Napoleonic Wars, series of wars fought between France and a number of European nations from 1799 to 1815.

In 1799 France came under the domination of Napoleon onaparte, who later became Napoleon I, emperor of France, in 18!". #he Napoleonic $ars were a continuation of the wars of the French %e&olution '1789(1799), in which the *absburgs and other d+nastic rulers of Europe combined in an effort to o&erthrow the re&olutionar+ go&ernment of France and restore the rule of the French monarch+. First Coalition In the $ar of the First ,oalition '179-(1797), France fought against an alliance consisting of .ustria, /russia, 0reat ritain, 1pain, the Netherlands, and the 2ingdom of 1ardinia. In 1793 Napoleon was entrusted b+ the go&ernment of France, the 4irector+, with conducting militar+ operations against .ustrian forces in northern Ital+. In less than a +ear, Napoleon had led his troops to &ictor+ o&er the larger .ustrian arm+. In 1798, he was made the leader of an e5pedition to con6uer Eg+pt as a base for future attac7 against the ritish possession of India. #he in&asion was ultimatel+ unsuccessful, and Napoleon returned to France. .lthough the two campaigns too7 place before Napoleon8s go&ernment, the ,onsulate, was established, the+ are generall+ regarded as the opening phases of the Napoleonic $ars. #he campaigns were the first in which Napoleon displa+ed on a large scale his genius as a commander9 earl+ battles of the $ar of the 1econd ,oalition are also included in this categor+. Second Coalition Napoleon8s success against .ustria in his northern Italian campaign had put an end to the First ,oalition. 4uring his absence in Eg+pt, howe&er, a new alliance 7nown as the 1econd ,oalition was formed on 4ecember :", 1798. #he alliance was composed of %ussia, 0reat ritain, .ustria, the 7ingdom of Naples 'see 1icil+; History), /ortugal, and the <ttoman Empire. #he principal fighting of the $ar of the 1econd ,oalition, which bro7e out at the end of 1798, too7 place during the following +ear in northern Ital+ and in 1wit=erland. #he .ustrians and %ussians, under the leadership chiefl+ of the noted %ussian general ,ount .le7sandr 1u&oro&, were uniforml+ successful against the French in northern Ital+. #he+ defeated the French in the battles of >agnano '.pril 5, 1799), ,assano '.pril :7), the #rebbia '?une 17(19), and No&i '.ugust 15). #he coalition also captured >ilan9 put an end to the ,isalpine %epublic, which had been formed under French auspices in 17979 occupied #urin9 and in general depri&ed the French of their pre&ious &ictories in Ital+. In 1wit=erland, matters went better for the French. .fter a defeat at @Arich '?une "(7) b+ ,harles Bouis ?ohn, archdu7e of .ustria, French forces under 0eneral .ndrC >assCna defeated a %ussian arm+ under 0eneral .le5ander 2orsa7o& on 1eptember :3. #he &ictorious 1u&oro& led his forces from northern Ital+ across the .lps to Doin those of 2orsa7o& in 1wit=erland. *e found 2orsa7o&8s forces alread+ defeated and scattered9 1u&oro& was forced b+ the French to ta7e refuge in the mountains of the canton of 0risons, where, during the earl+ fall, his arm+ was practicall+ destro+ed b+ cold and star&ation. <n <ctober ::, alleging lac7 of cooperation b+ the .ustrians, the %ussians withdrew from the 1econd ,oalition. .fter Napoleon returned to France from Eg+pt in <ctober 1799, he became leader of the ,onsulate and offered to ma7e peace with the allies. #he ,oalition refused, and Napoleon planned a series of mo&es against .ustria, and &arious 0erman states in alliance with .ustria, for the spring of 18!!. Napoleon crossed the .lps into northern Ital+ with a newl+ raised arm+ of

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"!,!!! men and on ?une 1" defeated the .ustrians in the attle of >arengo. In the meantime French forces under 0eneral ?ean Eictor >oreau had crossed the %hine into southern 0erman+ and ta7en >unich. >oreau had also defeated the .ustrians under .rchdu7e ?ohn of .ustria in the attle of *ohenlinden in a&aria on 4ecember -, and had ad&anced to the cit+ of Bin=, .ustria. #hese and other French successes caused .ustria to capitulate. <n Februar+ 9, 18!1, b+ the #reat+ of BunC&ille, .ustria and its 0erman allies ceded the left ban7 of the %hine %i&er to France, recogni=ed the ata&ian, *el&etian, ,isalpine, and Bigurian republics, and made other concessions. #he #reat+ of BunC&ille also mar7ed the brea7up of the 1econd ,oalition. #he onl+ allied nation that continued fighting was 0reat ritain. ritish troops had unsuccessfull+ engaged the French on 4utch soil in 1799, but had made some territorial gains at the e5pense of France in .sia and elsewhere. <n >arch :7, 18!:, 0reat ritain made peace with France through the #reat+ of .miens. #his peace, howe&er, turned out to be a mere truce. In 18!- a dispute arose between the two nations because of the treat+ pro&ision that 0reat ritain return the island of >alta to its original possessors, the 2nights of 1aint ?ohn of ?erusalem. #he people of >alta preferred the ritish crown, and the ritish did not surrender the island, so war again bro7e out between 0reat ritain and France. .n important conse6uence of this war was Napoleon8s abandonment, because of the need to concentrate his resources in Europe, of his plan to establish a great French colonial empire in the region 7nown as Bouisiana in North .merica. Instead, he sold Bouisiana to the Fnited 1tates. In 18!5 0reat ritain was Doined in its new war b+ .ustria, %ussia, and 1weden, and 1pain allied itself to France. #he ensuing war is 7nown as the $ar of the #hird ,oalition. Third Coalition Napoleon 6uic7l+ mo&ed against the new alliance. 1ince 1798 he had e5erted pressure on 0reat ritain b+ 7eeping an arm+ concentrated at oulogne on the English ,hannel, ostensibl+ preparing to in&ade England. 4uring the dissensions leading to the outbrea7 of war in 18!-, Napoleon had greatl+ increased the French forces at oulogne. .fter the formation of the #hird ,oalition against France, he mo&ed his troops from oulogne to meet the .ustrians, who, under Ferdinand III, grand du7e of #uscan+, and 0eneral 2arl >ac7 &on Beiberich, had in&aded a&aria. . number of 0erman states, including a&aria, $Arttemberg, and aden, allied themsel&es with France. Napoleon defeated the .ustrians at Flm, ta7ing :-,!!! prisoners, and then marched his troops along the 4anube %i&er and captured Eienna. %ussian armies under 0eneral >i7hail Illariono&ich 2utu=o& and .le5ander I, emperor of %ussia, reinforced the .ustrians, but Napoleon crushed the combined .ustro(%ussian forces in the attle of .usterlit=, sometimes 7nown as the attle of the #hree Emperors. .ustria again capitulated, signing the #reat+ of /ressburg on 4ecember :3, 18!5. .mong the terms of this treat+ was the concession b+ .ustria to France of territor+ in northern Ital+ and to a&aria of territor+ in .ustria itself9 in addition, .ustria recogni=ed the duchies of $Arttemberg and aden as 7ingdoms. Confederation of the Rhine In Ital+, where French forces under >assCna had defeated the .ustrians under ,harles Bouis ?ohn, Napoleon made his elder brother, ?oseph onaparte, 7ing of Naples in 18!3. Elsewhere in Europe, he made his third brother, Bouis onaparte, 7ing of *olland 'the former ata&ian %epublic)9 and on ?ul+ 1: he established the ,onfederation of the %hine, which e&entuall+ consisted of all the states of 0erman+ e5cept .ustria, /russia, runswic7, and *essen. #he

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formation of the ,onfederation put an end to the *ol+ %oman Empire and brought most of 0erman+ under Napoleon8s control. *is continental successes, howe&er, were largel+ offset b+ the &ictor+ on <ctober :1, 18!5, off ,ape #rafalgar, of the ritish under .dmiral *oratio Nelson o&er the combined fleets of France and 1pain. #his &ictor+ ga&e 0reat ritain master+ of the sea throughout the remainder of the Napoleonic era. In 18!3 economic warfare between 0reat ritain and France was initiated. Napoleon formulated his so(called ,ontinental 1+stem, issuing decrees, in 18!3 and later, forbidding ritish trade with all European nations. 0reat ritain retaliated with the <rders of ,ouncil, which in effect prohibited neutrals from trading between the ports of an+ nations obe+ing Napoleon8s decrees. ritish master+ of the sea made it difficult for Napoleon to enforce the ,ontinental 1+stem and resulted e&entuall+ in the failure of his economic polic+ for Europe. Fourth Coalition efore the effect of ritish sea power could be manifest, howe&er, Napoleon increased his power o&er the ,ontinent. In 18!3 /russia, aroused b+ Napoleon8s growing strength in 0erman+, Doined in a Fourth ,oalition with 0reat ritain, %ussia, and 1weden. Napoleon badl+ defeated the /russians in the attle of ?ena on <ctober 1", 18!3, and captured erlin. *e then defeated the %ussians in the attle of Friedland and forced .le5ander I to ma7e peace. + the principal terms of the #reat+ of #ilsit, %ussia ga&e up its /olish possessions and became an all+ of France, and /russia was reduced to the status of a third(rate power, depri&ed of almost half its territor+ and crippled b+ hea&+ indemnit+ pa+ments and se&ere restrictions on the si=e of its standing arm+. #hrough militar+ action against 1weden on the part of %ussia and 4enmar7, 0usta& IE .dolph of 1weden was forced to abdicate in fa&or of his uncle, ,harles GIII, on the condition that the latter name as his heir 0eneral ?ean aptiste ?ules ernadotte, one of Napoleon8s marshals. ernadotte became 7ing in 1818, as ,harles GIE ?ohn, founding the present ro+al line. Anti-Napoleonic Nationalism In 18!8 Napoleon was master of all Europe e5cept %ussia and 0reat ritain, but from this time on his power began to decline. #he chief reasons for this decline were the rise of a nationalistic spirit in the &arious defeated nations of Europe and the persistent opposition of 0reat ritain, which, safe from in&asion because of its superior na&+, ne&er ceased to organi=e and subsidi=e new coalitions against Napoleon. In 1pain, Napoleon first encountered the nationalistic spirit that led to his downfall. In 18!8, after dethroning 2ing ,harles IE of 1pain, Napoleon made his brother ?oseph onaparte 7ing of the countr+. #he 1panish re&olted and dro&e ?oseph out of >adrid. . &iolent struggle 7nown as the /eninsular $ar '18!8(181") then too7 place between the French, intent on restoring ?oseph as 7ing, and the 1paniards, aided b+ ritish forces under .rthur $ellesle+, 1st du7e of $ellington. #he French were e&entuall+ defeated, suffering losses in manpower that se&erel+ handicapped Napoleon when he was later forced to meet new enemies in the east and north of Europe. #he first of these new enemies was .ustria, which, inflamed b+ patriotic feeling, entered the Fifth ,oalition, with 0reat ritain, in 18!9. Napoleon defeated the .ustrians at $agram '?ul+ 18!9), and inflicted on them the #reat+ of Eienna, b+ which .ustria lost 1al=burg, part of 0alicia, and a large part of its southern European territor+. *e also di&orced his first wife and married the daughter of Francis II of .ustria in the &ain hope of 7eeping .ustria out of further coalitions against him.

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Defeat of Napoleon #he turning point of Napoleon8s career came in 181:, when war again bro7e out between France and %ussia because of .le5ander8s refusal to enforce the ,ontinental 1+stem. $ith one large arm+ alread+ tied down b+ the H1panish ulcer,I Napoleon in&aded %ussia with an arm+ of 5!!,!!!. *e defeated the %ussians at orodino and too7 >oscow on 1eptember 1", 181:. #he %ussians burned the cit+, ma7ing it impossible for Napoleon8s troops to establish winter 6uarters there. #he French retreated across %ussia into 0erman+, suffering the loss of most of their men through cold, star&ation, and %ussian guerrilla attac7s. %ussia then Doined the Fifth ,oalition, which also included /russia, 0reat ritain, and 1weden. In 181-, in a burst of patriotic fer&or caused b+ the political and economic reforms that had ta7en place since its defeat at ?ena, /russia opened the $ar of Biberation against Napoleon. *e defeated the /russians at BAt=en and aut=en and achie&ed his last important &ictor+ at the attle of 4resden, where on .ugust :7, 181-, a French force of about 1!!,!!! defeated a combined .ustrian, /russian, and %ussian force of about 15!,!!!. #he following <ctober, howe&er, Napoleon was forced b+ the attle of Beip=ig to retreat across the %hine, thus freeing 0erman+. #he following +ear the %ussians, .ustrians, and /russians in&aded France from the north. In >arch 181" the+ too7 /aris, whereupon Napoleon abdicated and was sent into e5ile on the island of Elba in the >editerranean 1ea. #he members of the Fifth ,oalition assembled at the ,ongress of Eienna to restore in Europe the monarchies Napoleon had o&erthrown. 4uring their deliberations Napoleon escaped from Elba to France, 6uic7l+ raised an arm+, and marched into elgium to meet the forces of 0reat ritain, /russia, %ussia, and .ustria. *e defeated his enemies at Bign+, but was defeated b+ them at Juatre( ras. Napoleon met final defeat on ?une 18, 1815, at the attle of $aterloo, which mar7ed the end of the Napoleonic $ars. Conclusion Initiall+ the Napoleonic $ars perpetuated the ideological conflict between re&olutionar+ France and monarchical Europe. .t some point, howe&er, the elusi&e ambitions of Napoleon himself became their principal and consistent cause. #he wars, moreo&er, bore Napoleon8s personal stamp because he personall+ determined strateg+ and commanded the French armies. *is e&er(broadening diplomatic ambitions were matched b+ his militar+ strateg+, a bold st+le of ta7ing calculated ris7s. #his st+le in turn reflected the strength of the French arm+9 its tactics, organi=ation, e6uipment, and morale had all impro&ed during the French %e&olution, and it was led b+ talented field generals who had risen from the ran7s. Napoleon8s genius as a commander was his abilit+ to mo&e rapidl+, thus gaining an important element of surprise o&er his opponents. *is maDor failings were matters of attitude rather than techni6ue. In general he underestimated his enemies, perhaps because of his earl+ one(sided &ictories. In 1pain and %ussia he was further hampered b+ his insensiti&it+ to national spirit and b+ his belief that sei=ure of a capital cit+ such as >adrid or >oscow would lead his opponent to capitulate. >ost important in its impact on the nature and fre6uenc+ of these wars was Napoleon8s utter disregard for the cost of his campaigns in bloodshed and li&es.

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Russo-Turkish Wars, series of conflicts between the %ussian and <ttoman #ur7ish empires during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, in the course of which %ussia gained control of the northern shore of the lac7 1ea and e5tended its influence into the al7ans. #he first direct confrontation came in the war between 1377 and 1381, in which %ussia ac6uired control o&er the F7raine east of the 4nieper %i&er. ,=ar /eter the 0reat, who assumed power in 1389, soon resumed the struggle against the <ttomans, and in two campaigns in 1395 and 1393 he captured the fortress of .=o&. In 171!, /eter again went to war with #ur7e+ as a result of the latter8s support of 1weden during the 0reat Northern $ar '17!!( 17:1), but a %ussian campaign in >olda&ia ended in disaster, and the #ur7s reco&ered .=o& in the #reat+ of the /ruth '1711). %ussia fought another war against #ur7e+ between 17-3 and 17-9 in alliance with .ustria. In the #reat+ of elgrade '17-9), .=o& was ceded to %ussia along with a section of the lac7 1ea steppe between the 4onets and ug ri&ers, but the %ussians had to ra=e the fortifications at .=o& and were not permitted to ha&e an+ ships on the lac7 1ea. Russian Gains, 1 !"-1"1# %ussia made dramatic gains during the reign of ,atherine the 0reat. In the first war '1738( 177"), %ussian armies won maDor &ictories in >olda&ia, $alachia, and ,rimea, and a %ussian fleet sailed from the altic to the >editerranean, where it destro+ed the <ttoman fleet at ,hesme in ?une 177!. #he #reat+ of 2uchu7 2ainarDi '177") ga&e %ussia additional portions of the lac7 1ea steppe and the right to free na&igation on the lac7 1ea, and #ur7e+ guaranteed the rights of its ,hristian subDects. In 178- ,atherine anne5ed ,rimea. #ur7e+ declared war in 1787 but was again defeated and forced, in the #reat+ of ?ass+ '179:), to cede <cha7o& and the lac7 1ea coast between the ug and the 4niester. .nother war between 18!3 and 181: resulted in %ussian anne5ation of essarabi+a. $ith that, %ussia controlled the entire northern coast of the lac7 1ea between the /rut and 2ubanK ri&ers. The $nter%ention of the &uropean 'o(ers In the ensuing period, the %ussians sought political influence in the al7ans and control of the straits 'between the lac7 1ea and the >editerranean). #heir gains were limited, howe&er, b+ increasing opposition on the part of other European powers, notabl+ the countries of 0reat ritain and .ustria. #he crisis engendered b+ the 0ree7 struggle for independence ultimatel+ drew %ussia into war with #ur7e+ '18:8(18:9). .fter a slow start, %ussian forces crossed the al7an >ountains in 18:9, captured .drianople 'now Edirne), and were ad&ancing on ,onstantinople 'present(da+ Istanbul), when the #ur7s sued for peace. #he #reat+ of .drianople '18:9) granted %ussia territor+ at the mouth of the 4anube and in the ,aucasus and a &irtual protectorate o&er an autonomous >olda&ia and $alachia9 autonom+ for 0reece and to a lesser e5tent 1erbia was also guaranteed. #hree +ears later, a %ussian force occupied the 4ardanelles 1trait to protect the <ttoman sultan against the forces of >uhammad .li of Eg+pt. #he resulting #reat+ of Fn7iar(17elessi '18--) was an important step toward establishing a %ussian protectorate o&er the <ttoman Empire as a whole. #he European powers managed to substitute a general European guarantee in the 1traits ,on&ention of 18"1, but b+ 185: ,=ar Nicholas I felt strong enough to attempt a further e5tension of %ussian influence. *is miscalculation led to the ,rimean $ar '185-(1853), pitting %ussia against a coalition of ritain, France, 1ardinia, and #ur7e+ and resulting in a maDor setbac7 for %ussia8s e5pansion to the $est. + the #reat+ of

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/aris, it lost the mouth of the 4anube and its protectorate o&er >olda&ia and $alachia and was forbidden to maintain a na&+ on the lac7 1ea ',rimean $ar). In 187!, howe&er, %ussia unilaterall+ re&o7ed the demilitari=ation clause. The War of 1" -1" "

In 1875 and 1873 a general uprising of al7an peoples against the <ttoman #ur7ish empire aroused widespread s+mpath+ in %ussia. ,=ar .le5ander II at first resisted in&ol&ement, fearing unfa&orable European reaction, but he declared war on #ur7e+ in ?anuar+ 1877 after diplomatic efforts to end the crisis failed. #he campaign in the ,aucasus ad&anced smoothl+ and that in the al7ans pro&ed une5pectedl+ blood+ and difficult, but b+ ?anuar+ 1878 %ussian forces were ad&ancing on ,onstantinople. #he #reat+ of 1an 1tefano '1878) granted %ussia considerable territor+ in the ,aucasus, 4obruDa 'or 4obrogea), and the 4anube delta9 decreed the independence of %omania, 1erbia, and >ontenegro9 and established a large autonomous ulgarian principalit+. ritain and .ustria(*ungar+ were opposed to this e5pansion of %ussian influence, and a congress of the European powers meeting in erlin in ?une 1878 re&ised the 1an 1tefano agreement, primaril+ b+ reducing the ulgarian principalit+ and b+ limiting the %ussian role there. %ussia fought no more wars with #ur7e+ until 191", presumabl+ sensing that it was too wea7 to gain control of the straits in the face of European opposition. In $orld $ar I it won the appro&al of ritain and France for the ultimate anne5ation of ,onstantinople and the straits after the war, but militar+ defeat and re&olution rendered these hopes &ain.

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Warsa( 'act 'formall+ the $arsaw #reat+ of Friendship, ,ooperation, and >utual .ssistance), militar+ alliance of se&en European ,ommunist nations, enacted to counter the rearmament of $est 0erman+, officiall+ called the Federal %epublic of 0erman+ 'F%0), and its admission to the North .tlantic #reat+ <rgani=ation 'N.#<). #he treat+ was signed in $arsaw, /oland, on >a+ 1", 1955, b+ .lbania, ulgaria, ,=echoslo&a7ia 'now the ,=ech %epublic and 1lo&a7ia), East 0erman+ 'now part of the united Federal %epublic of 0erman+), *ungar+, /oland, %omania, and the Fnion of 1o&iet 1ocialist %epublics 'F11%). #he alliance was dominated b+ the F11%, which 7ept strict control o&er the other countries in the pact. In 1931 .lbania bro7e off diplomatic relations with the F11% because of ideological differences and in 1938 withdrew from the pact. From the mid(195!s through the 198!s, two maDor bodies carried out the functions of the $arsaw /act; the /olitical ,onsultati&e ,ommittee and the Fnified ,ommand of /act .rmed Forces, both head6uartered in >oscow. Fnder the terms of the treat+, the /olitical ,onsultati&e ,ommittee coordinated all acti&ities, e5cept those purel+ militar+, and the Fnified ,ommand of /act .rmed Forces had authorit+ o&er the troops assigned to it b+ member states. It was agreed that the supreme commander would be from the F11%. #he $arsaw /act8s onl+ militar+ action was directed against ,=echoslo&a7ia, a member state. 'In the autumn of 1953, the F11% too7 unilateral militar+ action against *ungar+, another $arsaw /act member state, 7illing thousands of *ungarians and causing :!!,!!! to flee the countr+.) In .ugust 1938, after the ,=ech go&ernment enacted reforms offensi&e to the F11%, forces of the F11%, /oland, *ungar+, East 0erman+, and ulgaria in&aded ,=echoslo&a7ia and forced a return to a 1o&iet( st+le s+stem. %omania opposed the in&asion and did not participate, but remained a member. .lthough the $arsaw /act was officiall+ renewed in 1985 for another :! +ears, the political transformation of Eastern Europe at the end of the 198!s profoundl+ wea7ened the organi=ation. #he F11% began withdrawing its troops from other $arsaw /act countries, and East 0erman+ pulled out to Doin $est 0erman+ as the reunified nation of 0erman+ in <ctober 199!. .ll Doint militar+ functions ceased at the end of >arch 1991, and in ?ul+ leaders of the remaining si5 member nations agreed to dissol&e the alliance.

