SPECIAL REPORT: Security and Africas First World Cup

May 18, 2010

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Security and Africa's First World Cup

Security is always a concern for organizers of the World Cup, and this years upcoming tournament in South Africa the first World Cup on the continent is no exception. Envisioning a range of threats from terrorism to petty crime, tournament organizers are trying to beef up security in nine cities that will serve as venues for the games. Less than a month before the tournament begins, STRATFOR thought it time to look at how real those threats are and how security preparations are shaping up. In June and July, South Africa will host the first World Cup tournament ever held in Africa. The first game of the tournament will be on June 11 in Johannesburg, where the finals are scheduled to be held July 11. The World Cup draw hordes of spectators, sponsors and dignitaries, including this year, perhaps, U.S. President Barack Obama, who has expressed an interest in attending should the U.S. team proceed to the finals. Security is always a concern for World Cup organizers, and this years tournament the largest sporting event ever hosted on African soil raises concerns about South Africas ability to provide a secure environment for the month-long event. While terrorism is high on the list of organizers concerns, the security issue that will aff ect the most people will likely be violent crime, which has grown endemic in South Africa over the past two decades. The South Africa World Cup Organizing Committee has designated nine cities to host the soccer matches: Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Bloemfontein (Mangaung in the local language), Pretoria (Tshwane), Rustenburg, Port Elizabeth, Polokwane and Nelspruit. Semi-final matches will be played in Cape Town and Durban, the third place match will be played in Port Elizabeth and the finals will be played in Johannesburg. In the run-up to the event, STRATFOR thought it appropriate to take a look at the security environment in South Africa, evaluate specific threats and offer guidance on how to avoid danger during the tournament.

Crime
Unlike terrorism, which tends to be driven by ideology, criminal activity is driven by opportunity and the desire for quick cash, and both of those factors will be in abundance during the World Cup. To mitigate against any conceivable security threat, an estimated 44,000 members of the South African Police Service (SAPS), the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) and private security personnel will be deployed at tournament venues, hotels where the teams will be staying and anywhere considered a possible launching point for criminal or terrorist acts (more on these deployments below in the section titled Security Preparations). Many national teams will also have their own security details. The U.S. team, for example, will be guarded by personnel from the State Departments Diplomatic Security Service (DSS).

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Foreign governments also have been heavily involved in assisting South African security officials with logistics and communications in preparation for the tournament and will remain involved until it ends. The DSS has extensive experience conducting security for large, high-profile events, and there has been extensive coordination with the German authorities to learn from their experiences hosting the last World Cup, which was held in 2006. These measures will certainly go a long way toward securing the stadiums, hotels and other World Cup venues, most of which are located in city centers. But efforts to secure World Cup activities could displace criminal attacks to more accessible targets outside this ring of security, to urban and rural areas where the police presence will be weaker. Property crime is widespread in South Africa and found in every city throughout the country. The countrys criminal elements tend to be organized and efficient, with gangs often conducting practice runs and extensive preoperational surveillance before hitting hardened targets such as armored cash transporters and ATMs (sometimes using explosives and automatic weapons). Organized-crime leaders are even known to specify high-demand products for theft, including certain models of cars and cell phones and other electronics. In the pursuit of cash or valuables, criminals are known to use extreme violence against anyone attempting to stop them. While such extreme measures would not likely be

