THE LOGIC OF THE TRINITY Einar Duenger Bohn UiO, 2010

The logical problem of the Trinity has haunted Christianity since the beginning. Many solutions have been put forth, but arguably without much removal of overall incoherency.1 In what follows I present a new solution to it. As far as I can tell, it is a coherent one.

1. THE LOGICAL PROBLEM The logical problem is that according to Christian orthodoxy God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but the Father is neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit, nor is the Holy Spirit the Son. For example, according to the Athanasian Creed:
This is the Catholic faith: that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in unity, neither confusing the persons nor separating the substance; for one is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit; but the divinity of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is one, the glory equal, and the majesty coeternal. And in the Trinity there is nothing prior or posterior, nothing greater or less, but all three persons are coeternal and coequal. So in every way, as was said above, unity must be worshiped in Trinity and Trinity in unity.

For a survey plus references, see Tuggy (2009). For a good presentation and discussion of the logical

problem, see Cartwright (1987). For two fairly sophisticated, but in my mind ultimately incoherent philosophical (attempts at) solutions, see Geach (1967) and Swinburne (1994).

According to one interpretation, Christian orthodoxy thus asks us to believe in the following set of propositions: 1. God = the Father 2. God = the Son 3. God = the Holy Spirit 4. The Father ! the Son 5. The Father ! the Holy Spirit 6. The Holy Spirit ! the Son

But this set is inconsistent in the sense that it leads to paradox in virtue of the logic of identity. The standard logic of identity is given by the following two axioms: 7. For any x and y, if x = y, then x and y share all properties 8. For any x, x = x

From which the following two theorems are trivially provable: 9. For any x and y, if x = y, then y = x 10. For any x, y, and z, if x = y and y = z, then x = z

Which implies what we might call the Trinitarian Paradox: for example, by propositions 1 and 9 it immediately follows that 11. the Father = God

By propositions 11, 2, and 10 it immediately follows that

12. the Father = Son

The conjunction of propositions 12 and 4 is a direct contradiction. Q.E.D.

2. THE SOLUTION With no further restrictions on our concept of God, the paradox has of course the trivial polytheistic solution that there are in fact three gods, not one. But Christian orthodoxy is not only monotheistic, but postulates further propositions as well, the following five of which are the most pressing for present purposes: 13. There is one and only one God 14. The Holy Spirit comes from the Father and the Son 15. The Son comes from the Father 16. The Father comes from God 17. God is eternal and uncreated

Any solution to the Trinitarian Paradox must thus conform with 13-17 in order not to violate Christian orthodoxy. With proposition 13 in place, we have another paradox, which we might call the Paradox of the Cardinals: by 1-6 it follows that God is three in number, namely the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, each being distinct from each other. But by 13, God is one in number, not three. Hence, God is one in number and God is not one in number. Q.E.D.

I will for pedagogical reasons propose a solution to the Paradox of the Cardinals before I go on to propose a solution to the Trinitarian Paradox. Then at the end I will say how to understand 14-17 in accordance with our proposed solution. Consider some real pair of shoes. Referring to that pair of shoes, one might say with equal truth that it is one pair of shoes and that it is two shoes.2 In so doing one isnt referring to two distinct referents, or portions of reality, but rather to one and the same portion of reality divided up in two different ways. One such way is as two shoes, while the other is as one pair of shoes. The important point for our purposes isnt exactly how we manage to divide one and the same portion of reality in two (or more) different ways, but rather that we in fact do so all the time. And we obviously do. For example, we say things like: The team was awesome today! They played amazing. Whats happened in such cases is that on the one hand we have referred to one team, as a unit, while in the next breath referred to that very unit as many players, as a plurality. No one should claim that in such cases we must always switch referent from first be talking about some one thing to then be talking about some many things, which arent the same portion of reality as the one thing. That would be incredible. Rather, one should claim that what has happened is just that there is a switch between the way we thought of, or conceptualized one and the same portion of reality, not in what portion of reality we referred to. The implication is that number properties are relative properties. Having a certain number depends on how it has been divided up, or conceptualized to begin with. Conceptualizing something as two shoes it has the number two holding true of it, but conceptualizing the same portion of reality as a pair of shoes it has the number one holding true of it.