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World War $, militar+ conflict, from 191" to 1918, that began as a local European war between .ustria(*ungar+ and 1erbia on ?ul+ :8, 191"9 was transformed into a general European struggle b+ declaration of war against %ussia on .ugust 1, 191"9 and e&entuall+ became a global war in&ol&ing -: nations. #went+(eight of these nations, 7nown as the .llies and the .ssociated /owers, and including 0reat ritain, France, %ussia, Ital+, and the Fnited 1tates, opposed the coalition 7nown as the ,entral /owers, consisting of 0erman+, .ustria(*ungar+, #ur7e+, and ulgaria. #he immediate cause of the war between .ustria(*ungar+ and 1erbia was the assassination on ?une :8, 191", at 1araDe&o in osnia 'then part of the .ustro( *ungarian Empire9 now in osnia and *er=ego&ina), of .rchdu7e Francis Ferdinand, heir( presumpti&e to the .ustrian and *ungarian thrones, b+ 0a&rilo /rincip, a 1erb nationalist. #he fundamental causes of the conflict, howe&er, were rooted deepl+ in the European histor+ of the pre&ious centur+, particularl+ in the political and economic policies that pre&ailed on the ,ontinent after 1871, the +ear that mar7ed the emergence of 0erman+ as a great world power. Causes of the War #he underl+ing causes of $orld $ar I were the spirit of intense nationalism that permeated Europe throughout the 19th and into the :!th centur+, the political and economic ri&alr+ among the nations, and the establishment and maintenance in Europe after 1871 of large armaments and of two hostile militar+ alliances. Nationalism #he French %e&olution and the Napoleonic era had spread throughout most of Europe the idea of political democrac+, with the resulting idea that people of the same ethnic origin, language, and political ideals had the right to independent states. #he principle of national self( determination, howe&er, was largel+ ignored b+ the d+nastic and reactionar+ forces that dominated in the settlement of European affairs at the ,ongress of Eienna in 1815. 1e&eral peoples who desired national autonom+ were made subDect to local d+nasts or to other nations. Notable e5amples were the 0erman people, whom the ,ongress of Eienna left di&ided into numerous duchies, principalities, and 7ingdoms9 Ital+, also left di&ided into man+ parts, some of which were under foreign control9 and the Flemish( and French(spea7ing elgians of the .ustrian Netherlands, whom the congress placed under 4utch rule. %e&olutions and strong nationalistic mo&ements during the 19th centur+ succeeded in nullif+ing much of the reactionar+ and antinationalist wor7 of the congress. elgium won its independence from the Netherlands in 18-!, the unification of Ital+ was accomplished in 1831, and that of 0erman+ in 1871. .t the close of the centur+, howe&er, the problem of nationalism was still unresol&ed in other areas of Europe, resulting in tensions both within the regions in&ol&ed and between &arious European nations. <ne particularl+ prominent nationalistic mo&ement, /ansla&ism, figured hea&il+ in the e&ents preceding the war. $mperialism #he spirit of nationalism was also manifest in economic conflict. #he Industrial %e&olution, which too7 place in 0reat ritain at the end of the 18th centur+, followed in France in the earl+ 19th centur+, and then in 0erman+ after 187!, caused an immense increase in the

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manufactures of each countr+ and a conse6uent need for foreign mar7ets. #he principal field for the European policies of economic e5pansion was .frica, and on that continent colonial interests fre6uentl+ clashed. 1e&eral times between 1898 and 191" the economic ri&alr+ in .frica between France and 0reat ritain, and between 0erman+ on one side and France and 0reat ritain on the other, almost precipitated a European war. )ilitar* &+pansion .s a result of such tensions, between 1871 and 191" the nations of Europe adopted domestic measures and foreign policies that in turn steadil+ increased the danger of war. ,on&inced that their interests were threatened, the+ maintained large standing armies, which the+ constantl+ replenished and augmented b+ peacetime conscription. .t the same time, the+ increased the si=e of their na&ies. #he na&al e5pansion was intensel+ competiti&e. 0reat ritain, influenced b+ the e5pansion of the 0erman na&+ begun in 19!! and b+ the e&ents of the %usso(?apanese $ar, de&eloped its fleet under the direction of .dmiral 1ir ?ohn Fisher. #he war between %ussia and ?apan had pro&ed the efficac+ of long(range na&al guns, and the ritish accordingl+ de&eloped the widel+ copied dreadnought battleship, notable for its hea&+ armament. 4e&elopments in other areas of militar+ technolog+ and organi=ation led to the dominance of general staffs with precisel+ formulated plans for mobili=ation and attac7, often in situations that could not be re&ersed once begun. 1tatesmen e&er+where reali=ed that the tremendous and e&er(growing e5penditures for armament would in time lead either to national ban7ruptc+ or to war, and the+ made se&eral efforts for worldwide disarmament, notabl+ at the *ague ,onferences of 1899 and 19!7. International ri&alr+ was, howe&er, too far ad&anced to permit an+ progress toward disarmament at these conferences. #he European nations not onl+ armed themsel&es for purposes of Hself(defense,I but also, in order not to find themsel&es standing alone if war did brea7 out, sought alliances with other powers. #he result was a phenomenon that in itself greatl+ increased the chances for generali=ed war; the grouping of the great European powers into two hostile militar+ alliances, the #riple .lliance of 0erman+, .ustria(*ungar+, and Ital+ and the #riple Entente of 0reat ritain, France, and %ussia. 1hifts within these alliances added to the building sense of crisis. Crises Foreshado(in, the War '19!5(1"). $ith Europe di&ided into two hostile camps, an+ disturbance of the e5isting political or militar+ situation in Europe, .frica, or elsewhere pro&o7ed an international incident. etween 19!5 and 191" se&eral international crises and two local wars occurred, all of which threatened to bring about a general European $ar. #he first crisis occurred o&er >orocco, where 0erman+ inter&ened in 19!5(!3 to support >oroccan independence against French encroachment. France threatened war against 0erman+, but the crisis was finall+ settled b+ an international conference at .lgeciras, 1pain, in 19!3. .nother crisis too7 place in the al7ans in 19!8 o&er the anne5ation b+ .ustria(*ungar+ of osnia and *er=ego&ina. ecause one form of /ansla&ism was a /an(1erbian or 0reater 1erbia mo&ement in 1erbia, which had as one of its obDects the ac6uisition b+ 1erbia of the southern part of osnia, the 1erbs threatened war against .ustria. $ar was a&oided onl+ because 1erbia could not fight without %ussian support, and %ussia at the time was unprepared for war. . third crisis, again in >orocco, occurred in 1911 when the 0erman go&ernment sent a warship to .gadir in protest against French efforts to secure supremac+ in >orocco. .fter threats of war on both sides, the matter was adDusted b+

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a conference at .gadir. #a7ing ad&antage of the preoccupation of the 0reat /owers with the >oroccan 6uestion, Ital+ declared war on #ur7e+ in 1911, hoping to anne5 the #ripoli region of northern .frica. ecause 0erman+8s polic+ of Drang nach Osten 'Hdri&e toward the EastI) obliged it to culti&ate friendship with #ur7e+, the Italian attac7 had the effect of wea7ening the triple alliance and encouraging its enemies. #he al7an $ars of 191:(1- resulted in an increased desire on the part of 1erbia to obtain the parts of .ustria(*ungar+ inhabited b+ 1la&ic peoples, strengthened .ustro(*ungarian suspicion of 1erbia, and left ulgaria and #ur7e+, both defeated in the wars, with a desire for re&enge. 0erman+, disappointed because #ur7e+ had been depri&ed of its European territor+ b+ the al7an $ars, increased the si=e of its arm+. France responded b+ increasing peacetime militar+ ser&ice from two to three +ears. Following the e5ample of these nations, all the others of Europe in 191- and 191" spent huge sums for militar+ preparedness. )ilitar* -perations <n a Europe thus hea&il+ armed and torn b+ national ri&alries, the assassination of the .ustrian archdu7e had a catastrophic effect. Diplomatic )o%es #he .ustro(*ungarian go&ernment, considering the assassination the wor7 of the 0reater 1erbian mo&ement, concluded that the mo&ement must be suppressed b+ a militar+ e5pedition into 1erbia. <therwise it might become powerful enough, particularl+ if aided b+ similar mo&ements elsewhere, to cause the disruption of the .ustro(*ungarian Empire. <n ?ul+ :.ustria(*ungar+ sent an ultimatum to 1erbia submitting ten specific demands, most of which had to do with the suppression, with .ustrian help, of anti(.ustrian propaganda in 1erbia. Frged b+ both 0reat ritain and %ussia, 1erbia on ?ul+ :5 accepted all but two of the demands, but .ustria declared the 1erbian repl+ to be unsatisfactor+. #he %ussians then attempted to persuade .ustria to modif+ the terms of the ultimatum, declaring that if .ustria marched on 1erbia, %ussia would mobili=e against .ustria. . proposal, on ?ul+ :3, b+ the ritish foreign minister, 1ir Edward 0re+, Eiscount 0re+ of Fallodon, that a conference of 0reat ritain, France, 0erman+, and Ital+ settle the .ustro(1erbian dispute, was reDected b+ 0erman+. Declarations of War <n ?ul+ :8 .ustria declared war against 1erbia, either because it felt %ussia would not actuall+ fight for 1erbia, or because it was prepared to ris7 a general European conflict in order to put an end to the 0reater 1erbia mo&ement. %ussia responded b+ partiall+ mobili=ing against .ustria. 0erman+ warned %ussia that continued mobili=ation would entail war with 0erman+, and it made .ustria agree to discuss with %ussia possible modification of the ultimatum to 1erbia. 0erman+ insisted, howe&er, that %ussia immediatel+ demobili=e. %ussia declined to do so, and on .ugust 1 0erman+ declared war on %ussia. #he French began to mobili=e on the same da+9 on .ugust : 0erman troops tra&ersed Bu5embourg and on .ugust - 0erman+ declared war on France. <n .ugust : the 0erman go&ernment informed the go&ernment of elgium of its intention to march on France through elgium in order, as it claimed, to forestall an attac7 on 0erman+ b+ French troops marching through elgium. #he elgian go&ernment refused to permit the passage of 0erman troops and called on the signatories of the #reat+ of 18-9, which guaranteed the neutralit+ of elgium in case of a conflict in which 0reat ritain, France, and 0erman+ were in&ol&ed, to obser&e their

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guarantee. 0reat ritain, one of the signatories, on .ugust " sent an ultimatum to 0erman+ demanding that elgian neutralit+ be respected9 when 0erman+ refused, ritain declared war on it the same da+. Ital+ remained neutral until >a+ :-, 1915, when, to satisf+ its claims against .ustria, it bro7e with the #riple .lliance and declared war on .ustria(*ungar+. In 1eptember 191" .llied unit+ was made stronger b+ the /act of Bondon, signed b+ France, 0reat ritain, and %ussia. .s the war progressed, other countries, including #ur7e+, ?apan, the F.1., and other nations of the western hemisphere, were drawn into the conflict. ?apan, which had made an alliance with 0reat ritain in 19!:, declared war on 0erman+ on .ugust :-, 191". #he Fnited 1tates declared war on 0erman+ on .pril 3, 1917. For dates on which all the nations in&ol&ed in the war either issued a declaration of war or bro7e diplomatic relations, see the table #he Nations In&ol&ed in $orld $ar I. For details of the causes and e&ents that brought the F.1. into the war, see Fnited 1tates of .merica; World War I. 1914-15: Entrenchment >ilitar+ operations began on three maDor European fronts; the western, or Franco( elgian9 the eastern, or %ussian9 and the southern, or 1erbian. In No&ember 191" #ur7e+ entered the war on the side of the ,entral /owers, and fighting also too7 place between #ur7e+ and 0reat ritain at the 4ardanelles and in #ur7ish(held >esopotamia. In late 1915 two more fronts had been established; the .ustro(Italian, after Ital+ Doined the .llies in >a+ 19159 and one on the 0ree7 border north of 1aloni7a '#hessalonL7i), after ulgaria Doined the ,entral /owers in <ctober 1915. The Western Front #he initial 0erman plan of the campaign was to defeat France 6uic7l+ in the west, while a small part of the 0erman arm+ and the entire .ustro(*ungarian arm+ held in chec7 an e5pected %ussian in&asion in the east. #he speed+ defeat of France was to be accomplished b+ a strategic plan 7nown as the 1chlieffen plan, which had been drawn up b+ ,ount .lfred &on 1chlieffen, 0erman chief of staff from 1891 to 19!7. #he 1chlieffen plan called for powerful 0erman forces to sweep through elgium, outflan7 the French b+ their rapid mo&ement, then wheel about, surround, and destro+ them. .s e5ecuted with certain modifications in the fall of 191", the plan at first seemed li7el+ to succeed. #he swift 0erman incursion into elgium at the beginning of .ugust routed the elgian arm+, which abandoned the strongholds of BiMge and Namur and too7 safet+ in the fortress of .ntwerp. #he 0ermans, rushing onward, then defeated the French at ,harleroi and the ritish E5peditionar+ Force of 9!,!!! men at >ons, causing the entire .llied line in elgium to retreat. .t the same time the 0ermans dro&e the French out of Borraine, which the+ had briefl+ in&aded, and bac7 from the borders of Bu5embourg. #he ritish and French hastil+ fell bac7 to the >arne %i&er, but three 0erman armies ad&anced steadil+ to the >arne, which the+ then crossed. #he fall of the French capital seemed so imminent that the French go&ernment mo&ed to ordeau5. .fter the 0ermans had crossed the >arne, howe&er, the French under 0eneral ?oseph ?ac6ues ,Csaire ?offre wheeled around /aris and attac7ed the First 0erman arm+, commanded b+ 0eneral .le5ander &on 2luc7, on the right of the three 0erman armies mo&ing on /aris.

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In the First attle of the >arne, which too7 place on 1eptember 3(9, the French halted the ad&ance of 2luc78s arm+, which had outdistanced the other two 0erman armies and could not obtain their support. In addition, the 0erman forces had been wea7ened on .ugust :5 when, belie&ing the &ictor+ had alread+ been won in the west, the 0erman chief of staff, 0eneral *elmuth &on >olt7e, dispatched si5 corps to the eastern front. #he French pressure on the 0erman right flan7 caused the retreat of 2luc78s arm+ and then a general retreat of all the 0erman forces to the .isne %i&er. #he French ad&anced and, in an endea&or to force the 0ermans from the .isne, engaged them in three battles; the attle of the .isne9 a battle on the 1omme %i&er9 and the First attle of .rras. #he 0ermans, howe&er, could not be dislodged, and e&en e5tended their line eastward to the >euse north of Eerdun. . race to the North 1ea ensued between the two belligerents, the obDecti&e being the channel ports. #he 0ermans were pre&ented from ad&ancing to the French channel ports chiefl+ b+ the flooding of the region of the Nser %i&er b+ the elgians. #he western part of the .llied line was held b+ the ritish who, in the race for the channel, had ad&anced to Ieper, the southwest corner of elgium. .fter ta7ing .ntwerp on <ctober 1!, the 0ermans endea&ored to brea7 through the ritish positions in elgium, but were chec7ed in a series of engagements 7nown collecti&el+ as the attle of Flanders. In 4ecember the .llies attac7ed along the entire front, from Nieuport in the west to Eerdun in the east, but failed to ma7e an+ appreciable gains. + the end of 191" both sides had established lines e5tending about 8!! 7m 'about 5!! mi) from 1wit=erland to the North 1ea and had entrenched9 these lines were destined to remain almost stationar+ for the ne5t three +ears. #he attle of Flanders mar7ed the conclusion of the war of mo&ement or fighting in the open on the western front. From the end of 191" until nearl+ the end of the war in 1918, the fighting consisted largel+ of trench warfare, in which each side laid siege to the other8s s+stem of trenches, consisting of numerous parallel lines of intercommunicating trenches protected b+ lines of barbed wire, and endea&ored from time to time to brea7 through the lines. In this t+pe of fighting during 1915 in the west, the .llies were on the offensi&e9 the 0ermans, who were engaged in a hea&+ offensi&e on the eastern front 'see below), made onl+ a single attac7 in the west during the +ear. #he principal attempts in 1915 to force a brea7through included a ritish attac7 at Neu&e ,hapelle in >arch, which too7 onl+ the 0erman ad&ance line. #he 0ermans unsuccessfull+ attac7ed Ieper in .pril, using clouds of chlorine gas, the first time in histor+ that gas was used in this manner on a large scale. . combined attac7 b+ the ritish and French along the front between Neu&e ,hapelle and .rras, in >a+ and ?une, ad&anced troops " 7m ':.5 mi) into the 0erman trench s+stem, but did not secure a brea7through. Fnsuccessful simultaneous attac7s were made in 1eptember b+ the ritish in the town of Bens and French at Eim+ %idge o&erloo7ing the town. . large(scale French attac7 in 1eptember on a front of about :5 7m 'about 15 mi) between %eims and the .rgonne Forest, too7 the 0ermans8 first line of trenches, but was stopped at the second. <n the whole the lines that had been established in the west at the close of 191" remained practicall+ unchanged during 1915. The &astern Front <n the eastern front, in accordance with the plans of the .llies, the %ussians assumed the offensi&e at the &er+ beginning of the war. In .ugust 191" two %ussian armies ad&anced into East /russia, and four %ussian armies in&aded the .ustrian pro&ince of 0alicia. In East /russia

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a series of %ussian &ictories against numericall+ inferior 0erman forces had made the e&acuation of that region b+ the 0ermans imminent, when a reinforced 0erman arm+ commanded b+ 0eneral /aul &on *indenburg decisi&el+ defeated the %ussians in the attle of #annenberg, fought on .ugust :3(-!, 191". #he four %ussian armies in&ading .ustria ad&anced steadil+ through 0alicia9 the+ too7 /r=em+l and u7o&ina, and b+ the end of >arch 1915 were in a position to mo&e into *ungar+. In .pril, howe&er, a combined 0erman and .ustrian arm+ dro&e the %ussians bac7 from the ,arpathians. In >a+ the .ustro(0erman armies began a great offensi&e in central /oland, and b+ 1eptember 1915 had dri&en the %ussians out of /oland, Bithuania, and ,ourland, and had also ta7en possession of all the frontier fortresses of %ussia. #o meet this offensi&e the %ussians withdrew their forces from 0alicia. #he %ussian lines, when the 0erman dri&e had ceased, la+ behind the 4&ina %i&er between %ga and 4&ins7 '4auga&pils), and then ran south to the 4niester %i&er. .lthough the ,entral /owers did not force a decision on the eastern front in 191"(15, the %ussians lost so man+ men and such large 6uantities of supplies that the+ were subse6uentl+ unable to pla+ an+ decisi&e role in the war. In addition to the attle of #annenberg, notable battles on this front during 191"(15 were the First attle of the >asurian Ba7es '1eptember 7(1", 191"), and the 1econd attle of the >asurian Ba7es 'Februar+ 7(:1, 1915), both 0erman &ictories. The War in Ser.ia <n the 1erbian front considerable acti&it+ too7 place in 191"(15. In 191" the .ustrians undertoo7 three in&asions of 1erbia, all of which were repulsed9 the 1erbs, howe&er, made no attempt to in&ade .ustria(*ungar+. #he front remained inacti&e until <ctober 1915. Earl+ that month, in anticipation of ulgarian entrance into the war on the side of the ,entral /owers, and in order to aid 1erbia, which would be the target of a ulgarian attac7, ritish and French troops were landed at 1aloni7a, the gatewa+ into the al7ans, b+ arrangement with the neutral 0ree7 go&ernment. .fter ulgaria declared war on 1erbia on <ctober 1", 1915, the .llied troops ad&anced into 1erbia. #he ulgarian troops defeated 1erbian forces in 1erbia and also the ritish and French troops that had come up from 1aloni7a. .lso in anticipation of the ulgarian declaration of war, on <ctober 3 a strong .ustro(0erman dri&e, commanded b+ 0eneral .ugust &on >ac7ensen, was launched from .ustria(*ungar+ into 1erbia. + the end of 1915 the ,entral /owers had con6uered all of 1erbia and eliminated the 1erbian arm+ as a fighting force. #he sur&i&ing 1erbian troops too7 refuge in >ontenegro, .lbania, and the 0ree7 island of ,orfu '2Cr7ira), which the French occupied in ?anuar+ 1913 in order to pro&ide a place of safet+ for the routed 1erbians. #he ritish and French troops in 1erbia retreated to 1aloni7a, which the+ fortified and where the+ were held in readiness for later action. The Turkish Front #ur7e+ entered the war on <ctober :9, 191", when #ur7ish warships cooperated with 0erman warships in a na&al bombardment of %ussian lac7 1ea ports9 %ussia formall+ declared war on #ur7e+ on No&ember :, and 0reat ritain and France followed suit on No&ember 5. In 4ecember the #ur7s began an in&asion of the %ussian ,aucasus region. #he in&asion was successful at its inception, but b+ .ugust 1915 the hold that #ur7ish forces had gained had been considerabl+ reduced. #ur7ish pressure in the area, howe&er, impelled the %ussian go&ernment earl+ in 1915 to demand a di&ersionar+ attac7 b+ 0reat ritain on #ur7e+. In response, ritish na&al forces under the command of 0eneral 1ir Ian *amilton bombarded the #ur7ish forts at the 4ardanelles in Februar+ 1915, and between .pril and .ugust, two landings of .llied troops too7 place on the 0allipoli /eninsula, one of ritish, .ustralian, and French