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employed against unarmed civilians during the World Cup, firearms, knives and other weapons are plentiful in South Africa and are frequently used if a victim resists. Most crime in South Africa takes place in underdeveloped and poorly policed townships outside of the main city centers. However, criminals certainly do not limit themselves to townships, and in order to pursue wealthier targets they are known to attack in upscale neighborhoods and on downtown streets. In 2007, the wife of prominent businessman and senior African National Congress (ANC) politician Tokyo Sexwale was targeted in a carjacking in an upscale, well-policed Johannesburg neighborhood. Three hijackers in a vehicle cut off Judy Sexwales BMW in a parking lot, forced her from the car and sped off in it, all in about 10 seconds. The incident occurred at 11 a.m., with numerous bystanders looking on. Carjackers do not discriminate between white, black, foreigner or local; the trigger is the appearance of wealth mainly clothes, accoutrements and cars. Carjacking has become so rampant in South Africa that many South Africans do not stop at stop signs if they perceive any potential risk as they approach an intersection. Suggesting an even greater threat than that posed by local street gangs and criminals, STRATFOR sources say that criminals from Nigeria are planning to travel to South Africa and take advantage of the throngs of tourists attending World Cup events during the month-long tournament. Along with Chinese and Russians, Nigerians are leading organized-crime figures in South Africa, focusing on fraud and black-market activities. Driven by economic desperation, Zimbabweans also present a significant, though less sophisticated, criminal threat in South Africa. It is likely that migratory criminals from other African countries will also prey upon World Cup visitors, contributing to the prevailing threat. This criminal element will include everything from the relatively harmless hawkers of African curios who will be found outside every tournament venue and major hotel to organized gangs that will surveil unsuspecting tourists and rob them when the opportunities arise. Not all criminal activity in South Africa involves property crime. Among all the worlds countries, South Africa has the highest incidence of reported rapes per capita. While rapists do not specifically target foreigners, gangs often use the same level of speed and precision to identify and attack rape victims as they do in conducting carjackings. Rape is also employed to instill fear in victims, particularly white victims, during home invasions. Because of the high level of police protection in the city centers during the month-long World Cup, tourists should be relatively secure in these areas, but the risk of being targeted by opportunistic rapists and other criminals will increase in outlying areas. Finally, rape carries the associated risk of contracting HIV/AIDS, since South Africa has a high incidence of the disease (in 2008, approximately 11 percent of South Africans had been diagnosed with HIV/AIDS). When visiting South Africa during the World Cup, foreign travelers are advised to be mindful of their surroundings and maintain situational awareness at all times in public areas. Visitors should never expose valuables, including wallets, jewelry, cell phones and cash, any longer than necessary. And they should avoid traveling at night, especially into townships and areas of South African cities that are outside of the more secure and centralized soccer venues. Outlying areas will have scant police protection, since most of the countrys security apparatus will be focused on the World Cup. No matter where they are, foreign visitors are encouraged to travel in large groups (three or more people), since in South Africa, as elsewhere, there is generally more safety in numbers.

The Jihadist Threat

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Despite thinly veiled threats from regional jihadist groups, none of the major groups (either global or regional) possess the capability or the strategic intent to carry out a spectacular attack against a World Cup venue. The core al Qaeda group Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and their closest confidants has not demonstrated an ability to strike outside of South Asia for years. While the jihadist desire remains strong to strike at high-profile international targets, militant groups often come to the conclusion that striking local and regional targets where their capabilities are more established provides a better chance for success. Pulling off an attack in an entirely novel theater (where jihadists do not control the territory) against a lesser known target requires months of planning, training and coordination, along with substantial resources. The devolution of al Qaeda through military and covert operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan has severely hampered if not disabled al Qaeda prime, which is not likely capable of assembling and projecting sufficient force to South Africa this summer to affect the World Cup. Meanwhile, al Qaedas more capable and active regional nodes such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (to which a specific threat against the World Cup was attributed in April that ultimately proved hollow), the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and the Somalia-based jihadist group al Shabaab are focused on their own objectives back home. Of these groups, AQAP is the only one that has demonstrated the ability to strike outside of its region, since it was behind the Christmas Day attempt to bring down Northwest Airlines Flight 253. While the attempt was unsuccessful, its masterminds are believed to be still at large in Yemen. Still, the attempt did alert U.S. counterterrorism authorities to the threat posed by AQAP. The United States has deployed assets to Yemen to disrupt the groups capability to carry out further attacks, making it more difficult for AQAP to operate without U.S. authorities (who are working closely with South African officials in providing security for the World Cup) knowing about it. The other three primary al Qaeda franchise groups, AQIM, the ISI and al Shabaab, have demonstrated no ability to strike outside of their regions. AQIMs current st ruggle is primarily against the Algerian government, and groups target set is limited, for the most part, to Algerian military and police forces. AQIM also has claimed responsibility for minor attacks and abductions in Mauritania, Mali and Niger. While two members of the ISI have recently been arrested in Iraq on suspicions of plotting an attack during the World Cup, those reports have not been substantiated as a serious threat or even one that involved South Africa. The ISI also has not shown an interest in striking outside of its region and considering that it is currently fighting the U.S.-backed Iraqi government, now is not an opportune time for the group to stage an attack on another continent. South Africa is more than 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles) away from northern Africa and the Middle East, putting a substantial distance between these groups and the World Cup. Similarly, al Shabaab is consumed with a three-front war against the Western-backed transitional federal government (TFG) of Somalia, African Union forces and various Somali militias. The militant group is currently focused on toppling the TFG, not waging transnational jihad by attacking the World Cup. The primary advantage of attacking the tournament would be the publicity it would bring, but this is something al Shabaab does not necessarily want right now. The group is challenged enough as it is by forces on the ground supporting the TFG and does not need to provide another reason for regional and global security forces to intervene on the TFGs behalf.

