CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

SUBJECT- ADR
PROJECT WORK ON ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
SUBMITTED TO Mr. HRISHIKESH MANU (FACULTY OF adr) SUBMITTED BY ROHIT SINHA ROLL NO. 601 6 semester
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Making a project is one of the most significant academic challenges I have ever faced. Any attempt at any level can't be satisfactorily completed without the support and guidance of learned people. I am overwhelmed with my gratitude to acknowledge all those who have helped me put these ideas, well above the level of simplicity and into something concrete effectively and moreover on time. I am very thankful to my subject teacher Mr. Hrishikesh Manu for his valuable help. He was always there to show me the right track whenever I needed his help. He lent his valuable suggestions, guidance and encouragement, on different matters pertaining to the topic. He has been very kind and patient while suggesting me the outlines of this project and clearing my doubts. I thank him for his overall support without which I would not have been able to complete this project. I would also like to thank my colleagues, who often helped and gave me support at critical junctures, during the making of this project. Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family members for their emotional support.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The researcher has adopted doctrinal method of research. The researcher has made extensive use of the available resources at library of the Chanakya National Law University and also the internet sources.

SCOPE AND OBJECT OF THE PROJECT

The project revolves around the concept of theories of legal personality. It is aimed at getting an insight into intricacies of legal personality, emphasis being laid on the theoriesabout various legal personality theories, its special attributes and rules of termination. The project has also thrown light upon the lifting the view of legal personality as well as the criteria for determining the law applicable to it with reference to different types of legal persons.

SOURCES
The following secondary sources of data have been used in the project1. Case-laws 2. Books 3. Journals

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Table of Contents
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................... 3 SCOPE AND OBJECT OF THE PROJECT .......................................................................................................... 3 SOURCES .............................................................................................................................................................. 3 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5 A.DEFINITION OF LEGAL/JURISTIC PERSON ............................................................................................... 5 JURISTIC PERSONS............................................................................................................................................. 6 B. PURPOSES OF INCORPORATION ................................................................................................................ 7 C. KIND OF CORPORATIONS ............................................................................................................................ 8 I. CORPORATION AGGREGATE ................................................................................................................... 8 CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE AGGREGATE .............................................................................. 10 II. CORPORATION SOLE ............................................................................................................................. 12 D. CROWN AS THE CORPORATION SOLE ................................................................................................... 13 E. POSITION IN INDIA ...................................................................................................................................... 14 F. CORPORATION WHETHER A CITIZEN ..................................................................................................... 15 2. THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY ............................................................................................ 17 A. THE FICTION THEORY ............................................................................................................................ 18 B. THE REALISTIC THEORY ....................................................................................................................... 19 C. THE CONCESSION THEORY ................................................................................................................... 20 D. THE BRACKET THEORY ......................................................................................................................... 20 E. THE ORGANISM THEORY ....................................................................................................................... 21 F. THE OWNERSHIP THEORY ..................................................................................................................... 22 G. THE PURPOSE THEORY .......................................................................................................................... 22 H. THE KELSENS THEORY ......................................................................................................................... 23 3. LIFTING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY ............................................................................. 24 4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................................. 26

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1 INTRODUCTION
The word person is derived from the Latin word persona which meant a mask worn by actors playing different roles in the drama. Until the sixth century the word was used to denote the part played by a man in life. Thereafter, it began to be used in the sense of a living being capable of having rights and duties. Many writers have restricted the use of term personality to human being alone, because it is only they, who can be subject matter of rights and duties and, therefore, of legal or juristic personality. But it must be stated that the term personality has a far wider connotation in law and includes Gods, angels, idols1 and corporations2 etc, although they are not human beings. On the contrary, there may be living persons in olden times such as slaves, who were not treated as persons in the eyes of law, because they were not capable of having rights and duties and the slavery is now completely abolished in all civil societies of the world. Likewise, in Hindu law an ascetic (Sanyasi) who has renounced the world ceases to have any proprietary rights and his entire estate is passed on to his heirs and successors and his legal personality completely lost.3

A.DEFINITION OF LEGAL/JURISTIC PERSON

Jurists have defined persons in different ways. German jurist Zitelmana considers will as the essence of legal personality. To quote him, personality is the legal capacity of will, the bodily-ness of men for their personality is a wholly irrelevant attribute.4 Salmond defines a person as any being to whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties. Any being that is so capable, is a person, whether human being or not and nothing that is not so capable is a person even though he be a man5 Thus persons in juristic terms are of two kinds, namely natural and legal. The former are human beings capable of rights and duties while the later i.e. the legal persons are being who may be real (natural) or imaginary (artificial), in whom law vests rights and imposes duties
1 P.N. Mullick V P.K. Mullick 1925 LR 52; Ind App 245 Cited From Prof. Aggrawal Nomita s Jurisprudence 8th Ed.2010 Page 169 2 Saloman V Saloman (1987) AC 22 3 Dr. Paranjape N.V. on Studies in Jurisprudence, legal theory 4rth Ed.(Reprint 2006) Page 4 Ibid 5 Fitzerald P.J.; Salmond on Jurisprudence 1988 (12th Ed.) page 299 5|P age
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and thus attributes personality by way of fiction. A juristic person is not a human being. It may be any other subject matter; either a thing or a mass of property or group of human beings to which they attributes personality. In other words, juristic persons may be defined as things, mass of property or an institution upon whom the law confers a legal status and who in the eyes of law possess rights and duties as a natural person.6

