EN BANC

TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant, A.C. No. 5834

Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ. Promulgated:

- versus -

ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent.

February 22, 2011 x --------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM: The case originated from an administrative complaint [1] filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, an action to declare a deed of absolute sale null and void and for reconveyance and damages, which complainant had filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

In an En Banc Decision[2] dated December 11, 2003, the Court found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for, among others, abandoning her clients cause in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any explanation for doing so. She was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, and was likewise directed to return to complainant, within ten (10) days from notice, the amount of P3,900.00 which complainant paid her for the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which she never filed. Respondent moved to reconsider[3] the decision but her motion was denied in a Resolution[4] dated February 24, 2004. Subsequently, while respondents five-year suspension from the practice of law was still in effect, Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales, Branch 71, sent a letter-report[5] dated November 12, 2007 to then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock informing the latter that respondent had appeared and actively participated in three cases wherein she misrepresented herself as Atty. Liezl Tanglao. When her opposing counsels confronted her and showed to the court a certification regarding her suspension, respondent admitted and conceded that she is Atty. Luna B. Avance, but qualified that she was only suspended for three years and that her suspension has already been lifted. Judge Amog-Bocar further stated that respondent nonetheless withdrew her appearance from all the cases. Attached to the letter-report were copies of several pertinent orders from her court confirming the report. Acting on Judge Amog-Bocars letter-report, the Court, in a Resolution[6] dated April 9, 2008, required respondent to comment within ten (10) days from notice. Respondent, however, failed to file the required comment. On June 10, 2009, the Court reiterated the directive to comment; otherwise the case would be deemed submitted for resolution based on available records on file with the Court. Still, respondent failed to comply despite notice. Accordingly, this Court issued a Resolution[7] on September 29, 2009 finding respondent guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and is hereby FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely. Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified

of this Resolution, and be it duly recorded in the personal file of respondent Atty. Luna B. Avance.[8]

A copy of the September 29, 2009 Resolution was sent to respondents address of record at 26-B Korea Ave., Ph. 4, Greenheights Subd., Nangka, Marikina City by registered mail. The same was delivered by Postman Hermoso Mesa, Jr. and duly received by one Lota Cadete on October 29, 2009, per certification[9] dated February 3, 2011by Postmaster Rufino C. Robles of the Marikina Central Post Office. Despite due notice, however, respondent failed to pay the fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution based on a certification issued by Araceli C. Bayuga, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office. The said certification reads:
This is to certify that as per records of the Cashier Division, there is no record of payment made by one ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as payment for COURT FINE imposed in the resolution dated 29 Sept. 2009 Re: Adm. Case No. 5834.[10]

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent unfit to continue as a member of the bar. As an officer of the court, it is a lawyers duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. The highest form of respect for judicial authority is shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.[11] Here, respondents conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Courts orders. She willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from her despite receipt of two Resolutions from this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000.00 fine imposed in the September 29, 2009 Resolution. We have held that failure to comply with Court directives constitutes gross misconduct, insubordination or disrespect which merits a lawyers suspension or even disbarment.[12] Sebastian v. Bajar[13] teaches

Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.[14]

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from office as an attorney for gross misconduct and/or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)

In repeatedly disobeying this Courts orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment. WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE is hereby DISBARRED for gross misconduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior court. Her name is ORDERED STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record with the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

EN BANC

CONRADO QUE, Complainant,

A.C. No. 7054 PUNO, C J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009

- versus -

ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. Respondent.

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
PER CURIAM: In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar

Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: (1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case; (2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case; (3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood.[4] (4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased; (6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so. Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him. The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint. In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were the defendants. With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients. On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were

based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in open court. The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case.[6] The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him. Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC. The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan[8](Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.[9]

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his clients.[10] On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping.[11] On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. [12] On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic. The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of

law for two (2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to one (1) year.[14] The Issue The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry. The Courts Ruling Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[16] Abuse of court procedures and processes

The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients: First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily

demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]

Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion to dismiss filed.[18] Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the petition.[19] Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the property is a part of forest land. Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful detainer case. Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure;[22] and add to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[23] While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final. Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the courts The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts. First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact, have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) [24]

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below. Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit. Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD.[27][Underscoring and emphasis theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss. [28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party.[29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true. how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]

The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30] For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice,[32] and that he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work.[33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to his clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35] In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth and honor.[36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits. Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party. We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself. Unauthorized appearances We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.[38] In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he was previously associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented. In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.