Lone Wolves and Grassroots Jihadists

Threats from grassroots jihadists and lone wolves are much less predictable than threats from the al Qaeda core or its franchises. Whereas jihadist groups are bright blips on the radar of intelligence agencies around the world, lone wolves operate under the radar, often unbeknownst to any security or intelligence agency. They maintain anonymity by operating without the help of others and even without telling others, which means they are far more difficult to detect. They are also not limited to any geographical region. Grassroots terrorists, on the other hand, may work in groups, but these groups are small cells unaffiliated with known and monitored jihadist entities and are virtually invisible. In both cases, however, the lack of support networks typically limits their capability, and thus the

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damage they can cause. The low profile of lone wolves and grassroots jihadists generally means they lack experienced bombmakers, operatives and strategists, and their attacks typically come across as amateurish. Nevertheless, given the global attention to South Africa during the World Cup, it would not take a large attack to attract worldwide media coverage.

Other Terrorist Threats

While the actions of lone wolves and grassroots jihadists are difficult to predict and cannot be ruled out, there are no major political conflicts in South Africa at the moment that might induce a terrorist act. Nor is there any recent history of terrorism in South Africa. That, along with the general trend in grassroots attacks, suggests that any ideologically motivated terrorist attack in South Africa during the World Cup would likely if successful at all be small and unsophisticated. Of course, jihadists by no means have a monopoly on the tactic of terrorism. Any individual or group can attempt to affect political change through violence against the public. And the World Cup certainly offers an extremely public forum for a group or individual to air their grievances against the South African government, or any of the other 31 countries represented by the qualifying teams. Reasons for terror attacks can be as provocative as ethnic disputes, as mundane as personal financial problems or as unpredictable as mental illness. Although terrorism is not common in modern-day South Africa, there has been a trace of such activity in its recent history. During apartheid, the ANC the current ruling party was considered a terrorist group by the South African government because it was opposed to white rule and expressed its opposition through violence. On the far right, the white supremacist group Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) committed violent acts against black South Africans and staged protests against the government during the final days of apartheid. The AWB has not carried out violent attacks in decades, but its leader, Eugene Terre Blanche, was murdered by two black farmhands April 3. AWB leaders continue to leave violence as an option, at least rhetorically, but in more than 20 years they have shown no appetite for violent retaliation. While it is highly unlikely that the AWB would sanction an attack, underlying racial sentiments could still provoke a grassroots or lone-wolf attack (the consequences of which we have outlined above). As far as the AWB is concerned, the group is a known entity and would have a difficult time launching an attack without the authorities finding out about it during the planning process. There are other right-wing extremists in South Africa not affiliated with the AWB, and in April South African police arrested suspects and seized explosives from a residence in south Johannesburg linked to right-wing activities. The arrests served a positive purpose for the government in showing that blacks are not the only ones who commit violent acts in South Africa, and government officials were quick to say that Pretoria does not foresee a significant threat from right-wing groups during the World Cup. South Africa did spawn one militant Islamist group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), which detonated almost 200 improvised explosive devices between 1996 and 2000, largely targeting government buildings (such as police stations), gay night clubs and synagogues in the Cape Flats area west of Cape Town. Their largest attack occurred in 1998 against a Planet Hollywood restaurant (one person was killed and the restaurant was closed). PAGAD was not technically a jihadist group, since it did not want to overthrow the South African government. Its intent was to attack targets that it believed oppressed Muslim customs in the country. PAGADs leader and several members were sentenced to prison terms in 2002, and there has been very little activity by the group since. While PAGAD still has a small number of supporters in the Cape Flats area of Cape Town and still condones violence, there are no indications that it, or any other grassroots jihadist group in South Africa, is planning to carry out an attack during the World Cup.