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troops in .pril, and one of se&eral additional ritish di&isions in .ugust. #he .llied purpose was to ta7e the 4ardanelles9 howe&er, strong resistance b+ #ur7ish troops and bad generalship on the part of the .llied command resulted in complete failure. #he .llied troops were withdrawn in 4ecember 1915 and ?anuar+ 1913 'see 0allipoli ,ampaign). In the >esopotamian Ealle+, meanwhile, ritish forces from India defeated the #ur7s in se&eral battles during 191"(15, particularl+ that of .l 2u ut9 but in the attle of ,tesiphon, No&ember 1915, the #ur7s chec7ed the ad&ance of the ritish toward aghd ad and forced them to retreat to .l 2uut. <n 4ecember 7 the #ur7s laid siege to this town. The $talian Front Ital+ declared war on .ustria(*ungar+ on >a+ :-, 1915. #he chief militar+ e&ents on the .ustro(Italian Front in 1915 were four indecisi&e battles between .ustro(*ungarian and Italian armies on the Ison=o %i&er '?une :9(?ul+ 7, ?ul+ 18(.ugust 1!, <ctober 18(No&ember -, and No&ember 1!(4ecember 1!). #he purpose of the Italian attac7 was to brea7 through the .ustrian lines and capture #rieste. 1916: Continued Stalemate 0erman success in 1915 in thrusting the %ussians bac7 from East /russia, 0alicia, and /oland enabled 0erman+ to transfer some 5!!,!!! men from the eastern to the western front for an attempt to force a decision in the west during 1913. /erdun and Somme #he 0erman plan, as wor7ed out b+ Erich &on Fal7enha+n, chief of the general staff of the 0erman arm+, was to attac7 the French fortress at Eerdun in great strength in an effort to wea7en the French irretrie&abl+ b+ causing the ma5imum possible number of casualties. #he .llied plan for 1913, as laid out b+ commanders in chief, >arshal ?offre of the French arm+ and 0eneral 1ir 4ouglas *aig of the ritish, was to attempt to brea7 through the 0erman lines in the west b+ a massi&e offensi&e during the summer in the region of the 1omme %i&er. #he 0ermans began the attac7 on Eerdun, on Februar+ :1 ' see Eerdun, attle of). .fter bitter fighting the 0ermans too7 Fort 4ouaumont 'Februar+ :5), Fort Eau5 '?une :), and the fortifications of #hiaumont '?une :-), but did not succeed in capturing Eerdun. 'It was here that 0eneral *enri /hilippe /Ctain gained prominence as the Hhero of Eerdun.I) ecause of the se&ere losses in the battle, the French were able to contribute to the .llied offensi&e on the 1omme onl+ 13 di&isions of the "! originall+ planned9 the offensi&e, which began on ?ul+ 1 and continued until the middle of No&ember, conse6uentl+ was largel+ in the hands of the ritish. #he+ succeeded in winning about -:5 s6 7m 'about 1:5 s6 mi) of territor+, but the dri&e did not bring about a brea7through. #he First attle of the 1omme mar7ed the earliest use of the modern tan7, deplo+ed b+ the ritish on 1eptember 15 in an attac7 near ,ourcelette. From <ctober to 4ecember the French staged a counterattac7 at Eerdun and succeeded in recapturing Forts 4ouaumont and Eau5 'No&ember :), restoring the situation that had pre&ailed before Februar+. In .ugust *indenburg replaced Fal7enha+n as 0erman chief of staff with 0eneral Erich Budendorff. In 4ecember 0eneral %obert 0eorges Ni&elle succeeded ?offre as commander in chief of the French armies in the north and northeast. Russian 0osses1Romanian Defeat

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<n the eastern front in 1913 the %ussians staged an offensi&e in the Ba7e Naroc= region about 95 7m 'about 3! mi) northeast of Eilna. #heir attac7, designed to force the 0ermans to mo&e troops from Eerdun to the Ba7e Naroc= region, was a complete failure. Not onl+ did it fail to di&ert the 0ermans in an+ degree from their attac7 on Eerdun, but also the %ussians lost more than 1!!,!!! men. In ?une the %ussians carried out a more successful offensi&e. In response to an Italian re6uest for action to relie&e the pressure of an .ustrian offensi&e in the #rentino 'see below), the %ussians mo&ed against the .ustrians on a front e5tending from /ins7 south to ,=ernowit=. + 1eptember, when strong 0erman reinforcements from the western front stopped the %ussian ad&ance, the %ussians had dri&en some 35 7m '"! mi) into the .ustro( 0erman position along the entire front and had ta7en about 5!!,!!! prisoners. #he+ did not succeed, howe&er, in capturing either of their obDecti&es, the cities of 2o&elK and Bemberg9 and their losses of appro5imatel+ 1 million men left the arm+ in a demorali=ed and discouraged state. #he %ussian dri&e had nonetheless gi&en sufficient e&idence of strength to pla+ a large part in inducing %omania to enter the war on the side of the .llies '.ugust :7, 1913). .fter its entrance into the war, %omania at once began an in&asion of the .ustro(*ungarian pro&ince of #rans+l&ania '.ugust(1eptember), but .ustro(0erman forces speedil+ dro&e the %omanians out of that region. In conDunction with ulgarian and #ur7ish troops, the .ustro(0erman forces in&aded %omania 'No&ember(4ecember). + the middle of ?anuar+ 1917 %omania had been completel+ con6uered, and the ,entral /owers had gained a &aluable source of wheat and oil. $tal* and the 2alkans <n the Italian front 1913 was mar7ed b+ another inconclusi&e battle on the Ison=o %i&er, the fifth of a series in that region, and b+ an .ustrian offensi&e in the #rentino designed to brea7 through the Italian lines and reach the rear of the Italian position on the Ison=o. #he .ustrians gained considerable territor+ in the #rentino, but lac7ed the strength to accomplish a brea7through, and an Italian counteroffensi&e '?une(?ul+) succeeded in regaining most of the captured terrain. From .ugust to No&ember four additional inconclusi&e battles too7 place on the Ison=o9 the principal gain on either side was the capture of 0ori=ia b+ the Italians on .ugust 9. In the al7ans during 1913 the .llied powers interfered in 0ree7 affairs on the grounds that the 0ree7 go&ernment under 2ing ,onstantine I was, in spite of its declared neutralit+, undul+ fa&oring the ,entral /owers. .llied inter&ention brought about the establishment '1eptember :9) of a pro&isional 0ree7 go&ernment under the statesman Eleutherios Eeni=elos, who had consistentl+ fa&ored the .llied cause. .t 1aloni7a the pro&isional go&ernment declared war on 0erman+ and ulgaria on No&ember -. #he go&ernment of 2ing ,onstantine was still in power in .thens and large parts of 0reece, and friction too7 place between that go&ernment and the .llies, who resorted to a na&al bloc7ade of 0reece and other action in order to enforce their demands that the 0ree7s cease aiding the ,entral /owers. <n 4ecember 19 0reat ritain officiall+ recogni=ed the pro&isional 0ree7 go&ernment. #wo periods of fighting too7 place in the al7ans during 1913. In .ugust a 1erbian arm+, brought to 1aloni7a after ha&ing been reconstituted at ,orfu, ad&anced together with %ussian and Italian troops against the ulgarians and 0ermans on the 1aloni7a front. .fter the+ had gained some initial successes, a strong counterattac7 thrust them bac7. eginning in earl+ <ctober .llied forces began a large(scale offensi&e in >acedonia. <n No&ember 19 the .llied

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troops captured >onastir, and b+ the middle of 4ecember had reached Ba7e <hrid, on the border of .lbania and >acedonia. The Turkish Dominions ,onsiderable militar+ acti&it+ too7 place in 1913 in three parts of the #ur7ish <ttoman Empire; >esopotamia, .rabia, and /alestine. In >esopotamia, the besieged town of 2ut(al(Imara fell to the #ur7s on .pril :9, 1913. In 4ecember of that +ear the ritish began a dri&e toward the town, which the+ recaptured two months later. In .rabia in ?une 1913 *usein ibn .li, grand sharif of >ecca, continued the traditional conflict between .rabs and #ur7s b+ leading, with his son .bdullah ibn *usein, a re&olt of .l iDa= 'the *eDa=, now in 1audi .rabia) against #ur7ish rule. *usein had the help of the ritish, who recogni=ed him as 7ing of .l iDa= in 4ecember 1913. .s a di&ersionar+ mo&e to aid the .rabian re&olt, the ritish in No&ember began an ad&ance from Eg+pt, which the+ had garrisoned since earl+ in the war, into the 1inai /eninsula and /alestine, and b+ the earl+ da+s of ?anuar+ 1917 had ta7en se&eral fortifications. Ne,otiation Attempts In 1913 /resident $oodrow $ilson of the F.1., at that time a neutral nation, attempted to bring about negotiations between the belligerent groups of powers that would in his own words bring Hpeace without &ictor+.I .s a result of his efforts, and particularl+ of the conferences held in Europe during the +ear b+ $ilson8s confidential ad&iser, ,olonel Edward >. *ouse, with leading European statesmen, some progress was at first apparentl+ made toward bringing an end to the war. In 4ecember the 0erman go&ernment informed the F.1. that the ,entral /owers were prepared to underta7e peace negotiations. $hen the F.1. informed the .llies, 0reat ritain reDected the 0erman ad&ances for two reasons; 0erman+ had not laid down an+ specific terms for peace9 and the militar+ situation at the time '%omania had Dust been con6uered b+ the ,entral /owers) was so fa&orable to the ,entral /owers that no acceptable terms could reasonabl+ be e5pected from them. $ilson continued his mediator+ efforts, calling on the belligerents to specif+ the terms on which the+ would ma7e peace. *e finall+ succeeded in eliciting concrete terms from each group, but the+ pro&ed irreconcilable. 1917: U.S. EntranceRussian Withdra al

$ilson still attempted to find some basis of agreement between the two belligerent groups until a change in 0erman war polic+ in ?anuar+ 1917 completel+ altered his point of &iew toward the war. In that month 0erman+ announced that, beginning on Februar+ 1, it would resort to unrestricted submarine warfare against the shipping of 0reat ritain and all shipping to 0reat ritain. 0erman militar+ and ci&il e5perts had calculated that such warfare would bring about the defeat of 0reat ritain in si5 months. ecause the F.1. had alread+ e5pressed its strong opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare, which, it claimed, &iolated its rights as a neutral, and had e&en threatened to brea7 relations with 0erman+ o&er the issue, $ilson dropped his peacema7ing efforts. <n Februar+ -, the F.1. bro7e diplomatic relations with 0erman+ and at $ilson8s re6uest a number of Batin .merican nations, including /eru, oli&ia, and ra=il, also did so. <n .pril 3 the Fnited 1tates declared war on 0erman+. Arras and $eper

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In 1917 the .llies made two large(scale attempts to brea7 the 0erman lines on the western front. #he first .llied attempt too7 place near .rras between .pril 9 and >a+ :1. $hile it was being planned b+ the ritish and the French high commands, the 0ermans withdrew from their original line along the .isne to a new position, pre&iousl+ prepared somewhat to the north, and 7nown as the *indenburg line, against which the .llies directed their attac7. #heir offensi&e included the #hird attle of .rras, in which ,anadian troops captured the hea&il+ fortified and stubbornl+ defended Eim+ %idge, and the ritish forces made an ad&ance of 3 7m '" mi)9 and a battle on the .isne, and one in the ,hampagne district, both of which resulted in a slight French gain at a cost in casualties so great as to cause a mutin+ among the troops. ecause of the failure of his rec7less attac7, 0eneral Ni&elle on >a+ 15 was replaced b+ 0eneral *enri /hilippe /Ctain9 the new commander8s polic+ was to remain on the defensi&e until F.1. troops arri&ed. #he second great .llied offensi&e too7 place in ?une, when the ritish under *aig made an attempt in Flanders to brea7 through the right wing of the 0erman position. . preliminar+ battle at >essines set the stage for the main attac7s '?ul+ -1(No&ember 1!) at Ieper. 4esperate fighting, in which each side suffered appro5imatel+ :5!,!!! casualties, did not result in a brea7through. 3se of Tanks <ther attac7s of .llied forces on the western front in 1917 included a battle at Eerdun, in which the French succeeded in regaining an additional section of the area the+ had lost the pre&ious +ear9 and 'No&ember :!(4ecember -) the attle of ,ambrai, during which the ritish opened the attac7 with a raid b+ nearl+ "!! tan7s. #his was the first tan7 raid on such a scale in militar+ histor+, and, but for lac7 of reser&es, the ritish might ha&e achie&ed a brea7through. .s it was, the ritish dro&e an 8(7m '5(mi) salient into the 0erman lines. 0erman counterattac7s, howe&er, compelled the ritish to +ield most of the newl+ won ground. .fter the F.1. entered the war in .pril 1917, it mo&ed rapidl+ to raise and transport o&erseas a strong militar+ force, 7nown as the .merican E5peditionar+ Force '.EF), under the command of 0eneral ?ohn ?. /ershing. + ?une 1917 more than 175,!!! .merican troops were training in France, and one di&ision was actuall+ in the lines of the .llied sector near elfort9 b+ No&ember 1918 the strength of the .EF was nearl+ : million. From the spring of 1918 F.1. troops pla+ed an important part in the fighting. Su.marine Warfare

In 1917 not onl+ did the F.1. enter the war, but also the 0ermans failed in their attempt to dri&e 0reat ritain to surrender through the destruction b+ submarine of the ritish and .llied shipping on which it depended for food and other supplies. .t the outset the 0erman submarine campaign seemed li7el+ to succeed. #oward the end of 1913 0erman submarines were destro+ing monthl+ about -!!,!!! tons of ritish and .llied shipping in the North .tlantic9 in .pril 1917 the figure was 875,!!! tons. ecause the 0ermans had calculated that the destruction of 3!!,!!! tons monthl+ for si5 consecuti&e months would be sufficient to force 0reat ritain to capitulate, the+ were doubl+ certain of &ictor+ after .pril. 0reat ritain, howe&er, roused itself to unprecedented efforts to fight the submarine menace. + the adoption of a s+stem of con&o+ing fleets of merchant &essels with warships, especiall+ destro+ers and

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submarine chasers, and b+ the use of h+droplanes for spotting submarines and depth bombs or charges for destro+ing them, 0reat ritain, as the summer ad&anced, rendered the 0erman submarine campaign less and less effecti&e. + the fall, although large numbers of .llied ships were still being sun7, the 0ermans were sustaining hea&+ losses in submarines. .t the same time the .llied nations, especiall+ the F.1., were rapidl+ building new shipping. + the outset of 1918 the .llies were turning out more new ships than the 0ermans were destro+ing, and the 0erman effort to end the war b+ submarine warfare had clearl+ failed. Russia Withdra(s <n the eastern front the dominating influence on the fighting during 1917 was the outbrea7 in >arch of the %ussian popular uprising against the imperial go&ernment, which resulted in turn in the establishment of a pro&isional go&ernment and the abdication, in >arch, of ,=ar Nicholas II. #he pro&isional go&ernment continued the prosecution of the war, in ?ul+, under 0eneral .le7se+ .le7ese+e&ich rusilo&, the %ussians staged a moderatel+ successful :(wee7 dri&e on the 0alician front, but then lost much of the territor+ the+ had gained. In 1eptember the 0ermans too7 %ga, defended b+ %ussian forces under 0eneral Ba&r 0eorgi+e&ich 2ornilo&, and in <ctober occupied the greater part of Bat&ia and a number of %ussian(held islands in the altic 1ea. #he olshe&i7 part+ sei=ed power b+ force on No&ember 7. . cardinal point of olshe&i7 polic+ was the withdrawal of %ussia from the war, and on No&ember :! the go&ernment that had Dust come into power offered the 0erman go&ernment an armistice. <n 4ecember 15 an armistice was signed between the %ussian and .ustro(0erman negotiators, and fighting ceased on the eastern front. $talian Set.acks #he .llies suffered disaster on the Italian front in 1917. 4uring the first eight months of the +ear, despite deficiencies in troop strength, artiller+, and ammunition, the Italian forces under 0eneral Buigi ,adorna continued efforts to brea7 through the .ustrian lines on the Ison=o %i&er and to attain #rieste. #he Italian dri&es of 1917, which resulted in the 1!th and 11th battles of the Ison=o, did not attain their obDecti&e. #he latter part of the +ear '<ctober(4ecember) was mar7ed b+ a determined .ustro(0erman offensi&e carried on b+ nine .ustrian and si5 newl+ arri&ed 0erman di&isions. .ttac7ing on the upper Ison=o near the town of ,aporetto, the+ succeeded in brea7ing the line of the Italians, who fell bac7 in confusion from the Ison=o to positions on the /ia&e %i&er. In the disastrous ,aporetto campaign the Italian forces lost -!!,!!! men as prisoners alone and, the morale of the arm+ bro7en, appro5imatel+ the same number as deserters. In No&ember ritish and French troops arri&ed to reinforce the Italians on the /ia&e, and a new Italian commander in chief, 0eneral .rmando 4La=, was appointed in place of 0eneral ,adorna. Greece &nters the War <n the al7an front in 1917, after the .llied troops had fought se&eral inconclusi&e engagements at >onastir, at Ba7e /resba, and on the Eardar '.5iOs) %i&er, the .llies initiated an effort to oust the 0ree7 7ing, ,onstantine, claiming that his pro(0erman s+mpathies and his aid to the ,entral /owers made it impossible for the .llies to conduct successful operations in the al7an region. In ?une the .llies began an in&asion of 0reece, and at the same time e5erted diplomatic pressure on ,onstantine to abdicate. *e did so on ?une 1:9 Eeni=elos

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became premier of the go&ernment formed under .le5ander, the son of ,onstantine9 and on ?une :7 the 0ree7 go&ernment declared war on all four ,entral /owers. The )iddle &ast In /alestine during 1917 the ritish made two unsuccessful attempts '>arch and .pril) to ta7e the cit+ of 0a=a. Fnder a new commander, 0eneral 'later Field >arshal) 1ir Edmund .llenb+, the ritish bro7e through the #ur7ish lines at eersheba 'No&ember), compelling the e&acuation of 0a=a9 and on 4ecember 9, .llenb+8s troops too7 ?erusalem. #he +ear also witnessed the beginning of the brilliant leadership of ritish ,olonel #. E. Bawrence, 7nown as Bawrence of .rabia, in the .rab re&olt against #ur7e+. .rab troops led b+ Bawrence too7 the #ur7ish(held port of .l P.6abah in ?ul+, and during the remainder of the +ear e5ecuted man+ fora+s against the #ur7ish(held .l iDa= 'the *eDa=) %ailwa+. #he +ear 1917 was also mar7ed b+ ritish successes in >esopotamia9 the+ too7 aghdad in >arch and b+ 1eptember had ad&anced to %amadi on the Euphrates %i&er and #i7rt on the #igris. 191!: "he #inal $ear #he earl+ part of 1918 did not loo7 propitious for the .llied nations. <n >arch - %ussia signed the #reat+ of rest(Bito&s7 'see rest(Bito&s7, #reat+ of), which put a formal end to the war between that nation and the ,entral /owers on terms more fa&orable to the latter9 and on >a+ 7 %omania made peace with the ,entral /owers, signing the #reat+ of ucharest, b+ the terms of which it ceded the 4obruDa region to ulgaria and the passes in the ,arpathian >ountains to .ustria(*ungar+, and ga&e 0erman+ a long(term lease on the %omanian oil wells. 2ul,aria and Austria-4un,ar* Withdra( <n the al7an front, howe&er, the result of the fighting of 1918 was disastrous to the ,entral /owers. In 1eptember a force of about 7!!,!!! .llied troops, consisting of French, ritish, 0ree7s, 1erbs, and Italians, began a large(scale offensi&e against the 0erman, .ustrian, and ulgarian troops in 1erbia. #he .llied offensi&e was so successful that b+ the end of the month the ulgarians were thoroughl+ beaten and concluded an armistice with the .llies. #he 0erman success in %omania was nullified in No&ember when, with the support of .llied troops who had ad&anced into %omania after the ulgarian capitulation, %omania reentered the war on the .llied side. .fter the conclusion of the ulgarian armistice, the 1erbian part of the .llied arm+ continued to ad&ance, occup+ing elgrade on No&ember 1, while the Italian arm+ in&aded and occupied .lbania. <n the Italian(.ustro(*ungarian front, the .ustrians, in ?une, attac7ed on the /ia&e and succeeded in crossing the ri&er, onl+ to be dri&en bac7 with the loss of about 1!!,!!! men. In <ctober(No&ember the .llies definitel+ gained the &ictor+ in Ital+, routing the .ustrians in an offensi&e that culminated in the attle of Eittorio Eeneto '<ctober :"(No&ember "). #he .llies completel+ shattered the .ustrian arm+ in this campaign9 the+ too7 se&eral hundred thousand prisoners and the remainder of the .ustrian arm+ fled into .ustria. <n No&ember - the Italians at last too7 #rieste, and on No&ember 5 the+ occupied Fiume. #he shoc7 of the defeat precipitated re&olutionar+ e&ents in .ustria(*ungar+. #he ,=echs and the 1lo&a7s had alread+ set up a separate state9 in <ctober the 1outh 1la&s proclaimed their independence, and in 4ecember set up an independent 7ingdom, later part of Nugosla&ia. In No&ember the *ungarians established an independent go&ernment. #he .ustro(*ungarian go&ernment at