JURISTIC PERSONS7
Juristic or legal person is one to which law attributes legal personality. Normally legal personality is granted by law to all human beings. Legal personality, being an artificial creation of the law, may be conferred on entities other individual human beings. The law, in creating legal persons, always does so by personifying some real thing. Though it is not necessary for law to personify, since the law might, if it so pleased, attribute the quality of personality to a purely imaginary being but personification, in fact, conduces so greatly to simplicity of thought and speech that its aid is invariably accepted. Law may, if it so provides withdraw personality from certain human beings. Being the arbitrary creation of the law, legal persons may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons8and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also legal persons, though not registered as corporations. The conception of legal

personality is not limited in its application. There are several distinct varieties of such persons, notably-

The first class of legal persons consists of corporations, namely those which are constituted by the personification of groups (e.g. corporation aggregate) or series of individual (e.g., for corporation sole). The second class is that in which corporations or objects selected for personification are not a group or series of persons but an institution. The law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a person. That is to say it may attribute personality not to any group of persons connected with the institution, but to the institution itself. English Law does not indeed, so deal with the matter. The University of
6 7

Ibid Prof. Aggrawal Nomita on Jurisprudence 8th Ed. (2010) Page 177-178 8 State Trading Corporation of India V Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1963 SC 1811

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London is not the institution that goes by that name but a personified and incorporate aggregate of human beings namely, the Chancellor, the Vice Chancellor, Fellows and Graduates. It is to be noted, however, that notwithstanding this tradition and practice of English Law, legal personality is not limited by any logical necessity or indeed by any obvious requirement of expediency to the incorporated bodies of individual persons. In India, institutions like a university9, a temple10, public authorities, etc. are considered to be legal persons. The third kind of legal person is that in which the corpus is some fund or estate devoted to special uses - a charitable fund for example, or a trust estate, or the property of a dead man or of a bankrupt. Here, also English Law prefers the process of incorporation. If it chooses to personify at all, it personifies not the fund or the estate, but the body of persons who administer it. Yet the alterative viz.,of personifying the fund or estate is equally possible and may be equally expedient.

B. PURPOSES OF INCORPORATION
The most important purpose of incorporation is to enable traders to embark upon commercial venture with limited liability. This is possible only by the incorporation of the limited liability company. Company11 is so formed by a number of persons becoming shareholders and registering the company under companies Act. By becoming a shareholder, the member contributes or promises to contribute a stated amount of money for the furtherance of common objects of the company. His liability is limited to his share that is the contribution made by him. If the venture of the company ends in disaster, he will not be called upon to meet the claims of the creditors of the company from his other assets. The assets of the company (including the share capital promised but still remaining unpaid), would alone be answerable for the claims of the companys creditors. In this way the shareholders are able to trade with limited liability. This is one of the most important purposes of incorporation and it cannot perhaps be served by any other device known to the law.

Bansidhar v University of Rajasthan AIR 1963 Raj 172 Baba Kishore Dev V State of Orissa AIR 1964 SC 1501 11 Defined under Section 3 of the Company Act
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There are other purposes also served by incorporation but those can be served by other means as well. The fiction of corporate personality is introduced for the purpose of bestowing the character and features of individuality on a collective and changing body of men. Incorporation assimilates the complex form of collective ownership to the simpler form of ownership. In case there are number of persons who are owners of the same property, difficulty arises as to its distribution as well as to its management. To avoid this, law creates fictitious legal person viz., the corporation or company etc. to which it attributes the rights and duties that would ordinarily attach to the beneficiaries. This fictitious person is endowed by law with the capacity of dealing with the property as the representative of the coowners and of figuring in legal proceedings on behalf of its members.

This purpose of incorporation may be served also by means of trusteeship. The trustees can represent the body of co-owners for the purpose of suing and being sued. However, it must be observed that incorporation secures the object in view much better than trusteeship. Thus, a corporation becomes a continuous entity endowed with a capacity for perpetual existence. It is provided that a company has a perpetual succession and a common seal. Trustees, on the other hand, being mortal may have to be changed from time to time. The element of permanence is absent in trusteeship. Incorporation, thus, secures not only the element of unity but that of permanence as well. Incorporation can, therefore, be regarded as an indispensable legal concept of abiding value.12

C. KIND OF CORPORATIONS
Corporations are of two kinds: I. Corporation aggregate II. Corporation sole

I. CORPORATION AGGREGATE
A Corporation aggregate is a group of co-existing persons, a combination of persons who are united together with a view to promote their common interest which is generally the business or commercial interest. It has been defined as a collection of individuals united
12

G.W.Keeton, op,cit.162

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into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artificial form vested by the policy of the law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities, in common and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive, according to the design of its institution or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or at any subsequent period of its existence.13