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A recent incident in Angola during that countrys hosting of the African Cup of Nations soccer tournament raised questions about the possibility of a similar domestic terrorist threat in South Africa. In January, the Togo soccer team participating in the tournament in Angolas Cabinda province was attacked by members of the rebel group Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC). Armed with AK-47s, a small number of FLEC fighters, who are opposed to the Angolan governments presence in the oil-rich province, shot at the bus carrying the Togo soccer team as it was traveling to a game, injuring several team members and killing two. Angolas security environment is much less stable than that of South Africa, where no rebel groups on the order of FLEC operate. South Africa also does not have nearly the same level of volatility in its political conflicts as Angola, where disagreements can quickly become violent.

Security Preparations
For the duration of the World Cup tournament, the South African Police Service and the South African National Defense Force will deploy forces to the streets, air and sea to protect against threats to tournament venues. Most of the measures (such as naval patrols off the coast and overflights of fighter jets) are in light of the jihadist threat, which, while unlikely to materialize in an attack, is still seen as a looming worst-case scenario. Private security firms have been contracted by the tournament organizing committee to provide security around and inside the soccer stadiums. Participating teams and attending dignitaries (including visiting heads of state) will likely have security escorts that will include protective motorcades so as not to require closing off streets. Teams will have both primary and alternate travel routes, along with designated safe areas in the event of an incident and stationary protective teams at their hotels. Uniformed and plainclothes security officers will likely be stationed along travel routes between team accommodation sites and the playing venues. As a result of these precautions taken by the participating teams, along with the overall security umbrella provided by the South African government, the window of opportunity to attack a World Cup team will be very small. As a byproduct of these measures, potential attacks will likely be diverted to more accessible soft targets, which could be unsuspecting tourists or bystanders, especially in areas from which police have been pulled to beef up security at tournament venues. South African security agencies do have recent experience safeguarding large sporting events like the World Cup. In June 2009, South Africa hosted the Confederation Cup, an international soccer tournament that gathered eight teams in four different stadiums around the country for two weeks without incident. This time around, South African officials are making even more extensive preparations to secure tournament venues, and remaining concerns largely involve the execution of the security plan in the event of an incident. The federal police and military units to be deployed and the outline of this ye ars World Cup security umbrella include the following: South African air force (SAAF) Gripen fighter jets (currently South Africa has about six operational out of 12 delivered from an order of 26), which will enforce no-fly zones above World Cup venues. The aircraft will rotate to different air force bases depending on threat levels determined for each game. Other SAAF and army aircraft such as smaller Hawk fighter jets, transport planes and helicopters will be mobilized for other duties, including logistics. South African navy ships will be deployed, including patrol corvettes that will be stationed as command platforms in the harbors at Cape Town, Durban and Port Elizabeth to provide additional radar and anti-aircraft coverage. Naval submarines, minesweepers and other vessels will be deployed to provide supplemental coverage. Military and police explosive ordinance disposal teams, including sniffer dogs, will be present at all stadiums.

