RULE 13, SEC. 2 RENE RAMOS vs.

ANTONIO LIM, 2005 FACTS: The instant proceedings stemmed from a Civil Case of the RTC at Cotabato City, for an action for recovery of possession of real property with damages thereat filed by the Spouses Lim against Rene Ramos, et al. After the Spouses Lim rested their case, Ramos, et al. then represented by Atty. Dilangalen, commenced presenting their evidence. At the scheduled hearing Atty. Dilangalen failed to appear, impelling one of them to seek a resetting. Apparently fed up with the numerous postponements previously sought by Ramos, et al., the trial court denied the desired resetting and instead issued an order on the same date declaring the case as submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence on record. 2 weeks later, Atty. Datukon entered into the picture by filing, for Ramos, et al., a motion for reconsideration of the court's aforesaid order. In his motion, Atty. Datukon explained the reason for Atty. Dilangalen's absence in the hearing and manifested the difficulty Ramos, et al. were encountering in finding a new counsel to take over the case. Before the trial court could act on the motion, Atty. Estaniel filed an "Entry of Appearance" as counsel de parte for Ramos, et al. "in substitution of Atty. Datukon". Copies of the pleading were furnished Atty. Datukon and the Spouses Lims counsel, Atty. Dalandag. Subsequently, Ramos, et al, assisted by Atty. Estaniel, conferred with the Spouses Lim at the trial judge's chamber to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement. Apparently, no settlement was reached. For, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Ramos, et al, to vacate the disputed premises and to demolish their houses thereon. Atty. Datukon was furnished with a copy of said decision but Atty. Estaniel was not. The Spouses Lim, on the premise that copies of the decision "had already been served upon [petitioners] through Rene Ramos and one of their counsel[s] of record" , filed a motion for execution. Copy of the motion was furnished Atty. Datukon who reacted by filing a "MANIFESTATION" informing the trial court that he was no longer petitioners' counsel, having, according to him, earlier been "formally substituted by Atty. J.M. Estaniel as counsel for [petitioners] per the Entry of Appearance of even date filed by Atty. J.M. Estaniel . . . [and thus] the notice of the instant motion [for execution]

served on him is not notice to the [petitioners]". Atty. Datukon furnished Atty. Estaniel a copy of the same Manifestation on April 1, 1996. ISSUE: WON notice to counsel is notice to the party, and consequently binds that party. HELD: YES. Should a party to a suit appear by counsel, service of every judgment, order, or pleading subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice or similar papers shall be made upon his counsels or one of them. Accordingly, notices of all kinds and all orders of the court must be sent to the counsel. While notice to counsel is an effective notice to the client, notice to a client and not to his counsel is not notice in law. Corollary to the foregoing postulates on attorney-client relationship is the rule that the client is bound by the action or inaction, as the case may be, of his counsel. Although Atty. Estaniel was not officially sent a copy of the trial court's decision, he was however, put on effective official notice. He must, therefore, be made accountable for his failure to seek, within the reglementary period a review of said decision. The notice of appeal he did file was filed out of time. As counsel for Ramos, et al, it was incumbent upon him, consistent with his duty to serve his client with competent and diligence, to inquire from the respondent court about the status of the case or to obtain a copy of the decision at the earliest possible time. April 1, 1996 is the controlling date when Atty. Estaniel was considered to have effectively been put on notice of the trial court's decision and whence the period of appeal should accordingly be reckoned. Then, having known of the decision, he (i,e., Atty Estaniel) should have filed a motion for reconsideration, or seek quashal of the motion for execution. He did not do so. It was only when Atty. Estaniel instructed his paralegal staff to get a copy of the decision of the respondent court. He was remiss as counsel for Ramos, et al. It is for this reason that the denial of the notice of appeal by the CA must be sustained.

RULE 13, SEC. 13 GOVERNMENT vs. ABALLE, 2006 FACTS: Salvador Wee (Wee) filed a Cadastral Case seeking the judicial reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title (OCT). The copy of the OCT was lost and/or destroyed, as evidenced by the certification issued by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appeared as Oppositor in behalf of the Government of the Philippines and authorized the City Prosecutor of Zamboanga City to likewise appear in its behalf. Notice of Hearing was posted in the Sheriffs Bulletin Board, the City Hall, and the public market, all in Zamboanga City. The notice was also published in the Official Gazette twice. Subsequently, the RTC reconstitution of the OCT. issued its Order allowing

4. [That] at the hearing, petitioner submits proof of publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by the court.