Under Indian Law, corporation aggregate are all those bodies or associations which are incorporated under a statute of Parliament or State legislature. In this category come all trading and non -trading associations which are incorporated under the relevant laws like the state trading corporation, Municipal Corporation, Roadways Corporations, the public companies, State bank of India, Reserve bank of India, The life insurance corporation, the Universities, Panchayats, Trade Unions, Co-operatives Societies. In fact these are some examples of corporate aggregate. In Board of Trustees V State of Delhi14, the Supreme Court discussed in detail the characteristics of corporate aggregate. In this case the court was examining the question, namely, whether the Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College is a corporation aggregate or not. The court held the Board is not a corporation. Their Lordships observed that the most important point to be noticed in this connection is that in the various provisions of the Societies registration Act, 1860, there are no sufficient words to indicate an intention to incorporate. On the contrary the provisions show that there was an absence of such intention. Hence the Board is not a corporation aggregate because the essential characteristic of a corporation aggregate, namely, that of an intention to incorporate the society is absent. The court observed in this case that a corporation aggregate has one main capacity, namely, its corporate capacity. The corporate aggregate may be a trading corporation or a non-trading corporation. The usual examples of a trading corporation are:1. Chartered companies 2. Companies incorporated by special Acts of Parliaments 3. Companies registered under companies Act etc.
13 14

Halsburys Laws of England, (3rd Ed.) Vol. 9 P.4 cited from Supra Note 210 page 180 AIR 1962 SC 458

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However non-trading corporations are illustrated by:1. Municipal corporation 2. District Boards 3. Benevolent institutions 4. Universities etc.

The court further observed that an essential element in the legal conception of a corporation is that its identity is continuous, that is, that the original member or members of which it is composed are something wholly different from the incorporation itself; for a corporation is a legal person just as much as an individual. In fact the essential of a corporation consist in the following:

1. Lawful authority of incorporation 2. The person to be incorporated 3. A name by which the persons are incorporated 4. A place and 5. Words sufficient in law to show incorporation. No particular words are necessary for the creation of a particular corporation; any expression showing an intention in corporation will be sufficient.15

CHARACTERISTICS OF CORPORATE AGGREGATE

The essential characteristic of a corporation aggregate is that it possesses a personality distinct from that of its members. This doctrine was first approved by the House of Lords in Soloman V Soloman & Co. Ltd.16 the facts of the case are as follows- One Mr. Soloman was the owner of a business which he turned in to a limited liability company. The other members of the company were his wife and children. The total number of issued shares were 20,007 of which Soloman took 20,001 shares and his family members took the remaining six. Soloman also took mortgage debenture to the amount of pound 1000 in part payment for the business. Later on the company became insolvent. The trial judge and the court of appeal held that the creditors had the prior claim to the assets since the company
15 16

Infra Note 21 Page 8 (1897) AC 22 )P. 51 Cited from Supra Note 210 Page 181-182

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was a mere sham. The House of Lords reversed this, holding that the company was in law a person distinct from Soloman and that, therefore, Soloman was preferentially entitled to the assets as the secured creditors. Another important case dealing with a company as a separate entity from its members is Farrar V Farrar Ltd17.Justice Lindley said in this case- A sale by a person to a corporation of which he is a member is not, either in the form or in substance, a sale b y a person to himself. To hold that it would be to ignore the principle which lies at the root of the legal idea of a corporate body and that idea is that the corporate body is distinct from the persons composing it. A sale by a member of a corporation itself is in every sense a sale, valid in equity as well as at law. The leading American case on the point is Peoples Pleasure Park V Rohleder18 , where the question was whether a restrictive covenant that title to land should never pass to a colored person operated to prevent a transfer to a corporation of which all the members were Negroes. It was held that the corporation was distinct from its members and that the transfer was valid. Indian courts have also recognized the judicial personality of a company or corporation distinct from the members which compose it. In fact, this principle had secured a place in India even earlier than Solomans case. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kondoli Tea Co. Ltd., Re19, seems to be the first on the subject. In this case certain persons transferred a tea estate to a company and claimed exemptions from Ad valorem duty on the ground that they themselves were the share-holders in the company and therefore it was nothing but a transfer from them to themselves under another name. Rejecting this, the Court observed that the company was a separate person a separate body altogether from the share holders and the transfer was as much a conveyance, a transfer of the property, as if the shareholders had been totally different persons. In a number of other cases this principle has been recognized.

17 18

(1898) 40 Ch. D 395, 409 61 South Eastern Rep. 794 19 (1886) ILR 13 Cal 43 Cited from Supra Note 210 Page 182

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II. CORPORATION SOLE

Corporation sole is an incorporated series of successive persons. It implies two persons to exist under the same name, the one a human being and the other, the corporation sole, which is a creature of the law and continues to exist though the human beings changes. The live official comes and goes, said Salmond in a passage which has become the classic description of the corporation sole, but this offspring of the law remains the same for ever. The most outstanding example of Corporation Sole is the Crown (in England). Two persons are deemed to be occupying the throne of England- one the queen in flesh and blood and the other is the Corporation sole which is the creature of law. This Queen never dies though the Queen in flesh and blood may die.