This example is echoing examples from Frege (1884:59) and Quine (1960:91).

Independently of being conceptualized it has no particular number holding true of it at all. Likewise with God: conceptualizing the portion of reality that is God as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, we have conceptualized it as being three in number, but it is nonetheless the same portion of reality as what we might conceptualize as God, and hence as being one in number. Numerical properties arent properties holding of it independently of how it is being conceptualized. This is of course not saying that one conceptualization cannot be better somehow than another. It is only saying that, better or worse, it is a conceptualization of one and the same portion of reality either way. This solves the Paradox of the Cardinals because it is not true that God is one in number and that God is not one in number, simpliciter. Rather, what is true is that God is one in number relative to one way of conceptualizing that portion of reality that He is, but not one in number relative to another way of conceptualizing it. We thus get the logical form: One(x,y) & not-One(x,z), which is not a contradiction. The trick to solve the Trinitarian Paradox is now to collapse 1-3 into the following proposition: 18. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit,

where God is a singular term and the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit is a plural term, both referring to one and the same portion of reality albeit conceptualized differently. The further trick is thus to read = collectively, not distributively. That is, God is identical

with neither the Father nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit, but rather God is identical with all of them taken together: the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit collectively.3 An ordinary example will make the point clear. Consider three things a, b, and c surrounding one thing x. It is then true that a,b,c taken together, or collectively surround x, but not true that a surrounds x and it is not true that b surrounds x and it is not true that c surrounds x. To solve the Trinitarian Paradox we must treat identity like that; hence the collective reading of proposition 18. Collapsing 1-3 into 18 is no violation of Christian orthodoxy. The orthodoxy is well enough expressed by saying that God is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which is exactly what 18 says. Orthodoxy need not be expressed as per 1-3 by saying that God is the Father; God is the Son; and God is the Holy Spirit. The only coherent way of understanding it is as saying that God is all three of them, not each one of them. They are all part of God, and God is the unity of all of them. Trinity in unity, and unity in trinity! Proposition 18 also rules out that God is something over and above the three. He is them, and they are Him! There is neither a second nor a fourth thing. My solution to the Trinitarian Paradox is thus that we should understand Christian orthodoxy as asking us to believe in the following set of propositions: 19. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit 20. The Father ! the Son 21. The Father ! the Holy Spirit 22. The Holy Spirit ! the Son

The distinction between a collective and a distributive reading of predicates is common in natural

languages as well as in standard plural logic. See e.g. McKay (2006).

Which is a consistent set of propositions as long as 19 is read collectively, not distributively. This set of propositions is also consistent in union with 13: God is one, not three. God is thus not divided in substance. Of course, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three, not one, but proposition 13 implies no denial of that fact. Orthodoxy recognizes that they are three through its acceptance of 4-6/20-22. It is when conceptualized as God that He is one, undivided in substance; as per 13. What about propositions 14-17? By 17, God is eternal and uncreated, but lets not forget His powers as well. He can of course at times divide Himself. So, though God is eternal and uncreated, He decides to divide into the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and He does so without becoming identical with each one of them, but rather with all of them; just as my body is not identical with each one of its limbs, but rather with all of them taken together.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Cartwright, R. (1987). Philosophical Essays. MIT Press. Frege, G. (1884). The Foundations of Arithmetic. As translated by J.L.Austin, Blackwell 1980. Geach, P.T. (1967). Identity. Review of Metaphysics 21, pp. 3-12. McKay, T. (2006). Plural Predication. Oxford.

Quine, W.O. (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press. Swinburne, R. (1994). The Christian God. Oxford. Tuggy, D. (2009). Trinity. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.