In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.[40] The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41] The Respondents Defenses We find no merit in the respondents defenses. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious."[42] Bad faith, on the other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry. In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith. We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients. On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first

disbarment case.[44] As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.[45]

We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent. The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one

of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. x x x

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years. Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate. Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional

falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finisto the respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the interest of justice. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should beDISBARRED from the practice of law. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, Jr., NACHURA, DE CASTRO, BRION, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: February 23, 2009

ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.

x----------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Any departure from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority for there is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law.[1]

Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks without her authority and using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits against her. Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount ofP20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks, with numbers 47253, 47256 to 47266, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the

total sum of P12,910.00.[2] Claiming that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 toOctober 15, 1999,[3] thereby paying respondent the total sum of P35,690.00.[4] Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than P6,000.00, such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans.[5] In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason account closed; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.[6] The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines[7] (IBP), and the parties were required to file their position papers.[8] In her Position Paper, complainant, apart from reiterating her earlier claims, alleged that respondent, after the hearing on the disbarment case before the IBP on September 5,

2001, again filled up three of her blank checks, Check Nos. 47263, 47264 and 47265, totaling P100,000.00, to serve as basis for another criminal complaint, since the earlier estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case filed by respondent against her before the Office of the Prosecutor of Pasig City was dismissed on August 14, 2000.[9] Respondent insisted in his Position Paper, however, that complainant borrowed P100,000.00 in exchange for two postdated checks, and that since he had known complainant for quite some time, he accepted said checks on complainant's assurance that they were good as cash.[10] Investigating Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes submitted his Report dated September 6, 2002, finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.[11] The Report was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution dated October 19, 2002.[12] Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied, however, by the IBP Board of Governors on January 25, 2003 on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction on the matter, as the same was already endorsed to the Supreme Court.[13] On June 9, 2003 this Court's Second Division issued a Resolution remanding the case to the IBP for the conduct of formal investigation, as the Report of Commissioner Reyes was based merely on the pleadings submitted.[14] After hearings were conducted,[15] Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report dated December 5, 2006 finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended respondent's suspension for three years.[16] Commissioner Funa held that while it was difficult at first to determine who between complainant and respondent was telling the truth, in the end, respondent himself, with his own contradicting allegations, showed that complainant's version should be given more credence.[17] Commissioner Funa noted that although complainant's total obligation to respondent was only P24,000.00, since the loan obtained by complainant on October 13, 1998 wasP20,000.00 at 20% interest payable in six months, by April 13, 1999, however, complainant had actually paid respondent the total amount of P30,240.00. Thus, even though the payment was irregularly given, respondent actually earned more than the agreed upon 20% interest. Moreover, the amounts of P50,000.00 as well as the name of the payee in the subject checks were all typewritten[18]

Commissioner Funa also gave credence to complainant's claim that it was respondent's modus operandi to demand a certain amount as settlement for the dropping of estafa complaints against his borrowers. As Commissioner Funa explains:
[A] complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 was filed against [complainant] before the Prosecutor's Office in Pasig City on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the Prosecutor's Office dismissed the complaint. On October 2, 2000, Complainant filed this disbarment case. About one year later, or on September 5, 2001, Complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter demanding payment once again for another P100,000.00 corresponding to another three checks, Check Nos. 0047263, 0047264 and 0047265. Furthermore, Respondent filed another criminal complaint for estafa/violation of BP 22 dated October 17, 2001, this time before the QC Prosecutor's Office. The prosecutor's office recommended the filing of the criminal case for one of the checks. xxxx Respondent's version, on the other hand, is that Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262 were given to him for loans (rediscounting) contacted on November 15, 1999 and not for a loan contracted onOctober 13, 1998. x x x He claims that the October 13, 1998 transaction is an earlier and different transaction. x x x On the very next day, or on November 16, 1999, Complainant again allegedly contracted another loan for another P100,000.00 for which Complainant allegedly issued the following Postal Bank checks [Check No. 0047263 dated May 16, 2001 for P20,000.00; Check No. 0047264 dated May 30, 2001 for P30,000.00 and Check No. 0047265 dated June 15, 2001 for P50,000.00]. xxxx Oddly though, Respondent never narrated that Complainant obtained a second loan on November 16, 1999 in his Answer [dated January 18, 2000] and in his Position Paper [dated October 8, 2001]. He did not even discuss it in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, although he attached the Resolution of the QC Prosecutor's Office. Clearly, the November 16, 1999transaction was a mere concoction that did not actually occur. It was a mere afterthought. Respondent once again filled-up three of the other checks in his possession (checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001) so that he can again file another estafa/BP 22 case against Complainant (October 17, 2001) AFTER the earlier complaint he had filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office had been dismissed (August 14, 2000) and AFTER herein Complainant had filed this disbarment case (October 2, 2000). More telling, and this is where Respondent gets caught, are the circumstances attending this second loan of November 16, 1999. In addition to not mentioning it at all in his Answer, his Position Paper, and his Motion for Reconsideration, which makes it very strange, is that fact that he alleges that the loan was contracted on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant supposedly issued checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June