In India various offices like that of the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank, The Post Master General, The General Manager of Railways, the Registrar of Supreme Court and High Courts etc. which are created under different statute are some example of Corporation sole. In Govind menon V Union of India20, the Supreme Court pointed out the main characteristic of corporation sole. The court observed the Corporation sole is not endowed with a separate legal personality. It is composed of one person only who is incorporated by law. The same person has a dual character, one as a natural person and the other as Corporation sole, the later being created by Statute. In this case the court rejected the contention of the appellant that the commissioner has a separate legal personality as corporation sole under section 80 of the Act, ( Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act 19 of 1951, which states that the commissioner shall be a corporation sole and shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and may be sued in his corporation name) and that he is exempt from disciplinary proceedings for any act or omission committed in his capacity as commissioner. Their lordships observed, In our opinion, the object of the legislature in enacting section 80 and 81 of the Act was to constitute a separate fund and to provide for the vesting of that fund in the commissioner as a corporation sole and thereby avoid the necessity of periodic conveyance in the transmission of title to that fund.21

20 21

AIR 1967 SC 1274 Cited from Supra Note 210 Page 187 F.P. Walton,18 J.Comp.Leg.(1936),40 at 51

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The idea of corporation sole originated according to Maitland with a piece of land, known as the parsons globe, which was vested in a parson in his official capacity. Difficulties arose as to the conveyance (legal paper transferring ownership of property) of the Seisin22 to a person for the benefit of church. The Corporation sole was invented so that the Seisin could be vested in it. Today, under English law, there are number of bodies which can be said to be examples of Corporation sole. Noted them are a parson, a bishop, public trustee, the postmaster General etc.23

D. CROWN AS THE CORPORATION SOLE

Section 40(1) of the Crown proceedings Act 1947, sharply underlines the distinction between sovereign as an individual and the corporation sole. The Act does not apply to proceedings, by or against the Queen in her private capacity. This invariably leads to the conclusion that the Crown is Corporation sole meaning thereby the queen who adorns the Crown, is different from the one (i.e. the corporation sole) which is the actual owner of the throne- being the creation of law. The chief manifestation of this is to be seen in the proclamation that is made on the death of the reigning monarch in England. The proclamation says, The king is dead, long live the King. It thus refers both to the individual who has died and to the Corporation sole which survives, i.e. which never dies but lives for ever. If this device of Corporation sole is not accepted the following consequences would result on the death of a ruling monarch:1. Pending actions in the Royal Court would lapse on the Kings death and would have to be restarted when a new sovereign occupies the throne. 2. Parliament would stand dissolved and 3. Crown appointments would be automatically terminated.24.

22 23

Means Feudal Possession Supra Note 9 24 Infra 30 Page no-10 13 | P a g e

E. POSITION IN INDIA
Article 12 of the Constitution of India provides that the State includes the Government and parliament of India and the legislature of each state. What is the position of Indian State? It is a juristic person. In Shiv Prashad V Punjab State25, the Punjab High Court observedThe natural and obvious meaning of the expression is that person is a living human being, a man, woman or child, an individual of the human race. In law the word includes natural person and artificial persons like corporation and joint stock companies, but it does not include a State or Government26, for although a state is a moral person, having an understanding and a will, capable of possessing and acquiring rights and of directing and fulfilling obligations, the state in its political organization is entirely different and distinct from the inhabitants who may happen to reside there. Again in the State of Punjab V The Okara grain Buyers Syndicate Ltd.27, the court observed that a state is not a juristic entity for the reason that it does not partaken the characteristic of or satisfy in whole the definition of a corporation. The state is an organized political institution which has several of the attributes of a corporation, e.g. under article 300 of the constitution the Government of the Union and the Government of a State are able to sue and be sued in the name of Union of India and of the Government of the State as the case may be. As regards Ministers of Indian Government, they are appointed by the President or the Governors and are officers within the meaning of articles 53 and 154 of the constitution. They are in law, subordinate to the executive head and so are not personally liable for their acts of commission and omission. They are not directly liable in a court of law for their official acts. They have no legal or constitutional entity. Any person aggrieved by them can bring a suit against the Union of India or the State as the case may be. Consequently they are not corporation sole. Like any other servant of the Government the Ministers are not liable personally. In either case it is the state whether at the centre or in the federated units which is liable in torts28and contracts.29

25 26

AIR 1957 Punj. 150 Cited from Supra Note 210 Ibid State of Rajasthan v Rikhabchand, AIR 1961 Raj 64 27 AIR 1964 SC 660 28 State of Rajasthan V Vidyawati, AIR 1962 SC 933 29 New Marine Coal Co. V Union of India , AIR 1964 SC 15 14 | P a g e

To conclude, it can be said that when there is an aggregate of persons forming a body corporate we call it a corporation aggregate. But when there is not a body of persons, but a fund or an estate or an officer -bearer by himself, we call it or him a corporation sole. In a corporation aggregate there are two or more members at one time but in corporation sole there is only one member at a time. Corporation aggregate is endowed with separate legal personality whereas a corporation sole is not endowed with a separate legal personality.30

F. CORPORATION WHETHER A CITIZEN

Citizenship as defined in Part II of the Constitution of India indicates on ly natural persons and not juristic persons, like corporations. To throw more light on the subject we are examining certain case laws on the topic. 1. In State Trading Corporation of India v Commercial Tax officer 31, in this case Supreme Court held that company or corporation is not citizen of India and cannot, therefore claim such of the fundamental rights as have been conferred upon citizens. The citizenship conferred on a citizen as per the provisions of the Constitution is concerned only with natural persons and not juristic persons. In this case the State Trading Corporation was sought to be taxed in respect of sales affected by them in the course of their business operation. The corporation contended that its transaction related to inter-state sales and was therefore, exempted from taxation under Article 286(1).The impugned tax was therefore, an infringement of its fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, held that the State Trading Corporation was not a citizen and therefore could not claim the right under Article 19(1) (g). 2. In Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. V State of Bihar 32, the petition was filed by the company and some shareholders also joined it. They argued that though the company was not a citizen but its shareholders were citizens and if it was shown that all its shareholders were citizens the veil of corporate personality might be lifted to protect their