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Eienna concluded an armistice with the .llies on No&ember - and nine da+s later the last *absburg emperor, ,harles I, abdicated9 on the following da+ the .ustrian %epublic was proclaimed. Turke* Withdra(s 4uring 1918 the .llies also brought the campaigning in /alestine to a successful conclusion. In 1eptember the ritish forces bro7e through the #ur7ish lines at >egiddo and routed the #ur7ish arm+ and the 0erman corps that was assisting it9 after being Doined b+ .rab forces under Bawrence, the ritish too7 Bebanon and 1+ria. In <ctober the+ captured 4amascus, alab '.leppo), and other 7e+ points, while French na&al forces occupied eirut, and the #ur7ish go&ernment as7ed for an armistice. .n armistice was concluded on <ctober -!, and b+ its terms the #ur7s were obliged to demobili=e, brea7 relations with the ,entral /owers, and permit .llied warships to pass through the 4ardanelles. 0ast German &fforts 4espite the 0erman &ictories o&er %ussia and %omania in 1917, at the outset of 1918 the .llies, principall+ through their spo7esperson $oodrow $ilson, formulated war aims drasticall+ opposed to those alread+ stated b+ the ,entral /owers9 $ilson8s peace polic+ was enunciated in an address to the F.1. ,ongress and comprised 1" points designed to bring about a Dust peace, which were of considerable influence in inducing the ,entral /owers to cease hostilities later in the +ear. .t the beginning of 1918 the 0ermans, reali=ing that &ictor+ b+ means of submarine warfare was impossible, and that the+ must force a decision on the western front before .merican troops might ta7e up positions there in force, planned for the spring of the +ear an all(out effort to brea7 through the .llied lines and reach /aris. #he opening dri&e of their powerful offensi&e, which began on >arch :1, was directed at the ritish front south of .rras. #he dri&e hurled the ritish lines bac7 35 7m '"! mi) before it was halted, on .pril 5, principall+ b+ hastil+ summoned French reser&es. #he fear of a 0erman brea7through aroused among the .llies b+ the 0erman success in the first wee7 of the offensi&e caused the .llies to appoint 0eneral 'later >arshal) Ferdinand Foch in charge of assuring coordination of .llied operations9 in the following month he was made commander in chief of the .llied armiesQFrench, elgian, ritish, and .mericanQin France. 4uring .pril a second 0erman thrust too7 >essines %idge and .rmentiMres from the ritish, and in ?une a powerful 0erman surprise attac7 against the French on the .isne dro&e a salient 35 7m '"! mi) deep into the French position and enabled the 0ermans to reach a point of the >arne onl+ 3! 7m '-7 mi) from /aris. 4uring this battle .merican troops first went into action in force9 together with French troops, the F.1. 1econd 4i&ision halted '?une ") the 0erman ad&ance at ,hRteau(#hierr+. #he 0ermans made additional gains of terrain in ?une, but b+ the middle of ?ul+ the force of their offensi&e had largel+ been spent. In the 1econd attle of the >arne, the+ succeeded in crossing the ri&er, but once the+ were across their progress was halted b+ French and .merican troops. 1ensing that the 0erman dri&e had lost its power, 0eneral Foch on ?ul+ 18 ordered a counterattac7. #he attac7 dro&e the 0ermans bac7 o&er the >arne, and the .llies too7 the initiati&e on the western front that the+ retained to the end of the war. &nd of the War in &urope eginning with a ritish dri&e '.ugust 8(11) into the 0erman lines around .miens, the .llies began the offensi&e that three months later resulted in 0erman capitulation. 4uring the last

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wee7 of .ugust and the first three da+s of 1eptember, ritish and French forces won the 1econd attle of the 1omme and the Fifth attle of .rras, and dro&e the 0ermans bac7 to the *indenburg line. . particularl+ strong 0erman salient at 1aint(>ihiel was then reduced b+ .merican troops '1eptember 1:(1-), who too7 more than 1",!!! prisoners. In <ctober and earl+ No&ember the ritish mo&ed toward ,ambrai and the .mericans ad&anced partl+ through the .rgonne Forest. #he latter thrust bro7e the 0erman lines between >et= and 1edan. .s a result of these offensi&es, Budendorff re6uested his go&ernment to see7 an armistice with the .llies. #he 0erman go&ernment initiated armistice tal7s '<ctober) with the .llies, but the+ failed when /resident $ilson insisted on negotiating onl+ with democratic go&ernments. #he ritish ad&ance meanwhile made rapid progress in northern France and along the elgian coast, and on No&ember 1!, F.1. and French troops reached 1edan. + the beginning of No&ember the *indenburg line had been completel+ bro7en, and 0ermans were in rapid retreat on the entire western front. #he defeat of the 0erman arm+ had domestic political repercussions that were catastrophic to the established 0erman go&ernment. #he 0erman fleet mutinied9 an uprising dethroned the 7ing of a&aria9 and in No&ember Emperor $illiam II abdicated and fled to the Netherlands. #he 0erman republic was proclaimed on No&ember 9. .n armistice commission had alread+ been dispatched to negotiate with the .llies. .t 5 .> on No&ember 11, an armistice was signed at ,ompiMgne between 0erman+ and the .llies on terms laid down b+ the .llies9 at 11 the same morning hostilities ended on the western front. Colonial War%are #he forces in the 0erman colonies of .frica and the /acific, with the chief e5ception of those in 0erman East .frica in late 1917 and 1918, generall+ fought on the defensi&e. #he+ were in some cases swiftl+ o&ercome, and in others graduall+, but b+ the end of the war in 1918 practicall+ all had capitulated to the .llies. Africa In 191" the 0erman colonies in .frica consisted of #ogoland, the ,ameroons '0erman. 2amerun), 0erman 1outhwest .frica, and 0erman East .frica. .n .nglo(French force too7 possession of #ogoland in .ugust 191". In 1eptember of that +ear a ritish force in&aded the ,ameroons from Nigeria, and a French force in&aded from French E6uatorial .frica to the east and south of the ,ameroons. .fter man+ campaigns in which the 0ermans se&eral times defeated the .llied Forces, 0erman resistance was finall+ o&ercome in Februar+ 1913. 0erman 1outhwest .frica was con6uered, between 1eptember 191" and ?ul+ 1915, b+ troops from the Fnion of 1outh .frica. #he most important of the 0erman possessions, 0erman East .frica, displa+ed the strongest resistance to the attac7s of the .llies. Earl+ assaults b+ ritish and Indian troops 'No&ember 191") were repulsed b+ the 0ermans under 0eneral /aul &on Bettow( Eorbec7. In No&ember 1915, ritish na&al units gained control of Ba7e #angan+i7a, and the following +ear the .llied forces ' ritish, 1outh .fricans, and /ortuguese) intended for the in&asion of 0erman East .frica were placed under the command of 0eneral ?an ,hristiaan 1muts. In 1913 the .llies captured the principal towns of 0erman East .frica, including #anga, agamo+o, 4ar es 1alaam, and #abora, and Bettow(Eorbec78s troops then retreated into the southeast section of the colon+. Bate in 1917, howe&er, the 0erman forces too7 the offensi&e, in&ading /ortuguese East .frica9 and in No&ember 1918 the+ began an in&asion of %hodesia. $hen the armistice was signed in Europe in 1918, the troops in 0erman East .frica were still fighting, e&en though most of the colon+ was in the hands of the .llies. Bettow(Eorbec7 surrendered three da+s after the European armistice was declared.

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The 'acific In the /acific a force from New @ealand captured the 0erman(held portions of 1amoa in .ugust 191" and in 1eptember, .ustralian forces occupied 0erman possessions in the ismarc7 .rchipelago and New 0uinea. ?apanese forces too7 the fortress of Jingdao '#singtao), a 0erman(held port in 1handong '1han(tung) /ro&ince, ,hina, in No&ember 191", and between .ugust and No&ember of that +ear too7 possession of the 0erman(held >arshall Islands, the >ariana Islands, the /alau group of islands, and the ,arolines. .fter the war ended, ?apan retained Jingdao until 19::, and recei&ed a mandate o&er the >arshall Islands, man+ of the >arianas 'including 1aipan), and o&er the /alau group and the ,arolines. "he War at Sea .t the outset of war the main ritish fleet, the 0rand Fleet, consisted of :! dreadnoughts and numerous other ships, including battle cruisers, cruisers, and destro+ers9 and 0rand Fleet was based principall+ on 1capa Flow, in the <r7ne+ Islands north of 1cotland. . second ritish fleet, consisting of older ships, was used to guard the English ,hannel. #he 0erman fleet, the *igh 1eas Fleet, consisting of 1- dreadnoughts, was based on the North 1ea ports of 0erman+. &arl* -perations

4uring 191" no maDor na&al engagements between the belligerents too7 place in the .tlantic. #he ritish raided the 0erman na&al base at *elgoland ight, an island off 0erman+ in the North 1ea, sin7ing three 0erman ships. 0erman submarines sun7 se&eral ritish na&al units, including the superdreadnought Audacious '<ctober :7)9 and a daring attempt b+ 0erman submarines to raid 1capa Flow caused the ritish na&al units stationed there to withdraw to bases on the west coast of 1cotland. In the 1outh /acific a s6uadron of 0erman cruisers under the command of .dmiral >a5imilian &on 1pee did considerable damage to installations at the French island of #ahiti and the ritish( held Fanning Island '1eptember and <ctober 191")9 defeated a ritish s6uadron off the headland of ,oronel, ,hile 'No&ember 1)9 and on 4ecember 8 was defeated with the loss of four out of its fi&e ships in the attle of Fal7land Islands b+ a ritish s6uadron under .dmiral 1ir Frederic7 1turdee. 4uring 191" and the earl+ part of 1915 0erman cruisers did considerable damage to ritish shipping in the Indian <cean and elsewhere until captured or otherwise put out of commission. #he +ear 1915 was notable for the submarine bloc7ade 0erman+ instituted around 0reat ritain. #he sin7ing b+ 0erman submarine action of the ritish passenger liner Lusitania on >a+ 7 caused the loss of man+ .merican li&es, leading to a contro&ers+ between the Fnited 1tates and 0erman+ that almost precipitated war between the two nations. #he firm stand ta7en b+ the F.1. forced 0erman+ to modif+ its method of submarine warfare to the satisfaction of the .merican go&ernment. In >arch 1913, howe&er, the 0erman sin7ing in the English ,hannel b+ submarine of the French steamer Sussex, with the loss of .merican li&es, led to another contro&ers+ between 0erman+ and the F.1., a &irtual F.1. ultimatum compelling 0erman+ temporaril+ to cease its unrestricted submarine warfare. 151! and After

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#he most important na&al engagement of the war was the attle of ?utland, waged on >a+ -1 and ?une 1, 1913, between the ritish 0rand Fleet and the 0erman *igh 1eas Fleet. .lthough the ritish losses, both in ships and human li&es, were greater than 0erman+8s, the 0erman fleet, ha&ing returned to home ports, did not &enture to gi&e battle again during the war, and the ritish retained their supremac+ at sea. Ne&ertheless, during the remainder of the war, 0erman cruisers managed to run the bloc7ade of 0erman+, which the ritish had established from the outset of the war. #he 0ermans san7 considerable tonnage of .llied shipping in the North .tlantic and then returned to their bases. In 1917 the 0ermans again resorted to unrestricted submarine warfare, con&inced that this method was the onl+ one that would defeat 0reat ritain. #he plan not onl+ failed to force the capitulation of 0reat ritain, but also caused the F.1. to declare war against 0erman+. #he attac7s of 0erman submarines on ritish con&o+s in the .tlantic and in the North 1ea caused much loss of shipping. .s a result, in .pril 1918 the ritish attempted to bloc7 the 0erman submarine bases at <stend '<ostende) and @eebrugge in elgium9 the+ succeeded in partiall+ bloc7ing @eebrugge b+ sin7ing three o&erage ritish cruisers in the harbor, but failed at <stend. In <ctober, howe&er, ritish land forces, ad&ancing through elgium, too7 the two submarine bases and other elgian ports. German Fleet Scuttled

+ the terms of the armistice the 0ermans surrendered to the .llies most of their fleet, consisting of 1! battleships, 17 cruisers, 5! torpedo boats, and more than 1!! submarines. .ll of the fleet with the e5ception of the submarines was interned at 1capa Flow in No&ember 1918, with 0erman captains and crews aboard. #he #reat+ of Eersailles '1919), which ended the war, pro&ided that all the interned ships become the permanent propert+ of the .llies9 that other warships still in 0erman possession also be surrendered9 and that the si=e of an+ future 0erman na&+ be drasticall+ limited. In reprisal against these terms, the 0ermans on ?une :1, 1919, scuttled their ships interned at 1capa Flow. See Eersailles, #reat+ of. #he total tonnage of .llied ships sun7 b+ 0erman submarines, surface craft, and mines was nearl+ 1- million9 the largest tonnage sun7 in an+ one +ear was about 3 million, in 1917. "he War in the &ir $orld $ar I pro&ided a great stimulus to the production and militar+ use of aircraft, including the airplane and airship, or dirigible balloon, and the tethered balloon. .ircraft were used for two principal purposes; obser&ation and bombing. For obser&ation of stationar+ battlefronts e5tensi&e use was made b+ both belligerents of small tethered balloons9 for scouting at sea, dirigible balloons were e5tensi&el+ used, and airplanes were used for scouting coastal waters. In connection with militar+ operations on land, airplanes were used to obser&e the disposition of the troops and defenses of the enem+ and for bombing the enem+8s lines or troops in action. . special feature of the war was the raids conducted b+ means of dirigibles or airplanes on important enem+ centers far remo&ed from the battlefront. #he first 0erman airplane raid on /aris too7 place on .ugust -!, 191"9 and the first 0erman air raid on England was on 4o&er on 4ecember :1, 191". 4uring 1915 and 1913 the 0erman t+pe of dirigible 7nown as the =eppelin raided eastern England and Bondon 3! times. #he first 0erman airplane raid on Bondon too7 place on No&ember :8, 1913, and such raids were fre6uent during the remainder of the war. #he obDect of the 0erman raids on England was to

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bring about withdrawal of ritish planes from the western front for the defense of the homeland9 to handicap ritish industr+9 and to destro+ the morale of the ci&ilian population. #he raids caused much loss of life and damage to propert+ but accomplished little of militar+ &alue. From the middle of 1915 aerial combats between planes or groups of planes of the belligerents were common. #he 0ermans had superiorit+ in the air on the western front from about <ctober 1915 to ?ul+ 1913, when the supremac+ passed to the ritish. .llied supremac+ graduall+ increased thereafter and with the entrance of the F.1. into the war became o&erwhelming. In .pril 1918 the F.1. had three air s6uadrons at the front9 b+ No&ember 1918 it had "5 s6uadrons comprising nearl+ 8!! planes and more than 1:!! officers. #he total personnel of the .merican air ser&ice increased from about 1:!! at the outbrea7 of the war to nearl+ :!!,!!! at the end. .mong the noted airplane fighters, or aces, were the .merican Eddie %ic7enbac7er, the ,anadian $illiam .&er+ ishop, and the 0erman aron >anfred &on %ichthofen. Summar* of the War

$orld $ar I began on ?ul+ :8, 191", with the declaration of war b+ .ustria(*ungar+ on 1erbia, and hostilities between the .llied and ,entral /owers continued until the signing of the armistice on No&ember 11, 1918, a period of " +ears, - months, and 1" da+s. #he aggregate direct war costs of all the belligerents amounted to about S183 billion. ,asualties in the land forces amounted to more than -7 million 'see the accompan+ing table, $orld $ar I ,asualties)9 in addition, close to 1! million deaths among the ci&ilian populations were caused indirectl+ b+ the war. 4espite worldwide hopes that the settlements arri&ed at after the war would restore world peace on a permanent basis, $orld $ar I actuall+ pro&ided the basis for an e&en more de&astating conflict. #he defeated ,entral /owers declared their acceptance of /resident $ilson8s 1" points as the basis for the armistice and e5pected the .llies to utili=e the principles of the 1" points as the foundation for the peace treaties. <n the whole, howe&er, the .llies came to the conference at Eersailles and to the subse6uent peace conferences with the determination to e5act from the ,entral /owers the entire cost of the war, and to distribute among themsel&es territories and possessions of the defeated nations according to formulas arri&ed at secretl+ during the +ears 1915 to 1917, before the entr+ of the F.1. into the war. /resident $ilson, in the peace negotiations, at first insisted that the /aris /eace ,onference accept the full program laid out in the 1" points, but finall+, in order to secure the support of the .llies for the all(important 1"th point, which called for the creation of an association of nations, he abandoned his insistence on some of the other points. See Beague of Nations. #he peace treaties that emerged from the conferences at Eersailles, 1aint(0ermain, #rianon, Neuill+, and 1M&res were on the whole inade6uatel+ enforced b+ the &ictorious powers, leading to the resurgence of militarism and aggressi&e nationalism in 0erman+ and to social disorder throughout much of Europe. For additional information on historical figures, see biographies of those whose names are not followed b+ dates. #he militar+ conflict is also described in separate articles on maDor battles. For results of the war, see separate articles on indi&idual treaties and histor+ sections of indi&idual countries9

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World War $$, global militar+ conflict that, in terms of li&es lost and material destruction, was the most de&astating war in human histor+. It began in 19-9 as a European conflict between 0erman+ and an .nglo(French coalition but e&entuall+ widened to include most of the nations of the world. It ended in 19"5, lea&ing a new world order dominated b+ the Fnited 1tates and the F11%. >ore than an+ pre&ious war, $orld $ar II in&ol&ed the commitment of nations8 entire human and economic resources, the blurring of the distinction between combatant and noncombatant, and the e5pansion of the battlefield to include all of the enem+8s territor+. #he most important determinants of its outcome were industrial capacit+ and personnel. In the last stages of the war, two radicall+ new weapons were introduced; the long(range roc7et and the atomic bomb. In the main, howe&er, the war was fought with the same or impro&ed weapons of the t+pes used in $orld $ar I. #he greatest ad&ances were in aircraft and tan7s. The World After World War $ #hree maDor powers had been dissatisfied with the outcome of $orld $ar I. 0erman+, the principal defeated nation, bitterl+ resented the territorial losses and reparations pa+ments imposed on it b+ the #reat+ of Eersailles. Ital+, one of the &ictors, found its territorial gains far from enough either to offset the cost of the war or to satisf+ its ambitions. ?apan, also a &ictor, was unhapp+ about its failure to gain control of ,hina. Causes o% the War France, 0reat ritain, and the F.1. had attained their wartime obDecti&es. #he+ had reduced 0erman+ to a militar+ cipher and had reorgani=ed Europe and the world as the+ saw fit. #he French and the ritish fre6uentl+ disagreed on polic+ in the postwar period, howe&er, and were unsure of their abilit+ to defend the peace settlement. #he F.1., disillusioned b+ the Europeans8 failure to repa+ their war debts, retreated into isolationism. The Failure of 'eace &fforts 4uring the 19:!s, attempts were made to achie&e a stable peace. #he first was the establishment '19:!) of the Beague of Nations as a forum in which nations could settle their disputes. #he league8s powers were limited to persuasion and &arious le&els of moral and economic sanctions that the members were free to carr+ out as the+ saw fit. .t the $ashington ,onference of 19:1(::, the principal na&al powers agreed to limit their na&ies according to a fi5ed ratio. #he Bocarno ,onference '19:5) produced a treat+ guarantee of the 0erman(French boundar+ and an arbitration agreement between 0erman+ and /oland. In the /aris /eace /act '19:8), 3- countries, including all the great powers e5cept the F11%, renounced war as an instrument of national polic+ and pledged to resol&e all disputes among them Hb+ pacific means.I #he signatories had agreed beforehand to e5empt wars of Hself(defense.I The Rise of Fascism <ne of the &ictors8 stated aims in $orld $ar I had been Hto ma7e the world safe for democrac+,I and postwar 0erman+ adopted a democratic constitution, as did most of the other states restored or created after the war. In the 19:!s, howe&er, the wa&e of the future appeared to be a form of nationalistic, militaristic totalitarianism 7nown b+ its Italian name, fascism. It promised to minister to peoples8 wants more effecti&el+ than democrac+ and presented itself as