Jurisprudence dictates that these requirements must be complied with before the court can act on the petition and grant the reconstitution of title prayed for. The nonobservance of the requirement invalidates the whole reconstitution proceedings in the trial court. In this case, there is no showing that there were notices of hearing sent to the owners of the adjoining properties. Wee maintains that these notices were sent to the adjacent owners through registered mail. However, there is nothing in the records of this case that will prove service of these notices. It should be emphasized that Section 13 of R.A. No. 26 unequivocally requires a petitioner in a reconstitution proceeding to submit proof of notice. On this score, Rule 13, Section 13 is important. When service of notice is an issue, the rule is that the person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. In civil cases, service made through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with Section 7 of Rule 13 Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves, they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. Wee asserts that the registry return receipts are attached to the records of this case. It must be stressed, however, that the registry receipts alone are not sufficient to prove that notice was made to the adjoining owners. The law clearly states that it is the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and the affidavit of the person mailing, which proves service made through registered mail. Moreover, the Court notes that the registry receipts were not even marked as exhibits so that it may be considered as part of the records of the case. It must be stressed that the purposes of the stringent and mandatory character of the legal requirements of publication, posting and mailing are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of the existence of such action, and to give them enough time to intervene in the proceeding. In view of Wees failure to adequately prove that notices of hearing were sent to the adjoining owners of the property subject of the reconstitution case, the RTC, therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, and any proceedings held thereon are null and void.

The Government appealed the RTC Order to the CA on the sole ground that the trial court erred in ordering the reconstitution considering Wees failure to comply with the jurisdictional requisites therefor. The Government argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to Wees failure to comply with the requirement of notice to the adjoining owners, inasmuch as the Notice of Hearing was merely published and posted, but not furnished to the propertys adjoining owners. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTCs Order ruling that Wee had satisfactorily complied with the requirements laid down in Section 13 of Republic Act No. 26. ISSUE: WON the proof of notice (proof service) was satisfactorily complied with. HELD: NO. Under Sections 12 and 13 of RA No. 26, it was incumbent upon Wee to prove compliance with the following jurisdictional requirements:
xxx 3. [That] a copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein (i.e. the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining properties and all other interested parties) whose address is known at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing; and

RULE 13, SEC. 10 TOMAWIS vs. TABAO-CAUDANG, 2007 FACTS: Atty. Caudang was appointed as Regional Director of the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). At that time, the OMA staff and Regional Directors were not yet classified as Career Executive Service (CES) positions. Hence, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved Caudang's appointment as permanent. Subsequently, the directorship positions in the OMA, including those of Regional Directors, were classified as CES positions thereby requiring CES eligibility for permanent appointments. Caudang received a notice that she had been replaced by Mr. Umbra Tomawis. Aggrieved, Caudang requested a ruling from the CSC on her status (of appointment) as Regional Director. The CSC promulgated Resolution declaring Caudang's appointment as permanent. On the basis of that resolution, Caudang filed a petition for quo warranto. Caudang went to the CSC and moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC Resolution. However, the CSC denied Caudang's motion. The CSC noted that Caudang's petition for quo warranto was dismissed by the CA, thus, the motion for execution must necessarily fail. The CSC later denied Caudang's motion for reconsideration. Then OMA Executive Director removed Umbra Tomawis from the contested position and appointed Engr. Maruhom in his stead. Tomawis did not challenge his removal and, instead, claimed terminal pay equivalent to his earned leave credits. He was re-appointed to the same position but his appointment was characterized as temporary, because he did not possess the appropriate CES eligibility. Subsequently, Tomawis was directed to vacate and formally relinquish the position and turn over the office, along with its funds and properties, to Caudang. Caudang then requested the CSC to issue an order affirming the continuity of her service from the time she was separated from service until her reinstatement. The CSC denied Caudang's request. Aggrieved by the then OMA Executive Directors order requiring him to vacate his position, Tomawis instituted an action for injunction and prohibition against Caudang before the RTC.

Meanwhile, on September 15, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Tomawis (granting his petition for injunction and Prohibition against Caudang to cease, desist and refrain from further assuming the powers and functions of OMA Regional Director). A copy of the decision was served on Caudang and the following day, Caudang filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on December 15, 2003. However, it appears from the records that Caudang never received a copy of the December 15 Order. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order setting aside its September 15 and December 15, decision and resolution. Tomawis filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Execution of the September 15 decision and December 15 order of the RTC averring that they had become final and executory for failure of Caudang to appeal the same within the reglementary period. Caudang, however, opposed the motion claiming that she had not been served a copy of the order denying her motion for reconsideration (December 15 Decision). ISSUE: WON the September 15 Decision of the RTC attained finality even if Caudang had not received a copy of the resolution denying her motion for reconsideration. (Did not decision attained finality to justify the issuance of a writ of execution?) HELD: NO. Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides: Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions. Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. x x x. Section 10 of the same Rule provides: Completeness of service. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of 10 days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or after 5 days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service, the completeness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2) constructive service, which is deemed complete upon expiration of 5 days from the date the addressee received the first notice from the postmaster.

Thus, there is constructive service by registered mail only if there is conclusive proof that a first notice was duly sent by the postmaster to the addressee and that such first notice had been delivered to and received by the addressee. The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certification from the postmaster to the effect that not only was notice issued or sent but also on how, when and to whom the delivery was made. The mailman may also testify that the notice was actually delivered. In the instant case, there was no sufficient proof that Caudang actually received a copy of the December 15 resolution (the RTC Order denying her MR). Neither was there proof that a first notice was indeed received by her. As such, the rule on constructive notice cannot apply. Accordingly, since Caudang was not served a copy of the resolution, the decision could never attain finality. Consequently, there can be no valid basis for the issuance of the writ of execution.