30 31

(1959-60) 5& 6 Aust.J. of Politics and History,246. AIR 1963 SC 184 32 AIR 1965 SC 40 15 | P a g e

fundamental rights. The court rejected this argument and held that If this plea is upheld, it would really mean that what the corporations and companies cannot achieve directly can be achieved by them indirectly by relying upon the doctrine of lifting the corporate veil. 3.In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v State of Bihar33, it was held that the mere fact that the President of India and certain officers of the Central Government, in their official capacity, held the entire share capital of the respondent company does not make the company as an agent either of the President or the Central Government. The company and its shareholders are distinct entity. 4. In Bank nationalization case34, the court held that A measure executive or legislative may impair the right of the company alone, and not of its shareholders: it may impair the rights of the shareholders and not of company, it may impair the right of the shareholders as well as of the company. Jurisdiction of court to grant relief cannot be denied when by state action, the rights of the individual shareholders are impaired, if that action impairs the rights of the company as well. The test in determining whether the shareholders right is impaired is not formal; it is essentially qualitative, if the state action impairs the right of the shareholders as well as of the company the court will not, only upon technical ground, deny itself jurisdiction to grant relief. A shareholder is entitled to the protection of Article 19 of the Constitution. The fundamental rights of the shareholders as citizens are not lost when they associate to form a company. When their fundamental rights as shareholders are impaired by state action their rights as shareholders are protected. The reason is that the shareholders rights are equally and necessarily affected, if the rights of the company are affected.

5. The above case of Bank nationalization was followed in by Supreme Court in Bennett Coleman & Co. V Union of India35. In that case, the question was whether the shareholder, the editor, the printer have right to freedom under Article 19 of the Constitution. Relying on the Bank Nationalization case the court held that the protection of Article was available to a shareholder, editor, printer and publisher of a newspaper. The court said the rights of shareholders with regard to Article 19 (1) (a) were protected and manifested by the

33 34

AIR 1970 SC 82 AIR 1970 SC 564 35 AIR 1973 SC 106

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newspapers owned and controlled by the shareholders through the medium of the corporation. The individual rights of speech and expression of editors, directors and shareholders are all exercised through their newspapers through which they speak. The press reaches the public through the newspapers. The shareholders speak through their editor. The locus standi of the shareholders is beyond challenge after the ruling of this Court in the Bank Nationalization case. 6. In Godhra Electric Co. Ltd. V State of Gujarat36, the court held that though a company was not a citizen under Article 19 but a shareholder, a managing director of a company had right to carry on business through agency of company and if that right was taken away or abridged he was not disabled from challenging the validity of the provisions of any Act, which affected his right. 7. D.C. & G.M. V Union of India 37, following the decisions of Bank Nationalization and Bennett Colemans case, the Supreme Court in this case held that writ petition filed by a company complaining denial of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19 is maintainable. In the matter of fundamental freedom guaranteed by Article 19, Desai, J held, the right of a shareholder and the company which the shareholders have formed are co-extensive and the denial to one of the fundamental freedom would be denial to the other. The judge pointed out that this is the modern trend and suggested that the controversy on the point should be put to an end by passing appropriate legislation.

2. THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY

Law treats a corporation aggregate and a corporation sole as persons. About the nature of their personality different theories have been advanced. These theories have either a political undertone in so far as they attempt to project the nature of relationship between the state and the groups existing within the state or provide a philosophical explanation about the existence of such persons created by law or try to meet the practical implications of
36 37

AIR 1975 SC 32 AIR 1983 SC 937

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the existence of such groups as legal persons. In 1819 Marshall C.J defined a corporation as an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.38The courts have not, however, consistently followed any particular theory in dealing with various problems relating to corporation and have, by and large, being guided by practical considerations. These theories are not a mere existence in intellectual acrobatism but lead to important legal and practical consequences.39Various theories of corporate personalities are discussed below.

A. THE FICTION THEORY

According to some jurists, a corporation has a fictitious personality. This fictitious personality is attributable to the necessity for forming an individual organization existing by itself and managing for its beneficiaries, that is to say, the members of it and its affairs. In Roman law, we know of the persona ficta. Savigny developed the concept of the persona ficta. He called fictitious persons by the term juridical persons. Juridical persons are those who exist only for juridical purposes. While in the case of a natural person, he is born with a personality which the law has merely to recognize, it is otherwise in the case of an artificial or juridical person whose personality is created by the law (there being no personality apart from this fictitious creation by the law).40 Michoud has raised several objections to the fiction theo ry. 41One of the arguments against the theory is that from the point of view of ownership, the fiction theory takes us nowhere. If a corporation aggregate be only an imaginary person which exists only in the eye s of the law, how can a non -existing (imaginary) person hold property? Next it has been argued that a corporation has rights. But rights can only be had by real persons; so a corporation must be real and not an imaginary person. Against these arguments it can be replied that property can be held and rights owned and exercised by a body of persons instead of by each member of such body, for it is that body which is recognized for the purposes of convenience and ownership of property and rights as a separate entity.42
38 39

Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat ,518 at p 636 Brown, The Personality of corporation and the state (1905) 2I L. 40 Sethna Jehangir M.J., on jurisprudence 3rd revised Ed.(1973) Page 593-595 rd 41 Michoud; La theorie se la Personalite Morale, 3 Ed. 1924 page 18 42 Supra note 38 Page No-13 18 | P a g e

Another argument against the fiction theory is that its upholders mistake the part played by the legislator. The legislator makes nothing by itself. He only considers social want, social good and social evil, and gives effect to what society generally considers as good or proper. It is idle, therefore, to suggest that the legislature creates the personality of the corporation. But here again it may be said that this argument of the realists is fallacious. The legislation of the corporations creates it, in recognition of the economic necessity and business convenience, resulting from such recognition. Even the public opinion demands and is in real need of such recognition which the legislature satisfies. Undoubtedly the legislator, like the judge, can create something new, and something worthy, or give effect to what is a commercial convenience or an economic facility.43

B. THE REALISTIC THEORY

According to another theory regarding personality of the corporation, a corporation has a real and not a fictitious, personality. Its reality is psychic. Gierke is a leading exponent of realist Theory which refutes the fiction theory. The realistic theory maintains that a corporation has a real psychic personality recognized, and not created, by the law. The realist theory is also known as the sociological theory of the group personality of the corporation. The upholders of the realist theory are found not only over the continent but also in England. They hold that the collective will is, in psychology, different from the individual. An individual, all by himself may come to a particular decision; but in association with others he may come to a totally different decision. The will of the many is different from the will of an individual. So a corporation has a real psychic will, and is, therefore, not a fictitious creature of the law but a psychic personality recognized by the law.

The realistic theory, however, is incapable of being applied to a corporation sole, because the theory of the collective psychic will does not come in the case of a corporation sole where there is a single natural person whose will does not stand supported by the will of any one else ( there being none else). Moreover, taking the case of an artificial person as a corporation sole, as for example, an universitates bonorum (like a public fund or estate), we may say that the question of the collective will cannot arise, because a public fund or estate has no collective will; there is the will of its administrator.
43

Gray, The Nature and sources of Law(2d Ed. 1921) 27

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The realist theory can have significance only in the case of a corporation aggregate. We may say that it is from the point of view of convenience and a continuing existence (despite demise and insolvency of its members), with a limited liability of its members and a separate liability of the incorporation, that the law has thought it fit to give corporations separate fictitious personality.44The realist theory asserts that group personality has the same features as a human personality.The groups have a real mind, a real will and a real power of action.45

C. THE CONCESSION THEORY

The concession theory of the personality of the corporation, which is akin to the fiction theory, but not identical with it, says that legal personality can follow from law alone. It is by grace or concession alone that the legal personality is granted, created or recognized. The grace of the state and its law prevails. This theory is, to an extent, correct; it is correct, in the sense only that all rights, whether human or corporate, flow from what the law gives, and where the law does not give anything, at least, its recognition is necessary to validate, maintain or perpetuate what already exists or is conferred by nature or what man has taken or created for himself. In all civilized societies, man can assume his rights, only through the force of the law at his help and to his recognition.46

D. THE BRACKET THEORY

The bracket theory of the personality of the corporation maintains that the members of a corporation have their rights and liabilities referred to the corporation itself, simply from the point of view of convenience. To determine, however, the real nature of the corporation and its state of affairs, the brackets have to be removed, for the names of the members of the corporation are kept in brackets. If and when the brackets are removed, one would be able to see what the corporation is, what its true nature is, and how its members are revealed through the removal of brackets. The great defect, however, in the reasoning of the upholders of this theory of corporate personality is that rights, duties and liabilities are
44

Ibid Page 594 F.W, Introduction to Gierkes Political Theories of the Middle Age; F. Hallis Corporate Personality, 1 Ed. 1913 page 137; 146 46 Diecy A.V,:Law of the constitution,(8th ed.) p.87.
45 Maitland st

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thought to be possessed by natural persons alone and not by corporations which are legal entities. The bracket theory is also known as Jherings theory, as Jhering was its exponent. It was developed in France by Vareilles-Sommieres.47 However, to understand the real nature of the corporation, we must remove the bracket to find out the actual position of the company.48

E. THE ORGANISM THEORY

The organism theory of the personality of the corporation is the one that expounds that the corporation, like an organism, has members (limbs), head and other organs. The individual also has a head, a body with limbs that satisfy inter-dependent functions. Corporations, such as the state, the university, the club, social and public utility organizations, have also limbs in them and wills of their own. A corporation, according to this theory, is a subject of legal rights and is liable to duties also. According to this theory, a subject of legal rights need not be a human being. Any being or body with a will of its own and a life of its own can have legal rights and can be subject to legal duties and liabilities. What is essential, according to this theory, is that such a being or body must have a will of its own.49 According to the organism theory of the personality of the corporation, corporations are social organisms, while human beings are physical organisms. Corporations are different from those who are their members, and their wills are also different from the wills of their individual members, for it is not what individual members decide at meetings of the corporations while passing resolutions; it is what the corporation as a body decides. The will of each individual member of the corporation gets submerged into the will of the corporation. Individual A may not at all be in accord with the resolution finally passed by the corporation; individual BS views may now stand much modified by the final resolution; individual members enter into discussions at their meetings, and finally what is decided may be much different from the original views entertained by the individual corporator. The final resolution is therefore the will of the corporation.