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the one sure defense against communism. enito >ussolini established the first Fascist dictatorship in Ital+ in 19::. Formation of the A+is Coalition

.dolf *itler, the Fhrer 'HleaderI) of the 0erman National 1ocialist 'Na=i) /art+, preached a racist brand of fascism. *itler promised to o&erturn the Eersailles #reat+ and secure additional Lebensraum 'Hli&ing spaceI) for the 0erman people, who he contended deser&ed more as members of a superior race. In the earl+ 19-!s, the depression hit 0erman+. #he moderate parties could not agree on what to do about it, and large numbers of &oters turned to the Na=is and ,ommunists. In 19-- *itler became the 0erman chancellor, and in a series of subse6uent mo&es established himself as dictator. ?apan did not formall+ adopt fascism, but the armed forces8 powerful position in the go&ernment enabled them to impose a similar t+pe of totalitarianism. .s dismantlers of the world status 6uo, the ?apanese militar+ were well ahead of *itler. #he+ used a minor clash with ,hinese troops near >u7den in 19-1 as a prete5t for ta7ing o&er all of >anchuria, where the+ proclaimed the puppet state of >anchu7uo in 19-:. In 19-7(-8 the+ occupied the main ,hinese ports. *a&ing denounced the disarmament clauses of the Eersailles #reat+, created a new air force, and reintroduced conscription, *itler tried out his new weapons on the side of right(wing militar+ rebels in the 1panish ,i&il $ar '19-3(-9). #he &enture brought him into collaboration with >ussolini, who was also supporting the 1panish re&olt after ha&ing sei=ed '19-5(-3) Ethiopia in a small war. #reaties between 0erman+, Ital+, and ?apan in 19-3(-7 brought into being the %ome( erlin(#o7+o .5is. #he .5is thereafter became the collecti&e term for those countries and their allies. German A,,ression in &urope

*itler launched his own e5pansionist dri&e with the anne5ation of .ustria in >arch 19-8. #he wa+ was clear; >ussolini supported him9 and the ritish and French, o&erawed b+ 0erman rearmament, accepted *itler8s claim that the status of .ustria was an internal 0erman affair. #he F.1. had se&erel+ impaired its abilit+ to act against aggression b+ passing a neutralit+ law that prohibited material assistance to all parties in foreign conflicts. In 1eptember 19-8 *itler threatened war to anne5 the western border area of ,=echoslo&a7ia, the 1udetenland and its -.5 million ethnic 0ermans. #he ritish prime minister Ne&ille ,hamberlain initiated tal7s that culminated at the end of the month in the >unich /act, b+ which the ,=echs, on ritish and French urging, relin6uished the 1udetenland in return for *itler8s promise not to ta7e an+ more ,=ech territor+. ,hamberlain belie&ed he had achie&ed Hpeace for our time,I but the word >unich soon implied abDect and futile appeasement. Bess than si5 months later, in >arch 19-9, *itler sei=ed the remainder of ,=echoslo&a7ia. .larmed b+ this new aggression and b+ *itler8s threats against /oland, the ritish go&ernment

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pledged to aid that countr+ if 0erman+ threatened its independence. France alread+ had a mutual defense treat+ with /oland. #he turn awa+ from appeasement brought the 1o&iet Fnion to the fore. ?oseph 1talin, the 1o&iet dictator, had offered militar+ help to ,=echoslo&a7ia during the 19-8 crisis, but had been ignored b+ all the parties to the >unich /act. Now that war threatened, he was courted b+ both sides, but *itler made the more attracti&e offer. .llied with ritain and France, the 1o&iet Fnion might well ha&e had to fight, but all 0erman+ as7ed for was its neutralit+. In >oscow, on the night of .ugust :-, 19-9, the Na=i(1o&iet /act was signed. In the part published the ne5t da+, 0erman+ and the 1o&iet Fnion agreed not to go to war against each other. . secret protocol ga&e 1talin a free hand in Finland, Estonia, Bat&ia, eastern /oland, and eastern %omania. )ilitar* -perations In the earl+ morning hours of 1eptember 1, 19-9, the 0erman armies marched into /oland. <n 1eptember - the ritish and French surprised *itler b+ declaring war on 0erman+, but the+ had no plans for rendering acti&e assistance to the /oles. "he #irst 'hase: (ominance o% the &)is >an for man, the 0erman and /olish forces were an e&en match. *itler committed about 1.5 million troops, and the /olish commander, >arshal Edward 1mig l+(%+d=, e5pected to muster 1.8 million. #hat was not the whole picture, howe&er. #he 0ermans had si5 pan=er 'armored) and four motori=ed di&isions9 the /oles had one armored and one motori=ed brigade and a few tan7 battalions. #he 0ermans8 13!! aircraft were mostl+ of the latest t+pes. *alf of the /oles8 9-5 planes were obsolete. The 2lit6krie, in 'oland /olish strategic doctrine called for a rigid defense of the whole frontier and anticipated se&eral wee7s of preliminar+ s7irmishing. It was wrong on both counts. <n the morning of 1eptember 1, wa&es of 0erman bombers hit the railroads and hopelessl+ snarled the /olish mobili=ation. In four more da+s, two arm+ groupsQone on the north out of East /russia, the other on the south out of 1ilesiaQhad bro7en through on relati&el+ narrow fronts and were sending armored spearheads on fast dri&es toward $arsaw and rst. #his was blit=7rieg 'lightning war); the use of armor, air power, and mobile infantr+ in a pincers mo&ement to encircle the enem+. etween 1eptember 8 and 1!, the 0ermans closed in on $arsaw from the north and south, trapping the /olish forces west of the capital. <n 1eptember 17, a second, deeper encirclement closed 13! 7m '1!! mi) east, near rst. <n that da+, too, the 1o&iet %ed .rm+ lunged across the border. + 1eptember :!, practicall+ the whole countr+ was in 0erman or 1o&iet hands, and onl+ isolated poc7ets continued to resist. #he last to surrender was the fortress at 2oc7, on <ctober 3. The 'hon* War . French and ritish offensi&e in the west might ha&e enabled /oland to fight longer, but until enough ritish arri&ed, it would ha&e had to be mounted mainl+ b+ the French9 French strateg+, howe&er, was defensi&e, based on holding the hea&il+ fortified >aginot line. #he 6uic7 finish in /oland left both sides at loose ends. 4isma+ed, the ritish and French became preoccupied with schemes to sta&e off a blood+ repla+ of $orld $ar I. *itler made a halfhearted peace offer

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and at the same time ordered his generals to read+ an attac7 on the Bow ,ountries and France. #he generals, who did not thin7 the+ could do against France what the+ had done in /oland, as7ed for time and insisted the+ could onl+ ta7e *olland, elgium, and the French channel coast. E5cept at sea, where 0erman submarines operated against merchant shipping and the ritish na&+ imposed a bloc7ade, so little was going on after the first wee7 in <ctober that the F.1. newspapers called it the /hon+ $ar. The So%iet-Finnish War <n No&ember -!, after two months of diplomatic wrangling, the 1o&iet Fnion declared war on Finland. 1talin was bent on ha&ing a blit=7rieg of his own, but his plan faltered. #he Finns, under >arshal ,arl 0. >annerheim, were e5pert at winter warfare. #he 1o&iet troops, on the other hand, were often badl+ led, in part because political purges had claimed man+ of the %ed .rm+8s senior officers. <utnumbered b+ at least fi&e to one, the Finns held their own and 7ept fighting into the new +ear. #he attac7 on Finland aroused world opinion against the 1o&iet Fnion and ga&e an opening to the ritish and French. #he+ had long had their e+es on a mine at 2iruna in northern 1weden that was 0erman+8s main source of iron ore. In summer the ore went through the altic 1ea, in winter to the ice(free Norwegian port of Nar&i7 and then through neutral Norwegian waters to 0erman+. #he Nar&i7(2iruna railroad also connected on the east with the Finnish railroads9 conse6uentl+, an .nglo(French force ostensibl+ sent to help the Finns would automaticall+ be in position to occup+ Nar&i7 and 2iruna. #he problem was to get Norwa+ and 1weden to cooperate, which both refused to do. In 0erman+, the na&al chief, .dmiral Erich %aeder, urged *itler to occup+ Norwa+ for the sa7e of its open(water ports on the .tlantic, but *itler showed little interest until late ?anuar+ 19"!, when the weather and the disco&er+ of some in&asion plans b+ elgium forced him to dela+ the attac7 on the Bow ,ountries and France indefinitel+. #he first studies he had made showed that Norwa+ could best be ta7en b+ simultaneous landings at eight port cities from Nar&i7 to <slo. ecause the troops would ha&e to be transported on warships and because those would be eas+ pre+ for the ritish na&+, the operation would ha&e to be e5ecuted while the nights were long. 4enmar7, which posed no militar+ problems, could be usefull+ included because it had airfields close to Norwa+. Denmark and Nor(a* 1talin, fearing outside inter&ention, ended his war on >arch 8 on terms that cost Finland territor+ but left it independent. #he ritish and French then had to find another prete5t for their proDected action in Nar&i7 and 2iruna9 the+ decided to la+ mines Dust outside the Nar&i7 harbor. #his the+ thought would pro&o7e some 7ind of &iolent 0erman reaction, which would let them spring to Norwa+8s sideQand into Nar&i7. *itler appro&ed the incursions into Norwa+ and 4enmar7 on .pril :, and the warships sailed on .pril 7. . ritish tas7 force laid the mines the ne5t morning and headed home, passing the 0erman ships without seeing them and lea&ing them to ma7e the landings unopposed on the morning of .pril 9. 4enmar7 surrendered at once, and the landings succeeded e&er+where but at <slo. #here a fort bloc7ed the approach from the sea, and fog pre&ented an airborne landing. #he 0ermans occupied <slo b+ noon, but in the meantime, the Norwegian go&ernment, deciding to fight, had mo&ed to El&erum.

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.lthough the Norwegians, aided b+ 1:,!!! ritish and French, held out in the area between <slo and #rondheim until >a+ -, the conclusion was ne&er in doubt. Nar&i7 was different. #here "3!! 0ermans faced :",3!! ritish, French, and Norwegians bac7ed b+ the guns of the ritish na&+. #he 0ermans had an ad&antage in the ruggedness of the terrain and a greater one in their opponents8 slow, methodical mo&es. #hus, the+ held Nar&i7 until >a+ :8. In the first wee7 of ?une the+ were bac7ed against the 1wedish border and close to ha&ing to choose surrender or internment, but b+ then, militar+ disasters in France were forcing the ritish and French to recall their troops from Nar&i7. The 0o( Countries + spring, *itler had found a new and better wa+ of handling the campaign against France and the Bow ,ountries. #he first plan had been to ha&e the main force go through elgium, as it had in $orld $ar I. 0eneral Erich &on >anstein and some other ad&isers, howe&er, had persuaded *itler to shift the main force south to the area of Bu5embourg and the .rdennes Forest. #he .rdennes was hill+, wooded, and not the best countr+ for tan7s, but >anstein argued that the enem+ would not e5pect a big attac7 there. #he tan7s could ma7e a fast northwestward sweep from the .rdennes, behind the elgians and ritish and part of the French. .fter reaching the coast and defeating the enem+ in elgium, the+ could ma7e an about(face and stri7e to the southeast behind the French armies along the >aginot line. $hen the attac7 began, on >a+ 1!, 19"!, the two sides were appro5imatel+ e6ual in numbers of troops and tan7s9 the 0ermans were superior in aircraft. #he decisi&e ad&antage of the 0ermans, howe&er, was that the+ 7new e5actl+ what the+ were going to do. #heir opponents had to impro&ise, in part because the elgians and 4utch tried to sta+ neutral to the last. #he ritish and French, moreo&er, had failed to learn from the e5ample of /oland, ha&ing attributed that countr+8s defeat to its inherent wea7ness. ,onse6uentl+, the+ were not prepared to deal with the 0erman armor. #heir tan7s were scattered among the infantr+9 those of the 0ermans were drawn together in a pan=er group, an armored arm+. <n >a+ 1! 0erman airborne troops landed inside elgium and *olland to sei=e airfields and bridges and, most notabl+, the great elgian fortress Eben(Emael. #he 4utch arm+ surrendered on >a+ 1", se&eral hours after bombers had destro+ed the business section of %otterdam. .lso on >a+ 1" the 0erman main force, the pan=er group in the lead, came out of the .rdennes to begin the dri&e to the sea behind the ritish and French armies supporting the elgians. The Defeat of France

<n >a+ :! the pan=er group too7 .bbe&ille at the mouth of the 1omme %i&er and began to push north along the coast9 it co&ered "!! 7m ':5! mi) in 11 da+s. + >a+ :3, the ritish and French were pushed into a narrow beachhead around 4un7er6ue. #he elgian 7ing, Beopold III, surrendered his arm+ the ne5t da+. 4estro+ers and smaller craft of all 7inds rescued --8,::3 men from 4un7er6ue in a heroic sealift that probabl+ would not ha&e succeeded if the 0erman commander, 0eneral 0erd &on %undstedt, had not stopped the tan7s to sa&e them for the ne5t phase. <n ?une 5 the 0ermans launched a new assault against France. Ital+ declared war on France and ritain on ?une 1!. #he >aginot line, which onl+ e5tended to the elgian border, was

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intact, but the French commander, 0eneral >a5ime $e+gand, had nothing with which to screen it or /aris on the north and west. <n ?une 17, >arshal *enri /hilippe /Ctain, a $orld $ar I hero who had become premier the da+ before, as7ed for an armistice. #he armistice was signed on ?une :5 on terms that ga&e 0erman+ control of northern France and the .tlantic coast. /Ctain then set up a capital at Eich+ in the unoccupied southeast. The 2attle of 2ritain

In the summer of 19"!, *itler dominated Europe from the North ,ape to the /+renees. *is one remaining acti&e enem+Q ritain, under a new prime minister, $inston ,hurchillQ&owed to continue fighting. $hether it could was 6uestionable. #he ritish arm+ had left most of its weapons on the beaches at 4un7er6ue. 1talin was in no mood to challenge *itler. #he F.1., shoc7ed b+ the fall of France, began the first peacetime conscription in its histor+ and greatl+ increased its militar+ budget, but public opinion, although s+mpathetic to ritain, was against getting into the war. #he 0ermans hoped to subdue the ritish b+ star&ing them out. In ?une 19"! the+ undertoo7 the attle of the .tlantic, using submarine warfare to cut the ritish o&erseas lifelines. #he 0ermans now had submarine bases in Norwa+ and France. .t the outset the 0ermans had onl+ :8 submarines, but more were being builtQenough to 7eep ritain in danger until the spring of 19"- and to carr+ on the battle for months thereafter. In&asion was the e5peditious wa+ to finish off ritain, but that meant crossing the English ,hannel9 *itler would not ris7 it unless the ritish air force could be neutrali=ed first. .s a result, the attle of ritain was fought in the air, not on the beaches. In .ugust 19"! the 0ermans launched da+light raids against ports and airfields and in 1eptember against inland cities. #he obDecti&e was to draw out the ritish fighters and destro+ them. #he 0ermans failed to rec7on with a new de&ice, radar, which greatl+ increased the ritish fighters8 effecti&eness. ecause their own losses were too high, the 0ermans had to switch to night bombing at the end of 1eptember. etween then and >a+ 19"1 the+ made 71 maDor raids on Bondon and 53 on other cities, but the damage the+ wrought was too indiscriminate to be militaril+ decisi&e. <n 1eptember 17, 19"!, *itler postponed the in&asion indefinitel+, thereb+ conceding defeat in the attle of ritain. The 2alkans and North Africa 71589-1581:

In Fact, *itler had told his generals in late ?ul+ 19"! that the ne5t attac7 would be on the F11%. #here, he said, 0erman+ would get its Hli&ing spaceI and defeat ritain as well. *e claimed the ritish were onl+ being 7ept in the war b+ the hope of a falling(out between 0erman+ and the F11%. $hen the 1o&iets had been defeated and ritish positions in India and the >iddle East were threatened, he belie&ed that ritain would ma7e peace. *itler wanted to start in the fall of 19"!, but his ad&isers persuaded him to a&oid the ris7s of a winter campaign in the 1o&iet Fnion and wait until the spring.

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>eanwhile, 0erman+8s all+, >ussolini, had staged an unsuccessful attac7 '1eptember 19"!) on ritish(occupied Eg+pt from the Italian colon+ of Bib+a and an e6uall+ aborti&e in&asion '<ctober 19"!) of 0reece. In response to the latter mo&e, the ritish occupied airfields on ,rete and in 0reece. *itler did not want ritish planes within stri7ing distance of his one maDor oil source, the /loiesti fields in %omania, and in No&ember he began to prepare an operation against 0reece. Earl+ in 19"1 ritish forces pushed the Italians bac7 into Bib+a, and in Februar+ *itler sent 0eneral Erwin %ommel with a two(di&ision tan7 corps, the .fri7a 2orps, to help his allies. ecause he would need to cross their territor+ to get at 0reece 'and the 1o&iet Fnion), *itler brought %omania and *ungar+ into the .5is alliance in No&ember 19"!9 ulgaria Doined in >arch 19"1. $hen Nugosla&ia refused to follow suit, *itler ordered an in&asion of that countr+. Yugosla ia #he operations against 0reece and Nugosla&ia began on .pril 3, 19"1. #he 0ermans8 primar+ difficult+ with the attac7 on Nugosla&ia was in pulling together an arm+ of nine di&isions from 0erman+ and France in less than ten da+s. #he+ had to limit themsel&es for se&eral da+s to air raids and border s7irmishing. <n .pril 1! the+ opened dri&es on elgrade from the northwest, north, and southeast. #he cit+ fell on .pril 1-, and the Nugosla& arm+ surrendered the ne5t da+. Nugosla&ia, howe&er, was easier to ta7e than it would be to hold. 0uerrillasQ Cetni7s under 4raTa >ihaDlo&i and partisans under ?osip ro= '#ito)Qfought throughout the war. !reece #he 0ree7 arm+ of "-!,!!!, unli7e the Nugosla&, was full+ mobili=ed, and to some e5tent battle tested, but national pride compelled it to tr+ to defend the >eta5as line northeast of 1aloni7a. + one short thrust to 1aloni7a, the 0ermans forced the surrender on .pril 9 of the line and about half of the 0ree7 arm+. .fter the 0ree7 First .rm+, pulling out of .lbania, was trapped at the >etsO&on /ass and surrendered on .pril ::, the ritish force of some 3:,!!! troops retreated southward. #hereafter, fast 0erman dri&esQto the Isthmus of ,orinth b+ .pril :7 and through the /elopOnnisos b+ .pril -!Qforced the ritish into an e&acuation that cost them 1:,!!! men. .n airborne assault on >a+ :!(:7 also brought ,rete into 0erman hands. >eanwhile, %ommel had launched a successful counteroffensi&e against the ritish in Bib+a, e5pelling them from the countr+ 'e5cept for an isolated garrison at #obru7) b+ .pril 19"1. "he Second 'hase: E)*ansion o% the War In the +ear after the fall of France, the war mo&ed toward a new stageQworld war. $hile conducting subsidiar+ campaigns in the al7ans, in North .frica, and in the air against ritain, *itler deplo+ed his main forces to the east and brought the countries of southeastern Europe 'as well as Finland) into a partnership against the F11%. 3;S; Aid to 2ritain #he F.1. abandoned strict neutralit+ in the European war and approached a confrontation with ?apan in .sia and the /acific <cean. F.1. and ritish conferences, begun in ?anuar+ 19"1, determined a basic strateg+ for the e&ent of a F.1. entr+ into the war, namel+, that both would center their effort on 0erman+, lea&ing ?apan, if need be, to be dealt with later.