15, 2001. Note that May 16, 2001 is eighteen (18 months), or 1 year and 6 months, from November 16, 1999. This is strangely a long period for loans of this nature. This loan was supposedly not made in writing, only verbally. With no collaterals and no guarantors. Clearly, this is a non-existent transaction. It was merely concocted by Respondent. More importantly, and this is where Respondent commits his fatal blunder thus exposing his illegal machinations, Complainant allegedly received P100,000.00 in cash on November 16, 1999 for which Complainant gave Respondent, in return, checks also amounting to P100,000.00. The checks were supposedly dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 x x x. Now then, would not Respondent suffer a financial loss if he gave away P100,000.00 on November 16, 1999 and then also receive P100,000.00 on May 16, 2001 or 1 year and 6 months later? A person engaged in lending business would want to earn interest. The same also with a person re-discounting checks. In this instance, in his haste to concoct a story, Respondent forgot to factor in the interest. At 20% interest, assuming that it is per annum, for 1 years, Respondent should have collected from Complainant at least P130,000.00. And yet the checks he filled up totaled onlyP100,000.00. The same is true in re-discounting a check. If Complainant gave Respondent P100,000.00 in checks, Respondent should be giving Complainant an amount less than P100,000.00. This exposes his story as a fabrication. The same observations can be made of the first loan of P100,000.00 secured by Check Nos. 0047261 and 0047262. More strangely, during the course of the entire investigation, Respondent never touched on what transpired on the dates of November 15 and 16, 1999. Consider that Complainant's position is that no such transaction took place on November 15 and 16. And yet, Respondent never made any effort to establish that Complainant borrowed P100,000.00 on November 15 and then another P100,000.00 again on November 16. Respondent merely focused on establishing that Complainant's checks bounced --- a fact already admitted several times by the Complainant --- and the reasons for which were already explained by Complainant. This only shows the lack of candor of Respondent.[19] xxxx We take note further that Complainant is a mere mail sorter earning less than P6,000.00 per month. Who would lend P200,000.00 to an employee earning such a salary, nowadays, and not even secure such a loan with a written document or a collateral? It defies realities of finance, economy and business. It even defies common sense.[20]

Commissioner Funa also took note that the instant case had practically the same set of facts as in Olbes v. Deciembre[21] and Acosta v. Deciembre.[22] In Olbes, complainants

therein, who were also postal employees, averred that respondent without authority filled up a total of four checks to represent a total of P200,000.00. In Acosta, the complainant therein, another postal employee, averred that respondent filled up two blank checks for a total of P100,000.00. Acosta, however, was dismissed by Commissioner Lydia Navarro on the ground that it did not involve any lawyer-client relationship, which ground, Commissioner Funa believes, is erroneous.[23] On May 31, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution adopting and approving Commissoner Funa's Report, but modifying the penalty, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2007-219 Adm. Case No. 5338 Eugenia Mendoza vs. Atty. Victor V. Deciembre RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's gross misconduct and for practically found guilty of committing the same set of facts alleged in AC 5365, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELYfrom the practice of law to be served successively after the lifting of Respondent's Indefinite Suspension.[24]

Although no motion for reconsideration was filed before the IBP Board of Governors, nor a petition for review before this Court as reported by IBP and Office of the Bar Confidant, the Court considers the IBP Resolution merely recommendatory and therefore would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. The IBP elevated to this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in order. The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[25] A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar.[26] They must conduct themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times.[27]

The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability. A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public.[28] Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[29] In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxxx CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. xxxx Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed to mention in his Comment dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, 2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It is also questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e.November 16, 1999, were made without any interest. The same is true with the checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of P100,000.00, which were supposed to secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these circumstances and the sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against complainant, and complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more

believable is complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal cases in order to harass complainant. The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001[30] had its dates, amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan, were all filled up in her handwriting.[31] It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent committed his wrongful acts. In Olbes,[32] complainants therein contracted a loan from respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1, 1999, for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and his misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome.[33] In Acosta,[34] complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed P20,000.00 from respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had already paid the total amount of P33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to comply therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total amount ofP100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction did not involve any lawyer-client relationship.[35] As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client relationship. As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal profession. While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired,[36] the seriousness of respondent's

offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hestitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[37] This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney.[38] As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order. WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila

EN BANC

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,

A.C. No. 6593 Present: PUNO, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, and MENDOZA, JJ. Promulgated:

versus

ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.

______________ x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
PER CURIAM: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido; 3. x x x x 4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively xx x 5. x x x x 6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime on 1978. 7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x 8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial constraints. x x x x That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia.