47 48

Ibid Soloman V Soloman Co. Ltd., (1897) AC 22 49 Barnes, Sociology and Political Theory (1924) 29-30 21 | P a g e

F. THE OWNERSHIP THEORY

Another theory of the personality of the corporation is the ownership theory. Developed by Brinz, Bekker, Demelius, and elaborated by Planiol, the ownership theory of the personality of the corporation asserts that legal rights can be had by human beings and not by corporations. According to this theory, the so-called juristic person that is the corporation is not a person at all. It is subject less property destined for a particular purpose, according to Planiol, subject less rights are legal monsters. He holds that fictitious personality is not an addition to the class of persons, but is only a matter of owning or possessing property in common. It is only a form of ownership. He adds collective ownership is, so to speak, hidden from our eyes by the existence of fictitious beings to which we ascribe, at least in a certain measure, the attributes of personality, which are reputed owners, creditors or debtors, which make contracts, and sustain legal proceedings like true persons. All the collective ownerships are attributed to fictitious persons, of which each is reputed the single owner of a mass of goods, and the collective ownership appears as itself an individual ownership; a conception as false as useless. Consequently instead of teaching that we have two kinds of ownership, it is taught that there are two kinds of persons.50 The ownership theory has some significance when it is used with reference to estates and funds which are corporations sole. But apart from this it does not hold good, in so far as it denies the existence of the corporate personality as such.

G. THE PURPOSE THEORY

According to this theory personality is only enjoyed by human beings, they alone can be the subjects of rights and duties. The so called juristic persons are not persona at all. Since they are distinct from their human substratum, if any, and since rights and duties can only vest in human beings, they are simply subject less properties designed for certain purposes. The main implication of this theory is that law protects certain purposes and the interest of individual beings. Th e property supposed to be owned by juristic persons does not belong to anything; but it does belong for a purpose and that is the essential fact

50

Cited by Dean Pound Roscoe in his Jurisprudence 1959 (By West Publishing Co) Vol. IV, p 255

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about it. All juristic or artificial persons are merely legal devices for protecting or giving effect to some real purpose, e.g., a trade union51 is the continuing fund concerned and the purposes for which it is established.

H. THE KELSENS THEORY

Another important theory worth noting is Kelsens Theory of corporate personality. According to Kelsen, personality is only a technical personification of a complex of norms, a focal point of imputation which gives unity to certain complexes of rights and duties. Kelsen shows that there is no significant difference between the legal personality of an individual and that of corporation, for in the case of both what is known as legal personality is nothing but a complex of norms, that is to say, what is constituted by the bundle of rights and duties and liabilities centering round, and the norms which rule the behavior of individuals are also the norms that determine the rights and duties of corporations. For organizing rights and duties, a convenient legal device is that of legal personality. The greatness of Kelsens theory lies in the concept of personality as a complex of norms, giving unity to certain complexes of rights and duties. The acceptance of Kelsens theory as a correct theory, like the acceptance of the Quasi -Realist or Quasi-Fiction Theory of personality of corporation, opens out a new avenue in favor of corporations being entitled to enjoy fundamental rights under the constitution where such rights are guaranteed. If there be no difference between the personality of a natural being and that of a non-natural being like the corporation, why should fundamental rights be denied to the corporation and why should it be said that corporations are not persons? Why should Acts, like the Citizenship Act in India, lay down that the term person does not include a corporation or any body of persons whether corporate or incorporate? Under the modern law, as it should be, relating to corporations, Kelsens theory should be a welcome theory, as it would enable the recognition of the corporation as a person as much as a natural person, and would entitle it to greater rights as also subject it to greater duties than at present.52

51 52

Bonser V Musicians Union, (1956) AC 104 See Legal Personality and Political Pluralism, L.C. Webb (ed.), 1958

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3. LIFTING THE VEIL OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY

As we know that after incorporation a company becomes a legal person separate and distinct from its members. It has a corporate personality of its own with rights, duties and liabilities separate from those of its individual members. Thus, a veil of incorporation exists between the company and its members and due to this a company is not identified with its members. In order to protect themselves from the liabilities of the company, its members often take the shelter of the corporate veil. Sometimes this corporate veil is used as a vehicle of fraud or evasion of tax etc. To prevent unjust and fraudulent acts, it becomes necessary to lift the veil of the corporation or disregard the corporate personality to look into the realities behind the legal faade and to hold the individual member of the company liable for its acts or liabilities.53 In State of U.P. V Renusagar Power Co.54, the court held that the concept of lifting the corporate veil is a changing concept. Its frontiers are unlimited. However, it depends primarily on the realities of the situation. In The Deputy Commissioner V Cherian Transport Corporation55, the court has held that the company is a legal person distinct from its members. It is capable of enjoying rights and being subject to duties which are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by its members. In certain exceptional cases the court is entitled to lift the veil of corporate entity and to pay regard to the economic realities behind the legal faade. The corporate veil has been lifted by the courts and legislatures both in the interests of justice, equity and good conscience. In Sugar India Ltd. V Chander Mohan Chadha 56, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it is not open to the company to ask for unveiling its own cloak and examine as to who are the directors and shareholders and who are in reality controlling the affairs of the company. The doctrine of the lifting the veil of corporate personality is a doctrine that advocates going behind and looking behind the juristic or corporate personality of a body
53 54

