nations.
In principle, the realization of the above objective is to be by
diplomatic means. In carrying out the above policy, military
force is to be used for self-preservation and self-defense, only
if such things as the following occur, and there is no means of
resolving them: (1) A trade embargo by the United States, Bri-
tain, and Holland that threatens the survival of Japan. (2) The
encirclement policy against Japan is strengthened by the
United States, Britain, Holland, and China, and this cannot be
tolerated for reasons of national security.
There is no contradiction between this and your proposed
answer, but I noted it so that you would have it in mind. Fur-
thermore, was it not concluded that the reason economic
negotiations with Dutch Indochina by Kobayashi [Kobayashi
Ichizoo, Minister of Commerce and Industry, who was head
of the trade delegation that was sent to negotiate the import of
oil, tin and rubber] and Yoshizawa poshizawa Kenichi,
former Foreign Minister, who succeeded Kobayashi] failed,
was that there was behind-the-scenes interference by the
United States and Britain?
- Kiyose
(7) In reply to the first question, you said that you would put
aside the deeper causes, but are those deeper causes addi-
tional reasons why Japan entered the Pacific War?
Answer: The deeper causes are what created the objective
circumstances that drew the opponents into the unhappy fate
82
of the Pacific War, but they are not the direct causes.
However, in order to avoid future wars, and in order seriously
to think about world peace, they are large subjects on which
both the winners and the losers should reflect calmly. The
reason why disturbances are common in East Asia, the reason
Japan had been speaking of a New Order, the idea of building
a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, the real meaning
of the cry from the heart of the peoples of East Asia - all have
their origins in these deeper causes.
(8) Is that your personal view or is that the official view of
the Japanese government?
Answer: It is not my personal view. It is the foundational
thinking on which the Japanese government based important
policies.
(9) In that case, how can .you demonstrate that this was of-
ficial, foundational thinking?
Answer: Of all the declarations made by the various govern-
ments since the start of the China Incident, the clearest is the
Joint Declaration of Greater East Asia made at the Greater East
Asian Conference on Nov. 8, 1943. It is also clear from the
speeches given at the conference by the delegates of the
various countries. Also, the actual independence or in-
dependence movements that arose during the Pacific War in
the Philippines, Burma, India and in other places are an elo-
quent testimonial.
(10) If what you say is true, then what you call the cry from
the heart of East Asian peoples and nations, their ardent
desire, took shape as Japan's New Order policy. That can be
taken as an important cause of the war, can it not?
Answer: No. Indeed, it was one of Japan's important na-
tional policies, and everything was done to bring it to fruition.
However, it is well known that a nation that exists in an inter-
national setting cannot expect its unilateral demands and
wishes to 'be accepted unquestioningly by others. This is
something that comes about from a spirit of mutual com-
promise and mutual sympathy, with each nation and people
recognizing the welfare of others and making as their ideal the
establishment of world peace. It is a question of the heart, and
if only there is a conviction that war is unnecessary can things
be achieved peacefully. This was what Japan hoped and strove
for to the end. However, for other reasons, and before its
policies could be achieved by peaceful means, Japan was lured
into war. Therefore, these became the deeper causes that
established the environment for the Pacific War, but they were
not the direct causes.
(11) Nevertheless, any world statesman from a nation with
an important connection with East Asia, if he had the slightest
genuine desire for world peace, would not have ignored
something as important as this was to the nations and peoples
of East Asia. What do you say to that?
Answer: That is correct. It is something that could not be ig-
nored and was not ignored.
(12) On what basis do you say that it was not ignored?
I shall explain the facts.
1. At the Washington Conference in 1922, other important
questions were raised, but this problem was also considered.
However, at that time, the cry from the heart of the nations
and peoples of East Asia was not thoroughly understood. It
was thought that the East Asian nations could be controlled
through pressure and by alienating them from each other.
2. It can also be seen in the "Atlantic Charter," which was
agreed to by Prime Minister Churchill and President
Roosevelt at a meeting held in the Atlantic [August 14, 19411.
At this time, the full war in Europe had already broken out, the
unfortunate China Incident had occurred in East Asia, and the
tactic used by the Americans and the British of sowing
discord among the nations of East Asia was a great obstacle to
Japan's attempt to reach peace with China. In the Atlantic
Charter that resulted from this meeting, one cannot fail to note
that the feelings of the East Asian peoples and nations were
taken into consideration relatively often. However, the Presi-
dent and the British Prime Minister had, as top politicians,
already lost appropriate expectations for East Asia. They
should have been more bold in grasping what was happening
in East Asia, in making important corrections to the mistakes
of the past, and in making adjustments to the demands of the
times. Moreover, both nations had failed to understand that
they should abandon their traditional East Asian policy of
sowing discord among nations, and should instead adopt a
position of leadership based on the spirit of mutual aid and
cooperation. Their only preparation for a great conflagration
was a fire-fighting policy rather than a fire prevention policy.
3. These things are given further consideration in the
Potsdam Declaration [August 2, 19451 but this was at the close
of the Pacific War, and was not a policy for avoiding war.
84
(13) Do you mean, in your testimony, to criticize the past
policies of the victorious powers and thereby defy the dignity
of this court?
Answer: I have no intention at all of defying the dignity of
the court. Nor do I intend to criticize the past policies of the
victorious powers. It is regrettable if what I have said gives
that impression. I am only describing the facts, and explaining
the effect that Britain and America's past policies had on the
peoples of East Asia. It should be the intention of the vic-
torious powers to seek true peace for the hi i r e , and in order
to help them make fair observations, I believe it is the duty of a
defendant to provide the court with material for reflection.
(14) Assuming that what you say is true, if the leaders of the
United States and England had, even to a small degree, taken
heed of the hopes and cries from the heart of the nations and
peoples of East Asia, then you, as a leader of Japan, should
have taken a positive role in showing understanding to these
hopes and cries, should you not?
Answer: That is correct. I think what you say is true. This is
what Japan desired for Japan as well as for the nations and
peoples of East Asia. However, world politics must work with
nations and peoples, which are living things. An effect can be
achieved, and peace preserved only if the right policies are
carried out at the right time. It does no good to give medicine
to a corpse.
(15) According to your testimony so far, the reason that
Japan went to war was not the breakdown of the US-Japan
negotiations, nor was it as a result of Greater East Asian
policies. Instead, you say the direct cause was economic and
military threats from the allied side, and that Japan went to
war for reasons of self-defense and self-preservation. If that is
the case, why did Japan not adopt a policy of stopping the war
in its early stages, in mid-1942, for example, by which time
those threats had been largely dissipated?
Answer: War is not a solitary undertaking. Even if that
might have been good for Japan, we did not think that the
enemy would have agreed. In particular, both sides were
bound by treaty not to make conclude a separate peace, and
the world situation did not appear to be one in which pro-
posals advantageous only to Japan would be accepted.
Moreover, whatever the reasons for making war, once it had
begun, we thought to win it, to adjust Japan's policies to the
circumstances of war and, within the parameters permitted by
international law, to proceed boldly.

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