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In >arch 19"1 the F.1. ,ongress passed the Bend(Bease .ct and appropriated an initial S7 billion to lend or lease weapons and other aid to an+ countries the president might designate. + this means the F.1. hoped to ensure &ictor+ o&er the .5is without in&ol&ing its own troops. + late summer of 19"1, howe&er, the F.1. was in a state of undeclared war with 0erman+. In ?ul+, F.1. >arines were stationed in Iceland, which had been occupied b+ the ritish in >a+ 19"!, and thereafter the F.1. Na&+ too7 o&er the tas7 of escorting con&o+s in the waters west of Iceland. In 1eptember /resident Fran7lin 4. %oose&elt authori=ed ships on con&o+ dut+ to attac7 .5is war &essels. Friction 2et(een the 3;S; and <apan >eanwhile, .merican relations with ?apan continued to deteriorate. In 1eptember 19"! ?apan coerced Eich+ France into gi&ing up northern Indochina. #he F.1. retaliated b+ prohibiting the e5portation of steel, scrap iron, and a&iation gasoline to ?apan. In .pril 19"1, the ?apanese signed a neutralit+ treat+ with the F11% as insurance against an attac7 from that direction if the+ were to come into conflict with ritain or the F.1. while ta7ing a bigger bite out of 1outheast .sia. $hen 0erman+ in&aded the F11% in ?une, ?apanese leaders considered brea7ing the treat+ and Doining in from the east, but, ma7ing one of the most fateful decisions of the war, the+ chose instead to intensif+ their push to the southeast. <n ?ul+ :- ?apan occupied southern Indochina. #wo da+s later, the Fnited 1tates, ritain, and the Netherlands fro=e ?apanese assets. #he effect was to pre&ent ?apan from purchasing oil, which would, in time, cripple its arm+ and ma7e its na&+ and air force completel+ useless. The German $n%asion of the 3SSR #he war8s most massi&e encounter began on the morning of ?une ::, 19"1, when slightl+ more than - million 0erman troops in&aded the F11%. .lthough 0erman preparations had been &isible for months and had been tal7ed about openl+ among the diplomats in >oscow, the 1o&iet forces were ta7en b+ surprise. 1talin, his confidence in the countr+8s militar+ capabilit+ sha7en b+ the Finnish war, had refused to allow an+ counteracti&it+ for fear of pro&o7ing the 0ermans. >oreo&er, the 1o&iet militar+ leadership had concluded that blit=7rieg, as it had been practiced in /oland and France, would not be possible on the scale of a 1o&iet(0erman war9 both sides would therefore confine themsel&es for the first se&eral wee7s at least to sparring along the frontier. #he 1o&iet arm+ had :.9 million troops on the western border and outnumbered the 0ermans b+ two to one in tan7s and b+ two or three to one in aircraft. >an+ of its tan7s and aircraft were older t+pes, but some of the tan7s, particularl+ the later famous #( -"s, were far superior to an+ the 0ermans had. Barge numbers of the aircraft were destro+ed on the ground in the first da+, howe&er, and their tan7s, li7e those of the French, were scattered among the infantr+, where the+ could not be effecti&e against the 0erman pan=er groups. #he infantr+ was first ordered to counterattac7, which was impossible, and then forbidden to retreat, which ensured their wholesale destruction or capture. Initial !erman Successes For the in&asion, the 0ermans had set up three arm+ groups, designated as North, ,enter, and 1outh, and aimed toward Beningrad, >oscow, and 2+i&. *itler and his generals had agreed that their main strategic problem was to loc7 the 1o&iet arm+ in battle and defeat it before it could escape into the depths of the countr+. #he+ disagreed on how that could best be accomplished. >ost of the generals belie&ed that the 1o&iet regime would sacrifice e&er+thing to defend >oscow, the capital, the hub of the road and railroad networ7s, and the countr+8s main

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industrial center. #o *itler, the land and resources of the F7raine and the oil of the ,aucasus were more important, and he wanted to sei=e Beningrad as well. #he result had been a compromiseQthe three thrusts, with the one b+ .rm+ 0roup ,enter toward >oscow the strongestQthat temporaril+ satisfied *itler as well as the generals. $ar games had indicated a &ictor+ in about ten wee7s, which was significant because the %ussian summer, the ideal time for fighting in the F11%, was short, and the al7ans operations had caused a -(wee7 dela+ at the outset. #en wee7s seemed ample time. ,hurchill offered the F11% an alliance, and %oose&elt promised lend(lease aid, but after the first few da+s, their staffs belie&ed e&er+thing would be o&er in a month or so. + the end of the first wee7 in ?ul+, .rm+ 0roup ,enter had ta7en :9!,!!! prisoners in encirclements at ial+sto7 and >ins7. <n .ugust 5, ha&ing crossed the 4nieper %i&er, the last natural barrier west of >oscow, the arm+ group wiped out a poc7et near 1molens7 and counted another -!!,!!! prisoners. <n reaching 1molens7, it had co&ered more than two(thirds of the distance to >oscow. Hitler"s #hange o$ %lan #he %ussians were doing e5actl+ what the 0erman generals had wanted, sacrificing enormous numbers of troops and weapons to defend >oscow. *itler, howe&er, was not satisfied, and o&er the generals8 protests, he ordered .rm+ 0roup ,enter to di&ert the bul7 of its armor to the north and south to help the other two arm+ groups, thereb+ stopping the ad&ance toward >oscow. <n 1eptember 8 .rm+ 0roup North cut Beningrad8s land connections and, together with the Finnish arm+ on the north, brought the cit+ under siege. <n 1eptember 13 .rm+ 0roup 1outh closed a gigantic encirclement east of 2+i& that brought in 335,!!! prisoners. *itler then decided to resume the ad&ance toward >oscow and ordered the armor be returned to .rm+ 0roup ,enter. &he Attem't to &a(e )osco* .fter a standstill of si5 wee7s, .rm+ 0roup ,enter resumed action on <ctober :. $ithin two wee7s, it completed three large encirclements and too7 33-,!!! prisoners. #hen the fall rains set in, turning the unpa&ed %ussian roads to mud and stopping the ad&ance for the better part of a month. In mid(No&ember, the weather turned cold and the ground fro=e. *itler and the commander of .rm+ 0roup ,enter, Field >arshal Fedor &on oc7, faced the choice of ha&ing the armies dig in where the+ were or sending them ahead, possibl+ to be o&erta7en b+ the winter. $anting to finish the 19"1 campaign with some sort of a &ictor+ at >oscow, the+ chose to mo&e ahead. In the second half of No&ember oc7 aimed two armored spearheads at >oscow. ?ust after the turn of the month, one of those, bearing in on the cit+ from the northwest, was less than -: 7m 'less than :! mi) awa+. #he other, coming from the south, had about 35 7m 'about "! mi) still to go. #he pan=er di&isions had often co&ered such distances in less than a da+, but the temperature was falling, snow was drifting on the roads, and neither the men nor the machines were outfitted for e5treme cold. <n 4ecember 5 the generals commanding the spearhead armies reported that the+ were stopped; #he tan7s and truc7s were free=ing up, and the troops were losing their will to fight. So iet #ountero$$ensi e

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1talin, who had sta+ed in >oscow, and his commander at the front, 0eneral 0eorg+ @hu7o&, had held bac7 their reser&es. >an+ of them were recent recruits, but some were hardened &eterans from 1iberia. .ll were dressed for winter. <n 4ecember 3 the+ counterattac7ed, and within a few da+s, the 0erman spearheads were rolling bac7 and abandoning large numbers of &ehicles and weapons, rendered useless b+ the cold. <n 1talin8s orders, the >oscow counterattac7 was 6uic7l+ con&erted into a counteroffensi&e on the entire front. #he 0ermans had not built an+ defense lines to the rear and could not dig in because the ground was fro=en hard as concrete. 1ome of the generals recommended retreating to /oland, but on 4ecember 18 *itler ordered the troops to stand fast where&er the+ were. #hereafter, the %ussians chopped great chun7s out of the 0erman front, but enough of it sur&i&ed the winter to maintain the siege of Beningrad, continue the threat to >oscow, and 7eep the western F7raine in 0erman hands. The 2e,innin, of the War in the 'acific #he seeming imminence of a 1o&iet defeat in the summer and fall of 19"1 had created dilemmas for ?apan and the F.1. #he ?apanese thought the+ then had the best opportunit+ to sei=e the petroleum and other resources of 1outheast .sia and the adDacent islands9 on the other hand, the+ 7new the+ could not win the war with the F.1. that would probabl+ ensue. #he F.1. go&ernment wanted to stop ?apanese e5pansion but doubted whether the .merican people would be willing to go to war to do so. >oreo&er, the F.1. did not want to get embroiled in a war with ?apan while it faced the ghastl+ possibilit+ of being alone in the world with a triumphant 0erman+. .fter the oil embargo, the ?apanese, also under the pressure of time, resol&ed to mo&e in 1outheast .sia and the nearb+ islands. %earl Harbor

Fntil 4ecember 19"1 the ?apanese leadership pursued two courses; #he+ tried to get the oil embargo lifted on terms that would still let them ta7e the territor+ the+ wanted, and the+ prepared for war. #he F.1. demanded that ?apan withdraw from ,hina and Indochina, but would &er+ li7el+ ha&e settled for a to7en withdrawal and a promise not to ta7e more territor+. .fter he became ?apan8s premier in mid(<ctober, 0eneral #oDo *ide7i set No&ember :9 as the last da+ on which ?apan would accept a settlement without war. #oDo8s deadline, which was 7ept secret, meant that war was practicall+ certain. #he ?apanese arm+ and na&+ had, in fact, de&ised a war plan in which the+ had great confidence. #he+ proposed to ma7e fast sweeps into urma, >ala+a, the East Indies, and the /hilippines and, at the same time, set up a defensi&e perimeter in the central and southwest /acific. #he+ e5pected the Fnited 1tates to declare war but not to be willing to fight long or hard enough to win. #heir greatest concern was the F.1. /acific Fleet, based at /earl *arbor, *awaii. If it reacted 6uic7l+, it could scramble their &er+ tight timetable. .s insurance, the ?apanese na&+ undertoo7 to cripple the /acific Fleet b+ a surprise air attac7.

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. few minutes before 8 .> on 1unda+, 4ecember 7, 19"1, ?apanese carrier(based airplanes struc7 /earl *arbor. In a raid lasting less than two hours, the+ san7 or seriousl+ damaged eight battleships and 1- other na&al &essels. #he F.1. authorities had bro7en the ?apanese diplomatic code and 7new an attac7 was imminent. . warning had been sent from $ashington, but, owing to dela+s in transmission, it arri&ed after the raid had begun. In one stro7e, the ?apanese na&+ scored a brilliant successQand assured the .5is defeat in $orld $ar II. #he ?apanese attac7 brought the F.1. into the war on 4ecember 8Qand brought it in determined to fight to the finish. 0erman+ and Ital+ declared war on the Fnited 1tates on 4ecember 11. +a'anese #on,uests in Asia and the %aci$ic In the &ast area of land and ocean the+ had mar7ed for con6uest, the ?apanese seemed to be e&er+where at once. efore the end of 4ecember, the+ too7 ritish *ong 2ong and the 0ilbert Islands 'now 2iribati) and 0uam and $a7e Island 'F.1. possessions), and the+ had in&aded ritish urma, >ala+a, orneo, and the .merican(held /hilippines. ritish 1ingapore, long regarded as one of the world8s strongest fortresses, fell to them in Februar+ 19":, and in >arch the+ occupied the Netherlands East Indies and landed on New 0uinea. #he .merican and /hilippine forces surrendered at ataan on .pril 9, and resistance in the /hilippines ended with the surrender of ,orregidor on >a+ 3. .ccording to the ?apanese plan, it would be time for them to ta7e a defensi&e stance when the+ had captured northern New 0uinea 'an .ustralian possession), the ismarc7 .rchipelago, the 0ilberts, and $a7e Island, which the+ did b+ mid(>arch. ut the+ had done so well that the+ decided to e5pand their defensi&e perimeter north into the .leutian Islands, east to >idwa+ Island, and south through the 1olomon Islands and southern New 0uinea. #heir first mo&e was b+ sea, to ta7e /ort >oresb+ on the southeastern tip of New 0uinea. #he .mericans, using their abilit+ to read the ?apanese code, had a na&al tas7 force on the scene. In the ensuing attle of the ,oral 1ea '>a+ 7(8), fought entirel+ b+ aircraft carriers, the ?apanese were forced to abandon their designs on /ort >oresb+. See ,oral 1ea, attle of the. &he -attle o$ )id*ay . powerful ?apanese force, nine battleships and four carriers under .dmiral Namamoto Isoro7u, the commander in chief of the na&+, steamed toward >idwa+ in the first wee7 of ?une. .dmiral ,hester $. Nimit=, who had ta7en command of the /acific Fleet after /earl *arbor, could onl+ muster three carriers and se&en hea&+ cruisers, but he was reading the ?apanese radio messages. Namamoto, the architect of the /earl *arbor raid, had planned another surprise. #his time, howe&er, it was he who was surprised. <ff >idwa+, on the morning of ?une ", F.1. di&e(bombers destro+ed three of the ?apanese carriers in one 5(minute stri7e. #he fourth went down later in the da+, after its planes had battered the F.1. carrier Yor(to*n, which san7 two da+s later. See >idwa+, attle of. Namamoto ordered a general retreat on ?une 5. <n ?une 3(7 a secondar+ ?apanese force too7 2is7a and .ttu in the .leutians, but those were no recompense for the defeat at >idwa+, from which the ?apanese na&+ would ne&er reco&er. #heir battleships were intact, but the ,oral 1ea and >idwa+ had shown carriers to be the true capital ships of the war, and four of those were gone. "he "hird 'hase: "urn o% the "ide

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In late 4ecember 19"1 %oose&elt and ,hurchill and their chief ad&isers met in $ashington. #he+ reaffirmed the strateg+ of defeating 0erman+ first, and because it appeared that the ritish would ha&e all the+ could do fighting in Europe, the war against ?apan became almost solel+ a F.1. responsibilit+. #he+ also created the ,ombined ,hiefs of 1taff ',,1), a top(le&el ritish(.merican militar+ committee seated in $ashington, to de&elop and e5ecute a common strateg+. <n ?anuar+ 1, 19":, the Fnited 1tates, 0reat ritain, the F11%, and :- other countries signed the Fnited Nations 4eclaration in which the+ pledged not to ma7e a separate peace. #he Fnited Nations became the official name for the anti(.5is coalition, but the term used more often was the .llies, ta7en o&er from $orld $ar I. De%elopment of Allied Strate,* .s a practical matter, the F.1. could not ta7e much action in Europe in earl+ 19":. It had no troops there, and it was in the midst of building forces and con&erting industr+ at home. In North .frica, the ritish appeared to be more than holding their own. #he+ had relie&ed #obru7 on 4ecember 1!, 19"1, and ta7en angha= in Bib+a two wee7s later. %ommel counterattac7ed in late ?anuar+ 19": and dro&e them bac7 -!! 7m '185 mi) to al(0a=ala and ir *acheim, but there, well forward of #obru7 and the Eg+ptian border, a lull set in. .uro'e #he big 6uestion in the war was whether the F11% could sur&i&e a second 0erman summer offensi&e, and the %ussians were urging the F.1. and ritain to relie&e the pressure on them b+ starting an offensi&e in the west. 0eneral 0eorge ,. >arshall, the F.1. .rm+ chief of staff, belie&ed the best wa+ to help the %ussians and bring an earl+ end to the war was to stage a buildup in England and attac7 across the English ,hannel into northwestern Europe. *e wanted to act in the spring of 19"-, or e&en in 19": if the F11% appeared about to collapse. #he ritish did not want in&ol&ement elsewhere until North .frica was settled and did not belie&e a force strong enough for a cross(channel attac7 could be assembled in England b+ 19"-. %ommel settled the issue. In ?une he captured #obru7 and dro&e -8! 7m ':-5 mi) into Eg+pt, to .l P.lama+n 'El P.lamein). .fter that, the .mericans agreed to shel&e the cross( channel attac7 and read+ the troops en route to England for an in&asion of French North .frica. &he %aci$ic >eanwhile, despite the 0erman+(first strateg+, the .mericans were mo&ing toward an acti&e pursuit of the war against ?apan. #he F.1. Na&+ saw the /acific as an arena in which it could perform more effecti&el+ than in the .tlantic or the >editerranean. 0eneral 4ouglas >ac.rthur, who had commanded in the /hilippines and been e&acuated to .ustralia b+ submarine before the surrender, was the countr+8s best(7nown militar+ figure and as such too &aluable to be left with an inconse6uential mission. #he attle of >idwa+ had stopped the ?apanese in the central /acific, but the+ continued to ad&ance in the southwest /acific along the 1olomons chain and o&erland on New 0uinea. <n ?ul+ :, 19":, the F.1. ?oint ,hiefs of 1taff '?,1) directed the na&al and ground forces in the south and southwest /acific to halt the ?apanese, dri&e them out of the 1olomons and northeastern New 0uinea, and eliminate the great base the ?apanese had established at %abaul, on New ritain in the ismarc7 .rchipelago 'now in /apua New 0uinea). The Russian Front= Summer 158#

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In the most immediatel+ critical area of the war, the F11%, the initiati&e had passed to the 0ermans again b+ summer 19":. #he 1o&iet successes in the winter had been followed b+ disasters in the spring. 1etbac7s south of Beningrad, near 2har7i&, and in ,rimea had cost well more than a half(million men in prisoners alone. #he 0ermans had not sustained such massi&e losses, but the fighting had been e5pensi&e for them too, especiall+ since the 1o&iets had three times the human resources at their disposal. >oreo&er, *itler8s o&erconfidence had led him into a colossal error. *e had been so sure of &ictor+ in 19"1 that he had stopped most 7inds of weapons and ammunition production for the arm+ and shifted the industries to wor7 for the air force and na&+, with which he proposed to finish off the ritish. *e had resumed production for the arm+ in ?anuar+ 19":, but the flow would not reach the front until late summer. 1o&iet weapons output, on the other hand, after ha&ing dropped low in No&ember and 4ecember 19"1, had increased steadil+ since the turn of the +ear, and the 1o&iet industrial base also was larger than the 0erman. Boo7ing ahead to the summer, *itler 7new he could not again mount an all(out, three(pronged offensi&e. 1ome of the generals tal7ed about waiting a +ear until the arm+ could be rebuilt, but *itler was determined to ha&e the &ictor+ in 19":. *e had sufficient troops and weapons to bring the southern flan7 of the eastern front nearl+ to full strength, and he belie&ed he could compel the 1o&iet command to sacrifice its main forces tr+ing to defend the coal mines of the 4onets asin and the oil fields of the ,aucasus. &he !erman Dri e &o*ard the #aucasus #he offensi&e began east of 2har7i& on ?une :8, and in less than four wee7s the armies had ta7en the 4onets asin and ad&anced east to the 4on %i&er. #he distances co&ered were spectacular, but the numbers of enem+ 7illed or captured were relati&el+ small. 1talin and his generals had made the luc7iest mista7e of the war. elie&ing the 0ermans were going to aim a second, more powerful, attac7 on >oscow, the+ had held their reser&es bac7 and allowed the armies in the south to retreat. *itler, emboldened b+ the ease and speed of the ad&ance, altered his plan in the last wee7 of ?ul+. *e had originall+ proposed to dri&e due east to 1talingrad, sei=e a firm hold on the Eolga %i&er there, and onl+ then send a force south into the ,aucasus. <n ?ul+ :- he ordered two armies to continue the ad&ance toward 1talingrad and two to stri7e south across the lower 4on and ta7e the oil fields at >ai7op, 0ro=n++, and a7u. #he %ussians appeared to be heading toward disaster, as the 0erman thrust into the ,aucasus co&ered -!! 7m '185 mi) to >ai7op b+ .ugust 9. *itler8s strateg+, howe&er, presented a problem; #wo forces mo&ing awa+ from each other could not be sustained e6uall+ o&er the badl+ damaged railroads of the occupied territor+. In the second half of .ugust, he di&erted more supplies to the attac7 toward 1talingrad, and the march into the ,aucasus slowed. Ne&ertheless, success seemed to be in sight when the 1i5th .rm+ and Fourth /an=er .rm+ 'formerl+ group) closed near the 1talingrad suburbs on 1eptember -. &he /ussian Stand at Stalingrad #he F11% reached its low point in the war at the end of ?ul+ 19":. #he retreat was almost out of hand, and the 0ermans were getting into position to stri7e north along the Eolga behind >oscow as well as into the ,aucasus. <n ?ul+ :8 1talin issued his most famous order of the

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war, HNot a step bac7UI $hile threatening 4raconian punishments for slac7ers and defeatists, he relegated communism to the bac7ground and called on the troops to fight a HpatrioticI war for %ussia. Bi7e *itler, he had thus far conducted the war as he saw fit. In late .ugust he called on his two best militar+ professionals, @hu7o&, who had organi=ed the >oscow counteroffensi&e in 4ecember 19"1, and the arm+ chief of the 0eneral 1taff, 0eneral .le7sandr >. Easil+e&s7+, to deal with the situation at 1talingrad. #he+ proposed to wear the enem+ down b+ loc7ing its troops in a blood+ fight for the cit+ while the+ assembled the means for a counterattac7. Guadalcanal #he .5is was riding a high tide in midsummer 19":. 1talingrad and the ,aucasus oil were seemingl+ within *itler8s grasp, and %ommel was within stri7ing distance of the 1ue= ,anal. #he ?apanese had occupied 0uadalcanal at the southern end of the 1olomons chain and were marching on /ort >oresb+. $ithin the ne5t si5 months, howe&er, the .5is had been stopped and turned bac7 in the 1o&iet Fnion, North .frica, and the southwest /acific. F.1. >arines landed on 0uadalcanal on .ugust 7, 19":. .gainst a small ?apanese garrison, the landing was eas+. .fterward nothing was eas+. #he ?apanese responded swiftl+ and &iolentl+ b+ sea and b+ air. #he outcome hinged on the ?apanese na&+8s abilit+ to bring in reinforcements, which was substantial, and the F.1. Na&+8s abilit+ to 7eep the marines supplied, which was at times in some doubt. $hile the marines battled a determined foe in a debilitating tropical climate, between .ugust :" and No&ember -! the na&+ fought si5 maDor engagements in the waters surrounding the island. #he losses in ships and aircraft were hea&+ on both sides, but the ?apanese were more seriousl+ hurt because the+ could not afford to accept a war of attrition with the .mericans. #heir warships did not come out again after the end of No&ember, and the .mericans declared the island secure on Februar+ 9, 19"-. The An,lo-American -ffensi%e in North Africa

#he turnabout in North .frica began on .ugust -1, 19":, when %ommel attac7ed through the southern flan7 of the ritish line west of .l P.lama+n, was stopped at the P.lam al alfa8 %idge, and was thrown bac7 b+ 1eptember 7. #he newl+ appointed ritish commander, 0eneral ernard Baw >ontgomer+, hit the north flan7 on <ctober :- with a methodicall+ prepared offensi&e and, b+ No&ember 5, forced %ommel into a retreat. .merican and ritish #roops fighting together under 0eneral 4wight 4. Eisenhower began landing in >orocco and .lgeria on No&ember 8, the .mericans at ,asablanca and <ran, the ritish at .lgiers. #he 0ermans sent reinforcements into #unis and occupied all of France. #he+ managed to get the Fifth /an=er .rm+ under 0eneral ?Argen &on .rnim on the scene in time to stop Eisenhower in western #unisia b+ mid(4ecember. %ommel went into the >areth Bine in southeastern #unisia in earl+ Februar+ 19"- and launched an attac7 against the .mericans on Februar+ 1" that dro&e them bac7 8! 7m '5! mi) and out of the &ital 2asserine /ass. It was his last success and one he could not e5ploit. *itler recalled him in >arch, as the .mericans and ritish closed in from the west and south. .fter being cut off from their bases at i=erte and #unis and dri&en bac7 into poc7ets on the ,ape on /eninsula, :75,!!! 0ermans and Italians surrendered b+ >a+ 1-.