He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years. Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer. In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action against her. In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline: First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit. Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was already a

widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9] Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.[11] On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007. Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules. Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation. In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh

considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido. THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia. General Considerations Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court. As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a

subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19] Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law. In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido). Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed undersuch scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22] In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent. In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar. Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree. First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive. Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship. Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.

Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage. Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter. Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid. Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place. Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years. Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him. By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession. He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was

subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships. The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34] Atty. Valencia We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his

marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of the Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the other. Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the l atters family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six

children for a third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law. We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief. The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values. Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession. Conclusion Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason. In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42] We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character. In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to: (1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and (2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC OLGA M. SAMSON, Complainant, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

- versus -

BRION, PERALTA and BERSAMIN, JJ. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO, Respondent. Promulgated: August 5, 2009 x----------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION Per Curiam:

This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. In her complaint,[1] complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence[2], and for violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.[3] According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003. At that time a public prosecutor, respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties[4] and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.

On March 24, 2004, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges.[5] It also denied the complainants motion for reconsideration.[6] Thereafter, the complainant filed a petition for review[7] on October 28, 2004 in the Court of Appeals (CA). In a decision[8] dated November 25, 2005, the appellate court held that it could not take cognizance of the criminal charges against respondent on the ground that all appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman pertaining to criminal cases should be taken to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for certiorari.[9] As to the administrative aspect, the CA reversed and set aside the decision and joint order of the Ombudsman dismissing the charges against respondent. The CA then directed Ombudsman to file and prosecute the administrative charges against respondent. While the complainants petition was pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several times in the JBC from February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On August 25, 2005, he was appointed to the RTC, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija. The complainant charged that respondent never informed the JBC of his pending cases. This, she said, made it possible for him to be nominated and, subsequently, appointed. In his comment,[10] respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005. Accordingly, there was no impediment to his nomination to and assumption of the position of judge. However, he insisted that he informed the JBC of the said cases. The complainant filed a reply,[11] stating that the March 24, 2004 decision of the Ombudsman was not yet final and executory as it was timely appealed by way of a petition for review filed on October 28, 2004 in the CA. In fact, the petition was even granted. To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OASOCA) RTC Personnel Division.[12] According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction.

On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondents dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service. We agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. We have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete evidence.[13] Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses. However, respondent is not to be exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating No to the question Have you ever been formally charged? in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.[14] Respondents act of making an obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered No to that very simple question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question Have you ever been formally charged?, meaning, charged at anytime in the past or present. In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,[15] we held that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service. Respondent, a judge, knows (or should have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could subject him to dismissal. This Court

will not allow him to evade the consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable. There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a member of the judiciary. Time and again, we have emphasized that a judge should conduct himself in a manner which merits the respect and confidence of the people at all times, for he is the visible representation of the law.[16] Regrettably, we are convinced of respondents capacity to lie and evade the truth. His dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary. He does not even seem remorseful for what he did as he sees nothing wrong with it. He deserves the harsh penalty of dismissal from the service. This administrative case against respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.[17] This resolution, entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court were treated separately.[18] However, pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[19] This must be so as violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):[20]
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act. CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer.[21] In this particular case, respondents dishonest act was against the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondents misconduct likewise constituted a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended or disbarred. Thus:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court did not hesitate to apply the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a plethora of cases.[22] Of particular importance to this case is our decision in Caada v. Suerte[23] where we applied the rule to its fullest extent: automatic disbarment. In Caada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty, harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged, among others, that respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and Daewoo car to complainant. The latter refused. Their friendship later on turned sour when they failed to reach an agreement on the commission respondent was supposed to receive as agent-broker for the contemplated sale of complainants beach lot. The complainant voiced out his fear that respondent would use his judicial power to persecute him for what respondent may have perceived as complainants infractions against him. In his comment, respondent denied offering to sell the vehicles to complainant since, according to him, he never owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo car in 1998. However, a perusal of respondents Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1998-2001 revealed that among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200 double cab acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of dishonesty for having falsely denied that he ever owned the aforementioned vehicles. For his infraction, respondent judge was fined in the amount of P40,000. He would have been dismissed from the service were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed therefrom because of an earlier case.[24]

Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, we deemed respondent Judge Suertes administrative case as disciplinary proceedings for disbarment as well, and proceeded to strip him of his membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned as a lawyer separately from the order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable as a member of the bench.[25] In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable meaning of automatic conversion of administrative cases against justices and judges[26] to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench[27] also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or second-level court.[28] It cannot be denied that respondents dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.[29] If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[30] A parting word. The first step towards the successful implementation o f the Courts relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and

personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is and should be higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Cabanatuan City, GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of an official document. He is ordered DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Respondent is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKENfrom the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this resolution be entered into respondents records in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. SO ORDERED.