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The SAPS Special Task Force, the police forces specialized counterterrorism team, will be on standby for rapid response to any crisis situation in the country from its national base in Pretoria. Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams will be mobilized from city-based police force detachments. A national-level joint operations fusion center will be maintained in Pretoria, while each province hosting a World Cup venue will have a provincial-level command post. There are no designated demonstration areas for protesters, and no protests will be permitted at World Cup venues or fan parks adjacent to the venues. For access to VIP sections at the stadiums, there will likely be credential controls in place, including portable fingerprint scanners. Game attendees will be inspected by metal detectors and hand wands, and all vehicles arriving at the stadiums will be searched. While there are no official hotels for the visiting teams, there has been communication between World Cup security officials and management at the high-end hotels likely to accommodate teams and dignitaries. Uniformed and plainclothed police officers will be present at high-profile and popular venues such as Nelson Mandela Square in Johannesburg, the Victoria and Alfred (V&A) Waterfront in Cape Town and the Gateway in Durban, all of which are likely to receive large numbers of World Cup visitors.

Political Instability
The ANC is entrenched as the ruling party of the South African government. In the short term, the ANC does not face any threat to its political hegemony from a rival political party. Whatever instability the government does face stems from within its ruling alliance, which, along with the ANC, consists of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party. COSATUs approximately 2 million members are capable of mobilizing strikes and protests on a city and national basis, and are usually motivated by pay and cost-of-living concerns. Protests are not usually violent, but if any do occur during the World Cup, foreign visitors are advised to steer clear of them. Some COSATU members, notably the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa, have threatened to strike during the tournament, but the ANC government is almost certain to put intense pressure on all labor groups to help ensure a strike- and protest-free World Cup.

Miscellaneous Threats
Privately operated medical facilities in South Africa are well equipped for all levels of medical care, and foreign visitors should choose private over public (government-operated) health-care facilities in South Africa. Private medical services can also stabilize a patient and facilitate a medical evacuation to another country (such as the United Kingdom or the United States) should the need or preference arise. Should a catastrophic event occur in a South African city during the World Cup, both private and public medical services would be heavily taxed if not overloaded. Although provisions will be in place for such a contingency, a mass-casualty event would degrade the availability and quality of care on the scene, and conventional means of medical evacuation may not be immediately available. Indeed, South African health officials have publicly expressed their concerns about the medical systems state of readiness for the enormous influx of World Cup attendees (organizers estimate as many as 300,000), some of whom will need medical attention at some point during their stay. Even without a catastrophic event, South Africas transportation infrastructure will likely be stressed to capacity. There is a robust domestic private-airline sector, private nationwide bus network and many private car-rental companies, and these providers may be stretched to meet the needs of 300,000 foreign visitors.

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Hotels in South Africa that host World Cup teams will have extra security personnel assigned to them, though mainly to protect the teams. Hotels in South Africa are otherwise on their own as far as implementing security precautions, and travelers should not assume that hotels in which they find themselves have extensive security plans in place. South Africas airline industry maintains a level of securit y sufficient for direct flights operating to and from the country to be certified by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, and airport security will certainly be heightened during the tournament. The South African government also purchased body scanners following the attempted bombing by a Nigerian national of a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day in 2009. Despite these safeguards, however, South Africa has not implemented airport security standards as stringent as those used in the United States. That is not to say there is any intentional negligence, but there are weaknesses to be exploited in the system, should an attacker desire to do so. Finally, hooliganism, a security threat endemic to large soccer matches and to urnaments anywhere passions run high, will be present in South Africa. Hooliganism is the popular term for the phenomenon in which mobs of soccer fans engage in violent and destructive behavior, often under the influence of alcohol or drugs. However, South Africans themselves are not known for hooliganism, which tends to be more common in Europe. The fact that this years World Cup will be so far removed from Europe will reduce the risk of hooliganism considerably, and the large security force on hand will likely prevent any violent activity from getting very far out of hand. South African authorities are also working with European governments to blacklist identified hooligans and ban them from traveling to South Africa for the tournament. While crime will likely have the most visible affect on the World Cup games, South African authorities are preparing for the worst. Hosting an event like the World Cup is an extraordinary challenge for any country, especially one without a wealth of experience at it. In such cases, it is the unexpected and unintended that usually cause the most disruption. However, South Africa is not alone in preparing for the event. The International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA), Germany, the United States and other countries have provided financial and professional assistance. For the most part, events like the World Cup and the Olympics despite daunting challenges typically transpire rather smoothly, and South Africa is certainly hoping that it does not buck the trend.

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