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The So%iet /ictor* at Stalin,rad <n the eastern front the 0ermans8 ad&ances to 1talingrad and into the ,aucasus had added about 11!! 7m 'about 38! mi) to their line. No 0erman troops were a&ailable to hold that e5tra distance, so *itler had to use troops contributed b+ his allies. ,onse6uentl+, while 1i5th and Fourth /an=er armies were tied down at 1talingrad in 1eptember and <ctober 19":, the+ were flan7ed on the left and right b+ %omanian armies. .n Italian and a *ungarian arm+ were deplo+ed farther upstream on the 4on %i&er. #rial maneu&ers had e5posed serious wea7nesses in some of the .5is8s armies. <n the morning of No&ember 19, in snow and fog, 1o&iet armored spearheads hit the %omanians west and south of 1talingrad. #heir points met three da+s later at 2alach on the 4on %i&er, encircling the 1i5th .rm+, about half of the Fourth /an=er .rm+, and a number of %omanian units. *itler ordered the 1i5th .rm+ commander, 0eneral Friedrich /aulus, to hold the poc7et, promised him air suppl+, and sent >anstein, b+ then a field marshal, to organi=e a relief. #he airlift failed to pro&ide the -!! tons of supplies that /aulus needed each da+, and >anstein8s relief operation was halted 55 7m '-" mi) short of the poc7et in late 4ecember. #he 1i5th .rm+ was doomed if it did not attempt a brea7out, which *itler refused to permit. #he %ussians pushed in on the poc7et from three sides in ?anuar+ 19"-, and /aulus surrendered on ?anuar+ -1. #he battle cost 0erman+ about :!!,!!! troops. In the aftermath of 1talingrad, in part owing to the collapse of the Italian and *ungarian armies, the 0ermans were forced to retreat from the ,aucasus and bac7 appro5imatel+ to the line from which the+ had started the 19": summer offensi&e. The Casa.lanca Conference From ?anuar+ 1" to :", 19"-, %oose&elt and ,hurchill and their staffs met in ,asablanca to la+ out a strateg+ for the period after the North .frican campaign. #he .merican militar+ chiefs wanted to proceed to the direct, cross(channel assault on 0erman+. #he ritish, elo6uentl+ spo7en for b+ ,hurchill, argued the ad&antages of gathering in the Hgreat pri=esI to be had in the >editerranean, in 1icil+ and Ital+ for a start. %oose&elt supported the ritish, and the .merican militar+ succeeded onl+ 'se&eral months later) in getting an agreement that no more troops would be put into the >editerranean area than were alread+ there, all others being assembled in England for a cross(channel attac7 in 19"". %oose&elt ga&e his militar+ another shoc7 when he announced that nothing short of unconditional surrender would be accepted from an+ of the .5is powers. #he polic+ was meant to reassure the %ussians, who would ha&e to wait at least another +ear for a full(fledged second front, but was li7el+ also to stiffen .5is resistance. Air Raids on German* .s a prelude to the postponed cross(channel attac7, the ritish and .mericans decided at ,asablanca to open a strategic air 'bombing) offensi&e against 0erman+. In this instance the+ agreed on timing but not on method. #he ritish, as a result of discouraging e5perience with da+light bombing earl+ in the war, had built their hea&+ bombers, the Bancasters and *alifa5es, for night bombing, which meant area bombing. #he .mericans belie&ed their (17 Fl+ing Fortresses and (:" Biberators were armed and armored hea&il+ enough and were fitted with sufficientl+ accurate bombsights to fl+ b+ da+light and stri7e pinpoint targets. #he difference was resol&ed b+ letting each nation conduct its own offensi&e in its own wa+ and calling the

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result round(the(cloc7 bombing. #he ritish method was e5emplified b+ four firebomb raids on *amburg in late ?ul+ 19"-, in which much of the cit+ was burned out and 5!,!!! people died. .merican losses of planes and crews increased sharpl+ as the bombers penetrated deeper into 0erman+. .fter earl+ <ctober 19"-, when stri7es at ball(bearing plants in 1chweinfurt incurred nearl+ :5 percent losses, the da+light offensi&e had to be curtailed until long(range fighters became a&ailable. The 2attle of >ursk efore the winter fighting on the eastern front ended in >arch 19"-, *itler 7new he could not manage another summer offensi&e, and he tal7ed about setting up an east wall comparable to the fortified .tlantic wall he was building along the western European coast. #he long winter8s retreat, howe&er, had shortened the front enough to gi&e him a surplus of almost two armies. It also left a large westward bulge in the front around the cit+ of 2urs7. #o *itler, the opportunit+ for one more grand encirclement was too good to let pass. .fter waiting three months for more new tan7s to come off the assembl+ lines, *itler opened the battle at 2urs7 on ?ul+ 5 with attac7s north and south across the open eastern end of the bulge. @hu7o& and Easil+e&s7+ had also had their e+es on 2urs7, and the+ had hea&il+ reinforced the front around it. In the war8s greatest tan7 battle, the %ussians fought the 0ermans nearl+ to a standstill b+ ?ul+ 1:. *itler then called off the operation because the .mericans and ritish had landed on 1icil+, and he needed to transfer di&isions to Ital+. $ith that, the strategic initiati&e in the east passed to the 1o&iet forces permanentl+. The $n%asion of $tal* #hree .merican, one ,anadian, and three ritish di&isions landed on 1icil+ on ?ul+ 1!. #he+ pushed across the island from beachheads on the south coast in fi&e wee7s, against four Italian and two 0erman di&isions, and o&ercame the last .5is resistance on .ugust 17. In the meantime, >ussolini had been stripped of power on ?ul+ :5, and the Italian go&ernment had entered into negotiations that resulted in an armistice signed in secret on 1eptember - and made public on 1eptember 8. <n 1eptember - elements of >ontgomer+8s ritish Eighth .rm+ crossed the 1trait of >essina from 1icil+ to the toe of the Italian boot. #he F.1. Fifth .rm+, under 0eneral >ar7 $. ,lar7, staged a landing near 1alerno on 1eptember 99 and b+ <ctober 1:, the ritish and .mericans had a fairl+ solid line across the peninsula from the Eolturno %i&er, north of Naples, to #ermoli on the .driatic coast. #he Italian surrender brought little militar+ benefit to the .llies, and b+ the end of the +ear, the 0ermans stopped them on the 0usta& line about 1!! 7m 'about 3! mi) south of %ome. . landing at .n=io on ?anuar+ ::, 19"", failed to sha7e the 0usta& line, which was solidl+ anchored on the Biri %i&er and >onte ,assino. Allied Strate,* A,ainst <apan 1trateg+ in the war with ?apan e&ol&ed b+ stages during 19"-. In the first, the goal was to secure bases on the coast of ,hina 'from which ?apan could be bombed and later in&aded) b+ ritish and ,hinese dri&es through urma and eastern ,hina and b+ .merican thrusts through the islands of the central and southwestern /acific to #aiwan and ,hina. + mid+ear, it was apparent that neither the ritish nor the ,hinese dri&e was li7el+ to materiali=e. #hereafter, onl+ the two .merican thrusts remained. #heir obDecti&es were still Formosa and the ,hinese coast.

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3;S; Ad%ances in the 'acific In the /acific, F.1. troops retoo7 .ttu, in the .leutians, in a hard(fought, -(wee7 battle beginning on >a+ :-. '#he ?apanese e&acuated 2is7a before .mericans and ,anadians landed there in .ugust.) #he main action was in the southwest /acific. #here F.1. and New @ealand troops, under .dmiral $illiam *alse+, ad&anced through the 1olomons, ta7ing New 0eorgia in .ugust and a large beachhead on ougain&ille in No&ember. .ustralians and .mericans under >ac.rthur dro&e the ?apanese bac7 along the East ,oast of New 0uinea and too7 Bae and 1alamaua in 1eptember. >ac.rthur8s and *alse+8s mission, as set b+ the ?,1 in 19":, had been to ta7e %abaul, but the+ disco&ered in the 1olomons that ha&ing command of the air and sea around them was enough to neutrali=e the ?apanese Island garrisons and render them useless. Bandings on ,ape 0loucester, New ritain, in 4ecember, in the .dmiralt+ Islands in Februar+ 19"", and .t Emirau Island in >arch 19"" effecti&el+ sealed off %abaul. Its 1!!,!!!(man garrison could not thereafter be either ade6uatel+ supplied or e&acuated. #he central /acific thrust was slower in getting started. #he southwest /acific islands were relati&el+ close together9 airfields on one could furnish support for the mo&e to the ne5t9 and the ?apanese na&+ was war+ of ris7ing its ships within range of land(based aircraft. In the central /acific, howe&er, the islands were scattered o&er &ast stretches of ocean, and powerful na&al forces were needed to support the landings, particularl+ aircraft carriers, which were not a&ailable in sufficient numbers until late 19"-. #he first central /acific landings were in the 0ilbert Islands, at >a7in and #arawa in No&ember 19"-. etio Island in the #arawa .toll, 117.8 hectares ':91 acres) of coral sand and concrete and coconut log bun7ers, cost the :nd >arine 4i&ision -!!! casualties in three da+s. >ore intensi&e preliminar+ bombardments and larger numbers of amphibian tractors capable of crossing the surrounding reefs made the ta7ing of 2waDalein and Eneweta7 in the >arshall Islands in Februar+ 19"" somewhat less e5pensi&e. "he #ourth 'hase: &llied +ictor, .fter the attle of 2urs7, the last lingering doubt about the 1o&iet forces was whether the+ could conduct a successful summer offensi&e. It was dispelled in the first wee7 of .ugust 19"-, when slashing attac7s hit the 0erman line north and west of 2har7i&. <n .ugust 1: *itler ordered wor7 started on an east wall to be built along the Nar&a %i&er and Ba7es /s7o& and /eipus, behind .rm+ 0roup North, and the 4esna and 4nieper ri&ers, behind .rm+ 0roups ,enter and 1outh. In the second half of the month, the 1o&iet offensi&e e5panded south along the 4onets %i&er and north into the .rm+ 0roup ,enter sector. <n 1eptember 15 *itler permitted .rm+ 0roup 1outh to retreat to the 4nieper %i&er9 otherwise it was li7el+ to be destro+ed. *e also ordered e&er+thing in the area east of the 4nieper that could be of an+ use to the enem+ to be hauled awa+, burned, or blown up. #his scorched(earth polic+, as it was called, could onl+ be partiall+ carried out before the arm+ group crossed the ri&er at the end of the month. *enceforth, that polic+ would be applied in all territor+ surrendered to the %ussians. ehind the ri&er, the 0erman troops found no trace of an east wall, and the+ had to contend from the first with fi&e 1o&iet bridgeheads. #he high west ban7 of the ri&er was the best defensi&e line left in the 1o&iet Fnion, and the 1o&iet armies, under @hu7o& and Easil+e&s7+, fought furiousl+ to pre&ent the 0ermans from gaining a foothold there. #he+ e5panded the

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bridgeheads, isolated a 0erman arm+ in ,rimea in <ctober, too7 2+i& on No&ember 3, and sta+ed on the offensi&e into the winter with hardl+ a pause. The Tehran Conference .t the end of No&ember, %oose&elt and ,hurchill Dourne+ed to #ehr an for their first meeting with 1talin. #he president and the prime minister had alread+ appro&ed, under the code name <&erlord, a plan for a cross(channel attac7. %oose&elt wholeheartedl+ fa&ored e5ecuting <&erlord as earl+ in 19"" as the weather permitted. .t #ehr an, ,hurchill argued for gi&ing priorit+ to Ital+ and possible new offensi&es in the al7ans or southern France, but he was out&oted b+ %oose&elt and 1talin. <&erlord was set for >a+ 19"". .fter the meeting, the ,,1 recalled Eisenhower from the >editerranean and ga&e him command of the 1upreme *ead6uarters .llied E5peditionar+ Forces '1*.EF), which was to organi=e and carr+ out <&erlord. #he #ehran conference mar7ed the high point of the East($est wartime alliance. 1talin came to the meeting as a &ictorious war leader9 large 6uantities of F.1. lend(lease aid were flowing into the 1o&iet Fnion through >urmans7 and the /ersian 0ulf9 and the decision on <&erlord satisfied the long(standing 1o&iet demand for a second front. .t the same time, strains were de&eloping as the 1o&iet armies approached the borders of the smaller eastern European states. In >a+ 19"- the 0ermans had produced e&idence lin7ing the F11% to the deaths of some 11,!!! /olish officers found buried in mass gra&es in the 2at+n Forest near 1molens7. 1talin had se&ered relations with the /olish e5ile go&ernment in Bondon, and he insisted at #ehran, as he had before, that the postwar 1o&iet(/olish boundar+ would ha&e to be the one established after the /olish defeat in 19-9. *e also reacted with barel+ concealed hostilit+ to ,hurchill8s proposal of a ritish(.merican thrust into the al7ans. German 'reparations for -%erlord *itler e5pected an in&asion of northwestern Europe in the spring of 19"", and he welcomed it as a chance to win the war. If he could throw the .mericans and ritish off the beaches, he reasoned, the+ would not soon tr+ again. *e could then throw all of his forces, nearl+ half of which were in the west, against the F11%. In No&ember 19"- he told the commanders on the eastern front that the+ would get no more reinforcements until after the in&asion had been defeated. In ?anuar+ 19"" a 1o&iet offensi&e raised the siege of Beningrad and dro&e .rm+ 0roup North bac7 to the Nar&a %i&er(Ba7e /eipus line. #here the 0ermans found a tenuous refuge in the one segment of the east wall that had been to some e5tent fortified. <n the south flan7, successi&e offensi&es, the last in >arch and .pril, pushed the 0ermans in the broad stretch between the /olesK+e >arshes '/rip+atK >arshes) and the lac7 1ea off of all but a few shreds of 1o&iet territor+. #he greater part of 15!,!!! 0ermans and %omanians in ,rimea died or passed into 1o&iet capti&it+ in >a+ after a belated sealift failed to get them out of 1e&astopol8. <n the other hand, enough tan7s and weapons had been turned out to e6uip new di&isions for the west and replace some of those lost in the east9 the air force had "! percent more planes than at the same time a +ear earlier9 and s+nthetic oil production reached its wartime pea7 in .pril 19"". The Normand* $n%asion

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<n ?une 3, 19"", 4(4a+, the da+ of in&asion for <&erlord, the F.1. First .rm+, under 0eneral <mar N. radle+, and the ritish 1econd .rm+, under 0eneral >iles ,. 4empse+, established beachheads in Normand+, on the French channel coast. #he 0erman resistance was strong, and the footholds for .llied armies were not nearl+ as good as the+ had e5pected. Ne&ertheless, the powerful counterattac7 with which *itler had proposed to throw the .llies off the beaches did not materiali=e, neither on 4(4a+ nor later. Enormous .llied air superiorit+ o&er northern France made it difficult for %ommel, who was in command on the scene, to mo&e his limited reser&es. >oreo&er, *itler became con&inced that the Normand+ landings were a feint and the main assault would come north of the 1eine %i&er. ,onse6uentl+, he refused to release the di&isions he had there and insisted on drawing in reinforcements from more distant areas. + the end of ?une, Eisenhower had 85!,!!! men and 15!,!!! &ehicles ashore in Normand+. The So%iet Recon?uest of 2elorussia #he 0erman eastern front was 6uiet during the first three wee7s of ?une 19"". *itler full+ e5pected a 1o&iet summer offensi&e, which he and his militar+ ad&isers belie&ed would come on the south flan7. 1ince 1talingrad the 1o&iets had concentrated their main effort there, and the 0ermans thought 1talin would be eager to push into the al7ans, the historic obDect of %ussian ambition. .lthough .rm+ 0roup ,enter was holding elorussiaQthe onl+ large piece of 1o&iet territor+ still in 0erman handsQand although signs of a 1o&iet buildup against the arm+ group multiplied in ?une, the+ did not belie&e it was in real danger. <n ?une ::(:-, four 1o&iet arm+ groups, two controlled b+ @hu7o& and two b+ Easil+e&s7+, hit .rm+ 0roup ,enter. <utnumbered b+ about ten to one at the points of attac7, and under orders from *itler not to retreat, the arm+ group began to disintegrate almost at once. + ?ul+ -, when 1o&iet spearheads coming from the northeast and southeast met at >ins7, the elorussian capital, .rm+ 0roup ,enter had lost two(thirds of its di&isions. + the third wee7 of the month, @hu7o&8s and Easil+e&s7+8s fronts had ad&anced about -!! 7m 'about :!! mi). #he 1o&iet command celebrated on ?ul+ 17 with a da+(long march b+ 57,!!! 0erman prisoners, including 19 generals, through the streets of >oscow. The 'lot A,ainst 4itler . group of 0erman officers and ci&ilians concluded in ?ul+ that getting rid of *itler offered the last remaining chance to end the war before it swept onto 0erman soil from two directions. <n ?ul+ :! the+ tried to 7ill him b+ placing a bomb in his head6uarters in East /russia. #he bomb e5ploded, wounding a number of officersQse&eral fatall+Qbut inflicting onl+ minor inDuries on *itler. .fterward, the 0estapo hunted down e&er+one suspected of complicit+ in the plot. <ne of the suspects was %ommel, who committed suicide. *itler emerged from the assassination attempt more secure in his power than e&er before. The 0i.eration of France .s of ?ul+ :" the .mericans and ritish were still confined in the Normand+ beachhead, which the+ had e5panded somewhat to ta7e in 1aint(BV and ,aen. radle+ began the brea7out the ne5t da+ with an attac7 south from 1aint(BV. #hereafter, the front e5panded rapidl+, and Eisenhower regrouped his forces. >ontgomer+ too7 o&er the ritish 1econd .rm+ and the

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,anadian First .rm+. radle+ assumed command of a newl+ acti&ated #welfth .rm+ 0roup consisting of F.1. First and #hird armies under 0eneral ,ourtne+ *. *odges and 0eneral 0eorge 1. /atton. .fter the .mericans had turned east from .&ranches in the first wee7 of .ugust, a poc7et de&eloped around the 0erman Fifth /an=er and 1e&enth armies west of Falaise. #he 0ermans held out until .ugust :! but then retreated across the 1eine. <n .ugust :5 the .mericans, in conDunction with 0eneral ,harles de 0aulle8s Free French and %esistance forces, liberated /aris. >eanwhile, on .ugust 15, .merican and French forces had landed on the southern coast of France east of >arseille and were pushing north along the &alle+ of the %hVne %i&er. #he+ made contact with radle+8s forces near 4iDon in the second wee7 of 1eptember. 'ause in the Western -ffensi%e radle+ and >ontgomer+ sent their arm+ groups north and east across the 1eine on .ugust :5, the ritish going along the coast toward elgium, the .mericans toward the Franco(0erman border. >ontgomer+8s troops sei=ed .ntwerp on 1eptember -, and the first .merican patrols crossed the 0erman border on 1eptember 11. ut the pursuit was ending. #he 0erman armies shattered in the brea7out were being rebuilt, and *itler sent as commander Field >arshal $alter >odel, who had earned a reputation as the so(called lion of the defense on the eastern front. >ontgomer+ had reached formidable water barriersQthe >euse and lower %hine ri&ersQ and the .mericans were coming up against the west wall, which had been built in the 19-!s as the 0erman counterpart to the >aginot line. .lthough most of its big guns had been remo&ed, the west wall8s concrete bun7ers and antitan7 barriers would ma7e it tough to crac7. #he .llies8 most serious problem was that the+ had outrun their supplies. 0asoline and ammunition in particular were scarce and were being brought from French ports on the channel coast o&er as much as 8!! 7m '5!! mi) of war(damaged roads and railroads. Fntil the port of .ntwerp could be cleared and put into operation, maDor ad&ances li7e those in .ugust and earl+ 1eptember were out of the 6uestion. The Warsa( 3prisin, #he 1o&iet offensi&e had spread to the flan7s of .rm+ 0roup ,enter in ?ul+. <n ?ul+ :9 a spearhead reached the altic coast near %ga and se&ered .rm+ 0roup North8s land contact with the 0erman main front. /owerful thrusts past .rm+ 0roup ,enter8s south flan7 reached the line of the $isla 'Eistula) %i&er upstream from $arsaw b+ the end of the month. In $arsaw on ?ul+ -1 the /olish underground *ome .rm+ commanded b+ 0eneral #adeus= 2omorows7i '7nown as 0eneral or) staged an uprising. #he insurgents, who were lo+al to the anti( ,ommunist e5ile go&ernment in Bondon, disrupted the 0ermans for se&eral da+s. #he 1o&iet forces held fast on the east side of the $isla, howe&er, and 1talin refused to let F.1. planes use 1o&iet airfields for ma7ing suppl+ flights for the insurgents. *e did, finall+, allow one flight b+ 11! (17s, which was made on 1eptember 18. + then it was too late9 the 0ermans had the upper hand9 and 2omorows7i surrendered on <ctober :. 1talin insisted that his forces could not ha&e crossed into $arsaw because the+ were too wea7, which was probabl+ not true. <n the other hand, the line of the $isla was as far as the 1o&iet armies could go on a broad front without pausing to replenish their supplies. The Defeat of German*@s Allies in the &ast