Rai Kailash on Company Law 10th Ed. 2006 Page 47 (1992) 74 Comp. Case 128 (SC) 55 (1992) 74 Comp. Case 563 (Mad) 56 AIR 2004 SC 4368 24 | P a g e

corporate. Undoubtedly, as a general rule, a company is a person distinct and separate from its members. But, in exceptional cases, that veil of corporate personality can be lifted; and looking behind the veil, one could see the corporate personality fading away. Law courts have, in exceptional cases, cracked the shell of corporate personality and have looked upon a corporation and its members from a different point of view. Courts have lifted the veil, with the objective of preventing fraud. In such cases the members of the corporation are considered as persons working for the corporation. In Tata Engineering & Loco-motive Co. Ltd. V State of Bihar 57, although the veil was not lifted, however the doctrine of lifting the veil of the corporation was considered at great length. The law is complicated by the facts that the courts do not always take account of the distinct personality of a company. It renders impossible to any consistent theory as to the nature of personality and emphasizes more strongly than anything else the need to proceed empirically in understanding the law. The courts do in some cases pierce (lift) the veil of legal personality in order to detect and redress frauds upon creditors; the evasion of obligations or statutes or to suppress tax evasion. In England, the problem was faced soon after War. The court may lift the veil of personality for a number of reasonsFirstly- it may be done to ascertain whether a company is to be treated as an Enemy Company in times of War. Thus during the First World War in Dalmer Co. Ltd. V Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. ( Great Britain) Ltd.58, a company which was registered in England and which should normally be treated as an English Company was nevertheless held by the House of Lords to be an enemy company becaus e, all its directors and its shareholders except one were Germans. This is, however, not a departure from the general rule that a company is distinct from its members, it only shows that its character whether friendly or enemy is to be ascertained by looking behind the veil. A different view has been expressed in case of Kuemgel V Donnersmarch 59, where it was held that a company which acquires enemy character in this way still remains An English Company, if it had been registered in England. Secondly, public policy may make it necessary to lift the veil of a legal personality to look at the realities of a situation.
57 58

1964, 1 S.C.J. 666 (1916), 2 AC 307 59 (1965) 1 All ER 46

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Thirdly, it may become necessary to disregard corporate personality in order to prevent fraud.

4 CONCLUSION
Some of the theories, when the proper modifications are made, approach very close to each other. Thus Halliss from of the realist theory is that the conception of corporate personality is neither nor less than a juristic realitywhich leaves aside awkward questions of psychology and philosophy. Wolff would modify the fiction theory; if all juristic persons are treated as if they wills of their own and are capable of acting it makes no material difference whether you say they are real animate being with wills of their own, and so on or whether you say some of them may be and some certainly are not, but the law treats them all as if they were. The English lawyer often flatters himself that abstract speculation has not played an undue part in the decision of cases, but the same claim has been made for continental law. As has already been suggested, any one theory will lead to absurd result if not wisely applied. The practical object which the realist theory seeks to achieve is to secure freedom for the group and a just recognition from its claims. But this may be more easily achieved by an appeal to social necessities than by buttering a theory with rather questionable philosophical arguments. The law is wise to treat corporation as far as possible as as if they were natural mean. But it can hardly be claimed that a legal personality should be automatically achieved as soon as a groups develop a certain stage of legal personality. It would be burdensome if the law had to investigate the real development of each group before it could be determine whether it possessed legal personality. It should be pointed out that the phrase, a realist approch, has two different meanings. Firstly, there is the theory of Gierke that the group has a real mind a real will;secoundly , the doctrine of realism that practical considerations and convenience, rather than any theory, determine the problems of practical problems. A realist approach in the second sense may call for refusal to apply Gierkes theory, say, to a one man company. It has been suggested that, while the first task of a jurist is to understand analytically the role played the notion of legal personality in the logic of the law, he cannot stop there. Because of the ambiguities of the word person and confusion inherent in the various theories of legal personality. The jurist must seek to ask the right questions and to distinguish between those which go to the formal logic of a legal system and those which go to the assimilation and evaluation of facts
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which the legal system seems to organize. The jurist cuts himself off from life itself from communication with other workers in the field if he limits himself to the first task. It is suggested therefore that he should seek to separate the questions which ask whether or not an entity has been recognized by the rules of a particular legal system as a legal person for the purposes of legal reasoning and, if so, just what kind of legal personality the rules of that legal system whose rules do not clearly answer the question and, if yes, then just what a kind of personality should be accorded to that entity within that legal system. Questions for the former kind are proper for courts to decide and are commonly undertaken by courts whereas questions of the latter kind are, within the traditions of common law courts, properly for legislatures. Courts, however, from time to time, must face such questions and they do so with an uneasiness which reveals their reluctance to trend within the legislative field.

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BIBILOGRAPHY

BOOKS Sinha, S. Prakash. Jurisprudence, Legal Philosophy, in a Nutshell. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing, 1993.

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