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$hile the 1o&iet Fnion was letting the $arsaw uprising run its tragic course, it was gathering in a plentiful har&est of successes elsewhere. .n offensi&e between the ,arpathian >ountains and the lac7 1ea, opened on .ugust :!, resulted in %omania8s as7ing for an armistice three da+s later. ulgaria, which had ne&er declared war on the 1o&iet Fnion, surrendered on 1eptember 9, Finland on 1eptember 19. 1o&iet troops too7 elgrade on <ctober :! and installed a ,ommunist go&ernment under #ito in Nugosla&ia. In *ungar+, the %ussians were at the gates of udapest b+ late No&ember. Allied Ad%ances in $tal* '19""). #he Italian campaign passed into the shadow of <&erlord in the summer of 19"". ,lar78s Fifth .rm+, comprising French and /oles as well as .mericans, too7 >onte ,assino on >a+ 18. . brea7out from the .n=io beachhead fi&e da+s later forced the 0ermans to abandon the whole 0usta& line, and the Fifth .rm+ entered %ome, an open cit+ since ?une ". #he ad&ance went well for some distance north of %ome, but it was bound to lose momentum because F.1. and French di&isions would soon be withdrawn for the in&asion of southern France. .fter ta7ing .ncona on the east and Florence on the west coast in the second wee7 of .ugust, the .llies were at the 0erman 0othic line. .n offensi&e late in the month demolished the 0othic line but failed in three months to carr+ through to the /o %i&er &alle+ and was stopped for the winter in the mountains. The 2attle of the 'hilippine Sea <perations against ?apan in the /acific pic7ed up speed in 19"". In the spring, the ?,1 proDected ad&ances b+ >ac.rthur through northwestern New 0uinea and into the /hilippines and b+ Nimit= across the central /acific to the >arianas and ,aroline Islands. #he ?apanese, on their part, were getting read+ for a decisi&e na&al battle east of the /hilippines. .fter ma7ing leaps along the New 0uinea coast to .itape, *ollandia, and $a7de Island in .pril and >a+, >ac.rthur8s troops landed on ia7 Island on >a+ :7. .irfields on ia7 would enable F.1. planes to harass the ?apanese fleet in the /hilippines. . stri7ing force built around the world8s two largest battleships, Yamato and )usashi, was steaming toward ia7 on ?une 1when the F.1. Na&+ began bombing and shelling 1aipan in the >arianas. #he ?apanese ships were then ordered to turn north and Doin the First >obile Fleet of .dmiral <=awa ?isaburo, which was heading out of the /hilippines toward the >arianas. <n ?une 19 and :!, <=awa met F.1. #as7 Force 58, under .dmiral >arc .. >itscher, in the attle of the /hilippine 1ea. #he outcome was decided in the air and under the sea. <=awa had fi&e hea&+ and four light carriers9 >itscher had nine hea&+ and si5 light carriers. <n the first da+, in what was called the >arianas #ur7e+ 1hoot, F.1. fighters downed :19 of -:3 ?apanese planes sent against them. $hile the air battle was going on, F.1. submarines san7 <=awa8s two largest carriers, one of them his flagship9 and on the second da+, di&e(bombers san7 a third big carrier. .fter that, <=awa steered north toward <7inawa with Dust -5 planes left. It was the end for ?apanese carrier a&iation. >itscher lost :3 planes, and - of his ships suffered minor damage. Strate,ic Shift in the 'acific F.1. forces landed on 1aipan on ?une 15. #he .mericans had possession of 1aipan, #inian, and 0uam b+ .ugust 1!, gi&ing them the 7e+ to a strateg+ for ending the war. #he islands could accommodate bases for the new .merican long(range bombers, the (:9

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1uperfortresses, which could reach #o7+o and the other main ?apanese cities at least as well from the islands as the+ would ha&e been able to from bases in ,hina. >oreo&er, F.1. na&al superiorit+ in the /acific was rapidl+ becoming sufficient to sustain an in&asion of ?apan itself across the open ocean. #hat in&asion, howe&er, would ha&e to wait for the defeat of 0erman+ and the subse6uent release of ground troops from Europe for use in the /acific. #he regular bombing of ?apan began in No&ember 19"". .lthough the shift in strateg+ raised some doubts about the need for the operations in the ,arolines and /hilippines, the+ went ahead as planned, with landings in the western ,arolines at /eleliu '1eptember 15), Flithi '1eptember :-), and Ngulu '<ctober 13) and in the central /hilippines on Be+te '<ctober :!). #he in&asion of the /hilippines brought the ?apanese na&+ out in force for the last time in the war. In the -(da+ attle for Be+te 0ulf '<ctober :-(:5), the outcome of which was at times more in doubt than the final result would seem to indicate, the ?apanese lost :3 ships, including the giant battleship )usashi, and the .mericans lost 7 ships. The Air War in &urope #he main action against 0erman+ during the fall of 19"" was in the air. Escorted b+ long(range fighters, particularl+ /(51 >ustangs, F.1. bombers hit industrial targets b+ da+, while the 0erman cities crumbled under ritish bombing b+ night. *itler had responded b+ bombarding England, beginning in ?une, with E(1 fl+ing bombs and in 1eptember with E(: roc7ets9 but the best launching sites, those in northwestern France and in elgium, were lost in <ctober. #he effects of the .llied strategic bombing were less clear(cut than had been e5pected. #he bombing did not destro+ ci&ilian morale, and 0erman fighter plane and armored &ehicle production reached their wartime pea7s in the second half of 19"". <n the other hand, iron and steel output dropped b+ half between 1eptember and 4ecember, and continued bombing of the s+nthetic oil plants, coupled with loss of the /loie sti oil fields in %omania, se&erel+ limited the fuel that would be a&ailable for the tan7s and planes coming off the assembl+ lines. #he shortening of the fronts on the east and the west and the late +ear lull in the ground fighting ga&e *itler one more chance to create a reser&e of about :5 di&isions. *e resol&ed to use them offensi&el+ against the ritish and .mericans b+ cutting across elgium to .ntwerp in an action similar to the sweep through the .rdennes that had brought the ritish and French to disaster at 4un7er6ue in >a+ 19"!. The 2attle of the 2ul,e #he 0erman .rdennes offensi&e, soon to be 7nown to the .llies as the attle of the ulge ' see ulge, attle of the), began on 4ecember 13. #he .mericans were ta7en completel+ b+ surprise. #he+ put up a strong resistance, howe&er, and were able to hold the critical road centers of 1aint(Eith and astogne. #he 0erman effort was doomed after 4ecember :-, when good fl+ing weather allowed the o&erwhelming .llied air superiorit+ to ma7e itself felt. Ne&ertheless, it was not until the end of ?anuar+ that the last of the 8!(7m '5!(mi) deep HbulgeI in the .llied lines was eliminated. #he .llied ad&ance into 0erman+ was not resumed until Februar+. The Aalta Conference

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+ then the 1o&iet armies were on the <dra '<der) %i&er, 3! 7m '-5 mi) east of erlin. #he+ had smashed the 0erman line on the $isla %i&er and reached the altic coast east of 4an=ig '0dans7) in ?anuar+ 19"5 and had a tight hold on the <dra b+ Februar+ -. 1talin would meet %oose&elt and ,hurchill at Nalta 'see Nalta ,onference) in ,rimea 'Februar+ "(11) with all of /oland in his poc7et and with erlin and, for all an+bod+ then 7new, most of 0erman+ as well within his grasp. .t Nalta, 1talin agreed to enter the war against ?apan within three months after the 0erman surrender in return for territorial concessions in the Far East. #he .mericans and ritish, as was their custom, disagreed on how to proceed against 0erman+. In a meeting at >alta shortl+ before the Nalta conference, >ontgomer+ and the ritish members of the ,,1 argued for a fast single thrust b+ >ontgomer+8s arm+ group across the north 0erman plain to erlin. #o sustain such a thrust, the+ wanted the bul7 of .llied supplies to go to >ontgomer+, which meant the .merican armies would ha&e to sta+ on the defensi&e. Eisenhower8s plan, which pre&ailed, was to gi&e >ontgomer+ first priorit+ but also 7eep the .merican armies on the mo&e. Crossin, the Rhine #he first stage for all of the .llied armies was to reach the %hine %i&er. #o accomplish that, the+ had to brea7 through the west wall in the south and cross the %uhr '4utch %oer) %i&er on the north. #he 0ermans had flooded the %uhr Ealle+ b+ opening dams. .fter waiting nearl+ two wee7s for the water to subside, the F.1. Ninth and First armies crossed the %uhr on Februar+ :-. In earl+ >arch, the armies closed up to the %hine. #he bridges were down e&er+whereQ e&er+where, that is, e5cept at the small cit+ of %emagen, where units of the F.1. First .rm+ captured the Budendorff railroad bridge on >arch 7. + >arch :", when >ontgomer+ sent elements of the ritish 1econd .rm+ and the F.1. Ninth .rm+ across the ri&er, the F.1. First .rm+ was occup+ing a sprawling bridgehead between onn and 2oblen=. <n >arch :: the F.1. #hird .rm+ had sei=ed a bridgehead south of >ain=. #hus, the whole barrier of the ri&er was bro7en, and Eisenhower ordered the armies to stri7e east on a broad front. Allied -.Becti%es in German* .d&ancing at times o&er 8! 7m 'o&er 5! mi) a da+, the F.1. First and Ninth armies closed an encirclement around the industrial heart of 0erman+, the %uhr, on .pril 1. #he+ trapped -:5,!!! 0erman troops in the poc7et. #he ritish 1econd .rm+ crossed the $eser %i&er, halfwa+ between the %hine and the Elbe ri&ers, on .pril 5. <n .pril 11 the Ninth .rm+ reached the Elbe near >agdeburg and the ne5t da+ too7 a bridgehead on the east side, thereb+ putting itself within stri7ing distance '1:! 7mW75 mi) of erlin. #he Ninth .rm+8s arri&al on the Elbe raised a 6uestion of a Hrace for erlin.I #he ritish, especiall+ ,hurchill and >ontgomer+, and some .mericans contended that erlin was the most important obDecti&e in 0erman+ because the world, and the 0erman people especiall+, would regard the forces that too7 erlin as the real &ictors in the war. Eisenhower, supported b+ the ?,1, insisted that, militaril+, erlin was not worth the possible cost of ta7ing it, and a Dunction with the %ussians could be made Dust as well farther south in the &icinit+ of Beip=ig and 4resden. >oreo&er, he belie&ed Na=i diehards were going to ta7e refuge in a redoubt in the a&arian mountains, and he wanted, therefore, to direct the main weight of his .merican forces into south 0erman+.

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#he 1o&iet front, meanwhile, had remained stationar+ on the <dra %i&er since Februar+, which raised another 6uestion. #he postwar 1o&iet e5planation was that their flan7s on the north and south were threatened and had to be cleared. #he se6uence of e&ents after Februar+ 19"5 indicates that 1talin did not belie&e the ritish and .mericans could cross 0erman+ as fast as the+ did and, conse6uentl+, assumed he would ha&e ample time to complete his con6uest of eastern Europe before heading into central 0erman+. .lthough he told Eisenhower differentl+, he ob&iousl+ did not regard erlin as unimportant. In the first wee7 of .pril, his armies went into a whirlwind redeplo+ment for a erlin offensi&e. The Final 2attles in &urope *itler8s last, faint hope, strengthened briefl+ b+ %oose&elt8s death on .pril 1:, was for a falling out between the $estern powers and the 1o&iet Fnion. #he East($est alliance was, in fact, strained, but the brea7 would not come in time to benefit Na=i 0erman+. <n .pril 1" and 13 the F.1. Fifth and ritish Eighth armies launched attac7s that brought them to the /o %i&er in a wee7. #he 1o&iet ad&ance toward erlin began on .pril 13. #he F.1. 1e&enth .rm+ captured NArnberg, the site of Na=i /art+ rallies in the 19-!s, on .pril :!. Four da+s later 1o&iet armies closed a ring around erlin. #he ne5t da+ the 1o&iet Fifth 0uards .rm+ and the F.1. First .rm+ made contact at #orgau on the Elbe %i&er northeast of Beip=ig, and 0erman+ was split into two parts. In the last wee7 of the month, organi=ed resistance against the .mericans and ritish practicall+ ceased, but the 0erman troops facing east battled desperatel+ to a&oid falling into 1o&iet capti&it+. The German Surrender *itler decided to await the end in erlin, where he could still manipulate what was left of the command apparatus. >ost of his political and militar+ associates chose to lea&e the capital for places in north and south 0erman+ li7el+ to be out of the 1o&iet reach. <n the afternoon of .pril -! *itler committed suicide in his erlin bun7er. .s his last significant official act, he named 0rand .dmiral 2arl 4oenit= to succeed him as chief of state. 4oenit=, who had been lo+al to *itler, had no course open to him other than surrender. *is representati&e, 0eneral .lfred ?odl, signed an unconditional surrender of all 0erman armed forces at Eisenhower8s head6uarters in %eims earl+ on >a+ 7. + then the 0erman forces in Ital+ had alread+ surrendered 'on >a+ :), as had those in *olland, north 0erman+, and 4enmar7 '>a+ "). #he F.1. and ritish go&ernments declared >a+ 8 E(E 'Eictor+ in Europe) 4a+. #he full unconditional surrender too7 effect at one minute past midnight after a second signing in erlin with 1o&iet participation. The Defeat of <apan .lthough ?apan8s position was hopeless b+ earl+ 19"5, an earl+ end to the war was not in sight. #he ?apanese na&+ would not be able to come out in force again, but the bul7 of the arm+ was intact and was deplo+ed in the home islands and ,hina. #he ?apanese ga&e a foretaste of what was +et in store b+ resorting to 7ami7a=e '?apanese, Hdi&ine windI) attac7s, or suicide air attac7s, during the fighting for Bu=on in the /hilippines. <n ?anuar+ "(1-, 19"5, 6uic7l+ trained 7ami7a=e pilots fl+ing obsolete planes had sun7 17 F.1. ships and damaged 5!. See 2ami7a=e.

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I*o +ima and O(ina*a $hile the final assault on ?apan awaited reinforcements from Europe, the island(hopping approach march continued, first, with a landing on Iwo ?ima on Februar+ 19. #hat small, barren island cost the li&es of o&er 3!!! F.1. >arines before it was secured on >arch 13. 1ituated almost halfwa+ between the >arianas and #o7+o, the island pla+ed an important part in the air war. Its two airfields pro&ided landing sites for damaged (:9s and enabled fighters to gi&e the bombers co&er during their raids on ?apanese cities. <n .pril 1 the F.1. #enth .rm+, composed of four arm+ and four marine di&isions under 0eneral 1imon . uc7ner, ?r., landed on <7inawa, 5!! 7m '-1! mi) south of the southernmost ?apanese island, 2+ushu. #he ?apanese did not defend the beaches. #he+ proposed to ma7e their stand on the southern tip of the island, across which the+ had constructed three strong lines. #he northern three(fifths of the island were secured in less than two wee7s, the third line in the south could not be breached until ?une 1", and the fighting continued to ?une :1. Hiroshima and 0agasa(i

#he ne5t attac7 was scheduled for 2+ushu in No&ember 19"5. .n eas+ success seemed unli7el+. #he ?apanese had fought practicall+ to the last man on Iwo ?ima, and hundreds of soldiers and ci&ilians had Dumped off cliffs at the southern end of <7inawa rather than surrender. 2ami7a=e planes had sun7 15 na&al &essels and damaged :!! off <7inawa. #he 2+ushu landing was ne&er made. #hroughout the war, the F.1. go&ernment and the ritish, belie&ing 0erman+ was doing the same, had maintained a massi&e scientific and industrial proDect to de&elop an atomic bomb. #he chief ingredients, fissionable uranium and plutonium, had not been a&ailable in sufficient 6uantit+ before the war in Europe ended. #he first bomb was e5ploded in a test at .lamogordo, New >e5ico, on ?ul+ 13, 19"5. #wo more bombs had been built, and the possibilit+ arose of using them to con&ince the ?apanese to surrender. /resident *arr+ 1. #ruman decided to allow the bombs to be dropped because, he said, he belie&ed the+ might sa&e thousands of .merican li&es. For ma5imum ps+chological impact, the+ were used in 6uic7 succession, one o&er *iroshima on .ugust 3, the other o&er Nagasa7i on .ugust 9. #hese cities had not pre&iousl+ been bombed, and thus the bombs8 damage could be accuratel+ assessed. F.1. estimates put the number 7illed in *iroshima at 33,!!! to 78,!!! and in Nagasa7i at -9,!!!. ?apanese estimates ga&e a combined total of :"!,!!!. #he F11% declared war on ?apan on .ugust 8 and in&aded >anchuria the ne5t da+. &he +a'anese Surrender

<n .ugust 1" ?apan announced its surrender, which was not 6uite unconditional because the .llies had agreed to allow the countr+ to 7eep its emperor. #he formal signing too7 place on 1eptember : in #o7+o a+ aboard the battleship )issouri1 #he .llied delegation was headed b+ 0eneral >ac.rthur, who became the militar+ go&ernor of occupied ?apan.

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Cost of the War $orld $ar II8s basic statistics 6ualif+ it as b+ far the greatest war in histor+ in terms of human and material resources e5pended. In all, 31 countries with 1.7 billion people, three(fourths of the world8s population, too7 part. . total of 11! million persons were mobili=ed for militar+ ser&ice, more than half of those b+ three countries; the F11% '::(-! million), 0erman+ '17 million), and the Fnited 1tates '13 million). For the maDor participants the largest numbers on dut+ at an+ one time were as follows; F11% '1:,5!!,!!!)9 F.1. '1:,:"5,!!!)9 0erman+ '1!,9-8,!!!)9 ritish Empire and ,ommonwealth '8,7:!,!!!)9 ?apan '7,19-,!!!)9 and ,hina '5,!!!,!!!). >ost statistics on the war are onl+ estimates. #he war8s &ast and chaotic sweep made uniform record 7eeping impossible. 1ome go&ernments lost control of the data, and some resorted to manipulating it for political reasons. . rough consensus has been reached on the total cost of the war. In terms of mone+ spent, it has been put at more than S1 trillion, which ma7es it more e5pensi&e than all other wars combined. #he human cost, not including more than 5 million ?ews 7illed in the *olocaust ' see *olocaust; /esults o$ the Holocaust) who were indirect &ictims of the war, is estimated to ha&e been 55 million deadQ:5 million of those militar+ and -! million ci&ilian. &conomic Statistics #he F.1. spent the most mone+ on the war, an estimated S-"1 billion, including S5! billion for lend(lease supplies, of which S-1 billion went to ritain, S11 billion to the 1o&iet Fnion, S5 billion to ,hina, and S- billion to -5 other countries. 0erman+ was ne5t, with S:7: billion9 followed b+ the 1o&iet Fnion, S19: billion9 and then ritain, S1:! billion9 Ital+, S9" billion9 and ?apan, S53 billion. E5cept for the F.1., howe&er, and some of the less militaril+ acti&e .llies, the mone+ spent does not come close to being the war8s true cost. #he 1o&iet go&ernment has calculated that the F11% lost -! percent of its national wealth, while Na=i e5actions and looting were of incalculable amounts in the occupied countries. #he full cost to ?apan has been estimated at S53: billion. In 0erman+, bombing and shelling had produced " billion cu m '5 billion cu +d) of rubble. 4uman 0osses #he human cost of the war fell hea&iest on the F11%, for which the official total, militar+ and ci&ilian, is gi&en as more than :! million 7illed. #he .llied militar+ and ci&ilian losses were "" million9 those of the .5is, 11 million. #he militar+ deaths on both sides in Europe numbered 19 million and in the war against ?apan, 3 million. #he F.1., which had no significant ci&ilian losses, sustained :9:,1-1 battle deaths and 115,187 deaths from other causes. #he highest numbers of deaths, militar+ and ci&ilian, were as follows; F11% more than 1-,!!!,!!! militar+ and 7,!!!,!!! ci&ilian9 ,hina -,5!!,!!! and 1!,!!!,!!!9 0erman+ -,5!!,!!! and -,8!!,!!!9 /oland 1:!,!!! and 5,-!!,!!!9 ?apan 1,7!!,!!! and -8!,!!!9 Nugosla&ia -!!,!!! and 1,-!!,!!!9 %omania :!!,!!! and "35,!!!9 France :5!,!!! and -3!,!!!9 ritish Empire and ,ommonwealth "5:,!!! and 3!,!!!9 Ital+ --!,!!! and 8!,!!!9 *ungar+ 1:!,!!! and :8!,!!!9 and ,=echoslo&a7ia 1!,!!! and --!,!!!. /erhaps the most significant casualt+ o&er the long term was the world balance of power. ritain, France, 0erman+, and ?apan ceased to be great powers in the traditional militar+ sense, lea&ing onl+ two, the Fnited 1tates and the 1o&iet Fnion.

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